The Course of the Conflict in Gaza

Home , Ahmed Jibril, Dugit, Elei Sinai, Force 17, Gaza City, Gush Katif

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page i

CSIS______Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 [email protected]

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War

Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and Correction

The Course of the Conflict in Gaza

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies

With the Assistance of Jennifer K. Moravitz

February 23, 2005

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page ii

Introduction

The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of CSIS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XIV. THE COURSE OF THE CONFLICT IN GAZA...... 1

FIGHTING IN AN ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB...... 1 ISRAELI EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTAINMENT AND SECURITY OF THE GAZA STRIP...... 11 ARMS SMUGGLING INTO GAZA AND THE RAFAH TUNNELS ...... 12 FIGHTING WITHIN GAZA ...... 16 AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF THE SETTLEMENTS ...... 17 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA ...... 18 LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE ...... 23

List of Tables, Figures, and Maps

MAP XIV.1 ...... 25

THE GAZA ...... 25

CIA PROFILE OF GAZA AND WEST BANK - PART ONE...... 26

TABLE XIV.1 ...... 27

CIA PROFILE OF GAZA AND WEST BANK - PART TWO ...... 27

XIV. The Course of the Conflict in Gaza

Even during the peace process, Gaza and the West Bank created different sets of security problems for both Israel and the Palestinians. This was partly due to the different ways in which the Oslo Accords dealt with each area. For example, the political status of the Gaza Strip is defined by a number of agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements (the DOP), which was signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, provided for a transitional period of Palestinian interim self-government both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, because Gaza was largely Palestinian, densely populated, and mostly urban, the Palestinian Authority was able to establish significantly more formal control there than in the West Bank. Fighting in an Economic and Demographic Time Bomb

Once the conflict began, the geography and demography of the Gaza Strip ensured that an Israeli-Palestinian conflict would take a different form there than it had in the West Bank. Gaza is an area of approximately 360 square kilometers, sharing a 51- kilometer border with Israel, an 11-kilometer border with Egypt, with 40 kilometers of coastline.1 These borders are relatively compact and easy for the IDF to secure, provided that Egypt enforces the control of its borders with the same strictness as does Israel. Even without Egyptian cooperation, Gaza’s southern border can be secured with considerable effectiveness. Table XIV.1 provides a profile of the geographic, economic, and population profile for Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, and Israel. As a result of the September 13, 1993 accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Cairo Agreement signed on May 4, 1994, Gaza is divided into a mix of common roads, Israeli controlled entry points and roads, Israeli settlements, and Palestinian Authority controlled areas.2 Unlike the West Bank Gaza is an almost wholly Palestinian entity. The Palestinian population in Gaza is overwhelmingly Muslim, and the religious composition of the Gaza Strip is 98.7% Muslim, 0.7% Christian, and 0.6% Jewish. 3 In July 2002,

there were 1,274,868 Palestinians in Gaza and approximately 5,000 Israeli settlers. The Jerusalem Central Bureau of Statistics reported 6,678 Israeli settlers in Gaza as of December 2000.4 These settlers were, however, scattered in 25 Israeli settlements and civilian land use sites. At the same time, Gaza has long been an economic and demographic time bomb. According to CIA estimates, the economy has deteriorated steadily after the early 1990s, and long before the Israeli-Palestinian War created a crisis. Real per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) declined 36% between 1992 and 1996 as a result of the combined effect of falling aggregate incomes and robust population growth. CIA estimates that this downturn in economic activity led to a nearly two-year decrease in life expectancy and a significant increase in child mortality between 1997 and 2000.5 The population growth rate in Gaza is one of the highest in the world with 4.2%, in spite of economic conditions and gross overcrowding in available housing. This population is also extremely young: 57% are below the age of 20.6 The CIA describes Gaza’s pre-war economic situation as follows:7 largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS. The most serious negative social effect of this downturn has been the emergence of chronic unemployment; average unemployment rates in the WBGS during the 1980s were generally under 5%; by the mid-1990s this level had risen to over 20%. Since 1997 Israel's use of comprehensive closures has decreased and, in 1998, Israel implemented new policies to reduce the impact of closures and other security procedures on the movement of Palestinian goods and labor. In October 1999, Israel permitted the opening of a safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in accordance with the 1995 Interim Agreement. These changes to the conduct of economic activity have fueled a moderate economic recovery in 1998-99.

The GDP in purchasing power parity terms of Gaza was only US $1.17 billion in 1999, the last year before the war. The per capita income was US $1,060. Despite major water, desertification, and sewage problems, roughly one-third of the economy was still tied to agriculture in 1999. Another 25 percent worked in light industry, the rest in “services,” largely consisting of temporary work.8 The Gaza Strip never saw a meaningful “peace dividend” and there has never been a good prospect that peace and sovereignty alone could feed its people. Gaza has no natural resources and no significant internal industrial activity or exports barring souvenir production, a few showpiece factories, and citrus fruits—many of which are grown by

Israelis.9 In fact, Gaza’s economy has been historically highly dependent on Israel. Gaza provided the majority of the roughly 50,000 Palestinian workers who worked in Israel during 1994, and over 43 percent of all Gazan employment came from Israel during the peak employment year of 1992.10 Remittances accounted for roughly 40 percent of Gaza’s GNP.11 Israel has accounted for about 90 percent of Gaza’s external trade. The Oslo Accords did nothing to solve the employment problems of Gaza’s young Palestinian population. Total Palestinian unemployment rose by as much as 10 percent per year during the mid-1990s and unemployment and disguised unemployment in Gaza varied from 35 to 40 percent during 1995-1999.12 The official figures ranged from 20 to 30 percent, but only since nearly 80 percent of the Palestinian Authority’s expenditures went to wages for civil servants and security forces.13 Unemployment was particularly high among young Gazans, who accounted for over half of the total of the unemployed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 14 Gaza’s unemployment problems are certain to remain critical unless there is heavy outside investment and/or Gaza can develop close economic ties to Israel. The Gaza Strip is an enclave that requires a high volume of peacetime traffic across its borders for the Gazan economy to function. Israeli control of access to Gaza has been a powerful economic weapon ever since 1967, and it has not always been used wisely or with significant regard for the human costs of Israeli action. Approximately 30,000 Palestinian workers with work permits, and 500 trucks, still crossed the border daily before violence began in September 2000.15 This regularly took place at known checkpoints, however, it was still possible to smuggle in some small arms, explosives, and manportable weapons through other areas. Gazan Palestinian employment in Israel dropped sharply after 1992, due largely to Israeli actions to halt terrorism. Palestinian employment in Israel was only about one quarter of its peak level in mid-1995, and remittances accounted for only about 20 percent of Palestinian GNP. Changes in Israeli policy in 1998 permitted Palestinians to find new jobs in Israel and helped contribute to a decrease in unemployment. Nevertheless, the GNP per capita remained at only $1,100. 16 Since the end of the peace process, there has been a long and brutal history of combat in Gaza. The trends in the fighting are detailed in the chronology below:

2000 • March 18: Palestinians fire a mortar shell at an Israeli army base near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, lightly injuring one soldier. The mortar attack marks the first time Palestinian insurgents in Gaza have fired at Israeli targets located within Israel's borders. Three mortar bombs are fired at the Israel Defense Force base.

• September 27: An Israeli soldier is killed by a roadside bomb in Palestinian-ruled Gaza

• September 30: Major clashes erupt in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Fatah Hawks, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad supporters, as well as some Palestinian Authority security personnel, join in mass violence and stone throwing against the IDF. Fourteen Palestinians killed by Israeli fire, including 12-year-old Mohammed Aldura, whose death is broadcast around the world (the IDF would first contend that his death was accidental, and later would revise its position claiming that Palestinians may have shot Mohammed Aldura for sympathy purposes). Scattered sniping by Palestinians

• October 6: Israel seals West Bank and Gaza Strip as the Palestinians declare a ‘Day of Rage.’ Israeli troops seize a Jerusalem shrine after the Palestinians raise their flag. One killed in clash with police outside the shrine, nine die in West Bank and Gaza

• October 8: Israeli forces demolish two apartment buildings and a factory building in Gaza used by Palestinian gunmen. Jewish settler Hillel Lieberman is found dead in a cave near a West Bank highway. Two Palestinians and one Israeli Arab killed.

• October 23: Israeli army spokesman says a Palestinian shooting attack on an Israeli army position in the southern Gaza Strip was ``massive.'' The Israelis respond with small arms and anti-tank rockets.

• October 24: Three Palestinian teenagers were killed in fighting in the West Bank and Gaza.

• October 26: The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims credit for a suicide bombing of an Israeli Army post in Gaza killing the bomber and wounding an Israeli soldier. It was carried out on the fifth anniversary of the assignation of the group’s leader, Fathi Shiqaqi, although the PIJ claimed it was only a coincidence.

• October 29: Five Palestinians are killed in on-going fighting. Israel deploys armor to the Gaza Strip. Fatah urges the Palestinian people to “continue and escalate the Intifada.”

• October 31: Six Palestinians die in fresh fighting in Gaza. Palestinian forces from al-Fatah and Tanzim make use of anti-tank weapons for the first time. Israel forces responded with heavy machine gun fire and by bulldozing the al-Fatah outpost with military bulldozers

• November 7: One Palestinian died when a fishing boat exploded near an Israeli patrol boat off the Gaza Strip near the Egyptian-Israeli border in what IDF sources called a fumbled suicide bombing. There were no Israeli causalities.

• November 13: Four Palestinians, including the nephew of Mohammed Dahlan, the head of Preventative Security, and four Israelis die, including two female civilians. Palestinian gunmen are increasingly targeting settlers and soldiers in ambushes, moving towards a possible Lebanonization of the conflict. Israel once again shuts down non-emergency access to and from the West Bank and Gaza.

• November 20: A roadside bomb in Gaza is detonated next to a school bus killing two adults and wounding five children. Omar Al-Mukhtar, the military wing of the Syrian-based Fatah Uprising

claimed responsibility. Israel retaliates by launching numerous missile strikes against Fatah buildings in the West Bank and Gaza marking the heaviest bombardment to date.

• November 23: An Israeli-Palestinian liaison office is hit by a mortar shell killing an Israeli officer. This almost immediately results in Israel ordering all Palestinian police and security officers to leave all liaison offices throughout the West Bank and Gaza.

• December 13: Claiming that they were pursuing a shooting suspect, IDF forces cross into a Palestinian held sector of the Gaza Strip. They crossed only about 100 meters into Area A.

2001 • April 2: Mohammed Abdel Al, a member of Islamic Jihad, is killed when Israeli helicopters fire rockets on his car in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.

• April 6: Israeli helicopters fire rockets at Palestinian police installations north of Gaza City, damaging a two-story headquarters building and two other structures. Israel attacks after three Hamas mortar shells fired from Gaza landed near Netiv Haasara, an Israeli village next to Gaza.

• April 10: Hamas continues to fire mortar rounds at Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and inside Israel. The shellings do not result in any casualties. Israel responds by firing antitank missiles at Palestinian police posts in Gaza. The attack on one target, a Palestinian naval post, kills a lieutenant and wounds 7 police officers; the second strike, on a police headquarters in a refugee camp, wounds 10. In contrast to recent nighttime raids, these are daylight attacks without warning on occupied buildings.

• April 11: Israelis in tanks and bulldozers enter a densely populated Gaza refugee camp in Khan Younis before dawn and destroy buildings suspected of serving as launching pads for mortar attacks. The raid is followed by a prolonged ground battle as hundreds of armed Palestinians summoned by mosque loudspeakers to defend the camp against an “Israeli invasion” rush into the streets. Two Palestinians are killed and two dozen wounded; no Israelis are killed. The assault on the refugee camp represents the largest and deepest Israeli ground attack into Palestinian-ruled territory since the current round of violence erupted in September.

• April 16: The Israeli military briefly seizes Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza Strip, an area under full Palestinian control, and fires at posts of Force-17. One member of the unit dies from wounds days later.

• April 17: IDF forces for the first time reoccupy territory in the Gaza Strip ceded to the Palestinian Authority under the 1993 Oslo Agreements, before withdrawing under US pressure.

• April 21: Israeli tanks roll into the Palestinian-controlled town of Rafah and level a border police post before quickly pulling out. There are no reported injuries

• April 25 - Three Fatah members are killed in an unexplained explosion in the southern Gaza Strip town of Rafah.

• April 30: The IDF kills two Hamas militants with a car bomb in Gaza City.

• May 2: Israeli Army bulldozers backed by tanks enter a Palestinian refugee camp and demolish several homes. One teenager is killed and 14 other Palestinians are wounded, United Nations and Palestinian officials said.

• May 6: Israeli soldiers enter Palestinian-controlled territory for several hours in what the IDF term an effort to silence shooting at its positions. Israeli tank shells and gunfire kill a Palestinian fighter, Muhammad Abayat, 45, and wound 20 people, including a 5-year-old boy.

• May 18: Israel retaliates by sending F-16 fighter jets against security buildings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time since the 1967 war.

• May 13: Israeli helicopter gunships fire at Palestinian security targets across the Gaza Strip and naval boats strike at least eight Palestinian armored personnel carriers with rockets.

• May 25: A Hamas member explodes his truck outside an Israeli army post in the Gaza Strip, killing himself; no one else was injured.

• June 22: Suicide bombing in the Gaza Strip kills two Israeli soldiers.

• August 25: At a Gaza Strip Israeli army post, members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine breach security and kill three Israeli soldiers. Seven other Israeli soldiers are wounded, and two of the DFLP members are shot dead.

• August 26: Israeli F-16s and F-17s destroy security installations in the West Bank and Gaza.

• October 3: Israel responds by demolishing 7 Palestinian police posts in the Gaza Strip - nearby the Jewish settlement two gunmen had attacked the night before.

• November 15: In Gaza, Israeli troops, tanks, and bulldozers enter the Khan Younis refugee camp. The Palestine Red Crescent Society reports one dead and 13 wounded. According to the IDF, the structures destroyed were suspected firing bases for mortars aimed at settlements and IDF posts in Gush Katif.

• December 3: In Gaza City, the IDF sends in helicopter gunships and jets to hit Palestinian Authority targets near Arafat’s headquarters, including two of his three helicopters. The mission effectively confines Arafat to Ramallah.

2002

• February 10: From the Gaza Strip, Palestinians fire homemade Qassam-2 rockets into the Negev Desert.

• February 11-13: In response to Hamas rocket attacks, Israel bombs PA security compounds in Gaza City. Searching for the manufacturing and launching sites of the rockets, the IDF initiates a military incursion into Gaza.

• February 15: Palestinian mines blow up an Israeli tank. Three crewmembers are killed in the explosion. This is the first time that one of Israel’s highly sophisticated tanks is destroyed. Over the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza, Israeli jets attack a PA police compound.

• February 20: Israel initiates an attack on buildings belonging to the PA. Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah and the PA compound in Gaza City are attacked. Sixteen Palestinians are killed.

• March 10: The IDF raids Arafat’s compound in Gaza City, completely destroying the leader’s headquarters.

• June 19: In Gaza, in Khan Younis and in the Jabaliya refugee camp, Israeli helicopters attack weapons’ manufacturing plants.

• July 22: An Israeli jet attack on a residential area of Gaza City kills the Hamas military leader Salah Shehadeh and 14 other people, including nine children

• September 26: Israeli helicopter gunships fire rockets at two cars in a crowded street in Gaza City, killing at least two members of Hamas and wounding 25 civilians. The target was Mohammmed Deif, one of Hamas’ main bombmakers.

• October 7: Israeli tanks raid Gaza Strip and ten die when an Israeli helicopter fires on a Palestinian crowd

2003 • January 5: In response to the double-suicide attack, Israeli Air Force combat helicopters attack a weapons producing workshop in Gaza City. • January 26: Israeli troops conduct the largest raid on Gaza since Sharon came to office in 2001. Twelve Palestinians are killed and eight are seriously injured

• April 8: An Israeli missile blows up a car in Gaza City, killing Hamas commander Saed Arabeed and six other people, including Hamas operative Ashraf Halaby. A second missile wounds at least 50 bystanders

• April 19: At least five Palestinians are killed and 35 are wounded when Israeli troops push into the Rafah refugee camp. Clashes in Nablus leave Associated Press Television cameraman Nazeh Arwazeh dead and 17 others wounded

• May 18: Nineteen-year-old Hamas operative strapped explosives to the back of his bicycle and detonated them near an Israeli army jeep in the Gaza Strip, killing himself and injuring three soldiers.

• May 21: In an attempt to deprive militants of cover, Israeli troops demolish 15 houses and uproot trees in the Gaza town of Beit Hanoun.

• June 10: Israeli helicopter gunships strike the car of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi in Gaza City, injuring him and killing another person. Two-dozen bystanders are wounded.

• June 29: Israeli troops withdraw from Beit Hanoun and remove two roadblocks along the main north-south road in Gaza, transferring security responsibility to the Palestinian Authority. • August 21: IDF helicopters fire 5 missiles at the car of Ismail Abu Shanab, a senior Hamas political leader and spokesman, killing him and 2 bodyguards and wounding 19 bystanders. Both Islamic Jihad and Hamas officially declare an end to the cease-fire. • August 26: An Israeli helicopter strike in Gaza City kills a Palestinian bystander and wounds its target, Hamas member Khalid Massud, along with 25 other bystanders. Massud dies of his injuries on September 6. • August 28: An Israeli missile strike in southern Gaza kills wanted Hamas activist Hamdi Kalakh and injures three others. • September 1: Missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter kill Hamas member Khadir al-Husary and fatally wound a bystander. 25 others, including 3 Hamas militants, were also wounded. • September 10: Israeli warplanes drop a bomb on a Senior Hamas leader’s home in Gaza City killing his son and bodyguard, and wounding him and 24 others. • October 15: An unidentified group of Palestinian militants detonate a roadside bomb alongside a US embassy convoy as it was passing through the Erez area, killing 3 US security officers and wounding one US diplomat.

• October 20: Israeli helicopters and warplanes launch 3 air strikes at neighborhoods in Gaza. Two Hamas members and a bystander are killed, 23 other Palestinians on the street were wounded. The missiles destroyed what the IDF deemed a Hamas rocket factory.

• November 17: The Israeli security forces enter a Palestinian refugee camp in the southern Gaza Strip and kill one Palestinian. They arrested a man whom the army held responsible for digging tunnels for smuggling with Egypt.

2004 • January 14: A Palestinian woman blew herself up at the crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Israel. She killed three Israeli soldiers and a private guard.

• January 21: Israeli Forces operating at the southern Gaza Strip shot a Palestinian woman and wounded two of her family members. The Israeli officials claimed that they were not aware of any civilian casualties.

• January 30: Israeli forces killed two Palestinians suspected of preparing an attack in one of the Israeli settlements in Gaza.

• February 11: Israeli troops killed 13 Palestinians in Gaza and claimed that raids aimed to hunt down the militants behind attacks on numerous Jewish settlements.

• February 12: Israeli forces killed 15 Palestinians in two raids in Gaza. • March 3: Israeli helicopters fire on a car containing three Hamas militants on a coastal road southwest of Gaza city, killing all inside. • March 6: Two Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade militants, a member of Hamas and an Islamic Jihad member use vehicles disguised as IDF jeeps to conduct a joint attack on the Palestinian Security Forces and IDF posts at the Erez crossing. Two Palestinian security force officers are killed and 19 wounded in the attack. • March 19: An IDF tank is disabled and four soldiers traveling inside are injured when a roadside bomb planted by Hamas detonates along side it near Mughraqa. In response, the IDF demolishes 5 Palestinian homes in Mughraqa. • March 22: Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, is killed in an IAF helicopter strike as he leaves a mosque in Gaza City. • April 17: Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, is killed in an IAF helicopter missile strike. • April 28: Four IDF soldiers are wounded when a Hamas militant detonates an explosive laden jeep disguised as an Israeli civilian vehicle outside of the Kefar Daron settlement in Gaza. • May 2: An Islamic Jihad member and an Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade member kill a Jewish settler and her four children and wound two IDF soldiers traveling in the car behind them. In retaliation, the IDF raids the nearby Palestinian town of Wadi al-Salqa, bulldozing 15 homes. • May 11: The IDF conducts a major raid on the Gaza City neighborhood of Zeitoun to search for and destroy weapons workshops. During the operation, a large bomb detonates under an IDF APC, killing 6 soldiers riding inside. Various Palestinian militant groups seize and display body parts of the dead IDF soldiers. • May 12: A rocket-propelled grenade fired by Palestinian guerrillas hits an IDF APC loaded with demolition explosives during a search for cross-border arms smuggling tunnels along an IDF patrolled corridor between Egypt and the Gaza strip. 5 Israeli soldiers are killed in the attack.17

• May 13: In retaliation for the 5/11 and 5/12 attacks on IDF APCs, an IAF helicopter fires missiles at two groups of armed Palestinian militants in Rafah refugee camp, killing 11; and in Zeitoun, the IDF raises dozens of Palestinian homes containing arms and/or arms manufacturing materials.18 • May 17-25: The IDF conducts Operation Rainbow in and around Rafah, with the primary objective of uncovering and dealing with the local terrorist and weapons smuggling infrastructure.19 • June 27: Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades militants remotely detonate 150 kilograms of explosives in a tunnel they dug under an IDF outpost at the Gush Katif junction in the Gaza Strip, killing one IDF soldier and injuring 5..20 • June 28: Two Israeli civilians are killed and one seriously wounded in a Qassam rocket attack on Sderot carried out from the northern Gaza Strip by members of Hamas.21 • June 29: In response to the previous day’s rocket attacks, the IDF begins a major open-ended deployment in the northern Gaza Strip, creating a buffer “security zone” between the Erez border crossing and the outskirts of Gaza city.22 • July 8: IDF Colonel Yossi Turjeman, the officer in charge of implementing Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan, and Colonel Pinhas Zuaretz, the commander of IDF forces in southern Gaza, are wounded when a roadside bomb planted by Islamic Jihad members explodes alongside their vehicle near the Jewish settlement of Morag in southern Gaza.23 • July 22: Three Islamic Jihad members are killed when an IAF helicopter fires a missile at their car in the Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City. Israeli security sources confirm that the strike's target was Hazam Rahim, who had planned to carry out an attack in Israel in the coming days.24 • September 6: Fifteen Hamas members are killed when IAF aircraft bomb a paramilitary training facility near Jebalya in Gaza.25 • September 23: Palestinian gunmen ambush an IDF outpost near the southern Gaza settlement of Morag, killing three IDF soldiers and critically wounding a fourth. The three Palestinian militants are also killed in the ensuing gun battle. An anonymous caller tells the Associated Press that the attack was carried out by a joint-collaboration of Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committee and Ahmed Abu El-Rish Brigades militants.26 • September 24: An Israeli woman is killed and another is lightly wounded when four mortar shells are fired at the Neveh Dekalim settlement, part of the Gush Katif bloc in the southern Gaza Strip. Hamas claims responsibility for the shelling. It is the first time that any of the mortar attacks on Gaza settlements has been fatal.27 • September 29: A Palestinian rocket lands in an alley way in Sderot killing two young Israeli children. Hamas claims it carried out the attack in response to recent IDF incursions into the northern Gaza Strip.28 • October 1: The IDF launches “Days of Penitence”, a large-scale and prolonged operation aimed at pushing Qassam rocket launching sites out of the range of Sderot.29 • October 21: Adnan al-Ghoul, Hamas’ no. 2 man, and his deputy Imad Abbas, are killed in their car as a result of an Israeli airstrike on Gaza City; four bystanders are wounded. Al-Ghoul was responsible for making Qassams and other rockets and for manufacturing the group’s most powerful explosives.30

From the start, this fighting has had a devastating impact on the Palestinian economy. The broader costs of the war are summarized in Chapter XI, but they have been particularly high in Gaza. The International Monetary Fund indicates that before

September 2000, 146,000 Palestinians were working in Israel and its settlements. In fact, it amounted to nearly 22 % of total Palestinian employment. Moreover, in 1999, labor income from Israel accounted for about 20 percent of Palestinian GDP.31 Early Israeli prevention of Palestinian movement of goods and people disrupted trade and agriculture, and roughly 120,000 Palestinian employees have been unable to get to work in Israel. By early November 2000, over $3.4 million a day was being lost in remittances from Palestinians working in Israel, while in trade, over $6 million a day had been lost from tax receipts and customs fees. The World Bank estimated a cut in gross national income of $210 million from an annual $6.1 billion.32 By late March 2001, the crisis was believed to have halved Palestinian incomes and tripled the unemployment rate.33 In an October-December 2002 study, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) estimated that unemployment based on a “relaxed” definition was 35.1% in the West Bank and 40.5% in Gaza. Based on International Labor Organization (ILO) standards, unemployment was believed to be at 27% in the West Bank and 28% in Gaza.34 The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) director Hassan Abu Libdeh discusses the ‘relaxed’ standards in the following way: “…since the Palestinian who loses his job is not compensated in any shape or form and is not able to seek employment through government or any assistance…then the relaxed figure is calculated taking these matters into consideration. The International Labor Organization…assumes that employment and therefore its figure is usually less.”35 A study conducted by the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics in mid-April 2001 showed that 64 percent of the roughly 3 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank had fallen into poverty, compared to 23 percent before the outbreak of the violence in September 2000. Poverty was defined by the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics’ study as earning a monthly income less than 1,800 NIS (US$434) for a household of two adults and four children.36 On March 5, 2003, the World Bank reported that 60% of the West Bank and Gaza population were living under US$2 a day. According to these statistics, the poor have tripled from 637,000 in September 2000 to nearly 2 million in March 2003.37 Violence has also reduced the income of the Palestinian Authority. According to Assistant Deputy Finance Minister Muhamad Jaradeh, the PA’s income dropped from

$90 million a month before the Israeli-Palestinian War to $20 million a month by early May 2001.38 According to the World Press Online, as of December 2002, the PA was “… receiving US$10 million a month in taxes, putting it at a deficit of US$75-80 million.”39 Development plans to create a port and a transit route between Gaza and the West Bank were halted during the war. Israel not only stepped up its clearance procedures, searches and other security activity to help combat terrorism, but also as a way of putting political pressure on the Palestinian Authority. As a result, there have been major losses of agricultural investment and infrastructure, and local savings seem nearly exhausted. Gaza’s population has limited skills and not a great deal of capital. Israeli Efforts to Improve the Containment and Security of the Gaza Strip The containment of Gaza has posed far fewer challenges to the IDF than in the West Bank. The IDF has steadily improved its barrier and perimeter defenses regarding Gaza. The Israeli-controlled areas and settlements compose approximately 40 percent of Gaza’s land. Regardless of what happens within the Gaza Strip, the IDF has the military strength to quickly seal it off from the rest of Israel, and control its coasts and borders, The IDF also showed early in the war that it could do much to increase the security of the Israeli settlers within Gaza, as well as the necessary lines of communication, although full protection could never be guaranteed. In addition, the IDF has steadily fortified strong points, cleared fields of fire, and secured key roads. These measures have never been a perfect answer to sniper attacks, mortar shell firings, and terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, all of which remain extremely difficult to defend against, however they have been reasonably effective. Israel began using more sophisticated security procedures to minimize some of the problems and delays during the peace process long before the fighting began in September 2000. More advanced technology was available to help handle increased volumes of traffic with equal or greater speed and equal or improved security. These tools included UAVs, unattended ground sensors, ground-based radars, and night vision and surveillance equipment. The war has since shown that no mix of technology and improved security of procedures can wholly secure Gaza in the sense of preventing all

arms smuggling and infiltration; however there are a wide range of technical measures that can greatly improve security without extensive physical searches and delays. The previous chronology has shown that IDF tactics in Gaza have involved a steady increase in both levels of force and willingness to operate in Palestinian territory. These shifts became evident only one month after the war began. In late September 2000, the IDF was frequently using rubber bullets to help maintain aggressive crowds in Gaza. By the end of October, helicopter-assisted targeted assassinations were employed with the intention of thwarting suicide attacks. And once Ariel Sharon took office on March 7, 2001, these tactics became more widely used as the frequency of suicide attacks increased. Prime Minister Sharon subsequently expanded the use of weaponry available to the IDF to help combat terror. By late March 2001, the IDF began to use antitank missiles and F-16 fighter aircrafts. The use of checkpoints and roadblocks has also steadily increased since the war began. It has been the IDF’s intent to use them to reduce movement into and out of the Gaza Strip in order to prevent more suicide attacks. As of February 2002, the number of checkpoints within the territories (Gaza and the West Bank) was over 100. Arms Smuggling Into Gaza and the Rafah tunnels

It has historically been more difficult for the IDF to maintain security along the Gazan-Egyptian border and preventing the infiltration of weaponry into Gaza than it has been in preserving security within the Gaza Strip. Inhibiting the smuggling of weapons into Gaza is one of the most difficult problems the IDF has faced during this war. Despite repeated IDF incursions particularly since September 2000, according to Israeli sources, there are a substantial number of unauthorized arms in Gaza, and a considerable amount of military explosives.40 Most sources concur that the Palestinian Authority security forces have stockpiles of light anti-armor weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, rocket launchers, anti- tank missiles, and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles—all of which are forbidden under the Oslo Accord. Moreover, Hamas and PIJ cadres are presumed to have significant numbers of small arms, automatic weapons, and explosives, while Fatah and the Tanzim are thought to possess thousands of small arms.41 Some such groups have also

demonstrated their willingness to engage IDF forces with small arms fire and anti-tank weapons. As discussed in Chapter XII, there have been numerous discoveries of tunnels built along the Gazan-Egyptian border presumably used for arms smuggling. The opening of both an airport and seaport in Gaza in 1998 created further potential opportunities for smuggling. As a result, Israel closed the airport in 2001 in order to help prevent the transferring of weapons in addition to maintaining an increased presence in the area to help secure the waters off Gaza’s coast. The Israeli Navy has managed to intercept a number of weapon shipments to Gaza. For example, on 7 May 2001 off the coast of Haifa, the Israeli Navy intercepted a fishing boat that had been dispatched by Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP which contained missiles, mortars, grenades, and katyusha rockets. Israeli security officials believed that the boat had been on its fourth such mission before it was eventually seized. Following the Israeli interception of that boat, Ahmed Jibril stated that, “it wasn’t the first time that we sent arms and it won’t be the last time. We will send arms to anyone who takes part in the campaign (against Israel) no matter who it is.”42 The construction of tunnels in Rafah began in 1982. They were initially used for smuggling cigarettes, car components, electronic goods, cloth, foreign currency, gold, narcotics, people (primarily prostitutes), and weapons. According to the IDF, since the Palestinian Authority was given security responsibility for the area in 1994, (with the exception of a narrow corridor along the Gazan-Egyptian border, called the “Philadelphi Route”) the excavation of tunnels has accelerated and militant organizations such as Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have taken advantage of relaxed PA controls to increase the smuggling of weapons, making the tunnels their primary source of supply.43 While the IDF has publicly acknowledged that Palestinian security officials acted in a limited fashion against tunnel construction prior September 2000, they claim that the PA still “encouraged, financed, and supported smuggling tunnels in order to maintain the ability to smuggle weapons for their security apparatuses and control generated revenues.”44

Since September 2000, the border has become a significant issue in the Israeli- Palestinian War. According to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), since the start of the war, approximately 90 tunnels have been uncovered and destroyed by the IDF: 34 in 2002 and over 40 of them in 2003. Also according to Israel’s MFA, during such operations, the IDF discovered dozens of RPG rockets and launchers, hundreds of kilograms of explosives, hundreds of rifles (mainly AK-47s), tens of thousands of bullets and other ammunition, and thousands of cartridges.45 The danger of the tunnels, however, goes beyond weapons smuggling; tunnels packed with explosives have become traps underneath the Israeli military posts along the Egyptian border. Although as of November 2004 it had not become a significant threat, a full withdrawal from Gaza could have major implications for these border outposts. Construction of the Tunnels The process of constructing the tunnels is complex. Professional smugglers operating the tunnels first contact Egyptian weapons dealers and locate a counterpart in the Palestinian society seeking such weapons. The smugglers then must find individuals willing to offer their properties as cover for the tunnels. Finally, a special engineer is hired to direct the digging and to ensure that the tunnel has the necessary support to prevent it from collapsing.46 According to the IDF, the duration of the excavation depending on many conditions such as the number of workers digging, the type of equipment used, and the depth, length and width of the projected tunnel. 47 It can take anywhere from two weeks to two months to build a tunnel. Two of the main problems that Israelis have faced when attempting to counter the construction of such tunnels are the economic incentive which they provide as well as the location of such passageways, which take the battle right into civilian areas. The harsh economic conditions in Rafah, and the Gaza Strip in general, make the digging of tunnels and the smuggling of goods (particularly weapons) an appealing source of income for many families. The ways in which such families can help these efforts include covering the tunnels’ entrances with thin layers of cement, furniture, paneling, rags, sand, and wood, building “double walls” to conceal the rooms, and digging tunnels under sewage lids, showers, and even cabinets.48

Those who agree to have the tunnels built inside their properties are offered $1000 per month and a percentage of the sales of smuggled goods. The economic benefits of which are inflated due to the exorbitant merchandise costs in Gaza For example, while an AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle costs $320 in Egypt, in Gaza it is sold for $1000; even more profitable are the bullets, which cost $.08 in Egypt, but are sold in Gaza for $3.49 According to the IDF, the profitability of such enterprises and Palestinian Authority promises to rebuild their house in nearby Tel-Sultan help the Palestinians that contribute to this effort overcome their fears of arrest or execution.50 As a result, the IDF has had to conduct operations in civilian areas, and particularly deep into civilian houses, to uncover and destroy such tunnels. These actions have received significant international dissent. However, for the most part, Israelis have remained optimistic about such endeavors due to missions like Operation Rainbow and newfound successful cooperation with Egyptian border authorities. Operation Rainbow was one of the largest IDF operations since the start of the current conflict. Its primary objectives were the uncovering and dismantling of the local terrorist and weapons smuggling infrastructure in and around the city of Rafah, and the securing of the neighborhoods along the Philadelphi road, a route whose military outposts have been the target of underground explosions. The operation took place from 17-25 May 2004. Although Israeli, Palestinian, and UN officials disagree over the exact figures, there is a general consensus that over 50 Palestinians (a majority of them supposed members of militant groups) died and over 50 buildings were destroyed.51 According to the IDF, three smuggling tunnels were discovered and destroyed during the operation. 52 In addition to IDF efforts, Egyptian preventive activities have also helped contribute to efforts to prevent smuggling. Based on IDF reports, in 2003 Egyptian authorities discovered 30 tunnel entrances while increasing its patrolling along the border, its ambushing of known routes, and its arrests of smugglers.53 These efforts are projected to increase even further as a result of the bombings that took place at the Hilton Hotel in Taba on 7 October 2004. Another significant factor that has helped inhibit the construction of tunnels is the increasing protests to tunnel building by local Palestinians. Such protests have been

integral to undermining general support for the tunnels and will likely grow in coming years. The growing opposition among Palestinians living in Gaza to the tunnel digging and weapons smuggling in Rafah stems in part from the perception that few are receiving the economic benefits of the tunnels while the majority is paying the price of the Israeli efforts to dismantle such infrastructure. The escalated protests have ranged from staged demonstrations outside public buildings and the PA’s Police and Preventive Security Headquarters, to the encouragement of the kidnapping PA officers to protest the “negligence and lack of attention,” to the torching of a house where a tunnel entrance was found.54 As of November 2004, these complaints have only been slightly addressed by the Palestinian Authority—the PA has undertaken few operations to date in order to expose and seal tunnels and to arrest a number of smugglers. Fighting Within Gaza

The chronology of the fighting shows that the Palestinian Authority and other Palestinian groups have not been able to prevent the IDF from entering Gaza and operating with considerable freedom. The IDF has shown that it can resecure most Palestinian areas in Gaza in a mere matter of days. As yet, there are few signs that IDF operations will eventually lead to Gazans regrouping, reorganizing, and shifting to the kind of serious low-level fighting that has taken place in Lebanon, Ulster, and Iraq. Nevertheless, true street-by-street fighting in Gaza is a worst case scenario for the IDF, and one it seeks to avoid by containing the Palestinian areas in Gaza, rather than occupying them. IDF studies and exercises show that any prolonged form of low-level urban warfare in Gaza could become bloody, difficult, and lead to significant casualties, even though the Palestinian Authority forces have not yet shown they have organized effectively to fight this type of conflict. The IDF might also face growing problems if the Palestinians adapted or made better use of hit and run tactics, ambushes, booby traps, and the use of rocket launchers. Fighting the urbanized equivalent of the Hizbollah in a war of attrition confronts the IDF with major difficulties since its technical advantages would often provide little tactical superiority and the Palestinians could choose the time and place of their attacks.

Intelligence is an important issue. The IDF lost some of its former intelligence network and access to informants in Gaza and the West Bank during the peace process. The IDF did take steps to compensate for this once the war began. In the first three months after September 2000, Israel stepped up its intelligence war against the Palestinians by giving funding priority to a Field Intelligence Corps established in early 2000. According to some IDF commanders, the new Corps produced “impressive results” and was “vital in identifying targets for Israeli troops as well as providing alerts of Palestinian attacks.” The Corps has used UAVs, radar, reconnaissance outposts and helicopters to acquire information, which is then fed to the IDF’s Ground Forces Command and subsequently to commanders in the field.55 Nevertheless, the IDF and the Israeli General Security Services (GSS), or Shin Bet, face significant limits on their intelligence on Palestinian activities in Gaza.56 UAVs sensors, radars and other devices may help, but they are not a substitute for human intelligence. They also cannot eliminate the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage. Targets do not remain fixed in war. Threats change location, and so do innocent civilians. As a result, strikes and raids can fail and/or have high costs in terms of media coverage and world opinion, while even successes can breed more resentment and counter violence than they are worth. Precision weapons do not mean precision tactics or precision consequences. An Emergency Evacuation of the Settlements

The fighting has not shown to date that Israel will ever have to carry out an emergency evacuation of its settlers, and a planned Israeli withdrawal now seems far more likely, but there are several possible evacuation routes that the IDF could use for Israeli settlers. The most desirable would be to evacuate the settlers directly into Israel. However, due to the close quarters created by the urban environment other routes remain a possibility. Another route moves directly along the Israeli-Egyptian border, rather than through the heart of Gaza like more traditional evacuation routes. Israel might also use a combination of air and naval forces to rapidly extract the population in the event of a very sudden and dangerous escalation.57

The settlement of Netzarim, south of Gaza City, for example was cut off by land for two weeks and visitors, unfortunate enough to be caught in the 400-person settlement, had to be evacuated by helicopter. However, the settlers themselves show little intention of leaving. They have reacted by erecting electrical warning fences, paving patrol roads around the settlement, improving the observation and warning system and fortifying outposts with new roofs to prevent damage from incendiary weapons.58 Israeli Withdrawal from the Settlements in Gaza

The real issue is not whether Israel can dominate Gaza, but rather whether it should. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proposed a near complete withdrawal from Gaza in 2004, it was strongly supported by most IDF commanders and a majority of the Israelis. , There are also good military reasons for such an action. One key issue for Israel is whether the game in Gaza is worth the effort. Israel needs to ensure that Gaza cannot become a sanctuary for a Palestinian military build-up, terrorists, or weapons that could reach Israel. However, the Israeli settlements in Gaza have only about 8,000 residents. They do not help in this security mission, have no strategic value, and are a significant expense. Even a number of normally “hawkish” Israeli military experts are convinced that securing the remaining Israeli presence in Gaza has proved to be a costly and needless source of provocation. The defense of the small, scattered settlements in Gaza requires at least one soldier to be stationed for every two settlers. The Palestinians seem certain to gradually acquire significant numbers of long-range rocket launchers, mortars, and anti-tank guided weapons. Some IDF experts privately believe that Israel should fully withdraw from Gaza, while others believe that at least a temporary evacuation might be necessary. Despite its military success, the IDF’s operations in Gaza impose serious financial and manpower costs. The IDF has had to expand its presence to create a series of complex security zones. At the same time, Israel has had to enforce a wide range of security measures to defeat violent elements within the Palestinian population in Gaza while pacifying the rest. It would probably also have to make further improvements to the security of key lines of communication, and almost completely substitute other workers

for the Palestinians. The other side of this issue is Israel’s control over electricity and water and ability to seal off the Gazan economy. All of these factors help explain why Ariel Sharon declared in January 2004 his government’s intent to remove all 21 Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip. This was part of a disengagement plan which he initially hinted at during a December 18, 2003 speech at a Herzliya anti-terrorism conference. He claimed that “…he is working on the assumption that in the future there will be no Jews in Gaza.” 59 Reactions to this proposal were varied among Palestinians. Hamas, for example, claimed that the Israeli Prime Minister’s announcement was proof that it was winning the struggle, and thereby reason for continuing its violent resistance. The majority of Palestinian groups, however, initially seemed to feel differently. A leading Palestinian cabinet member, Saeb Erekat stated that “…usually when the Israeli government speaks about evacuation of settlements, it aims only at public relations…If Israel wants to leave Gaza, no Palestinian will stand in its way.”60 However, in October 2004, Hassan Abu Libdeh, Chief of Staff to Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei stated that they “welcome any Israeli withdrawal from any Palestinian land,” but that such effort needs to be part of “a resumption in the peace process and implementation of President Bush’s vision of a Palestinian state alongside an Israeli state.”61 On May 2, 2004, Likud party members (193,000 people in total) voted overwhelmingly against a non-binding referendum regarding this unilateral disengagement plan—60% to 40%. According to a poll conducted by Midgam Research Center on April 22-23, 2004, it appeared that the main reason why the referendum did not receive high support was likely because the majority of respondents did not believe that the plan would improve security. In fact, only 23% strongly agreed that the plan would improve security, while 21% somewhat agreed, 13% somewhat disagreed and 40% strongly disagreed. In addition, 42% strongly agreed that the plan was a reward for terrorism while 12% somewhat agreed, 16% somewhat disagreed, and 28% strongly disagreed. 62 Since the plan did not garner significant approval, it was revised. As discussed in Chapter X, the new plan called for the removal of the same 21 Israeli towns, villages, and

military positions in the Gaza Strip, in addition to 4 additional settlements and security installations in the northern West Bank, but this time in “stages,” and after all accompanying legislation had been drafted.63 In regards to Gaza, the general outline of the plan stated that “upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated.”64 The revised Disengagement Plan differed from the original in two main areas. The first one is that the plan was to be carried out in stages instead of evacuating all settlements at once. Under the revised “gradual” plan, the first stage would consist of the evacuation of the Gaza settlements of Morag, Netzarim and Kfar Darom; followed by Kadim, Ganim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh in the northern West Bank; and then the rest of the Gush Katif settlements would follow. The fourth and final stage would consist of the evacuation of the final three settlements in northern Gaza, Nissanit, Elei Sinai, and Dugit.65 The second difference is that under the revised plan “the homes of residents and sensitive structures, including synagogues, will not remain. Israel will strive to transfer other installations, including industrial, commercial, and agricultural installations, to an international third party, which will use them for the good of the Palestinian population that is not engaged in terrorism.” 66 In the initial plan, Israel intended to transfer the settlements with their entire infrastructure to an international body. However, after hearing criticism that the homes would be used by terrorists and that synagogues would be desecrated, as happened when Joseph’s Tomb was transferred to Palestinian control during Oslo, Prime Minister Sharon opted to leave in place only the “water, electricity, and sewerage infrastructure.” 67 The new “staged” version of the plan gained Cabinet approval on June 6, 2004, in a 14-7 vote, despite continued difference of opinion among many members of the Likud party. Many “rebel” Likud members vied that not only would the plan not be effective in combating terrorism, it would be a victory for Palestinian terrorist and extremist groups by making “concessions” before a final peace settlement is achieved. This may be one stance that such Likudniks and many Islamic Jihad and Hamas members could agree on.

After the revised plan was approved by the Cabinet, a Disengagement Plan Steering Committee was established and met for the first time on June 9. At the meeting, the Committee, chaired by National Security Council Chairman Giora Eiland and composed of various Cabinet members and senior officials, discussed one of the most urgent issues at hand—the possibilities regarding compensation payments and alternative settlement. One possibility is to build new settlements in the western portion of the Negev near the Gaza Strip.68 Opposition to the Israeli withdrawal continued. Soon after the Israeli Cabinet approved the revised plan, a speaker for Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, asserted that, “Any Israeli pullout from the Gaza Strip is a big victory for Palestinians and their brave resistance.” Khader Habib, a representative of Islamic Jihad, claimed that “The Israeli army is not evacuating, it is fleeing from the continuous and escalating resistance in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.”69 Furthermore, so-called rebel Likudniks, may be right— before meeting with Yasser Arafat (likely to discuss cessation of violence in response to the Israeli pullout) on June 12, 2004, senior Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar told reporters that Hamas would not lessen attacks against Israelis after the implementation of the disengagement plan, in fact, they would persist until Israel withdrawals from all land that Hamas perceives to be illegally occupied.70 Other critics, such as the Council of Jewish Communities of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, began to campaign for an “apocalyptic showdown.” The Council met on June 13, 2004 with the intent to determine a strategy to “topple” Sharon—the only course of action members agreed would be effective considering the revised Plan’s narrow approval.71 The mission of the activists is to educate and inform Israelis of the dangers involved with implementing Sharon’s plan—through rallies, leaflets, banners, etceteras.72 Council members perceive the Plan of “uprooting settlements, [to be] a victory for terrorism” and through their “plan” hope to remove Sharon from power since he possesses “the principles and ethical code of the Land of Israel, rather than pure pragmatism.”73 However, according to the campaign and rally organizer Ohad Bratt, if the Council fails to succeed, at the very least they have demographics on their side—“We [national-religious camp] are having babies at a much higher rate than the rest of the

country. The national-religious camp is growing at such a fast rate that in 15-20 years there will be no choice for Israelis.”74 Nonetheless, as a result of the approved Plan, United Nation’s Secretary-General Kofi Annan informed Prime Minister Sharon that he would work toward helping Israel to implement the disengagement plan and that the international community was ready and prepared to devote the necessary time and resources to helping Israel achieve the realization of the Plan.75 In addition, on June 8, 2004, the Group of Eight (G-8) solidified its support for the Plan by expressing in a joint statement that: “The G-8 hopes that this disengagement initiative will stimulate progress toward peace in the region, the realization of Palestinian national aspirations, and the achievement of our common objective of two states—Israel and a viable, democratic, sovereign, and contiguous Palestine—living side-by-side in peace and security.”76 Some believe that the increased international support for the Plan may also help foster future support for an international presence on the Philadelphi Route—a sensitive area along the Egyptian border.77 While official plans regarding the route have yet to be made, many also believe that such a presence would help hinder arms smuggling.78 On February 20, 2005, the Israeli Cabinet voted overwhelmingly 17 to 5 in favor of implementing Sharon’s Disengagement Plan and the evacuation of the first four groups of communities—thereby thwarting opponents of the plan’s attempts to conduct a national referendum. As previously discussed, the Disengagement Plan that was approved by the Cabinet on June 6, 2004 required the Cabinet’s approval of the evacuation of each group of communities five months prior to the actual evacuation. This particular cabinet vote called for the closure of all Jewish settlements in Gaza—in addition to the withdrawal of more than 8,000 Jewish settlers from those areas beginning in July 2005. According to Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, the entire process is expected to take approximately two months.79 Additionally, four Jewish settlements in the West Bank also are to be closed. According to the Israeli Cabinet Communique issued after the vote, the day of evacuation will be July 20, 2005.

Looking Toward the Future

On October 24, 2004, the Israeli Cabinet approved with a 13-6 vote, the Disengagement Implementation Bill, which “determine[d] the compensation to be paid to some 1,500 families to be evacuated from Gaza and four settlements in northern Samaria, and establishe[d] the penalties for those who try to disrupt the evacuation.”80 This vote was the first step in formalizing the disengagement process by including the findings of the steering committees established prior, and passing it on to the Knesset for final approval that would include terms for evacuation, compensation and funding. 81 Only two days later, on October 26, 2004, the Knesset approved the revised Disengagement Plan in a 67-45 vote.82 The approved plan stipulated that by September 2005, 21 settlements in Gaza and four settlements in the northern West Bank would be removed. The Plan also stated that “the State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the Gaza Strip…and the Northern Samaria (West Bank) area.”83 In Prime Minister Sharon’s speech to the Knesset plenum at the time the bill was introduced for deliberation, he said that “the Disengagement Plan [did] not replace negotiations and [was] not meant to permanently freeze the situation which will be created. [He also stated that the Plan was] an essential and necessary step in a situation which…[did] not enable genuine negotiations for peace. However, everything remain[ed] open for a future agreement.”84 Following Arafat’s death, Prime Minister Sharon was pressured from both the Likud and Labor parties to coordinate the disengagement plan with the Palestinians. According to one Israeli official, Israel will continue with its disengagement plan only if it perceives “a responsible (Palestinian) government capable of getting gunmen off the streets, [Israel] will reciprocate by renewing security co-ordination on disengagement steps [which Israel is]…preparing to take unilaterally.”85 As of February 2005, it appears that an actual Israeli withdrawal—to some degree—will take place in the near future. However, if for some reason there is no coordination, or even no continued and eventual full withdrawal, the IDF must plan for a future where pro-peace secular leaders in the Palestinian Authority may lose control of

Gaza and/or the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. Whether or not the settlements are withdrawn, Israeli contingency plans must pay attention to the growing links between Palestinian rejectionist groups; between them and groups outside the Palestinian Authority like the Hizballah, the PFLP, and the DFLP; and the risk they will be aligned with a range of outside Islamic extremist groups.

As for the Palestinians, it is not clear that they can ever either achieve a meaningful victory through asymmetric warfare in Gaza, or by using Gaza as a base. At best, there will be a high Palestinian price tag in memories, suffering, distrust, and blood. At worst, both sides will become locked into endemic violence or some kind of ceasefire arrangement that would do nothing to address Gaza’s need for development and acceptable living standards.

Map XIV.1

The Gaza

Table XIV.1 CIA Profile of Gaza and West Bank - Part One

Category Gaza West Bank Israel Jordan

Total Area (sq. km) 360 5,860 20,770 92,300 Land Area (sq. km) 360 5,640 20,330 91,971

Land Boundaries (km) 62 404 1,017 1,635 Egypt 11 - 266 - Gaza - - 51 - Iraq - - - 181 Israel 51 307 - 238 Jordan - 97 238 - Lebanon - - 79 - Saudi Arabia - - - 744 Syria - - 76 375 West Bank - - 307 97

Coastline (km) 40 0 273 26

Land Use (Percent) Arable 26.32 NEGL 17.02 2.87 Permanent Crops 39.47 0 4.17 1.52 Meadows & Pastures 0 32 7 9 Forest & Woodland 11 1 6 1 Other 34.21 100 78.81 95.61 Irrigated (sq. km) 120 - 1,990 750

Population 1,225,911 2,163,667 6,029,529 5,307,470 (% 0-14 years) 49.7 44.4 27.1 36.6 (% 15-64 years) 47.5 52 63 60 (% 65+ years) 2.8 3.6 9.9 3.4 Growth Rate (%) 3.95 3.39 1.48 2.89 Birth Rate (per 1,000) 41.85 34.94 18.91 24.58 Fertility Rate (Per Woman) 6.29 4.77 2.54 3.15 Net Migration Rate (per 1,000) 1.73 3.18 2.11 6.97 Death Rate (per 1,000) 4.12 4.26 6.21 2.62 Infant Mortality (per 1,000) 24.76 21.24 7.55 19.61 Life Expectancy (yrs.) 71.2 72.47 78.86 77.71

Ethnic Divisions Arab 99.4 83 19.9 98 Armenian - - - 1 Circassian - - - 1 Jew 0.6 17 80.1 -

Religion Christian 0.7 8 2.1 6 Jew 0.6 17 80.1 - Muslim 98.7 75 14.6 94 Other - - 3.2 -

Table XIV.1 CIA Profile of Gaza and West Bank - Part Two

Category Gaza West Bank Israel Jordan

Literacy - - 95 86.6

Labor Force - - 2,400,000 1,150,000 Construction (%) - - 8 10.0 Agriculture (%) 13.0 13.0 3 7.4 Industry (%) 21.0 21 20 11.4 Commerce (%) - - 13 10.5 Other Services (%) 66.0 66 25 52.0 Public Services (%) - - 31 -

GDP (PPE in $billion) .750 2.1 122 22.8 Real Growth Rate -35 -35 -1.1 3.5 GDP Per Capita ($US) 625 1,000 19,000 4,300 Inflation Rate (%) (1--- 1) 5.7 3.3

Unemployment Rate (%) (26--- 26) 10.4 25-30 Budget ($B) Revenues (.930------.930) 40.0 2.9 Expenditures (1.2------1.2) 42.4 3.1 Trade ($M) Exports (603------603) 28,000 2,500 Imports (1,900------1,900) 30,800 4,400 External Debt ($M) (108------108) 42,800 8,200 Economic Aid ($M) (800------800) - 600

Transportation Railroads (km) 0 0 647 677 Roads (km) - 4,500 15,965 8,000 Paved (km) - 2,700 15,965 8,000 Airports 2 3 54 18 Runways 1,500M+ - 1 7 4 Runways 3,000M+ 1 0 2 9

Telephones (95,729------95,729) 2,800,000 403,000 Cellular - - 2,500,000 75,000 Televisions - - 1,690,000 500,000 Stations 2 - 17 20 Radios - - 3,070,000 1,660,000 AM Stations 0 1 23 6 FM Stations 0 0 15 5 Short-wave - - 2 1

* In addition, there are 187,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and fewer than 177,000 in East Jerusalem, and more than 5,000 in Gaza.

Source: Adapted from CIA Internet database as of June 2003 by Anthony H. Cordesman

1 CIA, Atlas of the Middle East, Washington, GPO, January 1993, pp. 52-53, 62-63. 2 Many of these comments in this section are based on interviews in Gaza, Israel, and Cairo in 1994, and 1995; on detailed security maps of Gaza, and IDF Spokesman, “Gaza-Jericho Agreement: Security Aspects,” Tel Aviv, IDF, May, 1994. 3 CIA, World Factbook 2002, “Gaza.” 4 Hwww.fmep.orgH 5 CIA, World Factbook 2000, “Gaza.” 6 CIA, World Factbook 2002, “Gaza” And Intenational Monetary Fund Hhttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/wbg/wbg.pdfH 7 CIA, World Factbook 2000, “Gaza.” 8 CIA, World Factbook 2000, “Gaza.” 9 Based on the data in the CIA, World Factbook, 1995, 1998, and 1999, “Gaza”. Other sources report an Israeli per capita income of $14,000 and a Gazan per capita income of $1.400. (New York Times, November 8, 1995, p. A-19.) 10 New York Times, February 8, 1995, p. A-19; Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1995, p. A-18. 11 New York Times, February 8, 1995, p. A-19; Wall Street Journal, September 26, 1995, p. A-18. 12 Based on data released by the International Labor Organization on December 3, 1995, and the data in the CIA, World Factbook, 1995 and 1999, “Gaza”. Other sources report an Israeli per capita income of $14,000 and a Gazan per capita income of $1.400. (New York Times, November 8, 1995, p. A-19.) Also see Middle East Economic Digest, August 27, 1999, p. 20 and BBC, July 6, 1999, “Excerpts from Al-Ayyam.” Unemployment for Palestinians has already dropped from 20.3% in 1997 to 14.4% in 1998. Israel had a decline in its border closures in 1998, which led to the decrease in unemployment of Palestinians. 13 MEED, July 17, 1998, pp. 9-16; Palestinian Unemployment Falls Sharply in 1998,” Reuters, June 22, 1999. 14 Based on data released by the International Labor Organization on December 3, 1995, and the data in the CIA, World Factbook, 1995, 1998, and 1999, “Gaza”. Other sources report an Israeli per capita income of $14,000 and a Gazan per capita income of $1.400. (New York Times, November 8, 1995, p. A-19.) 15 Washington Post, October 16, 2000, p. A-23. 16 “Palestinian Unemployment Falls Sharply in 1998,” Reuters, June 22, 1999 and CIA, World Factbook, 1998 and 1999, “Gaza”.. 17 John Ward Anderson, “Five Israeli Soldiers Killed in a Second Attack in Gaza,” Washington Post, May 13, 2004, p. A24. 18 Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Israel Kills 12 in Gaza Strip After Deadly Ambush,” Washingtonpost.com, May 13, 2004. 19 Robin Shulman, “Israelis, Palestinians Disagree on Damage Done in Rafah Camp,” Washington Post, May 27, 2004, p. A11. 20 Nir Hasson, Arnon Regular, and Nadav Shragai, “IDF Soldier Killed, 5 Hurt in Attack on Gaza Army Post,” Haaretz.com, June 28, 2004. 21 Nir Hasson, Aluf Benn, and Arnon Regular, “Qassam Claims First Fatalities in Sderot,” Haaretz.com, June 29, 2004. 22 Arieh O’Sullivan, “‘Security Zone’ Set Up in North Gaza,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, June 30, 2004. 23 Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Israelis Fight Palestinians in North Gaza, Kill 7,” Washingtonpost.com, July 8, 2004. 24 Yoav Stern, “Three Islamic Jihad militants killed in Gaza strike,” Haaretz.com, July 23, 2004. 25 Marwan Athamna andAmir Buhbut, “Fourteen terrorists killed in IAF strike on Gaza,” Maarivintl.com, September 7, 2004. 26 Amos Harel, “Three IDF troops killed in clash near Gaza settlement,” Haaretz.com, September 23, 2004. 27 Amos Harel and Arnon Regular, “Woman killed in mortar strike on home in Gaza settlement,” Haaretz.com, September 24, 2004. 28 Peter Enav, “Palestinian Rocket Kills 2 Israeli Youths,” The Associated Press, September 29, 2004. 29 Aluf Benn, Amos Harel and Arnon Regular, “Palestinians: Large IDF force enters northern Gaza,” Haaretz.com, October 1, 2004. 30 The New York Times, “Israeli Missile Kills Hamas Weapons Maker,” The New York Times, October 22, 2004. 31 International Monetary Fund, Hwww.imf.orgH 32 Judy Dempsey, “Israeli Closures Wipe Out Palestinian Economic Gains,” Financial Times, November 6, 2000, p. 14 33 William Orme, Jr., “Gulf Arab States Prepare a Bailout to Assist Arafat,” New York Times, March 20, 2001, p. A1 34 Hwww.pcbs.org/english/press_r/press27/result27.htmH 35 “Palestinian Solidarity Campaign” , www.palestinecampaign .org/archives.asp?xid=267 36 “More Palestinians Poor Since Israeli Blockade,” Reuters, April 25, 2001 37 World Bank Press Release, “World Bank Highlights 60 percent Poverty Level in Palestinian Territories”, March 5, 2003, Hwww.worldbank.orgH 38 “Palestinian Authority Monthly Income Plummets 77 Percent, Paper Says,” Bloomberg, May 10, 2001 39 World Press Online, December 4, 2002, “Palestinians Getting Poorer”, Hwww.worldpress.orgH 40 For detailed complaints about arms smuggling in Gaza and other security problems, see “Peace Watch Report: Weapons Control and the Palestinian Authority,” Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, June, 1995. 41 Washington Post, October 22, 2000, p. A-28. 42 “Arms Boat made Three Visits to Gaza,” Ha’aretz, May 9, 2001 43 “The Rafah Smuggling Tunnels: A Historical Background,” Israel Defense Forces Website, Hhttp://www1.idf.il/dover/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=22063.ENH, October 12, 2003. 44 “The Rafah Smuggling Tunnels: A Historical Background,” Israel Defense Forces Website, Hhttp://www1.idf.il/dover/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=22063.ENH, October 12, 2003. 45 “Weapon Smuggling Tunnels in Rafah - Operation Rainbow,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism- +Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Weapon+Smuggling+Tunnels+in+Rafah+May+2004.htmH, May 17, 2004. 46 Margot Dudkevitch, “Philadelphia Reality,” Jerusalem Post Online, May 13, 2004.

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