1 Commission on the Defence Forces SUBMITTED by COLONEL

SUBMITTED BY COLONEL DORCHA LEE (RETD)

1. Capabilities

1.1 INTRODUCTION

One hundred years ago this State achieved its independence through force of arms. During the 1939 to 1945 Emergency, the same leadership of the War of Independence, rallied the nation, ready to defend, what was then a new State, but an old country.

In 1980, Irish defence spending was at 1.67% of GDP, the Army had a minimal combined arms capability to fight on the battlefield. The Air Corps had jet fighters to defend our skies and the Naval Service had warships capable of naval combat. The Reserve forces were over 15,000, strong enough to ensue rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Now, despite being an affluent nation, our defence spending is at 0.27% of GDP, the lowest in the EU. The Army has lost its combined arms capability to fight on the modern battlefield, the Air Corps has no jet interceptor capability, and the Naval Service has not got a single warship capable of naval combat. The Reserve is down to approx 1,700 men and women.

Given the historical cyclical pattern of war in Europe, and the unique threat to internal security in Ireland, the steady decline in military capabilities is now at the point where it poses a long-term existential threat to the State itself.

1.2 SUBMISSION OBJECTIVE

For this reason, the objective of this submission is mainly to address the parameters of the Defence Force’s primary role “to defend the State against armed aggression.”

For the purpose of this Paper, this is referred to as the “national defence” role, the term most used internationally. This makes clear that the primary national defence consideration is the sovereignty and independence of the Irish State.

The White Paper 2015, and as amended in 2019, is the main guideline on Government defence policy. However, it was not originally designed to answer all the questions required by the Commission. This submission attempts to address other factors not covered, but which are relevant to the DF’s (Defence Force’s) primary Role:-- ---the requirement for a defence concept, underwriting the State’s Defence Policy, ---the prioritisation of threats to the State, and ---the capabilities required for the DF to fulfil its primary role of national defence.

The submission accepts the Government policy of military neutrality. This means that the DF is required to achieve its primary role of national defence without entering into an international defence alliance. It does not preclude defence cooperation with other states and international organisations.

The primary role of national defence is presented in the following sequence:- ---National defence concept, ---Strategic overview, including, ---Identifying threats to national defence, ---military capabilities required to defend against armed aggression. ---Structures, staffing levels and equipment required to give the DF the necessary capabilities to carry out its primary role.

1.3 NATIONAL DEFENCE CONCEPT

In the first half of the 21stCentury, no State can successfully defend itself against armed aggression. Historically this may have been possible for large military powers, but that is no longer the case. In the perennial battle for dominance between Attack and Defence, Attack is currently very much in the ascendency. Not even the World’s militarily strongest nations can defend themselves completely.

Instead, all nations rely on the deterrent principle. The deterrent principle includes, inter alia, having the necessary military capabilities to make it too costly for an armed aggressor to attack or invade.

Just like in home security, unless a house is turned into a fortress, it can be burgled. Deterrent measures are meant to make it too difficult for a burglar, too costly in terms of time and effort, for the likely reward. The wise burglar will avoid the house with a dog, or an alarm system. Same with nation-states. The State must put in place a sufficient degree of active and passive measures to constitute a minimum deterrence against an armed aggressor.

The gap in the White Paper is that it neither mentions the deterrence principle, nor proposes an alternative concept. Of course, there are two alternative options. The first is to arm ourselves to the teeth, like, for example, Israel or North Korea, and hope we can, somehow, totally defend ourselves from armed aggression. The second is to surrender at the first confrontation with armed aggression. During the Cold War, there was a view, not in military circles, that we should put up a token or symbolic resistance and then surrender to the most likely belligerent, preferably NATO, rather than the USSR. However, such a surrender in wartime would lead to military occupation by a foreign power, who would of necessity introduce conscription and drag Ireland further into the war itself. As neither of these options are acceptable, I believe that the Commission’s starting position should be to acknowledge the deterrent principle as a key element in our national defence concept.

Before focussing on the military capabilities required to provide a minimum deterrent, we need to factor in certain strategic considerations, including a threat analysis.

1.4 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The dominant strategic geographic consideration is Ireland’s location in the North Atlantic. While Ireland’s operational area is limited to our own territorial land and seas, its area of ‘operational interest’ overlaps with our neighbours, along the North Atlantic’s Eastern seaboard from Norway to Portugal, and projects half-way across the Atlantic towards the North American Continent. The Eastern North Atlantic can be further broken down into

three sectors. The Northern, or Scandinavian Sector, currently the responsibility of Norway and Denmark stretching West to Greenland. The Central Sector, from the Orkneys to the islands off the South Coast of Kerry, which is the responsibility of the UK and Ireland. The Southern Sector, or Franco-Iberian Sector, which is the responsibility of France, Spain and Portugal, stretching West to, and beyond, the Azores. In military terms the weakest link is Ireland.

While one would think that at least our geographic location will not change, climate change may well force planners to look at our location in the North Atlantic very differently. The long-term opening of trans-polar sea routes, the increased accessibility to natural resources, and potential interstate disputes over maritime territory, may not happen until after 2030, the end of the period within the Commission’s remit. Still, related decisions, that will certainly impact on national defence, will have to be taken before then, and therefore at least acknowledged by the Commission.

To illustrate this point, consider, for example, the time lapse from placing an initial order for a Naval Service vessel until it is eventually decommissioned. This could spread out over 40 years, if, for instance, the Commission decides to recommend, in its Dec 2021 Report, the purchase of a particular ship. The ship could notionally be delivered to the NS in 2025, and, with a projected operational ‘life’ span of 35 years, be decommissioned in 2060. The Commission will need to have expert advice on the extreme weather events, and rising sea levels, that can be anticipated in the 2040s and 2050s.

From a historical point of view it is important for the Commission to consider the present and projected future, with an appreciation of the past. This defence analyst always recommends looking back a hundred years. Others consider it necessary to go back to the US Civil War (1861-1865), which is generally accepted as the start point of modern military history, to appreciate the true historical context. On national defence issues, it is recommended to follow the thinking that, “if it happened in the past hundred years, it could happen in the next hundred years.”

Ireland’s massive territorial area of 950,000km2 (Maritime 880,000km2 + Land 70,273km2) is a major consideration. It is more than twice the size of Germany’s (357,000km2). Apart from its economic potential the defence implications are enormous. Until recently, Russian Air Force activity in Irish controlled air space was considered to be, at best, a show of strength by Russia in retaliation for EU sanctions, and, at worst, a potential air safety issue. However, recently, Swedish defence analysts have concluded that the Russian exercises in the Baltic, the Arctic Circle and the North Atlantic demonstrate Russia’s ability to cut communications between the US and Europe, in time of tension. The transatlantic cables that come onshore in Ireland are particularly vulnerable. In response, before Christmas, the Swedish Government announced a major boost in defence spending and an increase in the strength of the Armed Forces from 60,000 to 90,000 personnel over the next four years. Moreover, the Swedish Parliament has agreed to discuss possible NATO membership after next year’s elections.

Another strategic factor is the future of the UK. If the hypothetical breakup of the UK seems unlikely before 2030, the Commission could be justified in not considering the defence implications of a united Ireland, or the impact of an Independent Scotland, on Irish national defence. At the same time, should the breakup of the UK be brought forward, the Commission’s own strategic conclusions could be overtaken by events. The defence 4

implications for Ireland of Scotland and NI leaving the UK are already being studied outside the framework of government, in academic circles. It is quite possible that publications on this theme will be released by the autumn of this year. The Commission could at least ‘flag’ this strategic consideration for its report.

1.5 THREAT ANALYSIS

While the White Paper does identify many of the threats to national defence, they are not co-related or prioritised in a ‘user-friendly’ way for the Commission. The authors of the White Paper were not thinking of this Commission when they were drafting the paper. It is hoped and expected that briefings on the threat analysis will probably be presented to the Commission, by DFHQ staff, who have all the expertise required to do a first class analysis.

It is common practice for freelance defence analysts, not in the Loop, to maintain and update their own generic lists of threats faced by their own nations and region. In order to have a basis for identifying the necessary DF capabilities, and for the purposes of this submission, I am using my own threat analysis. This was based on the German Defence White Paper on Defence of 2015 but constantly updated since then.

My current generic list, in order of priority is as follows:

Threat number 1: Cyber Attacks. Threat number 2: Epidemics and Pandemics. (Listed number 8 in 2019) Threat number 3: International Terrorism. Threat number 4: Internal security, Threat number 5: Inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Threat number 6: Threats to communications, supply lines and trade routes. Threat number 7: Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear). Threat number 8: Uncontrolled Migration. Threat number 9: Environmental Disasters and Climate Change. Threat number 10: Invasion.

This list is indicative only. It does not include ‘over the horizon’ threats such as environmental warfare, or extra-terrestrial threats such as from asteroids/comets/solar flares. These may rise in prominence over the coming decades and centuries.

The detailed rationale behind this list in not presented in this submission as it would take too long. For example, on my UK list, inter-state and intra-state conflicts are No 4, due to the UK’s involvement in regional conflicts, such as the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the Irish List it is NO 5, reflecting Irish involvement on peace support missions in war zones, currently in Mali and Somalia, but also in Lebanon and Syria (Golan) . NO 5 does not impact directly on Irish national defence but it may do so indirectly.

1.6 MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE DETERRENT PRINCIPLE

If we follow the deterrent principle, the general guideline is to acquire military capabilities that are proportionately comparable to other nations in our region, perhaps modified by additional strategic factors, including the threats to national defence, that may apply in our

case. The comparison factor is also relevant to home security. The house most likely to be burgled is the one that neglects its security disproportionately to its neighbours.

An important point to note is that Ireland is not a small country. The constant repetition by some political leaders that we are a small country is incorrect. Often our alleged smallness is used as an excuse to explain our military weakness. Small implies ‘poor’, which is not the case. We fall into the medium sized group within the UN, EU and the OSCE, by virtue of our population, the extent of our territorial area (land and maritime), and the size of our economy. The World Bank and the (British) Commonwealth classify small countries as having a population of 1.5m or less.

Nor is comparison with other countries of similar size the best example to follow. New Zealand is often mentioned but never had a comparable internal security threat to Ireland’s. Neither has the threat of invasion been as close in New Zealand, as it was in Ireland during WW2, mainly because of its remoteness. Because of its huge maritime area NZ’s defence forces needs disproportionate air and naval capabilities vis-à-vis land forces, than most other nations in the World.

Austria is small and neutral but has no maritime area, hence no navy, other than a few patrol boats on the Danube operated by the Army. Iceland has comparable territorial area to Ireland and is located in an area of strategic importance. Since 1951 it has a defence treaty with the US and is under US military protection. Israel exists under almost constant threat of invasion or attack. Its requirement for deterrent capabilities are at the higher end of the scale, including a nuclear deterrent capability.

In my opinion, for comparison, the Commission should stick to medium sized West European nations that do not have borders directly with larger nations that are hostile. For this reason, comparison with Finland, Greece or states that were part of the former USSR are excluded.

By a process of elimination, the following countries are the most relevant, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.

1.7 CRITERIA FOR COMPARISON

For the purposes of meeting the minimum requirements of the deterrent principle, the two main internationally recognised criteria of comparison are the % of GDP spent on defence, and the % of its population serving in the Armed Forces/Defences Forces, including its reserve. The latter is usually expressed as persons per 1,000 of the population.

Country POP %GDP Pers per k of Deterrent pop capabilities Belgium 11.6m 0.9%* 3.7 L,M,A, S Denmark 5.8m 1.3% 9.4 L,M,A, S Netherlands 17.1m 1.3% 3.7 L,M,A, S & C Norway 5.4m 1.7% 8.4 L,M,A, S & C Ireland 4.8m 0.3% 2.2 S Portugal 10.2m 1.9% 6.2 L,M,A, S Sweden 10.1m 1.1 % 6.0 L,M,A, S

(notes) L,M,A,S & C stands for Land, Maritime, Air, Space and Cyber *BEL excludes military pensions (0.47%). With pensions included, Bel spends 1.37%. Its ten year plan is to increase defence spending to 1.3 + pensions = 1.77% of GDP. SWE, has a four year plan to increase defence spending to 1.5% of GDP, and pers strength, upped from 6.0 to 9.0 per 1000. All six except IRL have a combined arms capability for land forces, inc main battle tanks, warships capable of naval combat, and jet fighter/interceptors. All seven contribute to the European Space Agency. All seven have a national cyber defence capability. Norway and the Netherlands have cyber offensive capabilities. All except Ireland, have the minimum deterrent capabilities, none have the upper spectrum CBNR (Chemical Biological, Nuclear and Radiological), aircraft carriers, strategic bombers or ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles).

1.8 SUMMARY OF MINIMUM DEFENCE CAPABILITIES FOR IRELAND

Having regard to the minimum deterrent principle, the DF should contribute to national defence in the same proportion as its neighbouring countries. We expect and accept that, in all other areas of Government, the objective is to achieve a ‘world class’ standard. Would we expect the HSE to provide clinics instead of hospitals, manage without consultants and rely on taxis instead of ambulances? Would we expect Government support for Education to stop at primary level and not support secondary schools and universities? Would we expect Michael O’Leary to run Ryanair without jet aircraft? Obviously not, but we expect the Air Corps to defend 950,000km2 of air space without jet aircraft.

As mentioned, in 1980 we had the minimum deterrent capability, including jet fighters, (Fouga Magisters) corvettes and a few main battle tanks (Comets). Our defence spending was at 1.67% of GDP. If we could afford that, then ,we should now be well able to afford the EU average of 1.2%. This should be the target annual running costs for the DF. A major additional equipment programme will be required to bring the DF up to international standards, not all by capital investment. Leasing may be a good option, especially for combat aircraft.

In terms of personnel strength, the figure of 2.2 per 1000 is clearly too low. The target figure should be a minimum of 3.2 per 1000, including reserve forces. In 1980 it was approx 7.5 per 1000. It should be pointed out that the idea of having large numbers of reserve forces has changed over the years. In previous times, wars were rarely spontaneous as they are today. There was usually many months and even years to mobilise and train large forces. The dominant view nowadays is 3:1 Regular to Reserve personnel.

This would indicate a total DF of 16,000, 12,000 in the PDF and 4,000 in the RDF. The current establishment versus this Paper’s new proposed establishment:-

Army : 7520 increases to 9000. Army Reserve decreases from 3885 to 3300 AC (Air Corps) : 886 increases to 1,400. new AC Reserve 200 NS (Naval Service), : 1094 increases to 1,600. NS Reserve (Slua Muiri) from 115 to 500

1.9 CYBER OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY

Because of our current exceptionally weak military capabilities, the State should consider developing a cyber offensive capability. The Defence Forces have the technical potential to create such a capability.

A potential enemy would need to reconsider his options if the target state had the cyber capability to immobilise his missile systems, paralyse his transport network or crash his economy.

2. Structures

2.1 CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE FORCES

In order to fulfil the Roles of the Defence Forces the DF needs to be organised along conventional lines, with broadly similar structures as most other European armed forces. This will also facilitate interoperability with other forces, when required. Our standards should not be less than NATO standards.

However, with a policy of military neutrality we are bound by the rules of, what, the late Col. E.D. Doyle, called the Miniature Army. This means we have to have the entire spectrum of combat support and combat service support to sustain the combat units. Within a military alliance it is possible to survive with missing parts, if allies agree to fill the gap. The big problem with the Miniature Army is that it means having a higher proportion of personnel supporting combats units than it would otherwise have been with larger armed forces.

2.2 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS RE-ORGANISATIONS

It is worth reflecting on lessons learned from previous, post-Emergency, re-organisations of the DF, particularly of the Army. The 1959 Re-organisation was known as the “Integration reorganisation” when the Army was regrouped into six brigades, integrating regular and reserve (mostly FCA). This failed for two reasons. First, the days of large sparsely trained volunteer reserves were already in the past. The second was, it depended on substantial resources to make it work, both in regular Army cadres, transport, equipment and additional finances. However, in the summer of the following year, the Congo operation began, and the resources set aside for the Integration went for the succession of Congo and Cyprus-bound units to follow. When this re-organisation failed the concept itself of integrating Regulars and FCA was wrongly blamed.

In the mid-nineties the “teeth to tail re-organisation” was designed to increase combat capabilities by reducing the number of personnel required to support the Army. It was based on reducing the Army from six to three brigades, and de- integrating the FCA from the regulars. Internationally the “teeth to tail concept” was already discredited, mainly among the larger armies, which had identified the need for more rather than less support staff to sustain modern and more technologically sophisticated combat units. However, there was scope to reorganise the support side, especially logistics, as this area had remained largely un-reformed since the Emergency. Full advantage was taken of computerisation, use if JIT (Just -in-time) supply systems, contracting out services, purchase of larger trucks, reforming administration, devolving decision making to logistics- operational levelling and additional barracks closures.

By 2012 there was no ‘fat’ left in the organisation. The 2012/13 re-organisation was essentially a downsizing operation aimed at retaining a reduced DF with, over the years, a consequential reduction in defence spending from 0.6% of GDP to the current level of 0.27%. The direct and indirect effects of this reorganisation is one of the reasons why the present Commission is necessary.

2.3 COMMAND AND CONTROL

DFHQ is by definition a Joint (inter-component) HQ and the recent practice of assigning middle ranking AC (Air Corps) and NS (Naval Service) officers to DFHQ should continue. It is important that officers who are eventually selected for the top military appointments should have prior DFHQ experience. DFHQ should have a JOC (Joint Operations Centre), where duty officers of all three PDF components are assigned. The JOC could, as at present, also direct Army only operations, but AC and NS should direct their own separate operations from Baldonnel and Haulbowline respectively, similar to Army brigade HQs.

2.4 STRUCTURE-ARMY

The commission will have to examine all aspects of whether the Army should revert to three brigades or remain at two brigades. We now have had over seven years’ experience of operating the two-brigade model. It has shown itself to be dysfunctional in several respects. Operationally, the country is now reduced to two territorial areas, each twice the size of Northern Ireland. Remaining occupied posts are further removed from operational areas, such as the Border. Tasking of two formation HQs, instead of three, makes management of DF resources more difficult leading to too much multi-tasking at unit level, and a further reduction in efficiency.

Training is adversely effected with soldiers required to spend too much time on the road getting to training locations. We now have the ridiculous situation that, for example, Donegal based soldiers, needing to do career courses, have to travel to Dublin for training instead of Athlone. Short cuts through NI are not permitted for military personnel travelling for duty.

Moreover, the disruption to family life for soldiers as a result of the 2012/13 redeployment has turned out to be far greater than was previously estimated. It must be pointed out that soldiers, for the most part, live, work and form relationships close to their home locations. Unlike officers they are less able to afford long distance commuting or secure mortgages to relocate their families. The DF no longer has married quarters to offer soldiers on transfer.

The three brigade structure based on the old Commands functioned quite well and gave the Army a greater geographic ’footprint’. The three Command/Brigade Training Depots used to be well staffed and facilitated soldiers’ travel arrangements. From a DFHQ point of view the three brigade structure also facilitated tasking between training, internal security duties and overseas commitments. It also gave the Army the flexibility of providing a formation-level HQ if Ireland were asked to be a Lead-Nation for a peacekeeping mission.

All six countries chosen for comparison have armies with three or more brigades. Those with only three brigades have, unlike Ireland, substantial combat units not integrated in the brigades. Moreover, brigade organisations in other armies are not always homogenous. It might be acceptable that the third brigade, in our case, has a different organisation than the other two.

The internal security argument is a strong case to revert to a three-brigade structure. None of the countries in Europe with a two or three brigade structure have a comparable internal situation to Ireland. While the closure of Columb Barracks in Mullingar complicates things,

restoring the third brigade, with HQ in Athlone is achievable, if the recommendations on increasing the size of the Army and bringing the RDF (Reserve Defence Forces) back to full strength are also considered.

The threat of future internal security problems in NI, and the nightmare prospects of it spilling over into the South, will remain, until the status of NI is finally resolved. For this reason, it would be prudent to restore the third brigade, as an interim precaution.

It is recommended that the DF develops a cyber-offensive capability, similar to the Netherlands and Norway. If this is agreed, it is recommended that a cyber company-sized unit be created, separate from DIT(Directorate of Information Technology).

The doubling of the ARW (Army Ranger Wing) already in the pipeline is also recommended.

2.5 STRUCTURE-AIR CORPS

The minimum air defence deterrent in peacetime is to have the capability to intercept potentially hostile aircraft over Irish Air Space, and to be able to monitor air movement in Irish controlled Air space. This requires a radar network and a squadron of jet fighters. As regards the jet fighters the ability to have two jets on standby at all times, is the minimum.

More maritime reconnaissance aircraft are required, and additional troop carrying helicopters. The AC should have at least one medium air transport aircraft, capable of moving stores and personnel. This aircraft could support overseas military and civilian humanitarian operations.

The AC will require an approx 50% increase in personnel and the creation of an AC Reserve. (see para 1.8).

The title Air Corps is an anachronism. It is no longer a subordinate ‘corps’ of the Army, answering to an Army HQ, but a component of the DF answerable to a Joint HQ (DFHQ). It should be re-designated as the Irish Air Force.

2.6 STRUCTURE -NAVAL SERVICE

The minimum naval deterrent in peacetime is to have at least one warship (capable of naval combat) deployable at any one time, primarily to participate in multinational operations to protect sea routes and home ports. This will require ideally two frigates which is in line with other navies in the medium group.

A case could also be made for a multi-purpose logistics naval ship which could operate re- supply runs for overseas operations, humanitarian assistance for aid missions, including rescue operations and serve as a mobile hospital.

An increase in naval patrol ships is required to better cover our large maritime area. Wartime tasks such as naval convoy escorts, mine sweeping and mine laying require to be considered given our posture of military neutrality.

The above changes will require increasing the fleet from 9 to 14 warships and approx a 50% increase in NS personnel establishment. (See para 1.8)

The title Naval Service is an anachronism. It is not a separate service but a component of the DF. It should be redesignated as the Irish Navy.

2.7 RESERVE DEFENCE FORCES

For the purpose of this paper, the overall authorised establishment of the RDF (Reserve Defence Forces), at 4,000 remains unchanged, but with the following redistribution:- Army 3,300 Naval Service 500 and a new Air Corps reserve of 200.

The main problem with the RDF is its current strength, approx 1,700 of which 122 are NS. In this submission the reserve strength will be the same whether the Army is at two brigades or three.

The RDF should be trained to a level where they can participate in internal security duties.

3 STAFFING

3.1 BARRACKS CADRES

Operational units are very often hampered by having to staff up administrative appointments required to run, mainly the larger barracks, of the DF. The creation of additional staff to serve as cadres would free up operational units for training and for ACP (Aid to the Civil Power) and ACA (Aid to the Civil Authorities) duties.

The personnel in these cadres do not necessarily have to be military. Indeed, civilian staff, who do not have to carry out periodic military training and other military duties, can often provide better administrative continuity than military, and hence a better service.

However, such operational units should participate fully in barracks security duties.

4 COMMENTS

4.1 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

As stated in Para 1, National Defence is the primary role of the DF. All other roles, however important in their own right, are secondary.

This submission is far from being as comprehensive as this defence analyst would like, but hopefully others will fill the gaps.

The quadrupling of defence spending from 0.27% of GDP to the EU average of 1.2% of GDP, may shock some members of the Commission. This means that the annual defence budget would increase from approx one billion euros to around four billion. However, it could take ten years, and possibly longer, to reach this level of spending, as substantial infrastructure would be required.

By that time, it is even possible that EU Common Defence convergence funding might be available, to ensure a level playing field among Member States in the area of defence spending.

4.2 CONCLUSION

The Commission’s recommendations on the capabilities of the DF to fulfil its primary role, must meet comparable and proportionate criteria based on the minimum deterrent principle, and international standards.

The lesson from History is that the undefended nation ultimately loses its independence.