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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research International Phenomenological Society Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. Articles Robert G. Burton. “The Human Awareness of Time: An Analysis”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 303-318. Robert Hollinger. “Aspects of the Theory of Classification”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 319-338. Steven S. Osheroff. “Wittgenstein: Psychological Disputes and Common Moves”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 339-363. M. Glouberman. “Doctrine and Method in the Philosophy of P. F. Strawson”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 364-383. Discussions James F. Harris. “A New Lok at Austin’s Linguistic Phenomenology”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 384-390. Stuart E. Rosenbaum. “Denotation and Eliminative Materialism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 391-397. Rew A. Godow, Jr. and Edward R. Wierenga. “Eliminative Materialism and Denotation: A Reply to Rosenbaum”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 398-402. Harvey Mullane. “Unconscious and Disguised Emotions”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 403-411. Michael Fox. “Unconscious Emotions: A Reply to Professor Mullane”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 412-414. Charles B. Fethe. “Miracles and Action Explanations”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 415-422. Neil Gallagher. A Plea to Stop Dreaming about Dreaming”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 3. March 1976. PP 423. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research International Phenomenological Society Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. Articles Lynne Belaief. “Self-Esteem and Human Equality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 25. Myles Brand. “On Philosophical Definitions”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 151. Robert G. Burton. “The Human Awareness of Time. An Analysis”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 303. Clark Butler. “Hegel and Freud: A Comparison”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 506. Michael Corrado. “On Believing Inscriptions to be True”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 59. Peter A. Facione. “Counterexamples and Where They Lead”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 523. J. G. Fauvel. “Towards a Phenomenological Mathematics”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 16. John Fisher. “Fallibility and Knowledge of the Future”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 44. Alan E. Fuchs. “The Production of Pleasure by Stimulation of the Brain: An Alleged Conflict between Science and Philosophy”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 494. M. Glouberman. “Doctrine and Method in the Philosophy of P. F. Strawson”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 364. Jacob Golom. “Psychology from the Phenomenological Standpoint of Husserl”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 451. Robert Hollinger. “Aspects of the Theory of Classification”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 319. C. A. Hooker. “The Information-Processing Approach to the Brain-Mind and its Philosophical Ramification”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 1. Peter Kivy. “What Makes Aesthetic Terms Aesthetic?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 197. Steven S. Osheroff. “Wittgenstein: Psychological Disputes and Common Moves”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 339. Nancy B. Sederberg. “Transmitting the Nontransmissible: The Function of Literature in the Pursuit of Social Knowledge”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 173. Francis F. Seeburger. “Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reduction”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 212. Robert C. Solomon. “Psychological Predicates”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 472. Paul Tibbetts. “Peirce and Mead on Perceptual Immediacy and Human Action”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 222. Carl Wellman. “The Justification of Practical Reason”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 531. Kenneth S. Witkowski. “The ‘Is-Ought Gap: Deduction or Justification?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 233. Discussions S. R. Bhatt. “The Concept of Moksa-An Analysis”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 564. Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti. “Some Comparisons between Frege’s Logic and Navya-Nyaya Logic”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 554. Craig A. Conly. “The Basis of Time”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 82. Frank K. Fair. “Two Problems with Roderick Chisholm’s Percerving”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 547. Charles B. Fethe. “Miracles and Action Explanations”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 415. Michael Fox. “Unconscious Emotions: A Reply to Professor Mullane”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 412. Neil Gallagher. “A Plea to Stop Dreaming about Dreaming”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 423. Rew A. Godow. “Eliminative Materialism and Denotation: A Reply to Rosenbaum”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 398. James F. Harris. “A New Look at Austin’s Linguistic Phenomenology”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 384. Richard W. Momeyer. “Is Pleasure a Sensation?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 113. Harold Morick. “Extensionalizing the Nonpsychological”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 551. Harvey Mullane. “Unconscious and Disguised Emotions”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 403. Howard L. Parsons. “The Philosopher and Mankind’s Struggle for Value”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 246. Douglas Rabb. “Prolegomenon to a Phenomenology of Imagination”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 74. Robert Redmon. “A Note on Nominalism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 122. Holmes Rolston. “Schlick’s Responsible Man”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 261. Stuart E. Rosenbaum. “Denotation and Eliminative Materialism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 391. George Sher. “Sentences in the Brains?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 94. Marcus G. Singer. “Logic, Facts, and Events”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 253. Frank Snare. “John Rawls and the Method of Ethics”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 100. Edward R. Wierenga. “Eliminative Materialism and Denotation: A Reply to Rosenbaum”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 398. James F. Zartman. “Hume and The Meaning of a World”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 36. No. 4. June 1976. PP 255. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research International Phenomenological Society Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. Articles Bernard Peach. “The Ethcis of C. A. Baylis”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 1-24. Valerii Kuvakin. “The Phenomenon of Partiinost: Structure, Dynamics, and Dialectics: An Exposition”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 25-45. Donald Nute. “Identification as Accomplishment”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 46-69. M. M. Van de Pitte. “Husserl: the Idealist malgré lui”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 70-78. John T. Kearns. “Denoting and Referring, Some Steps Toward a New Paradigm”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 79- 100. Discussions Allen Buchanan. “Basic Knowledge”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 101-108. A. C. Genova. “Linsky on Quine’s Way Out”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 109-115. T. M. Benditt. “Benefit and Harm”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 116-120. R. L. Simpson. “Nielsen on Ethical Subjectivism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 121-122. Kai Nielsen. “Ethical Subjectivism Again”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Volume 37. No. 1. September 1976. PP 123. Philosophy and Phenomenological
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