La Surveillance De Masse Dans Le Cyber Espace : La Reponse Securitaire Des Etats-Unis Au Terrorisme Djihadiste

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La Surveillance De Masse Dans Le Cyber Espace : La Reponse Securitaire Des Etats-Unis Au Terrorisme Djihadiste Université de Lyon Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon LA SURVEILLANCE DE MASSE DANS LE CYBER ESPACE : LA REPONSE SECURITAIRE DES ETATS-UNIS AU TERRORISME DJIHADISTE EL OUED Jihène M1 Affaires Internationales Risques internationaux et nouveaux paradigmes de la sécurité 2016-2017 Sous la direction de Tawfik Bourgou 2 | LA SURVEILLANCE DE MASSE DANS LE CYBER ESPACE : LA REPONSE SECURITAIRE DES ETATS-UNIS AU TERRORISME DJIHADISTE 3 | Déclaration anti-plagiat 1. Je déclare que ce travail ne peut être suspecté de plagiat. Il constitue l’aboutissement d’un travail personnel. 2. A ce titre, les citations sont identifiables (utilisation des guillemets lorsque la pensée d’un auteur autre que moi est reprise de manière littérale). 3. L’ensemble des sources (écrits, images) qui ont alimenté ma réflexion sont clairement référencées selon les règles bibliographiques préconisées. NOM : EL OUED PRENOM : Jihène DATE : 03/08/2017 4 | Liste des acronymes Anglophones CIA – Central Intelligence Agency COIN – Counter Insurgency COINTELPRO – Counter Intelligence Program CYBERCOM – United States Cyber Command DNI – Director of National Intelligence DDoS – Distributed Denial of Services DoD – Department of Justice FBI – Federal Bureau of Investifation FISA – Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act NCTC – National Counterterrorism Center NSA – National Security Agency RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs Francophones EI – Etat islamiste NTIC – Nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication 5 | Propos liminaires « La pleine lumière et le regard d’un surveillant captent mieux que l’ombre, qui finalement protégeait. La visibilité est un piège. » - FOUCAULT, Michel. Surveiller et punir, 1st ed. Paris : Gallimard, 1975, p.233-234 6 | Introduction La lutte contre le terrorisme est une constante de la politique de défense américaine. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 qui ont visé les tours jumelles à New York ont marqué un tournant dans ce contre-terrorisme pour lequel on peut dès lors distinguer deux directions : une réaction guerrière portée par la présidence de George W. Bush, puis le renforcement d’une stratégie axée sur la surveillance et la traçabilité des indésirables, en dehors du territoire comme à l’intérieur1. En réalité, ces deux trajectoires convergent puisque la surveillance de masse devient la clé de voûte d’une stratégie militaire de lutte contre le terrorisme passant par le cyberespace. Ce processus s’inscrit cependant dans une tradition historique de défense du territoire, orientée depuis les dernières décennies du XXe siècle vers une sécurisation accrue du pays. La sécurisation est une pratique gouvernementale dont le succès ne dépend pas nécessairement de l’existence d’une menace, mais de la capacité discursive d’un gouvernement à faire de cette dernière une menace effective2. Le terrorisme, et par extension le cyberterrorisme, est un cas d’école pour la théorie de la sécurisation : en effet, la façon dont le problème a été construit comme une priorité sécuritaire, en particulier aux Etats-Unis, s’articule parfaitement avec le contexte actuel au sein duquel le terrorisme représente la menace principale et celle qui fait couler le plus d’encre. Le narratif de la sécurité nationale aux Etats-Unis prend un tournant radical avec le 11 Septembre : la mythologie qui est issue de cet évènement s’inscrit dans un mouvement plus étendu de renforcement des mécanismes de défense américains qui anticipe plusieurs brèches et qui concentre son attention sur deux domaines à risque, le terrorisme et le cyberespace. 1 BIGO, Didier, BONELLI, Laurent and DELTOMBE, Thomas. Au nom du 11 septembre. 1st ed. Paris: La Découverte, 2008, 420p. 2 BALZACQ, Thierry, “The three faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context”, European Journal of International Relations, June 2005, 11(2), pp.171-201. 7 | La reconfiguration de la sécurité nationale américaine après les attentats de 2001 Aux Etats-Unis comme en Europe, les lendemains des attaques terroristes du 11 Septembre ont été marqués par une spectaculaire intensification des dispositifs de surveillance des citoyens3. Si la « guerre au terrorisme » contribue de façon spécifique à l’intensification de la surveillance, elle renforce pourtant une tendance historique préexistante à la surveillance comme moyen structurel de gouvernement de la société4. Aux Etats-Unis, il existe une rivalité historique entre les différents services spéciaux américains chargés du renseignement : les opérations spéciales ont été confiées alternativement à la CIA, puis au Département de Défense après le fiasco de la Baie des Cochons en 1961, avant de redevenir la responsabilité totale de la CIA en 1981. Pour autant, au-delà de cette compétition, les années 1950 et 1960 ont vu naître aux Etats-Unis et au sein de leur stratégie de défense un socle doctrinal fondamental : le rapprochement crucial entre le renseignement et l’affrontement armé. Cette corrélation intrinsèque entre les deux champs d’action permet de comprendre les développements actuels en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme : actions de renseignement et activités de type militaires y sont stratégiquement complémentaires, le point culminant de cette convergence se révélant de façon spectaculaire au lendemain des attentats contre les twin towers. 3 BIGO, Didier, BONELLI, Laurent and DELTOMBE, Thomas. Au nom du 11 septembre. 1st ed. Paris: La Découverte, 2008, 420p. 4 ibid 8 | Le contexte sécuritaire antérieur aux attentats du 11 Septembre 2001 Dès les années 1970, les services de renseignement américain mettent en place une grille de surveillance d’une partie de la population. Le programme COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program) permet au FBI et à son directeur, J. Edgar Hoover, d’espionner les organisations dissidentes aux Etats-Unis entre 1956 et 1971. Il place sous étroite surveillance les groupes activistes politiques américains et tente de les déstabiliser par la diffusion d’informations erronées à propos de leurs membres et par l’exacerbation de tensions entre eux. Le renseignement américain, tel qu’il est défini par la CIA5, ne s’applique donc pas seulement à des ennemis extérieurs à la nation, mais également à ses dissidents résidents. COINTELPRO ne vise pas tant la répression des actes – qui appartenait d’avantage aux forces de police – que leur anticipation. Cet exemple historique révèle une autre convergence, deux types de techniques employés par l’Etat pour faire face à un risque : les techniques qu’il oppose à l’ennemi dans l’exercice de sa souveraineté, et les techniques de justice et de police – que l’Etat de droit active traditionnellement à l’encontre des criminels sur son propre sol, et que ce programme permet de fait d’appliquer à des citoyens américains suspectés sur la base de leurs opinions politiques. La raison de cette nouvelle convergence s’explique par le fait que le FBI, dépendant du ministère de la Justice, soit non seulement doté de prérogatives de contre- renseignement mais qu’il soit aussi un acteur de police fédérale. « Une dualité de fonctions qui l’a conduit à développer une double culture de police et de renseignement, et qui fait de lui un acteur central de la lutte contre le terrorisme depuis les années 1990. »6. Couplée à COINTELPRO, la contre insurrection (ou « COIN ») est aux sources de la lutte anti- terroriste aux Etats-Unis : les tactiques adoptées par les Etats-Unis contre l’opposition extérieure comme intérieure sont les maquettes de ce qui sera développé quelques décennies plus tard en termes de contre-terrorisme. Ce glissement de l’insurrection vers le terrorisme se 5 « « Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and for national security, the conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned with these, against unauthorized disclosure.”. Source : Cia.gov. 2017. 6 BIGO, Didier, BONELLI, Laurent and DELTOMBE, Thomas. Au nom du 11 septembre. 1st ed. Paris: La Découverte, 2008, p.158 9 | fait au regard d’une précision définitionnelle qui s’effectue à la fin du XXe siècle et qui distingue « terrorisme national », « terrorisme international » et « insurrection ». Depuis la fin des années 1980, parce que la définition du terrorisme a changé, celui-ci est devenu « terrorisme international » avec la loi sur le renseignement étranger de 1978 (FISA ou Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act)7, et la réponse s’est, en conséquence, adaptée à ce changement. Les efforts ont donc été tourné vers une meilleure appréhension du caractère transnational du terrorisme qui rompt avec une tentative de territorialisation de ce dernier (enclenchée avec les logiques de la guerre froide opposant les Etats-Unis à l’URSS). Par ailleurs, à partir des années 1980 et plus encore à partir de la dernière décennie du XXe siècle, la stratégie anti-terroriste des Etats- Unis tente de prendre en compte de nouvelles formes de menace qui s’exercent désormais dans le champ technologique. Se développe le mythe d’un potentiel « Pearl Harbor numérique », qui concentre les peurs et les efforts, et qui justifie en 1998 la mise en place d’un centre d’alerte des cyberattaques au sein du FBI, le National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) et un an plus tard, l’élaboration d’une stratégie nationale de défense du cyberespace. Le FBI développe alors le programme Carnivore, un programme
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