Viktor Ilievski Viktor Submitted to Submitted Supervisor: Student 2009 CEU Etd Collection in General Impotent in the Matter of Grasping Reality

CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of of Arts of Master for degree the requirements of the fulfillment In partial Plato’s Cratylus and Beyond and Cratylus Plato’s Central European University Central European Department of DepartmentPhilosophy of Professor Gabor Betegh Budapest, Hungary Budapest, Viktor Ilievski Viktor Submitted to Submitted Supervisor: Student 2009 CEU eTD Collection in general impotent in the matter of grasping reality. Shaped into in reality.matter Shaped of impotent in the grasping general not make But notlanguage picturetheir outcome reflectthat does Names do nominata. or and thus unable to properly account for the nature of the things the words are attached to. semanticsphonology inconclusiveare and of andthat are confusing words, etymology languageisI reach reality. determine whether capableof conclusionsthat The depicting the into inquiry the behind idea initial My dialectic. of method the of introduction of the dialectician as knower of the Forms, and, as I believe some early hints analysis, as well as some crucial tenets of Platonic philosophy – the theory of Forms, the toetymologicaltheories ofnaming arepresented,alongprolonged section dedicated with words, the ability of words to express the nature of theirnominata. Two conflicting puzzling philosophical treatise. Its main concern is the correctness of names or, in other of dialectic, the ultimate method for approaching the intelligible realm. theintelligible method for approaching ultimate of the dialectic, Plato’s Cratylus has proven through the centuries to be extremely challenging and challenging extremely be to centuries the through proven has Abstract i logoi Cratylus it serves as vehicle was to CEU eTD Collection writing. andon whoUskokov encouragingme Aleksandar and of kept in course the advising the the “hardware”, help unselfish with Emre provided andErdenk,friends who colleagues helping hand whenever Iasked to, and that was quite often. Iam a also lent very thankful who myto Biber Krizsta to thanks Many well. as them to gratitude my deep express all indebted much to from my teachers Central European herebyI University,the and from mymindengage very subjectthe a deeperperspective.feel Ialso andapproach of completing this work. His numerous comments, advices and corrections made me truly task in the instrumental heaccomplishing was my supervisor, Being and asawell-wisher. as a teacher both I perceive Beteghwhom Gabor Professor goes to gratitude My greatest Acknowledgements ii CEU eTD Collection B 2. 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1. I T A A NTRODUCTION ABLEOF IBLIOGRAPHY BSTRACT CKNOWLEDGEMENTS C T T HE ONCLUSION HE J ANUS P A E T A S ROBLEM OF ROBLEM THE OF C OCRATES TYMOLOGY ASTYMOLOGY HE GAINST ...... N ONTENTS ICE - N FACED ...... 41 ...... 1 ...... AME – P F AIR N ORMS ORMS AND ’ -F ATURALISM R C ...... 12 ...... ORM EBUTTAL OF ...... RATYLUS ‘E N T AME NIGMA HEORY D IALECTIC IN THE IN IALECTIC -F ...... 26 ...... 4 ...... ORMS M C ...... 19 ...... ONVENTIONALISM ACHINE Table of Contents of Table ...... 29 ...... ’ FOR C iii RATYLUS D ECIPHERING ...... 7 ...... 35 ...... R EALITY ...... 21 ...... III II I CEU eTD Collection being, the genesis of logos (through being, of genesis the stoicheia latter divided into vowelsconsonants, and gives an account names as larger linguistic units composed of focus of thisbroad main asubject, the ismuch too therelation language–reality since However, thesis will precisely, question the whether languageis capable beof grasping and depicting being. placed upon interrelatednesslanguage speech of (especially or more itsand reality highest realms) or, the the ontological and epistemological ones. in isolation, butmore than often in the context of other fundamental problems, especially rethinkingPlato’s lies in language of linguistic factthatthe consideredthe are issues not of importance philosophical the Therefore, concerns. and epistemological metaphysical from never arealmosthis linguistic dissociated Plato’s speculations tonote that important thinking areexpounded in the 1 philosophy languageof and linguistic in general linguisticdedicated to both problems, for and the thus important developmentof although role insometimes underrated, It isopus. Plato’s theonly dialogue entirely with linguistics) isdealt in the with connected subjects (as well languageas other and thinking between language: relation the hehis raisesissues work many fall relevant which under thedomain of philosophy different facetsdialogues. throughout In language, problem butthe of dispersed remain of systematic treatment himself to devote notdoes Plato Characteristically, discussed. where speechand the speaker and linguisticof the meaning expressions are briefly ‘philosophylanguage’in of the evenearly dialogues as the philosophy is ultimatethe intellectual activity. Thatis why we find bits ofinquiry into the intellectual is use the no oflanguage, andnatural: imaginable activity without Plato for ininterestPlato’s oflanguageis intricacies the deepand andthatis only perseverant, In the field of phonetics and morphology, the morphology, and of phonetics field the In My primary interest in the area of Plato’s linguistic considerations wasthe linguistic considerations in Plato’s areaof the interest My primary . Some ground-breaking efforts in the field of syntax are also visible therein: a distinction is made Sophist Theaetetus Introduction , aswell language-relatedas further problems.is It symploke Cratilus 1 distinguishes betweensyllables and letters, with Cratylus . The meaning of non-beingmeaning of . The and terms the of ideas), the truth value of speech and 1 . Its main subject is the question of is question the main subject . Its , which plays a very significant, very a plays which , Acibiades and Charmides are, CEU eTD Collection establishes dialectic as a sufficient, if not the only possible tool for reaching out the realm the out reaching for tool possible only the not if sufficient, a as dialectic establishes sightposing suchaquestionbe seemsNamely, redundant. to himself explicitly Plato first the at because here, needed is clarification Further names. of of correctness account method of dialectic is a feasible one, but through the prism of theprism of the butthrough is one, feasible of a dialectic method reality, language in thequestion reliability ultimate the of to the whether relation or language is crucial philosophyislanguage crucial to dialectic,languagemeans isphilosophy, is relation the that to crucial transitive–that whichis the nolanguage,account is method dialectic So, without possible. crucial to disposeit of simply cannot thought, As acarriersphere. of intelligiblediscursive opinions.such Thea way thatmethod embodies thefaculty it reasoninganddiscursive of best, at thus isstirthe able to soul the in curd ofof realdialectic It whichis beingtogether. languageand brings finallyby factor practiced Plato, the knowledge will beingAlthough far and notion, from an as unambiguous dialectic the method, understood transcendsbe separatedour attention the question of the art practicedfrom by the dialectician – the method of dialectic. thethe whey by seeing the Form both sensualof their namesof and themselves. This referencefalse naturally brings to skilled inquestioningand answering, alsocapable and essence knowing the of true things realm anddialogue investigates Plato for the first time uses thethe word ‘dialectician’ and attaches it to a person time and space limitations. Another reason forexcluding it is its very questionable authenticity. 3 2 names’ is connected withsemantics. (Cf. Long, 2000). in and name), and then in formulation familiar from the occurrence of the theory of Forms find two references to the theory of Forms: once with regard toForms of artifacts (shuttle issues, this dialogue tackles other fundamental Platonic themes. First, in the Cratylus we refers to the subject of names and their relation to reality. Besides the eminently linguistic between ‘names’ ( ‘names’ between to mention one like Hermogenes, doyou really any that think can bethis,subject learned taught or soquickly,not which seems problemto of correctnessbethe to of amongnames,importance whichimmense is obvious ascribes from undoubtedly thethe statementPlato of mostCratylus:conventionalism. and “But naturalism important?” conflicting theories: the opposition through two of names, presented correctness of The Seventh Letter might be relevant for the subject investigated here, but falls out of its scope, due to due scope, of its out falls but here, investigated subject the for be relevant might Letter Seventh The Crat. 427e5-7 Phaedo , Symposium onomata ) and ‘things said’ ( and Republic 3 . Thus, the central theme of our inquiry remains to be to remains inquiry our of theme central the Thus, . – as Good itself and Beauty itselfitself.in –asGood and Beauty Second, this rhemata 2 ), while the entire discussion of ‘correctness of of ‘correctness discussion entire the while ), Cratylus 2 , in which he and its CEU eTD Collection speaking the truth, but the the world; intelligible the to ladder only the Plato to according not disqualifies language in foras avehiclegeneral the method of dialectic, whichis appropriate and sufficientnot are epistemologicaletymology and words toolsof for graspingsemantics although the highest that reality,presented be that will does conclusion dialoguethis in discussed insufficiently or open remain that issues the out point to briefly try andalso how Platohis own,deals as well as withthattheory of naturalism, that the theory of name-forms isthe an eristic devise andnota belief of namesthese are nottry to showquestions that Platoappropriate is much more inclined to the theory of conventionalism then to the I will issues tools these of examination Through name-giver. orthe legislator, the of account in for depictingsome the asto well as later name-forms, the of account the section, reality. etymological are the issues as works.I will argumentation of theFinally, dialogue, and pay special attention to the more or less controversial In order to try provide to answers to these questions,the Iwill work on presenting the overall be is investigated following:the intelligibleof the is things,Forms. or beyond That true, But,whatremains anydoubt. to b) a) culminates in intuitive insight? in intuitive culminates metaphysicsmean that it Plato’s humanthe languagedoes system, asacognitive former? Does it implydirectly, that there isin the found a statement superior explicit The rather kind of cognition, they simply toolsconvenient brought tolife by convention? then independent on or are do, supposedly properties Forms,asthe participate instable eternal and or the of basis imitate they precisely, do More they represent? objects the reflecting of properly of the namesconstituents of a meaningful sentence. Are they, on Plato’s account, really capable and phonemes, and extendingtheir nouns to verbsand ( resemblanceThe nature language,of starting its with most primitive andminimal theunits, to the logoi do. 3 Cratylus onomata that the objects are to be known and onomata rhêmata might not be ), as thebasic CEU eTD Collection naturalism and conventionalism namely names, of correctness the of theories conflicting mentioned totwo dilemma above refers the so extensively discussed; language and some of them are the following: In no other dialogue of Plato is the subject matter of understand.but difficultread, to pleasant to frivolous eristicbut conceived, awell later on (remindful of berejected simply to firstisdefended, idea same the which play) by argumentation in the turns unexpected the – etymologies, thesefanciful are some offor the the reasonsextensive etymologizingthatand seriousness visible dialogue, the throughout the perplexity surrounding reasons the make the as well as the very grounding of the sometimes overly his early period) – is leftfor some other occasion teaching. Thus the final conclusion of the dialogue – not atypically for Plato (at leastin such things as Forms, butlater on nevertheless decides that he is convinced in Heraclitus’ own ontological outlook. Cratylus Plato’s namely initially concedesintroduced, is to Plato’svariable another suggestionbook, the that of there eponym an are as served name whose ofyoung Plato, instructor and Heraclitean the Socrates between discussion the text, which seems to get solved by Socrates. Still, in the last part of of the lastpart in Still,the by solvedget Socrates. to seems which text, finds himself in aporeticmaze.an A is presented dilemma beginning very at the of the of allegories mystical sometimes 5 advances certain very important doctrines of his own, primarily the theory of the Forms. dialogues,as the dogmatic more the and them between ground middle the occupies It are. ones early or Socratic, called “deductions” of impenetrable the of distinctive subjects of multiplicity and voluminousness the by characterized not is dialogue This task. easy relatively 4 Plato’s of mansion splendid the Entering 1. TheJanus-faced Cratylus Sedley 2003,(in p3) attributes the introductionof terminologythe Kretzmannto (1971). That occasion never occurred. That, of course, does not make not does ofcourse, That, occurred. never occasion That There are, of course, several plain truths about the about several truths plain of course, There are, 5 ; the most pertinent issue of this work is the question of “correctness of “correctness of is question the work issuethis of pertinent most ; the Republic (vide Barney (2001), p.1). It is also a fact that in there Plato somewhat modestly Parmenides Timaeus . But upon inside, again gettingupon readeronce the . But 4 Republic , or the strong Pythagorean echoes and echoes Pythagorean strong the or , Cratylus 4 . The enlivening intermingling ofirony Cratylus , the obscurity and the seemingly at first sight presents itself as a Cratylus an aporetic dialogue as the so the as dialogue aporetic an that are beyond doubt beyond are that Cratylus Cratylus awork , during CEU eTD Collection etymological analysis – at least in its initial, expositional phase – is meant to reveal that reveal to meant is – phase expositional initial, its in least at – analysis etymological elaborate the of enterprise theentire Furthermore, naturalism. linguistic of theory conception itbut seemingly endorsesand presupposes, evenstrongly the advocates quasi-ontological the and Hermogenes by held as conventionalism of version extreme strategy in accomplishing this taskis he peculiar:rather straightforwardly refutes the positions Socrates is bound to first of all refute two distinct epistemological and ontological concluding part. Wecounterpart. in shall later this andconsider inproblem text, the especially the epistemology (understanding things through Forms)theiressences, or its onomatic over investigationsphonetic aside,andestablish the andsemantic supremacy of eidetic naturally to objects in question (those mistakenly assigned to them) are not names at all. nature“ names images, the their through than rather expressed,is things the that should beinvestigated and learned through themselves,about Socrates’ own standpoint(andany Plato’s without as well),ifdoubts all at explicitly Socrates’ superiority? And more importantly, what does it consist in? It seems that 12 person. particular that for least at one, correct the is object 11 discussions and move finger his insteadof answering. epistemological investigations,of and thatsubject conviction fixed any for allegedly allow does not flux, made the of constant historicaldoctrine Cratylus Heraclitean refrain the from hand, other relativism in the field of values as well, and(Cf. that is person certainly each for not what private are Plato that wants. Thethings second one, on the homo mensura 10 9 8 concern was toconsider thefunction anduse of language (vide Taylor1926, pp. 77, 78). example, used to hold that the ostensive subject of the dialogue was the origin of language, while its main 7 and adjectives as well as proper names 6 Socrates hastheedge confrontation, whenis that, theapproaches his two Cratylusof mentors andSocrates brought into are Sedley has names, of to correctness the on say discussion the the underlying following:idea essential the regarding Now, “ names Vide: Sedley (2003, p. 23) This view is endorsed both by Sedley and Barney. But it hasn’t always been the case. A.E. Taylor, for By names, Plato in The naturalists' claim is Briefly stated, the claim of the extreme conventionalists is that any name set down by any person for any The first ontological position isdeducible from the Protagorean absolute epistemological relativism. His Crat. 439a–b 6 ( ” ( Crat. 383 a 3 10 orthotes tôn onomatôn underlying the linguistic theories of conventionalism thesis allows only for an extremely relativist ontology, making the being and essence of the of essence and being the making ontology, relativist extremely an for only allows thesis Cratylus Now, in beorder ableto his toestablish opinion as authoritative, ). The extreme consequence of this viewpoint is that names which do not belong do not which names that is viewpoint ofthis consequence extreme The ). „ ... that there is a correctness of name for each thing, one that belongs to it by implies “ ) .” Sedley (2003, p. 4) a loose linguistic category, understood as including common nouns 7 , or the relation between the names and their reference. their and names the between relation the or , Plato’s ultimate aimin our dialog is … to show why it Crat. 385 e 4-5 ” 8 . But how are we to perceive and understand 5 9 . This conclusion,if would true, pushthe ). ontologySuch produces, inturn, strong 11 and naturalism and 12 . His . CEU eTD Collection belief that everything is always moving, were mistaken and consequently deceived their successors. their deceived consequently and mistaken were moving, always is everything that belief 16 reduce Cratylus’standpoint toabsurd. philosophical eristic powers overby very endthe of dialoguethe Cratylus (who is at this point still only an auditor), with the aim to 15 14 Logos. of theory general another Heraclitus’ device to support the notion of just is picture” “river the that concludes Marcovich interpreters. by his Heraclitus upon forced misreading a twice river same the into step can nobody that flow”. statement the waters make would different rendition this again correct, If and different rivers same the in stepping are who those “Upon reads: rendition other scholars, argues Marcovich(in 1983). The famous “riverfragment” (B 12 DK = 40Marcovich) in his theorist at all (as reported by Plato and further promoted by Aristotle). Against this view, among some 13 opinion hisown with collides detrimentally so this conception that fact as the well lines, as The fact that Socrates does not even attempt to veil the irony so obvious in the above authority of those wise men of old: devastating consequences for naturalist the theory ismuchwhich so dependent on the may have primeval and name-givers, that change tothe attributes doctrinethe of constant his conversation with Cratylus. Onevery interesting isnote also to thing thatSocrates during clear very becomes that and opposite, the exactly course, of is, truth The doctrine. gnômê, doxa ( things is unsteady and alwaysmoving. The same holds for most the important ethical of nature the that presumption the of basis the on is explained elements the of etymology flux of theory Heraclitean allegedly the oldespoused of name-givers the aretê, sôphrosynê, dikaiosunê, andreia aretê, sôphrosynê,dikaiosunê, Advancedearlier, much in It is really not certain that Heraclitus himself was an extreme Heraclitean of Cratylus’ type, oreven aflux Crat. 439c, Crat. 411 b 3– c 4 but flowingand moving full of everysort of motion and constant coming intobeing however,but on the nature of the things themselves,which theythink are neveror stable steadfast, aretimes exactly like thesewise men. Theydon’t blame thisontheir own internal condition, moving everywhich I way.peoplethink that Well, whothe things gave theirnames ancientin very nature of things that are,that the things themselves appear tothem to beturning around and Most ofourwise mennowadaysso dizzygoing around get andaroundintheir search for the 15 , namely that things possess stable essences (which will be once again presented togetherwith conclusion the thatthe name-givers, if they ascribed names to things in the etc.), and this seemingly aligns Socrates with the upholders of flux the of with upholders the Socrates aligns andseemingly this etc.), 386 aff. 16 ), seems to show that what he does here is exercising his etc.) and epistemological terms ( coincidentia oppositorum 6 within the frame of his 14 . epistêmê, 13 . The . CEU eTD Collection 19 (refutingin yetanotherpassing sophist’s doctrine, the one of Euthydemus, who dealsteachings Protagoras final blow to the Socrates dueconsideration. without although indoctrine, refuge Protagoras’ took intense internal he, turmoil, dueto when were times there that admits reluctantly dialogue, inthe theory conventionalist’s the of advocate is the who Hermogenes, not. are they that not, are that things of and are, they that Protagoras, whofamously stated: “of all things themeasure is man, of the things that are, result in a doctrine of extreme ontological relativism. This doctrine was originally held by same principle would be applied to things that are, or beings, instead of to names, would position, advances ideathe that the consequence of Hermogenes’ theory of naming,if the absurd. After all, Antisthenes was known as a kind of opponent to Plato. to ofopponent kind 18 a as known was Antisthenes all, After absurd. Plato’s initial endorsement of the theory of naturalism was purposeful, namely with the aim to reducerobes it to of Cratylus. If this were true, it would, of course, add an additional weight thus arguing with tohis fellow the and student forerunner argument of an influential school that ofthought, disguised in the respectively), present the opinion that it was actually Antisthenes who upheld this view, and that Plato is 17 and it” use custom whoestablishof the habit(rule)those and kalountôn –“ physei nomôkaietheitônethisantônte hekastôpephykenaionomaoudenoudeni, alla utterance: following with the of names correctness the on exposition Socrates’ not discouragedstart enough seriouslyto questioning hislatter the provokes outlook, is connection the holds that in thedialogue) of appearance view (in order the they are connected that maintains broadly(more language) with – Cratylus reality: we witness that clash main the inHence, the language. of users the among dialogue anagreement than more nothing is between the two opposingby is toobjectsornotions determined names intheir application thecorrectness that of views on the relationnamebein Hermogenes. cannot his He, opposition advocates to interlocutor, viewthe of words exposition doctrinethe of of naturalism,furthermore and offends himby claming that his complains Socrates to Cratylusthat him confuses with his sarcastic unclear and 1.1 Possibly a mouthpiece of Protagoras (cf. Steward, (cf. ofProtagoras mouthpiece a Possibly Stewart (1909, p. 35) and Demand (1975, p. 107), citing otherscholars (Raeder and Derbolav, vonFritz Crat. 384d4-6 Socrates’ Rebuttal ofConventionalism Rebuttal Socrates’ But let us return to the starting point of letdialogue, tothestartingof But the Hermogenes us return where point not a single name belongs to any particular thing by nature, but by any butby a singleby nature, to thing custom not namebelongs particular physei , while Hermogenes ibid 7 .) 17 , the propounder of the first one, 18 19 , who represents the second . Socrates, in replay to his nomô ou gar . Still CEU eTD Collection to definitely say that, for example, the water is either warm or cold. 22 21 20 opinions of individual men. If they do not have fixed the beingon of depend their own,being, than: their of matter in the do they, or own, their of essences have things whether asks and grounds, ontological to argument the turns hand, other the on Socrates, foreigners. the and Hellenes the among both holds that a truth things, same the for names name, andfurther supports his claim by the fact that different communities have different intention of the dialectician, namely Socrates. backnamesreturn to anddisprove conventionalism, which was after all original the finally to only beings, to names from transposition necessary the with off starts which line of elaborate reasoning interesting in and true) are a rather whatsoever statements all andconsequently object, in every present are simultaneously properties all contrary the believed that apparently events, one of them being that they are “ are they that being them of one events, philosophers. Still, there seem to be some peculiarities that are among contemporary debate is huge of actions) a subject matter, shared that (andfor events by both things and of status aunjustified extrapolation. The presents case of ishis or of grounded, well assumption ask whether this to part of argument the for later the important and legitimate humans, but have fixed ontological status of their own. stand in relation to our cognitive faculties, donot picture the transientmental states of the If man is the measure of all things and Peter’s opinion differs from John’s, then it would not be possible be not would it then John’s, from differs opinion Peter’s and things ofall measure the is man If version. Euthydemus' to According Starting off with Hermogenes claims: whatever one decides to call a certain thing, that willbeits call a certain that to decides thing, one whatever claims: Hermogenes Next, Socrates assumes that the same holds of actions, and therefore it isit both therefore and actions, of holds same the assumes that Socrates Next, This is Socrates’interim inconclusion argument. The the things’ not essences do x x x Crat. 385 d Webenot abledistinguish would to one from thing other the different if things opinions of our coincidenotthem do we would not have the means to attribute fixed properties to numerically Therefore, the things of this world have essences or being of their own. them properties of, say, goodness and badness, and to adifferent degree. But wedo distinguish oneindividual from and another, we doattribute 20 . Let reconstruct. ustrythestructure to of argument,this equally spatiotemporalinas much as both are 8 22 . 21 , and also , CEU eTD Collection – the names. following withoutproperly the rules speech-action the of tools appropriate andthe using separating of thetissues with patientthe a sharpmetal nobody Similarly,tool. can speak without a surgical operation perform can Nobody itself. of activity nature the essential by strictrules has dictated the according to tobeaccomplished undertaken any enterprise resume Letusnow agent. argument. our Cratylus presentedleast in actions, andthatthey can (at be described those essentiality to Therefore,is it probablysafeconclude enough thatSocratesto is attribute justified to by here Socrates. caseexplicated to the beseem relevant not factdoes to that action, but He alsoholds that actions can be subsumed under events; of course, notevery eventis an about. logical form of the sentences we use in our ordinary talk presupposes that there are things our sentences are24 23 causal nexus), still offers good reasons why events should be taken seriously as entities hand, although disclaims events have that (being essences identified particulars by the other the on Davidson, be. would events particular the instances whose and essence have would which type, or action event and events, the of in case the or, term, sortal under a accomplished whenmove be be.That oressence, would can fixednature, them ascribing example Socrates’ both types of in asfor features objects, with havingcommon things or susceptible other the of certain particular entities particulars non-repeatable, dated (objects and events) are subsumed Davidson (1980, p. 164 ff). Any description of an event implies that there is an entity MacDonald (1989, p.110) to be described; the This is the second interim conclusion drawn by Socrates. He makes it clear that it Hemakesclear Socrates. by drawn conclusion interim is second This the ) as “species” of events which are necessary causally connected with conscious a with connected causally necessary are which events of “species” ) as x x x the proper tools employed in the speech act. andincludes in saying words way the natural to use them. are Words nature, to according performed one speech is the correct Therefore, Speaking saying or is something onesort of action. tothem. attach naturally to performliking.it, andnotour In order to essence, andareperformed according them As for theactionspossess (weaving,cutting),naturethey or also properly, we must use the appropriate tools that ” 23 . And if events are particulars, that would make them 9 24 . CEU eTD Collection present issue), but would mean only one inconsistency less. inconsistency only one mean but would issue), present 385 b2-d1 edited did Plato if even Furthermore, false. improper the be true, above would of the names proper light the the In understanding, actions. performing for tools or natural proper of usage the on focuses passage out by pointing naturalism), theirof inability theory of the to do so if pillar not proper (false);supporting a afteris all, the (which discussionmeaning that immediatelyfixed of names’ convey idea to follows the thetransposedcapacity fostering for used be may names some to of falsity attribution the since redundant, completely as pronounced beunequivocally cannot passage the hand, other Onthe passage. disputed evenif pretty bold, is quite legitimate since the flow of the argument is not interrupted by onthe omission amended the to suit the conclusion of the mentioned passage an unintentionally left residue from a previous editionof the dialogue which was later not follow discussion the on “private” versus “public” names. Sedley (2003, p. 11 ff) considers the above translation of Plato’s works edited by Cooper, this objectionis not valid anymore, since the passage does the the relevantpassage on truth andfalsity of ( names nomenclature on common or public usage of language.With Schofield’s transposition(Schofield, 1972) of the attribution of truth-value to names is confined to limited cases of superimposition of private 26 verbs. 25 division of fallacy parts as well. This seemsof the statements as well,to on the principlebe that whatis true of the unit,an has beto true of its example of parts or flagrant constituents, the to truth-value also ascribe to heis but prone that, acknowledges error in reasoning, Socrates Plato’s sentences. of uses specific utterances, more precisely or propositions, knownto be attributed to is as truth-value the that logic of knowledge basic very of matter to point out to Hermogenes that there is a possibility of false, incorrect speech. It is a false; the same holds for the smallest parts of sentences – the names. But using names is names using But names. –the of sentences parts smallest the for holds same the false; some true, are statements some ispossible, andfalse speech So, since true argument. on. later establish the theory of naturalism upon a host of absurdities,just in order to deconstruct it movewhois to isyetanother eristic of determined playful the Socrates, inconsistency hasproperly notyet touched upon.The other possible answer wouldbe thatthis he naturalism, which of of the doctrine thebasic introduce tenet of stage argument, the both truth-value and reference, although it seems a bit odd that he would, at such an early meaning linguisticbearers and of microcosms truth, encapsulating within themselves independent namesexpound as notion the very of he isaboutto presupposes theory what seems to be a valid and firm argument? Not all the scholars agree that this is a case of fallacy. Taylor (1926, p. 79) flatly denies that, arguing that Elsewhere ( Elsewhere Socrates next proceeds briefly to discuss true andfalse speech, with an intention But letleaveus, for time the being, issueis,as it this with and proceed the out, that would in no way strengthen the case forthe existence of name-forms (which is the Soph. 263 d 25 . Why would Plato’s Socrates commit such a fallacy in the course of commit . Whysuch afallacyinthecourse Socrates would Plato’s ) Plato clearly asserts that truth-value arises from the combination of names and of names combination the from arises truth-value that asserts clearly ) Plato Sophist , with passagethe in question deleted. This assumption, 385 b2-d1 10 26 One obvious answer would be that the ) after ) 387c , followed, the in standard English CEU eTD Collection 28 nature. its to according thing each by dividing teaching is he B 1DKthat in statement Heraclitus’ echoing here is Socrates that and the capability of forming definitions belong to propositions orstatements. It is also very wellindependently possible capable of expressing essencethe of Butthings. that is hardly possible; or truth-value boththe andreference, meaning ofboth bearers are names that premise the true as weaccept if only possible is by distinguishing it from other thingsto encapsulating the thing’s essence in definition. This seems tobe philosophical truth, while ‘separating being’ refers to a range of meanings: from pointing outwhat a thing (2006, p.217 f) both functions eminentlyare in theservice of philosophy; ‘instructing’ means teaching particular object, and on the other marking it off from otherobjects or,better, beings. According to Sedley – a tool for separating for a tool – fashioned speechshould say of ita thingis firstly that elaborate much on these functions of names, but I think that, although closely related, they should be kept be should they related, separate. ‘Instructing’ closely ‘dividingand things’ (in although that, think I but of names, functions these on much elaborate consent his and their expresses Hermogenes readily nature, things to separate according it,we name says Isn’teach things. by naming Socrates, and that weinstruct also other, when do we precisely what know not he does that admits Hermogenes after answer this 27 ( teach us help to namesare of main functions the – this question to answer andprecise straightforward accomplishedby names as usageof the for activity the tools gives saying? Socrates of spontaneously itself present the inquisitiveto mind:is what the which ispurpose be to may aquestion asispurpose), has tissues separating cutting,activity which of performing that activity (in samethe way surgical as knifeis for natural the the tool natural for nature its and with tools own performed that names inaccordance were of Socrates. powerful the dialectic nochance against stand knowledge of theory Protagorean underlying the and naming of theory conventionalist wouldimply failurein name attemptthe to things. In way itthis is proven thethat of naming tools.Eschewing procedure this by usingappropriate with and essences their in accordance way,name in anatural them haveto rather but among citizens, agreement II and I that Consequently,if using names is a speech-action, it followswe from interimthe conclusions cannot of speech-action. using asort names isalso speaking, name therefore, action part of of the things according to our liking or even on the basis of Crat. 439d8 Crat. 388 b 9-10: ar' ou didaskomen tiallêlous kai tapragmata diakrinomen êechei; After Socrates establishedspeaking After Socrates saying or was an that which shouldbeactivity 27 . Now, by the end of the dialogue didaskô being ) one another something and separate ( andseparate something another ) one ) here probably mean on the one hand imparting positive information about a about information positive imparting hand one the on mean probably ) here 388 c 1 11 28 , Socrates points out to Cratylus that a well a name is said to be this and further on that it is diacrinô organon diakritikon tês ousias ) things. He gives Socrates does not does Socrates such CEU eTD Collection 30 of analogy the on persisting By blacksmith). a (probably performance its for necessary (lumberjackskills of two kinds of artisans are needed: the one who is proficientin performing it of fortool In for asawing performing be asawingact. order properly to the act executed, carpenter)is as asaw,for a in example, very same respect the for performing speech-acts, are tools andthe craftsmen responsible formanufacturing names. It was already establishedthe that names of authority the and one position the concerns itself imposes naturally that question Another who is an expert1.2 in manufacturingessences, which is actually what was to be proven,convey if and possible at all.encapsulate to power the have thenames is that that – issue truth-value whole tool of truth-value tonames, and, more importantly,because of the assumption underlying the attribution the surrounding inconsistency becauseabove the of exactly point, at this early naturalist theory of naming.ifwouldbe reasonable but it the about veryserious then enough,were true, Plato However, sounds his conclusion this it, of commitmentface the At aim. ultimate their to to approximation of suchlevel a theory is dubious evenlow areat names mostof the although essence, their to encapsulate but superficially, they nature; simply meantphilosophical not to are describelabel them or things functionsholdsboth that ofinstructing beingare separating and primarily of understand out its pointing through kind), same the to belonging (not things other the from off it marking by while with the earlier account of function of names( of function of account earlier with the you must first you 29 ( speech function of of account toiuton and such -protonmenhoti ekeinoestin,epeitahoti ekeino As I understand it to be, and as it is confirmed by Sedley (cf.footnote 22) Sedley (in 2006, p. 215) interprets this statement as follows:„ … A Nice Pair A Nice diacrinô ) and then ) anditsenumerating properties then genus proximus name didaskô (separating) as the usual way of defining a thing, or grasping its essence grasping or athing, defining way of as theusual (separating) yoursubject, then goon to (teaching or instructing) (teaching or asindicating the thing’s essential nature, and differentia specifica differentia 30 found in describe Cratylus 12 (toiouto) it didaskô “. . As Sedley itmentioned, was already 439 d8 ) to be in a similar way reconciled and to utter a complete statement ( (determining whatathingis diacrinô 29 . And in order for the later for the in . Andorder ), we would have to logos ), CEU eTD Collection notice the discrepancy in notice discrepancy the Demand Both this claim. support to reasons some quite are there and legislator(s), the of role indispensable in the convinced is truly Plato me that to seem tradition by the time the time the by tradition language an of was established originator of recognition anonymous an thatthe thesis the Sedley but advances of Socrates, side movethe on peculiar another yet seems as ( legislator or law-giver vocation, namely that of ( of a name-maker that namely vocation, ( construct names beliefthe heldpreviously just byHermogenes that any languagespeaker of a andcan assign themdiscards again once atthis point names. Socrates constructing of craft specific very the to things. At the contrary, that kind of craftsmanship interlocutor’s attention to the possessor of the craft ( so henot is readily Socrates: Hermogenes Fortunately, his again. perplexed directs used by teacher, the of product the manufacturer whenit tothe comes But that. person who will bein proficient using names, and have hisinterlocutor noproblems with capable of expressing properties (like motion, length, smallness, smoothness) of things, but the real point real the but of things, the that is here smoothness) smallness, length, motion, (like properties expressing of capable be can sounds the course, meaningfulOf only under the assumption of forms”. the theory, new allegedly into propounded in together sounds meaningful string to ability simple nomothetês introduce an apparent neologism, 31 determined in speaking tootherproductive activities, and back falling on functionsthe ofnames 35 34 Demand (1975, p.108)). dialogue introduction of neologisms; the the way the postulatingfor a personified nomos of notion the that hypothesis the advances Sedley Therefore, sources. 32 names, but also in ‘bringing them into currency’. 33 ‘ word the linked etymologists early the that is assumption The echo”. a faint than fifth-century etymological industry, a large-scale Sophistic enterprise of whichPlato’s technê Sedley (inSedley 2003, p. 69) inserts a very interesting remark on this point: “… Plato has Socrates Sedley (2003, p. 71) Demand (1975, p. 107) Sedley (2003, p. 70). He does that on the basis of the brief mention of Demand once again points out the deficiency of sources recognizing the recognizing of sources deficiency the out points again once Demand ’ (law) andthus brought out the idea that naming is some kind of lawmaking,which on itsturn paved ) is most rarely found among humans withand isassociated very of unusual kind Charmides , as if in recognition that the skill of institutionalizing a name is something far more than the than more far something is aname of institutionalizing skill the that inrecognition if as , technê 439 d8 , but recognizes the silence engulfing the mysterious legislator in the other ancient other inthe legislator mysterious the engulfing silence the but recognizes , possessed by a , Socrates picks out , Socrates nomothetês Cratylus 388 d nomothetês onomatourgos nomothetês, nomothetês , where Socrates firstintroduces that rarest of craftsmen, was composed was ) 31 is a ‘linguistic legislator’ efficient not only in contriving the . The introduction of the almost mythical legislators mythical almost the of introduction . The , ‘name-maker’, then immediately drop it in favor of favor in it drop immediately then , ‘name-maker’, onomatourgos is something much more elevated thansimple or several of them. of several or ho didaskalikos 13 32 . Even iftrue . Even were this ho têntechnênechôn ), who is at the same time called a , an instructor or teacher, as the teacher, or an instructor , nomothetês nomothetês nomothetês Cratylus 34 “… was a product of the onoma and Sedley in the probably earlier probably the in , that sounds are sounds that , Cratylus prior to Plato (cf. Plato to prior ’ (name) with ‘ 33 ), in this case , it not, does is no more no is 35 rightly ho CEU eTD Collection with this interpretation (besides the exegetical strain that it involves) is that nowhere else nowhere that is involves) it that strain exegetical the (besides interpretation this with and who can be interchangeably called both called interchangeably and who canbe activity of setting rules, but to a personal nomos dokei soi(einai)hoparadidous auta from analysis mentionedetymological the on based matter, the on view abovea different maintains (cf.however, Sedley, footnote 28): it was because the word establishing of serious about this one as well – itis at any rate peculiar to try to confirm the hypothesis be hewould then respect), in some atleastbe so, to heseems (and etymologies the about onomatourgos, 42 dialogue ( ‘law’,mean but rather ‘custom’ or‘habit’; and indeed Hermogenes’ claim from the beginning of the to one be the can anybody just not that says Socrates when supposed discreditmeant of whichis resulting to inetymological words pun position of the the a play uses here Plato that believes Demand later). shown be will it (as one right the not is often unfortunately, verdict, whose a legislator, even primarily, or isalso, name-maker 41 40 39 agreement. definite law or a rule set by a respectful person, but that they are simply a matterof convention and is that it is directed against Hermogenes’ extreme version of conventionalism. assignview his names ability collides supposed with to rule, custom, habit) – habit) custom, rule, very of honorable name the – Hermogenes instead perplexed of the answer the 38 37 36 given according are not disprove thatthenames was refute: to was exactlysupposed which Socrates or pointthe the Cf. Sedley (2003, p. 71) Demand (1975, p. 107) The idea behind the belief in the ‘cunning nature’ of Plato’s act of naming the name-giver a name-giver the of naming act of Plato’s nature’ ‘cunning the in belief the behind idea The “The law.“ names?“ with us provides “Who Crat. 388d9 Crat. 388 e 6-389 a 1 physei nomothetês. onomata hêmin ta Tisparadidôsin ho nomos 384 c-d relation between relation and byintroducingwords reality figure a whodoes by that nomothetês nomos – “Don’t you think it is the law who provides us with them (the names)?” ) is not that names are given and handed down to posteriority on the basis of a firm and firm of a basis the on posteriority to down handed and given are names that not ) is that the that who seems to be a , what is exactly the rival theory interrelatedness. is exactly language-world of rival theory the , what 39 ho nomosthesthai , nomothetês to and After all, her. sound Iagreewith like itof a play does words nomos nomothetês , butaccording to was so named.Thus, when Socrates says nomothetês is derived from his function set alawto also (but onomatourgos – which at least from an etymological point of 14 ; ho nomos 41 40 he is not referring to a depersonalized to referring is not he . The point is that if Plato were serious ; physis ho nomos 36 – asks Socrates, just tohimself give who passes down to us and . Here however, we find that the physei 37 onoma thesthai nomothetês . Interestingly enough, that enough, Interestingly . Nomos . 38 It turns out that the onoma is here not taken to 42 . The problem , but only an only but , wasderived ar’ ouchiho ar’ nomothetês onomata , CEU eTD Collection was already said (in said already was what reiterates Socrates on), later conclusion this challenge detrimentally, not if strongly, on the on devises. Again, approximately later,one Stephanus page while winding uphis discourse nomothetês endowed with the abilityissawing Andaccomplishhewood. how to is task? that onlyby Socrates resolute: being to look inthing, thesame blacksmithinway asthe embodies iron for tool the suitedexactly each to suited naturally name the embody in sounds be able to have to hewould function, while introducingexceptional that, that relates in artisan, properlyexecute order his to the later accounts laterof accounts the and early the between inconsistency the is aconclusion such to leading road royal The original benefactor in linguistic matters” linguistic in benefactor original investigation not of names,Forms. but inquirerthe toward direct inadequacy, its aim establish the with andto ultimately providerintends of names, Plato produce internal to intension the notion of very strong argument in support of the thesis that by introducing by that thesis the of in support argument strong very endowed with immaculacyabsolute regards as contrivinglinguistic tools.Thisfact is a structure of structure argumentative the is is name forwhich “abeing Furthermore, a search”. result: there word the analysis of etymological own Socrates’ 45 44 43 in Demand (1975, p. 108f) Ibid. Crat. 389d6 Cratylus nomothetês succeeding,has defeated itself from a name thatwe cannot learn from names: the circle is complete,and etymology, in gives names discussionwhich the asawholemakes: thatyou cannot learn from names. A The Nomothetes isbrought inagain and again simply because name his itself makes the verypoint isthe who can who perceive the Form of a given thing it and then with capture phonetic Cratylus – “Uponthat which is the name itself” , besides pronouncing winner Cratylus the of disputethe very (just to physei nomothetês 390 d-e nomothetês obviously does not support the notion of is acontradiction. is Butifthatis the then wecase, a sense,have, in learned ). First, name-giving). cannotbeinconsequentialfrivolous or referred to with the name . Using once again the analogy of other crafts, Socrates, crafts, other analogy of again the once . Using 44 . pros auto ekeinohoestin onoma 43 , and for that matter any of kind of 15 onoma in nomos, 421 a breeds utterly different utterly breeds as well as the fact that nomos 45 . He is an authentic an is He ho nomos as“personified Nomoethetes nomothetês nomothetês as the who CEU eTD Collection their manufacturers, however well-wishing and sincere they may be, are but fallible but are be, may they sincere and well-wishing however manufacturers, their because a dim best of reality, at reflection present coinednames meticulously most the vocabulary. lastingour philosophical ‘dialectic’ contributions‘quality’ to and arePlato’s nomothetai, were there that believed have might He interlocutors. his with pun justinmake to by invented order Plato purposefully fictional mean hecharacter, isa that andit, around dragging arewhirled Thus, with by them”. us endof the vortex of a kind into fallen have themselves name-givers the but all, at way that really beliefthe everythingthat isalwaysmoving andflowing,happens and asit things aren’t we use are consistent, but wrong. Then again, in beginning all andthuscausedadomino-effect with consequencethat the namesthatthe the at thing one named wrongly have might and mistakes to liable is used, is singular 47 mistakes. best working highlyhard men, liable out that they well wishing and to areatthough (he) nomothetês 46 in furthermore, c 4 more or less pejoratively about the speaks some briefly inthedialogue Socrates note where Letus of places the sounds. stringin of it appropriate look essenceof name uponthe then and a encapsulate ability to proneness commit to mistakes, which is that granted hardtoconceive, they the posses them attributes healso place), takes mythical craftsman almost of the occurrence multiple introducing besides everythingmonon ekeinontonapoblepontaeis onoma onhekastoto têphysei that Socratesinconsequential name-giverunusual the mustposses most andability, isidentifiedas: hasnon- that person. Second, be byachance performed cannot activity; consequently and to say about the Cf. Sedley (2003, p.69) Crat. 390e 1-2 – Socrates speaks of them (notice the plural) using irony in abundance, and abundance, in irony using plural) the (notice them of speaks Socrates Everything that has thus far been said about the about said been far thus has that Everything 47 and and as a matter of fact he himself was, in a sense, one of them – words like in of them – words asense,one was, fact he himself of anda matter as The moral of the story about the about story the of moral The nomothetai 436 c6-d3, „He alone who looks upon the name that each thing has by nature.“ ): “… The name-givers really did give them (the names) in clearly states that they, or rather he in this case, because in case, rather he this they,or that clearly states nomothetai nomothetês. (as opposed to opposed (as 16 nomothetês, It was already pointed out that in 439 c1-5 439 nomothetês. nomothetês (continuing to waver between to (continuing as is seems tome, is that even Later on in the dialogue, 388 bff may not necessarily not may 46 where the first . But that is not is that But . Cratylus nomothetês or , it turns it , 411 b3- CEU eTD Collection verdict of verdict 51 supervisor’s is not fully reliable. supervisor. Is it because his vision is imperfect? That might be, but it will turn out that evenmanufacturer, the who is somehowthe would why capable remains question to But the perceive the Form giveinstructions). to of entitled his product therefore and (e.g.experienced, a most name), have to have a the is user The thing. a imitates that one the and produces, that one the uses, that one the introduced: are uses the product, while the latterbeing the art that produces it( explicit formulation of a distinctionbetween superior and subordinate craft, theformer being the craft who makes the implement must ‘take his specifications’ from the man who is to use it” – whichwill later lead to 50 ofshuttle?) Form appropriate the name-forms of the words the latter coins words entitled to supervise the work of a which heoperates with tool of Form the appropriate the of real knower borrowed from is fieldtheuser,andthe of craftsmanship:not themanufacturer, as the is again by move,Socrates, given for this him. to rationale The assigned an overseer 390 b-e it morelearn Whateach name,and perfectly, from puzzling. even we thusmanufacture the makesof ability thesupposed supervisor into teacher the The transformation of teacher. answering questions and he is to be andheis answering asdialectician denominated to questions and in asking is expert he who be will legislator the of supervisor best the name: novel properthe user of names wasintroduced, first he is givenfurtherjob-description and a 49 accidental and casual, so also do our words.” manufactured bythe as user product of the the ascription of a special power over the over power special a of ascription the embody in sounds namesthe befitting naturally thethings. in The peculiarity question is during the initial discussion regardinghis craftfunction, and when heis said to be able to 48 themselves, and not by way of names. of heart very the I believe whatis gradually leadus they claimsas accept these theirto will,true, turn, on widely is andpracticed respected, inconclusiveeven misleading.or And if we wish to human beings Sedley Sedley,(in 2003,p.62) directly associates the instructoror dialectician of Taylor(in Taylor1926, p. 81) rightly points put that this is a matter of a general rule – “the manwho Cf. (for instance) (for Cf. Crat. 390 a 7-b 1– tis ounho gnôsomenos (ei) to prosêokon eidos kerkidos nomothetês There is yet another peculiarity in the account of of the in account the peculiarity another is yet There is that in order to be able to perform his duty properly, the legislator has to have Meno that to teach is to pose right questions which will prompt 48 to look to at the natural name eachof thing, orin other words at the Form of . Thisfurtherimply would etymology, although duringthat times Plato’s Tim. 35 c 2-4 – “ Cratylus – the conclusion –the thingsconclusion the that should bestudied through But as for us men, even as we ourselves partake largely of the 50 nomothetês, . In this section, however, unlike in nomothetês 17 nomothetês, Rep. 601 d-e: being very well-acquainted with the with well-acquainted very being to him who was at first introduced and referred to as instructor or anamnesis nomothetês, Therein actually three crafts three actually Therein ? (Who is then he who knows 51 Cratylus and thus ‘extract’ true , 49 or metaphysician , so is the user of which which appears with the 388 c when CEU eTD Collection outcome may be either that the postulated historical 54 53 be to again, once is, identifiedgood this with and philosophy.” instruments, as names with good highest the achieves whoever be to beexpected should name-user paradigmatic “The (ibid.): So Sedley reality. about truth ofthe expressive understanding that language is ultimately forphilosophy and that, if properly fashioned and used, should be 52 answering. antecedents naturally Asking mentioned. is them answer decipheringa key reality to position of the names. of correctness the determining him” supervise must be given well, adialectician are to or not names at all (therefore poor Hermogenes, who is not abundantly supplied with resources, is denied is resources, with supplied abundantly is not who Hermogenes, poor (therefore all at names or not but the strict theory of naturalism (having here Cratylus as its exponent) requires them to be either accurate text. ofthe 55 part concluding the in coined, were names when time the at absence dialectician’s task, or no supervisorat all. I will briefly mention the alternative outlook onthe situation, namely the and questions, ask to capacity dialecticians the introduces Socrates where between whatsoever) emphasis no (and flow anatural is There constrained. bit a seems questions knowledge from the soul. But his insistence that the dialecticians primary function is to ask, not to answer all a niceafter is not pair overseer and team seer of expert situation is not going to be favorable new the for of those outcome the who hold that mean may fast in turn, to the naturalistThis, theory: by a dialectician. the instructed and nomothetês work in harmony with the dialectician. If to the be becomesobliged thus well. He given guarantor that the generations thathistoricalcommit figureis to mistakesprone involuntarily and thus deceive the follows. But nowFurthermore, we are informed it form and then histranslate vision intowas why sounds, would heneed an overseer? that already he has showna supervisor, that the a kind of naturally fit supervise name-user, paradigmatic the to conjecture) (Taylor’s names areassigned names that namely theory, the of postulate fundamental the absurd to reduces unavoidably conclusion abovethe seems that reality. It to level approximation of isacertain name they at least occasionally commit blunders, and the best they can achieve in coining a As it turns out that the current names don't reflect the reality properly. The antecedents of such an ofsuch antecedents The properly. reality the reflect don't names current the that out it turns As Cf. Taylor(1926, p. 82). This additional appellation used for dialecticianthe points out indirection of the This does not necessarily mean that no name whatsoever is properly assigned to a thing orphenomenon; athing to assigned is properly whatsoever name no that mean necessarily not does This Crat. 390d5 The problem with the dialectician, as I see it, is that he further compromises the wants perform wants to his dutifully andwork be correctly,he supervised hasto nomothetês. nomothetês physei 52 . Socrates leaves no room for doubt on this matter: “And if names if “And matter: this on doubt for room no leaves . Socrates , which as a further consequence has the idea that semantics is has ideathat , which as afurtherthe consequence 55 If the latter is endowed with the ability to look upon aname- upon look to ability the with is endowed latter the If . will complete his job satisfactorily, and that the names will names the that and satisfactorily, job his complete will nomothetês 18 nomothetês, had a supervisor which was not up to his to up not was which supervisor a had nomothetês 54 even if accepted by Plato as a – despite their best intentions best their –despite 53 390 c7 . So the dialectician is the dialectician the So . and also instrumental in , where his ability to 390 c5 CEU eTD Collection across across different language and still theirnatural preserve standforappropriateness to operate to fit are names the itself that name the butof object, of the not Form, particular a with their relation through It is exactly manufactured. are names the which Form, after in andbeing encapsulated archetypal separating the Name. aimto at correctness andis accuracy, topreserve the function instruction providingof rules oneof grammar. thing But languages that namesacross should fulfill,if professing different and devises orthographic different systems, phonetic different use naturally languages as long function.different point hereisthat asthe name its The answers is free to use, in non-literal sense, different materials, orembody itin differentlanguages, syllables). 3)Although thefunction isof a name Form, byits determined the is, the truepreserving itsfunction, what he actually does is encapsulating the Form, orthe namename as it specificWhen thinganddistinguishingfashioning itfrom ( 2) name others. the the while Hermogenes’ if it opinion) be should at all an toolforappropriate instructinga about a name cannot bein mind the function ithas toperform,constructed i.e. to instruct and separate beings. In other words, freeisnamekeep fashionsounds itany not of to way hepleases, tobuthave the a thing, whimsically or just by random choice (in opposition to 56 ambiguous or attached names,of improperly the naturalists number are obligedincreasing to eitherwith faced modify ordrop the Therefore, theory altogether. refute. to quick is Socrates the inquiry into language is the best and only way of inquiry and discovery of truth ( the simple truth to be that anybody who knows a thing’s name knows also the thing itself, as well as that found among humanbeings’ – the rarely ‘most craftsman the to with, sticks craftsman ordinary an principles the of transfer a of result and here, are all they attention main ideasdeserving There arethree dialogue. intriguingmost andprobably mostthe controversial advancedtopic inthis part of the speech, while he himself is not good at devising speeches (Cf. speeches devising at good is not himself he while speech, contrived who god the was –Hermes basis different but on all, after Hermogenes not is he that concedes Hermogenes ofgods, names onthe speech ofSocrates’ course the in enough, Interestingly name. given his names fashioning of process the about At this point it might be helpful1.3 to make a short recapitulation of what Socrates says Based on Taylor(1926, p. 81) The Name-Form Theory So the mainSo the is problem at this juncture thenotion of unchanging paradigm or ekeino ho estin onoma estin ekeino ho nomothetês. 56 , which will lead us back to the most important, most the to back us lead will which , 19 ), in the appropriate material and material (sounds appropriate in the ), 1) The 1) 408 b-c nomothetês, )). Cratylus also claims ( while embodyingwhile in 435 8 e ) – which nomothetês 435 d 3-4 ) CEU eTD Collection names”. of craftsman be a can anyone not that and names natural have things that saying name consists in expressing the naturequalification. special no with of person itsrandom be any cannot giver referent, the thing. beand the name- activity, just“So cannot unplanned, chance name-giving some Therefore, Cratylus Form. the or with, endowed is it isforce the right deliver can name the whether is incounts languages,different aswell. Even etymological the meaning maybe Butwhat different. may The to apply letters. same in isdifferent embodied that name the of force is the it that idea the relays on Socrates subtracted? areaddedor letters some reasons, historical in dueto the casewhen, language, same languages,but within also the only across to the naturalist theory: how is it possible to ascribe a nature to a doctrinename of the existencewhich of Forms ofnamesdiffers, thus answers the most detrimentalnot objections name stands, and that isname mentioned separating beings and teaching stands, that already and the spoken when power or have sameforce still the but andsyllables, letters intheir they differ polemarchus captures its being.differentsense, still but properly signify thingin the question, provided itsuccessfully Socrates gives,according to different phoneticamongsigns, rules.in different embodied It be may even a name may shapes, be some so fashioned different slightly into as to shaped and conveyothers, a slightly the example materialskinds out canbeproduced artifact of a similarwayas of different any other of the namesAnd in shape.the is neithernor which it material of composed, dictate the not name does he is an equally good to prosêkonhekastô) onomatos eidos apodidô translate into sounds: “Provided he gives thingeach the form nameof it suited( to 59 metal. 58 57 things. Itis up to the 61 60 Cf A table may be made out of wood, glass etc, while a sword may be produced out of different kinds of Cf. Sedley (2006, p. 218f) Crat. 390a4-6 Crat. 390d9-e 1 . Crat. 394 c 59 Thus Socrates safely concludes (or at least so it seems) that the correctness of a of correctness the that itseems) so least at (or concludes safely Socrates Thus 61 . What it must be able to do, is to fulfill the function for which the Form of the And Hermogenes is almost forced, by the strength of Socrates’ arguments to , eupolemus nomothetês nomothetês (leader, war-lord, good-warrior), which all signify general – , assisted by the dialectician, to capture the Form and whether he is inGreeceorabroad.” he whether 20 , no matter what syllables it is embodied in, is embodied it syllables what matter no , 57 The Form of a 60 to tou . The . agis 58 , CEU eTD Collection are based on a meticulously argued theory which to isan naming, according a name ameticulously are basedof argued theory on etymologies in the favor seriousness of of of inthe utter Sedley’sthe problematic argument somewhat Euthyphro etymologizing, while of but of seriousness as aconfirmation the jokeinspired asa is assumed is he claim Socrates’ that hedoes perceive not instanceasacontra-argument: uses this to be trulywas almostscorned and ridiculed dialogue. intheeponymous Sedley, hand, other the on versed becauseis probably the character same wisdom. This interlocutor’s superhuman by his in the science became day possessed thus and that earlier he hadaconversation with whom Euthyphro of etymology influence oftheinspired by himself surprised confession powerful heis Socrates’ the that fordecisive the prove satirical nature of etymologicalthe section specifies Taylor part of commitment to the given etymologies.true without Taylorchange, certainly constant of has theory a negative outlookHeraclitean the on of this inaccuracy the show to way a far-fetched tobe serious, and thus bestat akind of satire on somebody or something or it proclaiming tooinaccurate too haveetymologizing, scholars Socrates’ disregarded Euthyphro everbussied himself withetymology. 64 ofetymology. means the 63 through extracted Socrates that of words meanings Barney,has in lastthe 130 years (since Grote) assumed that Plato might have believed the in hidden 62 more than phonemes) the halfelements, primary of the of thecharacter dialogue onomatopoetic the of account brief ( The etymological section of the 1.4 elaborate and controversial enterprise of etymological analysis of words. launch further forto Hermogenes Socrates asks persuasion, andthatthe compels his, and, as somebody said, to change a habitis more difficult than to move a mountain. comply, but resents doing it, because the opposite used to be a long-held conviction of Cf. Sedley (1998, p. 145ff) The problem with this approach is the lack of independent Cf. Taylor(1926, p.88) prove that Cf. Sedley (1998, p. 140) He mentions there that almost nobody, with few rare exceptions including Etymology as‘Enigma Machine’ for DecipheringReality Cratylus 63 , and even pronounces it nonsensical. It is interesting to note that as a as that note to interesting is It nonsensical. it pronounces even and , Cratylus (which is the position he endorses) is that “the etymologies “the that is endorses) he position the is (which 391 –427 Cratylus is very lengthy; isvery (together with it the occupies ). Nevertheless, most of the 20 21 64 th century Plato century . Yet another . Yet 62 , or CEU eTD Collection was not linguisticbuthidden meaning discovering pedantry, carefully the in encoded epoch of the spirit the neglect because they target miss the truly objections aforementioned More generally, the other. each reinforcing as rather but considered inconsistencies, as not were multiple etymologies that believed ‘real’ hidden meaning of anddwelling words not superficialities, on as well as they that the discovering on themselves prided ancients the that fact the out point to examples himeros oiônos (historia) intohumanthought(oiêsis) interpreted as the use of reasoning ( asthe useof reasoning interpreted gives of theexamples objectors, disagreeingthe with there are that they are overly fanciful and often differ from text to text. Sedley totext. from text differ andoften fanciful are overly they that are there Phaedo was already very widely practiced, especially with regard to divine names” with to especially regard very practiced, was widely already if all,time,by “etymology grammar washardly, at although Greeks: Plato’s developed linguistics. ancient of branch important an as etymology for as well as name-derivations of host of the in sense) leastsome (at seriousness caseforthe make astrong itself that text the a pretty serious tool in argumentation. Still, there are further arguments and indications inabsurd,which toreality is names to aresignposts than a way reduceCratylus’ position to it butcouldjoke;have been be to a elaborate namesis too of really theory correctness of imply that Plato truly the theory believesnamingof in isquestion ‘meticulously butinargued’, my opinion doesnotthat that semantics is the key to reality. His exposition of the coincide (Cf.Barey p.2001, 47) 70 69 68 67 of the etymogizing in Dervenithe Payrus. 66 65 the in – etymology of use makes often, too not although ( analysis ontological objective for tool crafted expertly It is of utmost importance to note that the ancient and the modern concept of etymology do not fully Cf. Sedley (1998, p. 142) Ibid. Cf. Ibid. Also Cf. Barney, (2001, p. 50f) where etymology is confirmed as established Sedley,(1998, p.141) practice on the basis Phaed.244 c – the bird of augury), as well as the inconsistencies between the etymology of First of all, the practice of etymology was not at all foreign to the spirit of ancient of spirit the to foreign all at not was etymology of practice the all, of First ( (desire) as presented in the aspresented (desire) Cratylus aside) 67 . Now, very common objections to the etymologies expounded etymologies the to objections common very Now, . dianoia 69 Cratylus (instead of (instead much the simpler derivation from 22 ) to bring intelligence( and the and 70 . The goal of the ancient etymologists ancient the of goal The . 385 e-390e Phaedrus oiônistikê Timaeus . He uses these two (augury) is which ).” nous , 65 Laws It is a fact that ) andlearning 66 . Plato also, , Republic 68 , , CEU eTD Collection accurate to offer: it is the one principle that sustains, carries sustains, is that it principle one the to offer: accurate Buthe itsbody), leaving occurs. hassomethingmoremore death the (probably due to called is it – ‘soul’ of etymology the of opinion whole of nature ( ( soul and body to given names the of analyses example: such one just to attention our turn briefly point, tenets in the guise of etymological derivations of of words inderivations of etymological guise tenets the Barbarians”. the and “Hellenes the for both true etymology andcombineditmakeswas matter, approach to jocular theserious with saidabove, what a as or lightly etymology take not did ancients the that show to was digression short everyone or he who consumes the entire creation at the end of the cosmic cycle. This same roots; thus from thus roots; same meaningsfrom canbelanguage,due tothe richnessthe deduced different Sanskritof Furthermore, assistance. of kinds all them offering him, to devoted those of side the by in so association, of ispervasion understood sense the the more aregiven: fanciful interpretations But then them.other, havingbeings, created – spread through, or again in the 70 Therein the name the Therein to a hymndedicated emancipation) section, Vishnusahasranamastotram 73 72 71 famous the in older), much it holds tradition the although in the tradition: another from more meanings was notconsidered as a fault but an advantage. Let us borrow an example or namecombines two one that Finding out names. weredivine if especially those words, Indian epic Indian anapsychon These are both English synonyms of synonyms bothEnglish are These Crat. Cf Sedley (1998, p. 152ff) Vishnu 399 d – 400 c Furthermore, itdoes seems thatPlato some propound his of basicphilosophical is he who pervades the entire universe as the World Soul, or he who enters all hewhoenters World or Soul, asthe universe entire pervades the is he who ) the body by giving it the power to breath, and when this refreshing is no is refreshing this when and breath, to power the it bygiving body the ) Mahabharata th 72 . Itis derived from verbalroot the . Socrates first of all presents what he betheestablished believes what of first. Socrates all to presents he physinocheikaiechei vis –visati Vishnu vish –veshati appears thrice: once in the first stanza, than in the 28 (eulogium comprised of names of (eulogium comprised 1000 of (loosely dated sometime between sometime between dated 400 BCandAD, (loosely – to enter, – to and this are the basic interpretations of namethe Anushasana Parva Anushasana ocheô. or vevishati 23 ), which is very much in accordance with inaccordance much very is which ), psychê (the book of instructions) of the lofty the of instructions) of book (the vish –vyapnoti , so , because itgives because refreshes lifeand Vishnu 71 Vishnu . Let us, in order to illustrate this Mokshadharma becomes he who is always who he becomes becomes he who subdues who he becomes 73 Shri Vishnu and holds supports, the –to pervade, permeate, Vishnu (the way of , entitled , ) is placed. ) th , and , CEU eTD Collection 78 whole. a as dialogue inthe and section 77 scale. the to under falls of knowledge object a as which Sun, the offspring, its about to talk instead agrees and that, do to tries if he himself disgrace and ridicule would he that professes most important thing to know, but we have no adequate knowledge of it, then of it, knowledge adequate no we have but know, to thing important most onomata ta doxanechontesetithento autois tôn antrôpôn,hênpotetina skepsometha peri …alla is( naming gods the subjectas such anelevated about themselves and their names, and promises to limit his speech to the ‘beingSocrates, man’, anintelligent lack confesses his realmboth of utter knowledge about of human to note that when it comes to sacred, highly intricate matters as important are the namesis also It of the gods, matter. the on authority firm as be regarded cannot simply such being and sometimes arebadlymistaken, but succeed, almost sometimes make itthey right, Sometimes concepts. and things of names the coining while error into mislead often are nomothetês as away deciphermeaningsto but the so not orwords, to allegedlythe specially qualified 76 75 74 itismaker, provided that done” properly name- of the beliefs the access to offers etymology “that Galen’s opinion Sedley quotes joke the in analysis etymological the took commentator the understanding is,not original, although still an eminently found in doctrine,Platonic both ithasbecause someis securely, which there kept analogy, based atextbook nowbecome has by what employs Socrates latter, of the nature out the point on a play of words as themover soul the of own understanding Plato’s – the body is the tomb (sôma – sêma) of the soul might have thought about how names express reality. Elsewhere ( in the presented of etymologies the names for ‘season’ and ‘year’ Socrates explicitly says explicitly Socrates ‘year’ and ‘season’ for names Ibid. Cf. Sedley (1998, p. 142). Although there are quite a few entertaining moments both in the etymological Crat. Tim. 34 c Laws 896b,Phaed. 245 c Phaedo 77 , still allots a somewhat ambivalent position to the etymologies in the dialogue. in the etymologies the to position ambivalent somewhat a allots still , 401 a2-5 All the aforementioned, jointly with the observation that virtually no ancient no virtually that observation the with jointly aforementioned, the All ) 76 . and the and or nomothetai The entire passage may be compared with compared may be passage entire The Phaedrus . It is shown time and again throughout the dialogue that they that dialogue the throughout again and time isshown It . . So, it seems that Plato does pay serious heed to etymology Cratylus 78 , and that is exactly what might be true of most 24 : if there was a name-giver, this is what he Rep. 505 a diken didonai 74 and master Cratylus eiper to eikoseidenai boulei peri autôn (theôn) oudenhêmeis peri autôn(theôn) , where the Good is said to be the doxa section of the epistemological to be an over-extended to (to pay a penalty). (to This 506 d – e 75 410 c5 of the body. Trying to , where Socrates where , ), discussing the doxa : “if : CEU eTD Collection Names do notdepict reality,butetymology can help aman of penetrating intelligence all. after discipline, admirable isan etymology things; of nature the about deep truths uponsome superiority andintellectual touches and heprowess his againproves once venture etymological the on embarking by but himself, etymologist an not is example, for Socrates, results. commendable yieldsome can investigation etymological the reflection andmuch After deep indirectly. imperfectly, and often though effort theirabout referents, beings. Still, they are worthwhile the pursuing, because names sometimes dospeak tous obviousfurther arbitrariness indrawingnature fallible ofthehuman reflecting the them, reality, due to their belonging to the for grasping realmeventool or preferred, be perfect, the cannot simply they that but together, of be all discarded arenotto investigations etymological me,the is that seems to as it to confirm his believes. seemedfirst asaway at which analysis, meansetymological of elaborate the employing was a aswell,great dramatist andhemighthave hisCratylus used todefeat expertise by for beingtheory philosopher,Forms; introduction the besides of Plato’s Plato agreat of pretty serious one: refuteto the Heraclitean theory of constant flux and thus pave a the way was aim ultimate its all, at intended pun was there If time. to time from adhered he also secondly etymology was well disciplineestablished and respected inhis times, towhich physei the other hand, however, if we accept the underlying assumption that the 400 c well into his own philosophical system (the already mentioned already (the system philosophical own his into well fit certainly presented etymologies the of some firstly, founded; firmly not is analysis perform was conducting byhavingSocrates Plato etymological the a‘gigantic leg-pull’ that assumption the hand, other the On referents. their to naturally belong not do names the right tool for determining the correctness of names, or if itis, it only shows that the 79 the of the on dwell to not is dialogue the of purpose real the that is note to point important know youto mustlook you fact…”. probablethe However, wantto the an truth… If the names were givenby orthotes tôn onomatôn. , by observing the name-forms, then their ) nomothetês, anêr All in all, the moral that should be drawn from thelongest section of the dialogue, ( 414 a ), (regardless of (regardless orimaginary)discuss present, whether of ancient, butto doxa nomothetai (420 b-c), the second occurrence of secondoccurrence b-c), the (420 79 A natural conclusion to draw would be that etymology is not , then their correctness would naturally depend on their depend naturally would correctness their , then doxai 25 would fall off the picture. the off fall would doxa , a fact which as consequence has the which asconsequence fact , a nomothetai epistêmê psychê gave the names the gave and ( 437 a soma ) etc.), and doxai ( 439 d- doxa . On CEU eTD Collection theory theory he wasproving anddefendingby –the naturalism. Hedoesthat seemingly trying the nextlaunches Socrates of formidable attack disputes, As an master unassailable 1.5 philosopher the by applied method right the be cannot etymology reality, grasping in the account in. transpositionand to the stabile world reinterpretation ofdrastic Forms,their instead requires oftask that but their presentthem; in truth reference to Platonic the transientof eminently a grain world wediscover live in the presented as etymologies also represents a distinct and genre oftenemployed opponent, Plato’s in works. imaginary Barney the concludes thatover although the superiority overall and stamina intellectual resourcefulness, his exhibits interpretation and thus cannot be taken as authoritative; c) it is an agonistic display duringSocrates’ etymological whichaccount involves Socrates form distancing event’ the first-person an‘inspired position, demandsb) as further a representative; as himself Cratilus having ofetymologizing, practice intellectual of contemporary reconstruction a rational presents a)it out: singled are etymologizing of Socrates’ features 82 Meno onomata methodpreferred of deal Plato’s dialecic, whichdoesn’t andsemantics of phonetics with 1964) and Kahn (Kahn 1996, p47) falls not long before the Plato’s mind in the time of writing this dialogue,since its date of composition, as argued by Luce (Luce implicitly it, abandons Socrates analysis, etymological of method the of jurisdiction of dialectic. In other words, after paying due attention and makingmost out investigation has tobe applied –studying things through isForms, which under means of andanother tobeimpotent, shows etymology layers reality, of of deepest the cosmos. the of fluidness in the field of cosmology, especiallyby recognizing andrecording the instability and the (borrowing anAristotelian firstterm) philosophy, the ancients had some genuineinsights predecessors’ although do that, wellinthat teachings not reveals they and did axiology 81 80 outpointed by Sedley sharpens the mind, asan which can exercise inphilosophical excellent beunderstood also isolation.taken It of case the in andshown (as things of nature the that about truths important some unveil is very much what Socrates does in this section. Next, as InBarney (2001, pp. 46-70) we find a very systematic analysis of the etymological section. Therein three The dialectical method is not directly touched upon in the upon touched directly not is method dialectical The Sedley,(1998, p.150f) Against Naturalism and , but with Phaedo , in both of which versions of the method are presented. are method ofthe versions of which both , in Cratylus logoi Still, when itStill,comes when tocreating andthediscovery big the picture 80 . And that is the most important lesson that the etymological lessonthe that important is most the . Andthat paradoxically teaches us: names are inappropriate tools us:names inappropriate forteaches are paradoxically Cratylus , the etymological analysis seen as a survey of Plato’s are intrinsically misleading, their value lies in the possibility to 26 Republic Cratylus , and loosely in the same period as the , but was certainly very much on 81 in favor of 82 psyche . ) CEU eTD Collection imperfect and incomplete pictures. incomplete and imperfect should consist of hundred units. Therefore, evenif we take the names to picture naturereality, of theywhat theycan at mostare applied be to ( the opposite of hardness ( 87 86 foundationof theorythe of naturalism, before undertaking the project ofits rebuttal. (Dereti 85 image imageis imperfect an Evenan a thing. essenceof the capture still may thing resemble or imitate imperfectly that names even that claims conversations, the course, 84 the nature of one of the things that are.“ is” itself each heexpresswhat has, wouldn’t thing each essence being and imitate this that or thing syllables inletters someone wereable to This is, presented in the briefest possible manner, the mimetic theory of names of theory mimetic the manner, possible briefest in the presented is, This essences. have also which largeness, softness, hardness, motion, like properties, express level of elementsportrait-like resemblance with things, down levelto the lowestthe word-analysis,of the represented of akind establish and imitations vocal are names so the imitation reality, of pictorial bybeing essence or both of andthings qualities sounds, whichto buildmanage elements the do how still But names. of not elements, of upcomposed are that a primary, carrycorrect some derivative thesemantic nature of value:name?theirstoikheia referent, Onthey the agaston strength and the derivative ofagathos their manage power names ( with starting derivative discovered, their components to todoand analyzed be imitatemay that names the Similarly, colors. individual by of level the wereach till the themeanssubcomponents, and components further with of parts, many of is composed theit that notice Socrates draws the analogy of a painting. We can easily imagine a picture of a man, and 83 of nature a thing in the succeed expressing names the how interlocutor) his still point this is at (who Hermogenes to explain to Socrates later on gives the example of the word This is what Dereti what is This Cf. Crat. 423e6-8 Crat. 422d1-2 Crat. Socrates, unlikeSocrates, juncture joinsapproximately Cratylus,his who the at and ( names primary the , then , which are the individual phonemes. Now, names are correct when they express they when correct are names Now, phonemes. individual the are which , 423 e 1-4 nomothetês. thoon : „Now, the correctness of every name we analyzed was intended to consist in expressing . ü calls a phonemo-analytic model, the last move in the attempt to check the check to attempt the in move last the model, aphonemo-analytic calls (‘admirable’ down and most ‘fast’), the to elementary parts, Crat. 434 d Crat. 435 b ), as well as of the names of the numbers, which do not reflect the prôta onomata ) – a name properly expressing the nature of ‘hundred’ sklerotes 83 27 ( 422 bff 84 (hardness), where the ‘ the where (hardness), . So, in the same way as a picture is ) which constitute them – in this case 86 . And the one who does that is, of ). In order to answer question, to ). In this order hystera onomata l ’ is supposed toexpress 87 . That claim may claim That . ü 2001 p. 41) 85 ) –like . “So if ta CEU eTD Collection 93 92 91 90 statements text the and like slips probablespeak the truth’ throughout ‘Iwill ignorant about gods and names’ and gods about ignorant names” about know to easy isn’t certainly it and about, know to difficult’ very inquiry in thefirst principles, which are theForms steadfast through directly, them know isto way That names. their through except things know the way to mustbe another there as true,then accept hasto Cratylus which premise had been given for them to know?” names any hadbefore knowledge rule-setters orthe namegivers the possibly that claim we can how names, their from except learned be cannot if things “So, them: naming to prior things the known not have must legislators the then name, its know is to a thing know ifmeant challenges thing,Socrates the himbysaying knowingway to that only the name the knowing that claimed Cratylus since Secondly, Heraclitean. of instead ontology motion, Eleatic of instead principle, as a rest establishes rendition The alternative 89 88 good asalways itself good the beautiful, asalways itself beautiful identify the to able weare contrary, at the identity of andparticulars, would make certainly toknowanything allattempts futile. But Forms,allow arguingfor wouldnot that the-always-changing-universe preserving the of theory Plato’s postulates strongly and flux theory, the of inadequacy the addresses ones previously given,themselvesconfirming expressingor the theory fluxof ( does that on two bases. Firstly by offering contradictory etymologies which refute the names in knowledge.He of andacquiring ineffectiveness true of matter the the proclaim deconstructand to theory the allows naturalism Socrates hewasseemingly upholding,of isall.legislator at notalegislator leads himin stubborn numberattitude His of aporiai, a bad isa name not that all, and at name given a badly that considering this notion, to objects strongly Cratylus But level. same the on are legislators all not consequently, lead to the conclusion that not all names are perfect imitations of things, and Cf. Cf. Cf. Cf. Crat. 384b1-2 Crat. 438b5-7 Crat. 425 c Crat. 410 c 5 Crat. 439 c-d Crat. Socrates’ Socrates’ opening linein the 439 b 5-6 . 90 , and therefore the theory of constantchange cannotbe true. 93 etc, but still accepts the challenge and undertakes the undertakes challenge and the still accepts but etc, 88 Cratylus But if they did have some knowledge of them, a 28 is very is very indicative in itself: “’fine are things 89 . Finally, Socrates again once Finally,Socrates . 91 92 437 a-d , says he, , ‘weare ). CEU eTD Collection 94 dialogue isof illustrated very final point This with things. wittily in Socrates the the remark nature real the grasping of matter the in analysis phonetic and etymology of inadequacy proclaim theory the naturalism, naming finally of only of andthe to arbitrariness the into elements conventionalist some introduces and being) and values to comes it (when flux constant of theory the of absurdity the shows argumentation, own his deconstructs he on Further change. and motion incessant of ontology “Heraclitean” of favor in go presentedthere etymologies The analysis. it extensiveetymological with supports further thetheory for of Then naturalism and argues as persuasivelypossible Protagoras. of quasi-ontology underlying the and names of correctness of theory conventionalist refutation the of straightforward but ina prolonged, discussion with the dialogue the initiates he Thus names. of correctness the about truth the determining of enterprise big Hermes who escorts viewsee Cratylus his of the capacity tothecountryside, onhisto son way asagood of souls to Hades.in all, after isHermogenes opposite, the accepted in discussion of the course who the Thus at the very end of the which are capable of picturing and depicting reality, or the forms the distant remain wouldor reality,which anddepicting of arecapable picturing must either benames there eristic than yet device, another Plato’s wasnot forms doctrine inconsequential,andbe simplymustnot overlooked. If introduction the of name-the theory of ifnaming, done with andconviction faith’ in‘good wouldn’t be theory of Forms is so crucial and prominentin Plato’s system, that its association with the finally burrowing,stops is and that introduction the of doctrinethe name-forms. of The reality. But there myof areultimately anegative one. Names capable not understanding, of delivering still remainsPlato’s position on onethe grave issue to be1.6 The Problem of the Name-Forms settled before the worm of doubt even or contradictory. inconclusive art, anadmirable although be, from proven has learn to learn from we cannota nameagain Etymology names. that Crat. 440 e 4 94 : Although neither a wealthy person nor a very Although speaker, noravery eloquent: neither Hermogenes, awealthy person , as pointed out in the editor's footnote. editor's the in out pointed , as orthotes onomatôn orthotes tôn 29 as presented in the dialogue is, to the best the is,to inthedialogue presented as Cratylus we once CEU eTD Collection a name identical with the Form of the object of of is onceagain which it Form object and a name aname, with of thus the identical name-forms. It seems meto that the principle of self-predication would make the Form of self-predication of Forms might directly. things be used as a further argument against the existence of denies here Socrates what isalso that and intermediary, an for such aneed postulates Plato does proper one, namely a Form, orits reflection in the sensible realm)? Nowhere in his works it a (be and object of knowledge the knower between the acting intermediary to, or asan it forapplies Form representingthe particular ‘do’ the of name-forms universe except of forms, corresponding to each particular word will follow. But what would this complex the present edition of the semantic link between language and linkbetween semantic world” the multiplication offurther needed the ofnaturalism. thesis Socrates suchaconcept to(initially) Plato’s beings. doctrine of name-formsFirst was presented with an aimthe different that then it appears a conclusion at first to sight – lead may it have we as argument of the of development – the not all there will be “a Form of Name in general, the statements ( together with an action by means of a name and a verb, or in other words to complete the thing”. ( thing”. the 97 96 95 the outside opus Plato’s in mention no is absolutely there which (of forms However, it seems ideal situated differentstages on paradigms,with words the them.of approximation to hardly viable that Plato was really upholding the theory of name- combinations of of the theverdict with conflict direct about correctness of names invalid. The of andtheory true falsenames also stands in of followingthe reasons: In opposition to Cratylus, who notoriously claims “… that anyone who knows a thing’s name also knows also name thing’s a knows who anyone “…that claims notoriously who Cratylus, to opposition In Kahn (1996, p. 365) Soph. 262e 97 In a similar way, but from a slightly different point of view, Plato’s doctrine of Furthermore, the introduction of name-forms would result in an unnecessary result name-forms would of introduction the Furthermore, The fallacy of division, if committed at all, would make the whole argument whole the make would all, at if committed division, of fallacy The , by suggesting end nearthe of the 435 d 4 logoi ) ) onomata 95 . So,is he contradicting himself in this case? I think that (if we accept and Cratylus rhemata, as authoritative, despite Sedley’s intervention) he is intervention) Sedley’s despite asauthoritative, Sophist: to speech ( 30 Cratylus therein Plato attributes truth-value only to only truth-value attributes Plato therein 96 , after which an entire array of name- ( logos 439 b ) produced by puttinga thing ) produced ) that itis better to know the Cratylus ), out ), CEU eTD Collection naming – which cannotin of for somearbitrariness kind allowing of all while essence the a thing,the express be evaded across form is essence the ideal supposed itsthe is,does embodying of name, part, on which to languages.a name- What away. in such structured inreality Butperform would that aname-form function is exactlymultitude a that whatForm uniform a in the of acommon is things allotted name.see cannot Isimply what separate or unique Formparticipation its to due also is it Finally, it. to relation participate in it, as well as on the epistemological, because knowledge is possible only in reignsbeingitprovides supreme ontological onthe – plane to Form arenamed.The its which according tokens to is that type a certain universality of essential the separates which notion or concept hypostatized the So Forms. those passage, Aristotle says that the sensible things are named (or spoken – spoken of (or arenamed things sensible the that Aristotle says passage, called Forms…any sensible thing, asthey were always Things changing. of sort, other this hethen, “( of anotherfor kind this – reason,that commonthe definition benotcould adefinition of heldtestimony “Plato… thatthe problem to any applied not sensible thing butto entities the realm of refutation, through the art of dialectic ( of dialectic art the through refutation, means something being understanding or Knowing phenomenal. the not able noumenal, the terminology) to give an accountcommon or definition place of Plato's haveof thethat same philosophything function, andHow are we i.e.to distinguish defend between these two distincttothat Forms, whenprovide they both, as it seems, knowledgeit fromus with thing?alla definition is Then possible the of Forma particular of particular theForm that of duty separatingisn’t essence the resembling thething. But a onlyname has thing?of to (tofit It useperfectlyis a Kant’s and representingby itdoes hisnature, forthat or essence, separatinginstrument thing’s thean is Forma name that text) the in ofearlier thementioned (as saying of way thing another is which being, it refers dividing and teaching too. for a tool instrument, an is name A referent. name’s the of essence a ‘Form’ a nameof whichisits Form because it naturally and unmistakably the captures be applicable to them as well, and thus we would end up with apretty strained concept of should self-predication of sameprinciple the name-forms If are there separate. standing, makes Forms,the themself- “saturates” The principle ofself-predication redundant. noesis Met. 987 b 4-7 Met. 987 , or the world of Forms. Furthermore, according to Aristotle’s ). It might be interesting to note that, in the same in the that, note to interesting be might It ). Rep. 534b 31 ). And dialectic, on its part, deals with deals part, its on dialectic, And ). ta aisthêta legesthai which ) after CEU eTD Collection many Forms that are completely separate from others.” ( others.” from separate completely are that Forms many single Form that’s outside them, orsingle a form that’s connected asaunit throughout many wholes,or the others. In addition he can discriminate Forms that are different from eachdiscriminating other but included a single within Form a spreadof adequately be capable out he’ll “… all throughuniqueness their a lot preserve still of but other, other each things, to point eacha relation, of which stands separate from necessarily jeopardizes their simplicity and immutability. They (especially the involve use of of involveaccounts, use are fallible alternative butthe soldiers; things –knowingthe through must themselves – understandpossible to the things independently names of is very significant. The names mustit be that endof dialogue the the near claim Socrates’ beings. accurately represent nomothetês’ not support the existence of name-forms. He alsoallows for significant diminution of the naturalism in sense, strong the allows for arbitrariness in naming and consequently does of theory advance the not does here Plato investigation. with the proceed to how solution has besoughtbeyondto reality, or the languageand between problemof the relation it to comes when language.of Therefore, reliability origins the into inquiries subsidiary some as well as analysis, phonetic and etymological of of language appliance through examined expressions those of semantics the withinterrelatedness, regard to and theirthe their designata to linguistic expressions of attribution he the considers quest for the ultimate truth, a 98 entities are conceived assimple Forms proper Butthe name. would make a Form of namea a composite Form, consisting of Forms of the parts of that participate in a Form. The same principlecomposed might be applicable to the letters as well.Cratylus Thatof true wouldcomponents, turn out toand be impossible. itsome seems kind which is a “bed ideal”; thus we end upwith two identicalthat but ideas,separate whichis of complex they, in itself reveal a Form,the latter participates isit tobed.But objective supposed the inentities. orderbecause “bed” bebutan“idealbed”, name could Form the the of what an understanding, to A bename, true,itself does,and the name-form remains ghost-like aredundant, entity. Inthelightof such on havethe theory to of the Idon’t think that the doctrine of It also appears to me that if the existence of the name-forms is accepted they is accepted name-forms the of if me existence the that also to appears It Plato’s reflections on linguistic issues in the issues linguistic on reflections Plato’s is constituted of component names, they, on their part of letters. A true name is authority and all in all seems not to believe that names are capable of capable are names that believe to not seems all in all and authority logoi koinônia eidôn , who are necessarily composed of words, and an Cratylus (combination of Forms), as expounded in the in expounded as of Forms), (combination , although the dialogue provides enough hints , although enough provides dialogue the 32 Soph. 253d Cratylus ) 98 are extensionally limited – limited extensionally are . megista genê ), will stand in Sophists , CEU eTD Collection generalizing naturalgeneralizing law behind it. knowing itself thing through means nothing but else knowingForm, its the or in indispensable of tool because of grasping enterprise intellectual Forms, the the 33 CEU eTD Collection 34 CEU eTD Collection So what will a person endowed with endowed what willaperson So than through names through than this is question thathe and investigate will learn aboutthings through themselves, rather names, to soul his of or trust them and firmly their point tothe givers of he stating knows something” that cultivation the or himself commit will understanding any with one Cratylus’ byhinting age Furthermore, at investigation. perseverant and courageous additional gravity requires the problem the of that lightly,be and taken to not are over pondered have they matters the that discussion, their of outcome the about 102 themselves. through things of the investigation the 101 with replaced and truth the know to attempt noble the in bediscarded to deserving thus and elements, Eleatic and Heraclitean both containing contradictory, – worse or even that, like either are names the that concluded already was it since conclusion, teachings, or the theory of constant flux. Still, this might not be a detrimental obstacle to the above with one important qualification – granted that they reflect the extreme interpretation of Heraclitus'therapeuein,pepisteukota ekeinois kai tois themenois auta,diischyridzesthai hôs ti eidota 100 99 already are well his interlocutors that assumes and itseems as if Socrates mentioned, are discarding images all from derived sense-experience, knowing its Form ( examination, oncareful Socrates, notnecessarilydoes we aremean that dealingwith a thoroughly dialogue; aporetic and aradicalfocusbutthat isneeded.Still,in shift of reinterpretation word-analysis, this asprovidingunderstood Barney’s supportto fn. (cf.isclaim 84)thatthere agrain truth of be may statements These time. of lots consume might inquiry an such that indicates winds upthe his Plato readers, evenfrustrate or to tease attempt less successful As ifinamore or 2. Conclusion – Forms and Dialectic in the Cratylus much,indeed, butstill enough. Thereare two passages in the that Plato in the itis Then,what of dialectic. method be the sad to is realm ontological that to applicable in the placed are conveniently realities intelligible but visible, knowledge, or true of object He isyoung and in his prime. Cf. Rep.509 b Crat. 439b5-6: Crat. 440c2-5 Cratylus : Oude pany noun echontos anthrôpou epitrpsanta onomasin auton kai tênautou psychên poly mallon auta ex autôn kai mathêteon kai dzêtêteon ê ektôn onomatôn. Cratylus 101 . Knowing a thing through itself means knowing itas itis, directly, 102 ( 440 c-d . In the famous analogy of the divided line in the tells us about the Forms and the method of dialectic? Not that epistêmê ) by having Socrates say that he is not exactly exactly certain not he say is that Socrates ) byhaving seems nous . Unlike the objects of this world, Formsthe notare noêsis to draw a definite to conclusion:“But surely,no do instead? The already well known answer to 35 section, while ofinvestigation section, method the Cratylus 99 as an advantage, he where the Forms the where . Unfortunately, Republic eidos) –the , these 100 . CEU eTD Collection the object that is to be measured. The philosopher has to rise above the realm of constant of realm the rise above to has philosopher measured. The beis to that object the it of touch theend-points laid it beanda rulerpictures as ofreality touch against can that use belong Wittgenstein’s the higherontological not language, to realm. to are Names, origin and their phonetic structure, cannot betheir absolutelyof correct, because and theyboth certainly do not themselves, names the understanding this of light the In latter. the in immutable and intelligible the while former, in the belonging objects changeable and further subdivided into hisPlato realms of postulates two Therefore, properly described. nor intellect, the by grasped be neither cannot they that means which flux, of state Beautiful, the Good wedohavethat know claims aresuch fixedthere as the Plato, things we knowledge, etc. On the beother the case.” must something then definite incognition, language grasped and hand, however, immutable objectsof necessary. being“If is knowledge areof things described capable in of existence the the then knowledge), being things not simple alternative (the unchangeable in this world individual The tools. Forms referencesecond in to the estin onoma being Platonic Forms, are‘regular’ aside,these artefacts of speaking).The long-standing controversy concerning status the of Formsthe of in theactivity a tool andusedas bythelegislator manufactured asanartefact, understood 105 104 name. specific each for Forms of distinct then and beings) functions dividing and general the teaching (capturing of name Form overall an all of first require to seems name' 'ideal of concept the shapes), different probably, and, materials different in be instantiated can it (although concept 103 VI Republic itself, and the same andagood beautiful itself, there “isa asksthat agrees Cratylus and reality. Socrates for eachconstitute that principles onedeterminate and stable of of doctrine the Plato’s and theory flux things that are” the dialogue ( mentionacquainted with doctrine,the sincehe doesnot provide much explanation. Thefirst ( Kahn (1996, p. 365) The situationwith the name-form is more complicated. While the 'ideal shuttle' is a more or less unitary Crat. 439 c 5-7: einai auto kalon kaiagathon kai hen hekaston tônontôn 389 b-d 103 and 439 c-440b , and servingas a paradigm towhich according artisansthe manufacture VII ) refers to Forms of artefacts, namely shuttle and name (also . If is there tobeany such thingas knowledge, fixed and eikasia ) is slightly more elaborate. It sets an opposition between the between opposition an sets It elaborate. more slightly ) is and pistis, and 36 dianoia and Cratylus 104 auto hoesti kerkis noêsis , which are the are which , , coming up at the endthe , coming upat of respectively, the visible the respectively, doxa and archai and epistêmê, 105 are auto ho of the of Now, in a CEU eTD Collection designed to introduce the term the introduce to designed dialektikos no was be there that might Theanswer names? wrong and sometimes imperfect attributed is how in things it are the as dialogue, a remarkable that possible presented personality such is he If dialectician. the of account this with problem one however, is, There world. intelligible of knowledge the itsthe elevate practitioner to is to artof dialecticthe meant name.” theIdeaof the in fact, is, a name … of “The ‘use’ represents. it thing the of and name the of both Forms, the to access have to have work, legislator’s the of overseer be arightful to pretending if question, answering and asking by prepared careful the adjective the his favored philosophical method. possesses as well. There alsomight besome indications in the text that Platois hinting to know something thedialectician about and understand thus theart something about he we cannot get much information about dialectic itself from the from itself dialectic about information much get cannot we is” realm what the of becoming to VII Republic in passage long in the explained (as dialectic of method in the proficiency because accomplish, can everybody not that feat a dialectics, pursue to is that do to way only nature notthrough names, butthrough themselves. 106 change and proceed towards the 111 distinguished from the Form of the thing. be easily cannot a Form such since ofbeings, multiplication of unnecessary example an my opinion, furtherembodied in the appropriate letters. This ‘being like the thing’ is both its use its Form which is, in which is, again, to teach and separate being. In order to do so it has to be like the thing it applies to, and 110 109 108 107 unreliable. they are proclaimed to be so on the basic of etymological analysis, which was already found to be Although we read in perform, to supposed is a name function the to refers here mentioned 'use' 36) The p. (1909, Stewart Kahn (1996, p. 306) ‘conversational’. is anadjective as meaning lexical The appearance. first in its substantivated Not Rep. 510 b Rep. 521 d 3-4 According to Khan,dialogues According the to As already stated, knowing things directly means apprehending Forms, and the and Forms, apprehending means directly things knowing stated, already As present when the , 511 a-b, 533d which discusses the subjects that “draws the soul from from of realm the thesoul that“draws subjects which the discusses dialektikos Crat. 398 d epagôgê appears .” that the heroes ofold – as skilled questioners – were dialecticians. But 109 nomothetês archai The dialectician, the user of names skilled in the art of 108 dialektikos 107 . Especially “the ) is a matter life-longof philosophical activity. Now, and ultimately the first principle first the ultimately and was coining the names the coining was Cratylus 37 for the first time, since its appearance is appearance its since time, first the for and Cratylus Euthydemus 110 Thus it becomes clearthat becomes Thusit passage might have been have might passage Cratylus 111 are the first in which first the are , or that names are names that or , ; butwe doget to 106 , grasping their CEU eTD Collection be very be indetermining the very careful should men all that suggests then and hypothesis), wrong a on relying system axiomatic an apply to samewould the that (Ibelieve error initial an with diagram geometrical in Plato’s Plato’s inpreferred philosophicalthe method phenomena, aswell with as use the of discursive reasoning andlanguage. discover realities fleetingto behind together by unifyingpurpose ultimate the the the and dialectic proper, as presented inas presented the and proper, dialectic secure.” doing awaywith hypotheses andproceeding thefirstprinciple to soastobe itself, is“… while dialectic andsense-data, hypotheses uses mathematicals, with concerned of the Theloweris segment fully described. method most the in andpracticed (astaught of hypotheses includes method the it sense in thebroader that 114 (applicable to first principles). justification, respectively forthe dianoeticof inneed (applicablestones stepping to mathematicals) unconfirmed mere as and and the confirmed dialecticwere they method though as hypotheses treating andbetween method, a priori the and ofsense-experience use the between difference a to amounts methods two the between difference the Thus confirmation. their for seeks method, dianoetic the 113 112 grasp the line, to of divided the the method of dialectic is specifically contrived to ultimately reach highestthe subsection dialectic.” calls Plato what is approach of method the and training “The training. arduous fundamental in without the intellectual of an turn requires which realities, grasp knowledge vague but definition dialectic: of subjectthe gives anappropriate, introduction the ofto the Good used isby becausePlato, is it allbutunambiguous, and much will take too in space. Kahn, the ultimate goal offocused be has inquirer on to Forms. the philosophy, of the entire attention the that and reality, represent adequately meantto not simply but it cannot be acquired Benson (2006, p. ) Khan (1996, p. 292) Rep. 533 c 6-d1 436 d Meno What we are here specifically interested in is of areany hints interested there whether we arehereWhat specifically The format of this work does not allow for discussion of the term ‘dialectic’ as 113 and , Socrates drawsan incorrectly names analogy construed and a , Socrates between Benson claims that the method of dialectic has a very complex structure and structure very complex hasa of dialectic method the that claims Benson Phaedo Benson (2006, p.478) furtherexplains that dialectic also uses hypotheses, but,unlike ), the method of collection and division ( archai archai . That is the verdict of the of of undertakingtheir –“forif have been they 38 Republic VI Cratylus , and I believe that there are. First, are. there that believe I , and and VII epistêmê . 114 Phaedrus, Sophist They are all linked Republic section, the one the section, , where the 112 etc.) So, CEU eTD Collection transitioning from transitioning conclusion,finally grasping from premise Forms to through the themselves justifying rejecting firstthe discursive hypotheses, thought, principles uses or methodfavored necessarily with linguisticoperates units, ofwhich isinvestigations of method the Forms, Plato’s conductedthrough the dialectic. mean language; investigation ofnames upon giving the istobeby replacedthe epistemological Butdeclaringtools. names’ insufficiency in reflecting reality notdoes imperfect best at thus and reality, representing of accurately incapable are names argumentation, and supported it with witty etymological analysis,just to show finally that impeccability developed defendedwith theirnames –Socrates correctness of something other and different.” but them, not signify would them from different and is other which that For themselves? through and akin, are if they other, each through way, straightest the and natural the way them? Whatisexpect toknow than well:“What other by you left other which could introduces heCratylusa methodas of‘knowing thingsthrough themselves’, notion the distinguishing itfrom everything else. b-c markthingitis from and And others. the off what also that wereadin the the dialectician’s skill to ‘instruct law’ from bebut quotation this aForm? and separate beings’, specific‘law’valid class for of agiven phenomena…” or to determine the essence of a as noted by Furthermore, Steward justification, leading the unhypotheticalstones principle stepping and to first does firsthypothesesnot considerin as butashypotheses the principles, need of the others. of particulars subsumed under it,identifies the thing in question(as auniversal) and distinguishes itfrom 120 119 118 117 116 115 one of the essential from will follow them.” steps plainly the subsequent adequately examined, features of the method of dialectic as presented in the I believe that Stewart by 'law' implies a substantial principle or even a definition that transcends the host the transcends that a definition even or principle substantial a implies by 'law' Stewart that believe I Stewart (1909, p. 38) Cf.Stewart (1909, p.37f) Crat. 438e Rep. 511 b Crat. 436d5-6 ) –adialectician is capablean of providing of a Form account and alsoof This is how the journey of the 118 Steward here recognizes a “… method of here Steward of recognizesa “…method a discovering 117 when Socrates for the first time introduces to introduces time first the for Socrates when Cratylus 120 The passage from the 39 ends; it started with the question of the 119 Andwhatwould ‘specific the logoi , and on its way towards Cratylus reminds me of 115 Republic Republic And that is that And ( 534 116 : it : . CEU eTD Collection presented in the presented of as refutations.dialectic, defend Themethod andalsofrom all to them he understood, principles the of account give aperfect to able isthen dialectician the because unaffected, 121 intelligible” the of end the “reaches philosopher the after even And different. or same as them knowing understanding, Rep. 532 b 1 Republic culminates into accurate accurate into culminates and true 121 , the power of , the power of reasoningdiscursive remains 40 logoi . CEU eTD Collection Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997 Plato. “Republic”, Cooper, J.M., Hutchinson D.S. (eds.) Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997 Plato. “Phaedo”, Cooper, J.M., Hutchinson D.S. (eds.) Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997 Plato. “Cratylus”, Cooper, J.M., Hutchinson D.S. (eds.) TranslationOxford Aristotle. “Metaphysics”, Barnes, J. (ed.) Primary Sources: Vol II, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995 Bibliography The Complete Works of Aristotle: TheRevised The Complete Worksof 41 Plato: CompleteWorks Plato: Complete Works Plato: Complete Works , Hackett , Hackett , Hackett CEU eTD Collection Companion toPlato’s Republic Denyer, N.Sun and Line: “The Role of the Good”, Ferrary, G.R.F. (ed.) T Demand, N. “The Nomothetes of the ‘Cratylus’”, Phronesis, Vol. 20 (1975), pp. 106-109 Blackwell London,Publishing: 2006 Benson, H.H. “Plato's Method of Dialectic”, Benson H.H. (ed.), Barney, R. Porter) Catherine Belknap press of Harward University 2000(translatedpress, under direction the of Pellegrin Pellegrin (eds.), Anthony A. Long “Language”, Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, Pierre Secondary Sources: Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997 Plato. “Timaeus”, Cooper, J.M., Hutchinson D.S. (eds.) Hackett Publishing Company: Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1997 Plato. “Theaetetus”, Cooper, J.M., Hutchinson D.S. 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(trans.), Longmans, , Methuen: London,1926 44 CEU eTD Collection 45