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Plato’s Epistemology: a Coherent Account in Meno , Phaedo and Theaetetus Chuanjie Sheng Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Leeds Department of Classics August 2015 II The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. © 2015 The University of Leeds and Chuanjie Sheng The right of Chuanjie Sheng to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. III Acknowledgements I appreciate all the persons that helped me to complete this thesis. I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Elizabeth E. Pender and Professor Malcolm F. Heath. As an enlightened teacher, Dr. Pender has offered me valuable comments and suggestions for my dissertation. Working with her is a stimulating intellectual experience. She patiently suggested on the structure of my thesis and corrected all the chapters line by line. As a wonderful friend, she brings happiness, pleasure and fruitful experience into my life in Leeds. Professor Heath has read all the chapters of my thesis and has given me feedbacks on each of the chapters. During the supervisions, he has given me valuable academic advice and comments, which has saved me from a large number of mistakes and errors in this dissertation. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to study Ancient Greek in the classes of Dr Hamstead. I wish to express deep thanks to my dear colleagues and friends in the Department of Classics in Leeds, Chris Green, Fábio Alexandre M. Serranito, Luca Sansone di Campobianco and Andrea Basso. I also wish to thank my friends in Leeds, Magesh Vasu, Gail Chen, Jason Kao, Lei Jiang, Xiaoxu Li and Qiang Liu for sharing my personal worries and happiness. I would like to express my appreciation to the China Scholarship Council and the Department of Classics in Leeds for their generous financial support which has made it possible for me to carry on my research in England. At last, I owe an immense debt to my parents for their encouragement and love. IV Abstract This dissertation analyses the epistemology in Plato’s Meno, Phaedo and Theaetetus . It will explain how Plato constructs his thought on knowledge in those three dialogues into a coherent explanation. In the Meno and Phaedo Plato offers an outline of his epistemology. The Meno introduces Meno’s paradox, the theory of recollection and the formula “knowledge is true opinion with an explanation of the reason why”. In the Phaedo , Plato proposes recollection theory as a proof of immortality of soul and introduces the theory of Forms to make the epistemological outline complete. Although this outline of epistemology is systematic, it still has problems, such as knowledge is limited to a narrow sphere and the epistemological function of the body is denied. Theaetetus is an attempt to rethink the definitions of knowledge and to supplement the epistemological outline in the Meno and Phaedo by presenting new theories. In Theaetetus , three definitions of knowledge are discussed, namely, knowledge is perception, knowledge is true opinion, and knowledge is true opinion with an account. During the investigation of the three definitions, Plato successively supplies the detailed explanations of the process of perceiving colours, the wax block analogy, the aviary example and the discussion of the meaning and nature of the concept of account. In the progress of my study, I will also prove that not all of Socrates’ arguments about knowledge are good and strong. Those poor or weak arguments are mainly caused by employing metaphors to illustrate philosophical thought. V Table of Contents Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... III Abstract ...................................................................................................................... IV Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ V Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 The aim of this research ....................................................................................... 1 The process of gaining knowledge in the Meno and Phaedo ............................... 3 Problems in the process of gaining knowledge in Meno and Phaedo ................. 7 Plato’s strategy for pursuing the definition of knowledge in Theaetetus ............. 8 Theaetetus supplements the outline of epistemology in the Meno and Phaedo 11 Scholarly Rationale ............................................................................................ 14 Reasons for the choice of Meno , Phaedo and Theaetetus .................................. 17 Chapter One: Meno on Knowledge, True Opinion and Recollection ........................ 20 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 20 1.1 Meno’s Paradox ............................................................................................ 21 1.2 Theory of Recollection ................................................................................. 27 1.3 Example of “Larisa”: Knowledge and True Opinion ................................... 33 1.4 Knowledge Is More Valuable Than True Opinion ....................................... 47 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 52 Chapter Two: Phaedo on Knowledge and How to Gain it ......................................... 54 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 54 2.1 Forms as the objects of knowledge .............................................................. 56 2.2 Knowledge in a narrow sense ...................................................................... 60 2.3 Soul gains knowledge from Forms .............................................................. 68 2.4 The theory of recollection ............................................................................ 71 2.5 The example of “lovers” in the Phaedo ....................................................... 77 2.6 Problems in the theory of recollection ......................................................... 80 2.7 Gaining knowledge through the soul in a reasoning state after death.......... 86 2.8 Denial of body’s contribution on epistemology ........................................... 90 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 92 Chapter Three: The Prologue of Theaetetus as an Allusion to Anti-empiricism? ...... 95 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 95 3.1 Euclides: a follower of Eleatic tradition....................................................... 98 VI 3.2 Terpsion: a Socratic follower ..................................................................... 101 3.3 Historical Socrates vs. Platonic Socrates: Universal Definition through experience ........................................................................................................ 102 3.4 Theodorus: the Function of Mathematics in Theaetetus ............................ 111 3.5 Theaetetus: in what way similar to Socrates? ............................................ 120 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 128 Chapter Four Theaetetus on Sense-perception ......................................................... 130 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 130 4.1 Theaetetus’ primary answer on the nature of knowledge and Socrates as midwife ............................................................................................................ 132 4.2 Knowledge as sense-perception and Socrates’ first response to Protagoras’ theory................................................................................................................ 141 4.3 Socratic second response of Protagoras’ “man is the measure of all things” .......................................................................................................................... 149 4.4 Socrates’ third response to “man is the measure of all things” .................. 153 4.5 Investigation on “all things are in motion” ................................................ 175 4.6 Perception has no share of knowledge ....................................................... 194 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 198 Chapter Five Knowledge as True Judgement in Theaetetus .................................... 201 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 201 5.1 Are knowledge and perceptions or their images on the wax block? .......... 205 5.2 The aviary example .................................................................................... 224
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