Remedying Some Defects in the History of Analyticity John Michael Carpenter

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Remedying Some Defects in the History of Analyticity John Michael Carpenter Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2012 Remedying Some Defects in the History of Analyticity John Michael Carpenter Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES REMEDYING SOME DEFECTS IN THE HISTORY OF ANALYTICITY By JOHN MICHAEL CARPENTER A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2012 Copyright © 2012 John Carpenter All Rights Reserved John Carpenter defended this dissertation on October 31, 2012. The members of the supervisory committee were: Russell Dancy Professor Directing Dissertation Michael Kaschak University Representative Michael Bishop Committee Member J. Piers Rawling Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am delighted to have this opportunity to thank my committee members— Dr. Michael Bishop, Dr. Russell Dancy, Dr. Michael Kaschak, and Dr. J. Piers Rawling—not just for their support and attention directly related to this dissertation, but also for what I have learned from each throughout the years of taking their seminars and enjoying their company. Dr. Dancy, my supervisor, deserves special mention as one who was always willing to share his encyclopedic knowledge of philosophy, and who bore our philosophical disagreements with equanimity. I have benefitted from discussions with, and advice from Dr. Joshua Gert, John K. Harvey, Dr. James Justus, Dr. Tina Talsma, and an anonymous referee for the 15th Annual Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference. (Of course, neither the committee members, nor any of the other individuals mentioned should be assumed to be committed to, or thought responsible for, any claims or errors that this dissertation may contain.) On a more general note, I am grateful to the departments of philosophy at The Florida State University and The University of Wisconsin-Madison for providing me with opportunities to gain proficiency in the discipline. I have appreciated the encouragement of my family, not just during my graduate work, but throughout the years, so it is gratifying to be able to here say “thank you” to my mother, father, brother, and two sisters. I am fortunate to have crossed paths with many thoughtful and interesting people in Tallahassee, but I am glad to single out Philip Griffith and Becka LaPlant as people whom I consider friends and colleagues. Finally, my life changed for the better, and continues to do so, ever since the February 22nd, 2008 colloquium reception at the Society for Women’s Advancement in Philosophy conference, when I met Lacey Anderson. During the time of writing this dissertation, we became engaged, and I am sure its completion will mark the next happy phase in our lives together! iii TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... v Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... vi 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Prima facie Constraints on any Conception of Analyticity ............................................. 1 1.2. A Brief Apology for Analyticity ...................................................................................... 6 2. Descartes and Analyticity ........................................................................................................... 8 2.1. Erde’s Interpretation ......................................................................................................... 9 2.2. Katz’ Interpretation ........................................................................................................ 13 2.3. “Cogito,” “Negitas,” and Skepticism ............................................................................. 28 2.4. Díaz’ Interpretation ........................................................................................................ 33 3. Frege’s Conception of Analyticity ............................................................................................ 45 3.1. Kant’s Theory of Knowledge and Frege’s Interpretation .............................................. 46 3.2. Definitions and Ordinary Language ............................................................................... 51 3.3. Frege Contra(sted with) Wittgenstein ............................................................................ 55 3.4. Stipulation and Scientific Purposes ................................................................................ 60 3.5. Carrying the Project Out ................................................................................................ 66 4. Carnap and Quine Throw Light on the Interesting Word “Analytic” ....................................... 68 4.1. Historical Background on Carnap .................................................................................. 68 4.2. Carnap’s Initial Diagnosis of Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy ..................................... 71 4.3. Carnap’s Initial Remedy for Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy: Logical Syntax ............ 74 4.4. Carnap’s Cure for Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy: Logical Semantics ....................... 78 4.5. Quine on Why Ontology is Relevant to Analyticity ...................................................... 84 4.6. Quine’s Call for Explanation ......................................................................................... 86 4.7. Quine’s Call for Explication .......................................................................................... 93 4.8. Quine Sufficiently Clarifies his Views on Analyticity................................................. 102 4.9. Misunderstandings, Problems, and Prospects .............................................................. 107 5. Williamson’s New Threat to Analyticity ................................................................................ 111 5.1. The Traditional Disquotationalist’s Dilemma .............................................................. 112 5.2. The New Disquotationalist’s Disambiguation ............................................................. 116 5.3. The Nature of Nominal Definitions ............................................................................. 119 5.4. Justifying Disquotational Principles............................................................................. 124 5.5. Compositional Semantics at the Characteristic and Particular Levels ......................... 127 5.6. Why Think “True” is Two (Senses)? ........................................................................... 129 6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 132 References ................................................................................................................................... 136 Biographical Sketch .................................................................................................................... 157 iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AT = Adam, C., & Tannery, P. (Eds.). (1964-76). Oeuvres de Descartes (Rev. ed.). Paris: Vrin. c. = “Circa” (Latin), indicating that a date is the best approximation. CE = Common Era. Df. = Is defined as. Esp. = especially. Ff. = “Folio” (Latin), indicating that the pages of the citation following the initial number mentioned are also relevant. Fn. = footnote. Ibid. = “Ibidem” (Latin), indicating that the source of the citation is the same as that of the previous citation. N.B. = “Nota bene” (Latin), indicating that the reader ought to pay careful attention to what is there said, to avoid any misunderstanding. Orig. = Date originally published, indicated by the author, or the best approximate date of initial composition (in an untranslated form). Prop. = Proposition. Sic. = “Sic erat scriptum” (Latin), indicating that some part of a quoted passage is quoted verbatim, in spite of possibly being incorrectly presented in the first place (due to, e.g., a printer’s or translator’s error). v ABSTRACT To a first approximation, analytic truths are those sentences that are true solely based on, or capable of being known by, semantic facts. The bulk of this dissertation is an investigation into how analyticity relates to the philosophical works of Descartes, Frege, Carnap, Quine, and Williamson. I also discuss some prima facie constraints on analyticity, and provide a survey of the relevant literature on the concept. Erde suggests that Descartes took “cogito ergo sum” to be analytically true on the basis of conceptual containment. I argue that Erde’s thesis is false for several reasons, one of which is that if Erde’s interpretation were correct, “cogito ergo sum” would have no more import than “I am walking, therefore I exist,” but clearly Descartes thought that it does. Katz argued that though Descartes had a sense of the fact that “cogito ergo sum” is analytic, since Descartes did not have access to the true linguistic theory in which its justification can be formulated,
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