NO. 31 JULY 2019 Introduction

Istanbul Election: Remaking of Turkey’s New Political Landscape? Galip Dalay

Istanbul’s fiercely fought municipal election is over. The opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, won a landslide victory over his rival. The governing Justice and Develop- ment Party (AK Party) has arguably suffered its most severe defeat since coming to power in 2002. The repercussions and reverberations of this election will be deeply felt across the political spectrum in Turkey. This election will have a formative impact on this new period of Turkish politics. Turkey has gained new political actors, for exam- ple İmamoğlu, as a result of this election. The same election has also further opened the way for contestations on the conservative end of the political spectrum. Former President Abdullah Gül, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and former Minis- ter of Economy Ali Babacan are set to break away from the AK Party and form their own political movements. Whether this defeat will lead to a new period of irreversible decline for the ruling AK Party is dependent on what lessons President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan draws from this defeat. Palliative and tactical steps cannot reverse his party’s political decline. Yet, Erdoğan’s ability to undertake necessary reforms and introduce course-rectifying measures is significantly constrained, given the nature of his alliance with the National- ist Movement Party (MHP), the de-institutionalisation of his party, and the personali- sation of power in Turkey. As Erdoğan’s grip on power and Turkish politics is weak- ened, the search for new political alternatives – both at the nation-wide level more broadly as well as on the conservative end of the political spectrum in particular – will gain momentum. These developments, in return, are sowing the seeds of a new political landscape in Turkey.

On 23 June 2019, Turkey’s ruling party lost rerun election in Istanbul on 23 June. The control of Istanbul to opposition candidate gap between İmamoğlu and his main rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, a member of the Repub- former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, was lican People’s Party (CHP). This followed an around 9 per cent. Whereas İmamoğlu gar- electoral battle of more than six months, nered 54 per cent of the vote, Yıldırım which included the period of campaigning received around 45 per cent – according for the local election of 31 March and the to the unofficial results. What made this

victory for the opposition and defeat for the Turkey are attracting even more curiosity governing AK Party more meaningful and and scrutiny than the local ramifications. consequential is the fact that İmamoğlu In any case, the election of 23 June is a had to win the same local election twice in historic moment that will have far-reaching order to become the mayor of Istanbul. He consequences for Turkey. The governing had won the local election in Istanbul on AK Party has arguably suffered its most se- 31 March with a margin of around 0.16 per vere defeat since coming to power in 2002. cent of the vote. Yet, the government – Whether this will be the start of a new with the support of its ally, the far-right trend for the governing AK Party and its MHP – disputed the results and made an coalition partner, the MHP (which together appeal to the Supreme Election Board (YSK) form the People’s Alliance), is dependent on on tenuous charges of electoral fraud and what lessons President Erdoğan will draw irregularities to rerun the election in Istan- from this defeat and what policy and politi- bul. In response, the YSK annulled the cal responses he will offer. This concerns, electoral outcome solely for the post of in particular, what he will do to rejuvenate metropolitan mayor – despite the fact that and institutionalise his party, whether he citizens had cast their votes for all of the will reach out to the AK Party’s previous following posts in the same envelope: political elites to prevent the emergence of metropolitan mayors, district municipality new political parties, and whether he will mayors, city councils, and mukhtars (neigh- change his style of polarising politics and bourhood representatives). personalised governance, as populist poli- Scrapping the outcomes for the metro- tics in Turkey appear to have reached their politan mayoral elections paved the way for climax. But one thing that is clear is that the rerun of the election in Istanbul on 23 Turkish politics have entered a new phase, June, and hence the governing coalition’s and Erdoğan cannot reverse his party’s major defeat at the polls. This decision was political decline with mere palliative and regarded to be political rather than legal – tactical steps. However, even if he diagnoses across the board. This has created a sense the situation accurately and draws the rights that electoral injustice is being committed lessons from this defeat, his room for re- against the opposition candidate. This sense form and manoeuvre is severely limited, of injustice – which helped to consolidate given the nature of his alliance with the the social base of the opposition bloc and nationalist MHP, the de-institutionalisation further disillusioned a segment of educated of his party, and the personalisation of upper-middle-class conservative voters, cou- power in Turkey. His political choices in pled with İmamoğlu’s dynamic campaign recent years have created path dependen- strategy and Kurdish dissatisfaction with cies that cannot be easily reversed. the ruling party – worked in favour of İma- moğlu and contributed to Yıldırım’s final and decisive defeat in the race. A compari- Reverse of Turkey’s 1994 Moment son between the electoral outcomes of 31 March and 23 June confirms this. Although The symbolism of this election was unmis- the difference between both candidates’ takeable. Municipal elections normally votes on 31 March stood at around 13,000, have a limited impact on the political direc- this gap increased to around 800,000 on 23 tion of a country. Yet, in post–Cold War June – in both cases in favour of İmamoğlu. Turkey, two municipal elections – in 1994 Despite being local elections, both the and 2019 – proved otherwise. In the local local election on 31 March in Turkey and elections of 1994, the pro-Islamic Welfare the rerun election on 23 June in Istanbul Party (Refah Partisi) won the municipalities were fought on national terms. The national of the country’s two largest cities: Istanbul implications of İmamoğlu’s win in Istanbul and Ankara. The then young and charis- and the opposition’s broader victories across matic 40-year-old, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,

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2 became mayor of Istanbul, which was the to changing Turkey’s political system to start of a journey that later took him to the rerunning Istanbul’s municipal election, top of the political pyramid in the country. Erdoğan has been trying to secure and Melih Gökçek won the municipality of prolong his political power. Yet, all these Ankara – a position that he retained until steps have proven to be grave mistakes that 2017. This election marked the clearest have weakened his power base. To start manifestation of the advent of “political with, the alliance with the MHP has dra- Islam” in Turkish politics and set in motion matically reduced the AK Party’s political a series of events that gave birth to the AK flexibility. The clearest manifestation of Party, which has ruled the country since this occurred in the aftermath of the local 2002. The political discussions in the media, election on 31 March. Following the elec- think tank circles, and academia that tion, Erdoğan spoke of the necessity of followed the 1994 election, both in Turkey forming a “Turkey alliance” in order to deal and abroad, were not about the municipal with the country’s burgeoning challenges. management of Istanbul and Ankara, but Yet, the MHP saw this as the government/ rather focussed on the political orientation Erdoğan testing the grounds to explore the and future of Turkey. possibility of forming a closer working rela- The municipal elections of 31 March tionship with the opposition, if not outright 2019, particularly with regard to the rerun replacing the MHP with a new political ally. of the Istanbul election on 23 June, have a Alarmed by this move, the MHP leader similar flavour. Instead of just pertaining rebuffed this proposal outright and called to the municipalities, the result of this elec- upon the AK Party to be more straightfor- tion is a strong indication of the political ward about its alliance with the MHP. Faced course of the country from here onwards. with what came across as an ultimatum In the end, after the change of the political from the MHP, Erdoğan and AK Party offi- system from a parliamentary to a super cials gave up on their idea of forming a new powerful executive presidency on 16 April political ally and renewed their pledge to 2017, the post of mayor of Istanbul has continue their alliance with the MHP. The arguably become the second most impor- cost of this alliance has been multifold. tant political post in the country – bearing Electorally, this alliance – coupled with in mind that the vice president is an un- the government’s nationalist turn – has elected figure and the parliament has lost driven wedges between the Kurds, educated much of its political weight. Given this fact, middle-class conservatives, and the AK it is highly likely that the new figures rising Party. The loss of major cities (Istanbul, An- in Turkish politics will come mostly through kara, Antalya, Adana, and Mersin) was the the municipalities. In Turkey, politics is not electoral outcome of this alliance. In a sense, only local, but will increasingly become the alliance that Erdoğan had pinned his more municipal. hopes on to win the local elections turned This election is set to bring major con- out to have cost him those same elections. sequences on multiple levels. Policy-wise, this alliance – coupled with the government’s nationalist, regressive, and anti-democratic turns in recent years – Nation-wide Implications has dramatically reduced the government’s scope for policy choices, particularly the First, the rerun of the Istanbul election was ones that will conflict with the MHP’s po- just the latest in a series of major initiatives litical preferences. This, in turn, has aggra- that Erdoğan has undertaken in recent vated Turkey’s political and economic woes years to increase the longevity and durabil- and further undermined the government as ity of his power, but which have produced well as Erdoğan’s political appeal. the reverse effects. To be more specific, Likewise, the new political system, which from forming an alliance with the MHP requires contenders to win more than 50

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3 per cent of the vote in order to become In contrast, the opposition has struck a president, makes Erdoğan dependent on conciliatory chord, played down the politics alliances. Given the increasingly close vote of polarisation, and put the spotlight on share of the People’s Alliance and the oppo- its candidates rather than chairpersons of sition, which roughly stands at around the political parties that formed the oppo- 51 to 52 per cent versus 48 to 49 per cent, sition block. Whereas Erdoğan – and to a respectively, puts the future of Erdoğan’s lesser extent Devlet Bahçeli, chairman of power at risk and in doubt. In particular, the MHP – was the face of the People’s the increasingly visible split within the AK Alliance’s municipal election campaign, the Party casts further doubt on the future of municipal candidates were the faces of the Erdoğan’s political power. In contrast, in a opposition block’s election strategy. Like- parliamentary system, the AK Party would wise, whereas the People’s Alliance invested have maintained its power with a much in the increasing polarisation and solidifi- lower share of the vote total. There would cation of the political and identity divides have been less of a need to form alliances of Turkey in order to secure victory, the op- in order to continue ruling the country. position block saw its fortune in lowering Lastly, the decision to rerun the Istanbul the level of polarisation and de-solidifying election has further tainted the AK Party’s the political and identity divides of the coun- political standing – it lost the political and try – given that the opposition needed to moral high ground to the opposition, made gain votes beyond its traditional base to win. the divisions within conservative circles When the opposition strategy worked, more visible and louder, and cast İmamoğlu the People’s Alliance changed strategy in as the new underdog of the political system. the aftermath of 31 March and prior to the rerun of the mayoral election in Istanbul. Putting aside the week prior to the election The End of the AK Party’s on 23 June, the government put the spot- Political Hegemony light on its candidate, Binali Yıldırım, rather than on Erdoğan; struck a conciliatory Second, since coming to power in 2002, the tone; tried to mend ties with the Kurds; and governing AK Party has maintained both tried to prioritise local issues over national numerical and political hegemony in Turk- ones in a new campaign strategy. In a sense, ish politics. It was the agenda-setter. It the People’s Alliance’s post-March election defined the political framework in which strategy was the opposite of its pre-March Turkish politics operated. The opposition strategy and resembled that of the opposi- usually played the game that the govern- tion camp. It is a novelty for the opposition ment put forward. Yet, the recent local to be playing the pro-active and agenda- election and developments since then are setting role in Turkish politics. This, in changing this: The government is losing its return, is bringing both an electoral (nu- ability to set the agenda. Instead, in many merical) and political balance to Turkish instances, the government has copied the politics and contributing to the country’s opposition’s political initiatives and strat- democratic resilience. It seems that the gov- egies. The stark differences in the govern- ernment can no longer singlehandedly ment’s pre- and post-March election strat- decide on the parameters of Turkish politics egies and narratives are illustrative of the and define the rules of the game. AK Party’s loss of status as the main agenda- setter in Turkish politics. Prior to 31 March, the government had The Emergence of once again bet on the politics of polarisa- New Political Actors tion, adopted a highly nationalistic and anti-Kurdish discourse, and portrayed the Third, with the weakening of the govern- election in national rather than local terms. ment’s political dominance, the public

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4 sphere and public discussions are likely to ğan’s appeal and weaken the AK Party’s become more varied. As a corollary to this, political monopoly over Turkish politics, the government is likely to face more pub- but particularly over the conservative end lic criticism from different corners of Turk- of the political spectrum. ish society and politics. There are already ample early indications of this trend in the immediate aftermath of the election on 31 The Kurds As the Kingmaker of March. Casting aside its docile posturing Turkish Politics vis-à-vis the government, Turkey’s largest business association, the Turkish Industry Fourth, it is arguable that one of the moti- and Business Association (TÜSIAD), esca- vations for the MHP and AK Party alliance lated its criticism of the government’s to change the political system was that, in actions, particularly its decision to rerun the new presidential system, Kurdish politi- the Istanbul election. Former high-profile cal actors and pro-Kurdish parties were sup- AK Party politicians have become more posed to be marginalised when it came to vocal and public in their criticisms of the deciding about the country’s power struc- government and President Erdoğan. A ture. The assumption was that Turkish poli- chunk of the conservative media circle tics is roughly made up of two main histori- and journalists have also followed suit. cal and identity blocks: a 60–65 per cent In a similar vein, the political cost for conservative-nationalist block versus a 35– new actors to enter the political sphere has 40 per cent secularist-leftist block. In this diminished. This is particularly important scenario, the conservative-nationalist block for the internal divides within conservative was expected to comfortably rule the coun- and government circles. In recent years, try for the foreseeable future. Moreover, ac- there has been growing political dissatisfac- cording to this view, any alliance with the tion among some AK Party political elites pro-Kurdish parties was deemed to be costly about the party and the country’s political for whichever side formed it – hence, it was direction. Three names have been particu- anticipated that both ends of the Turkish larly important in this regard: Abdullah political spectrum would avoid the Kurds. Gül, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Ali Babacan. This was not a completely baseless calcula- Because they are losing hope for the pos- tion. In fact, in forming the alliances, both sibility of change and reform within the AK the People’s Alliance and the Nation Alliance Party, these figures are opting for solutions (opposition block) avoided engaging in any outside of the party. To that end, they are formal relationships with the pro-Kurdish working on two separate political initia- Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Despite tives: One of them is being led by Babacan the fact that Kurdish support was the most and Gül, and the other one by Davutoğlu. decisive factor in the opposition block win- The result of the Istanbul election will ning the major cities, most notably in Istan- provide more motivation and fuel for these bul, this block still felt uncomfortable ac- initiatives. As a reflection of this, the split knowledging this support publicly. from the AK Party will become more visible, In spite of the opposition’s stance, the if not institutionalised. In April, Davutoğlu Kurds voted for the opposition CHP candi- already published his political manifesto, dates en masse. More than helping the oppo- which was highly critical of the govern- sition to win, the motivation for the Kurds ment’s political direction. This manifesto was to defeat the AK Party and MHP coali- can also be seen as providing a framework tion – hence weakening Erdoğan and the for Davutoğlu’s political activism in the AK Party’s grip on power. In fact, the pro- coming period. Likewise, Babacan resigned Kurdish party set two primary goals for from the AK Party. In his letter of resigna- itself in this election: to make the govern- tion, he gave strong indications of forming ment lose control of the major cities in the a new party. This, in return, will dent Erdo- western part of the country, and to win

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5 back the municipalities from the govern- solid, in the absence of a well-developed ment-appointed trustees in the Kurdish- Kurdish policy by the opposition. It was the majority regions in the east and south- HDP’s motivation of defeating Erdoğan that east. Regarding the former goal, the HDP was the Kurd’s major driving force for effec- achieved its aims; regarding the latter one, tively allying with the opposition in the it fell short of the goal it had set for itself. local elections. But this driving force might But overall, the HDP proved to be a durable not be as long-lasting as many think if and decisive actor in Turkish politics. Turkey and the Syrian Kurds find a modus Far from being a marginalised force in vivendi between themselves to move beyond Turkish politics, the Kurds played the role their current conflictual relationship, and of kingmaker in this local election. The in the absence of a coherent Kurdish policy People’s Alliance’s tactic of criminalising from the opposition. The opposition can no and securitising Kurdish politics backfired. longer easily escape the necessity of devel- The frenetic move by the government to oping a Kurdish policy. This policy, or its appeal for Kurdish votes and even try to lack thereof, will define the future of co- enlist support from the leader of the Kurdi- operation with the Kurdish opposition. stan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, as a last resort to prevent the Kurds from voting for the opposition candidate, Ekrem The Meaning of İmamoğlu’s Victory İmamoğlu, in Istanbul was revealing. This election will have a formative impact on this new period of Turkish politics. İma- New Sociological or moğlu differs from other opposition actors Political Reality? in one main way: He can overcome the political constraints of opposition politics No doubt that the Kurds on their own can- by appealing to voters who have tradition- not decide who will rule the country. But ally not belonged to the constituencies of what is increasingly becoming clear is that the opposition parties. In spite of this, what the Kurds, particularly the pro-Kurdish İmamoğlu means for the future of Turkish HDP, have sufficient power to decide who politics is still unclear and in the making. will not come to power. In this regard, He has deftly diagnosed the political vacuum Kurdish support is both an opportunity as in Turkey. Such an accurate diagnosis – well as a challenge for the opposition. The coupled with being the underdog of the sys- opposition needs to develop a Kurdish tem after the annulment of the March elec- policy that can at least partially meet Kurd- tion results in Istanbul – helped him to ish cultural and political demands. It needs win a landslide victory over his rival. It is to bear in mind that the opposition’s vic- not clear yet whether İmamoğlu will prove tories in municipal elections were not the to be the figure that fills the burgeoning outcome of a new sociological reality, but political vacuum or whether he will be the rather the result of a new political reality. gate-opener for others to fill this vacuum. This new political reality is related to alliance politics, in which Turkish politics is, broadly speaking, divided into two main Is the AK Party Capable of camps: the People’s Alliance (the governing Reforming Itself? coalition) versus the Nation Alliance (the opposition grouping). The Kurds throwing As regards the governing party and Erdo- their weight behind the Nation Alliance ğan, these are the questions they need was the most decisive factor in tipping the to ask themselves: What was defeated in balance in its favour in the local elections. Istanbul? Was it the AK Party’s candidate Such nature of these opposition victories for a municipal post who was defeated? Is in this election makes them fragile, not this the political trajectory of the govern-

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6 ment in recent years? Is this due to the Conclusion AK Party’s current politics? It is crucial for the AK Party to find more clarity about In recent years, particularly since the coup what they think was defeated in Istanbul attempt in 2016, Turkey has experienced on 23 June. fast-paced democratic regression, political The easier answer is to say that the AK decay in concurrence with the country’s Party’s municipal candidate was defeated authoritarian turn, and economic deteriora- by İmamoğlu. Blaming the defeat on tion. These developments have arisen in a Yıldırım might be seen by the governing context where the AK Party and President cadres as a convenient option. But it is clear Erdoğan had almost a complete monopoly that Yıldırım’s loss to İmamoğlu is only over Turkish politics. With the recent elec- part of the story, arguably a minor part. tion in Istanbul, the AK Party’s power mo- What happened on 23 June in Istanbul was nopoly has been diminished – new actors much more than this. The fact that the are, and will be, entering the Turkish politi- election was fought on national terms cal and public spheres. Istanbul has gen- rather than local ones; that Erdoğan was erally played the role of trend-setter in the most prominent face of the governing Turkish politics. It appears that it will again coalition’s campaign; that the AK Party’s play the same role. nationalist turn and its alliance with the MHP were what primarily drove the Kurds Scenarios to vote for İmamoğlu; and that a segment of the educated middle-class conservative One of the immediate manifestations of voters have grown increasingly dissatisfied the political course that the government ∎ with the AK Party as a result of Erdoğan’s will take will be defined by its approaches discourse and the political trajectory of the to the newly elected mayors, particularly government and the AK Party in recent those of Istanbul and Ankara. The gov- years all indicate what was primarily de- ernment controls the financial resources feated in Istanbul on 23 June: namely, the and has the legal means to undermine nationalist and polarising populist politics the performances of the new mayors. of the government and the AK Party as well There have been reports that the gov- as Erdoğan’s political parlance, his leader- ernment is contemplating the transfer ship style of recent years, and his alliance of some mayoral authority to municipal with the MHP. assemblies, where the governing party However, even if the AK Party asks the has the majority, and to the governors, right questions and makes accurate assess- who are appointed by the central gov- ments of the defeat and the overall political ernment. If this scenario materialises, situation, it is still not clear whether it can this means that the government will not develop an appropriate prescription for the rectify its political course of recent years, issue and implement it. There is likely to and that tensions between the govern- be a gap between diagnosis, prescription, ment and opposition and political polari- and implementation. Erdoğan’s room for sation will continue unabated. manoeuvre is not that wide, given the The discontent within the AK Party nature of his alliance with the MHP, his will likely give birth to new parties. The ∎ political course of recent years, and due result of the Istanbul election is set to to the growing distance between him and accelerate this. Currently, Davutoğlu and most of the AK Party’s previous political Babacan are leading two separate politi- elites. cal initiatives. Babacan resigned from the AK Party. Davutoğlu has been vocal in his criticism of the government. Once these political initiatives are formalised and institutionalised, this will bring

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7 more plurality to Turkey’s political scene the incumbent political class, such as Erdo- and terminate Erdoğan’s monopoly over ğan, Bahçeli, the CHP leadership, and Kurd- the conservative end of the political spec- ish political actors; critical political actors trum. within conservative circles such as Davu- The combined impacts of the above two toğlu, Babacan, and Gül; and emerging scenarios will be a further decline in the faces such as İmamoğlu. Such a multiplica- ∎ political fortunes of the AK Party and tion of political actors in itself illustrate the President Erdoğan. end of an era in Turkey – when Erdoğan The Kurds are increasingly playing the and the AK Party had an almost complete role of kingmaker in Turkish politics. monopoly over Turkish politics. ∎ © Stiftung Wissenschaft One of the major factors that could und Politik, 2019 shape the future of Turkish politics is All rights reserved whether the pro-Kurdish HDP’s alliance with the opposition is sustainable. In This Comment reflects contrast, the challenge for Erdoğan will the author’s views. be whether he can drive a wedge be- The online version of tween the Kurds and the opposition – this publication contains without Kurdish support, the opposi- functioning links to other tion’s chance of defeating Erdoğan is still SWP texts and other relevant limited. Two factors will be decisive for sources. this issue. First, the opposition has thus SWP Comments are subject far only shown the gesture of goodwill to internal peer review, fact- towards the Kurds, but it does not have checking and copy-editing. a Kurdish policy and is unlikely to have For further information on one soon. From their stance on the our quality control pro- Syrian Kurds to the fate of the impris- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- oned Kurdish politicians in Turkey, the berlin.org/en/about-swp/ opposition will come under increasing quality-management-for- pressure to develop a Kurdish policy. The swp-publications/ more likely scenario is that the opposi- tion CHP will have an ad hoc policy on SWP Kurdish issues. Second, whether Turkey Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and the Syrian Kurds can move beyond German Institute for the current conflictual relationship is International and another factor that will define the place Security Affairs of the HDP in Turkish politics. The chal- lenge that Erdoğan faces is that he can- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin not continue his alliance with the MHP Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 and initiate a political opening to the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Kurds in Turkey and Syria at the same www.swp-berlin.org time. Therefore, the most likely scenario [email protected] is that the HDP’s alliance with the oppo-

ISSN 1861-1761 sition will continue, but it will be fragile. doi: 10.18449/2019C31 The Istanbul election has ended the political monopoly of the governing party and Erdoğan. Yet, it has not set a clear path for Turkish politics. The future course will be shaped by the actions and interactions of

Galip Dalay is the IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP. The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

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