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The Course of the Conflict in Gaza Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page i CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 [email protected] Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and Correction The Course of the Conflict in Gaza Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies With the Assistance of Jennifer K. Moravitz February 23, 2005 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page ii Introduction The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of CSIS. Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page iii TABLE OF CONTENTS XIV. THE COURSE OF THE CONFLICT IN GAZA..............................................................................1 FIGHTING IN AN ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC TIME BOMB.................................................................... 1 ISRAELI EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTAINMENT AND SECURITY OF THE GAZA STRIP.......................... 11 ARMS SMUGGLING INTO GAZA AND THE RAFAH TUNNELS ...................................................................... 12 FIGHTING WITHIN GAZA .......................................................................................................................... 16 AN EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF THE SETTLEMENTS ............................................................................. 17 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SETTLEMENTS IN GAZA ...................................................................... 18 LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE .............................................................................................................. 23 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page iv List of Tables, Figures, and Maps MAP XIV.1 ................................................................................................................................................... 25 THE GAZA ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 CIA PROFILE OF GAZA AND WEST BANK - PART ONE.................................................................................. 26 TABLE XIV.1 ................................................................................................................................................ 27 CIA PROFILE OF GAZA AND WEST BANK - PART TWO ................................................................................. 27 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page 1 XIV. The Course of the Conflict in Gaza Even during the peace process, Gaza and the West Bank created different sets of security problems for both Israel and the Palestinians. This was partly due to the different ways in which the Oslo Accords dealt with each area. For example, the political status of the Gaza Strip is defined by a number of agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements (the DOP), which was signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, provided for a transitional period of Palestinian interim self-government both in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, because Gaza was largely Palestinian, densely populated, and mostly urban, the Palestinian Authority was able to establish significantly more formal control there than in the West Bank. Fighting in an Economic and Demographic Time Bomb Once the conflict began, the geography and demography of the Gaza Strip ensured that an Israeli-Palestinian conflict would take a different form there than it had in the West Bank. Gaza is an area of approximately 360 square kilometers, sharing a 51- kilometer border with Israel, an 11-kilometer border with Egypt, with 40 kilometers of coastline.1 These borders are relatively compact and easy for the IDF to secure, provided that Egypt enforces the control of its borders with the same strictness as does Israel. Even without Egyptian cooperation, Gaza’s southern border can be secured with considerable effectiveness. Table XIV.1 provides a profile of the geographic, economic, and population profile for Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, and Israel. As a result of the September 13, 1993 accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Cairo Agreement signed on May 4, 1994, Gaza is divided into a mix of common roads, Israeli controlled entry points and roads, Israeli settlements, and Palestinian Authority controlled areas.2 Unlike the West Bank Gaza is an almost wholly Palestinian entity. The Palestinian population in Gaza is overwhelmingly Muslim, and the religious composition of the Gaza Strip is 98.7% Muslim, 0.7% Christian, and 0.6% Jewish. 3 In July 2002, Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page 2 there were 1,274,868 Palestinians in Gaza and approximately 5,000 Israeli settlers. The Jerusalem Central Bureau of Statistics reported 6,678 Israeli settlers in Gaza as of December 2000.4 These settlers were, however, scattered in 25 Israeli settlements and civilian land use sites. At the same time, Gaza has long been an economic and demographic time bomb. According to CIA estimates, the economy has deteriorated steadily after the early 1990s, and long before the Israeli-Palestinian War created a crisis. Real per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) declined 36% between 1992 and 1996 as a result of the combined effect of falling aggregate incomes and robust population growth. CIA estimates that this downturn in economic activity led to a nearly two-year decrease in life expectancy and a significant increase in child mortality between 1997 and 2000.5 The population growth rate in Gaza is one of the highest in the world with 4.2%, in spite of economic conditions and gross overcrowding in available housing. This population is also extremely young: 57% are below the age of 20.6 The CIA describes Gaza’s pre-war economic situation as follows:7 largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS. The most serious negative social effect of this downturn has been the emergence of chronic unemployment; average unemployment rates in the WBGS during the 1980s were generally under 5%; by the mid-1990s this level had risen to over 20%. Since 1997 Israel's use of comprehensive closures has decreased and, in 1998, Israel implemented new policies to reduce the impact of closures and other security procedures on the movement of Palestinian goods and labor. In October 1999, Israel permitted the opening of a safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in accordance with the 1995 Interim Agreement. These changes to the conduct of economic activity have fueled a moderate economic recovery in 1998-99. The GDP in purchasing power parity terms of Gaza was only US $1.17 billion in 1999, the last year before the war. The per capita income was US $1,060. Despite major water, desertification, and sewage problems, roughly one-third of the economy was still tied to agriculture in 1999. Another 25 percent worked in light industry, the rest in “services,” largely consisting of temporary work.8 The Gaza Strip never saw a meaningful “peace dividend” and there has never been a good prospect that peace and sovereignty alone could feed its people. Gaza has no natural resources and no significant internal industrial activity or exports barring souvenir production, a few showpiece factories, and citrus fruits—many of which are grown by Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War-The Conflict in Gaza 6/25/2004 Page 3 Israelis.9 In fact, Gaza’s economy has been historically highly dependent on Israel. Gaza provided the majority of the roughly 50,000 Palestinian workers who worked in Israel during
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