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The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 7Th irmly established as the standard text for undergraduate courses in ethics, Rachels FJames Rachels and Stuart Rachels’ Te Elements of Moral Philosophy introduces readers to major moral concepts and theories through eloquent explanations and compelling, thought-provoking discussions. New in the Seventh Edition: | Rachels • More detail to the claim that our concept of death has changed over the last fifty years in Chapter 1 • Broadened dialogue on monogamy in Chapter 2 • Expanded discussion of homosexuality in Chapter 3 • Updated account of Classical Utilitarianism that explains what “equal consideration” is at the beginning of Chapter 8 • Explanation for why the debate between Retributivists and Utilitarians The may hinge on the debate over free will in Chapter 10 Elements • Completely revised subsection on honesty in Chapter 12 Please visit www.mhhe.com/RachelsEMP for more information on the seventh edition. Te Elements of Moral Philosophy can be complemented by James Rachels of Moral Philosophy and Stuart Rachels’ successful companion reader, Te Right Ting to Do, Sixth Edition (0-07-803823-5). ••• MD DALIM #1170980 11/9/11 On the Cover: Aleksandr Rodchenko Non-Objective Painting no. 80 (Black on Black). 1918. The Elements of Seventh Edition Moral Philosophy ••• CYAN James Rachels MAG Seventh Edition by YELO Stuart Rachels BLK Confirming Pages T he Elements of Moral Philosophy SEVENTH EDITION James Rachels Editions 5–7 by Stuart Rachels rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd i 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SEVENTH EDITION Published by McGraw-Hill, a business unit of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020. Copyright © 2012 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Previous editions © 2010, 2007, and 2003. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., including, but not limited to, in any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning. Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers outside the United States. This book is printed on acid-free paper. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 DOC/ DOC 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ISBN 978-0-07-803824-2 MHID 0-07-803824-3 Vice President & Editor-in-Chief: Michael Ryan Vice President & Director of Specialized Publishing: Janice M. Roerig-Blong Sponsoring Editor: Jessica Cannavo Marketing Coordinator: Angela R. FitzPatrick Project Manager: Jolynn Kilburg Design Coordinator: Margarite Reynolds Buyer: Louis Swaim Media Project Manager: Sridevi Palani Compositor: Laserwords Private Limited Typeface: 11/12 New Baskerville Printer: R. R. Donnelley Cover painting: Aleksandr Rodchenko. (Russian, 1891–1956). Non-Objective Painting no. 80 (Black on Black). 1918. Oil on canvas, 32 1/4 3 31 1/4” (81.9 3 79.4 cm). Gift of the artist, through Jay Leyda. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Digital Image © 2006 The Museum of Modern Art/Licensed by Scala/Art Resource, NY. © Alexander Rodchenko/RAO, Moscow/ VAGA, New York All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of the copyright page. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rachels, Stuart, 1969– The elements of moral philosophy/James Rachels.—7th ed. by Stuart Rachels. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-07-803824-2 (alk. paper) 1. Ethics—Textbooks. I. Rachels, James, 1941–2003. Elements of moral philosophy. II. Title. BJ1012.R29 2013 170—dc23 2011042104 www.mhhe.com rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd ii 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages About the Authors James Rachels (1941–2003) wrote The End of Life: Euthanasia and Morality (1986), Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (1990), Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (1997), Problems from Philosophy (first edi- tion, 2005), and The Legacy of Socrates: Essays in Moral Philosophy (2007). His website is www.jamesrachels.org. Stuart Rachels is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama. He has revised several of James Rachels’ books, including Problems from Philosophy (third edition, 2012) and The Right Thing to Do (sixth edition, 2012), which is the com- panion anthology to this book. Stuart won the United States Chess Championship in 1989, at the age of 20, and today he is a Bronze Life Master at bridge. His website is www.jamesrachels. org/stuart. iii rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd iii 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd iv 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages Contents Preface ix About the Seventh Edition xi 1. WHAT IS MORALITY? 1 1.1. The Problem of Definition 1 1.2. First Example: Baby Theresa 1 1.3. Second Example: Jodie and Mary 5 1.4. Third Example: Tracy Latimer 7 1.5. Reason and Impartiality 10 1.6. The Minimum Conception of Morality 13 2. THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 14 2.1. Different Cultures Have Different Moral Codes 14 2.2. Cultural Relativism 16 2.3. The Cultural Differences Argument 17 2.4. What Follows from Cultural Relativism 19 2.5. Why There Is Less Disagreement Than It Seems 21 2.6. Some Values Are Shared by All Cultures 23 2.7. Judging a Cultural Practice to Be Undesirable 24 2.8. Back to the Five Claims 26 2.9. What We Can Learn from Cultural Relativism 29 v rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd v 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages vi CONTENTS 3. SUBJECTIVISM IN ETHICS 32 3.1. The Basic Idea of Ethical Subjectivism 32 3.2. The Evolution of the Theory 33 3.3. The First Stage: Simple Subjectivism 34 3.4. The Second Stage: Emotivism 36 3.5. The Role of Reason in Ethics 39 3.6. Are There Proofs in Ethics? 41 3.7. The Question of Homosexuality 44 4. DOES MORALITY DEPEND ON RELIGION? 49 4.1. The Presumed Connection between Morality and Religion 49 4.2. The Divine Command Theory 51 4.3. The Theory of Natural Law 54 4.4. Religion and Particular Moral Issues 58 5. ETHICAL EGOISM 64 5.1. Is There a Duty to Help the Starving? 64 5.2. Psychological Egoism 65 5.3. Three Arguments for Ethical Egoism 71 5.4. Three Arguments against Ethical Egoism 76 6. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 82 6.1. Hobbes’s Argument 82 6.2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 85 6.3. Some Advantages of the Social Contract Theory 89 6.4. The Problem of Civil Disobedience 91 6.5. Difficulties for the Theory 94 7. THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH 98 7.1. The Revolution in Ethics 98 7.2. First Example: Euthanasia 99 7.3. Second Example: Marijuana 102 7.4. Third Example: Nonhuman Animals 105 rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd vi 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages CONTENTS vii 8. THE DEBATE OVER UTILITARIANISM 110 8.1. The Classical Version of the Theory 110 8.2. Is Pleasure All That Matters? 111 8.3. Are Consequences All That Matter? 112 8.4. Should We Be Equally Concerned for Everyone? 116 8.5. The Defense of Utilitarianism 117 8.6. Concluding Thoughts 123 9. A RE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 125 9.1. Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe 125 9.2. The Categorical Imperative 128 9.3. Kant’s Arguments on Lying 130 9.4. Conflicts between Rules 132 9.5. Kant’s Insight 133 10. KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 136 10.1. Kant’s Core Ideas 136 10.2. Retribution and Utility in the Theory of Punishment 139 10.3. Kant’s Retributivism 141 11. FEMINISM AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 146 11.1. Do Women and Men Think Differently about Ethics? 146 11.2. Implications for Moral Judgment 152 11.3. Implications for Ethical Theory 155 12. VIRTUE ETHICS 157 12.1. The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Right Action 157 12.2. The Virtues 159 12.3. Two Advantages of Virtue Ethics 167 12.4. Virtue and Conduct 169 12.5. The Problem of Incompleteness 170 12.6. Conclusion 171 rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd vii 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages viii CONTENTS 13. WHAT WOULD A SATISFACTORY MORAL THEORY BE LIKE? 173 13.1. Morality without Hubris 173 13.2. Treating People as They Deserve 175 13.3. A Variety of Motives 176 13.4. Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism 177 13.5. The Moral Community 180 13.6. Justice and Fairness 181 13.7. Conclusion 183 Notes on Sources 184 Index 195 rac38243_fm_i-xii.indd viii 10/27/11 7:07 PM Confirming Pages P reface Socrates, one of the first and best moral philosophers, said that morality is about “no small matter, but how we ought to live.” This book is an introduction to moral philosophy, conceived in that broad sense. In writing this book, I have been guided by the following thought: Suppose that someone has never studied ethics but wants to do so now. What are the first things he or she should learn? This book is my answer to that question. I do not try to cover every topic in the field, nor is my coverage of any par- ticular topic complete. Instead, I try to discuss the ideas that a newcomer should encounter first. The chapters have been written so that they may be read independently of one another—they are, in effect, separate essays. Thus someone who is interested in Ethical Egoism could go straight to Chapter 5 and find a self-contained introduction to that theory.
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