The Politics of the Sharpeville Massacre and Soweto Uprising
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Georgia Southern University Digital Commons@Georgia Southern University Honors Program Theses 2019 Genocide Masquerading: The olitP ics of the Sharpeville Massacre and Soweto Uprising Jessica P. Forsee Georgia Southern University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/honors-theses Part of the Africana Studies Commons, African History Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, International Relations Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Forsee, Jessica P., "Genocide Masquerading: The oP litics of the Sharpeville Massacre and Soweto Uprising" (2019). University Honors Program Theses. 415. https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/honors-theses/415 This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors Program Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Genocide Masquerading: The Politics of the Sharpeville Massacre and Soweto Uprising An Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in History. By Jessica Forsee Under the mentorship of Dr. Cathy Skidmore-Hess ABSTRACT Apartheid South Africa represented a paradox as a US ally and human rights pariah. “Genocide Masquerading” uncovers the implications of US foreign policy on the rise and decline of apartheid, looking specifically at the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre and the 1976 Soweto Uprising. By comparing Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Ford, and Carter foreign policy responses, this thesis creates a comparative analysis of how effective, or ineffective, the United States was during pivotal moments in apartheid history. This thesis will not only expand on the developing South African literature but add to the conversation of international aid, diplomacy practices, and North-South relationships. Thesis Mentor:________________________ Dr. Cathy Skidmore-Hess Honors Director:_______________________ Dr. Steven Engel April 2019 History Department University Honors Program Georgia Southern University ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I want to thank the Georgia Southern University History, Political Science and International Studies, Study Abroad, and Honors department for giving me the chance to grow personally and professionally. A special thank you to the archival staff at the John F. Kennedy Presidential library for guiding me through my first journey in the archives; they deserve all the fancy mac & cheese the world can offer. I am forever indebted to Dr. Cathy Skidmore-Hess for her encouragement to pursue my dreams, patience while reading long sentences, and the lessons on tea and camping I will carry with me forever. To my friends of 1111, thank you for the study times that turned into incredible discussions on human rights. To my colleagues of the Model United Nations Delegation, thank you for the adventures in diplomacy and while teaching the complexity of sustainable peacebuilding. To the women of the Omega Phi Alpha-Alpha Delta chapter, thank you for showing me the importance of international service and addressing institutional inequality. To Jenna, thank you for proving the power of friendship during hardships. To Jacob, thank you for reminding me to still do life even when this thesis was being written. To my family, far and wide, thank you for always being the museum- going, “zooing it,” and road tripping family. Finally, this thesis is owed to those in South Africa all those years ago and today, fighting for representation. It is my hope that this thesis sheds a light on your struggle. Ubuntu, friends. “I cannot believe that this world body, the United Nations, could stand by, calmly watching what I submit is genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilised dispensation of justice.” - Oliver Tambo, exiled President of the African National Congress in an October 8, 1963 speech to the United Nations’ Special Political Committee of the General Assembly1 Introduction For over fifty years, South Africa’s apartheid government held state power. Its state sanctioned violence represented an anomaly in the post-war liberalism of the second half of 20th century. The state that aided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be charged with the two of the most notable episodes of racially targeted violence. Two pivotal events, the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 and the Soweto Uprising in1976, respectively, altered the course of United States-South African relations. Both the Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprising demonstrate the United States and the United Nations failure to respond effectively to the public outrages of the apartheid regime. After Sharpeville, US Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy failed to establish a consistent foreign policy in opposition to the apartheid regime that was not influenced by Cold War politics. The Eisenhower administration actually deepened military ties. Even in the UN, the US stifled attempts by the African-Asian bloc to check the apartheid state to preserve its Cold War alliance. In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising, US Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter would utilize similar political rhetoric and take no real action towards the apartheid regime. Conversely, by establishing Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of 1 Oliver Tambo, “Appeal for Action to Stop Repression and Trials in South Africa” (1963), in Oliver Tambo: Apartheid and the International Community, ed. E.S. Reddy (New Delhi: Namibia Foundation Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1991). South Africa, the UN took action against the Pretoria regime.2 The US foreign policy response to the apartheid regime conforms to the Cold War policy of supporting white capitalism over black liberation. However, the rise of these same black liberation movements within the US and South Africa eventually forced substantive change. A US foreign policy focused on Cold War diplomacy and lack of a significant international pressure by Western States on the apartheid regime encouraged the growth of South African resistance both in the US and South Africa. Chapter 1: Literature Review This chapter introduces central ideas that surround the Sharpeville Massacre and the Soweto Uprising as well as incorporates the official US and UN position. The works that informed the background information of this project provide the clearest historiographical understanding of Sharpeville, Soweto, and US and UN reactions. The apartheid government of South Africa was a controversial foreign policy consideration that ten United States Presidents had to address. Each did so differently, and the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre and the 1976 Soweto Uprising marked shifts, either minute and latent or immediate and overt, in foreign policy towards the Pretoria regime. Cold War politics, the American Civil Rights Movement, UN pressure, and armed resistance in South Africa contributed to how apartheid and US governments interacted with one another. The spatial location of Sharpeville in American politics allowed the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to create superficial reprimands, thereby engendering an internal South African resistance. Soweto exposed further gaps in US foreign policy 2 The Pretoria regime refers to the apartheid South African government and the Nationalist Party. These terms will be used interchangeably. despite the success of the American Civil Rights Movements and growing international attention to South Africa’ human rights abuses. The existing literature provides individualized responses to US-South African relations rather than a cohesive comparative analysis of the two infamous events. The common trend of comparing American and South African race experiences was a critical element of anti-apartheid movements. Nicholas Grant notes the impact of Little Rock on Eisenhower’s handling of apartheid and the indirect effect it had on the Pretoria regime’s theoretical defense of apartheid on the international stage.3 Pretoria watched as the US fumbled the international reaction to Little Rock in 1957 and used it as a lesson to prepare for the impending day when racial supremacy was not an acceptable policy. One critical lesson Pretoria learned was the ability to twist the UN’s foundational principle of self-determination and state sovereignty as a protection from international scrutiny.4 Grant builds upon Cary Fraser’s earlier arguments that Eisenhower was sensitive to aligning with South Africa because their race relations made them a liability in the emerging American Civil Rights Movement.5 Grant then concludes that Sharpeville’s high publicity on the international stage demonstrated a similar Little Rock situation that did not sit well with the majority of Americans.6 This analysis of 1950’s US-South Africa relations informs readers of Eisenhower’s reaction towards the apartheid government in the aftermath of Sharpeville as the US and South Africa struggled to handle domestic race relations with international criticism looming. 3 Nicholas Grant, Winning Our Freedom Together: African Americans and Apartheid, 1945-1960 (USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2017): 58-62. 4 Ibid., 60. 5 Cary Fraser, “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race for US Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 2 (2000), 240. 6 Grant, 61. Existing literature fails to focus on a