DOCSLIB.ORG

Using KGB Documents: the Scali

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995 58 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE USING KGB DOCUMENTS: negotiations. The famous proposal for end­ superpower intelligence services sponsored THE SCALI·FEKLISOV CHANNEL ing the crisis, which Robert Kennedy later by Crown Publishers, Inc.4 IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS recalled as having made his brother "for the To understand better whatcan be learned first time hopeful that our efforts might pos­ from these documents, it is helpful to revisit by Alexander Fursenko sibly be successful," had not come from him, the standard account of the role of the Scali­ and Timothy Naftali but rather had come out of the blue from Feklisov channel in the resolution of the Scali. Scali, who was also present in Mos­ Cuban Missile Crisis. From the time that former State Depart­ cow, vigorously disputed Feklisov's ac­ According to the traditional version, ment official Roger Hilsman revealed in count.2 Scali received a call at his Washington office 1964 that ABC News television correspon­ Feklisov's surprising assertion3 and from Feklisov on Friday, October 26. Scali dent lohn Scali had served as an intermedi­ Scali's immediate rejection of this revision­ had been meeting off and on with this Soviet ary between the U.S. and Soviet govern­ ist history posed three questions for students Embassy official for over a year. From the ments at the height of the Cuban Missile of the crisis: FBI, which Scali had alerted from the outset Crisis, scholars have had to consider the role a) Did the Soviet government use the about his meetings with Feklisov, the jour­ that Scali and his contact, AleksandrFeklisov KGB to find a way out of the crisis on 26 nalist learned that this man was no ordinary (alias Fomin), played in the resolution ofthe October 1962? diplomat. Aleksandr Feklisov ("Fomin") was conflict. l Until 1989, it was generally as­ b) Did Feklisov act on his own or did the KGB Resident, or chief of station, in sumed that the Kremlin had used Feklisov, Scali suggest a settlement for his own gov­ Washington. On this particular Friday, with a KGB officer based at the Soviet Embassy ernment to consider? the likelihood of US military action against in Washington, to float a trial balloon at the c) What effect, if any, did the Scali­ Cuba seemingly mounting, Feklisov asked most dangerous moment of the Cuban Mis­ Feklisov meetings have on the endgame of for an urgent meeting with Scali. Scali sug­ sile Crisis because meaningful communica­ the Cuban Missile Crisis? gested the Occidental Restaurant near the tion between the two governments had Materials consulted in the archives of Willard Hotel. The lunch was set for 1:30 ground to a halt. the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, the p.m. But at a conference of scholars and new name for the First Chief Directorate of "When Jarrived he was already sitting former officials in Moscow in 1anuary 1989, the KGB), resolve some, though not all, of at the table as usual, facing the door. He Feklisov argued that Western historians had these questions. Documents on the Scali­ seemed tired, haggard and alarmed in con­ gotten his role in the crisis all wrong. The Feklisov meetings have been opened as part trast to the usual calm, low-key appearance Kremlin, he said, had not injected him into of a multi-book project on the history of the continued on page 60 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN KGB DOCUMENTS ships bound for Cuba are not carrying dent remained hopeful that the Kremlin continuedfrom page 58 any armaments. You will declare that would ultimately accept the October 26 pro­ that he presented." Thus Scali described in the United States will not invade Cuba posal as the basis for a resolution of the a 1964 television broadcast how this meet­ with its troops and will not support crisis. Indeed, Kennedy's response to ing opened. Scali said that Feklisov feared any other forces which might intend to Khrushchev offered to accept the implicit that war would begin soon, and was so invade Cuba. Then the necessity for terms ofOctober 26 and ignored the Turkish concerned that he volunteered a way out of the presence of our military special­ issue raised in Khrushchev's letter of the the stalemate.s ists will be obviated. 10 27th. The crisis ended the next morning, He asked, according to Scali's notes, Sunday, October 28, with the Kremlin's what Scali "thought" of a three-point propo­ By itself the Khrushchev letter did not public announcement of a deal-a with­ sition: promise anything except that future Soviet drawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a a) The Soviet missiles bases would be ships would carry non-military cargoes. But U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba-that dismantled under United Nations supervi­ when the letter was coupled with what Scali seemed to incorporate much of what John sion. had relayed from Feklisov, the Kennedy ad­ Scali and Aleksandr Feklisov had discussed. b) Fidel Castro would promise never to ministration believed it had received an ac­ Both men were proud of their accomplish­ accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever. ceptable offer from the Kremlin. Rusk in­ ment. c) In return for the above, the United structed Scali to contact Feklisov to make KGB records suggest that neither the States would pledge not to invade Cuba.6 clear that the U.S. found a basis for agree­ traditional version nor Feklisov' s revision is Feklisov was confident thatifU.S. Am­ ment in his offer. entirely accurate. Feklisov's cables to Mos­ bassador to the United Nations Adlai Sometime between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. cow from October 26 and October 27 and Stevenson "pursued this line," Soviet UN on Friday evening, Scali and Feklisov met at evidence of how the KGB handled them ambassador Valerian Zorin "would be in­ the Statler Hotel, near the Soviet Embassy. In suggest strongly that the Soviet government terested." As if to give some weight to his a very brief meeting Scali conveyed his mes­ did not initiate the proposals that Scali pre­ proposal, Feklisov noted that the Cuban sage: He was authorized by the highest au­ sented to Rusk on the afternoon of October delegate to the UN had already made a thority to say that there were "real possibili­ 26. similar proposal in a session of the Security ties in this [proposal]" and that "the represen­ Feklisov's cables, moreover, paint a Council but that it had been met with si­ tatives of the USSR and the United States in different picture of his relationship with the lence. Feklisov asked that Scali run this New York can work this matter out with [UN Americanjournalist. The KGB Residentcon­ proposal by his contacts at the State Depart­ Secretary General] U Thant and with each sidered him an intelligence contact, with ment and then gave the journalist his home other." Feklisov listened carefully, then re­ whom he could exchange political informa­ telephone number, to be sure he could be peated the proposal to be sure that he under­ tion. In his cable to Moscow on October 26, reached at any time'? stood the White House's offer correctly. Feklisov felt he had to introduce Scali to the Scali rushed this proposal to the State Unsure of Scali, he asked repeatedly for KGB. "We have been meeting for over a Department. Roger Hilsman, State's direc­ confirmation that Scali spoke for the White year," he wrote. This statement, of course, tor of Intelligence and Research, and Secre­ House. Finally, Feklisov added that it was would not have been necessary had Moscow tary of State Dean Rusk were extremely not enough for there to be inspection of the already considered Scali a channel to the interested in it. Rusk considered this to be dismantling of Soviet missiles, it would be U.S. government. In previous cables Feklisov the first concrete offer from the Soviet lead­ necessary for UN observers to observe the had referred to Scali only using a codename. ership for ending the crisis. The letters al­ withdrawal of U.S. forces from the southern This was the first time he introduced him and ready exchanged by Khrushchev and United States. This idea went beyond Scali's mentioned his position with ABC News. Kennedy had only brought about a harden­ instructions, so he demurred. Feklisov's cable describing his first ing of each side's position. So long as the The situation changed the next day, meeting with Scali on October 26 is almost Soviets refused to discuss removing the October 27, which U.S. veterans of the Mis­ a mirror image ofthe account that Scali gave missiles, there seemed to be no peaceful sile Crisis describe as "Black Saturday." Just Rusk. In Feklisov' s version, Scali is the one way out of the deepening crisis.8 as the ExComm was discussing a formal whois fearful ofwar. Afterassuring Feklisov Transcripts ofthe ExComm [Executive response to the Khrushchev letter and the that the U.S. was planning air strikes and an Committee of the National Security Coun­ Feklisov proposal, a second message arrived amphibious landing on Cuba in the next 48 cil] meeting ofOctober 27 9 confirm that the from Moscow, which this time immediately hours, Scali asked if the United States at­ Kennedy administration interpreted the "of­ publicized the communication. Khrushchev tacked Cuba, "would West Berlin be occu­ fer" from the KGB representative as an had upped the ante.
Recommended publications
  • The Partition of Korea After World War II This Page Intentionally Left Blank the PARTITION of KOREA AFTER WORLD WAR II

    The Partition of Korea After World War II This Page Intentionally Left Blank the PARTITION of KOREA AFTER WORLD WAR II

    The Partition of Korea after World War II This page intentionally left blank THE PARTITION OF KOREA AFTER WORLD WAR II A GLOBAL HISTORY Jongsoo Lee THE PARTITION OFKOREA AFTER WORLD WAR II © Jongsoo Lee, 2006. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2006 978-1-4039-6982-8 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-53150-9 ISBN 978-1-4039-8301-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781403983015 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lee, Jongsoo. The partition of Korea after world war II : a global history / Jongsoo Lee. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Korea—History—Partition, 1945– 2. World War, 1939–1945— Diplomatic history—Soviet Union. 3. World War, 1939–1945— Diplomatic history—United States. 4. Korea—History—Allied occupation, 1945–1948. I. Title. DS917.43.L44 2006 951.904Ј1—dc22 2005054895 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
  • Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis

    Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis

    COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995 Russian Foreign Ministry Documents previously published but were of lesser impon substantial addition to our documentary base and On the Cuban Missile Crisis than those already obtained.] some contribution to our understanding of the The 21 documents initially released com­ crisis. Introduction by Raymond L. GarthotT prise selections from six categories of material. These materials expand on the earlier re­ First are three cables from, and one message to, leased messages between President Kennedy and Among the new archival materials on the Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev in Ha­ Prime MinisterKhrushchev. Thereare, however. Cuban Missile Crisis recently made available by vana sent shonly prior to or during the crisis; no materials on Foreign Ministry evaluations or the Russian government are the first batch of second are seven cables sent from Ambassador other interagency deliberations in Moscow, in diplomatic documents, a selection of 21 docu­ Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington and one to him, contrast to the extensive releases of comparable ments totaling 147 pages; extensive translations also all prior to or during the crisis, and one from materials by the United States. of these materials (as well as of two other docu­ Soviet official Georgii Zhukov, also sent from Some of the Foreign Ministry documents ments released from the former CPSU Central Washington; third are one message from Ambas­ have been lightly sanitized, and a number ofthem Committee archives) follow this introduction. sador Valerian Zorin, Soviet representative to the are only excerpts, but excisions are not noted While certainly welcome, this represents only United Nations in New York, and one to him (and except where there is an internal blank space in a about twenty percent of a file of 734 pages of to Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov) paragraph.
  • YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation

    YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation

    YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation Svetozar Rajak Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London School of Economics and Political Science University of London February 2004 UMI Number: U615474 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615474 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ” OF POUTICAL «, AN0 pi Th ^ s^ s £ £2^>3 ^7&2io 2 ABSTRACT The thesis chronologically presents the slow improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, starting with Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, through their full normalization in 1955 and 1956, to the renewed ideological confrontation at the end of 1956. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations brought to an end a conflict between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, in existence since 1948, which threatened the status quo in Europe. The thesis represents the first effort at comprehensively presenting the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, between 1953 and 1957. It will also explain the motives that guided the leaderships of the two countries, in particular the two main protagonists, Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, throughout this process.
  • Soviet-American Relations and the Origins of Containment 1941-1946: the Force of Tradition

    Soviet-American Relations and the Origins of Containment 1941-1946: the Force of Tradition

    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1988 Soviet-American relations and the origins of containment 1941-1946: The force of tradition Anita Louise Coryell The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Coryell, Anita Louise, "Soviet-American relations and the origins of containment 1941-1946: The force of tradition" (1988). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5179. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5179 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 Th i s is an unpublished m a n u s c r ip t in w h ic h c o p y r ig h t s u b s i s t s . Any f u r t h e r r e p r in t in g of i t s c o n t e n t s m u st be APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR. Ma n s f i e l d L ib r a r y U n i v e r s i t y of Mo n ta n a Da t e : , 1 , SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT, 1941-1946: THE FORCE OF TRADITION By Anita Louise Coryell B.A., Rutgers, The State University, 1974 Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 1988 Approved by: Chairman, Board of Examiners Dean, Graduate School lusrt/J Date UMI Number: EP40643 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
  • Communist Propoganda in Azerbaijani Children's Literature In

    Communist Propoganda in Azerbaijani Children's Literature In

    ISSN 2411-9598 (Print) European Journal of January-April 2018 ISSN 2411-4103 (Online) Language and Literature Studies Volume 4 Issue 1 Communist Propoganda in Azerbaijani Children’s Literature in the Soviet Union Zhala Babashova KASTRATİ Kastamonu University Faculty of Science and Letters, Contemporary Turkish Dialects and Literatures Abstract After the national republic had fallen in Azerbaijan in 1920 and the nation taken in the USSR, people’s view of the world was reshaped. Foreseeing that the sustainability of the Soviet order depends on educating children, the Communist Party rapidly started to improve the children’s literature. Furthermore, the Soviet ideology began to be transferred to the children in Azerbaijan via magazines and newspapers. Improved under the control of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijani children’s literature maintained the goal of raising Soviet minded people thanks to the topics and heroes in the literature. Three stages were considered so that Azerbaijani children could be raised with communist mentality. These stages are: Oktyabryat (age 7-9), Pioner (age 10), Komsomol (age 14). Oktyabryat was the first title given on the way to the Communism. The Soviet government made use of the power of the press, magazines and newspapers in order to carve socialism ideology into people’s minds. With the purpose of raising children with the Soviet mentality, the children’s magazine called Pioner (1927-1990) began publishing in Baku, in 1927. The magazine was issued 11 times a year. 80 percent of the essays, stories and poems were served for the Communist propaganda. These praised the Soviet era, told stories about Lenin’s success in school and included poems about the Soviet ancestry.
  • Molotov and the Moscow Conference, October 1943* Introduction

    Molotov and the Moscow Conference, October 1943* Introduction

    1 Derek Watson Derek Watson, "Molotov et la Centre for Russian and East European Studies Conférence de Moscou, Octobre The University of Birmingham 1943." Communisme, no. 74/75, 72-99. Original text in English. Molotov and the Moscow Conference, October 1943* Introduction Molotov served as head of NarkomIndel from May 1939 until 1949, and then again in the early Khrushchev era. He is often remembered as being involved in some of the most infamous episodes in the foreign policy of the USSR: the Nazi-Soviet pact, the dismemberment of Poland, the take-over of the Baltic states and the creation of the Soviet satellite empire in eastern Europe after 1945. His style was equally notorious: he was rude and abrupt, and the net over the smallest matter came to represent the inflexible and stubborn nature of Soviet negotiating techniques, at the post-war conferences of foreign ministers. He seemed to be insensitive to and lack understanding of western opinion, which unlike his predecessor Litvinov, and subordinates, like Maiskii, he was not prepared to make any effort to represent to his Kremlin colleagues.1 There was, however, a much more positive side to Molotov as commissar for Foreign Affairs. If the Triple Alliance negotiations of 1939 with Britain and France failed, their success might have prevented the Second World War; during his visit to Britain and the USA in 1942 the Grand Alliance which was responsible for the defeat of Hitler war was forged; and the Moscow foreign ministers conference of October 1943, which is generally taken as marking the peak of Molotov’s diplomatic career, was crucial in laying the foundations for the post-war world.
  • Matt Byrne's Leadership Role in Dialogue with the USSR

    Matt Byrne's Leadership Role in Dialogue with the USSR

    Pepperdine Law Review Volume 34 Issue 2 A Tribute to Judge Byrne & Symposium: Balancing Career & Family: A Work/Life Article 2 Symposium 1-20-2007 "Momentous Changes Taking Place" Matt Byrne's Leadership Role in Dialogue with the U.S.S.R. Weyman I. Lundquist Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr Part of the Judges Commons Recommended Citation Weyman I. Lundquist "Momentous Changes Taking Place" Matt Byrne's Leadership Role in Dialogue with the U.S.S.R., 34 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 2 (2007) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/2 This Tribute is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. "Momentous Changes Taking Place", Matt Byrne's Leadership Role in Dialogue with the U.S.S.R. Weyman I. Lundquist * A warm and exciting chapter of my life involved the Cold War, cold places, and the Honorable William Matthew Byrne. "The Judge's" warm and understated but powerful Irish presence played an important role in a legal diplomatic success that began during the Cold War. A number of Americans think of Matt Byrne as a close friend. Less well known is that a number of Russians, ranging from the former Procurator General of the Russian Federation, Alexander Sukharev, to the current Chief Justice of the Russian Supreme Court, Vyacheslav Lebedev, to Veniamin Yakovlev, Head of the Russian High Court of Arbitration, also regard Matt Byrne as a close friend in America and the exemplar, for Russians, of what an independent judge should be.
  • The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)

    The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)

    TheHershberg United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1) ✣ What options did John F. Kennedy consider after his aides in- formed him on 16 October 1962 that the Soviet Union was secretly deploy- ing medium-range nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba? In most accounts, his options fell into three categories: 1. military: an attack against Cuba involving a large-scale air strike against the missile sites, a full-scale invasion, or the ªrst followed by the second; 2. political-military: a naval blockade of Cuba (euphemistically called a “quarantine”) to prevent the shipment of further “offensive” military equipment and allow time to pressure Soviet leader Nikita Khrush- chev into withdrawing the missiles; or 3. diplomatic: a private overture to Moscow to persuade Khrushchev to back down without a public confrontation. Kennedy ultimately chose the second option and announced it on 22 Octo- ber in his nationally televised address. That option and the ªrst (direct mili- tary action against Cuba) have been exhaustively analyzed over the years by Western scholars. Much less attention has been devoted to the third alterna- tive, the diplomatic route. This article shows, however, that a variant of that option—a variant that has never previously received any serious scholarly treatment—was actually adopted by Kennedy at the peak of the crisis. The United States pursued a separate diplomatic track leading not to Moscow but to Havana (via Rio de Janeiro), and not to Khrushchev but to Fidel Castro, in a secret effort to convince the Cuban leader to make a deal: If Castro agreed to end his alliance with Moscow, demand the removal of the Soviet missiles, and disavow any further support for revolutionary subversion in the Western hemisphere, he could expect “many changes” in Washington’s policy toward Journal of Cold War Studies Vol.
  • The Red Scare- Soviet Union

    The Red Scare- Soviet Union

    JCC: The Red Scare- Soviet Union Chair: Bridget Arnold Vice-Chair: 1 Table of Contents 3. Letter from Chair 4. Committee Background 7. Topic A: Race to the Moon 15. Topic B: Developing Tensions is the West 24. Positions 2 Letter from the Chair: Dear Fellow Comrades, Hello, and welcome to LYMUN VII! I am extremely excited to be chairing (the better side) of the JCC: The Red Scare. My name is Bridget Arnold, I am currently a Senior at Lyons Township and I have participated in Model UN since my Freshman year. Outside of MUN, I participate in various clubs such as Mock Trial and PSI and in general have a huge fascination with politics. In anticipation of the conference, you are expected to write one position paper outlining ​ your person’s beliefs on the topics that you have been given. Both topics will be discussed in order but only one position paper is required. All delegates should maintain their character’s policy within the committee and should avoid slipping into their own personal beliefs. During committee, I will not only be looking for delegates who speak a lot but those who work well with other delegates, contribute to discussions, and exemplify knowledge about the topic in their speeches. With that being said, I encourage all delegates to speak at least once in this committee. Any experience with public speaking will benefit your skills as a public speaker now and in the future. Writing directives and crisis notes with your own original ideas are also crucial for success in this cabinet.
  • Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory

    Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory

    Utah State University DigitalCommons@USU All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 5-2013 Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory Chelsea E. Carattini Utah State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Carattini, Chelsea E., "Cuban Missile Crisis: Applying Strategic Culture to Gametheory" (2013). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 236. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/236 This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and other Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Introduction Game theory applied to political situations offers a unique approach to analyzing and understanding international relations. Yet the rigid structure that lends itself so well to mathematics is not practical in the real world . It lacks a built in mechanism for determining a player's preferences, which is a key part of an international "game" or situation. Strategic culture, another international relations theory, is quite the opposite. Critics claim it suffers from a lack of structure, but it captures the spirit of international actors and what makes them tick. This paper explores the idea of pairing the two otherwise unrelated theories to bolster both in the areas where they are lacking in order to provide a more complete understanding of international states' behavior and motivations. Brief Summary of Major Theories The theories presented in the following pages are drawn from distinct schools of thought; consequently it is necessary to provide some background information.
  • No Progress in NATO-Russia Relations Without US Leadership

    No Progress in NATO-Russia Relations Without US Leadership

    Ap: 2017nr3 9 Special Section: Analysis No progress in NATO-Russia relations without US leadership Tony van der Togt This article examines the US-Russia relationship and its consequences for NATO. It also explores “European alternatives” to address the lack of US leadership vis-à-vis Russia. Moscow’s high hopes for an early deal at the recent mini-summit in Brussels underlined. Moscow squashed seems to be as surprised as Western capitals and just as un- certain about who really calls the shots in Washington and After Donald Trump’s surprise election to the US Presidency, what policies to expect. Russian Duma members celebrated with champagne. Expectations in official circles in Moscow were high and Although some high-level political visits have taken place, some pundits were already predicting a possible US-Russian including by Secretary Tillerson to Moscow and Foreign “Grand Bargain”, including on Ukraine. An anti-terrorist coa- Minister Lavrov to Washington, no early summit between lition of Russia, the US and possibly other (Western) powers Presidents Trump and Putin has taken place. Furthermore, against ISIS/Daesh in Syria also seemed to be just around Trump’s first foreign tour to the Middle East and Europe has the corner. This would somehow resemble the earlier “Re- failed to open up any new opportunities for dialogue or set” under President Obama, but this time on Russian pre- cooperation with Russia: conditions and taking the form of some “Yalta/Potsdam-2” arrangement: a multi-polar world with Great Powers working On Ukraine any talk coming out of Washington or from the in tandem and respecting each other as equals, including US in the UN Security Council has toughened and the pos- in their respective “spheres of influence/interests”.
  • Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies

    Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies

    YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr.