MORAL SENSE AND THE ONTOLOGY OF VALUE Robert Samuel Henderson A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto @ 1998 by Robert Samuel Henderson National library Biblioth&que nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services sewices bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K1AW Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde une licence Eon exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pennettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, districbute or sell reproduire, preter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la fome de microfiche/fh, de reproduction sur papier ou sur fonnat electronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thkse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de de-ci ne doivent titre imprimes reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Moral Sense and the Ontology of Value by Robert Samuel Henderson Ph-D., 1998 Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto The thesis examines the ontology of value in the ethical theories of Shaftesbury. Hutcheson and Hume. These three philosophers jointly constitute the 'moral sense school' in eighteenth century British philosophy. Ethical objectivism and ethical subjectivismt as I will use these terms, are contrasting claims about the nature of value. 'Ethical objectivism' refers roughly to any theory according to which moral values are or are logically entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons considering the character and actions of people, and of places and times. 'Ethical subjectivism' refers to any theory which claims that moral values are at least partly constituted by the responses of persons considering character and actions, or dependent on places and times. The thesis shows an interesting movement in moral ontology away from the objectivism of Shaftesbury to the subjectivist theory of Hume which effectively highlights some of the interesting differences between the three theories. The thesis is of historical interest since the demonstration of differences in moral ontology makes it less attractive to regard the three theories as a family. ACKNOWLED~S I wish to thank a number of people- Professor William Blissett of the university of Toronto read drafts, challenged choices of expression, made concrete suggestions and provided exactly the right sort of support when it was most needed. Professor Ron Bontekoe of the University of Hawaii, in addition to regular encouragement throughout, gave me a strong, well-timed push for which I will always be grateful. Professor Don Wiebe of Trinity College at the University of Toronto first introduced me to philosophy. Dr. Rob Pierson read drafts, made suggestions and offered encouragement throughout. Professor Plll kdal of Queen's University in Kingston introduced me to David Hume and eighteenth century British philosophy. Pbllls influence in what follows will be evident to those familiar with his contribution to Hume scholarship. My Area Committee included Professors Robert Irnlay, Howard Sobel and Fred Wilson of the University of Toronto, I thank them for their interest. f am especially grateful to Howard Sobel for his critical reflection and willingness to supervise this project to its completion. My family have also been supportive. Specifically, my mother and father helped in every way that they could. My parents-in-law, Betty and the late Bruce Black, supported me as they would one of their own children. Patricia, my wife, has made many sacrifices to help me to finish my work. I dedicate this thesis to her and to our son Bruce. PREFACS This thesis deals extensively with philosophical works by certain eighteenth-century British writers. I have enjoyed reading the original material, not only for its philosophical interest, but also because of the aesthetic qualities of the writing, some of which will be evident in passages I quote in what follows. I have made certain choices about quotations which should be explained. Eighteenth-century printing conventions included capitalization of nouns and extensive use of italics, which are generally removed from modem editions. Modern editions of the principal philosophical works of Shaftesbury and Hume are widely and easily accessible. On the other hand, modem publication of Hutchesonfs works and writings of some of the other authors cited in what follows are often facsimile reproductions. To simplify reading and comparison of these authors, I have taken the liberty of observing modem conventions and removed unnecessary capitals and italics from quotations. I did not feel it was necessary either to change non-standard spellings or to indicate so many instances by the customary IIS~C.~ I have retained "sicw in the many instances in which Hume uses mistaken spellings of other philosophers' names. Finally, in quotes which follow, eighteenth-century non-ultimate esses (the ones that look like effs) have been changed to modern esses. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii PREFACE iii 1: THE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL AND MORAL VALUE 1 2: SHAFTESBURY: ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM AND MORAL SENSE 3: HUTCHESON'S THEORY OF MOW VALUE: THE fNQUfRY 4: HUTCHESON'S THEORY OF MORAL VALUE: THE ESSAY AND ILLUSTRATIONS 5: HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL VALUE 6: TEE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL Appendix - A NOTE ON TEK 'ADVERTISEMENT' OF 1777 BIBLXOGRAPEY VITA THE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL AND MORAL VALUE 1.1 Ontolocw of Value and Moral Sense. Are moral values objective or subjective? Ethical theories are sometimes distinguished by the answer they give to this question. LL. Mackie has contributed one of the best-known recent discussions of the ontology of moral value. His own opinion is clearly indicated in the very first sentence of his book: DThere are no objective values."' This thesis concerns answers given to the above question by one group of early- modern philosophers. In it I explore claims about the ontology of value in what has become known in the history of philosophy as the 'moral sense school' of ethics. Anthony Ashley Cooper (the third Earl of Shaftesbury), Francis Hutcheson and David Hume jointly constitute the moral sense school. There are definite lines of influence running from Shaftesbury to Hutcheson through to Hume which have made it convenient for historians of philosophy to group them together. The main question of the thesis will be to determine whether this so-called school shares an ontology of moral value. 1.2 Objectivism and Subiectivism. This thesis concerns the nature of moral value in moral sense theory. Specifically, in senses shortly to be explained, are moral values J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventins Risht and Wronq, 15. 2 objective or subjective? The thesis will determine what each philosopher means by "moral sensen, "sense of right and wrongn or "moral sentimentw. It will address whether and in what way the moral faculty is intended to be analogous to physical sense, or conscience, or whatever. Although it will face questions of moral epistemology, language and psychology, its central concern is the ontology of moral value. For these philosophers, what is a moral fact? Here are some examples of moral sentences: "Honesty is a virtue," "Friendship in the midst of adversity is good," and "Lying is wrong.11 Virtue, vice, rightness, wrongness, goodness, evil, duty and obligation express, grammatically speaking, predicates in moral sentences and are examples of what I refer to as moral values. Whatever else they are, affirmations of moral values are action- guiding or prescriptive; they tell people what to do or be. Are moral values, such as goodness or obligation, matters of objective fact about persons or actions or are they matters of the way persons respond to people or actions? 'Ethical objectivismr and ,ethical subjectivism', in this thesis, refer to contrasting ontologies of moral value. Roughly, a theory is objectivist if it claims that moral values do not depend on people's attitudes, beliefs, conventions or places and times. Ethical subjectivism, again roughly, is partly a denial that there are moral values of the sort claimed by objectivism and partly an attempt to explain moral values some other way. As a correlate to objectivism the term is handy but not entirely satisfactory. Subjectivism refers most obviously to the experience of individuals but I will take it more broadly to include theories according to which moral values depend not only on people's attitudes or beliefs but also on conventions, places or times. The issue of objectivism is important. As Mackie put it, "the main tradition of European philosophy" and ordinary moral language "includes the contrary claim, that there are objective values of just the sortw that a minority dissenting tradition represented by Mackie denies .2 Ethical objectivism, somewhat less roughly and more specifically, refers to any theory according to which moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons making moral judgments about characters or actions, and of places and times. On an objectivist theory, moral values are action-guiding or prescriptive things which are or are logically entailed by properties or qualities of persons or actions which do not depend on the experiences, attitudes, feelings or desires of the person making the moral judgment. The truth of what is asserted in a moral sentence is independent of the person who uses the sentence, and the time and place at which it is spoken. According to an 2 Ibid. 30 4 objectivist interpretation, the sentence "Honesty is a virtuem, if true, is true, everywhere and always.