(

A publication of ihe African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies

No. 36 • November 5, 1984 A Guide to Black Politics in South Africa

by Steven McDonald

Under the terms of the new constitution approved by Black South Africans, on the other hand, have ral­ the white electorate in November 1983, South Africa's lied against the constitution, forging an unparalleled whites-only legislature was replaced on September 3, degree of unity on this issue and achieving some nota­ 1984 by a parliament consisting of the incumbent ble success in protest politics as they urged their Col­ 178-member House of Assembly representing South oured and Indian compatriots to stay away from the Africa's 4.5 million whites, a newly-elected 85-member polls. Of course, the durability of this new communal­ House of Representatives for the country's 2. 7 million ity is debatable for a number of reasons-notably, its Coloureds (mixed race}, and a newly-elected 45-member focus on a single issue, the formidable coercive powers House of Deputies for the Indian (i.e. Asian) population of the South African government, and the govern­ of some 870,000. The constitution makes no provision ment's demonstrated willingness to use these powers for parliamentary representation of the country's 22 (see Section 9 below, and "Destabilization and Dia­ million blacks. P.W. Botha, who was sworn in as the logue: South Africa's Emergence as a Regional Super­ Republic's executive president on September 14, after power" by John de St. Jorre in CSIS Africa Notes no. receiving a unanimous vote from an electoral college 26, April 17, 1984). Meanwhile, the new restrictions appointed by the new tricameral parliament, has gained imposed on the freedom of action of externally-based a number of powers beyond those he held as prime forces of black South African nationalism by the minister. These include the right to decide (immune Nkomati Accord and other regional "nonaggression" from challenge in the courts) what matters are and are pacts have also created new pressures and challenges not the "own affair" of any of the three ethnic houses for internal black activists across the political of parliament or a shared "general affair" of the nation. spectrum. President Botha also has the authority to veto any leg­ The following is a summary assessment of the orga­ islation passed by any house of parliament. nizational structure of black power in South Africa as Ironically, the new constitution has caused rifts with­ of the latter half of 1984: in and between the white, Coloured, and Indian com­ munities while having an opposite effect on the black majority it ignores. Although an unexpectedly high 1. The African National Congress (ANC) proportion (66 percent) of white voters approved the The ANC is the oldest nationalist organization in sub­ arrangement in the 1983 referendum, the Coloured and Saharan Africa. Its roots go back to early pan­ Indian electorates were less enthusiastic. In parliamen­ Africanist and nationalist thinkers of the late nine­ tary elections held in late August in those two commu­ teenth century, many of whom were educated in the nities, the official turnouts were just over 20 percent United States. Organizationally, it developed from the and about 30 percent respectively of registered voters. South African Native Convention which met in 1909 to Moreover, the voting was accompanied by protest protest the terms of the draft constitution for South demonstrations and school boycotts (at one point African union following the Boer War. The Conven­ 630,000 Coloured students were out of classes). Gov­ tion's protests were ineffective and, in frustration, the ernment officials have blamed intimidation as well as a South African Native National Congress-subsequently lack of organization and of "democratic traditions" for renamed the African National Congress-was formed the low voter turnout. in 1912.

Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate : J. Coleman Kitchen , Jr. • Production/Circulation: Sheilah Mclean CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone (202) 887-0219 • ISSN 0736-9506 2

The ANC's early philosophy was moderate, indeed also maintained offices in London, New York, and almost archaic, compared with its present profile. It several other countries. The first decade of its exile was was founded by professional, middle-class Africans who relatively quiescent. By the mid-1970s, however, a low­ focused on, according to its 1919 constitution, the use key insurgency campaign had been launched, consist­ of "resolutions, protests ... constitutional and peaceful ing mainly of sabotage and attacks on government in­ propaganda ... deputations [and] enquiries" to reach its stallations that resulted in only a few fatalities. In the objectives. Those objectives were clearly evolutionary, 1980s, the campaign has been stepped up, becoming ranging from demands for "equitable justice" in the more sophisticated and exacting a higher death toll. 1909 Convention to the All-African Convention's call in The sabotage action against the Koeberg nuclear the 1930s for "reconsideration" of unjust laws and pro­ power station in December 1982 and at the SASOL tests of the removal of Africans from the voters' rolls in coal conversion plant in June 1980; attacks on police Cape Province. The ANC of that era was willing to ac­ stations and government offices; and the May 1983 car cept a qualified franchise for blacks based on "civi­ bombing outside air force offices in Pretoria (at least 18 lized" factors such as education, property, or wage deaths and 217 injuries) added up to a clear new trend. qualifications and it expressed its understanding of and Guerrilla activities have occurred in all of South concern for the protection of white interests. Africa's four provinces and in most major urban Over the years, the ANC inexorably moved toward a centers, including Johannesburg, Durban, Bloemfon­ greater radicalism, from early petition to protest to de­ tein, Cape Town, and Pretoria. By these diverse ac­ fiance, then to underground insurgency, banning, and tions, the ANC has sought to demonstrate an ability to exile. This escalation was due to growing frustration strike anywhere and to penetrate sophisticated over a lack of any results from peaceful and legal pro­ defenses of critical installations. A rash of bombings tests (e.g., the failure to block the removal of Cape throughout the country, concentrated around the Africans from the voters' rolls in 1936). The ANC was month of the Coloured and Indian elections, as well as also stimulated by the post-World War II idealism (in a major attack on the Mobil refinery in Durban in May particular the self-determination principles of the 1984, have been intended to send a message. This Atlantic Charter) and stymied by the coming to power message is that the "nonaggression" pacts South of the Afrikaner-based National Party in 1948 and the Africa has signed with Mozambique and Swaziland, implementation of apartheid that followed. and seeks with others, all involving denial of "bases" to The ANC's 1952 "Defiance Campaign" was the first the ANC, will not end the movement's effectiveness. mass civil disobedience campaign in South Africa. The ANC has always been identified by its adherence Another effort to broaden the ANC's base was the Con­ to nonracialism in its campaign for political rights in gress Alliance, which brought together Indian, Col­ South Africa. The Freedom Charter, which enshrines oured, and white organizations in protest against grow­ its basic philosophy, advocates a "South Africa which ing government repression. Certain individual African belongs to all who live in it, black and white." The members of the South African Communist Party leadership has publicly spoken against racial confron­ (SACP) had participated in the ANC since the 1920s, tation and consistently calls for a "new nonracial demo­ but played no formative role in its organization. After cratic South Africa." An irony of this nonracism is that the SACP was banned in 1950, more white and Indian the presence of whites within the ANC command struc­ communists began to involve themselves through the ture, seen by some as an indication of the organiza­ broadening Congress Alliance. The Defiance Campaign tion's broad appeal, feeds the South African govern­ itself was an outcome of a decision, initiated largely by ment's belief that the movement is dominated by the the newly-formed Youth League, to begin a program of South African Communist Party and by the Soviet mass action. The Freedom Charter, issued by the Union. Alliance in 1955, resulted in growing harassment, ban­ Individual communists within the party hierarchy nings, and detentions by the government. Thousands of have considerable influence and played a role in mov­ arrests took place as anti-passbook marches, protests, ing the ANC from peaceful protest to greater activism. and boycotts increased in number. The long-running Since its exile, the movement has received the bulk of Treason Trial of 1956-61, in which 156 persons were its weaponry and much of its training from the Soviet charged but ultimately acquitted, was a central event Union and other Eastern bloc nations, a familiar pat­ in this era of borderline legality for the ANC. tern in African and Third World nations confronting Following the Sharpevijle confrontation in 1960, in minority or colonial ruling groups. (For a discussion of which police fired on a nonviolent demonstration, kill­ current Soviet views of the ANC, see "New Trends in ing 67 Africans and wounding 186, the ANC was Soviet Policy Toward Africa" by David E. Albright in banned and went underground. In 1961, its leadership, CSIS Africa Notes no. 27, April29, 1984, pp. 7-8.) along with some white and Indian communists, formed In sum, the ANC receives more international recog­ a paramilitary sabotage unit called Umkhonto we nition and media attention than any other black South Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"). In 1962 and 1963, the African organization. The ANC's ability to shape and Umkhonto leadership, including Nelson Mandela, was influence events inside South Africa beyond the arrested. By the end of 1964 the bulk of ANC leader­ pressures exerted through its sabotage campaign, ship was either in detention or in exile. however, will be dependent on internal black percep­ For the past 20 years, the ANC has directed its ac­ tions of its various parts; the character of other emerg­ tivities from headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia), and has ing internal organizations; and the coercive and co-

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984 3 optative powers of the South African government. Drake Koka, Saths Cooper, Malusi Mpumlawana, and many others played important roles in the movement. 2. The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) Organizationally, Black Consciousness surfaced first The PAC was formed in 1959 by a group of ANC mem­ in such student groupings as the South African bers who were uncomfortable with the vague socialism Students' Organization (SASO) and the South African and multiracial approach of the ANC. The thrust Students' Movement (SASM)-partly in reaction to behind the PAC's formation derived in part from black white students' groups' efforts to broaden their repre­ suspicions of Indian and white communist activists and sentation among black students. The political arm, the their external connections, but the underlying theme of Black People's Convention (BPC), was formed in 1972 the new movement was a purified form of African na­ to provide "a political home for all Black people who tionalism. The founders viewed the ANC Freedom could not reconcile themselves to working within the Charter as a betrayal of that principle. While rejecting framework of separate development, and to promote white alliances, the PAC was also strongly anticom­ black solidarity." One of the principles of Black Con­ munist. Many members of the ANC Youth League, sciousness was self-help and, accordingly, organiza­ which had also been urging a more nationalist line, tions such as the Black Community Programmes, the moved into the PAC over time. Ginzberg Education Fund, the Zenophile Clinic, and The PAC's founder-leader was Robert Sobukwe­ other community, health, educational, and agricultural imprisoned in 1960, later released but banned in schemes were established. Kimberley. An intellectual who practiced law after his Black Consciousness is generally perceived today, by release, Sobukwe strongly influenced the founders of both its detractors and proponents, as a radical, racial­ the Black Consciousness movement (see below). When ly exclusive philosophy. Its roots lie with the PAC he died of cancer in 1978, the funeral in his home of rather than the ANC. Current adherents eschew alli­ Graaff Reinet was attended by hundreds of Black Con­ ances with multiracial groups. Black Consciousness' sciousness adherents as well as old-line nationalists of original philosophy seemed to suggest a less exclusivist the PAC and ANC. policy, focusing on black pride and development and After their post-Sharpeville banning, the PAC and promoting a liberation sequence, i.e. independence of the ANC formed an alliance called the South African person, then community, then nation. Although it was United Front. This quickly fell apart, however, due to revolutionary in the sense that it challenged the ex­ various ideological and personal conflicts. Since then, isting social, economic, and political orders, it was not the PAC, unlike the ANC, has not been able to orga­ intended as a denial of a role for whites. Biko saw few nize effectively outside South Africa. It has an external whites as potential allies, but he also took the position structure, with offices in New York, London, Dares that "Blacks have had enough experience as the ob­ Salaam, and other African capitals, but, especially jects of racism not to wish to reverse the tables." Black since Sobukwe's death, has had a weak leadership Consciousness, he said, was "the affirmation of black marked by dissension, including assassination. The humans that emancipates black people from white PAC has nonetheless maintained considerable support racism and thus provides an authentic freedom for within South Africa, and occasionally launches guer­ both ... it affirms the humanity of white people in that rilla operations, although not on a scale comparable it says no to white oppression." with those of the ANC. The movement has undergone Almost all of the early Black Consciousness organi­ something of a resurgence recently in the general rise zations were banned in 1977, along with most impor­ of black activism against the new constitution. tant Black Consciousness leaders. Black Conscious­ ness was once more represented by a political 3. The Azania People's Organization (AZAPO) organization, however, with the formation of the AZAPO is the political home of the "Black Conscious­ Azania People's Organization (AZAPO) in 1978. ness" movement and the heir to the organizations that Created in Soweto by former members of the Soweto were banned by the government in 1977. Black Con­ Student Representative Council and of the BPC, sciousness is more a philosophy than an ideology and, AZAPO had a low profile during its first years, except while it has always had organizational ramifications, it for the national attention it received when it worked was never an organization as such. It grew intellec­ with Father Patrick Matelengwe and family members tually from the same roots as Pan-Africanism, Negri­ in planning the arrangements for Robert Sobukwe's tude, Black Pride, and Black Power. Its development funeral in 1978. There were strong Black Conscious­ followed a Black Theology group in South Africa ness overtones in the funeral proceedings and an inci­ strongly influenced by Americans such as Jim Cones dent having to do with an effort by Chief Gatsha and Martin Luther King, Jr. Buthelezi to speak almost resulted in serious harm to Black Consciousness began to emerge as an identi­ the Zulu leader of Inkatha (see lnkatha, Section 4). fiable philosophy in the late 1960s, reaching its peak of Although AZAPO had none of the known Black Con­ public. recognition and organizational adherence in the sciousness leaders of the SASO/SASM/BPC period early to mid-1970s. Over time, Steve Biko became its within its executive, it became the standard bearer for best-known spokesman, although he was only one of the philosophy of these groups and has developed a many who helped to form and continued to develop the new cadre of leaders as well as bringing old Black Con­ philosophy. Barney Pityana, Ben Khoapa, Mokethi sciousness types back with the formation of the Na­ Mothlabi, Mamphela Ramphele, Thoko Mbanjwa, tional Forum (see Section 6).

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984 4

4. lnKatha yeNkululenko yeSizwe (lnkatha) difficult. Nevertheless, lnkatha stresses black unity and Inkatha is a Zulu cultural organization founded in Buthelezi is personally sensitive to that need. In 1976, 1928. Its name means a woven grass ring used by he formed a group called the Black Unity Front con­ peasant women to cushion loads carried on their sisting of the leaders of other homelands which had re­ heads; figuratively, it denotes the cushion between the jected independence and of the (Coloured) Labour people and their burdens. The movement remained Party. The Black Unity Front was expanded in subse­ obscure for nearly half a century until Chief Gatsha quent years to include the (Indian) Reform Party and Buthelezi revived it in 1974 to sidestep legal repression was renamed the South African Black Alliance. Under of political activity. The constitution adopted in 1975 its new rubric, this attempt at unification foundered describes Inkatha as a "national cultural movement" when the Labour Party opted to participate in the elec­ that "desires to abolish all forms of discrimination and tions under the 1984 constitution. Inkatha has now separation." In more political terms, lnkatha aims to established an alliance (the South African Federal span tribal and urban-rural divisions and to bring Union) with black business, church, and homeland change in an "orderly and controllable fashion which leaders brought together by their shared opposition to will lead to a liberated South Africa which is govern­ the new constitution (see Section 7 below). able." Although Buthelezi is the chief minister of Inkatha's relations with the ANC were quite cordial KwaZulu, the government-designated Zulu homeland, until 1979. Differences in the past five years have he and Inkatha reject homeland independence and centered on Inkatha's rejection of violence and stand for a central, unified South Africa. Inkatha op­ Buthelezi's position of opposition to foreign divestment poses the new constitution and calls for "a national or disinvestment from South Africa as well as other convention" of blacks and whites to discuss the coun­ sanctions. During the early 1980s, personal animosities try's future. further weakened the ANC/ Inkatha relationship. There Inkatha currently claims over 750,000 dues-paying was some early contact between Inkatha and the members, making it the largest black organization in United Democratic Front (see Section 5 below); since South Africa's history. It is very well organized, with a the University of Zululand incident and Buthelezi's un­ military-style hierarchy and discipline. It has a Central willingness to criticize or investigate it, however, links Committee, chaired by the movement's president have been broken and the two groups are openly (Buthelezi), and regional branches, including township hostile to each other. outlets throughout the Transvaal. In KwaZulu (a Yet Buthelezi remains a charismatic and dynamic 12,000-square-mile cluster of land parcels in Natal pro­ leader, heading a large and powerful organization vince), Inkatha has branches operating in most com­ which, as he likes to emphasize, is self-supporting munities, including youth groups in schools and a financially. Because Inkatha is indisputably well­ Women's Brigade. The urban branches are not as organized, it has an enormous potential for contesting tightly controlled, although meetings in Soweto, out­ local elections or promoting strikes, boycotts, or work side Johannesburg in the Transvaal, are well attended. stayaways. Buthelezi is also an eloquent spokesman for Inkatha says it is open to all black people and claims black South Africa. Even Steve Biko, who strongly a large multi-ethnic following throughout the country. criticized Buthelezi's motivations and tactics, once said Secretary-General Oscar Dhlomo recently stated in an to me: "After all, Buthelezi is black. He knows and interview published in the quarterly Leadership SA lives the problem and can tell the story." (Vol. 3, no. 1, 1984) that 40 percent of Inkatha was non-Zulu as early as 1978, and cited an opinion poll 5. The United Democratic Front (UDF) result to support that claim. In the same interview, on The UDF is the broadest-based of the new political the other hand, Dhlomo observed that the Zulus are movements. Ideologically, it bears comparison with the the largest ethnic· group in South Africa, that lulu­ ANC; organizationally, it resembles the Congress dominated Natal is Inkatha's base, and that the Alliance of the 1950s. Its birthdate is the year 1983, organization is thus predominantly Zulu. On balance, but its ideological roots are much older. despite its aspirations, Inkatha remains essentially a The UDF has attracted disparate groupings that Zulu entity. have ties to the ANC but are uncomfortable with the Criticism of lnkatha is varied and emotional. Many ANC's exile status or its open advocacy of violence. observers see it as a personal vehicle for the political The UDF has also acquired adherents from among aspirations of Chief Buthelezi and claim that it would blacks uncomfortable with the post-banning radicaliza­ cease to exist without his presence. It is also criticized tion of the Black Consciousness movement, and with for using "strong-arm" recruiting tactics in KwaZulu. the fact that no internal organization spoke for those Many fear its militaristic image, strengthened by who eschewed the exclusivist racial approach but still Buthelezi's threats against his opponents. The killing of considered themselves "progressive" and anti­ five students at the University of Zululand in October apartheid. (In 1979, for example, at a conference held 1983 by Inkatha "impis" during campus protests and by the Azania People's Organization [AZAPO], a stu­ clashes added credibility to the concerns of Inkatha's dent wing was formed called the Azania Students' critics. Organization [AZASO]. Black Consciousness was, of Buthelezi has a "thin skin" and does not take course, the central theme for its formation, but subse­ criticism in stride, thus making Inkatha's attempts to quent attempts to form campus branches ran into diffi­ seek a broader constituency and tactical alliances more culties and AZASO began to diverge ideologically from

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984 5

its parent. AZASO's then-president, Joe Phaahla, The UDF actively lobbied among whites against the ( stated that "a number of students were not prepared to "yes" vote prior to the November 1983 referendum on affiliate with a dogmatic approach" and, in 1981, the constitution; successfully campaigned against black AZASO broke with AZAPO, stating in its new charter participation in the December 1983 municipal council that it embraced a broader, nonracial, more progres­ elections, holding the turnout down to some 10 percent sive outlook. By 1982, AZASO was seeking "to forge in several townships country-wide; has regularly held links with all relevant organizations concerned with the rallies and distributed literature on such occasions as liberation of the oppressed and exploited people of the anniversaries of the Sharpeville shootings and the South Africa [but] to continue to spread the nonracial Soweto-sparked upheavals of 1976; has spoken out on gospel." AZASO later played a role in the formation of issues such as the Strydom Committee's recommenda­ the UDF.) tions on the Group Areas Act and on relocations; effec­ The UDF seems to have begun to coalesce at a tively mobilized (the government says through intimi­ Johannesburg meeting in May 1983, at which 30 orga­ dation) opposition to the participation by Coloureds nizations representing trade union, civic, and church and Indians in the August parliamentary elections; groups, along with AZASO, came together. The mov­ and, during the election and post-election unrest in ing forces behind the Johannesburg meeting were the several black townships, organized medical, legal, and Transvaal Indian Congress, the Transvaal Anti­ nutritional assistance for victims. President's Council Committee, and the Anti­ The UDF has also appealed to the international Community Council Committee. This meeting was, in community for recognition and publicity. Dr. Boesak part, inspired by a February 1983 speech by Dutch frequently travels abroad and speaks often about the Reformed Church (Coloured) leader Dr. Alan Boesak, UDF. In April1984, the UDF Transvaal general secre­ also currently the president of the World Alliance of tary, Mohamed Valli, went to the United States, Reformed Churches. Dr. Boesak had invited various Canada, and Europe, and visited the United Nations, organizations, including sports and civic bodies, to in search of "moral [and] political support [to] come together for "the struggle for a nonracial, open, strengthen our hand internally." democratic South Africa, a unitary state in which all Much of the UDF's rhetoric comes from the ANC the people will have the rights accorded them by God." Freedom Charter, which, ironically, the South African Although the UDF began to take shape in the government has recently allowed to be distributed in Transvaal, its appeal rapidly became nationwide. the country. Although the UDF openly claims connec­ ?ormer ANC supporters and whites, Coloureds, and In­ tion with many ANC members and includes in its ranks dians, as well as Africans not comfortable with the the Release Mandela Campaign group, statements tight ideological parameters of Black Consciousness, made for public consumption by UDF officials disclaim rallied to its banner. It was officially launched as a na­ any ANC organizational ties. There are differences with tional movement at a convention in August 1983. the ANCona number of points-most notably over the Some 7,000 to 12,000 persons (estimates vary) use of violence-and some supporters, as noted above, representing over 400 diverse organizations met in may have come to the UDF out of frustration with the Cape Town's Coloured township of Mitchell's Plain and ANC. National Publicity Secretary Patrick Lekota, a pledged to fight "side by side against the government's former Black Consciousness activist, and other UDF constitutional proposals and the Koornhof bills." The supporters such as Winnie Mandela emphasize that the latter were a set of parliamentary proposals relating to UDF is not meant as a substitute or rival for "ac­ the pass laws, black residential rights, and township credited liberation movements" and that it is merely an municipal powers. The UDF demanded a "true "alliance of first-level organizations." Certainly many of democracy [for] all South Africans" and "a single, its affiliates and supporters who are white or who have nonracial, unfragmented South Africa ... free of Ban­ Black Consciousness roots would not welcome overt tustans and Group Areas." connections with the ANC. The front's declared founders and patrons read like a Whether the reluctance to admit past or present "who's who" of black and white activists over the ANC linkages is due to the factors cited publicly or years, with a strong ANC flavor. They included Nelson merely an elaborate facade to avoid legal crackdowns Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Helen Joseph, Govan Mbeki, arising from the ANC's banned status is difficult to and Dennis Goldburg as patrons and Archie Gumede, determine. In any case, the UDF seems to be acquiring Albertina Sisulu, and Oscar Mpetha as presidents. a life of its own. Even taking into account Lekota's em­ Focused on the specific objective of opposing the phasis on the umbrella nature of the organization, the new constitutional proposals, the UDF outlined a sheer numbers and the focus on clear-cut tactical ob­ strategy of organizing, mobilizing, and educating to jectives warrant attention. The UDF now has ana­ create unity among its followers and "to represent their tional, salaried executive, publishes literature, and has views and aspirations." Organizationally, the UDF has an efficient, democratic national structure that allows a National General Council, but is decentralized into at its members to vet policy issues thoroughly and recom­ .east five regional bodies. It is essentially an umbrella mend action. It works through affiliate members or organization. Individuals do not join directly but only empathetic white liberal organizations in establishing through an organizational entity. Membership is grass-roots community contact points. claimed to be as much as one million people affiliated The UDF is currently considering its strategies for to 560 organizations. what one official recently called the "ongoing struggle

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984 6 ...... against the new system after its formal inauguration." been quiescent for so long, seems to be experiencing a Recent interviews with UDF leaders indicated that modest revival in its influence in Black Consciousness these "strategies" were not yet decided upon and prob­ circles. ably would be defined by the membership. Still, the UDF's future is uncertain, largely because of possible 7. The South African Federal Union (SAFU) government pressures (see Section 9) and because of An unexpected entry into the anti-constitution forces the unattainability of its objectives in the foreseeable was a moderately conservative black coalition initially future, which creates built-in obsolescence or self­ launched in August 1983 as the Movement for National destructive tendencies. Unification and later calling itself the South African 6. The National Forum (NF) Federal Union. SAFU is philosophically akin to the now-defunct Black Unity Front and South African The second and smaller black group formed to fight Black Alliance led by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. the new constitution is the National Forum. AZAPO, Buthelezi played a key role in SAFU's formation, but the moving spirit behind the NF, launched the organi­ the impetus for such an organization also came from zation at a meeting in Hammanskraal, north of senior officials of the National African Federated Pretoria, in June 1983. The declared purpose was to Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC), a moderate group­ bring together blacks in opposition to the constitutional ing of black entrepreneurs and businessmen with a proposals, the same dynamic that produced the UDF, large national membership and led by the respected but under the banner of Black Consciousness. Over banker and businessman Sam Motsuenyane. The 800 persons representing some 200 organizations Union includes all the chief ministers and chief execu­ reportedly attended. They included several prominent tive councillors of the nonindependent homelands, black, Coloured, and Indian leaders-for example, Chief George Matanzima of "independent" Transkei, Bishops Desmond Tutu and Manas Buthelezi, Saths representatives from the Interdenominational African Cooper, and Neville Alexander. The meeting took on Ministers' Association of South Africa, and officials racially exclusive and strong socialist tones which were from the United Councils Association of South Africa, reflected in the National Forum's manifesto. In stark a group representing municipal councils. contrast to the UDF's attempt at a broad, nonracial Although SAFU appears to have made little impact appeal, the NF manifesto declared opposition to "the so far and faces considerable black animosity because system of racial capitalism which holds the people of of the homeland connection, its very existence in oppo­ Azania in bondage for the benefit of the small minority sition to the constitution and in support of a national of white capitalists and their allies, the white workers convention and "the establishment of a greater South and the reactionary sections of the black middle class." Africa" underscores the extent to which the govern­ It further called for control by workers of the "means of ment's constitutional change has galvanized the black production, distribution, and exchange" and stated that community as a whole. "the struggle against apartheid is no more than the point of departure for our liberation efforts." The National Forum has been far less vocal and visi­ 8. Trade Unions ble than the UDF. It does not appear to have a perma­ Black trade unionism has become a new force in recent nent organizational structure, and its strident rhetoric years-a force that many observers believe could, in has dampened the enthusiasm of its more moderate the long run, have far greater impact on the rate and supporters. Indeed, several have chosen to link them­ direction of change than any or all of the political selves informally with both the NF and the UDF but af­ groups on which attention is now focused. A series of filiate with neither. While many veteran Black Con­ illegal strikes carried out in 1973 by black industrial sciousness stalwarts such as Hlaku Rachidi and Saths workers in Durban, followed by a number of govern­ Cooper have helped organize the NF, many others ment concessions (including new minimum pay scales (e.g., the former AZAPO President, Curtis Nkondo) for urban workers, a limited legal right to strike, and have either joined the UDF or maintained a neutral open recognition of the need for more technical train­ position. AZAPO remains the NF's most important ing opportunities for black workers) helped set the component but, in recent commemorative meetings stage for some watershed events of 1979. These were and press interviews, AZAPO leaders have not men­ the publication of the report of the Wiehahn Commis­ tioned the NF. sion of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, and action by Although the NF has divided some groups (for exam­ parliament to amend the Industrial Conciliation Act to ple, a delegation walked out of the Black Consciousness­ allow black workers to join registered labor unions if based Media Workers' Association of South Africa in they are permitted to live with their families in urban January 1984 over the issue of white participation and areas. The government by ministerial action later ex­ UDF affiliation), it still has a credible constituency tended this right to commuters and migrants for an in­ because it represents an important group of mostly definite period. young, student-age activists who see themselves as Despite increasing government surveillance and heirs to the Black Consciousness movement and are harassment of specific union leaders and unions it impatient with the perceived moderate ways of their perceives to be involved in politics, new unions and elders, including the ANC and the UDF. Significantly, union groupings continue to multiply among black the PAC, which shares the NF's philosophy and has workers. In recent years this growth has been

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984 7

phenomenal, with a 200 percent surge in black mem­ dent leaders were especially angered in 1976-77 by bership between 1980 and 1983 (from 220,000 to ANC claims that the widespread civil protests and 670,000). The black trade union movement's potential resulting clashes with authorities that began in Soweto for forcing change on the shop floor, in management were orchestrated or inspired by the ANC. Some of attitudes, and in the economic structures of South this anger was based on ANC-Black Consciousness Africa cannot be underestimated. (See, for example, ideological differences, but it also reflected a human Black Trade Unions in South Africa by David Hauck, aspiration to be understood and credited properly. In published by the Investor Responsibility Research addition, there was concern that the focus on the ANC Center, Washington, D.C., in 1982.) had the effect of fueling government "communist Many unions, taking a long-term view, try to avoid onslaught" propaganda, thus allowing Pretoria to side­ political or quasi-political demands and focus on the step dealing with the specific grievances that immediate priorities of shop floor organization and precipitated the protests. creation of a national trade union federation to protect We are also witnessing here a syndrome that has rights gained.-Most major union groups will speak out recurred again and again among externally-based ("ex­ on specific issues such as the Industrial Court system ile") political organizations in Africa. The ANC and or certain broader issues (bannings, detentions, black PAC are both victims of their distance from their con­ unity). Others have become actively engaged in the stituencies. Although there is little doubt about the current political groupings. The UDF, the National ANC's growing presence within South Africa in recent Forum, and even Inkatha claim some union support. In years, it does not necessarily follow that this growth the case of the UDF, such major trade union groups as reflects a strong allegiance to the external ANC of the Council of Unions of South Africa (which includes Oliver Tambo. Notions of the ANC among blacks the National Union of Mineworkers), the South African within South Africa are often of a resurgent Nelson Allied Workers Union, the Motor Assembly and Com­ Mandela and Walter Sisulu. Restrictions on domestic ponent Workers Union of South Africa, and the press coverage of banned organizations are, of course, General and Allied Workers Union have affiliated; in a factor contributing to the limited identification with some cases, however, all their member unions may not the less familiar exiled leaders. have been consulted. Several groups, notably the In the face of these deep divisions, recent bridge­ Media Workers Association of South Africa, have been building successes warrant a closer look. The fact that divided over affiliation. the motivation for the formation of the UDF, the NF, and the South African Federal Union has been opposi­ 9. What Lies Ahead? tion to the current constitutional process rather than While there has been a dramatic convergence of black any perceived need for reconciling ANC-PAC-Black opinion in South Africa on the constitutional issue, Consciousness ideologies would seem to be a positive serious divisions remain. The ANC-PAC relationship is development. reflected in the groups they have ideologically Another straw in the wind is the urging by a signifi­ spawned. The UDF publicly denies ANC connections, cant range of major black leaders of a modus vivendi but openly calls its members "charterists." Although between the UDF and the National Forum. Dr. Nthato there is no clear evidence of PAC organizational in­ Motlana of Soweto's Committee of Ten and Bishops volvement in the National Forum or AZAPO, blacks Desmond Tutu and Manas Buthelezi are among those supporting those groups openly talk of the PAC and who have tried to interact with both groups. Several there may be crossover membership. Black Consciousness leaders-including Dr. Mamphela The PAC's public support of the National Forum was Ramphele, Zwelake Sisulu, and Curtis Nkondo-have illustrated by PAC Chairman John Pokela's prediction also attempted to keep the public rhetoric conciliatory. in an interview with New African (London, May 1984) Even Ish Mkhabela of AZAPO has stated: "We do not that the NF had "the best chance of succeeding" while see divisions among the oppressed. We are one ... [The the UDF "embraces all shades of multiracialism [and UDF] have their weaknesses and, in the long term, are contains] constituents [which are] enemies of the Aza­ fraught with dangers and pitfalls [but] AZAPO is nian African majority ... " Meanwhile, the ANC's prepared to be part of a principled unity with any Oliver Tambo, in an interview with the same publica­ organization engaged in the struggle." AZAPO's tion (April 1984), took the position that "the mass op­ Secretary Muntu Myeza has been quoted in the press position of our people ... united today in the ANC, the as having said that AZAPO was not "in opposition [or] UDF, the trade unions, the youth and women's move­ antagonistic" to the UDF because "we all ultimately ment without regard to ethnicity, race and color" is have the same objective." Winnie Mandela, a key throwing the government's plans into "a crisis." figure in any unity move, supports the UDF, but is also These divisions have other antecedents beyond the popular with Black Consciousness. She dismisses the historical ANC-PAC relationship. With the PAC in differences between the groups as relatively unimpor­ eclipse throughout the 1970s, the ANC had taken on a tant and says she is "cheered" by developments, char­ predominant role as the external representative of acterizing the constitution as the "best unifying factor" South Africa's blacks. Black Consciousness advocates in years for blacks. and student activists would not dispute that point, but Meanwhile, the government has not been idle. The many of them take exception to ANC misrepresenta­ first few months of the UDF's and NF's existence were tion of certain internal events in the mid-1970s. Stu- relatively trouble-free, with a short detention of one

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984 8

UDF official and the banning of several meetings. purpose represented in these organizations can be sus­ Monitoring has escalated as these groups have demon­ tained long enough to confirm the existence of a mean­ strated more appeal and clout. AZAPO offices and the ingful political force beyond the limited and transitory homes of at least 41 of its members in various parts of objectives that brought so many diverse elements the country have been raided. In Johannesburg, docu­ together in 1983 and 1984. ments, typewriters, files, filing cabinets, and other of­ Whatever the future holds, the emergence of na­ fice equipment were confiscated in May 1984. tional organized political entities, the first since the As its campaign against the elections began to prove 1950s, must be regarded as a landmark in South effective, the UDF also felt the sting of official sanc­ Africa's evolution. Given the heightened politicization tions. This began with the arrest of representatives of of urban (and also homeland) blacks that has resulted at least 44 affiliates at an anti-apartheid rally in Dur­ from the constitution issue, even moderates are now ban on June 23, 1984, and several other isolated inci­ impelled to speak out, organize, or join alliances in op­ dents. After the low Coloured turnout for the August 22 position to a new law of the land that ignores their poll, but prior to the Indian elections, authorities de­ existence. tained 47 UDF leaders along with 152 others par­ ticipating in protest actions. Fifteen of those UDF leaders were still being held as of late October under Steven McDonald received his Master's degree in Section 28 of the Security and Terrorism Act, which is African politics from the School of Oriental and a preventive detention clause allowing for six months African Studies, University of London. From 1970 to detention without charge or legal access. 1979, he was a career Foreign Service Officer in the It appears that the government was initially cautious U.S. Department of State. His diplomatic service in its approach to the UDF, possibly wishing to avoid a was exclusively within the Bureau of African Affairs repetition of the kind of world condemnation that fol­ and included two postings in Africa-as political lowed the 1977 bannings and detentions of Black Con­ officer in Kampala, Uganda (1971-73) and in Pretoria, South Africa (1976-79). He was country of­ sciousness leadership. The effective election protest of ficer for Angola and Mozambique in Washington the UDF has hardened the government's attitude, from 1973 to 1975. Earlier in his career, he was an although the detentions appear not to have been uni­ aide to Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri. Since versally agreed upon within the cabinet. Many UDF 1982, Mr. McDonald has been executive director of officials a nd infon~~d observers are openly worried the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange about a possible banning of the organization or, more Program (USSALEP), a multiracial organization probably, some of its affiliate groups and key leaders. established in 1958 and composed of distinguished In the wake of the recent township disturbances, Americans and South Africans who share a dedica: Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange has stated tion to keeping lines of communication open that the UDF has the "same goals" as the ANC and among and with all elements by whom South Africa's future will be shaped. USSALEP's govern­ the South African Communist Party and is "creating a ing body is a multiracial unitary council of approxi­ revolutionary climate" in South Africa. mately 25 South Africans and 25 Americans repre­ How the government deals with the UDF-NF sentative of a wide range of opinion in both coun­ phenomenon in the months ahead will, of course, dic­ tries. tate to a great extent whether the new sense of shared

~------~------~------, CSIS Africa Notes briefing paper series SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM

Please enter my/our subscription for one year (15 issues) at $48.00 airmail worldwide. Name ______

Institution ------

Address------~------City------State or Country ------Zip ------­ Mail to: CSIS Africa Notes Suite 400 1800 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Make check payable to CSIS Africa Notes

U.S.A. I ~------~

CSIS Africa Notes, November 5, 1984