COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Issue 5 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Spring 1995 58 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE USING KGB DOCUMENTS: negotiations. The famous proposal for end­ superpower intelligence services sponsored THE SCALI·FEKLISOV CHANNEL ing the crisis, which Robert Kennedy later by Crown Publishers, Inc.4 IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS recalled as having made his brother "for the To understand better whatcan be learned first time hopeful that our efforts might pos­ from these documents, it is helpful to revisit by Alexander Fursenko sibly be successful," had not come from him, the standard account of the role of the Scali­ and Timothy Naftali but rather had come out of the blue from Feklisov channel in the resolution of the Scali. Scali, who was also present in Mos­ Cuban Missile Crisis. From the time that former State Depart­ cow, vigorously disputed Feklisov's ac­ According to the traditional version, ment official Roger Hilsman revealed in count.2 Scali received a call at his Washington office 1964 that ABC News television correspon­ Feklisov's surprising assertion3 and from Feklisov on Friday, October 26. Scali dent lohn Scali had served as an intermedi­ Scali's immediate rejection of this revision­ had been meeting off and on with this Soviet ary between the U.S. and Soviet govern­ ist history posed three questions for students Embassy official for over a year. From the ments at the height of the Cuban Missile of the crisis: FBI, which Scali had alerted from the outset Crisis, scholars have had to consider the role a) Did the Soviet government use the about his meetings with Feklisov, the jour­ that Scali and his contact, AleksandrFeklisov KGB to find a way out of the crisis on 26 nalist learned that this man was no ordinary (alias Fomin), played in the resolution ofthe October 1962? diplomat. Aleksandr Feklisov ("Fomin") was conflict. l Until 1989, it was generally as­ b) Did Feklisov act on his own or did the KGB Resident, or chief of station, in sumed that the Kremlin had used Feklisov, Scali suggest a settlement for his own gov­ Washington. On this particular Friday, with a KGB officer based at the Soviet Embassy ernment to consider? the likelihood of US military action against in Washington, to float a trial balloon at the c) What effect, if any, did the Scali­ Cuba seemingly mounting, Feklisov asked most dangerous moment of the Cuban Mis­ Feklisov meetings have on the endgame of for an urgent meeting with Scali. Scali sug­ sile Crisis because meaningful communica­ the Cuban Missile Crisis? gested the Occidental Restaurant near the tion between the two governments had Materials consulted in the archives of Willard Hotel. The lunch was set for 1:30 ground to a halt. the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, the p.m. But at a conference of scholars and new name for the First Chief Directorate of "When Jarrived he was already sitting former officials in Moscow in 1anuary 1989, the KGB), resolve some, though not all, of at the table as usual, facing the door. He Feklisov argued that Western historians had these questions. Documents on the Scali­ seemed tired, haggard and alarmed in con­ gotten his role in the crisis all wrong. The Feklisov meetings have been opened as part trast to the usual calm, low-key appearance Kremlin, he said, had not injected him into of a multi-book project on the history of the continued on page 60 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN KGB DOCUMENTS ships bound for Cuba are not carrying dent remained hopeful that the Kremlin continuedfrom page 58 any armaments. You will declare that would ultimately accept the October 26 pro­ that he presented." Thus Scali described in the United States will not invade Cuba posal as the basis for a resolution of the a 1964 television broadcast how this meet­ with its troops and will not support crisis. Indeed, Kennedy's response to ing opened. Scali said that Feklisov feared any other forces which might intend to Khrushchev offered to accept the implicit that war would begin soon, and was so invade Cuba. Then the necessity for terms ofOctober 26 and ignored the Turkish concerned that he volunteered a way out of the presence of our military special­ issue raised in Khrushchev's letter of the the stalemate.s ists will be obviated. 10 27th. The crisis ended the next morning, He asked, according to Scali's notes, Sunday, October 28, with the Kremlin's what Scali "thought" of a three-point propo­ By itself the Khrushchev letter did not public announcement of a deal-a with­ sition: promise anything except that future Soviet drawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a a) The Soviet missiles bases would be ships would carry non-military cargoes. But U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba-that dismantled under United Nations supervi­ when the letter was coupled with what Scali seemed to incorporate much of what John sion. had relayed from Feklisov, the Kennedy ad­ Scali and Aleksandr Feklisov had discussed. b) Fidel Castro would promise never to ministration believed it had received an ac­ Both men were proud of their accomplish­ accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever. ceptable offer from the Kremlin. Rusk in­ ment. c) In return for the above, the United structed Scali to contact Feklisov to make KGB records suggest that neither the States would pledge not to invade Cuba.6 clear that the U.S. found a basis for agree­ traditional version nor Feklisov' s revision is Feklisov was confident thatifU.S. Am­ ment in his offer. entirely accurate. Feklisov's cables to Mos­ bassador to the United Nations Adlai Sometime between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. cow from October 26 and October 27 and Stevenson "pursued this line," Soviet UN on Friday evening, Scali and Feklisov met at evidence of how the KGB handled them ambassador Valerian Zorin "would be in­ the Statler Hotel, near the Soviet Embassy. In suggest strongly that the Soviet government terested." As if to give some weight to his a very brief meeting Scali conveyed his mes­ did not initiate the proposals that Scali pre­ proposal, Feklisov noted that the Cuban sage: He was authorized by the highest au­ sented to Rusk on the afternoon of October delegate to the UN had already made a thority to say that there were "real possibili­ 26. similar proposal in a session of the Security ties in this [proposal]" and that "the represen­ Feklisov's cables, moreover, paint a Council but that it had been met with si­ tatives of the USSR and the United States in different picture of his relationship with the lence. Feklisov asked that Scali run this New York can work this matter out with [UN Americanjournalist. The KGB Residentcon­ proposal by his contacts at the State Depart­ Secretary General] U Thant and with each sidered him an intelligence contact, with ment and then gave the journalist his home other." Feklisov listened carefully, then re­ whom he could exchange political informa­ telephone number, to be sure he could be peated the proposal to be sure that he under­ tion. In his cable to Moscow on October 26, reached at any time'? stood the White House's offer correctly. Feklisov felt he had to introduce Scali to the Scali rushed this proposal to the State Unsure of Scali, he asked repeatedly for KGB. "We have been meeting for over a Department. Roger Hilsman, State's direc­ confirmation that Scali spoke for the White year," he wrote. This statement, of course, tor of Intelligence and Research, and Secre­ House. Finally, Feklisov added that it was would not have been necessary had Moscow tary of State Dean Rusk were extremely not enough for there to be inspection of the already considered Scali a channel to the interested in it. Rusk considered this to be dismantling of Soviet missiles, it would be U.S. government. In previous cables Feklisov the first concrete offer from the Soviet lead­ necessary for UN observers to observe the had referred to Scali only using a codename. ership for ending the crisis. The letters al­ withdrawal of U.S. forces from the southern This was the first time he introduced him and ready exchanged by Khrushchev and United States. This idea went beyond Scali's mentioned his position with ABC News. Kennedy had only brought about a harden­ instructions, so he demurred. Feklisov's cable describing his first ing of each side's position. So long as the The situation changed the next day, meeting with Scali on October 26 is almost Soviets refused to discuss removing the October 27, which U.S. veterans of the Mis­ a mirror image ofthe account that Scali gave missiles, there seemed to be no peaceful sile Crisis describe as "Black Saturday." Just Rusk. In Feklisov' s version, Scali is the one way out of the deepening crisis.8 as the ExComm was discussing a formal whois fearful ofwar. Afterassuring Feklisov Transcripts ofthe ExComm [Executive response to the Khrushchev letter and the that the U.S. was planning air strikes and an Committee of the National Security Coun­ Feklisov proposal, a second message arrived amphibious landing on Cuba in the next 48 cil] meeting ofOctober 27 9 confirm that the from Moscow, which this time immediately hours, Scali asked if the United States at­ Kennedy administration interpreted the "of­ publicized the communication. Khrushchev tacked Cuba, "would West Berlin be occu­ fer" from the KGB representative as an had upped the ante.