An Investigation Into British Neutrality During the American Civil War 1861-65

AN INVESTIGATION INTO BRITISH NEUTRALITY DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 1861-65 BY REBECCA CHRISTINE ROBERTS-GAWEN A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of MA by Research Department of History University of Birmingham November 2015 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract This thesis sought to investigate why the British retained their policy of neutrality throughout the American Civil War, 1861-65, and whether the lack of intervention suggested British apathy towards the conflict. It discovered that British intervention was possible in a number of instances, such as the Trent Affair of 1861, but deliberately obstructed Federal diplomacy, such as the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. This thesis suggests that the British public lacked substantial and sustained support for intervention. Some studies have suggested that the Union Blockade of Southern ports may have tempted British intervention. This thesis demonstrates how the British sought and implemented replacement cotton to support the British textile industry. This study also demonstrates that, by the outbreak of the Civil War, British society lacked substantial support for foreign abolitionists’’ campaigns, thus making American slavery a poorly supported reason for intervention. This thesis proves there was not “apathy” for the American Civil War; Britain benefitted from the war by building ships and from sending munition through the blockade. Britain appeared apathetic because it refused official intervention. This refusal was rooted in the fact that Britain benefitted from the demise of its economic, political and historic rival – the United States of America. Contents Introduction Page 4 How was Victorian public opinion formed in the mid Victorian period? Page 7 British Foreign Policy and the Political Press Page 9 An Overview of the American Civil War Page 15 A synopsis of the American Civil War – Land Campaigns Page 16 A synopsis of the American Civil War – Naval Campaigns 31 Page 26 What is being investigated? Page 28 Significant Publications on the Topic Page 30 Sources Page 34 Chapters Page 38 Chapter One: The Representation of Warfare Page 40 Bull Run/First Manassas Page 49 The Trent Affair Page 61 Hampton Roads and Ironclads Page 76 Chancellorsville Page 94 Gettysburg Page 101 1 Sherman and Grant’s Land Campaigns Page 107 Chapter Conclusion Page 114 Chapter Two: The Representation of Slavery and the Confederate Cause Page 118 The Abolition of Slavery in Britain Page 118 Slavery In America Before the American Civil War Page 122 British Support for American Abolition Page 130 Why did Britain Fail to Oppose the Confederacy Page 135 Emancipation Proclamation – January 1st 1863 Page 163 British Reaction Page 168 The Recruitment of Black Soldiers Page 189 Chapter Conclusion Page 199 Chapter Three: The Economic Argument Page 206 Britain’s Economy 1860 Page 208 The British Working Class Page 211 The Cotton Loan 1862 or the Erlanger Loan Page 214 The Blockade and Cotton Famine Page 218 2 Suffering Page 227 Government Reaction and Relief Funds Page 244 Riots Page 257 Blockade Running Page 261 British Reaction to the Union and Confederacy through the Crisis Page 268 Chapter Conclusion Page 275 Thesis Conclusion. Imagining Civil War: Why was Britain Unmoved? Page 278 Appendix One – How They Went to Canada. Complete Lyrics from Punch Page 291 Appendix Two – Full chronological list of Tenniel’s cartoons from Punch Page 295 Appendix Three – Full chronological list of images from The Illustrated Page 304 London News Bibliography Page 317 3 INTRODUCTION A British student of History fascinated by the American Civil War may appear a rare combination. This thesis, however, fulfils a wellestablished fascination. Walking around the battlefields of Gettysburg at four years old captured the author’s imagination; The rows of white headstones, the guns left as memorials, and the peace and tranquillity of the beautiful, flat terrain initiated an interest with the author still pertinent today. From this family holiday, the author indulged in books and documentaries, desperate to discover and understand more about this war that literally tore families apart. Following Undergraduate study, the author became aware that she wanted to spend time studying this great and bloody war more closely. She began to consider if her own interest in the American Civil War as a 21st Century Historian could be paralleled with Victorian Britons. Aware that the War of Independence would be relatively recent History to Britons of the 1860s, the author began to consider how this may have impacted on the reporting of the outbreak of the American conflict. Furthermore, she began to question how the war itself may have been reported through various British media. These questions and reflections formed the basis for this study and thus the thesis was created. The eventual Union Victory and Confederate loss of the American Civil War (1861-65) has been evaluated and analysed meticulously by a multitude of Historians, each forming their own conclusions as to the primary reason for the result. Pohanka (1999) argues that the lack of supplies for the Confederate army, both in terms of manpower and equipment, meant defeat was assured. Robert Krick (2003) argues that inferior Southern resources against 4 Northern industrial dominance is an archaic view and instead reconsiders this by including the broader, yet simpler, argument of basic mathematics. He suggests that the sheer ratio of population figures (twenty seven million in the Union to seven million in the Confederacy) meant the South was inevitably doomed to defeat. McPherson (2003) uses examples of the American War of Independence to counter both of these arguments, suggesting that limited numbers and lack of resources are not a sufficient argument, otherwise the British would have conquered the weaker native American partisans. Instead, he suggests the combination of strong diplomatic leadership of Lincoln with robust military leadership of Grant, Sherman and Sheridan is the key to Union victory. Gallagher (2012) links his conclusion to McPherson, suggesting that a lack of Southern field victories was due to a lack of depth in Southern military command. Gallagher states that it is undeniable that Lee’s genius maintained the Southern campaign for a number of years, but excluding Lee, the South could not boast many more expert commanders. Each of these theories can be individually and collectively scrutinised to reveal merits and flaws, based on interpretation, yet the aim of this thesis is not to engage in the debate of “Why did the Union win/Confederates lose”. It has become axiomatic that one of the primary reasons for the defeat of the Confederacy in the American Civil War lay with the failure of its diplomacy in mobilising the European powers from their adherence to the public stance of neutrality to one either of intervention or, at least, recognition of Southern Independence. British public opinion was subject to intensive campaigning by the sympathisers of both North and South. This thesis, therefore, intends to explore why the British remained neutral and whether this indicated British apathy to the American conflict. 5 At the outset of this thesis, there are a number of points that should be clarified to prevent any misconstruction. Firstly, there is no doubt that the British did intercede in the conflict to a certain extent. Britain and America continued large scale trading throughout 1861-65, although this was disrupted by blockades of Southern Ports. Similarly, Britain’s shipyards profited heavily from the construction of ships and blockade-runners (Harvie, 2008, 286-288 and Wise, 1991.). Blockade-runners themselves were often British, supplying both Union and Confederacy with necessities (Barry and Burt, 2013). Also, there is no doubt that a number of British soldiers participated in the war1. Whilst these factors will feature heavily in the analysis of this thesis, these elements of Anglo-American relations do not equate to Britain as a nation and foreign power intervening. This thesis looks to explore why Britain did not shift from the position of neutrality and mobilise as an ally to neither North nor South. Secondly, an accepted fact at the commencement of this thesis is that campaigning did take place in Britain for both Union and Confederate support. The Confederacy knew that British recognition of Southern Independence would authenticate their “Cause” (Thomas, 1979; p88), or states’ individual rights, tariff policy and regional determination. This “Cause” developed into the protection of a “Southern identity” as cultural and societal differences became entwined with the demand for regional economic independence. This then developed further into the argument of maintaining a slave-based economy. The world’s greatest foreign power accepting the legitimacy of a new country may prevent the North from fighting a war to maintain a Union with the inclusion of Southern States who had democratically voted to withdraw from the United States. After all, the Confederacy maintained they were using the Constitutional right as Americans to secede from the United States of America. By Britain recognising this, the Union’s campaign would not only be 1 Numerous examples of British participants can be found with the British American Civil War Round Table society, but also found in various archive findings at Kew and London. 6 rendered futile, but, more significantly, ebbed dangerously on the verge of a more destructive war – perhaps even a precipitate world war.

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