f

3oo

CHAPTER XVIII.

OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE DURING THE HALT AT bloemfontein (continued).

REDDERSBURG.*

De Wet after Successful as the stroke at Sannah's Post had been, it was only Sannah's Post strikes south. an incident in the scheme which had been designed at Kroonstad. Fortune had favoured De Wet, and he had swept aside the only troops which interposed between him and his task in the south. He was thus able to take the next step. He now might hope to placeAngloBoerWar.comhimself between Bloemfontein and the Orange river, and by striking at the communications with the sea to hamper the advance northwards of Lord Roberts' main army. The withdrawal towards Bloemfontein first of Broadwood's brigade and then of Colvile's and French's divisions opened for him the larger prospect. to him were only a series of detach- His quarry. Opposed ments, neither firmly established in their posts nor adequately connected with the railway or with each other. These he might hope to capture or drive headlong before him. The dis- position of these detachments was consequent on movements How the situation was in the south of the Free State since the 15th of March, the day prepared for him. when Gatacre (Illrd division) and Clements (12th brigade) crossed the Orange river at Bethulie and Norval's Pont and joined hands with Pole-Carew's column from Bloemfontein. On March the 17th the bulk of the Illrd division was con-

centrated about Springfontein ; two battalions remained at Bethulie to guard the railway and to help in passing stores over

* See maps Nos. 34 and 35. t See page 257. OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 301 the river. From Springfontein Gatacre sent out patrols in every direction. On the 19th he received the following telegram from " Lord Roberts : Could you manage to take a small force, say two battalions, one battery and some mounted infantry, as far as Smithfield ? It is very desirable British troops should be seen all over the country, and opportunity given to burghers to surrender and deliver up their arms under the conditions of the Proclamation of the 15th March." Gatacre replied that he could not spare more than one battalion (the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles), a Field battery, a company of the mounted infantry of the Royal Scots and a section of that of the Royal Irish Rifles. His suggested reduction was approved, and the troops started for British ments Smithfield on the 20th. Following the spirit of his instructions ^£ Gatacre at the same time ordered Brabant, whose Headquarters Smithfield, were at Aliwal North, to send detachments to Rouxville and Rouxviiie and himself, small escort, Zastron ; and on the 21st Gatacre with a M^h^oth rode to Philippolis, took over the keys from the Landrost, and 19°°- returned the same day to Springfontein. Clements had mean- Clements ves °n while received orders to march with the 12th infantry brigade, ™^ ard two Field batteriesAngloBoerWar.comand a force of mounted infantry, principally Bioemfontein. Australians, from Norval's Pont, through Philippolis and Faure- smith, to Bioemfontein ; and, after concentrating at Donker Poort, he started on the 20th March. Gatacre was advised of this movement, and was also told to take charge of the country along the Orange river as Clements advanced northward.* On March the 26th the Commander-in-Chief directed that two Detachment squadrons of the Colonial division from Aliwal North and the wepener, Royal Scots company of mounted infantry from Smithfield March 26th. should push forward to Wepener. Next day he summoned to Bioemfontein the 1st battalion Derby regiment and the nth brigade division Royal Field artillery. The battery at Smith- field, which formed part of this brigade division, was brought back, and the two battalions left at Bethulie (1st Royal Scots and 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers) were called up to Spring- fontein. On the 27th Gatacre reported to Headquarters a rumour

* See page 257. 302 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

that the Boers were returning from Clocolan in force, and had occupied Stateberg and Modder Poort. He mentioned that he had already ordered a detachment of Brabant's Horse to hold Bushman's Kop, " at the junction of the Rouxville-Zastron

roads," and asked if he should reinforce the troops which were then moving on Wepener. The reply was that, though the Commander-in-Chief did not anticipate a return of the enemy

to Wepener, it would be better to strengthen the party there. On the next day, March 28th, Lord Roberts sent the following " telegram to General Gatacre : If you have enough troops at C-in-C. your disposal I should like you to occupy Dewetsdorp. It would ^e ne roa< irom this to Maseru safe and prevent the enemy wetsdorpto be ma * ^ occupied, from using the telegraph to the south. Let me know what you " can do to this end." Gatacre replied : Following moves are in

progress in view to covering whole country east of railway : Three

squadrons Brabant's moving from Rouxville to Wepener ; two of them reach Wepener Sunday next, the third one on Tuesday. One squadron Brabant's is moving to Bushman's Kop, half way between Rouxville and Wepener. One company Royal Scots mountedAngloBoerWar.cominfantry reaches Wepener Sunday. Two companies Royal Irish Rifles reach Dewetsdorp Sunday. One company Royal Irish Rifles and one section mounted infantry Royal Irish Rifles reach Helvetia to-morrow. Two companies Royal Irish Rifles remain at Smithfield, with one squadron Brabant's Horse." Gatacre orders To carry out Lord Roberts' wishes Gatacre next day ordered a 10" atDewets- concentration at Dewetsdorp of the mounted infantry companies dorp. of the Northumberland Fusiliers and of the Royal Irish Rifles from Springfontein, and three, instead of two, companies of the Royal Irish Rifles from Smithfield. He telegraphed these changes in his dispositions to Headquarters on the 30th March. Although on March 26th the Intelligence department had reported to the Commander-in-Chief that there was reason to believe that the Boers were collecting in the neighbourhood of Ladybrand and Modder Poort, the march of the various detachments on Dewetsdorp was not countermanded until the 31st March, the day of Sannah's Post, when two important telegrams were sent to Gatacre from Headquarters. The first OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 303

directed him to support and reinforce the Colonial division in the C.-in-C.'s

south-east of the Free State, whereupon Gatacre at once told Gatacreon Brabant to send the Cape Mounted Rifles, with their guns and the March 31st. WcDcncr 2nd Brabant's Horse, to Wepener. The second message in- reinforced, formed Gatacre of Broadwood's misfortune, ordered the concen- tration of the small outlying parties and the protection of the line of railway, and expressed the opinion that Dewetsdorp was too far advanced to be safely held. On receipt of the second message Gatacre telegraphed orders that the garrison of De- Dewetsdorp

wetsdorp must fall back on Reddersburg. A still later telegram fecaiied3ist desired General Gatacre to send a battalion and a battery to March. Leeuwberg Kopje, eight miles south of Bloemfontein, to be there at daybreak on the 1st April. This was done.

With the Illrd division there were two battalions of mounted April 1st, I9°°' infantry, each of four companies, and another company, used as divisional troops. Two companies had been sent on detachment to Dewetsdorp, and on April 1st Lieut. -General Gatacre ordered that the remainder should furnish posts along the railway from Springfontein to Bloemfontein. Single companies were sta- tioned at Springfontein, Jagersfontein, Kruger's Siding, Eden- burg, and twoAngloBoerWar.comcompanies at Bethanie. On April 2nd the Distribution r l 1 way distribution of the troops along the railway was rearranged by *|°££ i nn i 1

Headquarters ; the Guards' battalions were brought into Bloem- of April, fontein, while the garrisons of the railway posts were supplied by the Royal Scots, Derbyshire, and Northumberland Fusiliers, with sections of the 5th Field battery at Ferreira Siding and the Kaffir and Riet bridges. When, on April 3rd, the troops returned to Bloemfontein from their fruitless expedition to the Waterworks, the 1st cavalry brigade was ordered to Springfield, the 2nd cavalry brigade to Bloemspruit, and the 3rd cavalry brigade to Rustfontein. The IXth division and 13th infantry brigade marched into Bloemfontein, from whence the Vlth divi- sion had not moved. The Vllth division (Tucker) held Karee Siding to the north and Clements' brigade, the 12th, was within a day's march of Headquarters from the south. The Illrd division (Gatacre) was echeloned along the line from Bloem- fontein to Springfontein. But though the greater part of Lord 3°4 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

Roberts' force was thus once more collected under his hand, many troops continued scattered throughout the villages in the south-east of the Orange Free State. There were detach- ments at Smithfield and Helvetia. Dewetsdorp had been evacuated, and its former garrison was moving towards Redders- Outlying burg. Two squadrons of the Colonial division, with a mounted detachments infantry of the Royal Scots, held the distant Wepener, east of company railway. linked with Aliwal North by small bodies of Brabant's Horse at Rouxville and Zastron. A reinforcement of the 2nd regiment of Brabant's Horse, the Cape Mounted Rifles, and part of the Kaffrarian Rifles was on its way to Wepener from Aliwal North, which was for the moment the Headquarters of Brabant's Colonial division, and served as the base for its operations in the south- east of the Free State. The Intelligence department at Head- quarters at this time reported that on the Ladybrand—Tha- banchu line were concentrated between thirteen thousand and twenty thousand Boers, of whom about one thousand were moving south, with advanced patrols twelve miles south-east of Bloemfontein at Leeuw Kop Farm, where it was said that a concentrationAngloBoerWar.comof all burghers in the Dewetsdorp district was to take place on the 5th April. Motives for The general distribution of the troops south-east of Bloem- scattering troops during fontein had been made when from the facts then known it was the latter half inferred that the spirit of the Boers had been thoroughly broken. of March, 1900. Those who had seen the retreat along the Basuto borders had announced that the burghers were " in a complete state of demoralisation and collapse, and were retiring in hot haste, leaving the road strewn with men, baggage and ammunition."

To Lord Roberts it appeared that the best way to profit by this collapse and to restore peace to the southern portion of the Free State was to show small detachments of troops all over the An essentially country. By this means he hoped to encourage the farmers to |>eaceful purpose. throw off the influence of such of their fellow countrymen as were bent on continuing the war, and, accepting the terms of his Pro- clamation, to surrender their rifles and return quietly to their homes. The sturdy defence of the kopjes at Karee Siding no doubt showed that there were men still in arms who intended to OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 305 oppose the march on Johannesburg and Pretoria, but this the Commander-in-Chief had been led to expect. It was well known that Kruger, Steyn, De Wet, and a few more of the leaders would fight to the last, and that they were gathering round them at

Kroonstad all the warlike force they could muster. Some opposition to the march to Pretoria, with its long and difficult line of communications had, therefore, been anticipated. Sud- denly like a bolt out of the blue came De Wet's success at Sannah's

Sannah's Post. It had been achieved by only a fraction, fifteen changes'"' hundred out of the thirteen thousand, now reported to be muster- whole ing in the Ladybrand region. For resistance to so large a body of mounted men, under a leader such as De Wet had shown him- self, the dispositions of the troops, designed to restore peace, were not merely inadequate, they were altogether inappropriate. The importance of this offensive return, formidable in itself, was doubled by the fact that it at once attracted recruits to De Wet's Peaceful e rs commandos. As long as the organised armed forces of the b^fme Republics were flying, almost without showing fight, before Lord active Roberts' victorious arms, and while the " Rooineks " seemed to be flooding theAngloBoerWar.comcountry in every direction, the temptations of a quiet life and the blessings of neutrality seemed irresistible to a large number of burghers. On the other hand, when De Wet had captured more than half of the artillery opposed to him, and was coming south with swarms of mounted men, and with some of the captured weapons to be used against their former owners ; when, armed with the authority of both Republics, he was proclaiming vengeance against all traitors and appealing to the patriotism of the people—things presented a very different appearance alike to the farmers and to the petty detachments of soldiery scattered among them. At a moment's notice all the Hurried ion existing dispositions of troops had to be changed by Head- J^|^ quarters. The railway was necessarily the first care ; if that was seriously broken, the army in Bloemfontein, if it did not actually starve, must be injuriously affected, and the northward march, the one hope of quickly ending the war, postponed for a con- siderable, if not an indefinite time. Next, the many outlying detachments must be drawn in, and, in particular Dewetsdorp,

vol. 11. 20 ;

306 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

which, for administrative purposes, it had seemed desirable to hold, must be abandoned. Effect on There are few things which tell more on the fighting quality moral of changed of soldiers than the harassing effect of changing and uncertain orders, orders. A vigorous march towards the enemy, under severe conditions of soil and weather, is exciting and inspiriting, but a rapid retreat over the same ground, even to men accustomed to victory, is a trying experience. Unhappily the garrison of particularly on Dewetsdorp knew war chiefly in failure. Overdriven by the Dewetsdorp troops. zeal of an energetic commander, they had, through no fault of their own, been defeated with much loss at Stormberg. Now came the order for them to flee before De Wet, who was armed with the very guns which were supposed to have been covering their peaceful mission. They had no cavalry to scout for them, and no artillery.

Assembly at On the ist April the troops which had been ordered to Dewetsdorp, assemble at Dewetsdorp, now the most exposed outpost in the April 1st. Free State, began to arrive there. The first to reach their ren- dezvous were three companies of the 2nd Irish Rifles. Four companiesAngloBoerWar.comof this battalion and a section of mounted infantry had marched under Captain W. J. McWhinnie on March 28th from Smithfield. McWhinnie had dropped a company and the section of mounted infantry at Helvetia, to serve as a connecting link with the railway. On reaching Dewetsdorp, he was greeted with information from local sources that a Boer com- mando was expected soon to appear before the village and, selecting ground which commanded the place, he began to McWhinnie strengthen his position, which he covered by outposts. In the in touch with evening a patrol to the north of was fired upon. Boers on Dewetsdorp evening of He informed the Headquarters, Illrd division, of this by tele- 1st April gram, and also of the rumoured approach of the commando, which, however, was not credited by the Intelligence officer who accompanied his detachment. During the day two companies of mounted infantry from Springfontein had joined him, after a march of about a hundred miles in ninety-six hours. At midnight arrived Gatacre's telegram of the 31st March, which directed McWhinnie to be ready to return to Redders- OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 307 burg on receipt of further instructions. These were brought by he is recalled a messenger from Springfontein, who rode into Dewetsdorp at burg^ April 3.30 a.m. on April 2nd. The troops moved off at 5 a.m. in a 2nd - downpour of rain. The tracks were heavy, and greatly delayed a heavy and 11116 especially those of the mounted infantry transport, the wagons, ^JJ."^. the teams of which were much exhausted by the toil of the past four days. McWhinnie pushed on without interruption till 9.15 a.m., when the mounted infantry were ordered to feed their horses and give them a short rest. The animals were tired out. One had already died on the road from exhaustion. The three companies on foot now found their own advance and flank guards, and trudged on till noon, when they halted, and were rejoined by the mounted troops, who meantime had lost more horses from fatigue. Soon all were again on the march until, about 6 p.m., the little column bivouacked for the night. By dawn on the 3rd it was once more in movement. The The march of

l e pri ' road along which McWhinnie's troops were plodding ran for y miles almost due east and west over an open plain seamed with many dongas. At about nine o'clock, when a little way east of Reddersburg,AngloBoerWar.comthe leading scouts came in sight of a rough boulder-covered ridge parallel to the track and a few hundred yards to the north of it. This feature was about a thousand yards in length, and about a hundred feet higher than the surrounding level ; from its southern flank jutted out three spurs, each higher than the parent hill. As Captain McWhinnie, at the head of the main body, was nearing the ridge he learned from his right flank guard that a cloud of dust had been seen to the north. At the same time the leading scouts came under McWhinnie fire from the western of end the main ridge, on which a party of ReddTrsbTrg the enemy was concealed. He thereupon ordered two com- about 9 a.m., pn 3r ' panies to seize two isolated kopjes, and with the mounted infantry moved up the eastern spur. From this higher ground he saw that he must hold the western spur, as it commanded the whole system of kopjes around it ; he accordingly sent the mounted infantry there, and, bringing up all his infantry, Occupied the eastern and central spurs and the part of the ridge which con- nected them. The hospital was established on level ground

vol. 11. 20* 3 o8 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

between the ridge and the road, and the transport placed under cover. The troops were hardly in position when Captain De Wet calls McWhinnie received a message from General C. De Wet, in on him to surrender. which the Boer guerilla leader informed him that his opponents numbered more than two thousand men with four guns, and called upon him " for the sake of humanity " to surrender. De Wet's movements, after he defeated Broadwood on the 31st March, must now be described. De Wet's Before midnight on the 31st, from Klip Kraal, a little south scheme as reported to of the Waterworks, he had sent a despatch to the President Steyn on the at Kroonstad to report that, with a small escort, he was on his night of 31st " March. way to Dewetsdorp. Our commandos will join this evening with those of Chief-Commandants Lemmer and Olivier, and I shall march out to-morrow with two thousand men to cut off railway communication between Bloemfontein and Bethanie. Lemmer and Grobelaar, with 2,500 men, will remain between here and Bloemfontein and do whatever their hands find to do. We go to Dewetsdorp with Commandant Fourie to gather together the burghers of that district, and also to obtain dynamite for De Wet's our AngloBoerWar.comoperations." On the morning of the 1st April De Wet movements learned that Dewetsdorp was occupied by a British detach- between 1st April and the ment. After sending back peremptory orders to his Lieutenants, morning of the 3rd. Wessels, Froneman and De Villiers, to meet him with all speed, he visited the neighbouring farms in order to rally the spirits of the burghers who had taken the oath of neutrality and been permitted by Lord Roberts to return to their homes. He per- suaded or coerced more than a hundred of them to join his commando. Next morning his scouts informed him that the British had recently evacuated Dewetsdorp. He then directed the main body of his men, who were still some distance in rear, to ride towards Reddersburg, where he hoped to attack McWhinnie on ground of his own choosing, while he himself, dogging the march of the British column, halted for the night a little to the north of its bivouac. Early on the 3rd, burghers had arrived in sufficient numbers to enable him to bring the British to a halt, and no sooner had McWhinnie's refusal to surrender reached De Wet than with two guns he began to OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 309 shell them at a range of two thousand yards. At this distance On

' "me s the infantry were able to annoy the artillerymen, and the guns xJusai t were drawn back out of reach of musketry. Soon afterwards surrender De , . . , . Wet opens fire two more pieces were brought into action and lour guns now w ith artillery, harassed the troops, one from the north-east, one from the east and two from the south. Nor did the burghers limit their attack to a cannonade. Taking advantage of the cover afforded by the dongas, they gradually closed in and practically ringed the and encircles

rifle fire, maintained until British with a continuous which was whrfrinefire. McWhinnie held was extensive nightfall. The ground which ;

his men were worn out by the long marches of the last few days ; they suffered from the depression produced by a bombardment to which they could not reply. Never was the controlling influence of officers more required to keep the rank and file steady and in good heart, to maintain discipline, to ensure watchfulness and vigilance in patrolling during the trying hours of the night.

In the fighting on the 3rd the casualties among the rank and file Effect on were inconsiderable, but of the twelve officers in the column o^officers'on two were killed and two severely wounded. Thus by the end of April 3rd. the afternoon thereAngloBoerWar.comwere but eight, one foi every seventy soldiers, left fit for duty. In the days when men fought shoulder to shoulder this number might have sufficed. On the kopjes of Reddersburg, where the troops were necessarily greatly scattered behind rocks, boulders and improvised shelters, it was wholly inadequate. To this loss in officers was largely due the disastrous result which followed next day, April 4th.

As soon as it was dusk the Intelligence officer sent a messenger Urgent for Creeping along the to Bethanie assistance. dongas, this man heipa-ruto succeeded in passing through the Boer lines, and eventually Bethanie. reached the railway, but not till the news which he brought had already been forestalled. When darkness set in sentries were British pushed out in every direction. The mounted infantry on the fo^hentght. western spur were reinforced before dawn by some twenty in- fantrymen, and a company was pushed forward to occupy the part of the ridge between the western and the central spur. The anxieties of the commanding officer were not confined to his dispositions for defence. The spot where, to use the soldier's 3"> THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

" Want of term, the Boers had held him up," was waterless, and when water. during the evening water was issued from the carts there was

only enough to fill about one-third of each man's bottle.

Throughout the night the Boers kept up steady rifle fire, and at dawn on the 4th they renewed the attack. Then, to McWhinnie's dismay, he realised that under cover of the darkness some During night burghers had crept up the side of the hill and had settled them- Boers selves within thirty establish yards of the top of the ridge, just east of the themselves ground held by the mounted infantry. Soon after eight o'clock advantage- ously, and at the Boers forced their way upwards to the ridge itself, and made 8 a.m. 4th , a determined rush for the spur held by the mounted infantry, April, carry the key of the who capitulated. The enemy now held the key of the position. position. McWhinnie first lined the central spur, but, under fire from three sides, his men were soon obliged to retire to the eastern spur.

Here they were still worse off : they were bombarded by four guns and scourged by musketry at short range from every side. Surrender Soon after 9 a.m. the white flag was hoisted, and eight unwounded of the officers and five hundred and thirty-eight unwounded non-com- detachment, 9 a.m., missioned officers and men of the regular army laid down their April 4th. arms,AngloBoerWar.comafter a total loss of two officers and eight men killed, two officers and thirty-three men wounded. All that can explain this surrender has been recorded. De Wet lost not a moment in securing his prisoners. In

little more than two hours after their capture they were being hurried off to Winburg, vid Thabanchu, at the moment when his rear-guard was skirmishing with the leading mounted troops of the force which had been hastily collected from various quarters and sent to the rescue of the Dewets- dorp detachment.

News of The first news of the engagement was brought to Edenburg attack at p.m. on the 3rd April by one of De Montmorency's scouts, reaches 7 the railway. who had been reconnoitring towards Dewetsdorp. The vil- lage, he said, was now in the hands of the Boers, who were shelling McWhinnie's column near Reddersburg, at a spot about fourteen miles from Edenburg. The scout under-estimated the distance, but in other respects his information was correct.

It was at once . telegraphed to Headquarters and to Gatacre. OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 311

Lord Roberts directed Gatacre to hasten with all speed to the Lord Roberts' nS l ° as he could collect, and help of the detachment with such troops Gatacre. he himself sent five companies of the Cameron Highlanders by rail from Bloemfontein to Bethanie. Gatacre ordered two batteries and the mounted infantry at Edenburg to rendezvous at Bethanie, whither, with a party of scouts and mounted infantry, he him- self hurried from Springfontein. On his way he received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief warning him not to move against the Boers until he had satisfied himself that their strength and position warranted his doing so with success. When Gatacre reached Bethanie he learnt that the enemy's guns

were still in action ; and, arguing that if the British column, weak in numbers and without artillery, was still holding out, the Boers could not be in very great force, he decided to attempt the relief of the detachment.

At 6.15 a.m., April 4th, De Montmorency's scouts and the Gatacre's tl there " company of the Derbyshire mounted infantry started from ^ .°]Je Bethanie to reconnoitre towards Reddersburg, twelve miles marches from distant, and an hour later they reported that the action was still on^thAprnf going on. When the five companies of the Cameron High- landers, which AngloBoerWar.comhad left Bloemfontein at 11 p.m. on the 3rd, and the mounted infantry from Edenburg had joined him at Bethanie, Gatacre marched towards Reddersburg. At 9.30 a.m. came a disquieting message from the officer commanding De Mont- morency's scouts to say that firing had ceased for half an hour. Gatacre pushed on till he reached a ridge to the west of the village, five or six miles from the kopje which McWhinnie had defended. Here he was met by rumours that the British had surrendered, and at 10.30 a.m. he halted—as is now known, about half an but hearing of S der hour before De Wet began to march his prisoners ' towards nahs atout Thabanchu. The mounted troops, pushing on, drove before 10.30 a.m.,

them a few of the enemy's rear-guard scouts ; but General Gatacre decided that, as firing had ceased about two hours earlier, it would be useless to advance further, and ordered his whole force to retire on Bethanie. He had marched four miles when and retires directions were received to occupy Reddersburg, and there he ^hanle remained till midnight, when a telegram from Lord Roberts 312 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

ordered his immediate return to Bethanie, which he reached on the morning of the 5th. De Wet As soon as De Wet was satisfied that there was no danger of dashes off to his prisoners being rescued, turned his attention to the other Wepener, he sending British posts east of the railway- On the night of the 4th he Froneman against himself rode towards Wepener, and detached General Frone- Smithfield. man with five hundred men to deal with the troops at Smithfield. These consisted of the Headquarters and one company of the 2nd battalion Royal Irish Rifles, and about eighty mounted men of the Queenstown Rifle Volunteers, who had recently arrived from Aliwal North. On the 3rd of April, Major E. Allen, who commanded the Royal Irish Rifles at Smithfield, was directed by telegram to recall the mounted and dismounted detachments of his battalion from Helvetia, twenty-eight miles from Smithfield. Starting at 4 p.m. on the 4th, they joined him at 1.30 a.m. on the 5th. During the night of the 4th-5th Allen received orders from Bloemfontein for the immediate evacuation of his post. He was to retire at his own discretion either to Aliwal North (forty-five miles) or Bethulie (forty-two miles), and, knowing that twenty-threeAngloBoerWar.commiles off, at Rouxville, a post of Kaffrarian Rifles was in telegraphic communication with the Headquarters of the

Smithfield Colonial division at Aliwal North, he chose the longer route. garrison, By 8.30 a.m. on the 5th he was on the march, and had placed evading the stroke, reach the Caledon River between himself and the Boers before he halted Besters Kraal for the day, five miles south of the Commissie bridge. So far he had seen or heard nothing of the enemy, but at 9.30 p.m. Major H. L. Hallowell, commanding the Queenstown Volunteers, which had been left as rear-guard at the river, warned him that the burghers were at Smithfield, and that two commandos, one of which had guns, had passed through the town during the after- noon, apparently making for the drifts above and below Com- missie bridge. Allen decided to retire at once, and calling in the Queenstown Volunteers, started at 11 p.m., and at 3.15 a.m. on the 6th arrived at Rouxville. He at once telegraphed to Aliwal North for help, and, in reply, General Brabant promised to send two hundred of the Border Horse to meet him at Besters Kraal, a strong position about twelve miles north of Aliwal. At —

OPERATIONS IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE. 313 daybreak on the 7th the mounted patrols reported that there was no sign of the enemy within five miles of the camp, and at 8 a.m. his weary troops, accompanied by the detachment of Kaffrarian Rifles, were once more on the move, and reached Besters Kraal at noon. Here the Border Horse, which had been Border so opportunely sent out by General Brabant, took up the rear- ^ittre&t" guard. An hour after Allen marched for Aliwal, the Border to Aliwal, pn Horse were attacked, but gradually falling back, they effectually checked the burghers, who, finding that their prey had escaped them, drew off to the north. With the Border Horse Brabant had sent a number of empty bullock wagons, in which to carry the infantry, whom he knew would be footsore and exhausted by their forced marches. When, between 8 and 9 p.m., he went to the bridge at Aliwal to welcome the Irish Rifles, he found them almost barefoot, and reeling with fatigue, but still keeping in the ranks. They had refused to ride on the wagons, urging that if they did so the good name of the regiment would suffer.

The distances covered by Allen's troops were :

Helvetia to Smithfield, 28 miles. SmithfieldAngloBoerWar.comto Rouxville, 23 miles. Rouxville to Aliwal North, 22 miles.

The detachment from Helvetia marched seventy-three miles in fifty-two hours, and that from Smithfield forty-five miles in thirty-six hours.