Super, G 2015 Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime stability through the ‘Community’. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 31, pp. 1–20, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ft

RESEARCH ARTICLE Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’ Gail Super*

Waving placards that read “Sonele zizikoli, sanele yicrime (we have had enough of crime and thugs),” more than 60 angry residents protested outside the Khayelitsha Police Station on Tuesday. [ . . . ] Residents’ leader Unathi Mabengwana said: “Given the high crime rate in our area, we are of the view that whatever cops do to fight crime here is not enough. We demand that cops should be more harsh when dealing with criminals.” Greg Wagner, spokesman for community safety department said [Member of the Executive Council] Dan Plato will meet with the Western Cape police commissioner, General Arno Lamoer, to discuss the issue next week. Wag- ner said the meeting would also be a follow up on the recent vigilante attacks, in which three alleged crime suspects were burnt to death at Enkanini squatter camp (Mnyakama 2012).

Introduction Town population.4 Poverty is widespread, This paper is based on research on vigilan- with the majority of Khayelitsha’s residents tism in Khayelitsha, a black township, on living cheek by jowl in overcrowded shack the outskirts of Cape Town, South Africa. settlements, accessing electricity illegally, Meaning ‘new home’ in isiXhosa, Khayelitsha sharing communal water taps, and relying on was established in 1983 in terms of the grossly inadequate sanitation arrangements Native Urban Areas Act.1 It covers an area of (such as outside portable toilets).5 Despite about 47 square kilometers, is situated 30 overall poverty levels, some areas — such as kilometers from Cape Town’s city centre, and Lingelethu West — contain parts that are rel- is the fastest growing and third largest town- atively prosperous (Seekings 2013: 20). ship in South Africa, with a population esti- As a ‘frontier society,’ Khayelitsha poses mated to be between 400,000 and 750,000.2 a particular problem for the administra- It consists of both formal and informal tion of criminal justice and state structures settlements. enjoy little legitimacy (Little & Sheffield Almost half of Khayelitsha’s households 1983: 796).6 Identified by the Western Cape live below the food poverty line3 and there is a Provincial Government as a ‘zone of pov- significant difference between income distri- erty and unemployment,’ Khayelitsha has bution within Khayelitsha vis-a-vis the Cape the second highest number of murders in the province and — together with the poor black townships of Nyanga, Gugulethu, and  * Honourary Research Associate, Centre for Harare — reports the highest number of Criminology, University of Cape Town, South Africa murders in the Western Cape (DCS 2009: [email protected] 20; Lancaster 2013).7 Art. 31, page 2 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

This paper argues that despite the fact crime and how its policies are filtered and that South Africa attained formal democracy refracted through street committees and in 1994 and has one of the most progres- Community Police Forums. The section on sive constitutions in the world, the ‘nature ‘Banishment and the “Moral Community”’ and character of public participation’ is argues that banishment is utilized as a wide- problematic, non-deliberative, and a reflec- spread technology for dealing with crime tion of blocked opportunities, poverty, and in Khayelitsha and, although it is often pre- inequality (Miller 2013: 18). I argue that the sented as a voluntary departure, there are dis- discourse and rhetoric on ‘community’ is a tinct undertones of coercion. In ‘Violence to shallow and dangerous form of incorpora- Retrieve Property,’ I discuss how violence tion that does not live up to its promises of often occurs in the retrieval of stolen prop- full participation. Not only is ‘community’ erty and that the theft of consumer electron- used as a tool to connect the state to the ics assumes great importance in a context of population but vigilantes also claim to act deep scarcity and endemic societal inequal- in the name of the ‘community.’ As such, the ity. The penultimate section, ‘Outsiders on absence of deliberative democracy is linked the Edges’ argues that ‘mob justice’ is in fact to violent community-based punishment in less spontaneous than it initially appears to Khayelitsha and there is an elective affinity be. Informal political institutions — like their between this pathological form of grassroots more formal counterparts — are less respon- democracy and vigilantism.8 sive to those on the margins of mainstream After a brief section on ‘Background and society, particularly foreigners, refugees, and Methodology,’ I discuss the relationship suspected criminals. As such, the power dif- between democracy and imprisonment, not- ferentials between those who belong to the ing that South African democratization has ‘community’ and those who do not result witnessed a dramatic increase in long-term in ‘differential mobilization’ around crime prison sentences. I argue that the govern- and the policing of the community’s ‘moral ment’s embracing of a restorative prison has boundaries’ (Miller 2013: 10). enabled it to double back on its parsimoni- ous, pre-1994 stance on imprisonment. As a Background and Methodology result, the prison and penal punitivism have Prior to April 2002 vigilantism was not become an important part of state building officially recorded but, after an incident in newly democratic South Africa. In ‘Populist in which three suspected criminals were Politics and People’s Power,’ I discuss the his- necklaced,9 the police management of torical relationship between violence and the Khayelitsha precinct started to regis- justice and argue that both ‘criminality’ and ter vigilante incidents and the Khayelitsha ‘community’ are highly contested terms that Police Crime Intelligence Analysis Centre are subject to violent definitions and redefi- (CIAC) began to report on the phenomenon nitions. The section on ‘Politics and Crime’ (Häefele 2006). discusses how the post-apartheid criminal In August 2012, the Premier of the Western has been de-linked from a structural and Cape — acting on a complaint received from political context. I argue that the Khayelitsha six human rights organizations — established­ Commission of Inquiry into Policing was a Commission of Inquiry into Policing in itself a politicized vehicle that — thanks to Khayelitsha. The Commission was man- its narrow framing — was bound to focus on dated to investigate ‘Allegations of Police ‘police inefficiency’ rather than the socio- Inefficiency and . . . a Breakdown in Relations economic conditions that generate crime. In between the Community and the Police in the section on ‘Partnerships and Grassroots Khayelitsha’ which was supposedly indicated Democracy,’ I discuss how the government by a spate of vigilante attacks reported in the has encouraged partnerships to deal with media (Zille 2012). Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 3 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

It should of course be noted that the accused.13 I supplemented this ethnographic term ‘vigilante’ is politically contested and work with documentary sources including its usage reflects the political leanings of newspaper reports on vigilantism, affidavits those who deploy it. Thus for example, offi- of witnesses testifying at the Khayelitsha cials of the National Union of South African Commission, judgments in court cases that Mine workers recently referred to rival union dealt with vigilantism, and extensive docu- members as being ‘vigilantes’ (Tabane 2013). mentation made available by the Department There is also no certainty as to exactly what of Community Safety. vigilantism is and the term has been used to describe a wide range of activities, perpe- Democracy and Imprisonment trated by a variety of actors, e.g. errant police, One might have expected the advent of street committee and neighbourhood watch democratic rule to result in prisons being members, large mobs of people and indi- replaced by a more humane criminal jus- viduals acting against perceived lawbreakers tice system that emphasized non-custodial (Buur 2003; Buur and Jensen 2004; Harris rather than custodial sentencing.14 This has 2001; Huggins 1991; Johnson 1996). not been the case. Although the numbers in My research methodology included 38 custody have decreased from an all time high selective in-depth interviews, supplemented in 2004, democratization has brought with by documentation and attendance at vari- it a dramatic increase in long-term prison ous meetings.10 Interviews were conducted sentences ranging from seven years to life. with members of community patrol groups In 2013, the number of people serving life in two different informal settlements;11 four- sentences was 11,000 as opposed to just 400 teen members of the Social Justice Coalition in 1994 (JICS 2013). In 2014, 63 per cent of (SJC)12; a community journalist who covers an overall 154,648 inmates were serving sen- vigilante incidents; a film director making tences in excess of seven years (JICS 2014: a documentary on ‘mob justice’; fourteen 41). Between 2000 and 2010, sentences of street committee members; four members of life imprisonment increased by 572 per cent the ANC aligned South African National Civic whilst those in excess of ten years increased Association (SANCO); four residents who self- by 128 per cent (JICS 2010: 25). identified as ‘vigilantes’; four mothers whose Ironically, the 1995 Constitutional Court children had been beaten to death; a woman ruling that the death penalty was unconsti- who had been assaulted by male members of tutional also opened the door for greater reli- a neighbourhood crime patrol; four Enkanini ance to be placed on the prison.15 It did so by shack-dwellers; Gideon Morris – the Chief relying extensively on the concept of ubuntu, Director of Civilian Oversight in the Western as supporting a ‘reformative theory’ of pun- Cape Provincial Government’s Department ishment. In so doing it helped to cement the of Community Safety; and three advocates shift to long-term imprisonment by embrac- who were representing clients accused of ing the notion of ‘a reformative prison’ as a vigilantism. replacement for the death penalty (Super Apart from interviews, I also attended 2011, 2013). For example, in 2002 — at the eight meetings, organized by the SJC, precise time at which the South African around the Khayelitsha Commission and rate of imprisonment had almost peaked — the SJC’s ‘Campaign for Safe Communities.’ I the Department of Correctional Services attended the first ten days of the Khayelitsha introduced a restorative justice approach Commission and three weeks’ worth of that ‘aimed at facilitating the mediation proceedings in a High Court case where six and healing process between offenders, vic- people were charged with the kidnapping tims, family members and the community’ and murder of four youths alleged to have (Department of Correctional Services 2001). stolen the plasma television set of one of the However, as Michel Foucault and others Art. 31, page 4 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’ have pointed out, prisons are constantly 2011; Burman and Schärf 1990; Jensen 2008; failing institutions if measured in terms of Seekings 1992; Wilson, 2002). their capacity to rehabilitate (Foucault 1995; During the 1980s, left-wing activists pre- Dumm 1987; Rothman 1980; Meranze 1996). sented ‘people’s power’ as the ‘collective South African prisons are a stark reminder strength of the community’ (Sisulu 1986). of the edges of democratic rule insofar as Whereas some criminal acts were overtly they highlight the gaps in the human rights politicized and excused on the basis of hav- speak that is central to ‘bourgeois legality’ ing a political justification, non-political, (Fitzpatrick, cited in Merry 1988). The very purely criminal acts, were subject to severe professionals — social workers, psycholo- punishment. The complex process of con- gists, and other professionals — who are key structing and defining criminality had to rehabilitation are in short supply and — many aspects to it: not only did the com- in overcrowded institutions — prisoners rades17 justify ostensibly criminal acts as only have 1.2 square meters in which to eat, being political, but they were, additionally, sleep, and spend 23 hours of the day (JICS virulently anti-criminality per se (Harris 2010: 25; 2013: 81; 2007: 16). In this sense 2001). People’s power was regarded as a then, the embracing of restorative justice in particularly good form of ‘crime control’ the context of imprisonment, was a ‘discur- since it was — according to struggle stalwart sive maneuver’ (Garland 1985: 172) which Zwelakhe Sisulu — ‘disciplined, democratic enabled the new African National Congress and an expression of the will of the people (ANC) government to reinvent the prison [ . . . and] in the areas where people [were] as being restorative rather than repressive. taking control, crime [was] being wiped This reinvention enabled the ANC to deploy out’ (Sisulu 1986: 17–18). it as a vital cog in its state-building project, According to Sisulu, the key distinction despite previous pronouncements that it did between ‘people’s power’ and ‘coercion’ was not support imprisonment because of its whether a ‘democratic mandate from the association with apartheid rule (Super 2010, community’ existed or not. Thus: 2011).16 When bands of youth set up so called Populist Politics and People’s Power “kangaroo courts” and gave out pun- Whether it is referred to as ‘mob justice,’ ishments, under the control of no-one ‘vigilantism,’ ‘non-state punishment,’ or with no democratic mandate from the something else entirely, the phenomenon of community, this is not people’s power people taking the law into their own hands [ . . . but] a “crime” (Sisulu 1986: 17). is not new to South Africa. Indeed, the rela- tionship between violence and justice has On the other hand, when: deep historical roots and — whether legal or illegal — violence has had an ubiquitous disciplined organised youth, together and quotidian presence in South African with other older people participate history (Minnaar 2001; Seekings 1989; in the exercise of people’s justice Seekings 1995; Harris 2001; Thomas 2012; and the setting up of people’s courts; Wilson 2002; Van Onselen 1984; Allison when these structures are acting on 1990; Kynoch 2008; Pavlich 1992). Both the a mandate from the community and National Party government and the exiled are under the democratic control of ANC liberation movement used the death the community, this is an example of penalty against their enemies and the radical people’s power (Sisulu 1986: 17). traditions of people’s power and ungovern- ability sometimes resulted in violent punish- This stance against criminality did not only ment (Super 2013; Kynoch 2011; Machava play out in townships but also in some of the Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 5 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

ANC training camps.18 The 1981 campaign their violent actions via rhetorical appeals to against dagga smoking is one such exam- the ‘community’ (Wilson 2002:181; Ferndale, ple. In 1981, Moses Mabhida — head of the Malakane and Schärf 1994; Burman and Revolutionary Council in Angola — blamed Schärf 1990). It was also, as is the case today, dagga smoking in the camps on the apart- not exactly clear what ‘the community’ stood heid regime, stating that ‘the chief aim of the for, nor what its boundaries — moral, physical, apartheid government was to corrupt our and geographic — actually were. Then, as now, people and introduce bad morals’ (Ngculu the ‘community’ was a moving resultant in a 2009: 161). Because of this, he declared war shifting field of power relations. against those found ‘sneaking out of the camps in search of dagga, or those found to Politics and Crime be smoking dagga’ and camp security were In post-apartheid South Africa crime has given orders to shoot people caught leaving become increasingly problematized and the camp without permission (Ngculu 2009: politicized, subjected to better measurement, 161). Offenders were tied to a tree or locked parliamentary debates and a consensus on in a windowless container as punishment. the need to treat criminals harshly (Simpson Some were severely beaten by the Angolan 2004; Rauch 2007; Van Zyl Smit and Van der Regional Command, which resulted in a Spuy2004; Super 2010, 2011, 2013). number of deaths (Ngculu 2009; Skweyiya Shortly after assuming power, the ANC et. al. 1992). government was faced with the problem of Whereas the National Party government how to prove it was in control of the crime depicted township activists as violent crimi- problem, whilst at the same time appear- nals and terrorists in an effort to deny them ing to act within the liberation framework political legitimacy, comrades sometimes of a revolutionary organization. It therefore committed violent acts in the name of poli- sought to simultaneously legitimize the pre- tics, and accused government officials and viously vilified police and prove that it was their lackeys of being the true criminals.19 not soft on crime by embarking on an eclec- When gangs looted trucks driving into the tic range of strategies. This entailed a discur- townships, some political activists presented sive embracing of the concept of community this as part of the struggle (Jensen 2008). policing whilst at the same time uncoupling Similarly, what might be regarded as gratui- criminals from a political and social context, tous acts of violence — such as ‘necklacing’ — presenting them as a threat to the country’s assumed a form of political salience given that young democracy (Super 2014). targets were accused of being spies or apart- At the opening of Parliament in 1995, heid collaborators and thus on the wrong President Nelson Mandela blamed crime side of the just war. In fact both designations and violence for ‘eroding the foundation of from the state and political movements had our democracy,’ thus necessitating a ‘harsher some substance. Amongst and alongside the approach’ (DSS 1999: 9). In 1999, the Deputy ‘comrades’ there emerged activities and peo- Minister of Justice boasted that mandatory ple who took advantage of these township minimum sentences and restrictive bail laws struggles to wreak violence for their personal were ‘progressive’ (PRSA 1999). In 2001, the gain – hence the emergence of the label Minister of Safety and Security stated that ‘comtstotsis,’ meaning criminals masquer- prisons were overcrowded because the police ading as ‘comrades’ (Harris 2001; Minnaar were doing their job and that ‘all what we need 2001; Morris and Hindson 1992; Super 2010; [sic] . . . is to fully rally behind the police and Jensen 2008). to declare that the fight against crime is our The community was both a site of contesta- fight’ (PRSA 2001). Political leaders have also tion, as well as a powerful ideological legitimat- called on police to ‘kill the bastards’ (The Star ing device, with armed factions legitimating 2008); to ‘teach them a lesson’ (The Citizen Art. 31, page 6 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

2008) by means of the use of lethal force; and As already noted, the provincial govern- to show ‘no mercy’ (Burger 2009 cited in Bruce ment sought to restrict the ambit of the 2010: 9). This was a far cry from the 1992 ANC commission’s findings and terms of refer- discussion document on ‘Crime and Crime ence. Its legal counsel referred to the ‘terri- Control’, which — to give one example — ble spate of vigilante killings due to the lack ascribed gang formation to ‘structural and of trust in the police’ and ‘low per capita political reasons’ and presented gang mem- ratios of police to residents in Khayelitsha.’22 bers as having ‘legitimate economic needs’ As far as the Province was concerned, the (ANC 1992: 8–9). ‘essential focus’ of the commission was to The Khayelitsha Commission was also be ‘on the functioning of the South African mired in politics. The fact that it was estab- Police Service in the community and how lished by the Premier of the Western Cape – to improve it’ given that the ‘police are on the only province that was not run by the the frontline of the war against crime.’23 The ANC – at the request of leftwing activists focus was clearly not to be on the causes who were keen to paint it as a ‘people’s com- of crime, since as their counsel put it: ‘[we mission,’ was, from the outset, a recipe for a would] need to sit for five years and not political spectacle. Because the Commission five weeks if the focus was on the causes of was specifically tasked to investigate whether crime.’24 vigilantism was caused by inefficient polic- Counsel for the police blamed apartheid ing, it tapped into the type of mainstream policing for having played an active role discourse (Häefele 2006; Minnaar 2001; in fomenting gangs, drugs, and vigilantes Sekhonyane and Louw 2002) that called on whilst stressing that it was in control of the state to assert its authority in ‘poor urban the situation and that Khayelitsha was ‘not neighbourhoods, informal settlements and a lawless society.’25 It argued that although deep rural areas such as the former home- policing was taking place, it was impossible lands’ (Häefele 2006: 10). This considerably to have ‘normal policing in an abnormal soci- narrowed the framework of inquiry, thus ety . . . characterized by unemployment, a lack excising a more political approach. of housing [ . . . and where residents were] The SJC embarked on an activist campaign angry at poor service delivery and lack of to mobilize support for what it referred to as sanitation.’26 This was a thinly veiled critique a ‘people’s commission.’ It arranged marches, of the inadequate public services provided pamphlets, booklets, t-shirts and group by the Democratic Alliance-controlled Cape meetings aimed at targeting as many peo- Town Municipality. For its part, the Cape ple as possible. The leadership urged branch Town Municipality blamed ‘vandalism and members to ‘spread the message’ especially theft’ as the reason for poor services, thus locally in Khayelitsha.20 It also embarked on a tapping into a criminological explanation ‘Campaign for Safe Communities,’ which was based on a ‘culture of criminality.’27 launched at the University of Cape Town’s The common thread running through Jameson Hall in April 2013 and attended by these arguments was a lack of emphasis on at least 4000 people, most of whom were public policies that address broad social ineq- bussed in from the townships. The state, on uities. Instead, the focus was narrowed down the other hand, argued that the Premier had to police services and how to make the crimi- established the Khayelitsha Commission as a nal justice system more efficient (Scheingold cheap political ploy to discredit the govern- 1984; Miller 2013: 19). The fact that the gov- ment and attempted to have the proceedings ernment, both national and local, and most ruled unconstitutional. The matter was ulti- political parties in South Africa, blame crime mately resolved by the Constitutional Court on socio-economic conditions, whilst also in October 2013,21 more than a year after the supporting harsh punishment is indicative of establishment of the Commission. a superficial approach that seeks not so much Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 7 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’ to explain crime as to make practical sugges- active during the 1980s — in an attempt to tions for making the criminal justice system engage communities to fight crime ‘construc- more effective. This avoids a serious discus- tively’ (Minnaar 2001: 40). President Jacob sion by shunting responsibility to other state Zuma has also called on townships to revive agencies. Similarly, calling for a partnership street committees in terms of a very populist between the police and the community, in discourse, which harks back to the liberation terms of policies of responsibilisation that struggle. Indeed, street committees do exist place responsibility for crime prevention on on most streets in Khayelitsha. Whereas dur- the shoulders of those communities whose ing the 1980s street committees represented capacities are already severely stretched, alternative sites of grassroots democracy, sidesteps a longer-term and more in depth in post-apartheid South Africa most fall — approach. however loosely — under the umbrella of the ANC-aligned South African National Civic Partnerships and ‘Grassroots’ Association. However, as Boyane Tshehla has Democracy noted, not all bodies identifying as ‘street The apartheid government first embraced committees’ are aligned with SANCO and — the concept of community-based crime pre- in some instances — these proto-democratic vention during the 1970s as part of a neo- forums are merely a code for a gathering of liberal partnership discourse, which rooted people (Tshehla 2002). the ‘community’ in the notion of creating I was told that in informal settlements there a ‘strong stable urban middle class’ (PRSA are no formally constituted ‘committees’ 1982; Super 2013). The state began to call on because of the lack of streets.30 Instead, the the ‘community’ and the individual to take ‘community’ elects an ‘area committee’ con- responsibility for preventing and protecting sisting of about 15 members.31 These commit- against crime as well as managing the crime tees deal with the problems that are referred risk, acknowledging that the government to them by residents, including crime. Larger could not solve such problems on its own.28 community meetings are usually held in The new ANC government has also open spaces with attendance solicited by a embraced a partnership discourse in its loudhailer. According to one interviewee, approach to crime but justifies its appeal these meetings are often run chaotically with to the community by citing the liberation lots of shouting and very little listening.32 One struggle. This form of governance — one that of the SANCO meetings that I attended in operates in terms of a ‘liberation paradigm’ — the formal settlement of Greenpoint started valorises local-level initiatives by constantly three hours late and was aborted, due to lack seeking to mobilise communities on the of a quorum.33 Leadership engaged attend- ground (Darracq 2008). In 1992, the ANC ees with ANC songs and dances in an effort stated that it was ‘the community who [was] to evoke the atmosphere of the liberation largely responsible for prosecutions [and . . . ] struggle. On the day that I went to interview not the police alone who combat crime’ (ANC residents in Enkanini, I drove past a group of 1992: 8–9). Community policing — based on about 30 people assembled in an open space, ‘partnerships and . . . sharing responsibility’ — having a community meeting. The person was presented as the midwife for the ‘rebirth’ that I was interviewing, sitting in the car with of law enforcement whilst Community Police me, became very nervous and did not want to Forums (CPFs)29 were presented as vehicles be seen by this group, because she was with of ‘transformation’ (DSS 1996: 1; Nathan and me. She said that she feared being regarded Colin 1993). as an impimpi.34 In 1999, the Gauteng provincial govern- Initiatives such as neighbourhood watches ment launched a public campaign to estab- are sporadic with many people referring lish street committees — reminiscent of those to them as being a thing of the past and Art. 31, page 8 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’ complaining about a lack of funding.35 At one awaiting trial prisoner as well as unlawfully point the Department of Community Safety imposed sanctions. The latter include infor- offered a week of free residential training to mal curfews, the demolition of individual neighbourhood watch members, as a condi- residences, instructing family members to tion for donations of equipment. 36 This led send the alleged wrongdoer away from the to expectations that neighbourhood watches area,40 instructing homeowners in formal had some official status and that volunteers settlements to sell their houses, and finally, would be remunerated. Yet, the consistent killing. call is for residents in Khayelitsha to volun- I was shown vacated shacks in Enkanini teer without remuneration. Similarly, com- after the ‘community people’ had asked four munity patrols are also not well-supported, alleged drug dealers to move and ‘to take partly because it is dangerous to patrol their materials and clothes.’41 Another per- the streets of Khayelitsha at night but also son told me that he was a member of three because Khayelitsha’s population, particu- different committees, all with varying rela- larly in the informal settlements, is largely tionships with the state: the local neighbour- transitory (Seekings 2013). 37 hood watch, the Mayitshe Group, and the Witnesses testifying at the Khayelitsha Khayelitsha Community Police Forum. He Commission had either not heard of CPFs had also been a participant in the demolition or testified that they were weak structures, of three houses in an informal settlement meeting irregularly, with poor attend- after a decision to this effect was taken at a ance, and were badly funded (Khayelitsha ‘general council’ of local street committees. Commission Record 2014: 2419, 2681, 2701, It appears that street committees give per- 2708). Yet, despite the fact that CPFs appear mission for people to move into an informal to be largely cosmetic structures with acute settlement and that this permission can be resource problems, official discourse refers to revoked in the case of wrongdoing. The situ- them as being ‘elected by an open and demo- ation in a formal settlement is different since cratic process’ and as an important ‘conduit the owner of a house will presumably have between the police and the community’ a title deed to the property. In this case, the (Lamoer 2012). The 2002 SAPS Vigilantism person is ‘asked’ to leave.42 Prevention Strategy for the Western Cape was A police colonel testified before the premised on improving the performance of Khayelitsha Commission that, apart from CPFs and effective implementation of Sector ‘mob justice incidents,’ he was aware of for- Policing. This was to be coupled with ‘com- mal meetings that had resulted in a decision munity based crime prevention by means to evict people from their homes due to a of partnership policing’ (SAPS Vigilantism crime (Nel 2014: 4635). As he put it: Preventative Strategy cited in Häefele 2006: 11). This striving to reform and improve what It might be a child molestation case may well prove to be a chimera, a constantly or it might be a housebreaking cases failing project of the ‘community,’ is twinned where these formal meetings have with a responsibilising discourse that ‘the taken place but none of these were community’ must take responsibility for solv- accompanied by violence. These peo- ing crime on its own. This is not necessarily a ple were just motivated to leave, which good thing and often results in exclusion as I they then did. discuss in the next section. A senior member of the Greenpoint SANCO Banishment and the ‘Moral told me that the street committee’s job is to Community’38 interview the suspect, ‘take all the details,’ Banishment as a means to deal with crime and — in the event of ‘non co-operation’ — is widespread.39 It takes the form of lawfully remove them from the area, but only as a imposed prison sentences, detention as an ‘last resort measure.’43 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 9 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

A member of the area committee in Site B is mostly recorded in suburban and Central told me that if the accused in a ‘crime of stab- Business District station precincts (DCS bing’ was released from custody, the ‘com- 2009: 11). This is borne out by research munity’ would always ask him to leave the conducted by Jeremy Seekings, who found area. He insisted that there were never any that a far smaller proportion of Khayelitsha incidents of violent vigilantism in his neigh- residents said that they would report house- bourhood but that ‘when the community breaking to the police than in white/col- gets mad, so you will move, you will do what oured neighbourhoods (Seekings 2013: 24). they say.’44 Instead, a significant minority of respond- I was also told that a young man staying ents said that they would solve the problem alone would not be ‘banned’ but ‘asked to leave locally — through friends, neighbours, or nicely.’45 If he was staying with his parents then local organisations — rather than contact ‘we speak to them and they decide what to the police. Research commissioned by the do: maybe they send him back to the Eastern Department of Community Safety found Cape.’ In instances where he was staying with a that Khayelitsha residents were more ‘sup- grandparent, who was too old to play a supervi- portive of one another with regard to their sory role, then, if he refused to leave, the com- fight against crime’ than in respect of ‘one munity would either destroy the home (bash it another’s personal dilemmas’ (DCS 2011: 93). down with hammers) or threaten to sell it: ‘all I was told by a mother that the community I can say it depends how the person interacts beat her son to death because he was always with the community.’46 in trouble and was suspected of having sto- One witness at the Khayelitsha len a cellphone.48 A teenager living in a tin Commission testified that when the com- shack in Enkanini told me that had she seen munity demanded that her nephew leave the thieves who broke into her home, she the area due to his alleged ‘criminality,’ the would have alerted the ‘community’ to assist family did not argue and was unable to think her in retrieving her goods.49 An executive of any other options. As she put it: ‘Our main street committee member stated that in cer- concern was that he should leave the house tain instances the ‘community’ would closely so he wouldn’t be harmed. We could see the observe a suspect (i.e. ‘each and every step he mood of the residents and it appeared that takes’) to make sure that he did not commit they would do something.’47 further crimes.50 The power implications are plain to see In the trial that I observed, state eyewit- and the degree of social capital that the nesses testified that had the accused fol- wrongdoer enjoys at particular points in lowed the standard practice of reporting time obviously plays an important role in the incident — in this case, a stolen TV — to the decision that is made by ‘the community’ the street committee rather than the police, and how it is reached. Clearly, although the the deaths of the suspects could have been threat of violence might not be overt, there avoided. Although the police are called in is a form of coercion, a subtle/implicit threat serious cases such as murder — or cases of the violence that will occur should the involving bloodshed more generally — in person not leave ‘voluntarily.’ It would cer- the case of theft, the street committees tainly be worthwhile to do more research on prefer to sort the matter out; this stems not the right to residence in informal and formal from a mistrust of the police, but rather a areas and how these interplay with civil soci- sense of maintaining ‘harmony ‘and teach- ety organisations such as street committees. ing people to ‘live politely.’51 In general there is a high degree of com- Violence to Retrieve Property munity support for violent reprisals against As is typical of most townships, Khayelitsha suspected robbers and thieves. Even SJC does not rank high on the property-related members support the beating of ‘criminals’ crime scale. In fact, property-related crime by ‘community members’ as a technique Art. 31, page 10 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’ to retrieve stolen goods, although they those instances where there was an admis- claim not to participate in violent activities. sion of theft, the responsible party would This might seem surprising given the SJC’s either have to buy a replacement or make leftwing human rights stance but it is also financial restitution. Sometimes the commu- indicative of how theft of a cellphone or nity would go to the wrongdoer’s home and plasma TV assumes great importance in a decide what to take in lieu of monetary pay- context of deep scarcity and endemic societal ment.59 Despite the fact that overt violence inequality. One person told me that the rate was denied, it would seem that there is still of crime had decreased in his area because some form of investigation and/or coercion the troublemakers had been ‘taken out.’52 He with — at the very least — the threat of an stated that ‘smacking’ is not a punishment official charge being laid with the police. but qualified this by stating that ‘if we take A former member of the Amadlozi,60 now law into our own hands we are promoting living in Khayelitsha, explained that there was: apartheid’.53 Another told me that although ‘the community’ is ‘civilized,’ due to a ‘lack . . . nothing wrong with the victim of justice people will lose their patience’ and going to the police and getting a case ‘violence is always lurking’ with ‘decent peo- number — just to make sure we are ple . . . driven to acts of desperation.’54 Thus, covered — because for us it’s impor- on the one hand there is complicity and, on tant to have a case numbe . . . as mem- the other, there is outrage. bers of the community we want to be According to a 2012 police report between on the safe side. Because when we April and June 2012 there were 78 recorded find the suspect it’s important to get ‘vigilante incidents’ in Khayelitsha (SAPS goods back before they get taken to unpublished).55 These all resulted in death the Eastern Cape where they get sold with most victims being young men aged and you never see them again. We fol- between 18 and 30. At least half were low the lead and get the suspect – if caught — or suspected of — stealing/rob- the suspect is willing to talk (because bing/housebreaking and ten had previously all is pointing to him) there is no need been released from prison or remanded to for a massage and if he doesn’t talk detention. yes he will get a little massage and he In the court case that I observed, one talks and we find the goods and it’s former street committee member testified only then we take him to the police. that certain individuals had been tasked with administering ‘lashes’ (euphemistically His reply to the question of why he would referred to as ‘lectures’) in order to elicit a take the person to the police — even after confession from a suspect and retrieve sto- retrieval of the goods — was that prevention len property.56 This ties in with Rebekah Lee was ‘better than cure,’ that ‘the law’ had to and Jeremy Seeking’s observations that there ‘take its course,’ and that ‘the judicial sys- appears to be a tacit acceptance of ‘violent tem must do its duty: we already assisted the forms of vigilantism’ if it is initiated by, or has Investigating Officer. We made the job easier.’ consent of, street committees or other local institutions (Lee and Seekings 2002: 114). Outsiders on the Edges However, I was also told that, ‘due to In part, whether or not one survives a vigi- ubuntu,’ street committees no longer author- lante attack — or is attacked at all — depends ised corporal punishment against suspects.57 on the social capital that the person and their Instead, if the suspect denied responsibility relatives have within the area. I was told that: or refused to give the goods back — and if there was sufficient evidence — then a charge . . . if I stole something from my own would be laid with the police.58 However, in community — in my own area — I Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 11 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

would be beaten by the community contributing to the alienation and criminali- but I wouldn’t be killed, unless some- zation of foreigners (Super 2013). Moreover, one came there drunk and beat me in official discourse has also de-linked criminals my head.61 from their political and social context, thus contributing to their outsider status and As the above interviewee put it: ‘It would exacerbating perceptions of their otherness. seem that there is always more chance that someone from another community would be Conclusion killed.’62 Just as Douglas Hay (1975) argued that in A female who was beaten by a commu- 18th century England the criminal justice nity patrol for suspected drunkenness told system entrenched Whig power, so too has me that this wouldn’t have occurred in her the South African Constitution and the ideol- own neighbourhood. She also stated that ogy of grassroots democratic struggle made when the Somalian shopkeepers63 in her it possible for the ANC to govern within a neighbourhood were robbed, no one stood contradictory and deeply contested macro- up for them; conversely, if she were robbed economic framework. In the ‘frontier society’ the community would find and punish the of Khayelitsha, the governance of crime man- offender.64 This interviewee referred to a ifests as a ‘pathological’ form of grassroots mugging incident that had occurred in her democracy with organized and unorganized street in April 2014. It resulted in community interests all pressing for more punishment members chasing the two suspects and catch- and a more effective criminal justice system ing one, in an adjacent informal settlement, (Garland 2013: 508). The fact that poverty is where he was severely assaulted with spades, unevenly distributed in Khayelitsha — with sjamboks, sticks and stones. According to her, pockets of relative affluence — makes it a he broke his leg: ‘he was a mess but he sur- good breeding ground for what Jock Young vived.’ Others are not so ‘fortunate.’ has described as the ‘relative deprivation’ It seems, therefore, that even spontaneous that characterises ‘incomplete meritocra- ‘mob’ justice, of the deadly type, is not totally cies’ (Young 2007: 37). This sense of being unstructured but targeted at those who are deprived occurs in both directions: those perceived to be outsiders and as such func- who are less well-off feel deprived vis-à-vis tions as a mode of boundary setting. This ties their more well-off counterparts whilst the in with Bruce and Komane’s (1999: 44) find- latter feel unfairly encroached upon by the ings that: less well-off. Clearly, the specific historic condi- The actions of vigilantes should not tions of high crime rates, social insecurity, necessarily be seen to represent a political underrepresentation, as well as generalised intolerance of criminality under-enforcement (stemming from seg- but rather a selective hostility to the regationist apartheid crime control poli- criminality of ‘outsiders.’ cies), have impacted contemporary penality in Khayelitsha. Paying greater attention to These outsiders are also constructed as such crime has the potential to address the deeper in terms of official (state) discourse on crime. criminogenic conditions that give rise to it, In 1994, the Minister of Justice stated that but — given the ease with which a repressive ‘the influence of a large number of illegal form of penal power may be imposed — it aliens in South Africa . . . had a significant is understandable that punitive populism impact on the incidence of criminality’ (PRSA has arisen together with demands for the 1994). Official statistics also distinguish alleviation of criminogenic conditions. Of between citizens and non-citizens in the con- course, the criminal justice system could be text of arrests for commercial crimes, thus improved upon but first the debate must be Art. 31, page 12 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’ broadened to address both inequality and vigilantism in particular and punitive pop- poverty. ulism in general. In sum, we should focus on This paper has argued that there are clear the ‘structural conditions’ that enable ‘collec- precursors in the punitive treatment of sus- tive violence’ (Garland 2010: 36). These do pected criminals that played out during the not only encompass macro-socioeconomic struggle to end apartheid. Indeed, punish- conditions (such as inequality), although ment in South Africa has historically been this is obviously of crucial importance, but relatively unconstrained by the minimal- also factors such as the extant ‘popular sov- ist considerations associated with liberal- ereignty,’ the power struggles between ‘local ism and its democratic tradition has been actors,’ group relations, levels of violence, aligned with — rather than against — harsh and the presence of ‘despised low-status punishment. Prevailing ideology in South outsiders’ (Garland 2010: 36) – such as ex-­ Africa romanticizes the discourse of the prisoners, people released on bail and foreign- liberation struggle by deploying the ‘com- ers. Instead of presenting vigilantism as a form munity’ as a node of public participation of ‘mob justice’ (Minnaar 2001; Häefele 2006; and CPFs as democratic political institu- Sekhonyane and Louw 2002), as a scourge, as tions. Despite the political rhetoric about inimical to ‘civil’ society, and as being some- ‘community,’ there are many fractures and how outside of and opposed to it, we should divisions within those very communities acknowledge how vigilantes, or at least their that are most in need of cohesion. The supporters, are in fact part of ‘civil society.’ result is that the multivalent ‘community’ is deployed in various ways to justify harsh Acknowledgments action against criminals, by a whole range The author would like to thank the Social of actors in terms of a discourse that weaves Justice Coalition, particularly Joel Bregman, the notion of democracy into the discourse Welcome Makhanyele and Nohmle Maci for of partnership. When ‘civic engagement’ their assistance in arranging interviews. The (Barker 2013: 134) in and with crime occurs research for this paper was partly funded in the context of blocked opportunity and by the University of Cape Town’s Safety and relative deprivation, the ‘community’ can Violence Initiative (SaVI). Thanks also to become a place of exclusion, giving rise to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful popular punitivism. Those who are mar- comments. ginalized by poverty and inequality live in conditions of extreme risk and the politics Notes of resource allocation in townships such 1 This Act required local authorities to as Khayelitsha are masked by the labels of establish separate residential locations — ‘mob’ justice or ‘vigilantism.’ i.e. townships — for ‘natives’ and to exer- Because of the distorted institutional cise control over ‘native immigration’ into dynamics that not only shape the nature urban areas (O’Regan and Pikoli 2014: 30; and character of public participation in O’Malley 2007). South Africa but also form a crucial compo- 2 The population of Khayelitsha was nent of the relationship between democracy ­estimated at 400,000 in the 2011 and punishment, it is crucially important to census. However, non-governmental research these dynamics. In particular we organisations — such as the Social Justice should, as Huggins (1991:16) suggests, ana- Coalition — have estimated the number lyze the dynamics between the state and to be as high as 750,000 (Minister of social organizational structures, between Police and Others v Premier of the Western various local organizations and between Cape and Others [2013] ZACC 33): para 2). various government agencies (local, provin- 3 Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) calcu- cial and national) that shape and promote lates the poverty line by determining the Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 13 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

food and non-food items that are essen- campaigning for safe, healthy and digni- tial for daily survival. The upper bound fied communities’ (SJC 2011). poverty line is R779 (US$70) per month: 13 The State vs Mziwabantu Mncwengi, people can buy essential food items and Mzimasi Mncwengi, Buyelwa Mncwengi, spend R444 on non- essential food items. Lumnko Babalaza, Xolani Makapela, The lower bound poverty line is R501 Mawende Siboma Case Number per month meaning that people prob- SS03/2013, Western Cape High Court, ably have to sacrifice some essential food South Africa (part-heard). items in order to be able to buy essential 14 See note 16 where I refer to the ANC’s non-food items (Grant 2015). stance on imprisonment prior to it 4 In 2011 the annual median household becoming a governing party in 1994. income was about R20 000 whereas in 15 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) Cape Town as a whole it was about R40 [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 000 (Seekings 2013: 14). (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) 5 See also Ntongana and Swana 2014. SACR 1 (6 June 1995). 6 I use the term ‘frontier’ as a metaphor. 16 In 1992 the African National Congress According to Ray Abrahams, the idea of (ANC 1992: 7) stated that ‘our crime the frontier refers to more than just spa- problems are NOT being solved by large- tial distance between centre and periph- scale imprisonment’ and that ‘however ery (Abrahams 2008: 426). Frontiers much one condemns those deeds’ the include the boundaries created by cul- state response should show compas- tural differences; temporal flows such as sion for the perpetrator (emphasis in the between night and day; transitions from original). It has of course been argued, one social form to another; as well as by in the context of Western democracies inequality and severe poverty. In frontier (Barker 2013; Foucault 1995; Dumm zones, the state is viewed as absent, inef- 1987) that there is a ‘mutually consti- fective, and/or corrupt (Rodgers 2008: tutive’ relationship between the prison 358, quoting Abrahams 1998). and democracy. 7 In 2012–2013, there were 168 murders 17 The colloquial term for left wing town- in Khayelitsha (Lindeque and Essop ship struggle activists. 2013). 18 The ones that it had established when 8 See Lee and Seekings (2002: 15) who it went into exile and embarked on the argue that the ‘stock of social capital in armed struggle to end apartheid. the community’ plays a key role insofar 19 During the 1980s the term ‘vigilante’ as the less ‘cohesive’ a community is, the connoted: greater the likelihood of more sporadic . . . violent, organised and conser­ and violent incidents of vigilantism. vative groupings operating 9 Necklacing is the setting alight of a tyre within black communities, which, doused with petrol, which is placed although they receive no offi- around the neck of the victim. cial recognition, are politically 10 Most interviews were conducted in directed in the sense that they act English with the exception of those with to neutralise individuals opposed the victims of vigilantism as well as the to the apartheid state and its insti- SANCO member from Site B RR (con- tutions (Haysom 1989). ducted in Xhosa via a translator). 20 Statement made at Ndifuna Ukwazi, Dare 11 These groups patrolled the convoluted to Know, meeting on 20 January 2014. alleyways between shacks. 21 Minister of Police and Others v Premier 12 This group describes itself as a ‘mass- of the Western Cape and Others [2013] member based social movement ZACC 33). Art. 31, page 14 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

22 Personal note taken by author during 34 A colloquial term for spy. hearing on 23 January 2014. 35 Interview with member of Enkanini com- 23 Personal note taken by author during munity crime prevention committee on hearing on 23 January 2014. 1 February 2014; Interview with Mayitshe 24 Personal note taken by author during member on 1 February 2014; Interview hearing on 23 January 2014. with Deputy Secretary of the ‘X’ Area 25 Personal note taken by author during Committee on 16 June 2014; Interview hearing on 23 January 2014. Blaming with SJC Enkanini branch member on crime on apartheid is one of the primary 16 June 2014; Interview with RR street explanations offered by official crimi- committee member on 16 June 2014. nology. The argument is that because 36 Interview with Chief Director of apartheid never set ‘moral standards’ Civilian Oversight in the Department and embraced ‘an unethical position,’ it of Community Safety, Western Cape resulted in a breakdown of South Africa’s Provincial Government, on 14 April 2014. ‘moral infrastructure’ (Super 2013: 55). 37 Interview with member of community 26 Personal note taken by author during crime prevention committee in Enkanini hearing on 23 January 2014. on 1 February 2014; Interview with mem- 27 Personal note taken by author during ber of Mayitshe on 1 February 2014; hearing on 23 January 2014. Interview with deputy secretary of the 28 This was part of the state’s strategy of ‘X’ Area Committee on 16 June 2014; divide and rule which sought to create a Interview with SJC branch member in small, relatively privileged class of urban Enkanini on 16 June 2014; Interview with blacks whilst keeping the majority in the street committee member in RR settle- Bantustans. ment on 16 June 2014. 29 Established in terms of the 1995 South 38 This phrase comes from Buur and Jensen African Police Services Act. 2004: 144. 30 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the 39 It also has historical precursors in African ‘X’ Area Committee on 16 June 2014; customary law. Interview with former Harare street com- 40 Individuals are usually exiled to the mittee member on 26 August 2013. Eastern Cape, the point of origin for 31 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the many of Khayelitsha’s residents. ‘X’ Area Committee on 16 June 2014; 41 Interview with Enkanini SJC branch Interview with former Harare street member on 16 June 2014. committee member on 26 August 2013; 42 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the ‘X’ Interview with SJC Enkanini branch Area Committee on 16 June 2014. member on 16 June 2014; Interview with 43 Interview conducted on 19 October 2013. SJC criminal justice task team member on 44 Interview with member of area commit- 9 April 2013. tee in Site B RR informal settlement on 32 Interview with SJC Enkanini branch 21 June 2014. member on 16 June 2014. See also Kelly 45 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the Gillespie, who has argued that SANCO is Endloveni Area Committee on 16 June a much less effective and trusted forma- 2014. tion than it was at the end of apartheid; 46 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the as such, many residents have little faith Endloveni Area Committee on 16 June in its ability to manage problems at street 2014. level (Gillespie 2013: 7). 47 Testimony by Nomakuma Bontshi at the 33 The Regional SANCO meeting held in Khayelitsha Commission on 24 January Greenpoint, Khayelitsha on 19 October 2014. 2013. 48 Interview conducted on 16 October 2013. Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Art. 31, page 15 of 20 Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

49 Interview conducted on 16 October 2013. were too afraid to testify before the 50 Interview conducted on 16 October 2013. Khayelitsha Commission because of 51 Obviously this is contradicted by instances police victimization. where suspected rapists have been killed 64 Interview conducted on 16 June 2014; in incidents of ‘mob justice.’ See Interview Interview conducted on 21 June 2014. with the mother of a child who was mur- The selective attitude of the ‘moral com- dered in a vigilante incident and ex-member munity’ is borne out by research con- of a Street Committee on 26 August 2013; ducted by Amit and Gastrow (2012) and Interview with Deputy Secretary of the ‘X’ Igglsedon (2014). Area Committee on 16 June 2014. 52 Interview with SJC member on 9 April Court Cases 2013. S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) 53 Interview on 4 February 2013. [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 54 Interview on 9 April 2013; see also para (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) 141.1.1 of Mlungwana’s affidavit to the SACR 1 (6 June 1995). Khayelitsha Commission. Minister of Police and 6 others v The Premier of 55 This is also referred to in the report as the Western Cape and 8 others, Case Num- ‘bundu courts and mob justice.’ ber 21600/12), Western Cape High Court, 56 As one witness testified in the case of The South Africa, unreported judgment. State vs Mziwabantu Mncwengi, and five Minister of Police and Others v Premier of the others. This was followed up by an inter- Western Cape and Others [2013] ZACC 33). view with the witness on 26 August 2013. The State vs Mziwabantu Mncwengi, Mzimasi 57 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the X Mncwengi, Buyelwa Mncwengi, Lumnko Area Committee on 16 June 2014; Interview Babalaza, Xolani Makapela, Mawende with Site B RR area committee member on Siboma, Case Number SS03/2013, West- 21 June 2014; Interview with Site B street ern Cape High Court, South Africa. committee member on 21 June 2014. 58 Interview with Site B RR area commit- References tee member on 21 June 2014; Interview Abrahams, R 2008 Some Thoughts on the with Deputy Secretary of the ‘X’ Area Comparative Study of Vigilantism. In: Committee on 16 June 2014. Pratten, D and Sen, A (eds.) Global Vigi- 59 Interview with Deputy Secretary of the ‘X’ lantes. New York: Columbia University Area Committee on 16 June 2014. Press. pp. 419–442. 60 A vigilante association in Port Elizabeth. African National Congress 1992 Dis- Interview conducted on 29 January 2014. cussion Document: Crime and Crime 61 Interview on 19 October 2013. Control – What Role should the Police 62 Interview on 19 October 2013. I am Play? Marshalltown, South Africa: ANC. grateful to the reviewer who pointed out Centre for Applied Legal Studies, File that this connects with an old township AK2195, P2 Police, South African History ethical principle, which holds that crime Archives, University of the Witwatersrand. against whites was understandable whilst Allison, J 1990 In Search of Revolutionary crime against blacks was abominable. Justice in South Africa. International 63 See evidence by Vickie Igglsedon before Journal of the Sociology of Law, 18: the Khayelitsha Commission given on 409–428. 4 February 2014, available at http:// Barker, V 2013 Prison and the Public www.khayelitshacommission.org.za/ Sphere: Toward a Democratic Theory of images/transcripts/4%20February%20 Penal Order. In: Scott, D (ed.) Why Prison? 2014%20pp%201269-1475.pdf: 1321). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. She testified that Somalian shopkeepers pp. 125–146. Art. 31, page 16 of 20 Super: Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’

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How to cite this article: Super, G 2015 Violence and Democracy in Khayelitsha, Governing Crime through the ‘Community’. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 31, pp. 1–20, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ft

Published: 26 May 2015

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