COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995

58 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

USING KGB DOCUMENTS: negotiations. The famous proposal for end­ superpower intelligence services sponsored THE SCALI·FEKLISOV CHANNEL ing the crisis, which Robert Kennedy later by Crown Publishers, Inc.4 IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS recalled as having made his brother "for the To understand better whatcan be learned first time hopeful that our efforts might pos­ from these documents, it is helpful to revisit by Alexander Fursenko sibly be successful," had not come from him, the standard account of the role of the Scali­ and Timothy Naftali but rather had come out of the blue from Feklisov channel in the resolution of the Scali. Scali, who was also present in Mos­ Cuban Missile Crisis. From the time that former State Depart­ cow, vigorously disputed Feklisov's ac­ According to the traditional version, ment official Roger Hilsman revealed in count.2 Scali received a call at his Washington office 1964 that ABC News television correspon­ Feklisov's surprising assertion3 and from Feklisov on Friday, October 26. Scali dent lohn Scali had served as an intermedi­ Scali's immediate rejection of this revision­ had been meeting off and on with this Soviet ary between the U.S. and Soviet govern­ ist history posed three questions for students Embassy official for over a year. From the ments at the height of the Cuban Missile of the crisis: FBI, which Scali had alerted from the outset Crisis, scholars have had to consider the role a) Did the Soviet government use the about his meetings with Feklisov, the jour­ that Scali and his contact, AleksandrFeklisov KGB to find a way out of the crisis on 26 nalist learned that this man was no ordinary (alias Fomin), played in the resolution ofthe October 1962? diplomat. Aleksandr Feklisov ("Fomin") was conflict. l Until 1989, it was generally as­ b) Did Feklisov act on his own or did the KGB Resident, or chief of station, in sumed that the Kremlin had used Feklisov, Scali suggest a settlement for his own gov­ Washington. On this particular Friday, with a KGB officer based at the Soviet Embassy ernment to consider? the likelihood of US military action against in Washington, to float a trial balloon at the c) What effect, if any, did the Scali­ Cuba seemingly mounting, Feklisov asked most dangerous moment of the Cuban Mis­ Feklisov meetings have on the endgame of for an urgent meeting with Scali. Scali sug­ sile Crisis because meaningful communica­ the Cuban Missile Crisis? gested the Occidental Restaurant near the tion between the two governments had Materials consulted in the archives of Willard Hotel. The lunch was set for 1:30 ground to a halt. the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, the p.m. But at a conference of scholars and new name for the First Chief Directorate of "When Jarrived he was already sitting former officials in Moscow in 1anuary 1989, the KGB), resolve some, though not all, of at the table as usual, facing the door. He Feklisov argued that Western historians had these questions. Documents on the Scali­ seemed tired, haggard and alarmed in con­ gotten his role in the crisis all wrong. The Feklisov meetings have been opened as part trast to the usual calm, low-key appearance Kremlin, he said, had not injected him into of a multi-book project on the history of the continued on page 60 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

KGB DOCUMENTS ships bound for Cuba are not carrying dent remained hopeful that the Kremlin continuedfrom page 58 any armaments. You will declare that would ultimately accept the October 26 pro­ that he presented." Thus Scali described in the United States will not invade Cuba posal as the basis for a resolution of the a 1964 television broadcast how this meet­ with its troops and will not support crisis. Indeed, Kennedy's response to ing opened. Scali said that Feklisov feared any other forces which might intend to Khrushchev offered to accept the implicit that war would begin soon, and was so invade Cuba. Then the necessity for terms ofOctober 26 and ignored the Turkish concerned that he volunteered a way out of the presence of our military special­ issue raised in Khrushchev's letter of the the stalemate.s ists will be obviated. 10 27th. The crisis ended the next morning, He asked, according to Scali's notes, Sunday, October 28, with the Kremlin's what Scali "thought" of a three-point propo­ By itself the Khrushchev letter did not public announcement of a deal-a with­ sition: promise anything except that future Soviet drawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a a) The Soviet missiles bases would be ships would carry non-military cargoes. But U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba-that dismantled under United Nations supervi­ when the letter was coupled with what Scali seemed to incorporate much of what John sion. had relayed from Feklisov, the Kennedy ad­ Scali and Aleksandr Feklisov had discussed. b) Fidel Castro would promise never to ministration believed it had received an ac­ Both men were proud of their accomplish­ accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever. ceptable offer from the Kremlin. Rusk in­ ment. c) In return for the above, the United structed Scali to contact Feklisov to make KGB records suggest that neither the States would pledge not to invade Cuba.6 clear that the U.S. found a basis for agree­ traditional version nor Feklisov' s revision is Feklisov was confident thatifU.S. Am­ ment in his offer. entirely accurate. Feklisov's cables to Mos­ bassador to the United Nations Adlai Sometime between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. cow from October 26 and October 27 and Stevenson "pursued this line," Soviet UN on Friday evening, Scali and Feklisov met at evidence of how the KGB handled them ambassador Valerian Zorin "would be in­ the Statler Hotel, near the Soviet Embassy. In suggest strongly that the Soviet government terested." As if to give some weight to his a very brief meeting Scali conveyed his mes­ did not initiate the proposals that Scali pre­ proposal, Feklisov noted that the Cuban sage: He was authorized by the highest au­ sented to Rusk on the afternoon of October delegate to the UN had already made a thority to say that there were "real possibili­ 26. similar proposal in a session of the Security ties in this [proposal]" and that "the represen­ Feklisov's cables, moreover, paint a Council but that it had been met with si­ tatives of the USSR and the United States in different picture of his relationship with the lence. Feklisov asked that Scali run this New York can work this matter out with [UN Americanjournalist. The KGB Residentcon­ proposal by his contacts at the State Depart­ Secretary General] U Thant and with each sidered him an intelligence contact, with ment and then gave the journalist his home other." Feklisov listened carefully, then re­ whom he could exchange political informa­ telephone number, to be sure he could be peated the proposal to be sure that he under­ tion. In his cable to Moscow on October 26, reached at any time'? stood the White House's offer correctly. Feklisov felt he had to introduce Scali to the Scali rushed this proposal to the State Unsure of Scali, he asked repeatedly for KGB. "We have been meeting for over a Department. Roger Hilsman, State's direc­ confirmation that Scali spoke for the White year," he wrote. This statement, of course, tor of Intelligence and Research, and Secre­ House. Finally, Feklisov added that it was would not have been necessary had Moscow tary of State Dean Rusk were extremely not enough for there to be inspection of the already considered Scali a channel to the interested in it. Rusk considered this to be dismantling of Soviet missiles, it would be U.S. government. In previous cables Feklisov the first concrete offer from the Soviet lead­ necessary for UN observers to observe the had referred to Scali only using a codename. ership for ending the crisis. The letters al­ withdrawal of U.S. forces from the southern This was the first time he introduced him and ready exchanged by Khrushchev and United States. This idea went beyond Scali's mentioned his position with ABC News. Kennedy had only brought about a harden­ instructions, so he demurred. Feklisov's cable describing his first ing of each side's position. So long as the The situation changed the next day, meeting with Scali on October 26 is almost Soviets refused to discuss removing the October 27, which U.S. veterans of the Mis­ a mirror image ofthe account that Scali gave missiles, there seemed to be no peaceful sile Crisis describe as "Black Saturday." Just Rusk. In Feklisov' s version, Scali is the one way out of the deepening crisis.8 as the ExComm was discussing a formal whois fearful ofwar. Afterassuring Feklisov Transcripts ofthe ExComm [Executive response to the Khrushchev letter and the that the U.S. was planning air strikes and an Committee of the National Security Coun­ Feklisov proposal, a second message arrived amphibious landing on Cuba in the next 48 cil] meeting ofOctober 27 9 confirm that the from Moscow, which this time immediately hours, Scali asked if the United States at­ Kennedy administration interpreted the "of­ publicized the communication. Khrushchev tacked Cuba, "would West Berlin be occu­ fer" from the KGB representative as an had upped the ante. Now he demanded that pied?" Feklisov reported that he had replied elaboration of a more general proposal con­ the U.S. dismantle its Jupiter missile bases in defiantly that all heaven and earth might fall tained in a private letter from Khrushchev Turkey before he went ahead with any deal upon NATO if the U.S. were to attack Cuba. that arrived late in the afternoon of October that would strip Cuba of Soviet missiles. "At the very least," he said, "the Soviet 26, in which the Soviet leader had written: Scali was sent to see Feklisov to register the Union would occupy West Berlin." Feklisov U.S. government's strong disapproval ofthe' added that given the size of Soviet conven­ We, for our part, will declare that our new terms. Although Feklisov defended his tional forces on the line dividing East and government's new position, the KGB Resi­ West Germany, the situation would be very COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 61 difficult for the West. And to make matters whatever reason, forgotten the balance of In following the course taken by this worse, he expected the crisis to unify the his historic conversation with Scali.13 important telegram, we see that it could not entire Socialist bloc, including China. Per­ The SVR record on the second Scali­ have played any role in shaping Khrushchev's haps for dramatic effect, Feklisov assured Feklisov meeting of October 26 is less con­ letter of October 26, which proposed a U.S. his American interlocutor that the Cubans, troversial. The account that Feklisov cabled guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and especially Castro, were ready to die like to Moscow differs littlefrom what the Ameri­ as a means of resolving the crisis, or even in heroes. I I can journalist reported to the State Depart­ influencing the letter of October 27 that Feklisov's report to the KGB Center ment. Feklisov reported that Scali, who had asserted a parallel between U.S. bases in creates the impression that the direction taken initiated the meeting, laid out a formula that Turkey and the Soviet missile installations by the discussion depressed Scali even fur­ could be the basis for negotiations between in Cuba. ther. "A horrible conflict lies ahead," Scali Stevenson and Zorin at the UN. The only Feklisov's telegram arrived in Moscow said after hearing what the Soviet response difference between the Feklisov and Scali well after (nearly a full day) Khrushchev had would be to the use of American military accounts is that whereas Feklisov described sent his letter of October 26 to Kennedy. force against Cuba. According to Feklisov, this as a new American proposal, Scali re­ Because it was not expected that Feklisov Scali fell into such a state of anxiety that he layed to the State Department that Feklisov would act as a channel for resolving the began to muse aboutpossible ways out ofthe had responded energetically to word of for­ crisis, this telegram was not given priority conflict. "Why couldn't Fidel Castro give a mal U.S. interest in the Soviet proposal first treatment. After deciphering and summariz­ speech saying that he was prepared to dis­ mentioned at the Occidental Restaurant. 14 ing the telegram, which took the usual hour, mantle and to remove the missile installa­ After this second meeting with Scali, the FCD sent the telegram to the Secretariat tions if President Kennedy gave a guarantee Feklisov sent a long cable to Moscow, de­ of the KGB, which was the headquarters not to attack Cuba?" Scali is reported to have tailing both of his conversations with Scali. staff of the Chairman, Semichastny. Inex­ asked. 12 In retrospect, it seems odd that at a time plicably, the telegram sat in Semichastny's What is most significant about the ver­ when the Kremlin was hungry for any news office for anotherfour hours before theChair­ sion that Feklisov cabled to Moscow is that about U.S. intentions, Feklisov would have man decided to send it to Foreign Minister the KGB resident did not take Scali's musings waited so long to inform Moscow as to what Andrei Gromyko. This delay was so long as a formal U.S. offer. Instead of grasping John Scali was telling him. Feklisov was that by the time the Ministry of Foreign this as a proposal, Feklisov told Scali that accustomed to cabling his superiors at all Affairs received a copy ofthe Feklisovcable, what he was saying sounded a lot like some­ hours. And he had approximately five hours Khrushchev had already sent his second, thing already proposed by the Cubans in the between the end of the lunch and his next October 27 letter to Kennedy referring to the Security Council, which had been ignored discussion with Scali to tell KGB Centerthat Jupiters in Turkey. 17 by U.S. Ambassador Stevenson. Although something was going on. In his memoirs, The Scali-Feklisov meeting on October Scali responded that he could not recall any Feklisov has explained this gap by saying 27 looms even less significant in Russian American rejection of a similar Cuban pro­ that he did not expectanything to come ofhis records. Again Khrushchev could not have posal, he said he was convinced that such a discussion with Scali. Indeed, he writes that seen it in time to affect his strategy toward demarche at this time by Castro would meet he did not even bother to mention the meet­ the Americans. Feklisov sent a short report with a positive reaction from U.S. civilian ing to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoli after Scali scolded him for Khrushchev's and military circles. Dobrynin, until 4 p.m. Then, just as he was new position on resolving the missile crisis. Scali's confidence surprised Feklisov, in the midst ofgiving this reportto Dobrynin, This cable did not reach the Chairman ofthe who began to wonder whether indeed Scali Feklisov received Scali's request for a sec­ KGB until 4:40 p.m. on October 28. might know something about the White ond meeting. Not only did Feklisov have to Semichastny's reaction was to forward the House's negotiating strategy. When Feklisov leave the embassy before completing his letter to the Foreign Ministry, where it ar­ inquired as to exactly who might be inter­ briefing for Dobrynin but he had to put off rived at 7 p.m. Moscow time, an hour after ested in this kind of proposal, Scali avoided cabling Moscow until returning from the Khrushchev had publicly accepted the giving any names. This was as far as he Statler Hotel. 15 Kennedy administration's terms for ending would go. As Scali and Feklisov parted, the There was soon to be as much confusion the crisis. 18 KGB officer concluded that despite having in Moscow over what Feklisov was doing as The KGB materials substantiate claims taken an interesting tum, the meeting itself in Dobrynin's embassy. The KGB had no that for the Kremlin the Scali-Feklisovmeet­ had been inconclusive. warning that its representative in Washing­ ings were a sideshow that played no part in It is also significant that in his memoirs, ton had established, albeit unwittingly, a the U.S.-Soviet endgame of October 26-28. Feklisov does not mention anything about channel to the Kennedys. When Feklisov's Although ofless consequence in light ofthis having discussed a political solution with long cable arrived in Moscow at 2:20 p.m., information, it is nevertheless interesting to Scali at the first October 26 meeting. In fact, Saturday, October 27 (Moscow time was consider the contradiction between the con­ Feklisov categorically denies that he or Scali eight hours ahead of EST), the chief of the temporaneous accounts by Feklisov and Scali made any attempts to formulate a way out of First Chief Directorate (FCD), the foreign oftheirmeetings onOctober26. DidFeklisov the crisis at that time. Here the evidence intelligence division ofthe KGB, forwarded violate KGB procedure and present a com­ from the SVR archives contradicts Feklisov' s this telegram directly to the chairman of the pletely unauthorized settlement formula? Or, memoirs and suggests that Feklisov has, for KGB. Vladimir Semichastny.16 at the other extreme, did Scali use the KGB 62 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN resident to test some ideas that had occurred made after each of his meetings with the KGB officer. and Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 185-88. to him as perhaps the best way of averting 2. The Moscow conference was one of a series of five II. Feklisov to KGB Center, 26 October 1962. Delo conferences between 1987 and 1992 involving, at first, 116, T.I, SVR Archives, Moscow. nuclear disaster? U.S. scholars andformerofficials, who were laterjoined 12. Ibid. The KGB documents suggest that in by Soviet and then Cuban counterparts. The confer­ 13. Feklisov, Za Okeanom uNa Ostrovye, 223-25. the heat of discussion, with the fear of war ences were organized by James G. Blight, initially at 14. Feklisov to KGB Center, 27 October 1962, Delo hanging over their heads, Scali and Feklisov Harvard University's Center for Science and Interna­ 116, T.l., SVR Archives; John Scali, Report of 27 tional Affairs and laterat Brown University's Center for October 1962 Meeting, Cuban Missile Crisis Collec­ fastened on a revival ofa formula for ending Foreign Policy Development. For the Feklisov-Scali tion, National Security Archive. the crisis that, among others, UN Secretary exchange, see Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and 15. Feklisov, Zn Okeanom u Na Octrove, 225. There is General U Thant had been suggesting since David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of a problem with Feklisov's chronology. Scali's call October 24. 19 Because of the possibility the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, actually came later than 4 or 5 p.m.. Unless his meeting January 27-28, 1989 (Lantham, MD: University Press with Dobrynin actually occurred three hours later than that Feklisov and/or Scali mischaracterized ofAmerica, 1992), 112-14; I 17-18. Feklisovelaborated he said, Feklisov should have had enough time to brief their first meeting on October 26, it may on his testimony in his memoirs, Zn Okeanom i Na the Soviet ambassador and to send a cable to Moscow. never be possible to resolve the central Ostrovye (Moscow: DEM, 1994), 222-40. After returning from the second meeting, Feklisov contradiction between their respective 3. It appears that Feklisov first made this assertion to a continued to wait before sending Moscow any word on Russian scholar in 1987. A year later, Georgi Kornienko, his meetings with Scali. The long cable was not sent claims. However, the determination ofwhich who had been the Counsellor in the Soviet Embassy at until approximately midnight, four hours after Feklisov man actually proposed this plan is less im­ the time of the Missile Crisis, told Raymond Garthoff and Scali parted. At a September 1994 conference in portant than the fact that, although the Krem­ that on 26 October 1962 the Embassy had been confused Moscow, entitled "The Caribbean Crisis in the Ar­ lin was completely in the dark, John F. by Feklisov's account of his first meeting with Scali. chives ofthe Russian Federation, the Republic ofCuba Neither Kornienko nor the ambassador, Anatoli and the United States," Dobrynin and Feklisov argued Kennedy was convinced that Feklisov spoke Dobrynin, was sure whetherithad been Scali or Feklisov over the reasons for the delays in sending a KGB cable for the Soviet government, and indeed for who had made the proposal. See Garthoffs revised on the Scali meetings. Feklisov alleged that he waited Khrushchev personally. edition of Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis to give Dobrynin the opportunity to sign the cable; but As we now know, President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1989), 80-81. A 1988 when the latter stubbornly refused to do so, he sent it article by Garthoffwas the first published account of the anyway. The former Soviet ambassador rejected this decided not to use the Scali-Feklisov chan­ Scali-Feklisov channel to raise doubts as to whether account, saying that Feklisov had not needed his signa­ nel to settle the crisis. On the night of Feklisov had been authorized by the Kremlin to make ture to send a KGB cable. October 27, JFK sent his brother Robert to his proposal. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Cuban Mis­ 16. Spravka on Feklisov's October 26 telegram on Dobrynin to offer a face-saving deal to sile Crisis: The Soviet Story," Foreign Policy 72 (Fall Scali, Delo 116, T. I., SVR Archives. 1988). 17. Ibid. Khrushchev. In addition to pledging not to 4. Thus far, Crown has four books under contract. Each 18. Spravka on Delivery of Scali report of 27 October invade Cuba, Kennedy offered a secret un­ book will be written by a team. The FursenkolNaftali 1962, ibid. dertaking to remove Jupiter missiles from study of the superpowers and Cuba, 1958-1963, will be 19. U Thant, "Statement in the Security Council," 24 Turkey. Nevertheless, the story ofthe Scali­ the first book in the series. It will be followed by a October 1962, in Andrew W. Cordier and Max history of Soviet intelligence penetration of the British Harrelson, eds., Public Papers ofthe Secretaries-Gen­ Feklisov backchannel remains significant government by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev; a study eral of the United Nations, VI: U Thant, 1961-1964 as a prime example ofhow governments can of KGB-CIA operations in Berlin by George Bailey, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976),237­ misinterpret each other, especially in the Sergei Kondrashev, and David Murphy; and a history of 240. grip of a crisis. Soviet intelligence operations in the United States by Alexander Vassiliev and Allen Weinstein. Alexandr A. Fursenko is the Vice President of the St. 5. ABC news special of 13 August 1964. Transcript, Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sci­, I. The New York Times broke the story of John Scali's Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security ences; Timothy 1. Naftali is Assistant Professor of ! role in the Cuban missile crisis on 4 August 1964. It Archive. History, University ofHawaii at Man.oa. was reported that Look magazine was about to publish 6. Elie Abel. The Missile Crisis (New York: 1. B. an excerptfrom Roger Hilsman's forthcoming book on LippincottCompany, 1966), 177-79. In their first public foreign policymaking in the Kennedy years that named ( accounts, both Scali and Hilsman misremembered the Scali as an intermediary between the U.S. and Soviet details of the proposal. They had Khrushchev giving the governments at the climax of the missile crisis. Just as r pledge to keep Cuba free of offensive weapons, not Hilsman's piece was to appear in print, John Scali Fidel Castro. This flawed version of the "Soviet" pro­ 1 discussed his meetings with the Soviet KGB official, I posal gained wide currency when Graham T. Allison ( "Mr. X," on an ABC news special of 13 August 1964. featured it in his influential Essence of Decision: Ex­ Transcript, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National plaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, Security Archive, Washington, D.C. U.S. News & 1971), 260, 263. For Scali's confidential description on World Report carried an article about Hilsman's rev­ 26 October 1962 ofwhat he hadjustheard from Feklisov, , elation in its 17 August 1964 issue. Hilsman's excerpt I which confirms Abel's and Salinger's accounts, see , finally appeared in the 25 August 1964 issue of Look. , "John Scali's notes offirst meeting with Sovietembassy A few months later, in its 25 October 1964 edition, counselor and KGB officer Alexandr Fomin, October Family Weekly published Scali's "I Was the Secret Go­ 26, 1962," Document 43 in Laurence Chang and Peter ~ Between in the Cuban Crisis." Pierre Salinger, Hilsman l Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A t and Robert Kennedy all attested to the importance of "I National Security Archive Documents Reader, (New the Scali channel in autobiographical books: With York: New Press, 1992), 184. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966),274­ 7. Ibid. 280; To Move A Nation: The Politics ofForeign Policy 8. Hilsman, To Move A Nation, 217-19. in the Administration ofJohn F. Kennedy (New York: 9. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, Doubleday & Co., 1967),217-223; and Thirteen Days: President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Cu­ A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: ban Missile Crisis Meetings, 27 October 1962, John F. W.W. Norton & Co., 1969),90-91. Salinger's With Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. Kennedy quoted directly from notes that John Scali had 10. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 26 October 1962, in Chang

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