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1 Commission on the Defence Forces SUBMITTED by COLONEL 1 Commission on the Defence Forces SUBMITTED BY COLONEL DORCHA LEE (RETD) 1. Capabilities 1.1 INTRODUCTION One hundred years ago this State achieved its independence through force of arms. During the 1939 to 1945 Emergency, the same leadership of the War of Independence, rallied the nation, ready to defend, what was then a new State, but an old country. In 1980, Irish defence spending was at 1.67% of GDP, the Army had a minimal combined arms capability to fight on the battlefield. The Air Corps had jet fighters to defend our skies and the Naval Service had warships capable of naval combat. The Reserve forces were over 15,000, strong enough to ensue rapid expansion in time of emergency. Now, despite being an affluent nation, our defence spending is at 0.27% of GDP, the lowest in the EU. The Army has lost its combined arms capability to fight on the modern battlefield, the Air Corps has no jet interceptor capability, and the Naval Service has not got a single warship capable of naval combat. The Reserve is down to approx 1,700 men and women. Given the historical cyclical pattern of war in Europe, and the unique threat to internal security in Ireland, the steady decline in military capabilities is now at the point where it poses a long-term existential threat to the State itself. 1.2 SUBMISSION OBJECTIVE For this reason, the objective of this submission is mainly to address the parameters of the Defence Force’s primary role “to defend the State against armed aggression.” For the purpose of this Paper, this is referred to as the “national defence” role, the term most used internationally. This makes clear that the primary national defence consideration is the sovereignty and independence of the Irish State. The White Paper 2015, and as amended in 2019, is the main guideline on Government defence policy. However, it was not originally designed to answer all the questions required by the Commission. This submission attempts to address other factors not covered, but which are relevant to the DF’s (Defence Force’s) primary Role:-- ---the requirement for a defence concept, underwriting the State’s Defence Policy, ---the prioritisation of threats to the State, and ---the capabilities required for the DF to fulfil its primary role of national defence. The submission accepts the Government policy of military neutrality. This means that the DF is required to achieve its primary role of national defence without entering into an international defence alliance. It does not preclude defence cooperation with other states and international organisations. 2 The primary role of national defence is presented in the following sequence:- ---National defence concept, ---Strategic overview, including, ---Identifying threats to national defence, ---military capabilities required to defend against armed aggression. ---Structures, staffing levels and equipment required to give the DF the necessary capabilities to carry out its primary role. 1.3 NATIONAL DEFENCE CONCEPT In the first half of the 21stCentury, no State can successfully defend itself against armed aggression. Historically this may have been possible for large military powers, but that is no longer the case. In the perennial battle for dominance between Attack and Defence, Attack is currently very much in the ascendency. Not even the World’s militarily strongest nations can defend themselves completely. Instead, all nations rely on the deterrent principle. The deterrent principle includes, inter alia, having the necessary military capabilities to make it too costly for an armed aggressor to attack or invade. Just like in home security, unless a house is turned into a fortress, it can be burgled. Deterrent measures are meant to make it too difficult for a burglar, too costly in terms of time and effort, for the likely reward. The wise burglar will avoid the house with a dog, or an alarm system. Same with nation-states. The State must put in place a sufficient degree of active and passive measures to constitute a minimum deterrence against an armed aggressor. The gap in the White Paper is that it neither mentions the deterrence principle, nor proposes an alternative concept. Of course, there are two alternative options. The first is to arm ourselves to the teeth, like, for example, Israel or North Korea, and hope we can, somehow, totally defend ourselves from armed aggression. The second is to surrender at the first confrontation with armed aggression. During the Cold War, there was a view, not in military circles, that we should put up a token or symbolic resistance and then surrender to the most likely belligerent, preferably NATO, rather than the USSR. However, such a surrender in wartime would lead to military occupation by a foreign power, who would of necessity introduce conscription and drag Ireland further into the war itself. As neither of these options are acceptable, I believe that the Commission’s starting position should be to acknowledge the deterrent principle as a key element in our national defence concept. Before focussing on the military capabilities required to provide a minimum deterrent, we need to factor in certain strategic considerations, including a threat analysis. 1.4 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS The dominant strategic geographic consideration is Ireland’s location in the North Atlantic. While Ireland’s operational area is limited to our own territorial land and seas, its area of ‘operational interest’ overlaps with our neighbours, along the North Atlantic’s Eastern seaboard from Norway to Portugal, and projects half-way across the Atlantic towards the North American Continent. The Eastern North Atlantic can be further broken down into 3 three sectors. The Northern, or Scandinavian Sector, currently the responsibility of Norway and Denmark stretching West to Greenland. The Central Sector, from the Orkneys to the islands off the South Coast of Kerry, which is the responsibility of the UK and Ireland. The Southern Sector, or Franco-Iberian Sector, which is the responsibility of France, Spain and Portugal, stretching West to, and beyond, the Azores. In military terms the weakest link is Ireland. While one would think that at least our geographic location will not change, climate change may well force planners to look at our location in the North Atlantic very differently. The long-term opening of trans-polar sea routes, the increased accessibility to natural resources, and potential interstate disputes over maritime territory, may not happen until after 2030, the end of the period within the Commission’s remit. Still, related decisions, that will certainly impact on national defence, will have to be taken before then, and therefore at least acknowledged by the Commission. To illustrate this point, consider, for example, the time lapse from placing an initial order for a Naval Service vessel until it is eventually decommissioned. This could spread out over 40 years, if, for instance, the Commission decides to recommend, in its Dec 2021 Report, the purchase of a particular ship. The ship could notionally be delivered to the NS in 2025, and, with a projected operational ‘life’ span of 35 years, be decommissioned in 2060. The Commission will need to have expert advice on the extreme weather events, and rising sea levels, that can be anticipated in the 2040s and 2050s. From a historical point of view it is important for the Commission to consider the present and projected future, with an appreciation of the past. This defence analyst always recommends looking back a hundred years. Others consider it necessary to go back to the US Civil War (1861-1865), which is generally accepted as the start point of modern military history, to appreciate the true historical context. On national defence issues, it is recommended to follow the thinking that, “if it happened in the past hundred years, it could happen in the next hundred years.” Ireland’s massive territorial area of 950,000km2 (Maritime 880,000km2 + Land 70,273km2) is a major consideration. It is more than twice the size of Germany’s (357,000km2). Apart from its economic potential the defence implications are enormous. Until recently, Russian Air Force activity in Irish controlled air space was considered to be, at best, a show of strength by Russia in retaliation for EU sanctions, and, at worst, a potential air safety issue. However, recently, Swedish defence analysts have concluded that the Russian exercises in the Baltic, the Arctic Circle and the North Atlantic demonstrate Russia’s ability to cut communications between the US and Europe, in time of tension. The transatlantic cables that come onshore in Ireland are particularly vulnerable. In response, before Christmas, the Swedish Government announced a major boost in defence spending and an increase in the strength of the Armed Forces from 60,000 to 90,000 personnel over the next four years. Moreover, the Swedish Parliament has agreed to discuss possible NATO membership after next year’s elections. Another strategic factor is the future of the UK. If the hypothetical breakup of the UK seems unlikely before 2030, the Commission could be justified in not considering the defence implications of a united Ireland, or the impact of an Independent Scotland, on Irish national defence. At the same time, should the breakup of the UK be brought forward, the Commission’s own strategic conclusions could be overtaken by events. The defence 4 implications for Ireland of Scotland and NI leaving the UK are already being studied outside the framework of government, in academic circles. It is quite possible that publications on this theme will be released by the autumn of this year. The Commission could at least ‘flag’ this strategic consideration for its report. 1.5 THREAT ANALYSIS While the White Paper does identify many of the threats to national defence, they are not co-related or prioritised in a ‘user-friendly’ way for the Commission.
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