The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902

( 653 ) CHAPTEK XVII THE ADVANCE TO BLOEMFONTEIN On the morning of February 27 President Steyn had arrived Steyn and in the laager at Poplar Grove to exhort the burghers to some bSSSoh- fresh effort to relieve Cronje. Before many hours he received tein. _ the terrible news of Cronje's surrender. His visit had been g^jop Roberts fruitless. But he now knew the worst, so he believed, and at all costs. returned to Bloemfontein to see what might be done to repair the effects of the disaster and to check the British advance. On his way he met fresh tidings of misfortune : Colesberg reoccupied, and the British pushing forward to the Orange Eiver ; Ladysmith relieved, and the commandos in ISTatal flying in helpless, panic-stricken confusion. At any moment Eoberts might push on to Bloemfontein, and the fall of the capital might paralyse the whole resistance of the Pree Staters. He appealed to the elder President for help and counsel. Kruger had come back from Glencoe on March 3 with but slight assurance that his impassioned appeals had been effective, and that the burghers would make any stand in their new positions if BuUer pressed after them. But he knew that the danger in the Free State was the most pressing, and the very next night hurried down to Bloemfontein. A conference between the Presidents and their chief advisers took place on the 5th. It was resolved to stop Eoberts's advance at all costs, and to get together every available man for the purpose. By now there were fully 6,000 burghers assembled at Poplar Grove under De Wet. De la Eey, with part of his commandos, was still round Bloemfontein,* waiting * The Johannesburg Police had been actually in the town some days, but they had been so mutinous and had so terrorized the inhabitants by their indisciplined conduct that they were moved several miles out to avert further mischief. 554 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA for his transport and the dismounted burghers to come up from Norval's Pont, but would be ready to push on in a day or two. Fmther reinforcements from the Biggarsberg and from the Orange Eiver would be coming up as soon as the situation became clear at those points. If only Eoberts would wait a week longer at Paardeberg it might be possible to get together fully 10,000-12,000 men to bar his way, a larger force than the Eepublics had brought into the field anywhere since Joubert's original march into Natal. Kniger goes Even more necessary than numbers was courage. From to Poplar ^-j^ moment the fortune of war had be^un to change there Grove to en- ^ ^ courage the had been signs of disheartenment, and now voices already burghers. made themselves heard on every side, openly urging the abandonment of the struggle, and a surrender to the British demands. To counteract the faint-hearted, to convince the timid and inert that the whole national ideal, that the very existence of the Eepublics was at stake, and rouse them to activity and courage, was, indeed, the chief task to which the Presidents set themselves from this time onward. One of the first results of the conference on the 5th was the despatch of a message to the British Government, of which it is enough to say at this moment that, while couched in the form of a suggestion for peace, its main object was to provide argu- ments for a more determined resistance. That same afternoon EJruger left Bloemfontein for Poplar Grove, hoping to arrive in time to inspire the burghers with some of his own un- conquerable spirit before they were once more called upon to face the enemy. Before leaving he addressed a public meeting in Bloemfontein, and again on his way addressed the laagers outside the town, the theme and form of his speech being in each case based upon the long message sent to Botha and Meyer a fortnight earlier.* The "Boer At Poplar Grove, meanwhile, the burghers had been busily surrender, Poplar^rove. occupied, since Cronje's in taking up and in- trenching a series of positions astride of the Modder Eiver and across the direct roads to Bloemfontein on either bank. These positions covered a front of more than 25 miles. The extreme right was posted in the hilly country which, at an * See p. 511. THE ADVANCE TO BLOEMFONTEIN 555 average distance of eight or nine miles north of the river, extended from the Koedoesrand-Boshof road, past Damplaats and Bine Hill, till nearly due north of Poplar Grove. This section was held by the Boshof burghers, and by other contingents which had come round through Boshof with Kolbe or been sent from Fourteen Streams, and was rein- forced on the 6th to a total strength of, perhaps, 1,000 men and three guns. Separated from these hills by three miles of open valley was a lofty table-topped hill known as the Loog Kop, nearly four miles north-west of Poplar Grove Drift. This formed the right of the main Boer position, and from it the Boer trenches ran south across the open veld, striking the river a mile west of the drift. This section was held by Senekal, Bethlehem and Potchefstroom burghers, with one gun on the summit of Loog Kop. On the left bank the trenches, here held by the Heidelbergers and Bloemfonteiners, ran south for nearly two miles till they struck a steep ridge, which for the first mile trended away from the river, and then ran roughly parallel to it for another three miles. This section was held by Edenburg, Ladybrand and Bloemfontein burghers with three guns, their main strength being concen- trated on a very prominent kopje, known as Table Mountain, near the western end of the ridge. Beyond this western end, which was barely three miles from Makow's Drift, the ridge turned abruptly to the south and ran along for five miles to a cluster of pointed kopjes known as the Seven Kopjes. These formed the extreme left of the Boer line, and were held by Bloemfontein, Picksburg and Philippolis burghers with three guns. The Winburgers were held in reserve near Poplar Grove. As against a direct frontal advance along the river it was a very defensible position. Its weak point was the left flank, which was within easy reach of the British, and was completely in the air. These dispositions were well known to Eoberts ; con- Roberts sidering the proximity of the two forces they could hardly determines to have been otherwise. On the 2nd and 3rd the cavalry had whole Boer pushed up as far as Loog Kop in the hope of cutting off a ^°^°®' convoy going to Boshof. Their reports as to the hilly country on their left, though then still quite weakly held, and Major 656 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA Lawrence's reconnaissances on the south bank, led French to suggest to the Commander-in-Chief that the whole of the cavalry should move in a body round the exposed Boer left on to the open ground in rear. The idea at once took root in Eoberts's mind and soon developed into a remarkably ambitious and far-reaching project. This was nothing less than to capture bodily the whole of the Boer force south of the river. French with his whole division was to ride in a great sweep round the Boer left and place himself across the Boer line of retreat to Bloemfontein. At the same time two divisions of infantry were to deliver an enveloping attack upon the enemy's positions. Driven out of theii* positions, and finding their natural line of retreat barred, the Boers would be forced to try and escape by Poplar Grove Drift. Another division marching along the right bank would block their escape in that direction. The whole Boer force would then be compelled to take to the river bed, where it would sooner or later have to surrender. What Koberts aimed at, in fact, was another Paardeberg, on an even greater scale, but carried out scientifically, and free from the confusion and waste of life which had marked Kitchener's attack. It was a bold and ingenious conception, and it had in it all the elements of a great success. But to that success certain conditions were essential. The distance French had to cover was at least 17 miles : it was essential, therefore, that his movement should be well advanced before the Boers could get an inkling of what was in store for them. An early start by the cavalry, and a quick development of the infantry attack in the centre to engage the enemy's attention, were clearly advisable. Again, the meshes of the net that was to be cast round the Boers would at first be very wide. Large though French's force was it could not make sure of stopping a really determined attempt on the part of the Boers to break through at any one particular point on the twelve miles of open veld between Seven Kopjes and the river east of Poplar Grove. Given time to think, they could always escape : it was only by attacking them vigorously at every point, pressing close upon them, bewildering and confusing them, while the meshes of the net were rapidly drawn tighter, that there was — TEE ADVANCE TO BLOEMFONTEIN 557 any reasonable prospect of shepherding them into the trap before they realized the fate in store for them. On the afternoon of the 6 th Eoberts summoned all his March 6.

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