The INA Quarterly , ,, , ,; J , ,,, , , ............, ,<" , .:; , , ,, , , ," , , ,, A, Volume 26 No. 2 Summer 1999 3 The Confederate Blockade Runner Denbigh MEMBERSHIP J. Brzrf~lArtlcrld 111, Andy Hall, Tom Oertling, and Institute of Nautical Archaeology Christine A. Powell P.O. Drawer HG College Station, TX 77841-5137 13 St. Michael and the Port Royal Weights C. Wayne Smith Learn firsthand of the latest discov- eries in nautical archaeology. Mem- 16 In the Field be rs receive the INA Quarterly and other benefits (see INA Quarterly =.I, 27. 18 Review: The Alnbamn and the Kearsarge: Researcher (students only) .....$5 The Sailor's Cinil War Seafarer. ................. $40-99 by William Marvel Surveyor .............. $10&249 Mark A. Feulner Diver ................... $250449 Restorer ................ $50&999 Curator ...........$1,000-$2,499 19 In Memoriam: Excavator ........... $2,500-4,949 Charles Olin Mc Whirter Archaeologist: ......$5,00&9,999 Navigator .......... $10,000-24,999 Anchor ..........$25,000 and over Checks in U.S.currency should be made On the cover: A paintlng shows the Confederate blockade runner payable to INA. Thr portionof any dr~ Dcnbigh, which sank in Galvestan Bay six weeks after Robert E. nation in excess of $lC.00 is a tax-de- Lee's Army of Northern Virginia surrendered in 1865. Courtesy ductible, char-tabl contribution. Charles Peery. 0August 1999 by the Institute of Nautical Archamlogy. All rights resenred. INA welcomes requests !o reprint LNA Quarterly articles and iliustrations. hrb:des for publication should be submitted in hard copy and on a 3.25 diskette (Macintosh, m,ur Windows format acceptable) ~l~ngwith .dl artwork. Please address all requests and submissions to the Ed~tor,INA Quarterly, P.0. Drawer HG, College Station, TX 77841-5137; tel (409) 845-6694, fax (409)847-9260, e-mail [email protected]. 'he Home Page for INA and the Texas A&M University Nautical Anhtiology Program on the WorldWideWeb is http: / /nau!rarchtamu.edu The lnstihtte of Nautical Archaeology is a non-prvht scientitic and educational organization, incorporated in 1972. Since 1976, INA has been afFd~ated with Texas A&M University, where rN.4 faculty teach in the Naut~caIArchaeology Program of the Department of Anthropology. The opinions expressed in Quarlcrly articles are those nf the authors, and do pot necessarily reflect the views of the Institute. The INil Quarterly was former1y the INA Newsletter (vols. 1-18). Editor: Christine A. Powell The Confederate Blockade Runner Denbigh J. Barto Arnold 111, Andy Hall, Tom Oertling, and Christine A. Powell The most decisive engagement of the American Civil shipped to Great Britain each year, bringing $150,000,000 War may have been fought at sea, not on the great battle- into Southern coffers. Tobacco and naval stores such as fields that tourists visit today. The South had to protect its turpentine also formed an important part of the European supply lines in order to survive, just as winnmg the Battle economies. Continued trade would provide the capital to of the Atlantic was essential to Britain's victory in World purchase war materials, which the British and French were War 11. President Lincvln recogruzeci ths when he orga- anxious to sell. nized the "Anaconda Plan," the Union blockade named ReConfederate government was confident that the after the South American snake that suffocates its victims. Federals could not effectively blockade the 3500 miles of Shps like the blockade runner Denbiyh, the object of re- coast from Chesapeake Bay to the Rio Grande. However, cent INA operations in Bolivar Roads near Galveston, were they also firmly believed that the Royal Navy would act the warriors in hscrucial battle. to keep the South's ports open if there was any danger From the beginning, the leaders of the Secesion that cotton supplies to the mills in Liverpool and Manches- knew that the overwhelming resources of the northern ter might be cut off. Almost five million British subjects states prevented any chance of an unaided Confederate were employed in manufacturing cotton goods. With for- victory. However, they relied on the aid of their cammer- eign aid, the War for Southern Independence was a viable cia1 parhers in Europe. Fully 78% of the cotton crop was proposition. Fig. 1. Galveston Bay and island, including Bolivar Rmds, where Denbigh grounded. Courtesy of National Archives, on line. 3 INA Quarterly 26.2 The Confedrrate leaders had made two miscalcula- Blockade Running tions. First, the North had no need to watch the entire coast. Because the Southerners had been so sure that the The South could only use ships capable of outrunning the Norhem blockade would be ineffective, they made no Union coastal squadron, an unexpectedly large force com- contingency plans until the unpleasant truth became ap- posed largely of converted civhan ferries and other steam parent. By then, they had only three remaining pork of vessels. This meant that almost all of the runners used fast entry with adequate connections to the rest of the Confed- oceangoing steamships, These required deep water har- eracy. Keeping Wilrnington, Charleston, and Mobile har- bors with good communications to the interior. There were bors open and getting as much material into them as the only nine suitable ports on the entire Eastern seaboard of blockade allowed became a critical survival issue for the the Confederacy, and only a handful more on the Gulf Confederacy, just as closing those ports became a high pri- Coast. Since the ports west of the Mississippi lbver had ority for the Union. poor connections to the rest of the Confederacy, trade The South was not self-sufficient in food produc- would only go there as a last resort. Galveston (fig. I) only tion. Ironically, much of its meat supply during the war became important in the last year of the war. was tinned beef and pork from the midwestem Union Thls scarcity of harbors made it feasible for the An- states, imported by way of Bermuda or Nassau. It was even aconda Plan to throw its coils around the South and grad- less independent of Northern and foreign manufactured ually squeeze the life out of it. The 1860 cotton crop had goods and armaments. A Confederate rout at Shiloh was already been shipped when the blockade went into effect only avoided by the last-minute arrival of 900 kegs of Brit- in May 1861. By the time the 1861 crop was ready for ship- ish gunpowder through the Port of Whgton. Loss of ment, the Union had captured the approaches to most of the industrial centers of New Orleans and Memphis in early the ports east of Texas. ThereAer, the blockading fleets could 1862 only made this situation worse. safely ignore virtually all the Atlantic and eastern Gulf coasts Federal warshps lined the horizon outside each of and concentrate on just three locations-Wilrrungton, North the remaining Southern harbors. The blockade runners car- Carob;Charleston, South Carolina; and Mobile, Alabama. ried no weapons beyond sideanus, lest they be considered TIe second miscalculation involved thew illingness pirates and hanged on capture, so they had to outwit or of Great Britain to get involved. The Anaconda Plan was outrun their opponents. It was effectively impossible to not very eifect~vein its early days, but Bntain had always enter by daylight, so the runners had to slip past the b tock- been a champion of the right of blockade against the right aders by night, if necessary in a mad dash for the protec- of neutral, navigation. Ironically, the United States had al- tion of the Confederate batteries protecting the harbor ways taken the opposite tack-insistence on freedom of mouth. the seas had sparked the War of 1812 and was to bring Since each of the ports had shallow bars at the en- America into World War I. Britain and France saw no rea- trances, it was not uncommon for runners to go aground. son to surrender their stratepc position until the tactical A light draft was essential. Although screw-driven vessels situation grew clearer. Slavery was very unpopular in Eu- had been replacing paddlewheels for nearly twenty years, rope by midcenkuy. MOR,the Empea" powers declared propellers required deeper water. Sidewheels are less effi- their neubdty in May 1841. They ahady had the 1860 cotton cient than screw propellers, but they bring a ship to maxi- crop and could afford to wait for developments. By the th mum speed more quickly. This allowed the mersto driit next ~mpwas ready to ship, there was no way for the Royal quietly past the biockaders and still outrun them on dis- Navy to clear the blockaders from any of the remaining Con- covery. By backmg one side, side-wheelers can turn much federate ports without a major fleet action. more sharply than a screw-driven vessel, and they can more Soon, two millinn British subjects were out of work easily rock themselves off a sandbar. and facing starvation in the 1862 Lancashire cotton fam- The most successful sidewhee! hlockade runners were ine. Even so, the British government was unwhg to corn- built in a style that had been perfected for use as river and mit itself to a full-scale war with the United States unless it coastal packets on the Clyde fiver in Scotland. These had was reasonably sure of bettmg on the winning side. Restor- long, low iron hulls with a narrow beam, powerful engines, ing employmmt in the EngM mdlands was not worth risk- and a light draft. They were adapted for the blockade bade ing humikation, hruption of trade with the colonies, and by removing stateroon~sand making other modifications perbps evm French adventurism in an unpopular trans-oce- to increase their capacity and reduce their visibility.