( A publication of ihe African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies No. 36 • November 5, 1984 A Guide to Black Politics in South Africa by Steven McDonald Under the terms of the new constitution approved by Black South Africans, on the other hand, have ral­ the white electorate in November 1983, South Africa's lied against the constitution, forging an unparalleled whites-only legislature was replaced on September 3, degree of unity on this issue and achieving some nota­ 1984 by a parliament consisting of the incumbent ble success in protest politics as they urged their Col­ 178-member House of Assembly representing South oured and Indian compatriots to stay away from the Africa's 4.5 million whites, a newly-elected 85-member polls. Of course, the durability of this new communal­ House of Representatives for the country's 2. 7 million ity is debatable for a number of reasons-notably, its Coloureds (mixed race}, and a newly-elected 45-member focus on a single issue, the formidable coercive powers House of Deputies for the Indian (i.e. Asian) population of the South African government, and the govern­ of some 870,000. The constitution makes no provision ment's demonstrated willingness to use these powers for parliamentary representation of the country's 22 (see Section 9 below, and "Destabilization and Dia­ million blacks. P.W. Botha, who was sworn in as the logue: South Africa's Emergence as a Regional Super­ Republic's executive president on September 14, after power" by John de St. Jorre in CSIS Africa Notes no. receiving a unanimous vote from an electoral college 26, April 17, 1984). Meanwhile, the new restrictions appointed by the new tricameral parliament, has gained imposed on the freedom of action of externally-based a number of powers beyond those he held as prime forces of black South African nationalism by the minister. These include the right to decide (immune Nkomati Accord and other regional "nonaggression" from challenge in the courts) what matters are and are pacts have also created new pressures and challenges not the "own affair" of any of the three ethnic houses for internal black activists across the political of parliament or a shared "general affair" of the nation. spectrum. President Botha also has the authority to veto any leg­ The following is a summary assessment of the orga­ islation passed by any house of parliament. nizational structure of black power in South Africa as Ironically, the new constitution has caused rifts with­ of the latter half of 1984: in and between the white, Coloured, and Indian com­ munities while having an opposite effect on the black majority it ignores. Although an unexpectedly high 1. The African National Congress (ANC) proportion (66 percent) of white voters approved the The ANC is the oldest nationalist organization in sub­ arrangement in the 1983 referendum, the Coloured and Saharan Africa. Its roots go back to early pan­ Indian electorates were less enthusiastic. In parliamen­ Africanist and nationalist thinkers of the late nine­ tary elections held in late August in those two commu­ teenth century, many of whom were educated in the nities, the official turnouts were just over 20 percent United States. Organizationally, it developed from the and about 30 percent respectively of registered voters. South African Native Convention which met in 1909 to Moreover, the voting was accompanied by protest protest the terms of the draft constitution for South demonstrations and school boycotts (at one point African union following the Boer War. The Conven­ 630,000 Coloured students were out of classes). Gov­ tion's protests were ineffective and, in frustration, the ernment officials have blamed intimidation as well as a South African Native National Congress-subsequently lack of organization and of "democratic traditions" for renamed the African National Congress-was formed the low voter turnout. in 1912. Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate : J. Coleman Kitchen , Jr. • Production/Circulation: Sheilah Mclean CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone (202) 887-0219 • ISSN 0736-9506 2 The ANC's early philosophy was moderate, indeed also maintained offices in London, New York, and almost archaic, compared with its present profile. It several other countries. The first decade of its exile was was founded by professional, middle-class Africans who relatively quiescent. By the mid-1970s, however, a low­ focused on, according to its 1919 constitution, the use key insurgency campaign had been launched, consist­ of "resolutions, protests ... constitutional and peaceful ing mainly of sabotage and attacks on government in­ propaganda ... deputations [and] enquiries" to reach its stallations that resulted in only a few fatalities. In the objectives. Those objectives were clearly evolutionary, 1980s, the campaign has been stepped up, becoming ranging from demands for "equitable justice" in the more sophisticated and exacting a higher death toll. 1909 Convention to the All-African Convention's call in The sabotage action against the Koeberg nuclear the 1930s for "reconsideration" of unjust laws and pro­ power station in December 1982 and at the SASOL tests of the removal of Africans from the voters' rolls in coal conversion plant in June 1980; attacks on police Cape Province. The ANC of that era was willing to ac­ stations and government offices; and the May 1983 car cept a qualified franchise for blacks based on "civi­ bombing outside air force offices in Pretoria (at least 18 lized" factors such as education, property, or wage deaths and 217 injuries) added up to a clear new trend. qualifications and it expressed its understanding of and Guerrilla activities have occurred in all of South concern for the protection of white interests. Africa's four provinces and in most major urban Over the years, the ANC inexorably moved toward a centers, including Johannesburg, Durban, Bloemfon­ greater radicalism, from early petition to protest to de­ tein, Cape Town, and Pretoria. By these diverse ac­ fiance, then to underground insurgency, banning, and tions, the ANC has sought to demonstrate an ability to exile. This escalation was due to growing frustration strike anywhere and to penetrate sophisticated over a lack of any results from peaceful and legal pro­ defenses of critical installations. A rash of bombings tests (e.g., the failure to block the removal of Cape throughout the country, concentrated around the Africans from the voters' rolls in 1936). The ANC was month of the Coloured and Indian elections, as well as also stimulated by the post-World War II idealism (in a major attack on the Mobil refinery in Durban in May particular the self-determination principles of the 1984, have been intended to send a message. This Atlantic Charter) and stymied by the coming to power message is that the "nonaggression" pacts South of the Afrikaner-based National Party in 1948 and the Africa has signed with Mozambique and Swaziland, implementation of apartheid that followed. and seeks with others, all involving denial of "bases" to The ANC's 1952 "Defiance Campaign" was the first the ANC, will not end the movement's effectiveness. mass civil disobedience campaign in South Africa. The ANC has always been identified by its adherence Another effort to broaden the ANC's base was the Con­ to nonracialism in its campaign for political rights in gress Alliance, which brought together Indian, Col­ South Africa. The Freedom Charter, which enshrines oured, and white organizations in protest against grow­ its basic philosophy, advocates a "South Africa which ing government repression. Certain individual African belongs to all who live in it, black and white." The members of the South African Communist Party leadership has publicly spoken against racial confron­ (SACP) had participated in the ANC since the 1920s, tation and consistently calls for a "new nonracial demo­ but played no formative role in its organization. After cratic South Africa." An irony of this nonracism is that the SACP was banned in 1950, more white and Indian the presence of whites within the ANC command struc­ communists began to involve themselves through the ture, seen by some as an indication of the organiza­ broadening Congress Alliance. The Defiance Campaign tion's broad appeal, feeds the South African govern­ itself was an outcome of a decision, initiated largely by ment's belief that the movement is dominated by the the newly-formed Youth League, to begin a program of South African Communist Party and by the Soviet mass action. The Freedom Charter, issued by the Union. Alliance in 1955, resulted in growing harassment, ban­ Individual communists within the party hierarchy nings, and detentions by the government. Thousands of have considerable influence and played a role in mov­ arrests took place as anti-passbook marches, protests, ing the ANC from peaceful protest to greater activism. and boycotts increased in number. The long-running Since its exile, the movement has received the bulk of Treason Trial of 1956-61, in which 156 persons were its weaponry and much of its training from the Soviet charged but ultimately acquitted, was a central event Union and other Eastern bloc nations, a familiar pat­ in this era of borderline legality for the ANC. tern in African and Third World nations confronting Following the Sharpevijle confrontation in 1960, in minority or colonial ruling groups. (For a discussion of which police fired on a nonviolent demonstration, kill­ current Soviet views of the ANC, see "New Trends in ing 67 Africans and wounding 186, the ANC was Soviet Policy Toward Africa" by David E. Albright in banned and went underground. In 1961, its leadership, CSIS Africa Notes no. 27, April29, 1984, pp.