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Law and Military Operations in Kosovo: 1999-2001, Lessons Learned For
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) The Judge Advocate General’s School United States Army Charlottesville, Virginia CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO) Director COL David E. Graham Deputy Director LTC Stuart W. Risch Director, Domestic Operational Law (vacant) Director, Training & Support CPT Alton L. (Larry) Gwaltney, III Marine Representative Maj Cody M. Weston, USMC Advanced Operational Law Studies Fellows MAJ Keith E. Puls MAJ Daniel G. Jordan Automation Technician Mr. Ben R. Morgan Training Centers LTC Richard M. Whitaker Battle Command Training Program LTC James W. Herring Battle Command Training Program MAJ Phillip W. Jussell Battle Command Training Program CPT Michael L. Roberts Combat Maneuver Training Center MAJ Michael P. Ryan Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Peter R. Hayden Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Mark D. Matthews Joint Readiness Training Center SFC Michael A. Pascua Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Jonathan Howard National Training Center CPT Charles J. Kovats National Training Center Contact the Center The Center’s mission is to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and to devise training and resource strategies for addressing those issues. It seeks to fulfill this mission in five ways. First, it is the central repository within The Judge Advocate General's Corps for all-source data, information, memoranda, after-action materials and lessons learned pertaining to legal support to operations, foreign and domestic. Second, it supports judge advocates by analyzing all data and information, developing lessons learned across all military legal disciplines, and by disseminating these lessons learned and other operational information to the Army, Marine Corps, and Joint communities through publications, instruction, training, and databases accessible to operational forces, world-wide. -
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Saint Paul University The Making of Torturers: The Case of Abu Ghraib – An Exploration of Individual Psychological Factors, Group Factors, and Mimetic Structures of Violence By Nadine Olafsson A THESIS SUBMITTED to the FACULTY of GRADUATE STUDIES in PARTIAL FULFILLMENT of the REQUIREMENTS for the DEGREE of MASTER of ARTS in CONFLICT STUDIES © Nadine Olafsson, Ottawa, Canada, 2017 Abstract The exposure of the prison abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib in 2004 deeply shocked the American conscience and triggered a widespread public debate surrounding both the legitimacy of the use of torture and American values. With the election of president Trump this discussion has once more moved into the limelight of public discussion. While much attention has been devoted to the morality of torture, little has been paid to the perpetrators of torture themselves. This thesis explores the theoretical framework of Grodin and Annas (2007) to assess individual and group psychological factors in combination with Redekop’s (2002) mimetic structures of violence to assess how ordinary people turned into torturers at Abu Ghraib in 2004. The data analysed stems from the Central Investigative Departments investigation into the torture scandal, as well as the Taguba Report, the Fay Report, the Schlesinger Report, the Red Cross Report and Errol Morris award winning documentary Standard Operating Procedure. The study finds that individual and group psychological factors, in conjuncture with mimetic structures of violence appeared to have played a role in the making of torturers -
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture DEBORAH N
Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation, Detention, and Torture DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN* INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1255 I. EXECUTIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND T O RTU RE ....................................................................................................1257 A. Vague or Unlawful Guidance................................................................ 1259 B. Inaction .................................................................................................1268 C. Resources, Training, and a Plan........................................................... 1271 II. ExECuTrVE LIMITs: FINDING CONSTRAINTS THAT WORK ...........................1273 A. The ProfessionalM ilitary...................................................................... 1274 B. The Public Oversight Organizationsof Civil Society ............................1279 C. Activist Federal Courts .........................................................................1288 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................1295 INTRODUCTION While the courts continue to debate the limits of inherent executive power under the Federal Constitution, the past several years have taught us important lessons about how and to what extent constitutional and sub-constitutional constraints may effectively check the broadest assertions of executive power. Following the publication -
The Abu Ghraib Convictions: a Miscarriage of Justice
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Volume 32 Article 4 9-1-2013 The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of Justice Robert Bejesky Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bpilj Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Robert Bejesky, The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of Justice, 32 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 103 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bpilj/vol32/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ABU GHRAIB CONVICTIONS: A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE ROBERT BEJESKYt I. INTRODUCTION ..................... ..... 104 II. IRAQI DETENTIONS ...............................107 A. Dragnet Detentions During the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.........................107 B. Legal Authority to Detain .............. ..... 111 C. The Abuse at Abu Ghraib .................... 116 D. Chain of Command at Abu Ghraib ..... ........ 119 III. BASIS FOR CRIMINAL CULPABILITY ..... ..... 138 A. Chain of Command ....................... 138 B. Systemic Influences ....................... 140 C. Reduced Rights of Military Personnel and Obedience to Authority ................ ..... 143 D. Interrogator Directives ................ .... -
My Name Is Samuel Provance and I Grew up Williamsburg, Virginia
p~ãìÉä=gK=mêçî~åÅÉ= mêÉé~êÉÇ=pí~íÉãÉåí= My name is Samuel Provance and I come from Greenville, SC. I enlisted in the United States Army in NVVU and sought a specialization in intelligence in OMMO. I was drawn to the Army by the professional training and good life it promised, but also because it provided me an opportunity to serve my country. The Army has stood for duty, honor and country. In wearing my country’s service uniform and risking my life for my country’s protection, it never occurred to me that I might be required to be a part of things that conflict with these values of duty, honor and country. But my experience in Iraq and later in Germany left me troubled by what has happened to the Army. I saw the traditional values of military service as I understood them compromised or undermined. I am still proud to be a soldier and to wear the uniform of the United States Army. But I am concerned about what the Army is becoming. While serving with my unit in Iraq, I became aware of changes in the procedures in which I and my fellow soldiers were trained. These changes involved using procedures which we previously did not use, and had been trained not to use, and in involving military police (MP) personnel in “preparation” of detainees who were to be interrogated. Some detainees were treated in an incorrect and immoral fashion as a result of these changes. After what had happened at Abu Ghraib became a matter of public knowledge, and there was a demand for action, young soldiers were scapegoated while superiors misrepresented what had happened and tried to misdirect attention away from what was really going on. -
Diagnosing and Analyzing Flawed Investigations: Abu Ghraib As a Case Study
C A R D O Z O L AW R EVIEW de•novo • Featured Item • DIAGNOSING AND ANALYZING FLAWED INVESTIGATIONS: ABU GHRAIB AS A CASE STUDY Keith Rohman* We think of investigation as a road to truth, and truth as the goal of an investigation. Yet time and again, high- visibility investigations of public scandals not only fail to uncover the truth, they seem to redirect the focus in the wrong direction. The Department of Defense‘s (DoD) investigations of the detainee abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib prison are a recent example of this. With the departure of the Bush Administration, there is renewed interest in examining both the Abu Ghraib scandal and other aspects of the administration‘s interrogation policies. Senator Patrick Leahy, the Senate Judiciary Committee chairman, has proposed a truth commission along the lines of the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission.1 Others have called for Congressional hearings,2 criminal investigations,3 * Keith Rohman is president of Public Interest Investigations, Inc. and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. His practice focuses on human rights and civil rights investigations. He is the lead investigator for plaintiffs‘ attorneys representing torture victims from Abu Ghraib in Saleh v. CACI et al, and related litigation, and has interviewed torture victims, as well as former soldiers and private contractors who worked at the Abu Ghraib prison. This article would not have been possible without the assistance of Molly Kort, Patrick J. Burke and Jack Rohman. The author thanks them and others for their assistance. -
Congressional Record United States Th of America PROCEEDINGS and DEBATES of the 109 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
E PL UR UM IB N U U S Congressional Record United States th of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 109 CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION Vol. 151 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2005 No. 60 House of Representatives The House met at 12:30 p.m. clusions reached about Iraq’s weapons committees that deal with intelligence f of mass destruction programs. matters now. The committee could gar- The 9/11 Commission took the first ner input from various groups includ- MORNING HOUR DEBATES step in identifying what ails the intel- ing the intelligence community, other The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the ligence community, by pointing out governmental organizations such as order of the House of January 4, 2005, that it’s a community in name only. It CRO, CBO and GAO, and from outside the Chair will now recognize Members needs centralized direction and coordi- groups such as think tanks, former from lists submitted by the majority nation. The intelligence reform bill Members of Congress, and experts in and minority leaders for morning hour Congress enacted last year establishes the field. debates. The Chair will alternate rec- a director of national intelligence and Moreover, both the 9/11 Commission ognition between the parties, with each tries to address this problem. and the Robb-Silverman Commission party limited to not to exceed 30 min- I also believe that Congress did not made suggestions about how Congress utes, and each Member except the ma- challenge the intelligence community should reform itself to do a better job jority leader, the minority leader or aggressively enough before we invaded with intelligence issues. -
Standard Operating Procedure
Presents STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE A film by Errol Morris (117 mins, USA, 2008) Distribution Publicity Bonne Smith 1028 Queen Street West Star PR Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M6J 1H6 Tel: 416-488-4436 Tel: 416-516-9775 Fax: 416-516-0651 Fax: 416-488-8438 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] www.mongrelmedia.com High res stills may be downloaded from http://www.mongrelmedia.com/press.html 2 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE Sony Pictures Classics and Participant Productions Present An Errol Morris Film Music by Danny Elfman, Production Designer, Steve Hardie, Edited by Andy Grieve, Steven Hathaway, and Dan Mooney Directors of Photography, Robert Chappell & Robert Richardson, ASC Executive Producers, Jeff Skoll, Diane Weyermann, Martin Levin, Julia Sheehan, and Robert Fernandez Produced by Julie Bilson Ahlberg Produced & Directed by Errol Morris 3 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE Director’s Statement Is it possible for a photograph to change the world? Photographs taken by soldiers in Abu Ghraib prison changed the war in Iraq and changed America’s image of itself. Yet, a central mystery remains. Did the notorious Abu Ghraib photographs constitute evidence of systematic abuse by the American military, or were they documenting the aberrant behavior of a few “bad apples”? We set out to examine the context of these photographs. Why were they taken? What was happening outside the frame? We talked directly to the soldiers who took the photographs and who were in the photographs. Who are these people? What were they thinking? Over two years of investigation, we amassed a million and a half words of interview transcript, thousands of pages of unredacted reports, and hundreds of photographs. -
Food Riots, Food Rights and the Politics of Provisions
2Aworldinprotest Sara Burke Introduction During the time period covered by the Food Riots and Food Rights project, 2007-2012, the world registered a dramatic eruption of protests on many issues, includingfood. The protests were largely non-violent, but during these years episodes reported as "riots" and "violent protests" also occurred. These spiked to historic levels in 2008, 2011 and 2012 in response to price hikes for basic commodities necessary to life: fuel, water and especially food. Protests for subsistence have not been well understood, as they were not well covered in international news due to systematic biases in professional media organizations, which tend to ignore nonviolentprotests — or the nonviolent parts of protests — and also fail to distinguish between acts that harm lives and those that harm property, as well as labeling "violent" both riots and protests violently repressed by the state. This chapter aims to show how the historical eruption of protests throughoutthe period can be understood as a response to the stormy political economy 1 of the time. To many critics of the dominant economic paradigm, that time is best understood as the forseeable outcome of neoliberalism, what classical politicaleconomists Gérard Dúmenil and Dominique Lévy's 2011 book The Crisis of Neoliberalism characterizes as a globalized system of "free-market economics, free trade, and the free mobility of capital", literally a "new liberalism" and correspondingsocial order in which fmancialization propels a managerial apparatus that disciplines -
Congressional Record—House H3090
H3090 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE May 10, 2005 Third, Major General Geoffrey Miller: Ac- military judge, Col. James Pohl, declared a credibility the American occupation of Iraq cording to the Center for American Progress: mistrial after Pvt. Charles A. Graner Jr., a was clinging to when it happened. The hope, ‘‘a Guantanamo commander, Maj. Gen. Geof- former guard at Abu Ghraib, testified that at the time, was that the United States the photos were taken for training purposes. would show the world that it was different, frey Miller, was sent to Abu Ghraib to That testimony undermined England’s ad- that it would be accountable. ‘‘Gitmoize’’ it. Under his command, the Inter- mission that she knew her actions were ‘‘Watch America. Watch how we deal with national Committee of the Red Cross found in- wrong and her acceptance of responsibility. this,’’ then-Secretary of State Colin Powell terrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay But England and the the few other enlisted said almost a year ago in a commencement are ‘‘tantamount to torture.’’ ‘‘Harsh methods’’ men and women who have faced courts mar- speech at Wake Forest University. ‘‘Watch used at the prison include forced enemas, tial in the scandal should not be the only how a nation such as ours will not tolerate sleep deprivation and chaining prisoners to ones to pay a price for what happened at Abu such actions. The world will see that we chairs and leaving them ‘‘to soil themselves.’’ Ghraib. High-level military and administra- are still a nation with a moral code that de- tion officials must not be allowed to escape fines our national character.’’ Just weeks after he visited Iraq, the now-infa- responsibility for a scandal that is far more There was reason to hope. -
Tosca and the Ticking Time Bomb
HUMAN RIGHTS Tosca and the ticking time bomb 56 REFUGEE TRANSITIONS • ISSUE 33 HUMAN RIGHTS GEOFFREY ROBERTSON QC is a human rights barrister, author, academic and broadcaster. He is the founder and joint head of Doughty Street Chambers. He was made an officer of the order of Australia in 2018. This is a complementary chapter of his book “Dreaming Too Loud” TOSCA AND THE TICKING TIME BOMB 57 orture,’ said Fortescue, a But not so fast. Let’s update Puccini. Suppose Scarpia sixteenth-century English is ‘one of us’ (dress him as Donald Rumsfeld) while jurist, ‘is something that is Andreotti is an ‘enemy combatant’ recently escaped from done by the French.’ And it Guantanamo, and last seen being equipped in some way was, for centuries after 1641, by a sacristan – sorry, mullah – in Act I, which is set in the year parliament abolished the local mosque. Are our sympathies now, ever so the‘T king’s ‘Star Chamber’, with its brandings and slightly, with the judge who – in a legal process advocated pilloryings and ear-splittings. A proud tradition in by Alan Dershowitz – nods for the torture to start and England, but too good for the colonies, where the British picks up his pen to record the expected confession? Put army tortured relentlessly in Oman and Malaysia and Tosca in a burqa, give Cavaradossi a few flying lessons Kenya, and later in Basra. in Florida, and the audience may wish, ever so faintly, The US was orsew after 9/11 with its secret rendition to bring back Lynndie England and the alsatians fresh program, which ferried terrorist suspects to secret cells from Abu Ghraib. -
Taguba Report
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION TABLE OF CONTENTS References ……………………………………………………………….. 3 Background …………………………………………………………….. 6 Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations In Iraq (MG Miller’s Assessment).……….…………………………….. 8 IO Comments on MG Miller’s Assessment..……………………………. 8 Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq (MG Ryder’s Report)…………………………….……………… 9 IO Comments on MG Ryder’s Report…...……………….…………….. 12 Preliminary Investigative Actions ………………………..…………….. 12 Findings and Recommendations Part One (Detainee Abuse). ……………………………………………. 15 Findings ………………………………………………………… 15 Recommendations ……………………………………………… 20 Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) ………………………………... 22 Findings ………………………………………………………… 22 Recommendations. …………………………………………….. 31 Part Three (Command Climate, Etc…). ………………………………... 34 Findings ………………………………………………………… 36 Recommendations ……………………………………………… 44 Other Findings/Observations …………………………………………... 49 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………… 50 Annexes ………………………………………………………………… 51 2 References 1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949 3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949 4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967 5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951 6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949 7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 8. DOD Directive 5100.69, “DOD Program for Prisoners of War and other Detainees,” 27 December 1972 9. DOD Directive 5100.77 “DOD Law of War Program,” 10 July 1979 10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994 11.