Different Motivators for Whistleblowers and Leakers

DIFFERENT MOTIVATORS FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS AND LEAKERS

by Andrew Ghalili

A research study submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies

Baltimore, Maryland August 2020

ABSTRACT

What are the motivating factors for U.S. Intelligence Community whistleblowers, and how do they compare to those of leakers? This study seeks to determine the motivators for an individual within U.S. national security, and more specifically within the IC, to whistleblow. Interviews with 12 whistleblowers or leakers were analyzed to determine the factors that motivate whistleblowers and whether they differ from those that motivate leakers. The factors that were coded for include Intention, Education on

Whistleblowing, Perceived Personal Cost (PPC), Public Service Motivation (PSM), and

Loyalty. The current study adds to the field of whistleblowing research by filling a gap in the existing research, especially as related specifically to U.S. national security. The study finds that whistleblowers express higher levels of PPC, loyalty to institution, and loyalty to law than leakers, while leakers express higher levels of PSM, loyalty to public, and loyalty to self. The implications of these findings on policy within U.S. national security and Intelligence Community organizations are discussed and analyzed, resulting in multiple policy recommendations.

This study was read and reviewed by Michael Warner and Anthony Lang.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ...... i TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iii INTRODUCTION ...... 1 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 3 METHODS AND DATA ...... 7 CODE DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESES ...... 10 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ...... 14 CONCLUSION ...... 34 REFERENCES ...... 37

iii

INTRODUCTION

In general terms, whistleblowing occurs when an employee of an organization notices unethical or criminal behavior within the organization and proceeds to expose the wrongdoing, often by notifying an authority. Notifying authorities of an unethical activity can be a drastically different process depending on the organization or industry, however.

For this research, and within the Intelligence Community, whistleblowing is defined as

“the act of reporting waste, fraud, abuse and corruption in a lawful manner to those who can correct the wrongdoing.”1 Intelligence community (IC) whistleblowers are those employees or contractors working in any of the 17 elements of the IC who reasonably believe there has been a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a substantial danger to public health and safety.2 Whistleblowers have existed in America for many decades and are an important part of American society. While whistleblower laws still need to be more clearly written and made more effective, there are existing mechanisms which intend to help an individual avoid retaliation for blowing the whistle on a government agency by reporting to an Inspector General’s office or the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.3

The purpose of this study is to investigate the motivations for whistleblowing, and to compare them with the motivations for illegally leaking classified information. This research is important because there is little to no qualitative research on motivations for

1 U.S. Congressional Research Service. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections (R45345; September 23, 1019), by Michael E. DeVine. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45345.pdf 2 ibid. 3 See The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 https://www.sec.gov/eeoinfo/whistleblowers.htm

whistleblowing within the Intelligence Community in America, and because of the consistent, inherent political importance of a national security whistleblower occurrence.

Any discussion of prior research on whistleblowing must begin with a discussion of the definition of whistleblowing. While we have already established a definition, this discussion is still necessary both for a larger understanding of the cases that will be discussed and because only whistleblowers receive legal protections, not illegal leakers.

For this study, the term “whistleblowing” will solely refer to whistleblowing within the

United States government. This constraint is set due to the unique rules and regulations within the government, and the IC specifically, that allow for an individual to expose perceived unethical or illegal behavior. The legal process for a government employee to expose an agency’s wrongdoings is not extremely clear nor always effective, but there are mechanisms in place that are at least intended to enable a government employee to do exactly that. Individuals who choose to not even attempt to use those mechanisms, but rather steal documents or information and then illegally leak them to media or another entity, are classified as leakers, not whistleblowers.

Interviews with twelve whistleblowers or leakers are analyzed to determine the factors that motivate whistleblowers and whether they differ from those that motivate leakers. The factors that will be coded for include Education on Whistleblowing, Intent,

Perceived Personal Cost, Public Service Motivation, and Loyalty. The current study adds to the field of whistleblowing research by filling a gap in the existing research, especially as related specifically to U.S. national security. The research attempts to answer the following question: what are the motivating factors of U.S. national security whistleblowers, and how do they compare to those of leakers? This study intends to

provide insight to intelligence officials and decision makers within the American government, and perhaps officials and decision makers in other democratic countries across the globe. One expected outcome of this research is a larger understanding of motivations for whistleblowing and conditions that lead to whistleblowing, which may inform policy makers of how to create the most trustworthy and ethical environment, encouraging individuals to report perceived wrongdoings internally within the system as opposed to leaking to the media.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Definitions and Theory

In their seminal work, Marcia P. Miceli and Janet P. Near (1985), leading scholars on whistleblowing, defined it as “an activity of disclosure by organizational members for illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations who may be able to effect action” (p. 4). A broader definition has been suggested by other scholars to include whistleblowing by former members of an organization (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). For this research, and within the

Intelligence Community, whistleblowing is defined as “the act of reporting waste, fraud, abuse and corruption in a lawful manner to those who can correct the wrongdoing.”4

In order to fully understand what actions a whistleblower takes, as opposed to someone illegally leaking information, let us briefly look at Edward Snowden. Snowden is an example of a leaker, not a whistleblower, because he stole millions of documents from the NSA and illegally transferred them to a journalist. Although Snowden may not

4U.S. Congressional Research Service. Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections (R45345; September 23, 1019), by Michael E. DeVine. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R45345.pdf

have committed treason, he did illegally obtain and release classified government documents. If Edward Snowden’s true goal was just to make the American public aware of the NSA’s surveillance operations, he could have first tried to use the aforementioned mechanisms. He would have found at least some support in congress, where Senator Ron

Wyden of Oregon had warned the American public in 2011, “when the American people find out how their government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry.”5 Nonetheless, Snowden showed no intention to work with congress, nor did he limit the documents he released to ones that deal specifically with NSA surveillance, or with programs that were illegal at all. Furthermore, he did not read all of the documents he stole and sent to journalists, therefore it is implausible that he knew all of the information he was releasing.

There is no prior research that analyzes the factors effects on whistleblowers in relation to its effects on leakers. All prior research mentioned in this literature review is referring to both “leakers” and “whistleblowers”, as they are defined in this paper, when they discuss whistleblowers. While there isn’t currently a prevailing theory on whistleblowing, Miceli and Near drew upon expectancy theory, a commonly used theory of motivation, to attempt to develop a theory of whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1985).

Prior Research

Although there are few studies which employ qualitative analysis to determine psychological motivators for whistleblowing, several have investigated what factors may lead to whistleblowing. Keil, M., Tiwana, A., Sainsbury, R., & Sneha, S. (2010) used a

5 See “In Speech, Wyden says Official Interpretations of Patriot Act must be made public” https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/in-speech-wyden-says-official-interpretations-of- patriot-act-must-be-made-public

cost-benefit analysis to suggest that how an individual determines costs and benefits will play a role in their willingness or intent to whistleblow. Mesmer-Magnus and

Viswesvaran (2005) divided the determinants of whistleblowing into separate categories: characteristics of wrongdoing, whistleblower characteristics, and contextual factors.

Other scholars have classified the factors into different categories, such as personal versus situational factors (Cassematis and Wortley, 2013; Near & Miceli, 2008). Personal factors potentially include things like religion, culture, age, job experience, and others

(Dalton & Radtke, 2013). Situational or contextual factors include threats of retaliation and the size of the organization (Miceli & Near, 1985). In addition to personal and contextual factors, scholars have also classified characteristics of wrongdoing as a factor, such as the severity or type of wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 2008).

Factors Determining Whistleblowing Motivation

Prior research has identified multiple factors that may motivate an individual to expose wrongdoing within their organization, whether through internal or external methods. The identified factors include public service motivation (PSM), perceived personal cost (PPC), education on whistleblowing, and organizational protection (Cho and Song, 2015). PPC is defined by Dalton & Radtke as “perceived harm or discomfort that could result from reporting wrongdoing” (2013, p.156). Scholars have argued that individuals contemplating exposing wrongdoing would be discouraged by perceived personal costs. (Cho & Song, 2015). Potential forms of retaliation for whistleblowing include the loss of privileges or rights, slander, and separation (Cassematis & Wortley,

2013; Keil et al., 2010). While prior research has reached a consensus that PPC is negatively associated with whistleblowing (Cho & Song, 2015), this study will attempt to

analyze the association of PPC on whistleblowing in relation to its effect on leaking, which has not been investigated in prior research.

In addition to PPC, scholars have identified Public Service Motivation as another factor related to an individual’s decision to whistleblow. PSM is defined as ““an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations” (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 368). Lavena (2014) identified PSM as a key factor in whistleblowing when the whistleblowing would benefit society. Lavena (2014) further identifies responsibility and ethical behavior as key components of PSM, while other scholars include self-sacrifice and altruism. Near and

Miceli’s 2008 study findings supported prior research which suggested that individuals who express greater levels of PSM are more likely to expose wrongdoing, whether through whistleblowing or leaking (Perry & Wise, 1990).

There must also be an understanding of the legal protections that the US government offers whistleblowers. Attempting to expose illegal behavior is often a risky endeavor, as it creates tension and increases the potential for retaliation against the individual. The first statute to establish procedural protections for whistleblowers in the

U.S. came in 1978 when Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act. In part due to the 1978 act’s failure to adequately protect whistleblowers, Congress passed the

Whistleblower Protection Act in 1989 and the Intelligence Community Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1998. As more unethical behavior was exposed through whistleblowing or leaking, more protections have been added for whistleblowers, while also ensuring that leakers face consequences. This study will also attempt to identify how the existence, lack thereof, or knowledge of the aforementioned legal protections and proper

whistleblower procedures might affect an individual’s willingness to expose unethical or illegal behavior within their organization.

Education on whistleblowing and whistleblowing procedures has also been identified by scholars as a factor in whistleblowing. Prior research suggests that an understanding of how to properly report wrongdoing and what channels should be used to do so will be positively associated with whistleblowing (Miceli & Near, 1985). Since this research distinguishes between whistleblowers and leakers while prior research does not, this study will attempt to clarify whether there is any distinction between the two classifications. Education on whistleblowing, for this research, will refer specifically to education on how to report wrongdoing through legal channels within the system, as opposed information on how to illegally report wrongdoing to the press. This will provide insight into whether or not education on whistleblowing is a factor that encourages people to whistleblow as opposed to leak.

METHODS AND DATA

The research uses case study data consisting of the most politically important known cases of whistleblowing within the American Intelligence Community. Political importance is used as the sampling frame because whistleblowing within the U.S.

Intelligence Community environment has large, direct effects on politics and policy making, ranging from domestic issues like surveillance on U.S. citizens to international issues like the abuse of captured enemy combatants by U.S. soldiers at a prison abroad.

As Michael Quinn Patton (2015) writes, “sampling politically important cases is simply a strategy for trying to increase the usefulness and relevance of information where resources permit the study of only a limited number of cases” (p. 241). There are a

limited number of whistleblower cases throughout the relatively short period of time that the United States has had an established Intelligence Community, and the information on many cases remains limited or confidential. Thus, identifying the most politically important whistleblowing cases of the past few decades adds to the usefulness and relevance of this research. The whistleblowers and leakers that will be studied here include: Daniel Ellsberg, Edward Snowden, Jeffrey Sterling, Ed Loomis, Samuel

Provance, Thomas Drake, Thomas Tamm, J. Kirk Wiebe, William Binney, Chelsea

Manning, John Crane, and John Tye. The individuals were classified as either whistleblowers or leakers according to the definition of whistleblowers previously identified. Whistleblowers include Tye, Loomis, Wiebe, Binney, Sterling, and Crane, while leakers include Snowden, Ellsberg, Provance, Tamm, Manning, and Drake.

Considering that there are there a limited quantity of known whistleblowers and leakers, and most are not able to be contacted, this research relies on document retrieval as its collection method. The sampling frame for the data is political importance. While some of the individuals had many interviews available for use, only one or two interviews from each individual case was used, depending on the length. Regarding length, two interviews were chosen for one specific case only if the interviews available were particularly short, relative to those of other cases. This measure was taken because the data would be skewed if the interviews for some cases were significantly longer than others. The interviews were also chosen based on the topics covered; for example, an interview about why Edward Snowden released classified information would be chosen over an interview about how Edward Snowden enjoyed his time in Russia. The interviews were found using Google.

The data was analyzed using Dedoose, a software which allows for mixed methods content analysis through categorizing, coding, and extracting research data.6 The motivating factors that were coded for are: Education on Whistleblowing, Perceived

Personal Cost, Public Service Motivation, Loyalty, and Intention. These codes and their sub-codes will be further defined in the following section.

The first part of the analysis consists of quantitative research, measuring how often each factor is mentioned by each individual, grouping them based on their classifications as either whistleblowers or leakers, and observing any patterns or lack thereof. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of the data, looking more closely at the excerpts which were coded for and identifying any themes or patterns that exist. The goal is to figure out if there is any discernible difference between what motivates an individual who notices wrongdoing to report it within the proper channels or illegally expose it, and if the findings can inform government action intended to encourage the former and discourage the latter.

6 See https://www.dedoose.com

CODE DEFINITIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Figure 1: Packed Code Cloud

Education on Whistleblowing

This is defined as any time an individual expressed or took action which

demonstrated a knowledge of the proper whistleblowing procedures. This may also

include a leaker displaying knowledge of legal whistleblowing methods and choosing not

to follow them. Scholars have identified education on whistleblowing and whistleblower

procedures to be relevant to the likelihood of whistleblowing (Cho & Song, 2015). While

this is not necessarily a motivating, psychological factor, it does provide relevant context.

For example, an individual who is aware of the proper whistleblowing procedures yet

chooses not to use them has made a conscious decision to do so, whereas an individual

who is unaware of the proper whistleblowing procedures may not have known they had a

better option than leaking to a journalist.

Hypothesis 1: Whistleblowers will express education on whistleblowing more than leakers Hypothesis 1b: There will be leakers who express education on whistleblowing

Intention

The sub-codes for “Intention” are “intention to whistleblow” and “intention to leak.” Intention to whistleblow includes any time an individual expressed or took an action that followed the proper whistleblower procedures to notify an authority of wrongdoing. Intention to leak includes any time an individual expressed or took an action that went against the proper whistleblower procedures, choosing or expressing a desire to reveal information to a journalist or other external institution. While it may appear simple that whistleblowers will express an intent to whistleblow more than leakers and leakers will express an intent to leak more than whistleblowers, the most relevant result of this code will be the frequency with which leakers express an intent to whistleblow. If an individual expressed that they wanted to properly whistleblow, or even took action to do so, and then chose to leak information, it may be extremely insightful to determine why they shifted from their original intention to whistleblow. This will be explained further in the qualitative analysis.

Hypothesis 2: There will be leakers who express an intent to whistleblow prior to leaking

Loyalty

The amount of times “loyalty” itself was coded for will be less relevant than the prevalence of its child codes. The sub codes for loyalty were created to specify who or what the individual is expressing loyalty to. This includes: Loyalty to Public, Loyalty to

Law, Loyalty to the Institution, and Loyalty to Self. Loyalty to Self includes any

statements or actions which demonstrate an adherence to an individual’s personal wellbeing or ideology. Loyalty to Law includes any statements or actions which demonstrate the individual’s perception of the importance of following the law and obeying the constitution. Loyalty to Institutions includes any statements or actions which express obedience to either the government as a whole or to the specific agency where the individual is employed. Loyalty to Public includes any statements or actions which demonstrate an individual’s desire to inform the public of wrongdoing. It would be logical to observe a large co-occurrence between Loyalty to Public and Public Service

Motivation.

Hypothesis 3: Whistleblowers will express greater levels of loyalty to institution and loyalty to constitution than leakers. Hypothesis 4: Leakers will express greater levels of loyalty to public and loyalty to self than whistleblowers.

Perceived Personal Cost

Factors of PPC were identified by Cho and Song (2015). The motivating factors that were sub-coded for, which are based on the factors identified by prior research, are:

Action to Prevent Harm, Fear, Harm from Leaking, and Harm from Whistleblowing. Fear includes anytime that an individual expresses that they are scared of the repercussions of exposing wrongdoing, whether through proper channels or through illegally leaking. Fear is further sub-coded for Paranoia. Action to Prevent harm includes any mention of an action taken by an individual with the intention of preventing harm. This would include activities such as having any piece of writing reviewed by the proper authorities to check for classified information before being published.

Harm from Whistleblowing includes any mention of personal harm an individual faced directly as a result of whistleblowing. In relation to the importance of the prevalence of

leakers expressing an intent to whistleblow, the frequency with which leakers faced harm from whistleblowing may provide insight into why some leakers shifted from their intent to whistleblow to eventually leak.

Hypothesis 5: Whistleblowers will express more PPC, actions to prevent harm, and harm from whistleblowing more than leakers Hypothesis 6: Leakers will express more fear than whistleblowers.

Public Service Motivation

The three child codes for PSM are Responsibility, Self-Sacrifice, and Desire to

Serve. Responsibility is defined as any time an individual expresses a feeling of responsibility to act after witnessing wrongdoing. Self-sacrifice includes mentions of being willing to incur harm in order to expose information to the public, or taking an action despite expecting to face repercussions after doing so. Desire to Serve includes mentions of being motivated by an inner aspiration to serve the U.S. or the public, or actions taken because of that motivation. Guilt is included a child-code for responsibility, because responsibility may manifest as feelings of guilt. This includes any time that an individual expressed feelings of guilt or remorse, either for their own actions or lack thereof, their colleagues’ actions, or their government’s actions.

Hypothesis 7: Whistleblowers will express greater levels of desire to serve than leakers Hypothesis 8: Leakers will express greater levels of public service motivation, responsibility, and self-sacrifice than whistleblowers.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

0 10 20 30 40 50

Education on Whistleblowing Intent to leak Intent to whistleblow Loyalty Loyalty to Institution Loyalty to Law Loyalty to Public

Loyalty to Self Leaker Perceived Personal Cost Whistleblower Action to prevent harm Fear Harm from Whistleblowing Public Service Motivation Desire to Serve Responsibility Self-sacrifice

Figure 2: Total Code Counts Education on Whistleblowing

The findings confirm the hypothesis that whistleblowers would express knowledge of proper whistleblower procedures and their history more than leakers. As expected, this code primarily manifested in two ways. First, the majority of the excerpts in this category were whistleblowers discussing legal methods of exposing wrongdoing and how they have been employed in the past, by themselves or others. In his

Washington Post op-ed, John Tye provided a blueprint for U.S. national security officials to legally blow the whistle on government wrongdoing while also explaining his actions to the public. In doing so, he explained exactly what channels he used to report the constitutional violations he witnessed.

Before I left the State Department, I filed a complaint with the department’s inspector general, arguing that the current system of collection and storage of communications by U.S. persons under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. I have also brought my complaint to the House and Senate intelligence committees and to the inspector general of the NSA. (john tye interview/WaPo op-ed.docx (6068-6489).

In addition to outlining his actions, Tye also demonstrated a knowledge of past whistleblowing and leaking attempts.

All along, the government has said that Snowden had numerous internal opportunities to… work through the system to raise his concerns. I have worked through the system with my concerns. If the government means what it says, this is a chance for the government to come clean about just what it’s collecting and storing on the American people and show that the legal whistleblower system actually works. ((john tye interview/WaPo op-ed.docx (19275-19677).

Tye brought up the case of Edward Snowden in order to put pressure on the government to reward his decision to use legal whistleblowing channels and work within the system.

Tye’s sentiment may be a starting point for whistleblower policy discussions. If individuals see that reporting wrongdoing through proper channels within the system accomplishes something, they may be more inclined to use those channels.

John Crane demonstrated his education on whistleblowing by articulating why, exactly, he feels it is so necessary to follow the appropriate procedures.

Within any society, how does a person channel simply principled civil dissent within a Nazi dictatorship that accords violence? Within the system we have here, because it is a constitutional democracy, principled dissent needs to be channeled through the whistleblower system, because that will help senior management also seeing levels down. (john crane interview part 1*.docx (2121-2480).

Education on whistleblowing was also displayed by leakers, however, typically to express their belief that that the available legal methods to expose the wrongdoing they observed were unsatisfactory. This was expressed in a straightforward manner by Chelsea

Manning:

Everybody says that there's channels ... but they don't work … We've seen for at least a decade now that when you have information and you see wrongdoing, you don't have safe channels to go to ... They exist on paper, but in practice time and time again, you've seen that these channels don't work.” (Manning interview.docx (9458-9769).

Manning was aware of the proper channels, apparently having done enough research to know that individuals have failed when attempting to use them. While many of the whistleblower’s education on whistleblowing may have encouraged them to follow legal methods, Manning’s had the opposite effect. In this instance, education on whistleblowing discouraged the individual from attempting to use proper channels, due to fear for their personal safety as well as fear that they will not accomplish their goal of fixing the wrongdoing. Ideology likely plays a factor in an individual’s decision to break the law due to the belief that following the law would fail to accomplish her goal, as some individuals still attempt to follow the law despite believing it would not work.

Nonetheless, Edward Snowden articulated a sentiment similar to Manning:

There've been times throughout American history where what is right is not the same as what is legal. Sometimes to do the right thing you have to break a law. (Snowden Brian Williams interview.docx (25718-25877)

Here, Snowden implies that he was aware of the illegality of his actions and made a conscious decision to go outside of legal methods to expose perceived wrongdoing. Like

Manning, Snowden invoked history to suggest that his actions were righteous despite their illegality.

Intention

As expected, the quantitative findings for intention show that whistleblowers expressed higher levels of intent to whistleblow while leakers expressed higher levels of intent to leak. As mentioned in the definitions section, the prevalence with which leakers expressed an intent to whistleblow is of particular interest, as it suggests that the individual may have preferred or even attempted to follow appropriate procedures to become a whistleblower, but then changed their mind and decided to leak. The data does support the hypothesis that at least some leakers would convey an intent to whistleblow

prior to leaking. The qualitative analysis will further investigate the relevant excerpts to determine why leakers may have shifted from their original intention to whistleblow. Co- occurrence of leakers’ Intent to Whistleblow and Harm from Whistleblowing may partly explain the decision to leak instead of whistleblow. One thing not coded for that potentially should have been, as it occurred several times, is the occurrence of whistleblowers expressing disapproval of leaking.

For whistleblowers, intent to whistleblow was primarily identified explaining a part of their process of exposing wrongdoing through proper whistleblower methods. For example, J. Kirk Wiebe displayed an intention to follow proper oversight procedures by communicating his concerns with a staffer on the House Intelligence Committee, Diane

Roark. He explains this decision in the following excerpt:

Well, going to Diane was part of our strategy, because we knew that Diane had the chance to influence other people in decision making, either in the agency or external. She was very eloquent in her ability to converse with people at nontechnical levels and still make all the main points, was very good. So Diane was extremely useful as an advocate in addition to her oversight role, which she was trying to play for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (Wiebe interview.docx (14185-14639)

As mentioned, several leakers also displayed an intent to whistleblow despite ultimately illegally leaking information. Jeffrey Sterling mentioned the congressional intelligence committees, stating:

I reached out to the Senate Intelligence Committee. I gave them my concerns about an operation I was involved in, and I thought it could have an impact, a negative impact, on our soldiers going into Iraq. (Jeffrey Sterling Interview.docx (1906-2112).

Prior to leaking information to the press, Thomas Tamm raised his concerns with a

Senate Judiciary Committee staffer, Sandra Wilkinson. According to Tamm, his concern at the time was making sure congress was aware of what was happening, and thus he decided to reach out to congress. He explains the response he received in the following excerpt:

I had since left the -- well, I was still with the Department of Justice, I was in a different office. I'd left OIPR, and I used my government computer email to reach out to her again and say, "Can we have another cup of coffee?" And I went back up on the Hill and met with her, and I said: "So, were you able to talk to anybody? Does Congress know what we're doing with regard to this program?" And she said she couldn't tell me and that she just -- and I said, "Well, then I think maybe I will go to the press," And I remember her last comment was, "You know, Tom, whistleblowers frequently don't end up very well." And I told her, yeah, I understood that. (Thomas Tamm interview.docx (18330-18989).

Tamm goes on to explain that it was unacceptable to how “closely held” things were and that the government’s response to him was unsatisfactory, leading him to reach out to the press.

I just put everything together and felt that -- and again, the fact that we were rendering people to states that we knew tortured them, I just decided to -- I had read articles by Eric Lichtblau with The New York Times. I knew he was covering the Department of Justice, and I felt like he had a pretty good handle of what was going on in the department, and I reached out to him. ... (Thomas Tamm interview.docx (19483-19866).

Tamm’s case provides the clearest instance of an individual’s intent to whistleblow transforming into intent to leak due to the response to their initial intention. Tamm would have been encouraged to continue to fight for reform within the system had the congressional committee responded to his initial report with greater transparency.

Thomas Drake is another example of a leaker who displayed an intent to whistleblow prior to leaking. As the following excerpts show, Drake, similar to Tamm, first explained how he attempted to report his concerns through legal whistleblowing channels, then articulated that he felt it necessary to go outside the system in order to accomplish his goal of exposing or remedying the wrongdoing.

The mass surveillance regime in particular, knowing it was unleashed in an extraordinary way across the United States and rapidly metastasized. I was eyewitness to all of that. And I reported all that to the 9/11, the Congressional 9/11 investigations, particularly the joint inquiry, all censored and suppressed. (Thomas drake interview part 2.docx (10078-10391).

So the only thing left that I have is defend it. So I decided to keep defending it from within until I no longer could. That’s when I went outside the system (Thomas drake interview part 2.docx (1237-1394).

Intention was coded for largely to determine whether any leakers attempted to follow legal methods prior to leaking. While the quantitative analysis determined that the phenomenon does exist, the qualitative analysis has further identified potential reasons why the leakers abandoned their intent to whistleblow and why whistleblowers stuck with theirs.

Loyalty

The relevant findings for loyalty are in the child codes, not the parent code of

Loyalty. The findings support the hypothesis, as whistleblowers expressed more loyalty to law and loyalty to institution, while leakers more often expressed loyalty to public and loyalty to self. The co-occurrence of the two codes Loyalty to Law and Intent to

Whistleblow was the highest count of code co-occurrence in the data.7 This suggests that individuals whose value the rule of law highly are more likely to attempt to follow whistleblower procedures to report perceived wrongdoing rather than to illegally leak information.

7 See Appendix

Loyalty to Law

Loyalty to law was observed in the data more than any other single motivating factor (excluding the parent-codes “Loyalty” and “Public Service Motivation”). While whistleblowers expressed this trait more often than leakers, the difference was very small and potentially substantially insignificant. It is important to note, however, that Thomas

Drake mentions his oath to the constitution, Figure 3: Total Code Count for Loyalty as well as his witnessing its subversion by the government, so often that it skews the data.

For context, Drake accounts for 21 of the 31 excerpts of leakers demonstrating loyalty to law.

Loyalty to law manifested in a variety of ways, but primarily through individuals mentioning the oath they took to the constitution. Drake is careful to articulate that his loyalty is to the constitution above all, and that he didn’t take his oath lightly:

I was eyewitness to the subversion of the Constitution. I took an oath to that Constitution, and I was going to hold true faith and allegiance to the same. I didn’t take an oath to the president. I didn’t take an oath to secrecy. I didn’t take an oath to anything else other than defending and supporting the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. (Thomas drake interview.docx (9831-10195).

As previously noted, Drake’s intent to whistleblow also arises in the context of his loyalty to the constitution, as he mentions his repeated attempts to defend the constitution

“from within the system until I no longer could.” Furthermore, when asked directly why he “stuck his neck out” to report what he had witnessed, he again invoked his oath to, and the government’s subversion of, the constitution:

I owed it to the people. I took the oath. I wasn’t going to break the oath that I took. The oath mattered to me. It was the fourth time I had taken it. It mattered. And here’s the president committing high crimes and misdemeanors as defined by the Constitution. (Thomas drake interview part 2.docx (751-1014)

While Drake displays loyalty to the law far more than any other leaker, several of the whistleblowers expressed this trait many times each. William Binney conveyed a loyalty to the law more than any other whistleblower, often in a similar manner as Drake, by emphasizing his oath to the constitution. Binney also specifically mentioned his dismay at his colleague’s willingness to neglect their oath to the constitution:

Well, I'm very disappointed in the government, that everybody involved is violating their oath of office. I mean, they all took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution, and they've all scrapped that. They basically are violating their oath of office. I mean, I just never expected this from my democracy (William Binney interview.docx (27095-27407).

While Binney and Drake both expressed high levels of loyalty to the law, only Binney also expressed loyalty to institution. This may provide insight into why Binney to continue to follow proper whistleblowing and ultimately resign after his efforts failed, while Drake ultimately chose to leak. Binney’s loyalty to the institution likely discouraged him from leaking, while Drake did not feel the same discouragement.

Additionally, Drake expressed higher levels of loyalty to the public than Binney.

Juxtaposing all of this data suggests that an individual who expresses loyalty to the law is likely to defend violations of the law, and if they also hold loyalty to institution they are more likely to follow internal whistleblowing procedures, while if they hold loyalty to the public they are more likely to illegally leak information.

Loyalty to Institution

Loyalty to institution was expressed almost exclusively by whistleblowers. One way this trait manifested was in how unwilling some individuals were to believe it when they were told that their agency or government had taken a certain action. Ed Loomis

repeatedly mentioned that, although he had been told of some supposed illegal activities, he refused to believe them to be true:

I was aware that they had told me the names of other programs, but I just refused to believe, after all I had been through for 37 years, that all of a sudden things would change and they'd go back to the old ways, back to the early '70s, in violation of what the Church Committee tried to set up under FISA. ... (Loomis interview.docx (11863-12175).

Loomis held an idealistic view of his government and his colleagues, up until the point where he saw the evidence with his own eyes. When he did see the evidence, thanks to

Edward Snowden, his tone on his view of the government appeared to change.

Additionally, although he condemns how much information Snowden released, he does praise the bravery of Snowden’s actions. This may appear peculiar for an individual expressing such strong loyalty to the law and to the institution, but it is explained by the fact that Loomis now feels such shame for believing in the government over his colleagues:

Well, when I saw the warrant authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court authorizing on a three-month renewal basis collection of all this from the telcos, I said: "They were right; I was wrong. Shame on me. Shame on me for believing my government and not believing my fellow comrades who I'd worked with for a number of years." (Loomis interview.docx (37103-37445)

Loomis describes Snowden as an extremely brave individual who has a very idealistic view of what the Constitution means to this country and his generation. Loomis himself, along with several other whistleblowers, also expressed a sense of idealism regarding the government. Wiebe articulated that, because his loyalty also caused him to struggle to believe that the government was doing what he had been told, he understood why Ed

Loomis didn’t believe it either:

Ed did not believe Bill and I, or Diane for that matter or Tom, but I understand that. Probably of all in the group next to Ed I would understand that, because I was one of the last to come around to the notion that my government would actually work purposefully against me. It's a concept that never entered my mind ever in my entire career, either in the Air Force or as a government employee. I had always worked for my government, with my government toward noble ends.

Little did I know it would go off the wrong path, violate the constitution, and try to turn all of this against me or Bill or Ed. (Wiebe interview.docx (26384-27347).

Only one leaker expressed any loyalty to institution, and it was very brief. Samuel

Provance suggested that he was unwilling to talk to the press because he believed the government would resolve the issues he witnessed internally.

the media had already tried to contact me, but I didn’t want to — you know, I didn’t know what was going on and I was trusting that the investigation would uncover, you know, what had happened (Provance interview.docx (33968-34428).

Loyalty to Public

Leakers expressed loyalty to public more than whistleblowers. Edward Snowden, particularly, expressed loyalty to public three times as much as the individual who expressed the second most frequently, John Tye. Snowden repeatedly invokes “public interest” when explaining why he felt his actions were justified:

I could make mistakes, I could make the wrong call, but the reality is the situation determined that this needed to be told to the public. (Snowden brian Williams interview.docx (24763-25025)

There's nothing that would be published that would harm the public interest, these are programs that need to be understood, that need to be known, that require deep background and the context for research, they're difficult to report but they're of critical public importance. (Snowden brian Williams interview.docx (25197-25481).

This is something that's not our place to decide. The public needs to decide whether these policies are right or wrong. (snowden interview.docx (4757-4878)

Snowden makes clear that his loyalty to the public was a key motivating factor in his decision to leak information – this will be further examined in the upcoming Public

Service Motivation section, as there was a high co-occurrence of those two codes. While leakers expressed this trait more often than whistleblowers, John Tye and John Crane both expressed a sense of loyalty to public. Crane displays this trait explaining why whistleblowing is so important:

And in any large society, that there is a compact between the governed and those who govern them, and there needs to be transparency, and that there needs to be accountability. And should you have the wrong balance, should you have an executive out of control, that can simply compromise everyone’s rights. (John Crane interview.docx 122-731)

John Tye, meanwhile, very succinctly states his motivation due to loyalty to the public at the end of his op-ed in the Washington Post:

I am coming forward because I think Americans deserve an honest answer to the simple question: What kind of data is the NSA collecting on millions, or hundreds of millions, of Americans? (John Tye interview.docx 10686-10972)

Loyalty to Self

Loyalty to self was not observed much throughout the interviews, relative to the other forms of loyalty coded for here. The most prevalent way in which this trait was demonstrated was by whistleblowers explaining why they ultimately resigned after attempting to expose wrongdoing. While discussing why he and his colleagues resigned from their jobs in government, William Binney suggested it was due to a concern for involving themselves in illegal activities:

So 9/11 happened, and after that, we ran into the illegal activity with the spying on U.S. citizens, a violation of the Constitution and the laws, and we said: "We can't stick around and be a party to this. We can't be an accessory to all these crimes. We have to get out." (William Binney interview.docx (18415-18689)

Thomas Tamm is the one leaker who expressed his loyalty to self through his motivation to resign as well:

So it was right around the time that I had decided to leave that office because I was not comfortable working in that with my thought that there was something illegal going on. (Thomas Tamm interview.docx 15879-16055)

The findings for loyalty to self do not suggest that expressions of this trait will determine or predict an individual’s desire to whistleblow as opposed to leak in one direction or the other.

Perceived Personal Cost

The data shows that whistleblowers expressed higher levels of Perceived Personal

Cost than leakers. The findings support the hypothesis that that whistleblowers would express greater levels of actions to `prevent harm and harm from whistleblowing, while

leakers would express more fear. Nonetheless, the occurrence of leakers expressing harm from whistleblowing suggests that at least some leakers faced repercussions for attempting to expose wrongdoing properly. It is possible that the personal cost they faced from attempting to whistleblow led to them leaking instead; this co-occurrence will be analyzed further in the upcoming sections.

PPC - Action to Prevent Harm

Very few individuals spoke of actions they took to prevent harm to themselves. Thomas

Tamm viewed his resignation from government office as an action to prevent harm:

I was preoccupied with what was going to happen to me and when it was going to happen and what was going to happen, if it was going to happen. And again, I just ended up thinking that, well, the FBI is a part of the Department of Justice, and they want to talk to me, and I've told them that I'm not going to talk to them, that I shouldn't stay an employee of the Department of Justice. So it certainly was somewhat -- it was a mutual decision that we parted ways. (Thomas Tamm interview.docx (27556-28023).

While Tamm provides one example of a leaker taking action to prevent harm, whistleblowers took such actions significantly Figure 4: Total Code Count for PPC more often than leakers. Notably, John Tye’s protectionist action extends well beyond actions relevant to his whistleblowing. In Tye’s interview with Vice, the author writes,

“Tye says his ‘policy’ when speaking to reporters is to have another person present who will bear witness to his comments. It’s for Tye's protection; to ensure he has backup if a reporter misquotes him or if he’s accused of saying something he shouldn’t have said.” In his op-ed, Tye explains the steps he took to avoid harming the institution or nation by revealing sensitive information, thereby protecting himself from retaliation for doing so:

I have never made any unauthorized disclosures of classified information, nor would I ever do so. I fully support keeping secret the targets, sources and methods of U.S. intelligence as crucial elements of national security. I was never a disgruntled federal employee; I loved my job at the State Department. I left voluntarily and on good terms to take a job outside of government. A draft of this article was reviewed and cleared by the State Department and the NSA to ensure that it contained no classified material. (John Tye interview/WaPo op-ed.docx (9650-10169).

Ed Loomis claims that he took actions to protect himself after the FBI raided his house – an event that will be examined more closely in the upcoming “PPC-Harm” section. After the FBI raid, Loomis explains that he cut off all contact with Binney, Wiebe, Drake, and

Diane Roark, suggesting he did so to protect himself:

Because I didn't want them to get in trouble if I had been in trouble. I didn't want -- I didn't know that Bill, Kirk, Tom -- or Bill, Kirk and Diane had been raided; I was unaware of that. They had called and left messages to call them, but I refused to call them because I didn't know what had precipitated the raid on me. (Loomis interview.docx 30705-31033)

Wiebe, in his interview, recalled Loomis’ decision to cut off contact with him and the others, sympathizing with the decision because he understood it was encouraged by lawyers:

I think he was actually afraid to talk to Bill Binney and myself and Diane Roark, because he also had a lawyer who was telling him, "You don't know for sure, Ed, what those other guys said to the government and what they did, so protect yourself." And he abided by that. (Wiebe interview.docx (25982-266461)

Although this trait was displayed several times, the data does not suggest that it is a good indicator of whether someone may be motivated to whistleblow or to leak instead.

PPC – Fear

Fear was almost exclusively expressed by leakers, although a few whistleblowers demonstrated fear as well. While leakers primarily expressed fear of retaliation for leaking information, whistleblowers typically expressed being scared of the government’s actions, or of being associated with the government’s wrongdoing which they witnessed.

Let us first look at the leakers. Thomas Tamm feared prosecution for leaking:

Well, I did think there was a real chance that I would be prosecuted, and I actually even got to the point where I wondered whether I'd be out on bond or whether the bond would be so high that I

wouldn't be able to make the bond. I'm claustrophobic, so I didn't look forward to that possibility. (Thomas Tamm interview.docx (23841-24137).

While Snowden similarly expressed fear of prosecution if he returned to the United

States, he was also afraid that the CIA or others were going to target him:

Yeah. I could be rendered by the CIA, I could have people come after me, or any of their third party partners, you know. They work closely with a number of other nations. Or, you know, they could pay off the Triads, or any, any of their agents or assets. We've got a CIA station just up the road in the consulate here in Hong Kong, and I'm sure they're going to be very busy for the next week. And that's a fear I'll live under for the rest of my life, however long that happens to be. (snowden interview.docx (5316-5801)

Samuel Provance expressed a fear of being killed after he had answered a questionnaire by honestly expressing that he had witnessed wrongdoing, even though he was initially encouraged that an investigation was being opened and that he had been called back to discuss it after answering the questionnaire:

immediately everybody assumed, you know, either that I was in trouble myself or that I was telling on people that were in trouble. And even then, I’m thinking, you know, I might not leave here alive. (Provance interview.docx (21061-21266)

Thomas Drake is the one exception to the pattern here, as the only time he expressed fear was while explaining the danger of the security state environment being created by the government, similar to how this trait manifested in whistleblowers:

But all that doesn’t matter. We have an existential crisis. As I was told, you don’t understand, Mr. Drake. Exigent conditions apply. Emergency action is necessary to deal with the threat. It doesn’t matter that we failed to protect people, protect the nation, we did not keep people out of harm’s way. And that whole national security state apparatus, put into place formally in 1947, in the Cold War, just got transmuted into the 21st century with a new existential threat. And it was going to be decades, if not longer, that we would have to deal with it. (Thomas drake interview part 2.docx (3874-4432)

As mentioned, leakers expressed fear far more than whistleblowers. J. Kirk Wiebe is the only whistleblower to express fear more than once:

My reaction to the whole set of events and what has happened here is one of great sadness and despair almost. I am generally a pretty positive person. It takes a lot to make me negative. But I worry now for the way of life, for the type of government we once had and grew up under in which the Constitution was held sacrosanct more or less to one today where the Constitution is almost an afterthought and something that gets in the way of men's will. (Wiebe interview.docx (27724-28176)

Wiebe’s fear epitomizes how whistleblowers expressed this trait in general, as they were scared of the results of the government wrongdoing which they had witnessed. One potential explanation for leakers expressing more fear of retaliation is that the leakers expect to be retaliated against for their illegal actions, whereas the whistleblowers believe that they will not face retaliation since they stayed within the system and cooperated with authorities. This logic is supported by the idealistic view of the government that many of the whistleblowers communicated, which was demonstrated in the loyalty to institution section of this study.

PPC – Harm

The final characteristic of PPC which was coded for is harm. This distinction was drawn to see if any leakers demonstrated facing harm for whistleblowing prior to leaking.

Thomas Drake is the prime example of this phenomenon, as he legally exposed government errors several times and was retaliated against before he leaked any information to the press:

What happened is I ended up speaking truth to power, starting with NSA, and they didn’t like that. And I ultimately became a material witness in several government investigations, including two 9/11 congressional investigations, a Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General audit and investigation. And the long story short, after significant reprisal and retaliation, the New York Times article comes out in December 2005 revealing for the first time publicly the existence of the so-called terrorist surveillance program–it was not known as that. It was a convenient cover. That caused a huge stir at NSA and within the Department of Justice. They referred it to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation, and I was put on a target list shortly thereafter. (Thomas Drake interview part 2.docx (2969-3749).

Similar to Drake, Samuel Provance also tried to report the perceived wrongdoings he witnessed at Abu Ghraib before he went to the press. Provance received threats of retaliation.

After honestly reporting what he had witnessed in a questionnaire, which he had thought would remain anonymous to the public, Provance was summoned to be interviewed by a

general about what he had witnessed. Once he had explained what he had seen, despite the interviewer’s initial reluctance to hear it, Provance was met with threats of administrative action:

I told him I was in shock. I was like, you know, “I’m being honest with you. I’m — you know, I’m cooperating. I don’t understand how I go from being a witness to — you know, from one investigation to being a criminal in the next.” And — because, by then, he had said he was going to recommend me for administrative action, of being derelict of duty. (Provance interview.docx 27968-28292).

While impossible to know for sure, it is likely that, had Drake and Provance’s initial attempts to whistleblow been met with concern and reform instead of threats, they likely would never have chosen to leak information to the press. This can inform policy recommendations and reforms, as it suggests that decreasing the fear of retaliation and increasing the trust in the institution to respond adequately to reported wrongdoing may decrease the likelihood that an individual chooses to leak as opposed to continuing to use proper channels within the system.

Public Service Motivation

40 35 30 25 20 15 Leaker Whistleblower 10 5 0 Self-sacrifice Responsibility Desire to Public Service Serve Motivation Figure 5: Total Code Count for PSM The findings for Public Service Motivation support the broader hypothesis that leakers would express greater levels of PSM than whistleblowers, as well as the more specific

hypotheses that leakers would express greater levels of responsibility and self-sacrifice, while whistleblowers would express desire to serve more than leakers.

PSM – Responsibility

Leakers displayed feelings of self-imposed responsibility more than whistleblowers. This attribute manifested in multiple ways. Some individuals expressed a sense of responsibility to expose wrongdoing, while others conveyed that they felt directly responsible for the government’s wrongdoing or their inability to stop it.

Whistleblowers and leakers communicated guilt an equal amount of times. Thomas

Drake conveyed both types of responsibility several times, stating that he felt a need to fix the government’s wrongs and also feeling guilty for the fact that they happened in the first place. Drake invoked his conscience when explaining why he felt the need to speak up:

You grow a conscience or you had one. You’re also staring at history. You know, remember, the way I have put it, I’ll say it a different way. You open up Pandora’s box, which happened to me. The Pandora’s box is opened up and I’m staring into it, and the abyss is staring back at me. You could close Pandora’s box or just look away and act as if nothing was different, ’cause you didn’t give the orders, you weren’t the authorizer, you didn’t make all the decisions. (Thomas drake interview part 2.docx 14386-14852)

Not only does Drake suggest that he feels a need to not “just look away”, he also mentions that it may seem acceptable to some people to ignore what he had seen because they weren’t directly involved. Drake’s actions of exposing the wrongdoing implies that felt responsible despite his lack of involvement. Edward Snowden’s sense of self- imposed responsibility was articulated clearly when he was asked if he is a patriot:

You know, I think patriot is a word that's thrown around so much that it can be devalued nowadays, but being a patriot doesn't mean prioritizing service to government above all else. Being a patriot means knowing when to protect your country, knowing when to protect your constitution knowing when to protect, your countrymen, from the violations of, and encroachments of adversaries. And those adversaries don't have to be foreign countries, they can be bad policies, they can be officials who, you know, need a little bit more accountability. (snowden brian Williams interview.docx 32143-32814)

Snowden’s statements insinuate that he believes it was his patriotic duty to steal and leak documents, despite the fact that he would be going against the government he is supposed to serve. This can either be seen as Snowden’s self-imposed responsibility outweighing his desire to serve the government, or as Snowden feeling like he was serving the government by exposing their actions to the public. One interesting trend that was observed is, when expressing feelings of responsibility or guilt, most of the individuals uses the pronoun “you” instead of “I”, despite talking about their own actions and feelings. Chelsea Manning provides the exception to this pattern, as she expressed personal feelings of responsibility in response to being asked if she regrets leaking classified information:

All I can say is that, you know, I accept a responsibility … I went through a decision-making process that I don't think I would have done anything differently if I went through and played it again because -- not because I'm retroactively imposing that on me, but because I would have been a different person. And I am a different person now. (Manning interview.docx 1766-2127)

Manning conveys a sense of pride and satisfaction for fulfilling her responsibility. While whistleblowers displayed feelings of responsibility as well, it was typically to express a collective responsibility for government failures. For example, when discussing his immediate reaction to 9/11, William Binney claims he felt a sense of collective failure for not preventing it:

We just failed. We have failed, because we should have stopped this. There's no reason why we shouldn't have stopped this. (William Binney Interview.docx 10501-10633)

Binney repeatedly says “we” failed, suggesting that he felt responsible as a part of an institution, rather than individually. Ed Loomis, discussing the emotional environment of the NSA directly after 9/11, also suggested a feeling of collective guilt within the institution:

Oh, yeah, very definitely. I know the SIGINT [signals intelligence] director slept in her office for like two weeks. Didn't even go home. There were a lot of guilt feelings, probably more so by the

analysts who were charged with focusing on the terrorism problem than a lot of the other analysts, as well as engineers and computer scientists. (Loomis interview.docx 5102-5444)

The pattern seen in the data showing that whistleblowers tend to use the pronoun “we” when expressing a sense of responsibility, whereas leaker’s more often use “you” or “I”, suggests that individuals who feel strong connections to their colleagues and their institution are more likely to whistleblow than to leak. This conclusion supports the findings in the Loyalty section, as the data for loyalty to institution suggested that individuals who feel stronger loyalty to the government or their agency are more likely to whistleblow than to leak. Both of these conclusions can inform policy recommendations, as they insinuate that policies which increase feelings of collectiveness and loyalty amongst employees will encourage individuals to report complaints within the system rather than going to the press.

PSM – Self-Sacrifice

Self-Sacrifice was observed in the data less than any other single code, and it was expressed exclusively by leakers. This primarily manifested as leaker’s explaining that, prior to leaking information, they understood that they would likely face either social or legal consequences. Thomas Tamm summarizes this sentiment clearly:

I certainly was conscious of the fact that if I were going to be found out -- and I did think I would be found out actually, eventually -- that there would be serious ramifications. But I just thought it was important. (Thomas Tamm interview.docx 20804-21023)

Other leakers expressed a similar emotion, feeling that despite the likely ramifications for their actions, they could not remain silent.

PSM – Desire to Serve

Desire to serve is the only sub-code of PSM that whistleblowers expressed more often than leakers. This trait was often expressed by individuals while explaining their

reasons for initially joining either military of government office. Thomas Tamm provides a good example of this occurrence:

I felt really motivated to try and go more directly after the people who had attacked our country, so I applied for a position with what was then called the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, where I kind of was led to believe that you would work with agents, FBI agents primarily, to try and develop intelligence about people that we thought were foreign agents or terrorists. So I went in with a lot of patriotic fervor, I would say, toward the end of 2001. (Thomas Tamm interview.docx 775-1242).

Desire to serve also manifested as individuals discussing their attempts to serve the government or the public while employed. For example, prior to filing a complaint with the IG, Binney, Wiebe and Loomis had formed a business with the intention of building their surveillance program ThinThread as a private enterprise. In the following excerpt,

Binney explains that they wanted to use their program to be “useful”, even outside of the

Intelligence Community:

It wasn't so much the financial. It was more that we believed what we had could have been useful for not only the intelligence community but the law enforcement community as well, and not only just for the government. It could actually be used for applications in Wall Street, to see if there's trading that's untoward. ... (Loomis interview.docx 17960-18284)

Binney, Loomis, and Wiebe were all more concerned with their potentially useful program being wasted than anything else. Their desire to serve is reflected in the efforts they took to find any route possible to put their program to use, even being willing to work outside the U.S. national security environment. While the whistleblowers who displayed a sense of a desire to serve did so in the context of trying to advance either national or public interest, leakers often expressed this trait when speaking directly about their attempts to expose wrongdoing. Edward Snowden repeatedly stated that every action he took was to serve the government, and that he believed he was still serving the government, even after fleeing the country:

I mean I've from day one said the I'm doing this to serve my country, I'm still working for the government. (Snowden brian Williams interview.docx 28980-29089).

The fact that leakers like Snowden emphasize their willingness to sacrifice for the sake of serving his country supports the conclusions of the Loyalty section, which demonstrated that leakers expressed higher levels of loyalty to public. Leakers understand that there is a likelihood they will face repercussions, but their desire to serve the public appears to matter more than the potential harm they will face. Whistleblowers, meanwhile, conveyed a stronger sense of service in relation to serving the government, as opposed to a focus on serving the public.

CONCLUSION

Further Implications and Recommendations

The findings of this research exemplify the nuance involved in analyzing why an individual chooses to blow the whistle. Although several of the results’ implications have already been discussed, let us briefly delve into them further. Several policy recommendations can be informed by the findings in this study. First, the data suggests that granting additional protections for whistleblowers from retaliation from the organization would benefit both the potential whistleblower and the organization. The findings support the conclusions of prior research on the effect of PPC on whistleblowing, which suggested that PPC has a negative association with whistleblowing (Cho & Song, 2015). Although there are legal protections in place for

U.S. national security and IC officials who legally whistleblow, this study suggests that the current legal protections are unsatisfactory, as every single whistleblower who was studied experienced harm from whistleblowing, in addition to expressing PPC. Increasing

PPC by threatening to retaliate against individuals who leak information may seem like a logical deterrent to leaking, however many leakers expressed a willingness to incur harm

to themselves in order to expose the perceived wrongdoing. Thus, increasing PPC would likely serve to deter whistleblowers without deterring leakers, which does not foster a more cohesive national security environment. Decreasing PPC by adding additional legal protections from organizational retaliation will encourage individuals who witness wrongdoing to report it through proper channels. Any additional legal protections, however, would be more effective if employees have more faith in the channels available to them to report wrongdoing. Several of the individuals in this study expressed feelings of hopelessness regarding their mission to fix their government’s wrongdoing, with multiple whistleblowers acknowledging that the leakers who came after them likely could not have accomplished their goal through whistleblowing methods. If an employee thinks that reporting illegal or unethical behavior through legal channels will result in the report getting ignored, they are less likely to use those channels.

While these recommendations to decrease PPC seek to encourage whistleblowing, the data can also inform recommendations to discourage leaking. One of the strongest distinctions between whistleblowers and leakers in the data was regarding loyalty to institution. The data suggests that increased institutional loyalty may discourage leaking.

Thus, it is recommended that U.S. IC and national security organizations promote organizational loyalty and camaraderie.

Limitations and Future Research

There were several limitations of this study, but the most significant was in the data collection. There is a very small available size of leakers, and even smaller sample size of whistleblowers. While this problem was unavoidable due to the nature and secrecy of whistleblowing, it must be noted. Additionally, there were a limited number of

interviews available, and, with the exception of the four Frontline interviews, they are conducted by different interviewers. While interviews were chosen to all be within a specific length window, they do vary in length, potentially skewing results. Interviews were also chosen based on the questions asked and topic covered, but it is impossible to account for the fact that different interviewers will ask different questions, use different tones, and invoke different responses. Ideally, each individual would be answering the same exact questions, and the same number of questions. Nonetheless, the Binney,

Loomis, Tamm and Wiebe interviews were all conducted by Jim Gilmore for the same

Frontline interview series, providing some consistency.

Another limitation of the study is that only one researcher coded the interviews.

Ideally, multiple individuals would code each interview, increasing the reliability of the study. Finally, the last limitation that must be noted is that all of the data consists of what the individuals say their own motivations are, meaning the researcher is taking them at their word. It is possible that individuals lied or exaggerated their actions or emotions, skewing the data.

Future research on the different motivators for whistleblowers and leakers can work past these limitations. If the research is conducted from within the Intelligence

Community, there will be far more data available on both whistleblowers and leakers.

Multiple coders should also be used for future research. Additionally, several other factors outside of those used in this research could be included. Potential factors to add include guilt, ethical standards, moral standards, patriotism, and type or severity of wrongdoing.

REFERENCES

Appendix

Education on Whistleblowing Intent to whistleblow

Loyalty to Institution Loyalty to Law

Loyalty to Public Action to prevent harm

Desire to Serve Responsibility

Figure 6: Code Co-Occurrence

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INTERVIEWS

Davies, Dave (2018, Jan. 19). Interview with Daniel Ellsberg. Daniel Ellsberg Explains Why He Leaked The Pentagon Papers. https://www.npr.org/2018/01/19/579101965/daniel- ellsberg-explains-why-he-leaked-the-pentagon-papers Gilmore, Jim (2013, Dec. 12). Interview with Ed Loomis. FRONTLINE. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/united-states-of- secrets/the-frontline-interview-edward-loomis/ Gilmore, Jim (2013, Dec. 13). Interview with J. Kirk Wiebe. FRONTLINE. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/united-states-of- secrets/the-frontline-interview-j-kirk-wiebe/ Gilmore, Jim (2013, Dec. 11). Interview with Thomas Tamm. FRONTLINE. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/united-states-of- secrets/the-frontline-interview-thomas-tamm/ Gilmore, Jim (2013, Dec. 13). Interview with William Binney. FRONTLINE. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/united-states-of- secrets/the-frontline-interview-william-binney/ Greenwald, Glenn (2013). Interview with Edward Snowden. Transcript from Democracy Now! https://www.democracynow.org/2013/6/10/youre_being_watched_edward_snowden_eme rges Goodman, Amy (2016, May 23). Interview with John Crane. Exclusive: Meet the Pentagon Official Who Blew the Whistle on Mistreatment of Other Whistleblowers. https://www.democracynow.org/2016/5/23/exclusive_source_reveals_how_pentagon_rui ned Goodman, Amy. Interview with Samuel Provance. Broadcast Exclusive: Abu Ghraib Whistleblower Samuel Provance Speaks Out on Torture and Cover-Up. Democracy Now! https://www.democracynow.org/2008/1/25/broadcast_exclusive_abu_ghraib_whistleblow er_samuel Leopold, J. (2014, July 20). Meet John Napier Tye, the US Government's Ideal New Whistleblower. VICE. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbw4xx/meet-john-napier- tye-the-us-governments-ideal-new-whistleblower

Jay, Paul. Interview with Thomas Drake. From 9/11 to Mass Surveillance, The Man Who Knew Too Much – Thomas Drake on RAI (1/5). The Real News Network. https://therealnews.com/stories/tdrake0618raipt1-2 Tye, J. (2014, July 18). Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans. Retrieved July 10, 2020, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule- that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5- d0de80767fc2_story.html Shubailat Nadine (2017, June 14). Interview with Chelsea Manning. Chelsea Manning says she was trying to 'do the right thing' when she leaked classified military information. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/US/chelsea-manning-leaked-classified-military- information/story?id=47942490 Solomon, Norman. Interview with Jeffrey Sterling. The Invisible Man: CIA Whistleblower Jeffrey Sterling. Exposefacts.org; https://exposefacts.org/watch-the-short-documentary- the-invisible-man-nsa-whistleblower-jeffrey-sterling/ Williams, Brian (20014, May 28). Interview with Edward Snowden. Transcript retrieved from http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1s203lc

Andrew Ghalili | linkedin.com/in/andrewghalili

CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Office of Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), Legislative Intern March 2018 – June 2019 § Supported legislative staff on inquiries related to national security, intelligence and healthcare § Reviewed activity in the House and Senate and tracked issues critical to the Senator’s agenda § Attended DoD briefings and crafted memos on foreign affairs policy issues § Co-authored memos and briefings on armed services material and SASC committee matters § Tackled all duties as directed by the Senator’s staff and work to ensure all projects on deadline PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Friends Seminary, Chemistry Teacher December 2015 – June 2017 § Served a cohort of 80 chemistry students across four independent cohorts in the classroom § Served as a substitute teacher whenever needed by the District and high school staff

Friends Seminary, Basketball and Soccer Coach December 2015 – June 2017 § Coached high school varsity basketball and soccer for two seasons each

VOLUNTEER SERVICE Weill-Cornell Medical Center Clinical Research Volunteer PUBLICATIONS Torres, L., Shaari, C., & Ghalili, A. (2014). Maintaining Favorable Middle Turbinate Position after Endoscopic Sinus Surgery. Otolaryngology–Head and Neck Surgery, 151(1). doi:10.1177 EDUCATION Master of Arts, Global Security Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Class of 2020 Post-Baccalaureate Certificate, Intelligence, Johns Hopkins University, Class of 2020 Bachelor of Arts, Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Class of 2015