MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ

Katedra mezinárodních vztahů a evropských studií

Obor Mezinárodní vztahy

The influence of the interpersonal dynamic on the American foreign policy Diplomová práce

Kristýna Dyková

Vedoucí: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D. UČO: 219683 Obor: Mezinárodní vztahy Imatrikulační ročník: 2009

Brno, 2011

Poděkování

Na tomto místě bych velice ráda poděkovala panu PhDr. Petru Suchému, Ph.D. za odborné vedení diplomové práce, za konstruktivní kritiku, rady a čas, který mi po celou dobu věnoval.

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Čestné prohlášení

Prohlašuji, že jsem diplomovou práci „The influence of the interpersonal dynamic on the American foreign policy“ vypracovala sama na základě uvedených použitých zdrojů.

V Brně, dne 22.5.2011 Kristýna Dyková

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Obsah INTRODUCTION ...... 4

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IT´S PROCESSES ...... 6

THE KEY ACTORS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ...... 7

The President ...... 7

The National Security Council and the National Security Adviser ...... 7

The Secretary of State and the Department of State ...... 9

Theoretical models of the American foreign policy process ...... 10

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION ...... 12

CONCLUSION ...... 15

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION ...... 17

CONCLUSION ...... 24

THE NIXON-FORD ADMINISTRATION ...... 26

CONCLUSION ...... 32

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ...... 34

CONCLUSION ...... 41

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ...... 43

CONCLUSION ...... 53

THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION ...... 56

CONCLUSION ...... 61

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION ...... 63

CONCLUSION ...... 70

GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION ...... 72

CONCLUSION ...... 76

CONCLUSION ...... 78

LITERATURE ...... 81

MAIN LITERATURE ...... 81

SUPPORTIVE LITERATURE ...... 82

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INTRODUCTION

When America makes some decision in foreign policy, usually the whole world knows it in a very short period of time, because the politics of one of the most powerful country in the world is important for all actors in the international relations. Before the final result of the decision making process is ready to be made public, there is a long way with a lot of influences which take effect on it.

There are a lot of actors within the American foreign policy process and there is also a need to coordinate their views, interests and approaches. Concerning foreign policy, the main actors are the President, Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. The personal relationships between them are crucial for the smooth foreign policy. The decisions are made by people and those people have different opinions, based on different experiences. By closer look, all those influences are visible on the final decisions and acts, American administrations are doing in the foreign policy.

This thesis is focused on the fact, how the personal relationships between the actors influence the results of foreign policy of USA. Even though the individual level of foreign policy is not topic which is paid much attention to, it is still very important. There are disputes in every administration. It is natural for the people to have different views. The crucial question is, if they will be able to work together and make compromises and how. The situation is always better in the administration, where the members are able to come to the compromise and once it is reached they all speak one voice. On the other hand, it is more complicated when the President needs to choose from the irreconcilable opinion groups, there are “losers” and “winners” and the administration is not able to act jointly. Another problem connected with the inner problems of the administration comes when the dispute leaks into public and it sends over the signals to the foreign governments and partners about the division in the politics.

The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part – theoretical - is focused on the actors of American foreign policy and their position within the American political system, their brief history and development which led to the contemporary role in foreign policy. Those are concretely the President, the Secretary of State and the Department of State and the National Security Adviser and National Security Council. In the first part, there are also described the theoretical models which will be used for evaluation of the particular

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administrations. For that matter, a combination of two types of models is used. The first is the Rosati-Scott model, which has two types - State Department-oriented model and White House-centered model. They focus on the place, where the foreign policy is governed from – either White House or Department of State and the power and influence of the particular advisers. The second type of model is the personal model created by Zbigniew Brzezinski which has three types according to the power of the advisers - Dominant Presidential Leadership (strong National Security Adviser), Dominant Secretary of State and Team arrangement.

The second, practical part will be divided into eight chapters and each will be focused on one administration within the given time frame. For the easier orientation, the periods of Presidents, who were in Office for more than one term, will be described as a whole. The same principle will be applied to those administrations where it came to the change of President during the time in Office; they will be discussed in one chapter - concretely administration of Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford. There will be a small conclusion made at the end of every chapter which will compare the situation within the administration with the pre-set theoretical models.

The third part – the conclusion – will sum up all the knowledge and will try to answer the question: How do the interpersonal relations influence the smooth running of the American foreign policy?

Even though there were persons with competences to a certain degree comparable to the contemporary National Security Adviser, President Eisenhower was the first one, who appointed the first Adviser officially - Robert Cutler - in 1953. That is why the thesis will begin with the Eisenhower administration and will continue to the administration of George W. Bush. Because of the lack of distance and materials, the current administration of President Obama will not be included into the analysis.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IT´S PROCESSES

American foreign policy is a tool of the USA which is the most visible from the outside world. Because of the global approach of America, its foreign policy is significant not only for the American people, but for the whole world. When it is spoken about foreign policy, the people usually mean the definitive result, not the process which leads to those results. The process itself is a complicated mix of opinions, bureaucracy, different approaches, personal ties and relationships, interests, planning and ad hoc reactions.

Within this process, there are a lot of actors behind the final outputs of policy and their interests and approaches go very often against each other. The number of actors, which are included in contemporary foreign policy process, could also be a limiting factor. Except of the President, there is very often the Vice-president, the National Security Adviser and the National Security Council, the Secretary of State and the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Defense, Intelligence, economic departments in case of economic topics. The process is very complex nowadays, as well as the topics and a very high level of coordination and cooperation between the partners is necessary.

The main dividing role of American modern foreign policy history is the Second World War, which showed up the weaknesses of the system. In order to balance all the disadvantages that America had in comparison to the war machineries of Europe and to restructure its own forces, there was a pressure for change. The reaction was the adoption of the National Security Act from 1947, after year-long negotiations, where it was necessary to find compromise between the democratic President and the Congress, in those days dominated by the Republican Party.1 The Act signified main changes of the established patterns. It created new entities within the American foreign and security policy – the National Security Resources Board, Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council. Those changes were not too widely published, because the most visible one was related to the reorganization of military – it established the National Military Establishment (which became the Department of Defense two years later) from the hitherto existing Department of War and Department of Navy. Another military change was also constitution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position.

1 Brown, C.: The National Security Council – A History of the President´s Most Powerful Advisers, p. 4, online text reachable from: http://www.pnsr.org/data/images/the%20national%20security%20council.pdf. 6

THE KEY ACTORS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The President The President is the highest representative of the USA as well as their foreign policy. In this branch, he also has a wide power granted by the Constitution. One of his most important duties is that he is the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the USA (Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 1), he is competent to make treaties (Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2), and is also authorized to appoint the ambassadors (Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2).2

Besides the rights granted to him by the Constitution, the President is factually “the face of America” for the outside world. He is the key player, who determines how the foreign policy process will look like and work during his time in Office. By the choice of the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, their Deputies, the Secretary of Defense and others, he determines the direction of the whole administration.

The National Security Council and the National Security Adviser The National Security Council was established by Section 101 of the National Security Act. The functions were laid out as follows: “to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.“3 The act also gave the National Security Council the additional duties, such as coordinating the needs and interests of the particular agencies; considering all the possibilities (positives and negatives) connected with the foreign policy decisions and setting up the recommendations to the President, when necessary or asked. Those duties have stayed in force up to the present day. The role of the Adviser is to note all the arguments and approaches to the given topic by all agencies in question and either make a compromise, or lay it forward to consider it to the President. It is important to take into question also those possibilities which do not have any proponent within the administration. Since all the opinions are colliding in the National Security Council, it also has to serve as an honest broker or arbiter.4

In comparison to the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser does not have to go through the Congress approval. As a result, the President has absolutely a free hand in

2 The U.S. Constitution And Fascinating Facts About It, Naperville, Oak Hill Publishing Company, 2008. 3 National Security Act, online version reachable from: http://intelligence.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf. 4 Cameron, F.: US Foreign Policy After the Cold War, London, 2003, p. 44. 7

picking up the person which will suit his needs the most. There were objections against that over the time, especially in connection with the very strong and publicly known Advisers such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. There appeared attempts from Congress that the National Security Adviser (and his Deputy eventually) should be an object of Congress approval. One of the most expressing was the Amendment suggested by Senator Edward Zorinsky (D, Nebraska) in 1979.5

In reality, very often comes to overlapping of the competences and influence of National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. It is a result of the vague description of the duties and powers of the National Security Council and the growing complexity of the foreign policy, where the difference between foreign policy and security policy is not easily distinguishable. In this situation, the personalities and relationships between the two of them (respectively three, including the President) are absolutely crucial. While good relations can help to solve even the most complex topics of foreign policy, their disputes can paralyze the whole administration. There are some advantages the National Security Council has in the foreign policy process. It is mainly the factual distance between the President and his advisors – the National Security Adviser´s office is in the same building, few feet apart from the Oval Office. On contrary the Secretary of State his further and cannot therefore be immediately available when the President needs him. Another point is, that the Secretary of State has the whole large bureaucracy oversees (the Foreign Service) as well as the allies and day-to-day business in the foreign policy to take care of. Destler, Gelb and Lake interpret the relations as follows: “The competition for the President´s attention between the NSC and State Department has been linked to a duel between the “courtiers” and “barons.”6

The National Security Adviser has several types how to play his role. He needs to decide whether he wants to be the manager behind the scene and to pay the attention mainly to the questions of interagency cooperation and smoothly running the process; or he wants to exercise his duties publicly and overtake some responsibilities of the Secretary of State. There were both types of National Security Advisers during the history and the office is usually shaped only during the praxis over the years and by the needs of the particular Presidents.

5 Franck, T.: The Constitutional and Legal Position of the National Security Adviser and Deputy Adviser, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 74, No. 3, July 1980, online text reachable from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2201652. 6 Destler, Gelb and Lake in: Cameron, F.: US Foreign Policy After the Cold War, London, 2003, p. 42. 8

The Secretary of State and the Department of State The origins of American diplomacy and the Department of State go as far back as the Articles of Confederation. It was established in 1789 from the initiation of the Congress. At that time, it was clear, that the President cannot be the only one responsible for foreign policy and will need some institution to staff him. Despite being created by the Congress, the Department as well as the leading officer – the Secretary of State were given under the direction of the President.7 The biggest rise of the State Department came during the Second World War, because there was a need for professionals to coordinate the American engagement. But as it was shown later as well – in the times of war, the State Department does not get the full competence over foreign policy and the military departments are more active.

In contrary to the National Security Council, the contemporary Department of State has a large portfolio of duties except of foreign policy. They have to manage the whole Foreign Service, support of the American citizens in foreign countries or discuss the foreign policy with public.

The intense relations between the Department of State and the National Security Council are as long as the history of the NSC. There are discrepancies because of the competences. With the growing emancipation of the National Security Adviser, beginning with McGeorge Bundy, there was always fear and frustration from the State Department that the new institution is taking over the traditional role imputed originally to them. Madeleine Albright pointed out very exactly: “In theory the secretary of state´s job is to formulate and carry out U.S. foreign policy. The mandate of the national security advisor is to make sure all the elements of our national security policies, including defense, diplomacy, and intelligence, move in the same direction. He (or she) is supposed to coordinate policy, not make or carry it out. In practice, however, these lines blur. It is a standard observation in Washington that the only time the NSC and State Department worked together well was when Henry Kissinger was in charge of both.”8

7 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 7. 8 Albright, M.: Madam Secretary – A Memoir, Hyperion, New York, 2003, p. 112. 9

Theoretical models of the American foreign policy process There are several models which can explain the American foreign policy process, but for the purposes of this thesis, the main are two – the Brzezinski model and the Rosati-Scott model.

Rosati and Scott take, in their model, into consideration the fact who is the main adviser to the President in the area of foreign policy and point out two main possibilities:

1. State Department-oriented model – this model, otherwise the Cabinet government, means, that the State Department is the main driving power in the foreign policy process. The Secretary of State has the legitimacy to speak for the President. The State Department-oriented model tends to be open and it would require the President to speak with wide variety of people. Quite a problem in this case could be the fact, that beside the need to engage a lot of people into the process, the President would have to fight with the bureaucracy, which is from the nature not so much flexible as it would be required.

2. White House-centered model – this model is more frequent in the contemporary American foreign policy. The foreign policy process surrounds the National Security Adviser and the National Security Council. All the people have the advantage of serving directly to the President and thereby they can be more flexible and react to the President´s needs. This model is characterized by the closeness and small number of people involved.9

For purposes of this thesis, the personal relationships are very important. For that matter, there are models, which were created by one of the insiders in the foreign policy process, Zbigniew Brzezinski – the former National Security Adviser to the democratic President Jimmy Carter.

1. Dominant Presidential Leadership - according to this model - demands a strong, dedicated President, who wants to be engaged into foreign policy. The President in this case is accompanied by the strong and powerful National Security Adviser with extensive competences over foreign policy. On the other hand, there is a relatively weak Secretary of State, who is in the shadow and his powers are limited.

9 Rosati, J., Scott, J.: The Politics of US Foreign Policy, Wadsworth, 2011, p. 105-107. 10

2. Dominant Secretary of State - in the second model, the dominant component of the system is the Secretary of State, who has all the power over foreign policy. It demands the President not to be too engaged and leave majority of the foreign-policy-making on him. This model usually requires stronger personal commitment between the President and his Secretary. The third actor – National Security Adviser needs to be relatively weaker than the Secretary or not to step into his way.

3. Team arrangement - in the third model, the foreign policy power is equally divided within the President, the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, who are all able to cooperate and smoothly work together.10

10 Brzezinski, Z.: Brzezinski, Z.: Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983, p. 494. 11

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

President Eisenhower had sworn into office with a gloriole of a war hero; a man who was able to bring America to success once already. The international arena and its problems he had to deal with had very significant importance in those times. There was a war in Korea and generally the conflict with the Soviet Union, which was later complicated by the U2 spy- plane incident; a crisis in Suez or a revolution in Hungary. The foreign policy making system, he had created, helped him to manage the foreign policy in the way he wanted, but attributed him the title of a careless and passive President, which was changed only with the help of opening of his archives and the correspondence. He had to deal with the rising competition with Soviets, situation in Latin America, but also the domestic troubles, such as McCarthyism.

In case of Eisenhower administration, it is hard to speak about some specific relations between the key actors. The reason is that the National Security Council only started to establish and institutionalize its position and its role was strictly advisory and co-coordinative. As lately as the term of Gordon Gray, the Council started to be the equal partner of the other government agencies.

The incoming Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was a close friend of the President, he had very similar views and his position as the foreign policy leader was stronger than ever. He came from the long line of politicians and two of his predecessors had already served as Secretaries of State. From the experience of previous administration he knew that the success depends on the closeness of the Secretary of State with the President. That sometimes caused troubles not only for the other cabinet members, but also for the President himself.11 Many people from the administration remembered that the loyalty to the President went very far. In order to always look good, there had to be someone who would take the public fire in case something happened. Schlesinger told to David Rothkopf: “in public, he Eisenhower let Dulles to go out and take the heat on all sort of things like massive retaliation while Eisenhower just smiled and was the good guy.”12 President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles created a very successful foreign policy team, where Dulles acted according to the Presidents instructions, but he was also very much proactive in

11 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 78. 12 Schlesinger in: Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 73. 12

formulating the foreign policy himself.13 Dulles had been offered job in the NSC, but he refused, because the Secretary of State was the only position he was interested in.

The first National Security Adviser ever, Robert Cutler, was former banker who had experience with the NSC process from the Truman years. He was appointed by Eisenhower during his electoral campaign. He created a new structure, which he was encharged to implement as soon as he was introduced to the office. He saw his role as someone who is responsible for the instant flow of information, recommendation and implementations. The structure he created was lately known under the name of “policy hill”.14

Except for the traditional roles in Eisenhower administration, there was one more person, overlapping both – the National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, who helped the President – his name was Andrew Goodpaster and he served as President´s personal aide and played quite an important role in the foreign policy. He was working somehow outside of the traditional system, but his competences were quite wide.15 In the second part of Eisenhower´s term, the Secretary of State Herter did complain about the growing Goodpaster´s role, especially due to the fact that he was transmitting the calls between him and President.16

The division of power in Eisenhower administration was very clear since the very beginning. The extremely strong personality of Dulles and the vision of Eisenhower determined the system to be oriented on the Secretary of State. The National Security Council was slowly establishing itself as a member of the foreign policy team, but its competences very clearly only advisory, as it was Cutler who “carried the title of White house special assistant for national security affairs, but he was not to be Dulles´s competitor. Cutler´s role was custodial, not advisory. He oversaw the NSC´s reorganization and then managed its operations.17

The specifics of Eisenhower presidency was the fact that many of the competences later done by the Presidents were carried out by the secretaries. Barry Rubin noted:

13 Greenstein, F.: Ronald Reagan. Another Hidden-Hand Ike?, Political Science and Politics, Vol. 23, No.1, online text, reachable from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/419769.pdf. 14 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 5. 15 Ibid, p. 6. 16 Noble, B.: Christian A. Herter, Cooper Square Publishers, 1970, p. 299. 17 Immerman, Richard H.: John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U. S. Foreign Policy, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999, p. 47. 13

“Eisenhower foreign policy system was characterized by a strong secretary of state, with wide powers delegated by the president, alongside a weak State Department.” 18 The weak State Department was also result of Dulles´ strong personality, and it did caused troubles for the American foreign policy. Dulles practically cut out the entire State Department from the decision making process and information and tried to lead everything by himself. It happened to be a problem in the moment where Dulles was forced to resign due to his illness and the whole machinery began to be little bit forlorn.

Although Robert Cutler was not in the position (personal or structural) to affect the role of Secretary of State, Dulles had some suspicions about Cutler. Immerman points out: “Dulles attentively, even jealously, guarded his preeminence among Eisenhower´s security advisors. He nonetheless enthusiastically embraced the NSC system. Befitting his position, at each meeting he sat, doodling incessantly and appearing deeply contemplative, by Eisenhower´s right side at a table just large enough to hold the regular NSC members and special attendees.”19

Robert Cutler resigned in 1955 with the diagnosis of exhaustion to be replaced in the fast sequence by two almost invisible Advisers, Dillon Anderson and William Jackson, and he returned back to this position in 1957.

Secretary of State Dulles resigned in April 1959 because of his growing struggles with cancer and he died a month later. His successor became his hitherto Deputy, Christian Herter, a man with both political and diplomatic experiences, but a guy, whose potential was not used under Dulles. Because his boss preferred to do all the work by himself, Herter was practically useless and was considering quitting the job many times.20 Herter had experiences from the occasions he was the Acting Secretary, but the transition to replace Dulles was not easy for him. He didn´t posses the close relationship with the President as Dulles did, but he was more than dignified successor of him.21

18 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 76. 19 Immerman, Richard H.: John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U. S. Foreign Policy, Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999, p. 48. 20 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 91. 21 Christian A. Herter (1959–1961): Secretary of State, online text, reachable from: http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/cabinet/571 14

The successor of Cutler´s second term was Gordon Gray. He brought with the experience from the government service in the Department of Army and very good organizational skills. He was also in a little bit different situation than Cutler. Since President Eisenhower was getting older and went through several health problems and he needed his National Security Adviser to be in a stronger position in order to carry the day-to-day problems. Gordon Gray did elevate the NCS on the level as it is seen today. A very important hoar-stone for that was the Berlin-crisis, which forced the State Department and National Security Council to work together.

CONCLUSION President Eisenhower did make a big step by institutionalizing the National Security System and naming the first National Security Adviser to be responsible for it. In contrary to the later administrations, Eisenhower´s key actors in the foreign policy did not have to solve the power struggle and disputes faced ever since the Kennedy administration. The slowly establishing National Security Council tried to find out its own role and the best way how to fulfill the President´s request for suggestions and coordination.

The Eisenhower system was characterized by a very strong role of the Secretary of State, who was the unambiguously the leader of foreign policy; in its implementing as well as in the process of its creation. The Dulles-Eisenhower regime was an extreme example foreign policy oriented only on the State Department. This pattern changed a little bit with the interplay of various factors - death of Foster Dulles, Christian Herter as a more cooperative Secretary of State, Eisenhower´s fading health; international crisis and least, but not last the figure of Gordon Gray, who did not believe the anonymity and work in the shadows are necessary for the National Security Adviser.

By using Brzezinski´s model, the Eisenhower administration belongs clearly to the second model with a predominant Secretary of State and a strong President, where the National Security Council and the Adviser plays only a secondary role. It was so in both terms and both constellations even though in the Christian Herter – Gordon Gray term, the dominance of the Department of State was not that prominent.

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The Eisenhower administration did set the pattern of behavior in policy-making- process for most of the administrations in the future.

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THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

The Kennedy administration was in power in the times, when the good coordination of the foreign policy was crucial. The problems in international arena were apparent – the complicated Vietnam War; problems with Cuba, starting with the American disaster in the Bay of Pigs and culminating by the Cuban missile crisis. JFK was a very young president, ambitious and full of ideas about how his presidency should look like. His imagining of the foreign policy structure was the State-department-centered model, but his nominations and the people´s personalities changed his notions. It is visible from the memoirs of the White House staff, such as Arthur Schlesinger22: “Kennedy had come to the Presidency determined to make the Department of State the central point, below the Presidency itself, in the conduct of foreign affairs. McGeorge Bundy emphasized that the President wanted no question to arise concerning “the clear authority and responsibility of the Secretary of State, not only in such large scale related areas as foreign aid and information policy, but also as the agent of coordination of all our major policies toward other nations.23 These original plans, the president had, were changed by the inconsonance between him and the Secretary of State.

Dean Rusk was, beyond all doubts, a perfect administration worker. He was very experienced and came through many positions in different parts of the American government and Pentagon. His problem was the fact, that he was not actually such a charismatic foreign policy leader, the Secretary of State should be. According to Schlesinger: “Rusk was a superb technician: this was his power and his problem. He had trained himself all his life to be the ideal chief of staff, the perfect number-two man. The inscrutability which made him a good aide and a gifted negotiator made him also a baffling leader. In consequence, he failed to imbue the Department with positive direction and purpose. He had authority, but not command. One telephone conversation with the President was worth a score of meetings with the Secretary.24 In addition to that, he was always confronted with the president, who, according to several authors, wanted to be his own Secretary of State.25 Rusk was often described as very submissive person and this character was even more strengthened in the army.

22 Arthur Schlesinger served as an advisor of President Kennedy and was very closed to him. 23 Schlesinger, A.: A thousand days: John F. Kennedy in the white House, Houghton Mifflin, 2002, p. 156. 24 Ibid., p. 163. 25 For example Halberstam, D.: The best and the brightest, Modern Library, New York, p. 29. 17

Rusk was really not the president´s first choice. There was a long list of people, who had been taken into consideration first. But by all of them there were some serious problems which made it impossible to nominate them. Mostly it was age (either too old, or too young), but the beliefs (too leftist, republican) were also judged, even the health condition by some candidates played its role.26 It was believed that the Secretary of State will be Adlai Stevenson, but the president nominated him for the ambassador of the USA to the UN. Kennedy´s personal choice for the State was McGeorge Bundy, because their characters were alike and they shared the same view on the important issues as well as the foreign policy problems. But there was an outstanding fact playing against Bundy, by the words of the president himself: “He´s too young. It´s bad enough, that I´m that young, but if there´s a Secretary of State that young it´ll be too much. Besides, he´s a Republican.”27 There were a lot of people lobbying for Rusk - in those times a head of the Rockefeller Foundation. His recommendations were impressive, and made by very influential members of political life, such as Dean Acheson, Paul Nietze or J. W. Fulbright. He was told to be an excellent diplomat, hardworking person, amazingly intelligent and highly responsible. On the other side, he was really serious and professional in the conservative sense. He liked to keep the hierarchical structure and follow the traditional patterns and channels. The word mostly used by others to describe his attitude was conventional. That is why he was irritated by the Kennedy administration style, which was a little bit chaotic, not structured and more than the formal model it was important to have a strong personality, such as McGeorge Bundy or Robert McNamara.

President Kennedy liked Rusk and admired very much his intelligence and self control. But there were other things on which they had very different point of views. Kennedy tried to be as informal as possible, calling his people in the administrative by first names, all but Rusk, who preferred to be formal. Another problem is very well described by the Rusk´s son: “Although grateful for Rusk´s loyalty, Kennedy was baffled by his obsession with confidentiality, for example, by Rusk´s unwillingness to speak his mind freely when others were in the room, fearing that his remarks would be gossiped about around town. A mischievous White House tale, apparently spread by McGeorge Bundy, had Kennedy and Rusk alone in the Oval Office with the president asking Rusk for his views. “There´s still too

26 Viorst, M.: Incidentally, who is Dean Rusk?, Esquire, April 1968. 27 Halberstam, D.: The best and the brightest, Modern Library, New York p. 30-31. 18

many people here, MR. President,” replied Rusk”28 President was not pleased with Rusk´s attitude to the State Department. Under all the dynamic and aggressive people in the administration, he was criticized for the lack of initiatives and new ideas. There were Rusk´s teammates and colleges, who tried to explain this situation: “the problem was that Rusk was a lot less bright than the other people at the table, beginning with Kennedy himself and including Bundy, Sorensen, McNamara and almost all the rest.”29 The people from the administration added a little bit mockingly that he could be a star on Davidson30, but in the American top class of the brains his position is different. But although there was a lot of personal inconsonance between President, Rusk and the other administrative members, President Kennedy never accepted the Rusk´s resignation, though it was offered several times.

If it had been possible in any way, Rusk would have lost his position over McGeorge Bundy. Bundy and the President knew each other slightly from the Boston society clubs and their connection for the foreign policy seemed to be natural. Their characters were much more compatible than it was between the president and Rusk. Both young, ambitious, men of action with clear vision in foreign policy and they agreed (oppositely to Rusk) that sometimes it is necessary to use force to achieve to foreign policy goals. While Rusk was convinced, that there are some problems, which should not been paid attention to, because they will never be solved by American assistance, such as Arab-Israeli conflict or the struggles between India and Pakistan, Kennedy and Bundy had the opposite opinion. The similarity in their tempers was so huge, that some newspapers often used the nickname “president´s alter-ego” for Bundy.31 They shared the passion for informality in acting and they both tried to get rid of paperwork in favor to make the administration more effective. The President especially liked the part of Bundy´s character, which David Halberstam characterized as “dashing, bright, brittle, the anti-bureaucratic man, the anti-conventional man.”32

Bundy was not the “usual” candidate for the Secretary of State. He was almost unknown and what is more important, was a republican. But Kennedy admired his intelligence, his ability to speak clearly and to the topic. Although he was not master- graduated, he previously served as the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences and just a few

28 Rusk, D.: As I saw it, New York, 1990, p. 197. 29 Viorst, M.: Incidentally, who is Dean Rusk?, Esquire, April 1968 30 Davidson is one of the best universities of the American South, which Rusk attended. 31 Bird, K.: The color of truth – McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in arms, New York, 1998, p.189. 32 Halberstam, D.: The best and the brightest, Modern Library, New York p. 57. 19

years later, he become the full professor. His outstanding intelligence was partly the reason, why President Kennedy wanted him in the administration at any price. He did found the perfect place in the White House.

The intentions of President Kennedy when he came into the office were clear – the State Department and the Secretary of State will be the center of foreign policy planning and day-to-day formation. One of the biggest problems which made it difficult to keep this determination were his own ambitions and desire to act in the international arena by himself. His personality and style made it extremely exacting for Dean Rusk to assert himself or to have the decisive word in the foreign policy forming process. Since the beginning of his Presidency Kennedy found that the State Department is not doing the job it was meant to do. He found it slow, big and very rigid and it did not get better after naming Dean Rusk into the office. One of the aspects of this rigidity was Rusk´s attitude to the foreign policy. In his opinion, the Secretary of State should not be visible in the front pages of the newspapers and his aim was to “depersonalize” the Department. He did not even try to change the direction, because he respected the people who were in the office before him.33 According to him, “the things that are well done are almost by definition not heard of because they don´t hit the headlines.”34 There was a specific area in which Rusk´s character was very useful – negotiations with Congress. With his southern temper, he was a crucial man to persuade the key senators to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 196335 and other difficult acts. There was also another area of expertise, where Rusk and his Department of State were excellent. It was the day-to-day diplomacy service, communicating with the embassies and the first diplomatic aid in the situation where it was necessary. The example of the Berlin crisis is very often quoted in this place. The originally meant State-Department-centered model was even more complicated by the very strong personality of the second crucial player – the National Security Advisor. McGeorge Bundy´s character, very similar to president´s made the situation for Dean Rusk lost. Oppositely to Rusk, Bundy had an unlimited and daily access to the President which gave him an outstanding superiority. The President had clearly preferred Bundy in solving the problems because of his abilities to talk and brisk mind. According to some scholars, the relationship was not that complicated how it showed up in the next administrations (where the

33 Viorst, M.: Incidentally, who is Dean Rusk?, Esquire, April 1968 34 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 107. 35 Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963 prohibited the tests in outer-space, atmosphere and under water 20

struggle between Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft or Zbigniew Brzezinski were clear and visible), but it was not a peaceful walk either. In his memoirs, Dean Rusk wrote:”I looked upon McGeorge Bundy and his successor, Walt Rostow, as allies rather than competitors. They and their assistants greatly assisted the State Department in presenting issues and preparing papers and speeches for the president. ... We worked so closely together that I regarded the National Security staff at the White House as almost another wing of the State Department. We had many joint meetings and often came up with combined recommendations for the president.”36 This formulation of words shows how extremely diplomatic he was, because in reality (as it is visible from memoirs and documents of other administrative members) the State Department was absolutely outshined by the Bundy´s staff. In American newspapers Rusk had the nickname “shadow Secretary of State”.37

It is clear from the memoirs of different administrative members that the relationship was not equal and the State-Department-centered model did not work at all. Kennedy´s disappointment with Rusk led to the situation, when Bundy was more and more speaking for the American foreign policy. It was very visible during the Berlin crisis, which solution was almost all directed and led by Bundy. He was also very active in negotiating with France about nuclear weapons, Great Britain or Canada, which is traditionally the job of the Secretary of State. Bundy´s office tried to make the model work, but the rigidity and slowness of the State Department made the things complicated. There is an interesting quote by one of the Bundy-group members “We clarify issues, add facts, comment on political issues the State Department isn´t sensitive to – in effect the President gets a one- or two-page memo from this office, and the State Department memo becomes a back-up document. We honestly wish they´d do the job the first time, but they won´t.”38

To Bundy´s honor, it is necessary to say, that several authors agreed that his role in the administrative was most likely “honest broker”.39 As he appreciated the president´s need for a wide-knowledge from all over the administrative, he brought to him the ideas from everywhere, not just his own. Bundy by himself has once characterized his job as “a traffic

36 Rusk, D.: As I saw it, New York, 1990, p. 518. 37 for example Nünlist, Ch.: Kennedys rechte hand: McGeorge Bundys Einfluss als Nationaler Sicherheitsberater auf die Amerikanische Aussenpolitik 1961-1963, Zürich, 1999. 38 Nünlist, Ch.: Kennedys rechte hand: McGeorge Bundys Einfluss als Nationaler Sicherheitsberater auf die Amerikanische Aussenpolitik 1961-1963, Zürich, 1999, p. 113. 39 See for example Daahler, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 40. 21

cop´s job – to see what gets to the President and what should go elsewhere.”40 Bundy laid forward even the opinions and advices, which were not compatible with his own.

In the memoirs or public speeches, Rusk never said about Bundy anything which would not be full of respect and professionalism. Even Warren Cohen, who interviewed Rusk repeatedly agrees, that Rusk never complained about the fact, that he and his department were practically overshadowed by the NSC and Bundy.41 It is highly possible, that Rusk was in fact convenient with the situation, that Bundy is the more visible. Another fact, which is necessary to take into consideration, is that Bundy never took any action in the areas where Rusk did his job well and Kennedy did not take exceptions. In general, it is possible to say that Rusk and Bundy were satisfied with the situation where they complemented each other. The ability to cooperate together differ them from the next administrations, where the rivalry between this two offices was expressive and made it very complicated to work smoothly. Rusk wrote in his memoirs: “I am rather proud that an inquisitive and diligent press was unable to generate any stories of feuding between Bob McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, his successor, Walt Rostow, and myself – those at the top levels of government. We spent a great deal of time talking things over, in discussions infused with the thought that we were all trying to serve the same president.42

As the relationship was satisfactory on the professional level, there are many questions about the human connection between them. According to the members of the administration, Bundy did not like Rusk, because he was convinced, that Rusk is not as clever as him and he always had problems to cooperate with those people, he thought about as second-raters. The fact that he was Jew and he thought he is something better belonged to his feelings of exceptionality.43 But despite the personal problems they had, they worked together and they were able to come to the basic understanding when it came to important foreign policy issues.

The situation radically changed after President Kennedy´s death in 1963. His successor, former Vice President Lyndon Johnson, had absolutely different character than Kennedy. Unlike him, he saw the importance of the presidency more in the domestic than in

40 JFK´s McGeorge Bundy- Cool Head for Any Crisis, Newsweek, March 4, 1963, volume LXI, No. 9, p. 24. 41 Cohen, W.: New Light on Dean Rusk? A Review Essay, Political Science Quarterly, 03/12/1991, online text reachable from http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?hid=119&sid=8cd548b0-a1c3-4e79-be7b- a951b055b273%40sessionmgr111&vid=9. 42 Rusk, D.: As I saw it, New York, 1990, p. 522 43 Halberstam, D.: The best and the brightest, Modern Library, New York, p. 32. 22

foreign policy. Although the politics was very much continuity, the dispensation of power was visible. The roles in the triangle President - National Security advisor - Secretary of State had also shifted around. Lyndon Johnson was much closer to Dean Rusk than to MgGeorge Bundy. Both Southerners, deeply religious, Johnson respected him. They shared an invisible tie since the Kennedy administration – “the President Johnson saw Rusk as the outcast of the Kennedy Cabinet. He knew a kindred spirit when he saw one. Both had been kicked around by the Arthur Schlesingers and Dick Godwins of the world. The President saw Rusk as wounded and he came to his support. Rusk never forgot that. Rusk immediately acquired a feeling of belonging he never had with Kennedy.”44

McGeorge Bundy was probably in the most inconvenient situation. He kept his responsibilities even after President Kennedy death as his duty to the presidency and country.45 He was one of the people who stayed behind sending another troops to Vietnam and what is more, he had a big disagreement with Rusk because of the idea of bombing the North Vietnam. While Bundy, supported by McNamara, was a big proponent, Rusk opposed this idea very strongly. Bundy did not feel comfortable in the new administration as many of his staff. He left in 1966 to become the President of the Ford Foundation.

His resignation only confirmed the change of the role of Dean Rusk and the stronger competences he had in the new administration. In 1966, the President also signed his NSAM 341: The direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas, which says “... to assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs, I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas.”46 By this NSAM Dean Rusk got the fully competences over the whole foreign policy. President Johnson tried to strengthen his position even more by avoiding calling Walt Rostow, Bundy´s successor the National Security Advisor, but Rusk´s position was already strong.

Bundy´s successor, his former Deputy, Walt Rostow, was much less conflicting person in the administration, but he was highly unpopular by public. Since he was in office during

44 Viorst, M.: Incidentally, who is Dean Rusk?, Esquire, April 1968 45 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 41. 46 NSAM 341: The direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas, online text, reachable from: http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam341.asp 23

the years distinguished by rising public aversion to the Vietnam War, his pro-war opinions made him a frequent target of the peace activists. Rostow was an academic, but he lacked some of Bundy´s abilities to organize and lead. Even when he served under Bundy, his agenda was a long-time planning (his first agreement with Kennedy was to chair the Policy Planning Council). Very useful started to be as well his expertise on economy of developing countries.

CONCLUSION When Kennedy entered the office, he clearly wanted his foreign policy to be oriented on the State Department. He was able to fulfill this requirement from the beginning. His process was open, very wide and decentralized. There was a distinctive number of actors involved. The good example for that could be the ExCom (Executive Committee) process, which was engaged into the decision process over the time of the Bay of Pig invasion. Large Committee, which included a lot of people, supported the President within the collective decision making process.

Over the time, the State Department and the wide model were not able to fulfill the President´s requests for a quick and progressive policy-making process. It was chaired by a very bureaucratic Secretary of State, who was amazing in the day-to-day diplomacy and in dealing with the Congress. On the other side, there was President´s real soul mate that reacted absolutely according to his will and played the role of the traffic cop. The sympathies and personal attachment played an outstanding role in this case. After the beginning, President Kennedy turned from the State Department-centered model to the White House-oriented with a strong dominance of the National Security Council and the Adviser. But it is necessary to mention, that it is highly possible, that there was really no rivalry between Rusk and Bundy and they were both satisfied with the distribution of power as such. Although the decline of the Department of State was not as visible as in the later administrations (Kissinger-Rogers for example), it was clear, that the second man after the President was his National Security Advisor.

The relation between McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk and President Kennedy is possible to place somewhere between the Presidential leadership and Team Arrangement. At that time, Bundy was quite overshadowing the Secretary of State and Kennedy was without any doubts very engaged into foreign policy and they created a very strong and dynamic team 24

together. They were dominant in the given time, but in comparison with the administrations which followed, they were able to cooperate as a team.

The situation changed with the assassination of JFK and Lyndon Johnson becoming a President. The sympathies and character likeness played a significantly important role even in this case. The President was bound more to the Secretary of State, actually from the same reasons, why President Kennedy preferred the National Security Adviser. The origin and the family background seem to be very strong factors. The model set by his predecessor was reversed to the State-department-oriented model and the role of National Security Council was completely suppressed. Walt Rostow withdrew to the shadow of the policy process more than policy creating and the model changed to Dominant Secretary of State Model.

25

THE NIXON-FORD ADMINISTRATION

Richard Nixon´s administration was in power during one of the most turbulent periods of the modern history. Aftermath of the revolutionary year of 1968 and very important changes in the American domestic society; catastrophic situation in Vietnam, which the President-elect promised to end; long-lasting problems in the Middle East; China as a new rising power and of course – the Soviet Union as the eternal enemy of the USA. Richard Nixon was not a political greenhorn when he entered the office in 1969, and he had a clear vision of how his presidency should look like. He served in President Eisenhower´s administration and he admired him a lot for the way he was managing the policy and the people around him. The inspiration by this time was clearly visible in his own presidential system, which was later called the imperial presidency. President Nixon´s desire was to leave a remarkable trace in the history and in his opinion; it was possible only through a very active role in the foreign policy. For that reason, he established a system called cabinet government, which meant to transfer as much responsibilities and duties on the Secretaries as possible. As one of his followers explained his reasons for this decision - “At the heart of Nixon´s plan for the cabinet government was his desire to reduce the president´s role in domestic policy making in order to free his time for foreign policy issues”.47 The foreign policy was the only area of responsibilities which was under the full competence of the President.

When he entered the office, he inherited the foreign policy model oriented on the State Department, how President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk had it. According to many observers and President Nixon himself, he intended since the early beginning to have a strongly centralized foreign policy which would be operated from the White House. More than anything else, according to its importance, the person of the National Security Adviser was discussed. As the President wrote in his memoirs, “From the outset of my administration ... I planned to direct foreign policy from the White House. Therefore I regarded my choice of a National Security Adviser as crucial. Considering the importance I placed on the post, I made my choice in an uncharacteristically impulsive way.”48 This man, whom the president had chosen, was a Harvard professor, publicly not a very much known person, Henry Kissinger. The irony of the nomination is that Kissinger really did not like Nixon. He supported Nelson Rockefeller against Nixon in 1968. Many people around him remember that

47 Friedman, L., Levantrosser, W.: Richard M. Nixon – Politician, president, administrator, Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 332. 48 Nixon, R.: RN – Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Grosset  Dunlap, New York, 1978, p. 340. 26

he had belonged to the anti-Nixon wing in the Republican Party and he had a lot of doubts about his intellect and abilities. His mind was changed with his eagerness to get power. Many authors mention his need to be the center of the attention and habit to act with everybody like with somebody of a lower intelligence.49 The possibility to be in charge of the foreign policy was such a big temptation, that he agreed to be Nixon´s National Security Adviser. Their view of foreign policy was the same, but they never became close or friends. According to Tad Szulc “Nixon had no personal attachment to Kissinger, and he never felt quite at ease with the professor except when they worked together. Nixon and Kissinger spent hours and hours together, just the two of them ... but it was always sort of impersonal, and that´s the way both of them wanted it. They were not on buddy-buddy terms.50 Although they have never established a personal relationship, they were absolutely competent as a working team. Their personalities were compatible and they were one of the strongest teams America has had in the foreign policy. In the words of David Rothkopf: “Nixon and Kissinger cannot fully be seen as separate characters. They were to a large extent two parts of a whole, complementing each other, augmenting each other, often infuriating each other, and in the end creating together the smallest, most powerful, most brilliant, and sometimes – thanks largely to the paranoid and “strange” Richard Nixon – most dysfunctional inner circle of all those that shaped and implemented the international policies of the world´s most powerful nation.”51. Except of President Nixon´s paranoia, they shared the same obsession with secrecy and sometimes a really paranoid distrust of the bureaucracy, which included, on the first place, the State Department.

There was a problem that President Nixon and his National Security Advisor were very alike. They both wanted to be in the spotlights and in the center of attention. This fact sometimes led to a jealousy between them. It was clearly visible with the first Kissinger´s steps into diplomacy with China, where the President was aware that Kissinger will “steal” his fame and glory.52 According to some authors53 Nixon even wanted to remove Kissinger after he was reelected for his second term Kissinger himself wanted to resign, but the power of the Watergate scandal changed the situation.

49 for example: Dallek, R.: Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in power, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p. 93. 50 Szulz, T.: The illusion of peace – Foreign policy in the Nixon years, The Viking Press, New York, 1978, p. 17. 51 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 110. 52 Daahler, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 82. 53 Ibid, p. 89. 27

Another thing the President and the NSA shared was the opinion that people from the State Department are responsible for the majority of the information leaks, which were typical for the Kennedy-Johnson administration and that they are not at all competent to lead the foreign policy. This approach which excluded the people of Foreign Service and embarrassed them very often was a cause of a deep crisis in the Department of State, which affected mainly the motivation and morale.

As both Nixon and Kissinger did not trust the State Department at all, the nominee for the position of Secretary of State was very important. For a good efficiency, it had to be a person with no ambitions or very loyal to the president so he or she would not cross the path of the Nixon-Kissinger tandem. Richard Nixon found such a person - his very old friend William P. Rogers. Rogers accompanied Nixon since his candidature for vice-president in 1953. He accepted the nomination with a full mind, that he will not be the one in charge with the US foreign policy. As he said “I was prepared to play a subordinate role. I recognized that Nixon wanted to be his own foreign policy leader and did not want others to share that role. After all, the man who ran for office and won deserves to make his own decision. I knew that Nixon would be the principal actor and, when Kissinger came along, I recognized that he would be a very valuable asset to the presidency.”54 William Rogers had a great administrative experience in the political life; he served as an Attorney General in the Eisenhower administration, but almost no experience in foreign policy, which fitted the profile the President wanted. He also had many skills which made him a way better Secretary of State then the previous. In the first place, he was a great negotiator, which was a crucial art together with his intellect, which helped him to deal with the most important players in the world politics of those days, such as Chinese, Russians or Vietnamese. Even though the real foreign policy decisions were made somewhere else, he was a great representative of his country. As Tad Szulz wrote in his book “in addition, he was an expert on handling the Congress and the press – problems which have stumped most Secretaries of States in years past.”55

Although Rogers seemed to accept his role in the foreign policy making process, his relationship with Henry Kissinger was really complicated. Henry Kissinger´s nature – obsession with power, secretiveness, unwillingness to cooperate and his persuasion that he is

54 Rogers in: Friedman, L., Levantrosser, W.: Richard M. Nixon – Politician, president, administrator, Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 337. 55 Szulz, T.: The illusion of peace – Foreign policy in the Nixon years, The Viking Press, New York, 1978, p. 16. 28

the only one competent in the field of foreign policy - made their cooperation practically impossible. The combination of these factors together with the Nixon´s intentions made Rogers and the whole State Department being absolutely kicked off from the real politics. The secret meeting with North-Vietnamese or even more hidden first contacts with China during the first years of Nixon´s office were established with no sense of the Secretary of State. Even though Rogers should have received memos and papers with the information about the ongoing political actions, it was not always true. As Szulz pointed out: “Rogers, however, received only a partial version of what had been going on: Kissinger remained obsessively distrustful of him, although he now took William Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and head of the Interdepartmental Vietnam Task Force, into his confidence. But Sullivan and his personal aides were instructed to write out in longhand all papers pertaining to the negotiations so that no typing would be done by secretaries and there would be no danger that Rogers saw any copies.56 Kissinger´s obsession by secrecy and paranoia about Rogers could have the riots in his elitists thinking. He has never taken Rogers as equal to himself, according to his opinion, Rogers did not constitute a threat to him, and so he did not have any need to take him into consideration.

The bitter relationship between the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor quickly became not only President´s problem, but it also leaked into the press. President Nixon by himself described Kissinger´s role as: “he´s psychopathic about trying to screw Rogers – that´s what it really gets down to.”57 In his own memoirs, Kissinger tries to be objective on Rogers, telling that he was usually underestimated, smart and good analyst. What was separating them was their approach to the world politics. He also notes that their personal conflicts created problems for the whole administration and they could have tried to get along better. What is surprising, he says that the leading role in the foreign policy should have the Secretary of State, but it was not possible in their case, because Nixon did not trust the whole Department of State and his own relationship with Rogers was complicated.58

One of the most controversial topics within the administration was the problem of the Middle East. Since the President wanted to be remembered as a peacekeeper, he tried to negotiate some stable relationship between the countries in this region. Because of his Jewish descent, Kissinger was not permitted to lead the diplomacy here and Rogers had the full

56 Szulc, T: The illusion of Peace – Foreign policy in the Nixon Years, The Viking Press, New York 1978, p. 621 57 Dallek, R.: Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in power, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p. 250. 58 Kissinger, H.: Roky v Bílém domě, BB Art, Praha, 2006, p. 38-39. 29

competency. Kissinger hated him for that and often and very loudly disagreed with him. Rogers favored more the diplomatic negotiations, while Kissinger was more pro-Israeli and a hardliner. In this particular topic the personal relationships started to be a problem of the policy realization. As Dallek observes, the Middle East leaders were very well aware of the gap within the American foreign policy and they tried to use that for their own purposes.59

According to Nixon and Kissinger, the role of Rogers and his Department of State was not the actual policy-making process, but managing the day-to-day bureaucracy, the embassies and other things, which he thought about as ceremonial. He shared the view with President, that the everyday organization of the diplomatic relations is too time-consuming and so the State Department cannot and does not have time to the real policy planning and making.60

The model of power changed a lot with the rising scandal of Watergate, which enfeebled the possibilities of President Nixon and took away his time for solving the foreign policy. The less power had the President, the more gained Kissinger. When the affair started to be too much time-consuming for Nixon and he saw, that he is not able to handle the problems of international policy any more, he tried to figure out a solution which would be the best for him to excuse him from that area of responsibilities. According to Szulz - “the logical answer was to transfer maximum authority to the long-neglected State Department, where power would be vested in the secretary of state. But in Nixon´s judgment, this could not be done so long as William Rogers remained at the post.”61 The problem of this solution was Henry Kissinger whose own pride and ego would never agree with the fact, that the Secretary of State, whom he disdained, should have more responsibilities and power. The President was also aware of the fact that Kissinger was practically “blackmailing” him by threatening with resignation if he will not be selected as a Secretary of State. As president Nixon said to Robert Dallek: “He let me know that he would resign if he didn´t get it.62 The unprecedented step which Nixon did by concentrating two Washington hats on one person´s head was preceded by the “forced” resignation of William Rogers.

59Dallek, R.: Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in power, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p. 278. 60 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 118. 61 Szulz, T.: The illusion of peace – Foreign policy in the Nixon years, The Viking Press, New York, 1978, p. 716. 62 Dallek, R.: Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in power, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p. 432. 30

Even though William Rogers was an old friend of President Nixon, he was the Secretary of State in the first place. He was very uncomfortable with Kissinger and his policy full of secretiveness and his practical exclusion of the real politics. When the President met with him personally and “asked for his resignation for the good of the country ... drew heavily on their old personal friendship ...,”63 Rogers did not have practically any other chance than to resign by himself to keep at least some dignity. On the other side, Nixon knew that what he wanted from Rogers was not fair and refused to tell him face-to-face. That happened only after few sharp words from Rogers.64 Rogers´s resignation could be seen as an act of a true loyalty to the President and the country, because for some time the President hoped, that those changes (Rogers´s resignation and Kissinger´s appointment as a Secretary of State) could distract the media from concentrating on the Watergate scandal.

The new model worked somehow. All the power was concentrated in Kissinger´s hand and Brent Scowcroft, the Deputy National Security Adviser, was in charge of the everyday problems of the National Security Council. That was also the model of foreign policy which was inherited by President Ford, after the resignation of Richard Nixon in 1974. Since the very beginning, Ford was convinced that he needed to keep the continuity of the foreign policy. And for that he needed Henry Kissinger. On the other hand, he was advised by his transition team to take away one of Henry Kissinger´s hats. It was thought, that Kissinger is not able to do both jobs effectively and for the good of the country. Although he did not want to make any change, he did later. As he wrote in his memoirs: “I became convinced that Henry ought to concentrate on the Department of State and foreign policy; he shouldn´t have to worry about the mechanics of the NSC.”65

After Kissinger formally left the National Security Council, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, the hitherto Deputy was named into his place. The politics did not change, because Kissinger and Scowcroft were very similar in thoughts and opinions about foreign policy and structure of the NSC. As Gerald Ford noted- “He and Henry thought alike. I knew that their excellent relationship will continue even after I asked Brent to wear Henry´s second hat.”66 Scowcroft and Kissinger not only thought alike, they were a great team, complementing each

63 Szulz, T.: The illusion of peace – Foreign policy in the Nixon years, The Viking Press, New York, 1978, p. 716 64 Dallek, R.: Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in power, Penguin Books, London, 2007, p. 506.. 65 Ford, G.R.: A time to heal – The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford, HarperRow, Norwalk, 1979, p. 323. 66 Ibid, p. 324. 31

other. One of the key ingredients, why their cooperation was so successful, was the Scowcroft´s nature. Oppositely to Kissinger, he was not a leader, but more a team player, more skilled and comfortable with the bureaucratic apparatus, a man, who had education and experience in military, as well as in civil service and his intellect was comparable to Kissinger. What was important, there were no ideological disputes between the two of them - both realists and pragmatist. He managed to cooperate with all the other agencies and with Kissinger at the same time. President Ford tried to balance their power and responsibilities so would correspond to the pattern set up by the National Security Act from 1947, but according to many witnesses, it was not like that. According to Winston Lord, as he told to David Rothkopf -”Henry ran foreign policy when he had one hat, when he had two hats, and when he had one hat again. And Brent was loyal and good with Henry but he was not a balance against Henry.”67 Their compatible tempers were a great advantage for America in the difficult times what matters not only foreign policy but increasingly the domestic one.

CONCLUSION The foreign policy in the administration of Nixon and Ford was an extreme of what can happen when the President and his closest adviser are secretive and independent. They did show how powerful such connection can be.

The foreign policy model in this era was since the very beginning very strongly White- House oriented. In no other administration the exclusion of State Department was that complete and total as in the time of Henry Kissinger in the position of National Security Adviser. The Secretary of State had no real influence over the foreign policy and very often was even not informed about the initiatives which were going on. The personal model was an extreme example of Dominant Presidential Leadership, where the National Security Adviser has all the competences. The model was also supported by the rise of the Watergate scandal. The President had no time and desires to be deeply involved in the foreign policy and Kissinger was the one who was only possibility to supersede him.

When Henry Kissinger shifted to the Department of State, the model changed to State Department-oriented, where the combination of a relatively weak President, a strong

67 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 154.

32

personality and a recessive Secretary of State gave to Kissinger probably the strongest position in the foreign policy all over the times. The personal model for the Ford administration would be Dominant Secretary of State. But with hyperbole, it is possible to say, that the system was more or less Kissinger-oriented. He had and extraordinary power when he was in the National Security Council, and it did not change even when he shifted to the Department of State to became a full time Secretary of State.

33

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION

Jimmy Carter´s administration was under a lot of pressure since the very beginning. The American society, dismayed by the Watergate scandal, gave the privilege of Presidency to somebody who considered himself to be an outsider with no connections to the previous establishment. The shadow of personality and politics of Henry Kissinger hung over the new administration as a big cloud. The fear from the concentration of power in one person was so big that although according to some people Carter would tend to higher concentration of foreign policy within the White House, he sworn in promising to avoid that and be the “managerial president”.68

President Carter entered the campaign and later the office with the plan to make a balanced foreign policy team. He wanted his advisors to be strong personalities, which would discuss all the topics, sometimes disagree and for that matter there will be the President to decide and choose the right approach. As Daalder noted: “He wanted balance among his advisers: they would be like spokes of a wheel, with himself at the center. He was determined that the final decisions on basic foreign policy would be made by me in the Oval Office, and not in the State Department.”69 There are other opinions, which say that Carter indeed wanted to be the primus inter pares, but he originally wanted to emphasize the State Department more and Brzezinski and his team should have work more quietly and not so assertive.70 He chose his appointees according to the theoretical Team Management Model – both advisers were strong personalities and the President should have been in the center. They all met during the work on Trilateral Commission.71

The Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor were Carter´s key decision to make. Cyrus Vance was a “natural” choice for President Carter. He had great establishment and military experiences, he was in the center of problematic issues in the previous administrations and he proved himself to be competent in the crisis management. It seems that the State Department was not criticized insomuch as it was usual in the other administration

68 Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 81. 69 Daahler, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 96. 70 Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 81. 71 Trilateral Commission is an informal think-thank, created in 1973 which put together the scholars and politicians from USA, Europe and Japan to discuss their common issues. 34

for the lack of innovativeness and secrecy. Carter admired Vance´s preparedness and ability to state his judgment in such a way that it was suitable not only for the public, but also for the Congress and other foreign policy players.72 Brzezinski appreciated the same qualities about Vance as the President did. In his memoirs, he wrote, that Vance was greatly informed, dedicated, always prepared and very loyal.73

Zbigniew Brzezinski was the one who was closer to him from both advisors later active in foreign policy. He was his foreign policy advisor and tutor even in times, when Carter had small chances to become a President. Their relationship had never been on the friendship level, but they were very close, partly because they shared the same views. On the other hand, this could be a result of the fact, that Carter was not very experienced in the international topics and the majority of the things he knew, he learned thanks to Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski himself writes in his memoirs that his relationship with the President was “somewhat cold; but in front of groups he is warm and complimentary about me.”74

Many authors, including Carter himself, consider very interesting the fact, that Brzezinski and Vance, when asked during the campaign, advised each other for the job they lately held. According to Brzezinski, Vance was the best to fit into his model of foreign policy and due to Vance Brzezinski would serve as a great National Security Adviser.75 It is necessary to note that in the Carter inner circle there was not unity about both of these appointees and some of them, such as Hamilton Jordan, the White House Chief of staff to be, said he would rather quit, if he sees this constellation of the foreign policy power.76

At the very beginning, both his appointees were in understanding about their roles. Vance expected that “only the president and his secretary of state were to have the responsibility for defining the administration´s foreign policy publicly.”77 The same view was shared even by Brzezinski, who noted in his memoirs that: “Vance, as I saw it, was going to

72 Carter, J.: Keeping Faith – Memoirs of a President, The University of Arkansas Press, 1995, p. 56. 73 Brzezinski, Z.: Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983, p. 494. 74 Brzezinski, Z.: Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983, p. 18. 75 see for example Carter, J.: Keeping Faith – Memoirs of a President, The University of Arkansas Press, 1995, p. 55. 76 Hamilton Jordan in McDellan, D.: Cyrus Vance, RowmanAllanheld Publishers, New Jersey, 1985, p. 36. 77 Vance, C.: Hard Choices – Critical Years in America´s Foreign Policy, Simon Schuster, 1983, p. 35. 35

be the principal negotiator and spokesman; thanks to my closer relationship with Carter, I would work on the inside.”78

A problem was that their views were formed in different circumstances and were very different in the very basics. As an immigrant, who was forced to leave Poland with his family, Brzezinski came to Carter´s services with strong opinions of the world. He was a hardliner in the question of USSR which he saw as an eminent threat to the US security and he did not resist to use force when necessary. Vance was more careful about this topic, which caused troubles in the critical moment of the administration. “Brzezinski thought Vance a victim of the “Vietnam syndrome,” fearful of needed interventions. But it was Vance´s experience as President Johnson´s army secretary that made him suspicious about simplistic notions on the effectiveness of military power.”79 Brzezinski derisively called Vance WASP, or “the once- dominant WASP elite, whose values and rules were of declining relevance. “80 But because of that, he was able to manage the bureaucracy and the State Department apparatus.

One of the biggest discrepancies between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance was caused by the symbolism of the role of the Secretary of State. The riot was the question who will actually be seen as the spokesman of American foreign policy, who will appear in public, travel abroad and meet with the foreign delegations. Together with the fight over the supremacy, there was also another problem and namely the press leaks, which occur in almost every administration and usually the Department of State is blamed for that. In this case, the leaks were very often personal, trying to undermine especially the role of Vance. There was particularly the mutual animosity between the staff of both institutions. They blame each other for the leaks and attempts to make the other look incompetent - Brzezinski as arrogant and self-centered hawk, who is sabotaging every move the Department of State makes and Vance as indecisive and not enough strong to stand up to the President. Brzezinski alone writes in his memoirs, that most of the problems were constructed by the press. He was not

78 Brzezinski, Z.: Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983, p. 36. 79 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174. 80 Cyrus Vance: Cyrus Roberts Vance, a principled statesman, died on January 12th, aged 84, The Economist, Jan 17th, 2002, online text, reachable from: http://www.economist.com/node/939853. 36

too popular and in the vision of the press he was the one with the legacy of Kissinger and was projected in the not friendly prism.81

Another problem came with the ideas of President Carter. Since the very beginning, he wanted his Secretary of State to be somebody as an “educator” to the American public about the policy which was taken. Vance was not particularly keen to be the center of attention of the media. Carter assumed it was not for him, because it is a time-demanding job and usually very uncomfortable. On the other hand, he considered Brzezinski to be “natural center of public attention” and he praised him also for being some kind of lightning conductor for the administration.82

The problem of the supremacy over the foreign policy was not only the two persons and their egos, but it had also the practical implication. As it sometimes happened during the Kissinger-Rogers days, the widely known and publicly ventilated conflicts gave the foreign governments and leaders a useful tool to use for their own purposes. Rubin talks about the destroyed credibility, which - in the times of the problematic relations with the Soviets and international situation which was about to blow up – did not serve to the administration good name. He diplomatically notes that the administration looked out of control.83

The new administration had inherited a few big foreign policy issues, which had to be solved from the Nixon-Kissinger and Ford-Kissinger tandem. Those were the SALT talks with the Soviets; the Middle East policy, which would actually dominate the politics later and the normalization of the relationships with China. The China policy became one of the fields where Brzezinski and Vance had totally different opinions, which resulted from their very basic worldviews. As Rothkopf realizes, Brzezinski´s position was very strict, he wanted to normalize the relations with China in order to weaken and contain the USSR. On the other hand, for Vance, the world was not seen only in the west-east prism and even though he wanted to cooperate with China, he did not want to do it at the expenses of the USA-USSR relations.84 Since President Carter gave the full competence for the China policy to Brzezinski, Vance was practically excluded from the decision-making process, as were all his

81 for example Brzezinski, Z.: Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983, p. 38. 82 Carter, J.: Keeping Faith – Memoirs of a President, The University of Arkansas Press, 1995, p. 56-57. 83 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 176 and 180. 84 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 188. 37

people. At this point, the politics started to look very similar to Kissinger-style policy. The China talks were completely secret, with no one allowed to participate even from the administration, with exclusion of the Congress and other key players. The discrepancies on the very core of the China-policy were accompanied by the fact, that every action Brzezinski did had undermined the SALT talks, which were a priority for Vance. The normalization of the US-China relations was announced a few days before the planning completion of the SALT talks, which undermined the whole work of Vance and caused a huge blow to the relationships between him and Brzezinski.

The SALT talks constituted another big engagement the administration inherited. It was a big issue for the administration but unfortunately, there was another big discrepancy between Brzezinski and Vance which divided the American foreign policy of those times. Brzezinski was a hawk in this topic, who wanted to contain the USSR in every possible way; the cuts were not deep enough for him as well as the détente was too soft. He also wanted to connect the SALT talks, as the main forum with the Soviets, with the other foreign policy actions they did in the whole world. On the other hand, it was mostly Vance who was in charge of the Geneva negotiations and strongly opposed Brzezinski´s ideas. He wanted to close the negotiations into the SALT II Treaty as they were (based on the Vladivostok agreement) and clear the table for the next round. He also opposed the idea to link the behavior of Soviets in the world to the core negotiations.85

This linkage-problem was particularly visible in 1977, when Somalia invaded Ethiopia, which was by that time helped by the Cubans. The administration had to face the situation. Brzezinski saw it in the broader view, trying to persuade Carter to show the military strength and link the behavior of USSR to the ongoing SALT talks. Vance opposed both ideas – in the opposition to the military presence around the Horn of Africa he was backed up by the Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, so no action was provided. But anyway, with the growing tension between USA and USSR, because of the expansive behavior of USSR in the world which culminated by the occupation of Afghanistan and the effect the new China policy had, the SALT II talks were radically slowed down.

There were not many foreign policy issues which could be identified as a visible success, but the Camp David negotiations and the Middle East Policy is surely one of them.

85 McDellan, D.: Cyrus Vance, RowmanAllanheld Publishers, New Jersey, 1985, p. 36. 38

The diplomatic effort in Camp David is also one on the most important moments, when Brzezinski, Vance and Carter were able to work in unity. Carter´s full time presence as well as personal diplomacy together with Brezinski´s willingness to step down; were key elements to the success of the treaty. As Daalder and Destler pointed out: “The secretary of state became the point man for putting things back together after the quick Camp David agreement Carter gad anticipated in early September 1978 did not materialize, and the near-venomos relations between Begin and Sadat threatened to blow the negotiations out of the water ... Vance deserves much of the credit for patiently shaping the Camp David Accords and the text of the peace treaty.”86

The unfortunate fact was that the harmony between Brzezinski and Vance didn´t last too long. Things got complicated in Iran and created the administration´s nemesis, which resulted in Vance´s resignation and paralysis of the politics. The disagreement between the key players was visible since the very beginning of the crisis. Brzezinski advocated for supporting the Shah so he can suppress the revolution by himself. On the other hand, Vance had information that Shah is not able to do so, and his opinion was to connect the administration with some parts of the opposition.87 The situation got more complicated with the American Embassy in Teheran being overrun and grew even more complex in December 1979, when the USSR invaded the neighboring Afghanistan. The opinions collided on the topic whether or not to provide the military action to rescue the hostages. Brzezinski wanted to use the military power as soon as possible, on the other hand, Vance advocated, that it has no political sense, since the administration is dealing with the chaotic situation under the ayatollahs’ and the only way is to negotiate.88 Vance also won the first battle against Brzezinski, who wanted to mine the Iran ports.89

The dead-end situation encouraged Carter to consider the possibility of the military action. Vance had more than one reason to be against it. Since he was in the military structure during the last administration, he did not trust the predictions of the military establishment.

86 Daahler, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 96. 87 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 198. 88 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 174. 89 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 203. 39

He also spent a lot of time in negotiations with the European countries, which already agreed to force the embargo in the way of exchange for non-military action.90

The decision which favored Brzezinski´s more hawkish style was done when Vance was out of the city. When he returned, he tried to summarize his reservations. Zbigniew Brzezinski recalled that in his memoirs as: “Vance stressed that in his judgment progress was still being made in the negotiations, that our allies were beginning to join us in sanctions, and that the rescue would probably result in the loss of some lives.”91 Because of his feeling, that he cannot identify himself with the administration any more, Vance decided to resign without waiting for the rescue mission results. In his own words: “You President Carter would not be well served in the coming weeks and months by a secretary of state who could not offer you the public backing you need on an issue and decision of such extraordinary importance – no matter how firm I remain in my support on other issues, as I do, or how loyal I am to you as our leader.” 92 Much later, in connection to his death, the Economist wrote that Vance was after a long period a Secretary of State, whose resignation was based on his principles.93

After Vance´s resignation, President Carter had to nominate a new leader of diplomacy. He chose two possibilities – the current Deputy Warren Christopher and Senator Edmund Muskie. Since Brzezinski made it clear that he did not want to be the Secretary, Carter decided for Muskie and Christopher as his Deputy. That was necessary, because even though Muskie was active the Senates Foreign Relation Committee, he lacked the diplomatic and practical knowledge. On the other hand, he came with “a broad and mature understanding of our nation itself and its international role, derived from his years as governor and senator,”94 as Carter wrote in his memoirs. Muskie did not have much time to establish his role as Secretary of State, so from one point of view, his relationship with Brzezinski seems to be smoother than the Vance-Brzezinski. Another factor could be that in the remaining time, the administration did not have to face such a big problem as during the last years. Muskie had the same reservation to the Brzezinski-style of politics, but he did not have the possibility to

90 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 195. 91 Brzezinski, Z.: Power and Principle – Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York, 1983, p. 494. 92 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 196. 93 Cyrus Vance: Cyrus Roberts Vance, a principled statesman, died on January 12th, aged 84, The Economist, Jan 17th, 2002, online text, reachable from: http://www.economist.com/node/939853 94 Carter, J.: Keeping Faith – Memoirs of a President, The University of Arkansas Press, 1995, p. 532. 40

change it and as Rothkopf points out, the Carter-Brzezinski duo was only strengthened, because the main factor which tried to make the government equal and counter-weighed – Vance – was no longer on the scene.95

CONCLUSION When President Carter entered the office, he had to take into consideration not only his wishes and desires, but also the heritage which was left to him by the preceding administration. Carter made the promise to be a managerial President and according to that, he chose his National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. What he wanted were discussions between two personalities, both very strong and knowledgeable, and the possibility to choose his own way. What happened in given circumstances was that very often he had to decide between two equal opinions which were in principle both right and both supported by the other members of the government. What was more significant, the discrepancies leaked very often into the press and then into the public and could have been, and were, taken as an advantage by the foreign governments.

Although Carter probably did not want to go into that direction, he ended up in one of the most centralized system during all the times. Since Vance was more emancipated than, for example, Rogers in the Nixon years, the discrepancies were more visible and more important. Brzezinski had the advantage of the physical closeness to the President, he was responsible for all the policy paper drafts, which the President will read, and which Vance often complaint that differed from what was discussed on the meetings. He was also his foreign policy mentor and this fact, together with the closeness caused that even though Carter wanted to protect human rights, balance the relationship with Soviets and talked about international economy, he “had accepted the views of his national security adviser and sounded like another cold warrior.”96

In the Rosati-Scott models of foreign-policy-making process, the Carter administration started as an attempt to be a Team Arrangement in order to stop away from the mistakes and power shifts which were made by the Nixon administration. Although the President may have

95 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 207. 96 National Security Council – the Nixon, Ford and Carter years, online text, reachable from: http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/National-Security-Council-The-nixon-ford-and-carter-years.html 41

been in opinions closer to Secretary of State Vance, he turned under international circumstances (such as Soviet invasion to Afghanistan) to his hawkish National Security Adviser. The model from the end of Carter´s administration was clearly White House-oriented with a strong role of National Security Adviser. In Brzezinski personal models, they tried to have Team Arrangement, but turn out to be the Dominant President Leadership. The President was quite strong and dedicated to the foreign policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski was a strong personality with clear and powerful opinions, which, together with the closeness, gave him the leading role in the decision-making process on the prejudice of Cyrus Vance, who was strong in a different, non-hawkish style and for more in charge of big bureaucracy and offended by Brzezinski´s, attempt to dominate.

42

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The Reagan administration will be later known as the one, which destroyed the Soviet Union. In the critical and important times, such as the culminating relations with the longtime enemy, when it was necessary for America to speak in one voice, the Reagan administration, more than any of the previous, failed in finding a workable pattern of cooperation. Ronald Reagan belonged to the ultraconservative wing of the Republican Party and stepped into power with his anti-soviet and hard-line approach after President Carter, whose credibility was lost after the Teheran crisis and some other failures. He was a heavy critic of the Carter administration inability to “speak one voice” and wanted to do it better by shifting the power in the administration.97 There were many other problems to solve except of the relations with USSR. The situation in Middle East got very complicated and also the security threat started to come from the very close part of the American world – the Central America and Caribbean.

The usual disputes over foreign policy in the administrations are between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser; and the President tries to balance them somehow. In case of Reagan administration, the situation was more complicated because of the specific pre-set of the relations. Reagan wanted to overcome the fight between the two major players on the field of the foreign policy, but in reality he only added fighters. There were paralyzing discrepancies between Department of State and Department of Defense; very active and usually not positive role was played by the group, sometimes pejoratively referred to as Reaganauts – the Reagan´s White House people; and of course the National Security adviser. Since no one in the inner circle (except of Haig, who was held far from the President) had bigger amount of foreign policy experiences, it had led to the disastrous vacuum and chaos in the whole field of foreign policy formulation and implementation.

The figure of the President in the field of foreign policy was in the Reagan´s era more important than ever before. With the disputes between his advisers, it should be the President, who will say the last word and set the path of foreign policy. The problem with Reagan was, that he “was not very interested in foreign affairs except where they touched on his ideological principles. He lacked the background and inclination either to run the process himself or to form a close partnership with someone who could do it for him”98. Others would

97 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 127. 98 Rubin, B.: Secrets of State – The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 204. 43

describe it as “delegated presidency” or “detached view of governing”. Spending a lot of time on his ranch in California, leaving the Office early, or taking a regular nap was seen as the President´s strange habits, which did not help to keep him in touch with what was going on in the administration. There was another problem, which practically paralyzed the whole administration – Reagan´s inability or unwillingness to take side in the conflicts between his advisers. One of the most extreme opinions on that topic is brought by Daalder and Destler who say that the result of his inactions was practically the first-come-first-served model, when all the agencies tried to be the first without the others knowing anything.99

Alexander Haig, the newly sworn Secretary of State, was an over-ambitious, very aggressive and self-minded admiral, who had served under Kissinger and admired his style of policy. Reagan nominated him to be the Secretary according to the advice from the former President Nixon, in whose administration Haig gained his experiences. There were some similarities between Reagan and Haig. They had the same opinion about America´s need to stand a hard-line on the Soviets and both also saw the Carter administration as a way too weak in this area.100 In harmony with the Reagan´s plan to strengthen the role of the Secretary of State, Haig tried to secure his position from the very beginning. But by proposing his memoranda about the foreign policy structure, he came across Meese, who actively “sabotaged” it and never delivered those to the President.101 Haig´s effort to achieve the leading position within the foreign policy was seen by the Reagan´s inner circle as the effort to challenge the President. The big tension established his attempt to call himself the “vicar” of the American foreign policy. He was seen as pathetic, choleric and with a big temper. Important was also the fact that he was the only expert on foreign policy the administration had. The beginning of the end of Alexander Haig was the pathetic speech after President Reagan had been shot on March 30th 1981, when he told the reporters he was in charge of the government right now. It caused a big confusion, because even though the Vice President was in the plane over Texas at that time, Haig would still not be the one in the line of succession. There was a big dispute over what he really meant or not,102 but there was any way the rising

99 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 154. 100 Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 87. 101 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 217. 102 The day Reagan was shot, online text, reachable from: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/04/23/60II/main287292.shtml. 44

feeling, that Haig in fact wanted to keep even the President himself out of the foreign policy, because he took it as his “private property.” Haig stayed in the office for another 15 months before he was practically resigned by the President who told him he accepts his resignation although Haig had not offered one this time.103 The same interpretation – Haig was expected to leave and Reagan accepted his hypothetical resignation - is clear from the Reagan Diaries.104

The thing President Reagan wanted to change was the pattern which was set about the power of National Security Advisers by the previous administrations. The idea was to shift the foreign policy advising back to the State Department and make the foreign policy united. The relatively weak NSA would guarantee that no fight would arise. Reagan had chosen Richard Allen, his long-time companion for his first National Security Adviser. In his own words, his role would be “to staff the president and to leave the policy creation to the real lead dog on the president´s foreign policy team, his secretary of state.”105 Allen´s invisible role was supported by the fact that his access to the President was not smooth and very often he had to go through Edwin Meese, whom he was supposed to report. Meese was one of the “Reaganauts-group” and also overtook the usual National Security Adviser office in the White House. Allen had experiences from the previous Nixon administration, but because of the Kissinger aggressive style of politics, he never became the Security Adviser he wanted to be and later became a critic of Kissinger´s exaggerated role in foreign policy. As Rothkopf noted, Meese was in fact the one acting as a National Security Adviser and sometimes also as a Secretary of State. As the model was supposed to work, Allen and his people should be primarily engaged in the coordination of the foreign policy process over the different agencies and establishing the long-term planning. Everything else, concerning the foreign policy should have been in the competences of the Secretary of State.106 There were practically no troubles in the relationship with Haig, because Allen was almost an invisible person. Richard Allen was convinced to leave the office after the fabricated scandal with bribery.107 Although

103 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 145. 104 Reagan, R.: The Reagan Diaries, Harper Perennial, 2009, p. 90-91. 105 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 215. 106 Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 91. 107 He administrated the interview between the first Lady and some Japanese journalists. According to their habits, they gave him 1000 $ and he save it in his office and forgot about them. More for example Rothkopf, D.: 45

the accusation proved itself to be false, Allen never returned to the administration and there are rumors, that the real reason for his replacement was his poor performance in the interagency cooperation.

Allen´s successor, William Clark, came to the White House from the Department of State, where he served as a deputy for Alexander Haig. He was a personal friend to President Reagan since his governor´s times, which made his position easier. On the other hand, he lacked the foreign policy experience, which get him a hard time by the Senate´s confirmation hearing already.108 Contrary to Allen, Clark had the privilege to report directly to the President and according to that, his credibility rose. Although the relationship between Clark and his former boss, Haig were quite good in the time they both worked in the Department of State, nobody expected them to last after they will metaphorically stay against each other. The obvious problem was that Clark´s managing skills, friendship with President and his personal abilities such as patience started to make the NSC and NSA the player in foreign policy again. Haig took that very hardly, because he was very much concerned about being the only one in charge.

The major discrepancy (among all others) between Haig and Clark became the attempt of European countries to establish a pipeline, which would be able to transport the soviet gas into Western Europe. That went against the Reagan´s strict policy on Soviet Union. On one hand, there were the “hard-liners”, Clark and Reagan, who did not want the project to run at all, the other was Haig and most of the America´s Western European allies, who wanted to make at least some compromise. As per Clark, by negotiating with the Europeans, Haig was betraying the President´s policy and that was inadmissible for him. This conflict culminated during the economic forum in Versailles in June 1982, when Haig lost his temper by being convinced that Clark is trying to lead the foreign policy. The heated argument between the two of them was just beginning of the bitter end of their relationship. The pipeline problem was solved by President Reagan himself by his memorable comment: “They the Western

Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 224.

108 for example Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 91. 46

European governments can have their damned pipeline. But not with American equipment and not with American technology!”109

There was another problem between the views of the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. As the situation in the Middle East went complicated again, this time because of the chaos in Lebanon, which followed the Israeli invasion, the two major players were not able to unite themselves on the problematic what to do with the American soldiers in the area. In the case of Lebanon negotiations, Haig crossed over the line when he had sent his negotiator with instruction without clearing with anyone else, notably with the President. Since Lebanon and the whole Middle East was a very sensitive issue, Haig´s problems with anyone in the administration were just too big and he finally annoyed even Clark, the President took action and fired him.

President Reagan together with Clark made the decision about that who should be the next Secretary of State. Although they did consider the possibility of recalling Henry Kissinger into office, the winner happened to be the former Secretary of Treasury, George Shultz. Clark valued him for being a team player. For many people, Shultz was taken as an ambivalent person. As for example Mulcahy points out: “Shulz´s personal characteristics were widely agreed upon (“conservative, methodical and calm”) as were his administrative qualities (“an incrementalist, a problem solver and a mediator”). Yet these very qualities also earned Shultz criticism: his calm was seen as passivity, his team playing as timidity.”110 Many authors talk about him like a very warm person, who was very patient, but they advert as well on the fact, that he was an economist, so, long time planning, complex view and diplomatic abilities were not exactly his strengths.111 He had other advantages. In opposition to Haig, Shultz did not aspire to be the one, who was taken as a policy maker, he saw himself more in the position of a man, who would bring the decision and policies made and created by the President into effect.112

109 Ronald Reagan in Kengor, P.: The Judge: William P. Clark, Ronald Reagan´s top hand, Ignatius Press 2007, p. 182. 110 Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 93. 111 Christinson, K.: The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), online text, reachable from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2537632.pdf?acceptTC=true, p. 43. 112 Ibid, p. 30.

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At the beginning, especially in comparison to the difficulties, the administration has had with Alexander Haig, Shultz seemed to be the solution and he earned President´s trust. While his relations with the President and also Clark were satisfactory, in his memoirs, he mentioned many times his troubles with the NSC staff, which were incompetent and secretive. Another question was his relation with the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, which many insiders called the “nastiest and most relentless of all the nasty, relentless battles that have riven every bureaucracy of the modern era.”113 The particular problem which they were not able to solve was among others the problem of international terrorism, where Shultz wanted to be strong and respond militarily, on the other hand Weinberger was more moderate and sometimes united with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

William Clark had resigned in October 1983 since he was getting more uncomfortable within the given administration. He was a good replacement for the resigning Secretary of Interior, James Watt. His replacement was a very heatedly discussed topic within the administration. There were two names – James Baker, from the White House people, and Jeane Kirkpatric, the UN ambassador. Because of the strong opposition against both of them, the “winner” was “everybody´s second choice” – present NSA Deputy Robert McFarlane. He came with the experience of the negotiator in the Middle East and managerial experiences which he took over from Clark. What he did not posses, was Clark´s close relationship with the President, and thus such a strong position. McFarlane´s duties were larger than Clark´s from a very simple reason. When he entered the office, the nasty relationship between Shultz and Weinberger was obviously a problem, which President Reagan refused to solve and expected McFarlane to do that. He tried hard, organizing many types of sessions, which should be informal enough to help to break the ice, but he did not succeed. His authority was not strong and since he was not the cabinet member, he was not able to smooth the process.

The relationship between McFarlane and Shultz was not the easy one, though it did not reach the bitterness of the previous administrations. The disputes between them given by the positions they held were very visible as well. Shultz complained in his memoirs, that McFarlane clearly wanted to play prim in the foreign policy process. He also took exception to the McFarlane´s behavior, which he saw as a try to copy Kissinger with his secrecy and

113 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 228. 48

backchannel negotiations.114 There are some people who point that since McFarlane was not able to smooth the relation between Weinberger and Shultz, he started to incline more to Shultz, who appeared to be more willing to cooperate and that allowed to create something like working “Shultz-McFarlane axis”.115

The main question which caused the National Security Adviser McFarlane and the Secretary of State Shultz to cross the swords was the Iran-question. Shultz had sworn into the office in the time, when the Middle East crisis culminated and he should have overtaken the responsibility. From being a strong pro-Arab politician, he underwent a transformation to a strongly pro-Israeli proponent, partly because the Middle East policy he tried to apply were not successful. After the failure of the Middle East policy, Shultz found a new major topic, which he advocated and that was a fight against the international terrorism. There were some notions that he became a little bit obsessed by that topic.116 Even though they stood together in the hard line policy which should be applied against Lebanon, they differ over Iran-policy. On one hand, Shultz´s State Department was standing, as well as Shultz by himself, who considered Iran to be a state which supports international terrorism and therefore it is a non- negotiable partner. On the other hand, there was standing McFarlane, in whose opinion the policy toward Iran should be reconsidered.117 Later, this problem culminated not only by selling the weapons to Iran, but also using the funds for supporting the Nicaraguan Contras. While McFarlane was a proponent and his name was the one most connected with the scandal, Shultz opposed this idea as too dangerous. He was strongly against exchanging arms for the Iranian support and hostages, which proved to be false expectation anyway.118 On this topic, he was rarely united even with the Secretary of Defense. The Iran/Nicaragua operations were kept in secret and it is unclear to what degree was Shultz informed about what is going on. As Amyia Rao stated based on their testimony before the independent commission: “Both

114 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 524. 115 Mulcahy, K. V.: The Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations. In: Rosati, J. A.: Readings in the Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Harcourt Brace 1998, p. 96. 116 Christinson, K.: The Arab-Israeli Policy of George Shultz, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter, 1989), online text, reachable from: www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2537632.pdf?acceptTC=true, p. 36. 117 Iran-Contra and Arms-for-Hostages Scandals, online text reachable from: http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=irancontraaffair&irancontraaffair_key_figures=irancontr aaffair_robert_mcfarlane. 118 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 828. 49

Shultz and Weinberger, known for their vigorous protests against the shipment of arms to Iran described themselves as 'victims' 'frozen out' 'kept in the dark about the entire operation' as the powerful coterie in the NSC with active encouragement from William Casey tried to 'get the President's ear'.”119

In the times when Reagan and his administration were in power, the American public became more and more concerned about the possibility of a potential nuclear war. Reagan a hard liner did not set up the arms control as a priority, at least in the beginning, and in spite of that, or maybe because of that, he signed one of the most important arms reduction treaties – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. In opposition to the previous administration, it was not a point of conflict in this one, because it was fully in competence of the Secretary of State. McFarlane saw the process as connected with human rights and other points and was convinced, that it is the job of the Department of State.120 George Shultz himself confessed that on the matter of Soviet Union, there were no troubles with McFarlane and valued his contribution.121

When Robert McFarlane delivered a personal letter to the President with a note, that he wants to resign on November 30 1985, President Reagan wanted not to stop him, but offered him to stay.122 Although the official grounds for McFarlane´s resignation were the family reasons, there appeared rumors, that his conflicts with George Shultz, and lately primarily the disagreements with Don Regan, President´s Chief of Staff were the real reason. They both have denied that as nonsense, but many insiders talked about Regan´s yearning for power and it crossed with the McFarlane´s once set pattern of policy process – for example Regan´s decision to be present by the private briefing between the President and his National Security Adviser.123 The fact that the relationship between McFarlane and Regan was far from

119 Rao, A.: All the President´s Men, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 38 (Sep. 19, 1987), online text reachable from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4377508.pdf, p. 1596.

120 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 236. 121 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 798. 122 Reagan, R.: The Reagan Diaries, Harper Perennial, 2009, p. 373. 123 Nelson, J.: Poindexter Named as Security Adviser : McFarlane's Resignation Accepted by Reagan; Cabinet Battles Denied, Los Angeles Times, December 5 1985, online version reachable from: http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-05/news/mn-872_1_foreign-policy/2. 50

friendly was confirmed even by George Shultz, who characterized it as “tense and strained”.124

Immediately after the resignation of Robert McFarlane, President Reagan nominated his deputy, Admiral John M. Poindexter, to be the new National Security Adviser. The former Deputy was pushed very hard by Shultz, because Poindexter´s reputation as a “weak Deputy and weak National Security Advisor” would give him a privilege role in the foreign policy. On the other hand, many people were afraid, that exactly that – weak National Security Adviser - will cause troubles for the foreign policy, which had already been chaotic and not very well governed.125 Many authors would agree that Poindexter just did not have the potency for being a good National Security Adviser. Daalder and Destler pointed out: “he had neither skills nor the substantive strength nor certainly the stature to be national security adviser.”126

During Poindexter´s time of being National Security Adviser, the Iran-Contra affair started to be the most time-consuming and explosive agenda. Poindexter did many things connected with this affair behind the back even of the President. It was also a reason, why he was fired after not even a year in the office of National Security Adviser, together with his aide Oliver North. They both had been the centerpiece of the congressional critique for being the major figures of the Iran-Contra affair. In his Diaries, Reagan wrote, Poindexter did not tell him about what was really going on in the Middle East, he understood his resignation, but was not happy to see him leaving.127

McFarlane´s successor, Frank Carlucci, surprised everybody by his willingness to return to the administration. There was another name in play – Zbigniew Brzezinski. But, as Shultz noted, it would have been politically dangerous to bring back a NSA from the Carter administration.128 So Carlucci became a compromise and although he did not stay in the NSC very long, he was quite successful. He knew his position since the very beginning. As he confessed to D. Rothkopf, he was the only one, Weinberger and Shultz were able to agree

124 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 798. 125 Nelson, J.: Poindexter Named as Security Adviser : McFarlane's Resignation Accepted by Reagan; Cabinet Battles Denied, Los Angeles Times, December 5 1985, online version reachable from: http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-05/news/mn-872_1_foreign-policy/2. 126 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 145. 127 Reagan, R.: The Reagan Diaries, Harper Perennial, 2009, p. 453-4. 128 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 842. 51

on.129 He came into the administration with an impressive record of foreign policy as well as administration service. He knew, the National Security Council system has to be remodeled and he was keen to try it. Carlucci had in hands the critique which was put forward by the Tower Commission.130 The results were to formalize the National Security Council process again and practically strengthen its role. It also heavily criticized the President for the lack of managerial skills.

The reorganization and strengthening of the power of National Security Adviser caused a dispute between Carlucci and his Deputy Colin Powel and George Shultz, who did not agree with the Tower Commission results and in his idea, the ideal way would be to weaken the NSA even more. The most painful point for Shultz in the new process was that the new Presidential Directive (NSDD 276) from June 1987 has put the National Security Adviser on the equal level with Cabinet members, by letting him to chair some of the Interagency Groups and making him a member of the Senior Review group.131 In his own words, the problem was that: “... the NCS adviser, a nonstatutory member of the National Security Council, someone who is NOT in the cabinet and NOT subject to confirmations by the Senate or to the accountability of appearances before congressional committees ... to be designated as chairman of NSC meetings.”132 But Carlucci tried only to do what he was instructed to do – bring the NSC back to its advisory and managerial role. The problem was brought to a satisfactory level by shifting the whole process on the lower level. The issues had been worked out by the deputies. Colin Powel stated: “Weinberger had confidence in his seconds. Shultz had confidence in his seconds. Carlucci had confidence in his seconds.”133 Shultz says in his memoirs that he had never have a personal problem with Carlucci, their problems stemmed only in the position and the process view they had.134

For Carlucci, his time as a National Security Adviser became a prelude for being named as a Secretary of Defense in 1987. As it was usual in Reagan´s administration, the new

129 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 252. 130 The Tower Commission was in charge to investigate the Iran-Contra scandal, to interrogate the witnesses and come with a reasonable conclusion. It was chaired by John Tower (R, Texas), Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft. 131 NSDD 276: NSC Interagency Process, online text, reachable from: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd- 276.htm. 132 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 903. 133 Powell in: Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 165-166. 134 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 991. 52

National Security Adviser happened to be the former Deputy, Colin Powell. It was not a decision admitted easily by everybody. Colin Powell, however skilled and talented, was the first African-American on such a high governmental post and what was more important; he was supposed to be (after Admiral Poindexter) the second active-duty officer in the office. He became the National Security Adviser and he felt confident enough: “Over the last ten months, I have been delegated so much responsibility as deputy that I felt fully confident about handling the top NSC job.”135 And he indeed did. After seven years of foreign policy process that was complicated and not organized on every level, there were finally actors, which were able to cooperate together. Powell got more background role than on the visible point of the foreign policy and paid attention more to the actual process. It left the primacy to George Shultz, who had many compliments about Colin Powell, such as experienced, knowledgeable or straightforward.136

CONCLUSION President Reagan entered the office with a clear vision of his future way of governing. It should have been the “cabinet government” with collective decision making process and he also wanted to decrease the power of National Security Adviser, the position which has been very well established and influential during the last administrations. President Reagan had many qualities, but the managerial skills were not one of them. The cabinet government, as well as healthily working foreign policy process acquires the President to play an active role and to be a kind of arbiter. President Reagan, whose managerial style was very often described as “detached” and later influenced as well by the fact, that he was in his late seventies, was not very suitable for that. Because he was not able to take side in the conflicts, it had happened very often that they got from working to personal and (as in case of the Weinberger-Shultz, or Haig-against-all) they paralyzed the normal of foreign policy decision process. Because of the fluctuation and complicated relationships, it is hard to characterize the administration as a whole according to the set models and it must be done by the separate periods.

135 Powell, C.: My American Journey, Ballantine Books, New York, 1995, p. 349. 136 Shultz, G. P.: Turmoil and Triumph – My Years as Secretary of State, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993, p. 991.

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The administration wanted to lower the influence of the National Security Adviser. By trying to find the right level of cooperation, Ronald Reagan´s administration holds the record for fluctuation on this position since its establishing till today - six persons in total. By the first, Richard Allen, the lowering was too much. Allen was practically invisible and even though Haig thought something else, the Secretary of State did play the major role. There had been conflicts with the White House Staff, but the foreign policy was clearly governed by the Department of State. In Brzezinski´s model this would conform to the second model with a passive President, a weak National Security Adviser and a dominant Department of State.

The same model, even though a little bit modified, is possible to use on the relationship Haig-Clark as well, though the NSC came through an emancipation phase during this time. There were many structural as well as personal conflicts between the two of them, Clark possessed the advantage of personal relation with the President and his position as well as the whole NSC was rising.

The model, with prevailing power of the State Department and the slowly rising NSC survived as well the arriving of a new Secretary of State, George Shultz. By the short time, he had to cooperate with Clark he had more problems with the entire NCS staff, which was over secretive and complicating passing the information to the President.

With Clark´s successor – Robert McFarlane, the entirely complicated structure started to fall apart. Secrets of the National Security Council staff and the Adviser, culminating problems between Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, which the President made by his hesitancy only worse and McFarlane was not able to solve, made the administration to look very incompetent. By this period, it is not possible to match any of those models for the whole foreign policy, because it is unclear what a common policy was, what the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense knew and what a “private” policy by the NSC staff was. The same reservations are possible to lift in the case of the next National Security Adviser, Admiral John Poindexter. This period could be taken as a complete breakdown of the foreign policy making and implementing process which led to a public scandal and attempts to reestablish the role of NSC.

The relations between the Department of State and the National Security Council started to normalize during the last two appointees – Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell. They tried to implement the Tower Commission results, which led to the structural conflict with 54

Shultz, but those problems were solved and for first time in the whole Reagan´s administration there was a foreign policy team, whose members were able to cooperate without secrecy and backbiting. By Colin Powell, the NSC went back to the managing role and the primacy in foreign policy was fully overtaken by the Department of State. So they established a pattern of behavior which led to a very successful end of the Reagan´s years.

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THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

Only a few administrations, if any, had the opportunity as well as obligation, to guide America through more turbulent and dynamically changing world than the administration of George H. W. Bush. The situation in the Soviet Union and its satellites was changing every day, the conflicts in the Middle East did not belong to the most stabile; China and Latin America had its own problems which were reflected in the international relations.

George H. W. Bush was perhaps one of the most experienced Presidents ever entering the Office. He served on many positions, diplomatic as well as governmental though different administrations. His Secretary of State, James Baker III, quoted in his memoirs: “I believed in George. He had one of the best résumés in the history of presidential politics – great education, military hero, successful businessman, respected congressman, party chairman, UN ambassador, head of the CIA, envoy to China, and the most active and engaged vice president in American history in one of the most successful administrations in American history.”137 President Bush had a first-hand-knowledge with the press leaks, personal disagreements between particular cabinet members; disasters the exaggerated mistrust and secrecy can have. He wanted to build a team which would not have those problems. From the process view, he created one of the most successful and cooperative foreign policy teams America has ever had. As Tarplay and Chaitkin noted, there were two possible ways, how to get into the President´s inner circle. The first was to belong to the friends, or friends of the Bush family. That is the case of the Secretary of State James Baker III. The second way was to be related with the Kissinger Associates, as it happened with the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and later Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.138 In the foreign policy process, President Bush had a long line of bad examples. As Rothkopf says: “The Kissinger- Nixon obsession with secrecy, the Kissingerian übermensch-centric policy processes, the Vance-Brzezinski and Shultz-Weinberger battles, the perils of “operationalism” that led to Iran-Contra, the paranoia of Nixon, the micromanagement of Carter, and the disconnectedness of Reagan all were signposts indicating what paths not to take.”139

137 Baker, III, J. A.: Work hard, study ... and keep out of Politics!, Northwestern University Press, 2008, p. 239- 240. 138 Tarplay, G. W., Chaitkin, A.: George Bush, the Unauthorized Biography, Executive Intelligence Review, Washington DC, 1992, p. 504-505. 139 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 269. 56

All the key players in the foreign policy, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, had known each other ever since the Ford administrations, where they were for the first time appointed to high administration offices. Some of the journalist gave to this administration a nickname “A Ford Foundation”.140 The indisputable advantage the members of the foreign policy team shared was their friendship. They not only started their careers together, but they also shared their spare time by fishing or camping which made their relationships to be based on absolute trust and confidence. They were as well bounded with a great loyalty to the President himself. The extent of trust among them was really high and it was characteristic not only for the top advisers, but for all the levels of the decision making and implementing process. They lower the press leaks to a minimum and allow the process to run smoothly. There was also one more point, lately very important. The fact, the President appointed the people by friendship more than politically eliminated the possibility of ideological struggle, which usually came in the administrations.141

The incoming National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft could have picked up on his own experience of holding the same position during the Gerald Ford´s administration. This well experienced retired general was Bush´s expert in the area of nuclear weapons and it was significant for him, that he did not agree on many things with President´s Reagan activities in this field. He secretly hoped to get the job of the Secretary of Defense but his nuclear arms expertise (among others) got him into the White House. Neither Bush, nor Baker had enough knowledge about that topic.142 There was a significant closeness between Scowcroft and Bush; it can be demonstrated for example by the fact, that they wrote the memoirs from these times together. Many associates say, that “they work well together, because they have the right combination of similarities and differences.”143

James Baker III was a very old friend and associate of President Bush; and was confident Bush was the best President ever. As well as President Bush, James Baker had many governmental experiences before entering this administrations, one of the most

140 See for example Gergen, D.: Bush's Very Own Ford Foundation; The Cheney-Scowcroft-Baker Team Learned the Same Lessons in the '70s, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/307132243/12E9F2662811BC424CE/1?accountid=16531. 141 Oral History Roundtable: The Bush Administration National Security Council. The Brookings Institution and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 29 April 1999, online text reachable from: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/projects/nsc/transcripts/19990429.pdf, p. 17. 142 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 177. 143 Hosler, K.: Scowcroft evolves as Bush's top sidekick Critics say adviser neglects paperwork, The Sun, 07 July 1991: pp. 3A, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/407134698/12EA69CCD3E259B75FC/1?accountid=16531 57

important was the Ronald Reagan´s White House Chief of Staff. Many people appreciated him for his ability to negotiate, get on well with the Congress as well as the pressure groups or media. On the other hand, he was slightly criticized for being a lawyer oriented on short-term problem solving more than some policy planning and implementing process.144 Another weakness of the new Secretary of State was his impatience with the standard bureaucracy processes, which are especially in the State Department very large. That is why he was sometimes criticized that he is not paying attention to some innovative proposals which are coming from the lower levels of the State Department.145

Both, James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, specified that their bounding experience of working together was a huge mistake President Ford did in the TV debate back in 1976, when he declared that there is no Soviet dominance in Poland. Baker, as a campaign leader, and Scowcroft, the hitherto National Security Adviser did think back about it as the “traumatic experience”146 and “complete disaster”.147 But ever since they knew the price of loyalty and their cooperation went on very well.

In the very beginning of the administration´s foreign policy, there were some misdoubts about the role division between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. The background for those rumors was the fact, that Baker did not have much experience with the foreign policy, he established a brand-new team and the first thing he had to do was a trip over the most important allies. That would give Scowcroft enough time and place to make himself comfortable within the foreign policy.148 But the roles were clearly divided since the very beginning. The officer in charge of foreign policy would be the Secretary of State, who was also the administration spokesman on this topic. Contrary to the previous administrations, the division of roles had worked in this one. Scowcroft spoke on foreign policy in public only a few times in the whole time, but even though he did, they all make sure, that everybody know what he is going to speak about and there were no surprises.

144 Ullman, O.: Baker and Scowcroft: Both the President´s Man, Philadelphia Inquirer, 20 Jan 1991: pp. A.14, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/286461817/12EA68D084A2A981856/1?accountid=16531. 145 Gergen, D.: Baker, Cheney, Scowcroft: Government Between Friends, Los Angeles Times, 02 Apr 1989: pp. 1, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/280745613/12EA6A107801850E5F4/4?accountid=16531 146 Bush, G., Scowcroft, B.: A World Transformed, Vintage Books, New York, 1999, p. 20. 147 Baker, J. A.: The Politics of Diplomacy – Revolution, War  Peace, 1989-1992, G. P. Putnam´s Sons, 1995, p. 26. 148 Apple, R. W.: Someone Has to Do It / Scowcroft Taking Over U.S. Foreign Policy, San Francisco Chronicle, 06 Feb 1989: pp. A10, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/302380328/12EA6A107801850E5F4/32?accountid=16531 58

In the first directive, the President Bush signed, he declared, that the National Security Council will be “the forum for consideration of national security policy issues ... shall advise and assist in integrating all aspects of national security policy ... coordinating Executive departments and agencies.”149 That was exactly, what happened. Brent Scowcroft the man behind the scene, who mostly did not formulate the policy, but try to implement it and coordinate the particular agencies responsible for doing it and try to solve the problems between them as an honest broker.150

Over the time, there were some foreign policy topics, in which Brent Scowcroft started to play prim – with the knowledge and agreement of James Baker. One of them was China, which became a big issue especially after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. President Bush, who served in China on a diplomatic mission, did make a lot of policies related to China by himself, but there were some missions which were necessary to make in secret. Since everybody in the administration was aware of the NSC to “go operational”, Baker insisted that both agencies will be present. So, in such situations, to preserve the spirit of collegiality, Scowcroft always took the Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger with him.151 The China topic was left for Scowcroft, because Baker “dropped it like a hot potato.”152

Brent Scowcroft stepped markedly from behind the scene in the moment the situation in the Persian Gulf got complicated and the quick and decisive answer from America was needed. When the crisis broke, the administration showed an extraordinary ability to cooperate and work out the very successful results. Scowcroft operated from the White House together with the President. Baker, who was in Russia when the crisis broke, started immediately the talks with Russians, Cheney tried to figure out the possible military solution. With no doubts, the Gulf crisis, followed by the broad coalition war, was an impressive example of a mastered policy.153 The majority of the decision making process was managed from the National Security Council, but because of the working pattern of interagency cooperation, all branches had information and were able to talk their opinion. There was slight

149 NSD 1: Organization of the National Security System, online text reachable from: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd1.pdf 150 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 168. 151 Baker, J. A.: The Politics of Diplomacy – Revolution, War  Peace, 1989-1992, G. P. Putnam´s Sons, 1995, p. 109. 152 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 177. 153 Ibid, p. 196.

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opinion inconsonance between Scowcroft who was clearly for the military solution and Baker who, till the very end, tried to make as much diplomacy as possible, but nothing from that could threaten the cooperation.

One of the biggest issues the administration had to face, were the turbulent changes in Europe, especially in Germany. The question whether or not to unify Germany cause as well one of the biggest conflicts between the State Department and the National Security Council. There was a question precisely how to do it and what should the role - if any - of the US be in that. It is to the government´s credit none of those discussions ever leaked to the press or public. James Baker and some other administration members were convinced that the reunification should be the quickest possible way and the Soviet Union should be notified and invited to the negotiations, as well as the US should play a big role. Baer´s fear was that Germans will negotiate with Soviets and the price for reunification will be the German neutrality.154 On the other hand, Scowcroft had some concerns about the American role in the process of reunification. He wanted Germans to do the stuff with both superpowers out of the game. He raised the question of the possible problems if Germany would not be allowed to leave the Warsaw Pact and also that Soviets will not be too happy about Germany entering NATO.155 Phillip Zelikow who was directly involved in the policy in these years, says: “Brent was suspicious. He was suspicious of Baker personally. And at the level below Brent, that suspicion was acute and spilled over in consultations with people in Bonn, and so on”.156 The problem with Germany was above all the speed with which the old regime collapsed, it was necessary to do something and the time press together with the disagreements between the key players made the decision complicated. But the team work played a big and satisfying role in that process. Brent Scowcroft gave up his position in the moment where President Bush made a big interview by supporting the unification without diplomatic buck-passing and, together with Baker, he started to prepare the strategy.157

154 Bush, G., Scowcroft, B.: A World Transformed, Vintage Books, New York, 1999, p. 234. 155 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 281-282. 156 Oral History Roundtable: The Bush Administration National Security Council. The Brookings Institution and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 29 April 1999, online text reachable from: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/projects/nsc/transcripts/19990429.pdf, p. 14. 157 Zelikow, P., Rice, C.: Germany Unified and Europe Transformed – A Study in Statecraft, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 95. 60

Baker had resigned in August 1992 to become the White House Chief of Staff, but mainly to help President Bush to be re-elected. His role was overtaken by Lawrence Eagleburger, the hitherto Deputy. Bush decided he will not name him officially a Secretary of State, since there have been only few months to the elections. Eagleburger was surprisingly sworn on December 1992, by what he gained the full Cabinet member status for the last six weeks of Bush´s administration. Eagleburger was one of the most experienced men in the administration, with almost thirty years of service in foreign policy. For the majority of time he has spent in the Department of State, he handled the day-to-day administration and had accompanied Scowcroft in case Baker was preoccupied.158 Eagleburger did not have the closeness with the President as Baker had it, but his experience and abilities made his relationship with the President work. That is why even after the resignation of Baker and Eagleburger becoming the Secretary of State, the situation practically did not change. The preset patterns were able to work for the rest of the functional period of President Bush.

CONCLUSION President Bush was able to create a foreign policy team, which did not suffer from the usual disputes visible in all the other administrations. There were no press leaks, no public backbiting or fighting. Even though there were conflicts and different views even on big issues such as unification of Germany, they never leaked into public and the administration was able to solve them inside. The relationships in the administration were equal, with very well mastered division of the roles. This administration can serve as an example, why the personality is so important. All the key players - Baker, Scowcroft, Bush, Eagleburger, Cheney, and Gates – were friends, able to forget about their egos in sake of a satisfactory cooperation. President George H. W. Bush´s administration was so far the only one, which is possible to be named as a clearly team work, with a strong President, and both his key advisers. There was no distinctive swing to the National Security Council or the State Department. The instant flow of information and no secrecy made it possible to conduct the

158 Houston, P.: Statecraft Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger Will Cast Big Shadow of His Own, Experts say, Los Angeles Times, 31 Aug 1992: pp. 1B, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/303619839/12EAE550B086AC17664/2?accountid=16531 61

stable and controlled foreign policy even in the times of crisis, as was for example the Persian Gulf War; reunification of Germany; situation in Latin America or the Soviet Union.

62

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION

The young governor of Arkansas, William Clinton, won the Presidency over Bush Sr. on the economic topics, which were very close to the voters. The problem was the program which was clearly more focused on domestic policy than foreign affairs and the fact that the incoming President had no experiences in foreign policy and on the beginning also no close foreign policy team. That showed up to be a big weakness in the time of unstable situation in the post-soviet area, rising troubles in Somalia, problems in Haiti, growing threat from the North Korean regime and, very importantly, the situation in the Balkans which was about to become the administration´s nemesis.

Even though, in his speech before the United Nations, the President said the engagement of US in the world will not dramatically change, there was a clear reversal to the domestic policy. The foreign policy team was the last the President named and stayed in the shadow of the economy as long as it was possible. Even after the naming, Clinton wanted to delegate as much foreign policy responsibilities on the advisers as possible, hoping it will not be necessary for him to pay bigger attention to that area.159 In his memoirs Clinton wrote: “Early on my national security advisor, Tony Lake, had declared that success in foreign affairs is often defined by preventing or defusing problems before they develop into headaches and headline grabbers. “If we do a really good job,” he said” the public may never know it, because the dogs won´t bark.” When I took office, we had a whole kennel full of barking hounds, with Bosnia and Russia howling the loudest, and several others, including Somalia, Haiti, North Korea, and Japan´s trade policy, growling in the background.”160 He was very right about the foreign policy, but according to that, he was not successful to keep the dogs quiet and with the first foreign-policy problems the weak points of his problematic approach to foreign policy were clear.

The incoming Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, had many experiences from the politics, bureaucracy and the foreign policy process. Serving as a Deputy Secretary of State to Cyrus Vance or the Attorney General, he was asked to lead the President´s Clinton transition team. There are different stories about Christopher becoming a Secretary of State. He himself wrote in his memoirs: “The offer to be Secretary caught me off guard.”161 Although he took

159 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 206. 160 Clinton, B.: My life, Vintage Books, 2005, p. 503. 161 Christopher, W.: Chances of a Lifetime, Scribner, 2001, p. 175. 63

some time to think it over, by return he said: “I don´t suppose there was any real probability that I would have turned it down.”162 On the other hand, there is an opinion by Daalder and Destler, who write in their book that: “In contrary to Lake, Warren Christopher really did want to be secretary of state. ... When Vance resigned over the ill-fated hostage rescue mission in April 1980, Christopher had hoped and expected to take his place, and he was deeply disappointed when Carter appointed Muskie instead.”163

There were two serious candidates on the post of the National Security Adviser – Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger. Although Berger was a closer friend to Bill Clinton, Lake was chosen, mostly because Berger suggested to the President he would like to be Lake´s Deputy.164 Many people had had some doubts with Lake taking the place, among them for example Henry Kissinger, whom Lake served with. On one hand, they appreciated his analytical mind and knowledge, but on the other, they pointed out his weakness in fighting the bureaucracy and standard procedures common in security policy.165 Despite his preparedness he had never thought he would stay more than a year in this position before returning to his previous life.166

Unlike the previous administrations, President Clinton, mainly according to the suggestion of Anthony Lake, decided to leave the structure of national security and foreign policy the same as he inherited it from President Bush.167 The problem with such a pattern was that the original detachedness of the President and unwillingness or inability of the two key players to take the lead in foreign policy left the administration in provisional arrangement. The good relationships between Lake and Christopher started to fall apart. Christopher was usually blamed by the public for the foreign policy catastrophes of the early Clinton´s administration such as Rwanda, Somalia or Bosnia. As the time went, both of them in turns were in the center of the speculation that they would have to leave, which the

162 Christopher, W.: Chances of a Lifetime, Scribner, 2001, p. 175. 163 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 210. 164 Clinton, B.: My life, Vintage Books, 2005, p. 455. 165 Nelson, J., McManus, D.: Clinton Rejects Foreign Policy Team Shake-up, Los Angeles Times, 28.5. 1994, online text, reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/282266489/12F1005525A372E57CD/26?accountid=16531 166 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 208. 167 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 313. 64

President demented every time. On the other hand there was information that he sometimes embarrassed Christopher during the senior dealings by criticizing him.168

Both of the key foreign policy players offered their resignation during the first term of President Clinton. Lake offered it after the American mishap in Somalia, but the President never even considered accepting it. Christopher followed in 1994 and this time Clinton tried to persuade (again) Collin Powel to take the job. He refused and Christopher changed his mind and stayed till the end of his term.169

Even though Lake and Christopher knew each other and they did talk about each other in a very kind tone, there occurred conflicts, which the administration wanted to prevent, remembering the problems of the last democratic administration – that of President Carter. The disagreements were from far not that bad and more importantly they were not that much publicized, but they still existed, even though both actors demented them time to time.

One of the visible discrepancies between Anthony Lake and the NSC on one side and Warren Christopher on the other was caused by a politician who did not even come from America – Gerry Adams, the political leader of the Irish party Sinn Fein. The administration had to decide if he should be granted to get the visa for visiting America. While Lake and the NSC came to the conclusion that allowing him the visit would be politically non-problematic, Christopher and the State Department were very afraid of the relations with Great Britain, which considered Sinn Fein to be the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, a terrorist organization.170 The press wrote in connection with this topic about the “humiliation” of Christopher and even (not for the first time) speculated about his resignation.171

Another conflicting topic was the need of America to take a position to the possible enlargement of NATO, or better – to the speed of this process. In this case, the conflict was not only between Lake and Christopher, but went through the whole administration and included Warren Christopher and the Department of Defense on the more careful side and Anthony Lake with National Security Council on the side which advocated for so called “fast

168 Warren Christopher, 3/3/2011, online text reachable from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8393890/Warren-Christopher.html. 169 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 226. 170 Clinton, B.: Můj život, Ikar, 2004, p. 660-661. 171 for example Robinson S.: International: Christopher 'to resign' in feud at White House, The Daily Telegraph 24/9/1994, online text, reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/317390735/12F0B1CC972CF1FD24/27?accountid=16531. 65

track”. The result of that was a kind of symbiosis – the program Partnership for Peace, which helped the post-communist states to fulfill the requirements.172

One of the biggest discrepancies between Lake and Christopher which were also reflected in public was caused by the crisis in the tiny Caribbean state of Haiti. Although both politicians agreed that there is no conflict, there were press leaks from inside the government that Christopher was practically shifted aside by Anthony Lake and did not attend the whole process. There was also information that Christopher did not agree with the mission led by former President Carter together with former National Security Adviser Colin Powell. Even though the State Department demented all such information, the truth is that when the solution had been found and the mission was accomplished, Christopher was not there by the President´s victory speech.173

The Haiti policy and problems showed the weak point of the Clinton´s administration – chaos and fractionalism, for each big area of the foreign policy, there was, at least informally, someone else to take care of it. There was a significant personality of Strobe Talbott, who was the one responsible for all the administration relations with Russia. He was officially appointed and his role was significantly strong, because he was a personal friend of President Clinton as well as a leading expert on that area. According to some sources, Secretary of State Christopher was responsible for the Middle East policy (where he was especially successful) as well as the Balkans. Asia, meaning Japan and China, was under the command of the newly established National Economic Council, while Korea was the area of interest of the Secretary of Defense Perry.174 Anthony Lake was active in the field of Haiti, Rwanda or Northern Ireland; because in his words the "paralysis" in the State Department was so severe he had been forced to seize control of foreign policy in a number of areas.”175

President Clinton was reelected in the 1996 elections and his entire foreign policy team was different, but not entirely new. Basically the good and proven people were

172 Talbott, S.: The Russia Hand – A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy, Random House, New York, 2002, p. 97-98. 173 Sciolino, E.: Mission to Haiti: In Washington, On Foreign Policy, 2 Clinton Advisers Wage a Bitter Duel, 23/9/1994, online text, reachable from: http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/23/world/mission-haiti-washington- foreign-policy-2-clinton-advisers-wage-bitter-duel.html?scp=2&sq=haiti&st=nyt&pagewanted=1. 174 Nelson, J., McManus, D.: Clinton Rejects Foreign Policy Team Shake-up, Los Angeles Times, 5/28/1994, online text, reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/282266489/12F1005525A372E57CD/26?accountid=16531. 175 Warren Christopher, 3/3/2011, online text reachable from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8393890/Warren-Christopher.html. 66

promoted to the new roles. That is the case of Madeleine Albright, who shifted from Ambassador to the United Nations to the post of the Secretary of State, the hitherto Deputy National Security Adviser Samuel Berger became the National Security Adviser himself. The second term of President Clinton is characteristic by the big foreign policy issues he had to pay attention to, such as Bosnia, the enlargement of NATO or the Middle East. These problems were sometimes overshadowed by his private troubles with Monica Lewinski and took off a big portion of his time and energy.

Madeleine Albright came into the post with the experience of woman who started her career fundraising for her daughter´s school and through the positions by Senator Muskie, the National Security Council and several scholar institutions became the first women ever holding the highest cabinet position. There were some opinions that she has no executive experiences and doubts if she could lead an organization as large as the Department of State.176 She and the President knew each other from the dinners Albright had served in her Washington House and stayed close during the campaign. She was known for her ability to explain even the most complex and complicated foreign policy issues in such a way that they were understandable for the average people, which was really important. President Clinton, many times during his first administration, said that his foreign policy problems were not the members of his team, but the lack of communication to the public. On the other hand, the position of the Secretary of State is only as strong as the President wishes. Madeleine Albright had a real global portfolio of interests and obligations which was sometimes difficult for Bill Clinton to swallow. Even though he lost his detachment in comparison to the first term, he remained careful.177

Samuel Berger (mostly called only Sandy) had the advantage over everybody else to be a close friend to President Clinton. According to Daalder and Destler, his position was even better than that of Lake and was even strengthened by the fact that there were many areas in the previous term, where Berger already played prim, such as economy, China or (partly) Bosnia. They knew each other very well and that is why they were very complementary.178 On the other hand, Albright was sometimes too moral and pushed the

176 Melloan G.: The Dangers Clinton´s New Team Will Face, Wall Street Journal, 12/10/1996, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/308274978/12F15FC5E03640ACE95/25?accountid=16531 177 Dobbs, M.: Madeleine Albright – A Twentieth-century Odyssey, Henry and Holt Company, New York, 1999, p. 402. 178 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 236. 67

human rights and morality too harsh, more than the President was willing to accept. Berger was sometimes compared to Henry Kissinger, but the authors such as Daalder and Destler noted that he did not win his position to the prejudice of the Department of State or any other actor.179

Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger together with the Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen developed a new platform of cooperation – the so called ABC luncheons, named as an acronym of their initials. According to some authors, the level of cooperation during the second term of Bill Clinton´s administration was unprecedential. Their relationship was based on loyalty, friendship and the fact, that it was not the first time, they were cooperating together. There were many laudatory comments about the new foreign policy people. Professor Goodman for example summarized the new situation: "This team has the uncanny ability to realize that foreign policy does not depend on where you sit, but on the needs of the nation in a particular crisis."180 The ABC luncheons were accompanied by the regularly breakfasts which included almost all the key actors in the foreign policy process and offered a ground for the discussions about the international topics on the informal bases.

But even though the cooperation was running better than in the previous administration, there were some opinion inconsonance’s within the members. But also some people saw the rising role of National Security Adviser Berger of the Secretary of State accord. His personal as well as real closeness to the President made it easier for him to somehow eclipse Madeleine Albright sometimes. In this situation it is interesting to have a closer look on the development of the position of Ivo Daadler, the scholar, who studies intensively administrations and National Security Council and worked with Berger during the first term of President Clinton. In 1999 he was one of the most pessimistic about the role of the Secretary of State by pointing out: ''She remains a participant in the process. But her weight as secretary of state in the determination of foreign policy appears less than at any time in the Clinton administration, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher's term. ...

179 Ibid, p. 238. 180 Goodman in Tyson, A. S.: Three musketeers of US foreign policy, Christian Science Monitor, 2/20/98, online text reachable from: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=de9b37df-f8ed-4382-bb30- ed9f2b3436bb%40sessionmgr4&vid=2&hid=10&bdata=Jmxhbmc9Y3Mmc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=a9h&A N=247607 68

There is no dispute who runs the show on foreign policy''181 In 2009 he wrote in the book he co-authored “though there were times when he would have liked to engage in such diplomacy ..., he knew that doing so would create tensions with Albright and State, and he did much less of it than Lake (tough some officials at State felt that he compensated by trying to micromanage Albright and her diplomatic activities instead).”182

Even Madeleine Albright herself conceded that there were some competence problems between her and Sandy Berger. “The truth is that problems arose when Sandy and I tried to occupy each other´s space. Although the NSC´s job was supposed to be limited to coordinating the actions and policies of the departments, proximity to the President sometimes tempted Sandy and his staff to assume an operational role.”183

One of the biggest opinion discrepancies which were between Albright and Berger was the possibility of use of force in the Balkans. As the situation in Kosovo and Serbia worsened, the Secretary of State pressed for air strikes and even engagement of the ground forces which was strongly opposed by the National Security Adviser and the strikes were delayed for a long time. She was an advocate for that a long time, but she remembers from this debate how Berger lost his temper by saying: “You can´t just talk about bombing in the middle of Europe. ... What would you do the day after? The way you people at the State Department talk about bombing, you sound like lunatics.”184 There was a strong fear from Berger but also Clinton from the beginning that the Congress would disagree, which above all Berger tried to avoid very actively by visiting the Capitol Hill and testing the situation. To the honor of the whole foreign policy team, it is necessary to point out that once the administration reached some decision, it does not matter how different the opinions were, they all stood out as a team and they cooperated on the implementation in public. But the actions on the Balkans were also a proof for the fact that even though it was publicly mostly

181 Daalder in: Perlez, J.: With Berger in Catbird Seat, Albright´s Star Dims, New York Times, 12/14/1999, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/431319383/12F15FC5E03640ACE95/24?accountid=16531. 182 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 241.

183 Albright, M.: Madam Secretary – A Memoir, Hyperion, New York, 2003, p. 443. 184 Berger in: Albright, M.: Madam Secretary – A Memoir, Hyperion, New York, 2003, p. 488. 69

Albright´s topic and the media called it “Madeleine´s war”, the actions were more coordinated from the White House.185

CONCLUSION Despite his problematic beginning in the foreign policy aspects of his Presidency and his personal problems, Bill Clinton turned out to be a foreign policy leader. On the other hand, it is complicated to characterize his style of governing. The first term was more than anything else a fragmented attempt to manage the incoming crises on the daily bases, accompanied by the administration´s difficulty to set a long-time plan. The particular areas of foreign policy were more or less directed by separate people. There was, indeed, a traditional division of roles and it started to be more influential especially in the second part of Clinton´s first term. By that time, the model changed to some modifications of the third model – the team arrangement with a swing to a more powerful National Security Adviser. Lake took advantage of the factual closeness to the President as well as the opinion similarity. Even though Lake wanted to make his role similar to that of Brent Scowcroft (especially during the Ford years) – to be the behind-the-scene-man, he never succeeded. The administration made a lot of mistakes, which forced him to step up and play a more active role in particular areas of foreign policy. That brought tension with Secretary of State Christopher, but helped Clinton to realize the need for a strong, coherent foreign policy team.

The factors, such as opinion similarity and factual closeness, played an important role in the second term of President Clinton as well. The difference from the first was that the team arrangement was more equal, since both actors were very active in public and there was a lot to explain as well as to manage. The President also grew stronger and more confident about his possibilities and abilities. Even though there were doubts and conflicts between Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger, in comparison to the previous administrations (with honorable exception of the one of George H. W. Bush), the cooperation was relatively well- balanced. They also brought new pattern of frequent and informal meetings and consultations into the game and the ABC´s helped the whole team to look unified, to clear the opinions and

185 Daalder in: Perlez, J.: With Berger in Catbird Seat, Albright´s Star Dims, New York Times, 12/14/1999, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/431319383/12F15FC5E03640ACE95/24?accountid=16531. 70

speak one language in the public. The second Clinton´s administration belongs to the Team Arrangement, but with a stronger National Security Adviser.

71

GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

After two terms of democratic President Clinton, the new republican President George W. Bush, former Governor of Texas, came with literally no foreign policy experiences, but with a strong team, which was supposed to help him in this area. Beside his own people, he could have used many persons connected with his father´s administration. The biggest significance which changed the whole presidency of George Bush were the attacks on September 11, which not only determined the foreign policy of the administration, but also named his foreign policy team as a “war cabinet”.

The foreign policy team President Bush created consisted of very strong actors, which brought sometimes clashes and very different opinions. The unique personality of the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the administration´s biggest hawk, was sometimes very complicated to get on well with. Contrary to other administrations, there was unprecedential role of the Vice-president, Dick Cheney, the former Secretary of Defense and subordinate of Rumsfeld. He had his own staff, focused on many aspects including foreign and security policy. He was able to get a lot of information and very often acted in public without anyone from the administration even knowing.186 In case of administration of George W. Bush, there was not the usual tension between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser as evident as the problematic relationship between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

President Bush´s conception about the whole process around the National Security Council was the NCS to advise him on all the topics of security policy. Its main role was defined by him as “a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.”187 President Bush preferred to discuss the topics within his inner circle of advisers, without large staff and formalities. He relied heavily on Condoleezza Rice with her foreign policy knowledge, but she was not (especially in the beginning of the term) the most important adviser. The emphasis was given to the religiosity and his inner guidance system based on belief.

After the election, Colin Powell found himself after years of experience within the government, in the shoes of the Secretary of State. He brought with himself not only

186 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 253. 187NSDP-1 - Organization of the National Security Council System, online text reachable from: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. 72

respectable skills and knowledge, but also a very good public image, based not only on his military career and government services, but as well on his engagement during the first Gulf war. His very good public image and deep knowledge, which threaten to overcast the President, were exactly the reasons for Bush and Cheney to decide to have a strong Secretary of Defense and led to a surprising appointment of Donald Rumsfeld, who was a long time opponent of the President´s father.

Condoleezza Rice was in many regards unique as a National Security Adviser. Not only the first women holding this position, but also black and for more – she possessed the closest relationship with the President in the history of National Security Council. She was a personal friend of him and his family and spent most of the time with him. The list of things they had in common included not only political or religious views, but also the “normal” points such as passion for sport or the same sense of humor. She had experiences from the NSC of the Brent Scowcroft´s times, when she was working in the Soviet Department. Her idea about the National Security Council was an institution which will be much smaller than the one she inherited and will work a lot like in those times of Brent Scowcroft – it will coordinate the process and be in waiting for the President. According to some authors, such as Rothkopf, she tried too hard to be on President´s Bush side and to help him with everything what had something to do with foreign policy. Those actions on one hand made her relationship with him very privileged, but on the other hand, it made the national security process and the National Security Council itself very weak and inactive. 188 With Rice, many authors speak about her significant influence on the President in the personal area, but she was not that influential in the politics. She was not only a personal friend to President Bush, she was also extraordinary loyal to him. Always by his side, helping him and always protecting him, their closeness brought them the nickname the Rice-Bush black box and even people from their own administration had difficulties to differ if the ideas come from the President or Condoleezza Rice.189

Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell had been friends long before they crossed each other in one administration. The problem between them was the fact that Powell had experiences working as a National Security Adviser and had his own presumptions about how

188 Rothkopf, D.: Running the world – The inside story of the national Security Council and the architects of American power, PublicAffairs, 2005, USA, p. 406. 189 Kessler, G.: Transformed by her Bond With Bush, Washington Post, 9/3/2007, online text reachable from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090201297.html. 73

the process should work. His NCS had a coordination role and he did not have such a close relationship with the President as well as he was not so much visible in the public. “Powel has demanded, and been assured, that Rice´s duties won´t impede his ability to guide U.S. foreign policy. Rather, members of the Bush team predict, Rice will manage the day-to-day interagency paper flow and keep the trains running on time.”190

After their appointment the media very often pointed out the things they had in common and one of them was the race, but it became only symbolically a tie. At the beginning, it was also supposed that Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell will be the natural moderate allies against the more hawkish and militarily-oriented Rumsfeld and Cheney. In reality, she oscillated between both approaches and it was complicated to estimate where she will go. David Frum pointed it out: “Because of Rice´s extraordinary tight-lippedness, even her own National Security Council senior directors confessed themselves unable to predict whether she would align herself with Rumsfeld´s big victory or Powell s small-war point of view.”191 Other authors mentioned that in 60 % of the cases, she was more for the hawkish side rather than with Colin Powell.192 The biggest issue where it was Powell against the whole administration was the Iraq war. He argued very forcefully that it is risky to go to war, where the result is the whole nation which would be necessary to take care of. He wanted to go more multilateral and with the support of the United Nations.193

Over the time, Colin Powell found himself in isolation. He still believed that the things in international arena should go though the traditional allies net and diplomacy more than an active war, but he was a lonely voice in that. There was also a tension with some of the people from the administration, who thought he complaint about the inside problems to the press.194 He was in a complicated situation – the difficult and important issues for the administration had been handled between the Department of Defense, President and Vice-president. He was left practically only with the bureaucracy oversees. He decided to leave in the end of President´s Bush first term with bitterness.

190 Kaplan in: Felix, A.: Condi – The Condoleezza Rice Story, Pocket Books,New York, 2002, p. 243. 191 Frum, D.: The Right Man – The surprise Presidency of George W. Bush, Random House, New York, 2003, p. 198. 192 Evan, T., Lipper, T., Gutman, R.: Chemistry in the War Cabinet, 28/1/2002, Nesweek, online text reachable from: http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=19&sid=8fb27ede-fc70-4ed0-a326- 8f5951e9cd99%40sessionmgr12&bdata=Jmxhbmc9Y3Mmc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saXZl#db=a9h&AN=5909402. 193 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 273. 194 Frum, D.: The Right Man – The surprise Presidency of George W. Bush, Random House, New York, 2003, p. 281. 74

With the new, second term of President Bush, there was a shift within his foreign policy team as well as policy. Condoleezza Rice went over to became the Secretary of State and her hitherto Deputy, Stephen Hadley, became the new National Security Adviser. The situation of the administration changed a lot. Bush, after the complicated situation in Iraq, wanted to emphasize diplomacy more than it was during his first term, which actually became reality. A big change was that Donald Rumsfeld was forced to resign in connection to the failures in Iraq, for example the widely publicized Abu Ghraib prisoner’s abuse. His Deputy Paul Wolfowitz was appointed to the World Bank. The Vice-president´s Cheney power and influence declined as well and had opened a space for the greater cooperation especially in the field of foreign policy. It was necessary, because there was a big deal before Condoleezza Rice in the Department of State – she needed to try to restore the relationships with the former allies and friends, which were damaged by the American invasion into Iraq. In the same region, there was another problematic point of America´s foreign policy – Iran and his more and more ambitious programs. Her close relationship with the President and loyalty helped her a lot in this case. Being a Secretary of State, she never presented her ideas, but spoke entirely for the President, which gave her the power she needed for pushing the topics.

Stephen Hadley was not a new man in the administration. He served under four republican Presidents and was skilled bureaucrat well oriented within the problems of national security, for what he was sometimes called “Bush´s Clark Kent.”195 He had a full confidence and trust by President Bush, who said about him, that he is “a man of wisdom and good judgment.”196 He was more successful in managing the national security process than Condoleezza Rice. He was practically publicly unknown; he did not appear there much and knew his limits. Bumiller points out: “Smart and cautious, but lawyerly and awkward in public.”197 On the other hand, he fulfilled all the requirements the President had to his National Security Adviser.

The cooperation between Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley was almost ideal. The reason was that there was practically no change in their relationship. Contrary to Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley did not have ambitions (or need) to be in the public

195 Lobe, J.: The Bush Team Reloaded, Middle East Report, Nr. 234, Spring 2005, online text reachable from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1559363.pdf?acceptTC=true. 196 Gearan, A.: Successor to Rice shares her outlook; Stephen Hadley brings changes in style, if not substance, as national security adviser, Orlando Sentinel, 11/24/2004, online text reachable from: http://search.proquest.com/docview/280239977/12F36A8F07D229BC0D8/35?accountid=16531. 197 Bumiller, E.: Condoleezza Rice – An American Life, Random House, New York, 2007, p. 255. 75

spotlight and under his leading the National Security Council went back to the original role of coordinating the interagency process and working more in the shadows. There were scoffs within Washington, pointing out that even though Hadley was promoted, in reality, he stayed to be Rice´s deputy.198 These rumors were supported by the facts that he not only attended the meetings in the Department of State, but together with Rice they tried to coordinate their staff, so there were no discrepancies. It is fair to say that Condoleezza Rice was much better a Secretary of State than a National Security Adviser and with Stephen Hadley, who agreed on her leading role within the foreign policy, they made together a very successful team.

Their good and smooth cooperation was clearly visible for example on the topic of Iran. The Iranian nuclear program and ambitions were getting to be a burning problem for the administration. Rice and Hadley made a plan together for opening the negotiations with Iran, which was something unthinkable for longer than thirty years before. Their detailed plan was so well argued, that it convinced even the Vice-president to agree on.

CONCLUSION President Bush entered office without any foreign policy experience and with shoes of his father to fulfill. He put together a very strong team, which was sometimes too strong. The strong personalities and egos of the star members were complicated to handle. On contrary to previous administrations, there was no interregnum in foreign policy, as it was for example in case of President Reagan, but here came the other extreme – the militarized politics fully under the control of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, his former Deputy Cheney and sometimes the President.

For applying any model of foreign policy, it is necessary to divided President´s Bush administration according to the terms. The relationships within the administration were so different that it is not possible to judge them together. The key component of both administrations was the extraordinarily close relationship between Condoleezza Rice and the President, which gave her not only the instant access to him, but also caused troubles with the structure, where she staffed the President and did not have time for paying attention to other duties.

198 Daalder, I., Destler, I.: In the Shadow of the Oval office, Simon Schuster, 2009, p. 293. 76

The first term was significant by a very dominant Department of Defense, a dominant Vice-president and an active President on side with quite a weak and primarily isolated Secretary of State. The National Security Council as an agency did not work much successfully in cooperation the interagency process. It was probably not much possible with the “militarized politics”. The structure was quite unique, the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser were on similar, equal low, level, both dominated by the Secretary of Defense.

The second term had begun with the struggle between the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld; they were not solved until Rumsfeld´s resignation in the end of 2006. The administration is clearly an example of the second foreign policy model – with a strong Secretary of State, a relatively weak National Security Adviser and a relatively passive President. In this case, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley was not forced into his backstage role by the predominant Secretary of State, it was more his own choice. The model worked very well and was based not only the good structure, but their personal relationship was very important as well.

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CONCLUSION

The American foreign policy is complicated in its process of creation with wide range of actors participating in it. The personal relations between them are crucial for the smooth running. There are no two similar administrations as well as no two similar circumstances in which the administration needs to work. There are however trends, which are possible to note by looking through the postwar history.

Crucial in the foreign policy process is the role of the President. It is him who has to set up the policy and keep it running. There are disputes in every administration. But the responsibility of the President is to decide, if he wants to be part of the discussion, or he will leave the opinion battles for his subordinates and wants to get only the compromise. The importance of the engagement of President was shown for example by President Reagan. He was not able to take side in the discussions, which left the administration fragmented, unsure and weakened. The same problem had to face President Clinton, who didn´t want (from the beginning of his term) to pay much attention to the foreign policy. On the other side, too active President in foreign policy is not helping to smooth the process as well. President George H. W. Bush did have wide knowledge and extensive net of contacts in foreign countries, when he entered the Office. Very often he acted without his Secretary of State or National Security Adviser knowing. President Nixon was obsessed by being active in foreign policy that he practically gave his Secretary a back seat and William Rogers very often didn´t have any idea what are the administration´s activities.

The position of National Security Adviser was created by President Eisenhower in 1953. There was an adjustment phase during his administration, but starting with McGeorge Bundy, the position started to gain respect and power. This trend is visible up to the present day. It is not strictly continuous; there were ups downs, for example in the Nixon administration, with the absolute dominance of Henry Kissinger after his shift to Department of State, or the weak National Security Council during the Reagan administration. The National Security Council has, compared to the Department of State, many advantages. One of the biggest is the fact that the Adviser is not obligated to go through the process of Congress approval. That is why the President can choose people who may be controversial, but they suit better his needs. That was for example case of McGeorge Bundy, who was seen as too young for such a position, but he was President´s Kennedy soul mate; or Condoleezza Rice – very close friend to President George W. Bush. The Advisers tend to be more 78

influential – they can use another plus of the office – they are physically very close to the President and have more possibilities for presenting their views and positions. An example for that can be President Carter, who was in opinion closer to his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, but especially in the end of his administration, his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski was clearly the driving force of foreign policy. The National Security Adviser also has no need to stand for the needs and interests of the whole department, as the Secretaries have to. To mediate the interagency process very often means to have all the information needed, which makes the foreign policy process easier for them.

It is necessary to mention that the power and influence of the other White House staff is rising as well. Distinctive examples of that was the administration of Ronald Reagan, whose White House staff was pejoratively called Reaganauts. This trend was even more visible in the administration of George W. Bush, whose Vice-president, Dick Cheney was one of the most influential persons within the government.

The State Department is suffering from diminishing influence over the years. The State Department have played more important role only in the periods when the Secretary of State was some really strong personality. That is an example of President Nixon´s administration and Secretary of State Kissinger, George Shultz in Reagan´s era or, with some reservations Madeleine- Albright in Clinton administration. Another time of dominance of State Department was Dean Rusk as the Secretary of State of President Johnson, where the reason was opinion likeness between them.

There are only few Presidents, who declared from the very beginning, that they want their system to be White House oriented. That was for example Richard Nixon. Almost all the other since the Second World War wanted the Secretary of State to be the main speaker for American foreign policy and the system should have been State Department-oriented. Very often the reality turned the model to White House-oriented. Presidents started to see the State Department as too big, slow and rigid, an institution, which never comes with new or quick ideas. They were very often blamed from being too much oriented on the allies and with a huge influence of the foreign countries.

Generally it is possible to say that the system tends to be White House-oriented and personally Dominant Presidential Leadership with strong National Security Adviser. There are exceptions, as for example the administration of George H. W. Bush, which was the 79

example of Team arrangement where the advisers were clearly equal. Another sample could be the Kennedy administration. Even though in those times McGeorge Bundy was blamed for overshadowing the Secretary of State Rusk, in comparison with the following administrations Rusk and Bundy were able to work as a team. The same is possible to argue for the second Clinton administration with Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State and Samuel Berger as National Security Adviser.

The personal relationships between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser and their ability to work together are crucial for the smooth running of foreign policy. Once the compromise is reached, the administration has to be unified – that was mastered by George H. W. Bush. Even though the advisers had different opinions on for example unification of Germany, they were able to communicate that to public in one voice. The problems which can occur in case of inability to reach compromise can be seen in the Carter administration and the embarrassing mishap by the rescue mission in Teheran. Another example could be the Reagan administration where the conflicts between advisers and detachment of President led to the secret missions of the National Security Council which was very operational in those times, but formally without the President knowing the whole true.

As the administration of George H. W. Bush as well as second term of Bill Clinton prove, the best possibility for the American foreign policy are the advisers which know each other, are friends and are able to work together without their egos. The thrust and openness is crucial for the successful foreign policy process.

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