Copyright by Jessica Lynn Miner 2006 The Dissertation Committee for Jessica Lynn Miner certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Crowning Thersites: The Relevance of Invective in Athenian Forensic Oratory Committee: __________________________________ Michael Gagarin, Supervisor __________________________________ Laura K. McClure __________________________________ Timothy J. Moore __________________________________ M. Gwyn Morgan __________________________________ Andrew M. Riggsby Crowning Thersites: The Relevance of Invective in Athenian Forensic Oratory by Jessica Lynn Miner, A. B.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2006 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my committee: Laura McClure, Tim Moore, Andrew Riggsby and Gwyn Morgan. I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Michael Gagarin, for his guidance and support since my first-semester Oratory seminar with him back in 1998. Additionally, I have acquired many good friends over the last eight years whom I’d like to thank for the good times. My classmates Stephie, Joann, Dimitri, Susan, and Amanda made it all worthwhile. A special thanks goes to Amanda for discussing comedy with me, reading drafts of my chapters at all stages, and especially for her admirable struggle with trading in the axe for the stiletto. Finally, I am most indebted to Keith, Grant, and Mel who sacrificed at least one night of their life to help me make this happen. I hope to repay you all someday with something more than breakfast tacos and beer. iv Crowning Thersites: The Relevance of Invective in Athenian Forensic Oratory Publication No. _________ Jessica Lynn Miner, Ph.D. The University of Texas at Austin, 2006 Supervisor: Michael Gagarin This dissertation examines the function and relevance of invective in late 4th- century oratory. I bring together recent approaches to performance, humor, and legal studies in order to reevaluate the role of character depiction, and especially character assassination, in forensic rhetoric. Both on the comic stage and in the courts, evoking derisive laughter from the audience was an important mechanism for effecting social control. I demonstrate how the orators draw from Old and Middle Comedy to depict opponents as character types, like braggarts (alazones), flatterers (kolakes), and comic prostitutes (male hetairai/pornoi). I argue further that speakers do not use invective to skirt legal issues; rather, they tailor their arguments about character to the legal charge. In the Athenian system, the concept of legal relevance was broad and subject to manipulation. The only mechanism of restraint on a speaker was the threat of being shouted down (thorubos) by the jury. Invective, therefore, was not automatically “out of v bounds”. Moreover, issues of character and morality were of increasing public concern in 4th-century Athens (as evidenced by Xenophon, Middle Comedy, and oratory alike). To the minds of Athenian jurors, information about character provided important evidence for reaching a just verdict. vi Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1: The Crowned Thersites: Comic Invective in On The Crown 36 Chapter 2: Comic Strategies in Against Timarchus 71 Chapter 3: Invective, Relevance, and Sunêgoroi 108 Chapter 4: Laughing with Low Profile Litigants 145 Epilogue 184 Bibliography 186 vii Introduction ˜ fÊsei pçsin ényr√poiw Ípãrxei, t«n m¢n loidori«n ka‹ t«n kathgori«n ékoÊein ∞d°vw, to›w §painoËsi d' aÍtoÁw êxyesyai… (Dem. 18.3) “It is by nature that all people listen with pleasure to slander and invective, but get annoyed at those who praise themselves…” In this brief but insightful remark near the opening of On the Crown (OTC), Demosthenes asserts two intriguing aspects of invective; it produces pleasure for the listener and it appeals to humankind by nature. His claim thus conveys the importance of invective for orators; if the jury enjoys listening to it, then the orator can benefit from using it. Also important is the implicit counterpoint that the orator can suffer from not using it. Demosthenes’ immediate goal is to argue that he has the harder task—praising himself, while Aeschines has the easier one—attacking his opponent. Incorporating invective into a speech, however, is more problematic than Demosthenes suggests here. Although enjoyable for the listener, invective can also backfire if the speaker does not introduce it carefully.1 In fact, Demosthenes’ statement is the first step toward preparing his audience for his own use of invective since, in this case, it is an important part of his strategy for defending his career. 1 Cf. Cicero De Oratore 2.58. 1 Demosthenes’ positive spin on invective provides a striking contrast to the standard condemnation of it by many modern critics;2 even scholars who do not simply condemn the use of invective in oratory—finding redeeming qualities in its artistry and persuasive effects—tend not to see it as evidence in support of arguments based on laws, but rather as entertaining diversions.3 The use of invective thus forms part of the continuing debate about whether rhetoric (i.e. composing arguments by whatever means necessary to win a case) or legal argumentation (i.e. adhering closely to the laws and evidence) held greater sway in Athenian litigation. A better understanding of how invective works within the speeches suggests that no such dichotomy exists. Indeed, although invective is thoroughly rhetorical, it is also a form of legal argumentation, and like the law itself, it aims at regulating community behavior and effecting social control.4 In societies such as Athens where no police force existed, verbal punishments and deterrents such as invective take on a primary role in setting standards and enforcing community norms and regulations.5 Interpretations of invective have not yet benefited from recent studies of oratory’s role within a performance culture. In particular, although the connection between invective and comedy is strong, few scholars have explored how invective can be 2 See Wayte 1882, xxx; Lipsius 1905-15, vol. II, 646-651; Bruns 1961, 487; Kennedy 1963, 229; Koster 1980, 76. 3 Usher 2000, 227; 272-73; Harding 1994b; Yunis 2005; Voegelin 1943, 168; Rowe 1966; Dyck 1985; Wankel 1976, 150. 4 Cf. Henderson 1990 who argues that Aristophanic comedy picks up where the law courts leave off, or sometimes fail, by holding politicians accountable for their actions through scathing attacks on the comic stage. He does not acknowledge, however, that this phenomenon occurs in the courts as well. Even if a defendant who is accused of immoral behavior is acquitted, normative community values can be reified informally by the process of laughing at deviant behavior during the course of the trial. 5 Cf. Hunter 1994, 3-6; 96-119; Ober 1989, 148-51; Cohen 1991, 171-202. Cf. also Corbeill 1996. 2 elucidated by Aristophanic and Middle Comic characterizations.6 Since verbal censure was an important mechanism of social control that crossed the boundaries of comedy and oratory, a study of comic invective in forensic rhetoric will allow us to focus on invective’s socio-political, but also legal, function. It is my goal in this dissertation to reevaluate invective in forensic rhetoric; I do this by examining oratorical strategies for incorporating invective into speeches while paying attention to its function within Athenian legal and democratic processes. I. Oratory as performance Recent studies of Athens as a performance culture have opened up new avenues for the interpretation of Attic oratory. Whereas scholars used to examine the speeches primarily as texts, in the past fifteen years they have begun to emphasize the dramatic elements of courtroom procedure.7 Hall’s article on “lawcourt dramas” is a brief point- by-point comparison of aspects of the dramatic stages with various aspects of the courtroom scene: characters, plot, tragedy, comedy, and staging.8 The staging of trials is also illuminated by Blanchard’s recent article on the creation of law court setting as a performance space.9 Duncan and Easterling have investigated the role of acting as taken 6 Koster (1980, 76-77), for example sees oratorical invective carrying on the tradition of what Aristotle calls fiambikÆ fid°a but connects it to Homeric and tragic poetry because of the shared conduit of the speech. But see Rosen 1988 who discusses fiambikÆ fid°a and demonstrates the continuity of iambographic poetry in Old Comedy with Cratinus as the primary conduit. See also Rowe 1966 and Harding 1994b for brief but useful discussions of comic elements in oratory. 7 See Ober 1989, 152-55. 8 Hall 1995, 39-58. 9 Blanchard 2004, 11-31. 3 up by Aeschines and Demosthenes: Easterling concentrates on the orator’s voice and posturing, and Duncan elucidates the conflict between acting and sincerity.10 They both shed light on how the orator is by nature an actor, which implies that his performance is contrived—and yet in a courtroom, he must appear to speak naturally. Wider in its scope is Goldhill’s introduction to a volume on Athenian performance culture. Goldhill posits that “the notion of performance will not merely appropriate ancient materials to a distorting modern framework, but will bring into significant focus a series of related terms, institutions, attitudes, and practices integral to the society of classical Athens in a way which will be especially illuminating for the culture of democracy.”11 Performance is a valuable heuristic tool for understanding Athenian democracy and can, Goldhill argues, be located in four keys themes: agôn (contest), epideixis (display), schêma (physical appearance, constitution, way of life, etc.), and theôria (spectating).12 All four occupy important places in forensic rhetoric. Most of these studies have been interested in the ways in which oratory resembles drama.