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Israel's Disengagement Plan

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Israel's Disengagement Plan Middle East at the Crossroads Israel’s Disengagement Plan: Conception and Implementation Jonathan Spyer was impossible, then it might feel it incumbent upon Director itself to take unilateral action. Olmert in these spee- Keys Center’s European Affairs ches laid emphasis on the ‘demographic issue’: i.e. Global Research for International Affairs Center (GLO- the fact that the rapidly growing Palestinian popula- RIA), Herzliya tion in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea might eventually, in the absence The decision by the government of Israel to with- of diplomatic progress, make the continued maintai- 2006 draw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and its 17 Jewish ning of a democratic, majority-Jewish state unfeasi- settlements, and from four West Bank settlements ble. Since this was the case, he argued, the status Med. in the autumn of 2005 represented a moment of his- quo did not work in Israel’s favor. An alternative way toric importance in the ongoing conflict between forward, Olmert suggested, would be for Israel to uni- Israelis and Palestinians. Both conceptually and prac- laterally withdraw from areas it felt were not essen- tically, it was a major departure from Israeli policy tial, or which would in any case be ceded during futu- since 1967. Disengagement has re-shaped Israeli re peace negotiations. This might lead to the de facto 30 politics, setting in motion processes which have ended emergence of the Palestinian state with provisional the generation-long domination of the Israeli politi- borders envisaged by the Road Map, to which Israel cal scene by the Likud Party. Indeed, the emergence remained committed. of a new Israeli strategy based on unilateralism has This idea was further explained, and began the path re-shaped the basic parameters of the Israeli dis- to becoming Israeli policy, with the speech by Prime cussion, which since 1967 had been divided bet- Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon, at the fourth Herzliya ween supporters and opponents of the idea of land Conference on 18th December, 2003. PM Sharon for peace. This article will discuss the emergence of expressed his advocacy of unilateral disengage- the idea of unilateral disengagement, its adoption as ment in the following terms: “We are interested in policy by the government of Ariel Sharon, the imple- conducting direct negotiations, but do not intend to mentation of the Gaza disengagement and events hold Israeli society hostage in the hands of the since the implementation. Palestinians. I have already said: We will not wait for them indefinitely. The Disengagement Plan does not prevent the implementation of the Roadmap. Rather, The Idea of Unilateral Disengagement it is a step Israel will take in the absence of any other option, in order to improve its security. The Disen- The Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip and gagement Plan will be realized only in the event that from four settlements in the West Bank was appro- the Palestinians continue to drag their feet and pos- ved by the Israeli Cabinet on 6th June, 2004, and by tpone implementation of the Roadmap.” the Knesset on 25th October, 2004. The idea had emerged publicly, however, a year earlier. In October, 2003, then Industry and Trade Minister Ehud Olmert Details of the Plan made a series of speeches in which he first floated the notion that if Israel became convinced that prog- The precise provisions of the Disengagement Plan, ress through negotiation with the Palestinian Authority as accepted by the Israeli Cabinet in June, 2004, laid out a blueprint for the complete withdrawal of Israeli The opposition campaign notwithstanding, on 16th forces and civilians from the area of the Gaza Strip, February, 2005, the Knesset passed the final ver- and the evacuation of civilian residents from four West sion of the Disengagement Plan Implementation bank communities. According to the Revised Law. This law represented the penultimate hurdle Disengagement plan the settlements to be evacua- that the plan was required to pass on the road to ted were divided into four groups: implementation. It laid down a series of practical measures for the relocation and compensation of • Group A – Morag, Netzarim, and Kfar Darom in Israeli residents of communities in the Gaza Strip the Gaza Strip. and in the four West Bank communities slated for • Group B – the villages of Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, dismantlement. The law allocated the sum of NIS and Homesh in the northern West Bank 3.8 billion ($884 million) for the relocation and com- • Group C – the towns and villages of Gush Katif pensation of residents. It was passed with 59 in in the Gaza Strip favour, 40 opposed, 5 abstaining. A proposed • Group D – the villages of the northern Gaza Strip amendment to submit the plan to a referendum was (Elei Sinai, Dugit, and Nissanit). rejected. Keys The Plan, as modified and amended by the Knesset, It was made clear that territorial contiguity would be was then presented before the Israeli Cabinet on assured for the Palestinians in the areas to be eva- 20th February. The Cabinet approved it, comple- cuated, and that no permanent Israeli military pre- ting the progress of the Disengagement Plan from sence would remain. an idea floated by senior politicians to the appro- 2006 In the course of 2005, the Disengagement Plan was ved policy of the Government of Israel. Med. revised and finalized. It also became integrated into On 28th March, the Knesset rejected a bill to delay the broader picture of relations between Israel and the implementation of the disengagement plan by the Palestinian Authority. a vote of 72 to 39. The bill was introduced by a group of Likud MKs who wanted to force a refer- endum on the issue. 31 The Plan Becomes Policy, in the Face of On 17th March, Israel Defensive Forces (IDF) Determined Opposition Southern Command issued a military order prohi- biting Israeli citizens who did not reside in the Gaza At a summit meeting held in Sharm al-Sheikh on 8th Strip settlements from relocating to the area. February, 2005, the Disengagement Plan was dis- The domestic campaign against disengagement did cussed and endorsed by representatives of the not cease at this point. But for the remainder of Palestinian Authority (PA), Egypt and Jordan. The 2005, it would take the form of a series of public summit also witnessed the brokering of a ceasefire events and demonstrations which sought – through between Israel and the PA which effectively brought massive public pressure – to delay or frustrate the to a close five years of overt hostilities between the carrying out of the dismantling of settlements, and two sides which had resulted in heavy loss of both the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Israeli and Palestinian life. On 7th August, just a week before the commen- The Sharm summit was followed by the final endors- cement of Disengagement, Finance Minister ing by the Knesset of the Disengagement Plan on Benjamin Netanyahu resigned his Cabinet post, 16th February, 2005. The first months of 2005 wit- prior to the final Cabinet ratification of the first phase nessed a determined campaign of opposition to disen- of Disengagement. This vote was carried in the gagement waged by Israeli residents of the Gaza Strip Cabinet by 17 votes to 5. Netanyahu explained his and West Bank, and their supporters. This cam- reasons for resigning as deriving from his fears of paign began with a strong sense of confidence among a surge of terrorism following the Disengagement. its adherents that the Disengagement could be pre- He considered that this would take place both vented. Public support for the Disengagement Plan, because Israel would no longer be able to control however, remained consistently high in the months events in Gaza, and because the withdrawal would leading up to implementation. Polls revealed a rate be perceived by Palestinian rejectionists as a vin- of support of around 70% among the Israeli public dication of their violent tactics. “The withdrawal,” for the plan. Netanyahu said in a statement following his resig- nation, “endangers Israel’s security, divides its peo- gagement, Ariel Sharon once more clarified the rea- ple and sets the standard of the withdrawal to the sons for Israel’s unilateral turn. He expressed him- 1967 border.” self in the following terms: “We tried to reach agree- ments with the Palestinians which would move the two peoples towards the path of peace. They were The implementation of the plan crushed against a wall of hatred and fanaticism. The unilateral disengagement plan…is the Israeli The implementation of Disengagement began on answer to this reality. The plan is good for Israel in 15th August, 2005. The Gaza Strip and the area any future scenario. We are reducing the day to day surrounding the four West Bank settlements were friction and its victims on both sides. The IDF will closed to visitors, and the process of evacuating redeploy on defensive lines behind the Security all those individuals who had not already left, and Fence. Those who continue to fight us will meet the demolishing the infrastructure of the communities full force of the IDF and the security forces.” began. In the event, the disengagement proceeded Keys far more smoothly and speedily than had been pre- dicted. There were nevertheless anguished scenes Developments since the Disengagement in all the communities slated for destruction, as the settlers and their allies protested their removal. In the days that followed the implementation of Some protestors threw substances at Israeli secu- Disengagement, an immediate trial of strength deve- 2006 rity forces personnel. The substances included, loped between Hamas and the Israeli security for- paint, turpentine and in one case acid.
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