"AVIT6RIA E CERTA : THE STORY OF ANGOLA"

COLOR SLIDE-•TAPE OR FILMSTRIP TAPE PRESENTATION

DIRECTIONS

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1 A VITORIA E CERTA : THE STORY OF ANGOLA (slide 1)

Narrative Slide Number "We must return [21 to our lands red with coffee 2. Min . of Health/people white [3] with cotton green with maize fields we must return. [4] 3. Woman and cotton

To our mines of diamonds, gold, copper, oil 4. Open pit mining we must return . [51

We must return 5. Children to liberated Angola independent Angola." 6. Neto in poncho Thus wrote Agostinho Neto, leader [6] of the liberation movement, MPLA, when he was incarcerated in a Portuguese prison in 1960 . 15 years later—on November 11, 1975—his poem was fulfilled . His land proclaimed [7] its independence, 7. PRA flag becoming the People's Republic of Angola—with Dr . Neto as President.

The process of independence in Angola brought the world's most powerful [8] 8. Soldiers profiled political and military forces to the brink of another global war.

Nevertheless, despite devastating losses in lives, [9] crops, property and institu- 9. Man/tree stumps tions the people of Angola were victorious—winning the right to determine [10] their own destiny as a nation. 10. Min . of Health/people Why did the birth of Angola cause such a furor in the United States and among its allies? Why did the U .S . funnel millions of dollars through Zaire to prevent the independence of Angola? Why [11] were mercenaries recruited in the U .S. and 11. S .A. troops Europe to fight against Angolan liberation? Why did the most hated enemy of Africa South Africa—invade Angola in a desperate effort to halt independence? Why is the U .S . so afraid of a free [ 12] Angola, and of Cuban aid in defending that 12. Neto and Fidel right to freedom? And why is Angola so important today? [13]

The answers to some of these questions lie in the long history of Angola, its 13. Map of Angola tremendous natural wealth and its strategic location.

The Angolan struggle began 500 years ago in the late 15th century with the arrival 14. Portuguese man with of the Portuguese . Through military conquest and mass emigration of Portuguese guns and workers settlers, Portugal established [14] its domination of the area by the 19th century. For 300 years Portugal 's primary interest in Angola was the wealth it gained [15] from the slave trade. 15. Slave line

But from the beginning, the societies and kingdoms [16] of Angola resisted Portuguese intrusion and domination of their land . By the middle of the 20th 16. Drawing of Resistance century resistance culminated in the war of national liberation, from 1961-1974, led by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-MPLA . [17] 17. MPLA soldiers To understand the reasons for the war over Angola and U .S . involvement we must look at Angola's human and natural [18] resources . In oil, diamonds, iron, manganese, coffee and cotton, Angola produced a GNP of $1 .5 billion in 1973. 18. Diamonds

Gulf [19] Oil Corporation represents a prime example of U .S . interests in Angola. Since 1968 it has pumped more than 100,000 barrels of oil a day out of Angola's 19. Gulf cartoon Cabinda enclave . While the oil brought in more than $500 million a year to Gulf, the company was able to pay enough royalties and taxes to finance half of the Portuguese colonial war budget in Angola.

Other [20] U .S . corporations, Texaco, Diversa in diamonds and Bethlehem Steel 20 . Ads collage also testify to the depth of U .S . interests in Angola .

2 U.S [211 companies also bought up to 50 per cent of Angola 's most important agricultural export—coffee. 21. Maxwell ad

Another key Angolan resource is potential hydro-electric [22] power, symbolized by the massive South African-Portuguese dam scheme on the Cunene River, which 22. Cunene dam will supply power to southern Angola and northern Namibia, but is now illegally occupied by South Africa. 23. Mines None [23] of this economic activity—in the mines, the fields, the fisheries or the dam sites, was aimed at the economic development of the Angolan people. (PAUSE) Such exploitation would never have been possible without the forced labor of millions of Angolans . Said former Portuguese Prime Minister, Marcelo Caetano: "The natives .[24] of Africa must be seen as productive elements organized . . . in an economy directed by whites. " 24. Workers bent over

Thus the Portuguese adapted the slave system into one of forced labor for the plantations, mines and factories . Through a system of control over traditional 25. Children on plantation chiefs, people were forced [25] to work for the Portuguese or made to grow cash crops for export, which meant less food and more starvation. 26. Solitary worker Wrote an African poet: [26] "I put on my clean shirt and go and work my contract to work far away. Which of us will come back? Which of us will die? "

In order to control the people, each [27] African was forced to carry an I .D. card. 27. I .D. card If you didn't have it—more forced labor or jail.

(PAUSE) 28. Map/Sn . Africa Angola was also desirable to the west because of its critical [28] position in Southern Africa, an area which includes Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa . [29] 29. Resource map

Today Southern Africa is the primary world producer of gold, diamonds, chrome, cobalt, manganese and platinum . Containing rich oil deposits, agricultural lands, fisheries and ports, and vast hydro-electric potential, it is vital to the fueling of capitalist economies.

Finally Southern Africa rests [30] along the important sea lanes between the 30. Indian Ocean map Indian Ocean and the south Atlantic. It is an area of vital strategic importance to the military and commercial control of the U .S ., South Africa, and other allies . [31] 31 . Soldiers marching How then did the Angolan people launch their independence struggle which ultimately succeeded in overthrowing the Portuguese regime? Their long history of resistance continued into the 20th century taking on new [32] forms—cultural and 32. Mural from Luanda militant.

To keep the Angolans under control, the Portuguese divided them by a system of assimilation whereby a minute percentage of Africans were -allowed to become part of so-called Portuguese civilization . Ironically, it was from among some of these assimilados that there developed a modern African national consciousness.

Meanwhile, [33] contract labor and low wages, and slums growing up outside the 33. Cotton workers cities breeding unrest forged a new and clear political consciousness among the African population as a whole, and the stage was set.

The Portuguese regime could provide no reformist outlets such as constitutional independence which occurred in other parts of colonized Africa . This [34] was 34 . Portugal/poverty because Portugal itself was too poor and underdeveloped, a neo-colony of Britain, and heavily dependent upon its African colonies . With little economic base, .Portu- gal simply could not decolonize without losing total control over its colonies . 3

Modern [35] nationalism dominated Africa in the decade after World War I I so that in December, 1956, a number of Angolans from various nationalist groups in 35. Nkrumah, AAPC Luanda formed [36] the MPLA whose objective was to defeat Portuguese colonialism and develop a nation designed to meet the needs of the Angolan people. 36. MPLA logo By 1959 the atmosphere in Luanda was explosive . Portugal and its secret police had met emerging nationalism with intense [37] political repression and arrests. Executions were not uncommon in the jails and in the streets. 37. Man behind bars

At the same time the white [38] population had almost quadrupled in 10 years growing to 200,000, while the African population numbered around 5 million. 38 ." Settlers arriving

In June, [39] 1960, Agostinho Neto, one of MPLA's founders, a medical doctor and poet, was arrested . After being tortured he was removed to the Cape Verde 39. Neto Islands.

Response was immediate . [401 More than 1,000 people from Neto's village 40. Port ./crowd marched 60 miles to the government headquarters to demand his release . Their peaceful demonstration was met with machine gun fire killing more than 30 people and wounding nearly 200 . The following [411 day, Potuguese troops burned these 41. Burning hut people's villages and killed anyone left.

These nationalist uprisings were paralleled in the countryside . A recession in coffee and cotton prices caused an economic depression . Farmers began burning their seeds and destroying tools in protest to low prices . In [42] response, Portuguese 42 . Strafing villages planes firebombed and strafed African villages—again killing thousands.

Finally, on February 4, 1961, the level of rebellion reached such a pitch that a large number of Angolans from Luanda's sand .slums, organized by the MPLA, attacked the city's main prison demanding the release of hundreds of political prisoners. Portuguese [43] troops took to the streets slaughtering masses of Angolans . It is from this day that the MPLA dates the beginning of the armed struggle. 43 . Dead bodies

In early, 1962, [44] Neto escaped from prison ; in December, the MPLA held its 44 first national conference and Neto was elected President . The strategy for liberation . Group meeting was no longer to focus on the cities but on mobilizing the 90 per cent peasant population for a long war based in the countryside.

There then followed 12 years [45] of MPLA military and political action—first in the north and Cabinda, then in the east and south . The vast, open, and 45. Map-liberated zones under-populated countryside and supply line problems made guerrilla warfare difficult, but the MPLA persisted and mobilized the people . In zones [46] liberated from Portuquese control, MPLA set up institutions for a new life. 46. People in liberated zone

(PAUSE)

Throughout the wars in Africa the United States clearly alligned itself with 47. U.S ./Port . cartoon Portugal, [47] its NATO ally, not only through its economic interests in Angola, but also by directly intervening in the fates of nationalist organizations, such as FNLA [481 headed by Holden Roberto. 48. H . Roberto

Roberto led a group called the Popular Union of Angola, UPA, whose original objective was to unite the people of northern Angola into their pre-colonial [491 49. Map of Bakongo Bakongo kingdom . UPA remained limited as a truly national movement because of its narrow ethnic and regional base.

In March, 1961, this group led people in the north in attacks against European settlers, Angolan assimilados and mestizos (or people of mixed race) . Many, many MPLA cadre were killed . Unlike earlier revolts, these [50] were aimed at civilians. 50. Port . in trucks The Portuguese reprisal was devastating with counter massacres, infinitely greater. Hundreds [511 of thousands of peasants fled into Zaire, becoming there the main constituency of UPA . 51 . Refugees 4 During this time Roberto began to receive international attention . [52] The CIA 52. Roberto et al chose him as "their man" to lead Angola in the unlikely event that Portugal would be forced out . In 1962, [531 UPA, became the National Front for the Liberation of 53. UPA office Angola, FNLA, setting up a government in exile in Kinshasa, capital of Zaire, where Roberto had lived since childhood . In the same year Roberto [54] was put Kissinger $ on the CIA payroll for at least $10,000 a year. 54.

In 1969 U .S . policy became clearer when the Nixon Administration played no small 55. NSSM 39 role in Portugal's major offensive against the MPLA . [55] According to a Kissinger-sponsored National Security Study, known as Memorandum 39, Angola was declared one of the most valuable countries on the African continent because of its strategic position and mineral wealth.

Further documents revealed the U .S. aim to keep [56] Angola an "exlusively western preserve ." Thus U.S . policy was : one, to insure that Portugal did not turn 56. Map & cartoon over Angola to the MPLA, and, two, to have the CIA covertly build up anti-MPLA forces. 57. Herbicides Aid to Portugal grew . For example in 1970 the Portuguese [57] began dropping herbicides and defoliants—similar to those used by the U .S . forces in Vietnam. Department of Commerce figures show that the U .S . sales of herbicides to Portugal increased five-fold between 1969 and 1970.

In 1971 the U .S . went beyond [58] the traditional channel of NATO support, when Nixon himself met with Portuguese dictator, Caetano . The result : a huge aid 58. Nixon & Caetano package of $436 million to bail out the Portuguese economy racked by its wars.

In addition to the Portuguese enemy, its ally, the U .S ., and FNLA, another [59] 59. UNITA posters force emerged which favored alliance with Portugal and later South Africa against the aspirations of the Angolan people . This group was known as UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, and it was led by Jonas 60. Savimbi Savimbi . [60]

Savimbi came from southern Angola and had been FN LA's Foreign Minister until he resigned in 1964, denouncing Roberto for "flagrant tribalism" and being an "agent of the Americans ."

After several years in and out of Angola, and unsuccessful attempts to join the MPLA, he formed UNITA in 1966 basing it among the Ovimbundu people who live along the strategic [61] Benguela Railway which runs the width of central Angola. 61. Benguela RW

It has since been disclosed in the memoirs of former Prime Minister Caetano that UNITA was used by the Portuguese [62] Army to disclose the whereabouts of the 62. Savimbi & Portuguese MPLA in order to destroy that movement.

Yet despite the escalated efforts of western powers to stem Angola's liberation, 63. MPLA marching [63] MPLA doubled its attacks in 1971 and began to use larger, more mobile fighting units . Fighting in 10 out of Angola's 15 districts, MPLA had mobilized over one million people.

During the years of armed struggle, MPLA received [64] international assistance— 64. Conference military, medical, educational and political—from many international sources, pri- marily from friendly African governments and socialist countries . Scandinavia, organizations like the World Council of Churches, private [65] European and North 65. Solidarity American support groups aided MPLA as well.

MPLA was successful because it was always more than just an army . From the beginning its objective was not only ousting the Portuguese, but also creating a new life for the Angolan people reconstructed to meet all needs in a united, non-tribal, non-racist, free Angola . [661 66. Children

Despite the overwhelming task of the war itself, MPLA structured an organization that based its strength on mass participation. 67. Teacher/blackboard In [67] education, the aim was not only to train cadres for political and military work but also to provide basic [68] literacy for the whole population, 97 per cent 68. Children in row of whom never learned to read and write under the Portuguese .

1 A typical letter [69] in the MPLA literacy manual teaches the letter X thus: 69. Lesson on X X is like imperialism . It always hides itself from the people and appears in many shapes, sometimes as colonialism, sometimes as neo-colonialism . It also changes often like the chameleon . Sometimes it is pronounced SH, or KS, or SS, or sometimes EIS. But people always discover and triumph over imperialism by struggling a lot.

In [70] health, MPLA had to begin with virtually nothing . In 500 years the Portuguese had provided little medical training and few programs to stop the 70. Clinic pattern of chronic diseases and malnutrition . There were less than 5,000 hospital 'beds to serve the whole population . Within five years MPLA set up a Medical Assistance Service and launched a vaccination campaign, improved public helath 71. Operation and stressed preventive medicine [71] —all in the midst of war while caring for war casualties as well.

Another service [72] MPLA organized was People's Stores where people exchanged 72. People's Store their rice, potatoes, fish, meat, and honey for goods such as soap, salt and clothing—all at a fixed price. In addition, MPLA abolished all taxes, ended forced labor, and freed [73] people 73. People in fields to produce crops for themselves through new cooperative units called "people's plantations ."

To carry out these services, mass organizations were established early in the struggle ; [74] such as the National Union of Angolan Workers, the Youth 74. Two workers Organization, and the Organization of Angolan Women, OMA.

Created in 1962, OMA was a vital [75] arm in the liberation war by enabling 75. Woman with gun women to take part in military actions . It also sought to release women from the bonds of tradition, such as polygamy, and as well, colonial oppression . [76] A woman sat on every Action Committeee, MPLA's basic unit of government during 76. Women in meeting the war, and women began to develop their full potential as participants and leaders in a new Angola.

Thus the movement and its mass organizations encompassed the full range of people 's activities, inspiring new thinking, new relationships, an end to the colonial mentality [77] and a will to struggle . "A Vitoria e certa"—Victory is certain was 77. Victory is certain the slogan of the MPLA.

But now it is important to look at the actual events leading up to the present.

The stage for independence was made final [78] by the Portuguese coup in April, 78. Headlines, coup 1974 . The armed struggles in Angola, Guinea-Bissau under the PAIGC, and Mozambique under FRELIMO, had created increasing unrest in Portugal itself. Frustration ran high especially among the Portuguese troops [79] as military 79. casualties mounted, and almost half of Portugal 's budget went into its African wars. Wounded soldier Yet the colonial forces kept losing ground.

80. Soldiers on truck Finally on April 25, a coalition [80] of officers leading what was called the Armed Forces Movement ousted Prime Minister Caetano and overthrew the 50 year-old dictatorship.

While today Portugal's revolution remains unresolved, [811 the course taken in the colonies as they seized independence was one that had been nurtured and prepared 81 . Mozambique's Independence for by centuries of resistance and more than a decade of armed struggle.

Portugal's collapse as a colonial power was clear . But independence was not completely automatic . In fact, in Angola there had to be a "Second War of Liberation " against far greater odds which included the U .S., the South African army, mercenaries, and neo-colonial interests in Portugal and Africa.

Portugal 's [82] first President after the coup was General Antonio Spinola, former 82. Spinola in G-B colonial Governor of Guinea-Bissau and architect of the assassination of PAIGC leader, Amilcar Cabral . Spinola 's [83] solution was to establish a federation 83. Spinola/monacle between Portugal and its colonies in which each would have local political autonomy, but in a more sophisticated way would be tied to Portugal, similar to Britain and its Commonwealth . 6

In September, 1974, Spinola held a secret [84] meeting in its then colony of Cape 84. Cartoon of CV Meeting Verde with Roberto, Savimbi, and thier Zairean ally, Mobutu, to work out an arrangement for Angola 's future—excluding the MPLA.

When Spinola returned to Portugal later in the month, however, he was ousted by a more progressive coalition of the Armed Forces Movement.

In early January, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA met to establish a procedure for negotiating with the Portuguese, and then signed an agreement with them which placed all three on an equal footing establishing a transitional government to administer Angola and move it towards independence—set for November 11, 1975. [85] 85. Alvor Meeting

This arrangement was ill-fated . The many attempts at unity during the armed struggle had all failed, mainly because Roberto and Savimbi had less of a real base inside Angola and had worked with outside forces, even the Portuguese, to destroy MPLA . Nevertheless the MPLA signed the accord.

MPLA [86] had always pressed for a broad coalition of anti-imperialist forces, and 86. Neto/crowds was not going to jeopardize Angola 's independence now, by not honoring that commitment.

At the very same time, in the United States, the Committee of 40, Kissinger's special National Security Panel which included President Ford and the head of the CIA, voted to increase CIA backing [87] to Roberto by appropriating $300,000 to 87. Cartoon—under table FNLA . Thus even before the ink was dry on the agreement calling for unity in Angola, it was being broken by one of the parties, FNLA, through its collaborator —the United States.

Two months later, in March, FNLA began attacking [88] MPLA offices and killing 88. Dead soldier MPLA people in Luada . MPLA supporters [89] organized themselves into People 's Militias to protect their neighborhoods from further FNLA attacks . At the same 89. Children marching time they also provided basic [90] services in health and education . This movement was called "Poder Popular" or People 's Power, and was strongly opposed by both FNLA and UNITA. 90. Children in Luanda

Meanwhile [91] FNLA was transporting war materials from Zaire into northern Angola . Portuguese authorities did nothing to stop this violation of the January 91. FNLA marchers agreements, and even withdrew from the north in April, leaving military installa- tions in FNLA hands . However, when the MPLA attempted to receive weapons from friendly socialist countries, the Portuguese refused to allow the ships to unload.

Throughout the spring of 1975, FNLA [92] continued to attack the `MPLA in Luanda . Most of the FNLA troops were French-speaking soldiers from Zaire, 92. 2 MPLA prisoners unable to communicate with the majority of Angolans. Not having the support of the people, they resorted to intimidation and terrorist tactics.

In June, the CIA, desperate to defeat the increasingly strong and popular MPLA, requested [93] $30 million from Kissinger's Committee of 40 . $13 million went in 93. Kissinger/hands cash directly to FNLA and UNITA, and the rest in military hardware was channelled through neighboring Zaire and Zambia who supported anti-MPLA movements.

By July, the violence and chaos created by FNLA attacks, and lack of responsibility on the part of the Portuguese to enforce the unity agreements, led [94] the MPLA to take over the administering of the transitional government. 94. MPLA office

At the same time, [95] FNLA began a massive drive from the north towards Luanda, reaching Caxito 30 miles to the north, by the end of the month . 95. FNLA/machine gun

Much ,of FNLA's military equipment came from the United States and western Europe through Zaire . Under Mobutu, [961 Zaire had become a major African 96. Mobutu recipient of U .S. investment and aid.

U.S . [97] arms sales from the private sector to Zaire amounted to $16 million for 97. US/AID on arms the first 7 months of 1975 . Because of Mobutu's close links with FNLA, Zaire's role in Angola's Second War of Liberation was no surprise.

In July the transitional government in Luanda formally dissolved and fighting raged throughout the country . Portuguese, other European and North American merce- naries began to appear in Angola.

In early [98] August the South Africans made their first overt penetration coming 98. South Africans/river in from occupied Namibia to the Cunene dam site 20 miles inside the Angolan border.

At this time MPLA held control in most of the country, and was administering 12 of Angola 's 16 provinces while being active in the rest.

The enemy's strategy became clear . With U .S . aid, FNLA and Zairean attacks intensified . Then, [991 on October 23, less than three weeks before the slated 99. SA troops independence of Angola, South Africa launched an invasion with thousands of troops crossing from Namibia into Angola.

With air [100] support, the South Africans advanced up the coast and were joined 100. SA airplane by FNLA and UNITA units . In their "scorched earth" assault they destroyed villages, towns, bridges and many innocent civilians . In a matter of days they penetrated 500 miles inside Angola to within 150 miles of the capital Luanda . One 101. Panhard car reason [101 ] for the blitz-like success of the South African invaders was its military arsenal, such as French-made Panhard armored cars which repelled MPLA attacks.

As South African troops [102] reinforced FNLA from the north, with UNITA coming from the center and with more South African troops coming up from the 102 . Map of SA strategy/ south, there was in effect the "pincer strategy " created to destroy the MPLA in a invasion/Pincer last ditch effort before independence.

U .S . Air [103] Force planes carried armaments to Zaire and from there into 103. U .S . plane southern Angola for the FNLA/UNITA troops . U .S . spotter planes flew missions from Zaire directly over Angola, and U .S . cargo planes dropped supplies to the South African column . And finally, it was reported that the U .S . Naval Command was put on full alert in the South Atlantic.

The day before independence the Portuguese left Luanda refusing to hand over authority to any one group . On [104] November 11, 1975, even as the MPLA was 104. Independence being attacked from all sides, the Movement none the less proclaimed independence and the formation [105] of the People's Republic of Angola . The new nation was immmediately recognized by dozens of countries and three months later became 105. Children marching the 47th member of the Organization of African Unity. (SMALL PAUSE) 106. Neto & Cuban troops In the same week as independence, several [1061 hundred Cuban troops arrived in Luanda at the request of the new Angolan Government . Their aid was sought to assist and train MPLA troops in the use of high-powered weaponry which had been given by the USSR and other socialist countries in order to repel the invaders. 107. Neto & Che Contrary [1071 to U .S . press reports, this was not a new relationship, but one that had long existed with Cuban aid to the MPLA, and continues [1081 today in the 108. Cuban workers in Angola form of Cuban technical assistance.

In the furor over Cuban assistance to Angola, the U .S. press completely ignored the 109. PAIGC presence of other long-time friends of the MPLA . On [109] hand to help train and fight with MPLA troops was the PAIGC from Guinea-Bissau . In addition the leaders of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique held a meeting just prior to Angola 's indepen- dence declaring their commitment to their sister movement, the MPLA . 8

The Cubans and the Guineans were invited by the Angolans and volunteered men and aid to free Angola from invaders who opposed its independence . In this sense these countries demonstrated the highest form of international solidarity with Angola's fight for freedom; in striking contrast to the uninvited invasion by South Africa, with the full military and financial backing of the U .S., committed for the sake of "national interest and security ."

The war [110] for MPLA had changed from a guerrilla struggle to conventional 110. Tank warfare . Thus, aid from the PAIGC, Cuba, the Soviet Union, and many others enabled MPLA to turn the tide and ultimately to defeat these outside aggressors. 111. Hut burning By the end of February, 1976, the South Africans and Zaireans were driven to the borders, and FNLA and UNITA into hiding . [111] As MPLA regained territory news of mercenary, Zairean, UNITA and FNLA atrocities became available . [112] 112. Destroyed building Whole villages and families had been wiped out ; stores, hospitals and homes were looted and destroyed.

The response [113] was that more and more people turned to the MPLA, which maintained a conscious policy of respect for civilians and property. 113. Meeting

Angola's "Second War of Liberation" left it with a devastated economy . [114] The Benguela Railway was crippled for many months, and blown up bridges caused 114. RW car under repair major problems in getting food, services and information to all parts of the country.

In addition, when the Portuguese left, they took as much material and equipment 115. Sunken boat as they could—or else they destroyed [115] it as illustrated by this sunken ship in the port of Lobito.

Factories were left with no machinery ; [116] hospitals and health clinics without equipment, supplies—or even beds . This, combined with war casualities, has made 116 . Clinic medical needs one of Angola's highest priorities. (PAUSE) In December, 1975, news began to leak out in the U .S. press about U .S. backing of South African, Zairean and mercenary invaders along side FNLA and UNITA. Members [117] of the U .S. Congress and concerned North Americans demanded 117. Headlines [118] to be informed of this new international involvement, and the specter of another Vietnam was constantly raised . The Senate and later the House voted to 118. Demonstration cut off covert aid to Angola and demanded discussion as to why such aid was in the "national interest ." 119 . Oil and $ The U .S . also utilized economic sabotage against the new People's Republic of Angola . [119]

Gulf Oil was scheduled to pay the Angolan Government approximatley $150 million in back taxes and royalties . Under pressure from the U .S. State Department, it refused to pay . In another [120], Boeing Aircraft held up the delivery of two commerical jets which Angola had already paid for. 120. Boeing/logo

Finally, the U .S. Government failed [121] to investigate and end the open and illegal recruitment of mercenaries in the U .S. In many cases, the recruitment took 121. Ads/headlines place in or around U.S. bases such as Fort Bragg in North Carolina.

While the U .S . continually denied financing the mercenaries, recruiters [122] in 122. Trials Britain stated that they were funded by the CIA, and mercenaries brought to trial in Angola in June, 1976, confirmed the CIA as a major contributor to their activities.

Mercenaries are still being recruited today to fight against African independence in other parts of Southern Africa, namely Zimbabwe and Namibia .

Q

In June, [123] 1976, the People's Republic of Angola applied for U .N. 123. Security Council membership . Giving as its reason the presence of Cuban troops in Angola which meant that Angola was not fully sovereign, the United States vetoed that application . This completely [124] ignores the fact that the Cubans were invited 124. Neto & Fidel signing into Angola by an independent internationally recognized government, but it is made even more ludicrous by the fact that the U .S . has troops stationed in countries all around the world—even in the Republic of Cuba itself!

The U .S . [125] Government seems bent on "punishing" Angola for its victory, and the Kissinger-Ford policy typifies U .S . intentions to control change in Southern 125. A Victoria e Certa Africa.

During the 1976, U .S . policy reached a new level with the "shuttle diplomacy" of Secretary of State Kissinger to Southern Africa 's tense spots . Cloaked in termi- nology calling for an end to racial war, the real purpose of the discussions involving Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia was to preserve the region for capitalist expansion . Kissinger's agenda was anti-communism, strategic interests and natural resources.

126 MPLA's victories and the guerrilla [126] successes in Namibia, under SWAPO, and . SWAPO in Zimbabwe spurred Kissinger to take action [127] —trying to prevent more 127 . Zimbabwe Angolas in Southern Africa, especially in the key prize itself—South Africa.

But Soweto, [128] Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town have punctured that illusion. 128. Boys/fence The South African uprisings and rebellion of 1976 are only a prelude of what is to come—to which the definitive victory of the Angolans over South Africa in 1975 129.OMA women has served as a major inspiration . [129]

The victory of MPLA would never have been possible if it had not had the overwhelming support of the Angolan people . Through mass organizations insti- tuted years before, Angola was able to win its "Second War of Liberation ." For example, OMA mobilized citizens to support MPLA and women to join the armed forces, while young people [130] and children helped provide essential services in local communities and gathered information about the enemy. 130. Pioneers

Today [131] the People's Republic of Angola is creating a new life for its people. The task is enormous—almost 90 per cent of the population does not know how to 131. Student reading read or write, and there is a tremendous shortage of technical personnel.

New [132] health, education, labor and government facilities must be developed on top of the immediate task of post-war reconstruction. 132. Children/slum

"To [133] Produce is to Resist" has become the national motto of Angola since the victory of its Second War of Liberation. 133. Sign

The lessons [134] of the war will not be lost : the emphasis on popular participa- 134. Participation poster tion, patience, and the full involvement of women and men . The Angolan [135] 135 .OMA women people have gained a major victory . They have achieved political independence despite opposition from the most powerful expansionist forces in the world . Yet the speed at which they will be able to direct their energies towards social progress will depend in part on the current and future policies of the United States, towards them and towards all of Southern Africa.

Angola [136] revealed a pattern of United States interests locked in combat against the aspirations of an African people . The oppressed throughout Southern Africa 136 . Marching FAPLA will ultimately be victorious . The lesson of Angola will not go unheard . (MPLA army)

137. Credits

For further information contact : Southern Africa Committee 156 Fifth Ave., Room 707 New York, N .Y. 10010 (212) 741-3480