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Roger Bacon: Richard Rufus' Successor as a Parisian Professor Author(s): REGA WOOD Source: Vivarium, Vol. 35, No. 2, Bacon and (1997), pp. 222-250 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41963598 . Accessed: 01/01/2015 20:45

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This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 3 RogerBacon: RichardRufois Successor as a ParisianPhysics Professor

REGA WOOD

Why did despise Richard Rufus,calling him the worst and most famous among the foolishmultitude? It is a question whose answermay have littleto do withRufus. Bacon dislikedsome of the most eminent,learned men of his time. and earned Bacon's contemptjust as Rufusdid.1 Still, Bacon's dislikeof Rufus was not irrational.Bacon was opposed to the developmentsin what we now call ""which are exemplifiedby Rufus. Bacon was an accomplishedlinguist by the standardsof the time and the author of Greek and Hebrew ;he was quite widelyread in the literatureof the ;he was convincedof the value of ;and he was committedto an allegorical approach to - . By contrast,Rufus probably could read only ; among the Arabs he felta strongneed to come to termsonly withAverroes. In mathematicsRufus showed no special interest;even in ,about whose importancethey agreed, the two men disagreed.Rufus asserted and Bacon denied that correctassertions could be made about emptyclasses.2 And Rufus was to carrythe day. Even the many later logicianswho agreed with Bacon ratherthan Rufus on the questionof emptysets saw the enterpriseof philosophyand theologyin the same termsRufus did.

1 Compendiumstudiiphilosophiae , c. 5, ed.J.S. Brewer,London 1859, 426; Compendium studiitheobgiae , c. 4, n. 86,ed. T.S. Maloney,Leiden 1988, 86. HenceforthComp. ph. and Comp.th. Thanksare owed to Jeremiah Hackett for helpful replies to a seriesof questions about Baconand for comments on thisarticle. 2 Bacon,Comp, th., p. 2a, c. 4, n. 85, ed. Maloney,86; Rufus,Sent. Ox ., Ill d. 21,as citedby F. Pelster,Der Oxforder Theologe Richardus Rufus O.F.M. über die Frage'. "Utrum Christus in triduomortis fuerit homo," in: Recherchesde Théologieancienne et médiévale,16 (1949),259-80. See alsod. 25, ,Balliol 62, f. 230^: "Namtempus aliter est de essentiaarticuli, aliter de essentiaenuntiabilis. Tempus enim est de articulosecundum essentiamsuam, sed secundum differentias suasquae omnes eidem veritati etarticulo inesse possuntest de essentiaenuntiabilis, ergo etc. Ergo cum eadem Veritas sit sub differentia praeteriti,praesentis et futuri, patet quod idem articulus est Christum esse natum in a, et nasciturumin ö, et nasciin a, et tarnentria sunt enuntiabilia propter tres differentias temporis."

© KoninklijkeBrill, Leiden, 1997 Vivarium35,2

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Like Rufus, they omittedallegorical moralizingfrom their lectureson theology.When lecturingon theology,they were preoccupied,as Rufus was, withmetaphysical problems and even withtopics in naturalphiloso- phy such as substantialchange and beginningand ceasing. They shared Rufus' relativelynarrow knowledge of the historyof philosophyand his weaknessesin and mathematics. When we considerthe big picture,Bacon appears as a defenderof the breadthof early thirteenthcentury learning. Taking another more fine grainedapproach, however, a differentpicture emerges, a picturein which Rufus,not Bacon, defendsa moreold-fashioned early 13thcentury scholas- ticism.And it is thatpicture I want to sketchhere. This approach starts withwhat Rufus and Bacon have in common: the period in theirlives beforethey became Franciscanswhen theytaught 's libri naturales at Paris. Specifically,I am going to compare and contrastBacon and Rufus as lecturerson the Physics, a task which they undertookabout ten years 3 apart: Rufus before 1238 and Bacon before 1247. These lecturesmay have followedeach otherclosely, since Bacon lecturedfor an exceptionally long period, as he himselfreported and as is suggestedby the that he prepared twelve major commentaries.4The lectureswith which we will be concernedare stylisticallyas well as chronologicallyquite close: both are sets of briefquestions on controversialpoints in the text,rather than runningcommentaries or synopses.Bacon preparedtwo such lecture courses.Many of the questionsin both of these courses are longer and betterdeveloped than those of Rufus,and Bacon is oftenconcerned with somewhatdifferent issues. That is what we should expect, since Bacon was probablynot Rufus' immediatesuccessor, but very likelyfollowed .Still, there are enough pointsof contactfor the con- trastbetween Rufus and Bacon as physicsprofessors to be instructive.

3 1247 is the date by which Bacon must have left Paris for Oxford, since he saw Thomas ofWales, probably when Thomas served as theFranciscan lector at Oxford,and Thomas departedOxford as Bishopof St. David in Walesin 1247.I acceptCrowley's contention thatBacon studied with and also briefly with Thomas of Wales at Oxford afterhis first sojourn at Paris,cf. Crowley, Roger Bacon , Louvain 1949, 27-9. Since as Hacketthas pointed out there is alsogood to believe that Bacon was at Parisuntil 1247,it seemsto methat Bacon probably made the move in 1247.Cf. Hackett, Scientia Experimentalis:FromRobert Grosseteste toRoger Bacon , in: J. McEvoy(ed.), : New , 1995,95. Perspectives4 Steenbrugis Comp.ph. y c. 8, p. 468; Bacon,Quaestiones supra libros octo Physicorum Aristo t., ed. F. Delorme,in: Operahactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi , Vol. 13,ed. F. Delormeand R. Steele, (Oxford1935), xxx. Hereafter citations of this work will take the form Qso Physics , XIII: pagenumber.

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The comparisonwill show two men withvastly different attitudes toward the old-fashionedneo-Platonic understanding of Aristotle,which preceded the introductionof the librinaturales , and towardAverroes. Surprisingly, as a physicsprofessor, not only does Rufus defendold-fashioned scholas- ticism,but he, ratherthan Bacon, challengesAverroes' interpretation of Aristotle.That is the picturewhich emergesfrom the examinationof five topics: Platonic ideas, final cause, the eternityof the world, projectile motion,and the place of the heavens.

1. PlatonicIdeas

Scholastics were not free to accept Aristotle'scomplete rejectionof - Platonic ideas {Met. c. 11. 1, 1059b2) or, as medievais would have describedthem, divine ideas. Still,views about divine ideas varied con- siderably.And on this issue, Rufus and Bacon representtwo extremes.5 Rufus believed God could be correctlycharacterized as the exemplary formof everythingwhich is. He held that God as the firstcause is the formof all thingsor theirexemplar, just as a seal is the formof wax; the firstcause is also the firstform.6 Bacon explicitlyconsiders this view, askingwhether there is "one first formjust as thereis one firstmatter." His replyis negative,since forthe physicistthere is no one firstform in .Only at the instantof crea- tion is there a singleexemplar form {in primo exitu rerum ... per creationem, una estforma , scilicetexemplar). Subsequently {in secundoexitu3 scilicet in esse physico... per naturam), in the naturalworld thereis no firstform.7 On the topic of the numberof divineideas, earlyscholastics were also divided.Most thirteenthcentury authors, influenced by Anselm,held that God has onlyone idea, just as he has one .8By contrast,Augustine,

5 For a discussionof Bacon'sreluctant and minimalacceptance of innateideas, cf. Crowley,167-80. 6 Rufus,In Phys. I, Erfurt,Q. 312,f. 1: "Et quia causaprima est in triplicigenere causae,ideo eius proprium est cognoscere per illas tres causas. Intelligendum quod prima causaest forma omnium sive [?] exemplarsicut sigillum est forma cerae." Hereafter InPhys. Rufus,In Metaph. I (Vatican, lat. 4538, f. Ira;Oxford, New College 285, f. 194ra):"Item, cumipse sit causa in triplicigenere causae: est enim causa finalis, quia omniumrerum creatarumfinis est; est etiam [autem O] causaformalis cum de ipsodicatur ipsum esse exemplaromnium rerum." 7 Bacon,Quaestiones supra libros quatuor Physicorum Aristot., I, ed.F. Delormeand R. Steele, in: Operahactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi , vol. 8, Oxford1928, 41-2. Hereafter citations ofthis workwill take the form Qsq Physics , I, VIII: 41-2. 8 Anseimus,Monologion, c. 15 et 37,ed. F. Schmitt,in: OperaOmnia , I, 28-9et 55.

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Peter Lombard, and the early Alexanderof Hales posited a pluralityof divine ideas. As Lombard puts it, citing Augustine,there is only one divine will, one divine power, and hence only one principalcause. But - - since the effectsof that cause are many everythingwhich exists the causes of thosethings in God are said to be many.Rejecting the assump- tion on which the opposite opinion is based, Lombard holds that not everythingGod knowsis his essence.9 Directinghis argumentsin the firstinstance against , on this issue Rufus supportsthe position of Augustineand Lombard. And in some respectshis positionis more extremethan theirs.He argues that God not only has many ideas but even has ideas for each individual creature.10Though theirideas constitutea unityin Goďs mind, every singlething is understoodin itself,with its own nature,by its own spe- cies or idea in God's mind.11Holding that God has only a single idea, Rufus' opponentsobject that this is too much to know, because infinite and hence unknowable.Quite the contrary,Rufus replieson Augustine's authority;indeed fromthe perspective,God does know infinitely many things.12 Bacon confrontsthis position of Rufus' too, in his lectures on the Physics'."Some say that there are many diverseideas in the firstcause, finitein that they produce finitethings." He rejects this unusual view

9 Lombard,Sententiae , I d. 36 c. 1 & II d. 18 c. 5, ed. Brady,Quaracchi 1971, c. I: 259,418. For the development ofAlexander ofHales views on divineideas, cf. R. Wood, DistinctIdeas and Perfect Solicitude: Alexander ofHales, Richard Rufus , and Odo Rigaldus , in: FranciscanStudies, 53 (1993),7-46. Henceforth, Wood, Distinct Ideas. 10Rufus, De ideis,tr. 1, Erfurt, Q. 312,f. 81™: "Numquid ipse Averroes sibi contradiceret ineodem passu (Metaph. XII t. 52) ubiet haecverba dixit? Ibidem enim dicit quod datio huiuslargae comprehensionis ... a largodatore primo nobili, non nisi ex perfectasolici- tudinecirca homines individuos provenit. Numquid ergo ille dator qui secundum Averroem estintellectus a materia,cum sit sic sollicitus circa individua, et 11 separatus ipsaintelligit." Rufus,De ideis, tr. 4, f. 81 : "Et quisdubitat naturam creatam vere et perfecte cognosci,si fueritnota eius propria species et idea?Est autem causa prima singulorum creatorumideae propriae." De ideis, Ad 1,f. 84ra b: "Etipsa species primo est intellectum, secundoillud obiectum cuius est ilia species. Ergo quia tu omnia alia inteliigis solum per tespeciem . . . primumintellectum a tuo intellectu ettuus intellectus simpliciter idem ; secundariointellecta, id est ilia obiecta quae per [om. E' te specieminteliigis, ineffabiliter a tuointellectu diversa. Et hocdico secundum sua subiecta et secundum hoc quod suntin se ipsiset suissubiectis et naturis,licet in quantuma te intellectamiro modo in unasimplicíssima specie adunata sint." 12Sent. Ox ., I d. 36, Oxford,Balliol 62, f. 80vb:"Item, melius est ponere finita quam infinita,. . . ergovide tur decentius et congruentius poneretur unica esse idea quam plures.- Supra tarnen habitům est ex Augustino,De civitate Dei, quod 'in sapientia Dei sunt infinitaquaedam.'"

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 226 REGAWOOD summarily,13accepting instead the view of the vast majorityof theolo- gians in the firsthalf of the thirteenthcentury, according to which there is a singleidea fromwhich everythingis produced.14 Roger Bacon had no sympathyfor Richard Rufus' old-fashioned AugustiniánNeo-. He consideredit simplymistaken. It is a case in which Bacon was in tune with the timesand Rufus was not.

2. Final causes Not all of Rufus' old-fashionedviews were as unusual as his defense of a pluralityof divineideas. Some of the old-fashionedviews he upheld were no more than scholastictruisms. One such view is that a thing's finaland efficientcauses mutuallydefine each other. states the dictum succinctly:"the end moves the efficient[cause];" in the naturalrealm no cause is actual withoutthe concurrenceof the finalwith the efficient[cause].15 An objection consideredby Philip the Chancellor is based on the same truism:the "efficientcause is actualizedby the final cause [secundumearn [causam finalem ] efficiens est in actu)."16 Rufus statesthe view circumspectlyboth in his Physicslectures and in his commentaryon the PosteriorAnalytics . Sometimes, as when statingan objectionhe uses the phrase "movingas an end: movetut finis"11 Elsewhere more preciselyhe speaks of the efficient[cause] "movingon account of an end" and of the efficient[cause] insofaras it is efficientexisting in virtueof the end.18Rufus explains this language in an early work,his questionson the PosteriorAnalytics . Efficient and finalcauses mutuallydefine each other because a potentiallyor habituallyexisting end moves the efficientcause, as a purpose moves an agent, while an efficientcause actualizes the end.19

13Bacon, Qso Physics , II, XIII: 113. 14See forexample Alexander Nequam, Speculum Speculationum , ed.R. Thomson,Oxford 1988,254-5; Guillelmus Altissiodorensis, Summa aurea , II, tr.1 c. 2, ed.J. Ribaillier,Paris- Grottaferrata1982, III: 17 (SpicilegiumBonaventurianum 17);Philippus Chancellarius, Summade Bono , ed. N. Wicki,Bern 1985, 56. 15Bonaventure, Sent., II d. 1 p. 2 d. 1, Quaracchi1885, II, 51. 16Philippus Chancellarius, Summa de Bono , ed. N. Wicki,Bern 1985, 6. 17Cf. Rufus,In Phys., VIII, f. 13. Et videturquod debemus dicere utrumque ut efficiens,quia in agentibusinferioribus perapprehensionem ipsares extra, propter quam agitur, movet ut finis." 18In Phys . II, f.4rb: "Unde sicut efficiens propter finem movet et exit in actumpropter finem,sic efficiens in ratione efficientis salvatur et estper finem." 19In An.Posty Erfurt, Q. 312,f. 30ra:"Ad ultimumdicendum quod specialis causa secundumquam efficiens definitur per finem et e converso,est quod utrumque est causa

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Incautiouslystated, the problemwith this view is that strictlyspeaking the finalcause or end does not move at all. As Aristotlesays in De gene- ratione, 1. 7, 324b14- 15, the end moves only metaphorically.And that is the objectionBacon raises. Instead of explaininghow the final and the efficientcause mutuallyactualize each other, Bacon contraststhe fined cause which moves only metaphoricallywith the efficientcause that is the truemover.20 Bacon has no morepatience with the languageof mutual causationthan he has with the notion of habitual existence- anotherof his bêtes noires.21 Here it is Bacon who challengesa consensusposition. And thoughhe does not adduce Aristode'sauthority explicitly, having lectured on De gene- ratione,22 he not only knew the relevanttext but even took it forgranted. His criticismof the truismabout the relationof finaland efficientcauses is a step towardsestablishing an Aristotelianorthodoxy and away from the complicatednotions of causalitywhich characterizedearlier scholas- ticism.In thiscase, however,as when consideringdivine ideas, it is Rufus who maintainsand explains the tenetsof early scholasticism.

3. The Eternityof theWorld Where Aristotle'sviews differedfrom those establishedby Christian theology,Christian philosophers had more to do than choose between glossingAristode and challenginghis authority.At the outset they also had to determinewhether Aristotle disagreed with Christiandogma. CharacterizingAristotle's views on the eternityof the world was com- plicated for early scholastics;for some time theywere not clear on the extent of the differencesbetween the Philosopher and the tenets of Christianity.By 1292, when Bacon wrote his Compendiumstudii theologiae, the issue had been setded.Aristode's position on the eternityof the world alterius,aliter tarnen et aliter.Finis enim habitualiter et potentialiter exsistens est causa efficiensmovens ipsum, sicut tegere ab intemperiebusetc.est causa movens architectorem; efficiensautem causa actualis exsistentiae ipsius finis." 20Qso , II, XIII: 128. 21 Physics, Comp,th., p. 2a,c. 4-5,especially n. 101and 128,ed. Maloney, 92, 106-8.Cf. Pelster as citedabove. See alsoIn An.Post ., f. 31ra:"Ad ultimo quaesitum dicendum quod hoc quoddico 'homo', et quaelibetspecies specialissima, dupliciter potest dividi per individua: autper individua actualiter exsistentia, aut habitualiter. Licet ergo non semper dividatur [? E] per individuaactualiter exsistentia, dividitur tamen per individuahabitualiter [rep.E] exsistentia- ut homoin Sorteet homoin Platone.Et tangoper hoc quod dico 'in'habitualem exsistentiam individuorum velhominis in Sorteet in Platone." 22F. Delormedescribes the probable order of the lectures in QsoPhysics , I, XIII: xxx.

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was a principalreason for the ban on the librinaturales P But when the librinaturales were firstbeing introduced,things were by no means so clear cut. Philip the Chancellordid not commithimself one way or the other. At the outset,he says that Aristotle"seems to intend" to argue for the view that the world is eternal.But in fact,according to Philip,Aristotle's argumentssupport only the view that the world is perpetual,lasting for all time and commensuratewith all motion;time, motion, and the world are coeval. The true intentionof Aristotle'sphilosophy, Philip concludes, - is to show that the world is perpetual leaving unexplainedwhat view Aristotlehimself actually held.24 is more forthcoming;he straightforwardlyexcul- pates Aristotle.Writing before 1236, Alexander of Hales saw no great danger in Aristode'steaching. Aristotle and the ancientphilosophers did not know about creation,which is above nature.But thoughlimited, the ancientphilosophers' account of the naturalworld was correct:the world's existenceand its motion are commensuratewith the whole durationof time.25Aristotle did not reallyhold that the world was eternal.In a turn of phrase adopted by Richard, Alexander claimed that this view had been imposed on Aristode.26 In his Physicscommentary, Richard agreed: Aristotlewas denyingonly that before the world existed there was a preexistingpotential world, or ratherthat the non-existenceof the world had a temporalor quasi- temporalduration. Like Philipand Alexander,Richard held thatAristotle's argumentsjustified only the conclusionthat there was no timebefore the worldexisted. As was common,Rufus specifically disputed Aristode's claim that everyinstant is preceded by time and motion.And he chose to do so in an unusualway by appealingto God's entirelysimple and unchang- ing nature.Since God is simple,Rufus like his contemporariesmakes an analogy betweenGod and an indivisiblepoint; he claims that time flows fromGod as froman indivisible.Rufus concludes that to the instant

23Comp, th., p. Ia, c. 2 n. 14,ed. Maloney,46. 24Philippus Chancellarius, Summa de Bono , ed. N. Wicki,Bern 1985, 47-9. Note that Philipis citing implicitly here, De consolationephilosophise , V. 6. 14,ed. J. O'Donnell, BrynMawr, Pa., 1990,123. 25De materiaprima , Paris, B.N., lat. 15272,16406, as translatedby R. Dales,Medieval Discussionsabout the Eternity ofthe World , an unpublishedclassroom /transcription, Fall 1992,96. 26Alexander de Hales,De durationemundi , ed. D.M. Nathanson,Ph.D. Diss. Univ. of SouthernCalifornia, May 1986,80-1: "Verum est quod Aristoteli imponitur quod posuit mundumesse perpetuum et fuisse semper. Sed notandumest quod 'mundum fuisse sem- per'potest dici vel quia nunquam ceperit esse, et sicnon est verum; vel quia se comme- ciaturtoti tempori, et sicest verum mundum fuisse semper, et sicintellexit Aristotelis."

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BACONAS RICHARDRUFUS' SUCCESSOR 229 of creation,there is no time or change, thereis only God's unchanging being,in whichthere is no beforeand after.Rufus agrees thatAristotle's argumentsdemonstrate that thereis no firstinstant of time. Rufus does not object since on his account creationis not part of time,it is rather the last instantof non-being.Rufus can thus both defend creationand concurwith Aristotle that there is nothingin the world priorto time and no firstinstant of the being of created things.27 Beforethey come into being, however,created thingsexist with God; theirnon-being is with God, there is no change in that non-beingand so no motion or time. Citing Boethius,Rufus holds that the creator is prior to creationby nature not "antiquity,"in that there is no before and afterin God. Similarly,the non-beingof created thingsis not tem- porallybut naturallyprior to theirbeing. By comparingthe creatorto a point, and time to a line flowingfrom a point, Rufus is claimingthat time begins at eternity.Since time begins but has no firstinstant, its beginningis at the last instantcreated things do not exist.In otherwords, the initiallimit of timeis extrinsic;what is priorto time is anothermode of being, durationlesseternity.28

27 Rufus,In Phys., Vili, f. 12ra:"Et possumusrespondere sic, ut communiterrespon- detur[respondet £], utdicamus quod haec est falsa 'omne nunc est medium duorum tem- porum.'Sed contra... Si ergoad essemutatum praecedit motus, tunc ad omnenunc praecedittempus. Ergo non potest poni primům nunc, et sittempus ab aeterno." "Etpossumus dicere quod hoc non sequitur. Si enimintelligamus ensprimům ut indi- visibile,et essetemporalium utquemdam fluxum ab ipso.Unde apparet quod ipse fluxus ab alio,et tamenin ipsonon est dicere [ita forsan pro : dare E] primum.Sic estin creationemundi vel motus, quod illud a quo estille fluxus est sicut quoddam indivisibile, etin esse ipsorum non est dicere primum. Et sicest possibile dicere tempus incepisse, nec tamenesse primum nec temporis." 28 Rufus,In Phys.,VIII, f. 1lvb: "Et hic [?] dicitBoethius quod Creator non est prius creaturistemporis antiquitate sed simplicitate naturae, quia ipse cum sit simplicissimus, in eiusesse non čadit prius et posterius.Sic ergoest prior aliis, quod alia suntex non-esse inesse, ipsum autem non. Et hocnon ponit alia esse aeterna, quia totum illud potest esse si omniaalia habueruntprincipium et ipsum non habuit principium. Aliaautem est dubitatio circa primam radonem sumptam a natura temporis, quia aut dicemusmundum creatum aut non creatum. Et oportetdicere primum membrum. Et si hoc,tunc aut eius esse et eiusnon-esse fuerunt simul, et hocnon potest esse; aut non- essepraecessit, et hoc non potest esse cum non sit ibi prius. Etpotest responderi itaet dicere quod non-esse mundi fuit prius quam esse mundi uno modo,et tamen in ipso non-esse non cadebat prius et posterius. Et hocsic possumus intel- ligere:non-esse creaturae non est nisi sola exsistentia eius apud Creatorem. Exitus ergo de non-essein esseest fluxus eius a Creatore.Intelligamus ergo Creatorem ut aliquod indivisibileutpunctum, ... etesse creaturae tamquam lineam fluentem expuncto. Et intel- ligamuspunctum sicut manens et totamlineam sicut fluentem, adhuc erit dicere quod in ipsopuncto non čadit prius ñeque posterius, et tamen ipse punctus est prius quam ipsa lineavel aliquid ipsius. Et hocmodo est dicere quod non-esse mundi est prius quam suum esse,et tamenin suonon-esse non cadit ñeque prius ñeque posterius."

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Agreeingwith Aristotle that time has no firstinstant, Rufus even fol- lows Alexanderin claimingthat it is imposingon Aristotleto say thathe rejectedthe view that the world began. That thisis the case, Rufussays, is clear fromthe recapitulationof argumentat the end of book 8 of the Physics.29 Rufus leaves himselfa narrow avenue of escape here, when he con- sidersthe relationbetween Aristotle's views and those of . As Rufus understandsPlato, Plato postulatesduration before time. Accordingto Rufus it is this view that Aristotleopposed and not the view that time and the world were created fromnothing.30 Askingfor the last time what Aristotlebelieved, Rufus suggeststhat it may be that Aristodedid believe the world was eternala partepost . He had refutedPlato's argumentfor the existenceof durationprior to the world's creation,but not Plato's argumentagainst the end of the world. Rufusspeculates that Aristotle's regard for Plato's authorityand his accept- ance of the claim that destroyingwhat is best does not pertainto God may have persuaded Aristotleto believe in endless time. The différence between the ancient philosophersand Christiansmay be about the best dispositionof the world.Thus Rufusholds thatif Aristotledissented from the truthsof Christianityit was for a creditablereason.31 When he came to change his mind about Aristotle'sviews, however, Rufusdid not avail himselfof thisescape route.Instead, he completelyre- - tractedhis previousviews, preferring instead those of RobertGrosseteste

29Rufus, In Phys., VIII, f. 12ra:"An possimus concludere ex dictisAristotelis quod mundusincepit: Quia imponitur Aristoteli quod ipse intellexit mundum non incepisse, cuius oppositumapparet ex sua recapitulatione, videtur quod possumus habere ex dictis Aristotelis quodmundus incepit." Fora furtherdescription of Rufus' contribution to the debate see R. Wood,Richard Rufuson Creation: The Reception ofAristotelian Physics inthe West , in: and Theology,2 (1992),1-30. Cf. also S. Brown,The Eternity ofthe World Discussion at Early Oxford, in: Miscellanea Mediaevalia , vol. 21, Berlin 1991-1992, 265. 30In Phys., VIII, f. 1lvb-12ra: "Et possumus dicere quod ipse non sic intellexit, sedinten- ditostendere quod non-esse non potest esse prius hoc modo ut in ipso non-esse čadit prius et posterius.Et itaposuerunt philosophi cum posuerunt mundum fieri ex aliquopraeia- centeet nonex nihilo.Ipsi enim posuerunt non-esse mundi et motuscum quadam dura- tione.... Et debemusintelligere quod ipse non intendit quin tempus processit [/E] ex non-essein esse.Sed hunemodum intendebat improbare eis ut eiusnon-esse esset cum dimensionealiqua et duratione.Et sieintellexit Platonem ponere." 31In Phys., VIII, f. 12rb:"His et multis aliis rationibus contingit arguere ex dictisAristo- teliset per rationes physicas mundum incepisse. Sed fortecrediderit mundum non habere finemiuxta illam auetoritatem Piatonis bona ratione, conditum dissolvi velie non est Dei. Credideruntenim mundum esse factum in optimadispositione, sednos per fidem et vere credimusoppositum sicut resurrectionem et meliorem mundi dispositionem."

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a factwhich ought to have earnedhim Bacon's approbation.Rufus actually did what Bacon so stronglyrecommends in his Opus maius'he neither ostentatiouslydisplayed his knowledge,nor concealed his error.Instead, he adopted the views of one of Bacon's heroes, praisingGrosseteste as unreservedlyas Bacon himself.32Grosseteste is not cited by name, but neitheris his identityconcealed in a phraselike aliqui dicunt. Rufus refers to - him as vireminentissimus ,33No otherauthor is accorded this recognition certainlynot Aristotle. Under Grosseteste'sinfluence, Rufus radically alters his outlook.Instead of condemningAristotle's critics for the views theyimpose on him, Rufus now refersunfavorably to thosewho tryto excuse Aristotle.He abandons the quasi-Aristoteleanposition presented in the Physicscommentary, accord- ing to which time has no intrinsiclimit, only an extrinsiclimit which is God's atemporalmode of being. Instead,in the Metaphysicscommentary, Rufus allows that time has an intrinsiclimit. God created the world ex nihiloat the firstinstant of time. Rufus dissociateshimself radically from his own formerreply, describing it as worthless{illud nihil est ).34 Instead he borrowsfrom Grosseteste a complicatedsemantic distinction between God's "speaking"and God's "making,"which addresses the problempre- sentedwhen we maintainthat an immutableGod created the world in time.35Rufus' embarrassmentis palpable; not only does he drop his own argumentsin favorof Grosseteste's,but he adds thatthis is the replythat should have been made to Aristotle'sarguments in the Physics.36 Like Rufus',Roger Bacon's views on this subject changed rapidly.The point

32 , III & IV d. 1 c. 3, ed. London1900, 67 & 108. 33Opus majiLs Bridges, Rufus,In Metaph ., II c. 1 t. 2, Vatican,Vat. lat. 4538, f. 4ra: "Ad illud respondebat virexcellentissimus in scientia. ..." 34 Rufus,In Metaph ., XII, lect.1, q. 2: "Aliivolunt alio modo salvare ipsum sic. Linea habetprincipium intrinsecum sui,scilicet punctum. Motus autem habet principium extra se sednon intra, et hoc intendit Aristoteles cum dicit quod non est motus primus. In motu enimnihil est nisi motum esse. Et illudnihil est. Aristoteles enim vult quod tempus sit infinitumet motus infinitus, et non habet principium intrinsecum aliquod. Quia nuncest principiumfuturi et finispraeteriti, etsecundum ipsum instans non potest esse principium temporis,itaquod ante ipsum instans non sit aliud tempus. Unde ponit tempus non habere finemnec principium, nec similiter motus [motum N]." (ed.T.B. Noone,An Edition and Studyofthe Scriptum super Metaphysicam, bk.12, dist. 2: A WorkAttributed toRichard Rufus ofCornwall , Ph.D. dissertation, ofToronto, 1987, 181. 35 University See RichardRufus on Creation , in: Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 2 (1992), 1-30. Rufus'account of the nature of truth in the commentary is also borrowed from Grosseteste. 36 Rufus,In Metaph., XII, c. 6, lect.1, q. 3-4:"Penitus eodem modo respondendum estad argumentumAristotelis quod facitin octavoPhysicorum" (ed. Noone, An Edition , p. 185).

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of departureis radicallydifferent, however. Bacon begins by notingcor- rectlythat Aristotle holds both in book 6 and in book 8 thattime neither beginsnor ceases. What is more, Bacon at least comes close to espousing a doctrineof double truth,according to which,Aristotle's opinion is true "physicallyspeaking."37 The Christian account of creation transcends nature,according to Bacon, but he goes on to describeGod's threefold operationin at least quasi-physicalterms. First, there is creationin which substances are completelyproduced; , there is concreation in which elemental formsand universaisare broughtinto existence;and finallythere is influx,in which the primarypassions of completebeings proceed fromGod. Time, motion,and place are those primarypassions. So what does Bacon mean when he saysthat according to the Christian account, time begins with an operationtranscending nature, the sudden mutationwhich is creation?Very likelyit has nothingto do with the threefoldoperation of creation.Probably Bacon is simplyclaiming that creationis a supernatural,not a natural,phenomenon. This seems the mostlikely interpretation, since it is Hales' view: "creationis not a natural, but a supernaturalmutation." Hales goes on to claim that since Aristotle deals only with natural mutations,his conclusionsapply only to them.38 Thus thereis no firstnatural mutation,but thereis a firstsupernatural mutation. Supposing that is the correctinterpretation, the argumentis not ap- propriateto Aristotle'sarguments for beginninglesstime, since they are foundednot on physicalbut on logical impossibility.But it would mean thatBacon, likeHales, has an answerto the questionhow the two accounts can consistentlybe maintained.Hales says that Aristode'sstatement is true only in a qualifiedmanner. Most likely,Bacon means similarlythat it is true thattime has no beginningin the physicalworld. Probablythat is how we should understandBacon's claim thatit is true both thattime did not begin and also that it did, dependingon whetherone is speak- ing "physically"or not. At any rate, this was not a positionwhich Bacon espoused for long. When he next lecturedon the Physics, Bacon argued that not only faith but also reason shows us that the world has not existed frometernity.

37 QsqPhysics , IV, VIII: 222:"Solutio: Ad primam istarum quaestionum dicendum quod sententiaAristotelis in 6. et 8. hujusest quod tempus non cepit nec in esseexivit. Et hoc verumest, loquendo physice. Sententia autem nostra est quod tempus exivit et cepit ope- rationetamen naturam transcendente, scilicet subitanea mutatione, quae estcreatio." 38Alexander de Hales,De durationemundi , 81.

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Aristotleneither held that the world is eternal,nor were his arguments intendedto demonstratethe timelesseternity of the universe.39 That Bacon changed his views radically,and did so withoutadverting to the change in his position,is not surprising.What is surprisingis that apparentlyhis positionchanged underRufus' influence, at least indirectly. The questionwith which we shallchiefly be concernedis entitled:Whether Aristodeconsents to the view that motion is eternal?And the answer is negative.The positiveaccount is much like Rufus5first account: time has a beginninglimit, but not an intrinsiclimit; its extrinsiclimit is God's - atemporalmode of being eternity.As Bacon puts it: there is nothing firstin timewhich is a part of time; but priorto time is its terminusa quo fromwhich it begins.Time terminatesat eternity,and so it begins from eternity.Verbally there is not much similaritybetween Rufus and Bacon's Physicsquestions, but substantiallythe two accounts are very close. The basic positionin both is that time begins at its extrinsiclimit, which is eternity.Just as Rufusin his Physicscommentary had claimedthat Aristotle opposed onlythe view thatbefore time therewas duration,Bacon claims thatAristotle disputed only the claim thatbefore motion there was time.40 Virtuallyall the argumentsadduced by Bacon in favorof his position are anticipatedby Rufus.In additionto what has alreadybeen said, there are three:41The firstcites Aristotleagainst himself,saying that where thereis no firstthere is no last. Here the claim is that it is obvious that thereis a finalmoment here and now, and so there must have been a first.That parallelsRufus' thirdargument for a beginningof time.42 The second has a long historyamong Arabic and Jewishauthors, but is not used in thisform and contextby Rufus.It claims thatif timewere infinitea parteante , nothingcould be added to it. But in fact each new revolutionof the sun adds a day to past time, so the assumptionmust be rejected.Basically, this argument claims that if timewere infinite,there

39Qso , VIII,XIII: 391. 40 Physics QsoPhysics , VIII, XIII: 387:"licet non sit ponere primum in temporequod sit pars, tamenest ponere aliquid prius eo quodest tantum terminus a quo incipit: unde . . . incipit nona tempore,set ab eternitate.. . . Quod tamen ipse nichil contra fidem posuerit, vide- turper intentionem eius ... et sicvidetur ipsum velie solum quod motus non incepit in tempore,et hocest verum." Notethat the claim that time has a beginningwhich is externalto it is notoriginal withRufus. Cf. William of Durham, Quaestiones deaetemitate as printed by R. Dalesand O. Argerami, Texts on the Eternity ofthe World, Leiden 1991, 15. 41Qso Physics , VIII, XIII: 387-8. Rufus,In Phys ., VIII, f. 12ra: "Item, in Libro Caeli et Mundi dicit quod si nonest primus terminus,non est ultimus. Ergo si estultimus, est primus; sed temporispraeteriti usque ad diemistum est ultimus terminus; ergo est primus."

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- could be no arithmeticalrelations between differenttimes no adding, substracting,multiplying or dividing.43 Bacon's final argumentis Rufus' variant on the "no arithmetically relatedtimes" argument. As Bacon puts it, if timewere infinite,the time betweenthe firstrevolution and todaywould be equal to the timebetween the firstrevolution and tomorrow.Or in the words of Rufus' fifthargu- ment, there would be no fewerdays before tomorrowthan today, and hence today would not come beforetomorrow.44 Bacon concludesthis question by concedingthe argumentsin oppositum. He affirmsthat those argumentsconclude correctlythat Aristotle is argu- ing only that there is no time beforemotion. In his reply,he offersas additional evidence of Aristotle'sorthodoxy his "recapitulation,"just as Rufushad.45 In the followingquestion, he adoptsRufus' distinction between the beginningand end of time.The beginningof time can be provenby necessaryargument, the end of time is evidentonly to faith,mentioning in thiscontext the resurrectionas had Rufus.Thus both thosewho heard Rufus and those who heard Bacon's second lectureson the Physicswould have heard that positingbeginningless time is a philosophicalerror not - espoused by Aristotle to which Bacon adds that this view has been imposed on Aristotleby Averroes.46 As we know,this was not Bacon's finalposition. But it changed more graduallythan one mighthave supposed. Even in the Opusmains , Bacon does not say that Aristotlewas wrong. He says only that Aristotlewas not sufficientlyexplicit on the subjectof the eternityof the world.47This, then, is an odd sort of case. Bacon held more tenaciouslyto the old- fashioned exculpation of Aristotlecharacteristic of the early scholasti- cism of Alexanderof Hales than did Rufus,and it was probablyRufus who persuaded him it was reasonable to do so. Rufus,himself, however soon adopted a more pessimisticview of Aristotle.Under the influence of Grosseteste,he accepted a more criticalapproach to Aristotleand Aristotelianism.

43For more on the ofthese seeWood, Richard Rufus on Creation. 44 history arguments, Rufus,In Pkys.,VIII, f. 12ra:"Iterum numerus dierum usque eras esset ab unitatein infinitum.Sed talisnumerus non est unus numerus maior alio nec minor, et sicnon sunt paucioresdies usque ad diemistum quam usque ad diemcrastinum, nec minus tempus. Et tuncnon citius veniret ista dies quam crastina. Priori enim respondet brevius tempus." 45Qso Physics , VIII, XIII: 388. 46Qso , III, XIII: 148;IV, XIII: 223;VIII, XIII: 376. 47 Physics Opusmajus , I c. 6, ed. Bridges,London 1900, 14.

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This case shows us that Bacon was much more reluctantthan Rufus to criticizeAristotle. Before 1238 Rufuswas condemningthose who sought to excuse Aristotle.In 1267 Bacon was still saying that all wise men approvedof Aristotle.Though he did not reach the limitof wisdom,he was the most perfectof the philosophers.48Rufus did not share Bacon's venerationfor Aristotle, whom he ordinarilycalls quite simply"the author." Rufus believed Aristotlewas wrong not only when he disagreed with Christianteaching but also in his dispute with Plato about forms.49As we shall see in the next section,Rufus did not hesitaterespectfully to dis- agree withAristotle, or even to correcthim.

4. ProjectileMotion Like the last problem,the case of projectilemotion is one in which Bacon was influencedby Rufus, but to a lesser extent.It is a case in which Rufus radicallydeparted fromAverroes5 reading of Aristotleand even correctedAristotle. Rufus held that by itselfthe account of projec- tile motion in PhysicsVIII was both inadequate and inconsistentwith Aristotelianprinciples. Rufus does not say, however, that Aristotleis wrong, he says only that Aristotleprovided an incomplete account, perhapsbecause it was adequate for his purposesin book VIII.50 Rufus argued firstthat the account was inconsistent.In PhysicsVIII, Aristotlesays that in projectilemotion the originalmover "gives the power of being a mover eitherto air or water or somethingelse of the kind" (8.10, 267a3-4). When it loses contactwith the thrower,the air continues to move, but ceases to be moved. The firstlayer of air moves the next - layer,that layer in turnis firstacted upon and then acting,and so on thishas been called the "air layertheory."51 As Aristodepoints out, projec- tile motion,so described,though apparentlycontinuous, would actually be composedof consecutivediscrete movements. That explainswhy such motion takes place only in a medium like air or water, he says. Some

48Opus majus , I c. 3, ed. Bridges,London 1900, 8. 49Cf. R. Wood,Richard Rufus and the Classical Tradition: A Medieval Defense ofPlato , forth- comingin theproceedings ofan InternationalConference held at Corfu(October 1995), underthe Auspices of the Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la PhilosophieMédiévale, Turnhout1997, 229-51. 50 Rufus,In Phys., VIII, f. 13va:"Et si quaeraturpropter quid Aristoteles. . .," quoted in R. Wood,Richard Rufus and Aristotle's Physics , in: FranciscanStudies, 52 (1992),280. HenceforthRAP. 51J. Sarnowsky, Diearistotelisch-scholastische TheoriederBewegung: Studien zum Kommentar Alberts vonSachsen zur Physik der Aristoteles , Münster 1989, 384.

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- say, he adds, that what happens is antiperistasisor mutual replacement an allusion to Plato's Timaeus. Aristotle concludes his briefdiscussion of projectilemotion by stipulatingthat no correctaccount of projectilemotion can postulate the simultaneousmotion of all parts of the medium; in other words,it is essentialfor the layersto move successively. Rufus takes issue with Aristode'sclaim that the air would continue to move in the absence of the mover. That would make air animate, an . And, as Aristotlehimself holds, air is a body, and bodies as bodies do not move themselves.As Averroesputs it, Aristode has just shiftedthe problem; now we have to account for the motionof the mediumrather than the projectile.So if air moves afterlosing contact with the thrower,a furtherexplanation is necessary.Tacidy rejecting Averroes'account of air's movement,Rufus argues thatthe fluidityof air does not explain the supposed abilityof air to move itself,since fluidity is a passive not an active capacity.52 Rufusmodifies Aristotle's explanation of the movementof the air, allow- ing a sense in whichair is a mover,but givingit a more secureAristotelian foundationby appealing,as Aristodenormally does, to the natureof the mover.When air is violendydivided, Rufus says, that rarefies the air beyond the limitsestablished by its nature.The formof air gives the partsof the air a certaindensity and orientation(situs) to each other.When its parts resume theirnatural inclination, air moves. Rufus describesthis as acci- dental motion not motionper se, because it cannot be an initialmotion; it is rathera reactionto the initialviolent motion. Since this secondary motionis produced by the reinclinationof the medium'sparts, I will call it reinclination.Closely relatedto antiperistasisor replacement theory, it is an attemptto providea mechanicalexplanation of the movementposited in the air. It somewhatresembles peristalsis, since it is a process of suc- cessive,violent distensions followed by contractionsresulting from the air's naturalinclination to resistdistension. Rufus himself compares it the move- ment of stringsof lyre (cordoe citharae) when plucked.53

52Rufus, In Phys.yVIII, f. 13^: "In respondendoad dubitationem . . quotedin RAP, 279. 53 Rufus,In Phys.yVIII, f. 13**:"Dicendum est quod corpus in quantumcorpus per se loquendo,per se nonpotest movere se localiter.Ex consequentitarnen et accidentaliter potestper hune modum: Cum aer dividitur [?] violenter,fitin partibus aeris divisis maior rarefactioet distantia quam ei debeatursecundum suam naturam (forma enim talis dat partibusmateriae talem rarefactionem et talem situm ad invicem),et proptereareincli- nanturad debitaminclinationem et approximationem ex natura sua parteshuius cor- poris. . quotedin: RAP , 279.

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Having revisedAristotle's account, Rufus then argues that even the revisedaccount is inadequate,since projectile motion cannot be sufficiently explainedin termsof the action of the medium.Motion impartedto the mediumalone would not account for the appearances (signa).If by itself the action of the mediumwere an adequate explanation,then the action of the medium moving one projectileeast would preventanother pro- jectile fromtraveling west at the same time. Also someone throwingtwo projectilesof the same size and shape in the same way would throwthem at the same speed, regardlessof theirweight or density.But in fact a pitcherforced to throwa baseball made of papier maché could not throw it as fast as a regulationball, and as Rufus says, "the heavier (grautus) body is betterprojected." This too is a tacit rejectionof Averroes,who - held that diversemotions do not impede each otherin a medium that is, a quasi-spiritualbody. Unlike Averroes,Rufus concludes that an ade- quate theoryof projectilemotion must supplement the Aristotelianaccount by sayingsomething about the effectof the throweron the projectileitself as well as on the medium.54 Rufus supplementsAristotle's explanation by postulatingthat violent motionhas an effecton the projectileas well the surroundingmedium, a greatereffect on heavy than on lightprojectiles. According to Rufus, because they affordgreater resistance, heavier projectilesreceive more violence,and hence can be thrownbetter.55 Violent motionproduces an impressionboth in the mediumand in the projectile.When that impres- sion is strongit does two things:It gives the projectilea motionopposite to its naturalmotion and impedes that natural motion. The impression is continuallyweakened until it can performonly one function;it impedes the naturalmotion. Thus a rock thrownupward eventuallystops moving upward,after which the impressionceases to functionaltogether and the rock falls,resuming its naturalmotion.56 One problemwith Rufus' account of the action of projectoron the projectileis to describe the impressionit makes, the received violence. Rufus says that it is a formand a qualityimprinted in the projectileby the thrower.Supplying a mechanical explanationof that action, Rufus suggeststhat it acts by transposingthe partsof the projectile,presumably

54Rufus, In Phys., VIII, f. 13va:"Sed ad hocper plura signa . . in:RAP , 280. 55Rufus, In Phys ., VIII, f. 13™:"Et iterum, si quaeratur propter quid mediocriter grave meliusproicitur . . in:RAP , 280. 56Rufus, In Phys.,VIII, f. 13vb:"Debemus ergo dicere, ut mihividetur, quod haec impressioin medio et in proiecto. . in:RAP , 280-1.

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that explainshow it impedes the naturalmotion of the projectile.57Here Rufusapparently meets the challengeof fittingviolence into an Aristotelian category,but as his successorswould point out, the projectileimprint he posits is a problematicrevision of Aristoteliannatural philosophy. Bacon does not raise an objectionbased on the natureof the imprint, but his objection is equally fundamental.As a good Aristotelian,Bacon refusesto entertainthe idea of action at a distance.Following Averroes, but not Aristotleor Rufus, he gives major emphasis to accountingfor projectilemotion, rather than treatingit as a briefdigression in an argu- ment about the firstmover. And he does not even considerpostulating any lastingaction of the throweron the projectile.Bacon himselfmakes a major contributionby subtlychanging the termsof the debate. In reject- ing an imprinttheory, he refersnot to unmovedmovers, but to "virtual" as opposed to "substantial"contact between the mover and the moved body. Violentlocal motion,he stipulates,does not occur withoutsubstan- tial contact.But since Bacon cannot claim that projectilemotion ceases when substantialcontact does, the questionremain: why does it continue? Rufus had claimed that projectile motion resultsfrom the impression made by the projectorin the medium and on the projectile;the projec- tor acts on medium and projectile in a similar fashion by causing a temporarytransposition of parts. Bacon rejectsboth these claims. The projectorcannot act by produc- ing an impression,and it cannot act on the projectile.It does not pro- duce an impression,since alteration,not local motion continuesmotion by producingan impression,insinuation or immission.58It cannot act on the projectileat all, because the throwerloses contact with the projec- tile. Denying that virtualcontact (necsecundum virtutis influentiam estsimul) can substitutefor substantialcontact, Bacon has to explain projectile motionby the action of the mediumalone. Since unlikethe thrower,the medium never loses contact with the projectile,according to Bacon it alone can account forthe continuationof violentmotion characteristic of projectiles(huiusmodi motus continuatur a medio et nona primoproiciente).59 Having establishedto his satisfactionthat the explanationof projec- tile motion can involveonly the medium,Bacon devotes the next three questions to explaining the action of the medium. He considers two

57 Rufus,In Phys.,VIII f. 13va"b:"Et videturmihi quod hoc estverum, quod aliqua qualitaset formasive aliquid ei imprimatura proiciente . . in:RAP , 280. 58Qso Physic, Vili, XIII: 339. 59Qso Physic , Vili, XIII: 338.

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BACONAS RICHARDRUFUS' SUCCESSOR 239 alternatives:Rufus5 (reinclination) and Averroes'(fluid retention). As sum- marized by Bacon, Averroes'view relies on the fluidityof mediumslike air and water:because theyare flexible,or, as Averroesputs it, shapeless and unterminated,60they retain ratherthan terminatingviolent motion. Bacon prefersRufus' explanation,which he describessuccinctly as acci- dental motion by reinclination,motion that weakens continually.61The continuallyweakening posited by Rufus is importantto Bacon, since it is consistentwith the descriptionof violentmotion which is strongestat the outsetand weakensover time,by contrastwith natural motion, which strengthensover time.62Bacon accepts Rufus' explanation and rejects Averroes'on the groundsthat it betterexplains the directionof motion.63 On Averroes'account, there is no reason to suppose that some parts of the mediumwould retainviolent motion more than others,his account would provideno explanationfor movement in one directionrather than another. Here Bacon has accepted Rufus' revisionof Aristotle'saccount of the action of the medium in projectilemotion, but rejected the supplement he proposed.Though Bacon adduces morephenomena for which a theory - which considersonly the action of the medium will not account such as projectilesmoving upstream,64 his adherence to the Aristotelianpara- digm is so completethat anomalous cases do not lead him to reconsider basic principles.Moreover, he followsAverroes in makingthis anomalous case central to book VIII of the Physics. Bacon accepts a revision of Averroes'account for the sake of greaterconsistency with Aristotelian principles.Bacon himselffocuses attention on the issue of contact.

5. Heaven3s Place

The last problemin naturalphilosophy which will concern us here is the place of the heavens.65As Averroestells us (IV t. 43), Philoponus posed a perplexingdilemma forAristotle's theory of place: if all motion is in a place, thenthe outermost,the eighthsphere according to Averroes,

60Averroes, In Phys. , VIII t. 82,Venice 1550, f. 195. 61Qso Physic VIII, XIII: 340-1. 62Qso VIII,XIII: 343. 63 Physic QsoPhysic VIII, XIII: 345. 64Qso Physic VIII, XIII: 340. 63A fulleraccount of this problem, Rufus' response of those his predecessors and suc- cessorswill be foundin R. Wood,Richard Rufus: Physics atParis before 1240ì in: Documenti e Studisulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale, 5 (1994), 87-127.

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 240 REGAWOOD must be in a place since it is manifestthat the heavens move. But place is definedas a dimension(the inner boundary)of the containingbody, and nothingcontains the outermostsphere, so it must not be in a place. Accordingto Averroes,this argument seeks to compel us to admit either that somethingcan move withoutbeing in a place, or that place is not a bodily dimensionbut a bodiless dimensionor a .66Though Philoponuschose the second alternative,positing empty space as the place of the eighthsphere, he had no medieval disciples.After presenting and rejectinga number of replies to Philoponus,Averroes presents his own solution.He modifiesthe definitionof place for the outermostsphere. That sphereis in a place accidentally,in virtueof the centerof the world system,which is fixed.67Averroes' solution was acceptedby manyauthors. More importantly,even thosewho rejectedhis view agreed withhim that an acceptable solution to the problem of the missingcontainer would have to providea substitutewhich provides a fixedlocation for the outer- mostsphere. Accordingly, even authorswho disagreedwith Averroes pro- vided an account of the "immobility"or stabilityof the universe. Richard Rufus rejectsAverroes' account. Why should we believe that center of world is the place of the outermostsphere, or the 9th orb? Afterall, when asked where it is, we do not point down. He wonders whetherthe centerof the world is even a part of the outermostsphere. Could we not just as well describethe place of the outermostsphere in termsof its circumferencewithout reference to the center?68And what

66Averroes, In Phys., IV t. 43, Venice1550, f. 66: "Sphaeraautem octava non con- tenta,si nonaccidit ei motusproprius, et totus orbis qui movetur motu diurno, accidit in eo magnaquaestio: quoniam manifestum estipsum moveri. Et cumomne motum sit in loco,necesse est ut totus orbis sit in loco. Ergo sumus inter duo: aut ponere quod aliquod motumnon est in loco, aut ponere quod locus est inane et dimensio. Ioannes vero propter hocobedit huic, scilicet locum esse et dimensionemet vacuum, non finem continentem, utdicit Aristoteles." 67Averroes, In Phys ., IV t. 43,Venice 1550, f. 66: "Nosautem dicamus, quoniam cum sitfixum secundum totum, necesse est ut hoc modosit quiescens. Et quia quiesest ei propterquietem centri, quod est in terra,et quiesest, quia est in locoessentialiter, ideo diciturcoelum esse in eodemloco, et nontransmutatur ab eo peraccidens, id estquia centrumeius est in loco essentialiter.Et haec est intentio sermonis Aristotelis dicentis quodcoelum est in locoper accidens." 68Rufus, In Phys., Vili, f. 6vb: "Videtur quod sententia sua peccet multiplicités Estenim dicereuno modo centrum esse partem circuii, alio modo non. Si enimintelligamus per circulumipsam circumferentiam, tunccentrum non est pars circuii. Sed si dicamusspatium contentumintra, tunc centrum est pars circuii. Quo istorummodorum est caelum circu- lus?Magis sicut circumferentia si loquamur de quintaessentia. Ergo est dicere centrum nonesse partem eius; et si hoc,non dicerecaelum esse per accidens in locoquia centrumsit in loco."

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BACONAS RICHARDRUFUS' SUCCESSOR 241 about the other spheres?The sphere of Saturn and the sphere of the moon have the same center.Are theyall in the same place? If not, how can Averroesaccount for theirbeing in differentplaces?69 Rufus' own account evolved in an attemptto meet these difficulties. At the outsethe admits that the outermostsphere is not in a place in the same sense as the otherspheres. It cannot be, since thereis no con- tainingsurface. According to Rufus,the functionordinarily exercised by innermostconcave surfaceof the containingsphere is performedin its absence by the outermostconvex surfaceof the containedsphere. Its own outer skin ratherthan a distinctwrapper contains it. Rufus asks us to considerthis surfacenot as a boundary,but as somethingmoving at a constantdistance from the centerof the universe. That leaves Rufus with a problem: His account appears to leave the universewith a moving,not a fixed place. To solve it, he asks: What makesthe outermostsurface parts of the place of the universe(UP)? Not, he says,being part of the sphere,but theirrelation to the centerof the universe.Consider x, which is the easternmostpart of UP at time t. It can be describedeither as x or as the easternmostpart of UP. As the sphererotates, so does the surfacepart x. But it is replaced by another part,y, which bears the same relationto the center,so that at t + 1, y is the eastern most part. There is always an easternmostpart which bears exactlythe same relationto the centerof the universe.At different timesit will be a differentpart of the surface,but it will always be the - same part of the place of the universe that is, its easternmostpart. Moreover,since the orbit is fixed,the same is true for each and every part of UP. Since being part of UP does not depend on being part of the ninthorb but on distancefrom and orientationto the center(things whichdo not change),in one sense UP is fixed;it is immobileby equiv- alence. The partsof the surfacewhich constitute UP move,but its descrip- tion remains constant; it can be described in exactly the same way the convex surfaceof the outermostorb would be described if it did not move.70

69Rufus, In Phys.yVIII, f. 6vb:"Item, nonne est dicere hune orbem esse hic et hune nonesse hic, sicut orbem Lunae esse hic et orbemSaturni non esse hic sed hic?" 70Rufus, In Phys^VIII, f. 7ra:"Debemus ergo scire quod haec circumferentia si con- sidereturnon ut huius corporis terminus est, sed ut est quiddam ambiens, undique habens distantiama centro, sic est locus universi ut communiter dicamus. Contra:partes huius superficiei moventur, ergo loci partes moventur, quod est falsum. Propterea,debemus scire quod partes huius superficiei non sunt partes loci secundum hoc quodsunt superficiei, sedut sic distant a centro, ut dicatur quod haec pars est

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The immobilityby equivalence solutionalso allows Rufus to address the moregeneral problem of movingplaces whicharises for the Aristotelian notionof place as a dimensionof the containingbodies. Motion is defined in termsof a body which changes place over time. That is unproblem- atic when place, the inner surfaceof the containingbody, is rigid,but not when it is fluid.Take the case of the Ichneumon,a boat at anchor in the Nile. Is it movingor stationary?Aristotle's own stanceis not entirely clear. Once he says thatplace mustbe motionless,that it does not move when its contentsmove {PhysicsIV, 4, 2 12a 18), which suggeststhat the Ichneumon is stationary.But some modern commentatorsthink that he - would maintainthat it is moving thatis, in successivelydifferent places.71 Rufus consideredthe second alternativeabsurd, and having at hand a notionof immobilityby equivalence allowed him to avoid it. The watery parts of the rivermove, but as long as the Ichneumon is at anchor, it will always be bounded by water bearing the same relationto the uni- verse. That allows Rufus to maintainthat he can hold his hand stillin the air, even on a windyday.72 Bacon seems have been the firstto respondto Rufus,and he returned repeatedlyto the problem over a period of fortyyears. InitiallyBacon accepted Averroes'solution: the place of the universeis its center.There is no immobilityby equivalence,only literalimmobility will do, and that has odd consequences for what we can say in answer to the question, "whereis the Ichneumon?"Bacon assignsseven definitions to place. Strictly speaking,the Ichneumonis in the Nile as a whole, since the Nile never moves and the boat never leaves it; then comes the water which flows

ex hac partecentri, et haecex hac. Hoc habitopossumus videre cum aliqua pars cir- cumferentiaeestin talirespectu a centro,ipsa recedit; et cumadvenit alia, tunc habet ipsaadveniens eundem respectum quem habuit pars prior a centro.Et propterea,si ex talirespectu fiat pars superficiei pars loci, ergo ex eodemrespectu pars eadem, ergo pars adveniensetpars recedens sunt eadem pars loci, cum tarnen sint diversae partes superficiei, tameneundem respectum habent a centro...." 71E. Aristotle'sPhysics , Books III andIV ' Oxford1983, xxx. 72 Hussey, Rufus,In Phys., VIII, f. 7ra:"Qualiter ergo debemus dicere de immobilitateloci? Debemusdicere sicut prius dictum est quod terminus huius aeris, non in quantumest huiusaeris sed in quantum talem habet respectum ad universum, locus est; quia iste respec- tusmanet idem recedente aere et adveniente aqua circa manum. Propterea terminus aeris et terminusaquae consequenter advenientis sunt idem locus manus meae, quia per ean- demnaturam sunt locus. Et hocintelligendum estcum dicit 'terminus continentis immo- bilis'(212a20), quia hoc est dictu: terminus ipsius aeris continentis inquantum talem habet respectumad universum,qui respectusmanet immobilis et manetidem. Quia aer per suampropriam naturam non est locus aquae, quia aqua nonsequitur aerem ubicumque fuerit,et sic ex naturasua nonest locus aquae sed [secundumE ] secundumrespectum quemhabet ad universum."

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BACONAS RICHARDRUFUS' SUCCESSOR 243 past the boat when it is anchored;the differentparts of the waterycourse throughwhich the boat moves down river constitutethe least proper sense of "place."73This view somewhatimplausibly implies that it is more properto say thatthe boat is "in the Nile fromLake Victoriato Alexandria" than to say that it is "in the Nile at Cairo." - The second commentary,by contrast,is stronglyinfluenced by Rufus both positivelyand negatively.Bacon accepts Rufus' account of immo- bility,but stillprefers Averroes on the place of the heavens.The influence is most unmistakablewhen Bacon is paraphrasingand rejectingRufus' views on the question of heaven's place.74At the outset we learn that thoughRufus' positionis wrong,it is betterthan Themistius'.75Indeed Bacon devotes more attentionto Rufus' argumentsthan to those of Averroes,whose opinion he himselfespouses. There is, for example, a whole question intendedto explain why we do not point down, if asked where the heavens are, an objectionagainst Averroesraised by Rufus. Here Bacon distinguishesbetween the sur- roundingplace {locuscirca quem ) and the place in whichmotion takes place (locusin quo).76If a man were on the surfaceof the outermostsphere, it is truethat he would not point to the centeras the place where he was, but at parts of the sphere.That is because he would be indicatingonly the locusin quo, not the locuscirca quem. That "here" and "there" are rel- ative terms,Bacon tellsus, explainswhy the man on the ninthorb refer to thisaspect of place. Bacon's main reason forrejecting Rufus' view is his intuitionthat place mustbe separablefrom the object it contains.Bacon presentsRufus' reply to this objectionfairly: the containingsurface can be separated concep- tuallyfrom the body it limits,because being the limitof a body is not part of its quidditativedefinition. Surfaces, like pointsand lines, are sim- ple quantities;they can be definedwithout reference to the body that theylimit. Consequently the convex surfaceof the universecan be seen as its place; so conceptualizedit is not a part of the outermostsphere.77

73Bacon, , IV, VIII: 196-7. 74 QsqPhysics Parallelpassages from the texts of Rufus and Bacon are presented in RichardRufus: PhysicsatParis. 75Bacon, Qso Physics , IV, XIII: 217-20.Bacon's views are fully and favorably discussed byP. Duhem,Medieval Cosmology , Chicago-London 1985, 144-8. 76Bacon, Qso , IV, XIII: 219-220. 77 Physics Rufus,In Phys ., IV, f.7rb: "Nec superficies hoc-quod-est estterminus corporis. Immo in se suntquantitates simplices etprius natura, et huius signum est quodpotest definiri . . . superficiesnon in respectuad corpus.Quia ergosuperficies caeli in se quantitasaliqua est et nonsolum terminus, contingit intelligere illud in se nonut huiusest sed ut receptivum huius."

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Immobilityby equivalence stilldoes not provide an entirelyadequate - account of celestialimmobility that is pardy a functionof the fifthele- ment, quintessence.But immobilityby equivalence is part of the expla- nation, and what is more Bacon statesit more clearlythan Rufus had, and he providesan example which is easy to follow.78 In Rufus,the prose is difficultto follow.After telling us that parts of the universe'scontaining surface are not parts of place in so far as they are parts of the surface,but only in so far as they are parts at this maximal distancefrom the centerof the system,he adds a complicated reflectionon what makes something"this" part: "ut dicaturquod haec pars estex hacparte centri, et haecex hac" He explainsthat as the sphererotates, one part takes the place of another and has the same relationto the center as the previouspart. What makes a differentpart of the surface the same place is a constantrelation to the center:79"If such a relation makes a part of the surfaceat part of the place, then the same relation makes it the same part. Hence the advancingand the recedingpart are the same part of place. And thoughthey are diverseparts of the surface, yet theyhave the same relationto the center." This difficultprose is typicalof Rufus when he is stillgroping toward a solution.By contrast,Bacon's prose is polished.True, his is an account of the immobilityof ordinaryterrestial place, not celestialplace, but by itselfthis would not account for the improvement;Bacon's words show that he understoodposition better:80 "Wherever the relationis identical, the place is immobile. My view is that relationalidentity is the com- pletingdifferentia of the immobilityof place, because we alwaysposit the same relationin the containing. Though the containingbody is not the same, the relationis always the same, that is the relationto left and right,front and back, up and down." This matureand well-developedtheory is preservedvirtually unchanged

Bacon,Qso Physics IV, XIII: 218:"... iliaultima convexitas potest considerali dupliciter: velinquantum est terminus celi, et sic nonest locus ejus nec separabilis ab ipso;aut in quantumin se consideraturet diffinitur sine loco et secundum essentiam ejus in quantum est et sicest locus 78superficies, ejus." Bacon,Qso Physics , IV, XIII: 191. 79Rufus, In Phys., IV, f. 7 : "Si ex talirespectu fiat pars superficiei pars loci, ergo ex eodemrespectu pars eadem, ergo pars adveniens et parsrecedens sunt eadem pars loci. Cumtarnen sint diversae partes superficiei, tamen eundem respectum habent a centro." 80Bacon, Qso Physics , IV, XIII: 192-3:"ubique est identitas respectus, est locus immobilis.. . . Dico quodidentitas respectus est differentia completiva immobilitatis loci, quiasemper ponitur idem respectus in continente;et licet continens non sit idem, semper idemest respectus, scilicet ad sinistrum,dextrum, ante, retro, sursum, deorsum."

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81 in the Communianaturalium , written after 1265, at least fifteenyears after the two Physicscommentaries we have been discussing.82The main changes foundin the Communianaturalium are the resultof more fullyintegrating Rufus' relationalaccount of the immobilityof place. Bacon has com- pletelygiven up explainingthe immobilityof place in termsof celestial nature,the fifthessence. Relations are now incorporatedinto the very definitionof place.83 Place in its most proper sense is a containingsurface, as relatedboth to the dimensionswithin it and to the boundariesof the world. The most equivocal use of the term"place" applies to heaven, which has no con- tainingsurface, only the relation,first included in the definitionof place by Rufus.84 Not only does Bacon revisethe definitionof place, but he changes his interpretationof Averroes.In the Communianaturalium , Bacon says that Averroeshimself did not hold thisview; it is a view thathas been imposed on him.85Unwilling though he is, however,Bacon has in fact rejected Averroesand his own earlieraccount and accepted a theorycloser to that of Rufus and . When Aristotlesays that heaven is in a place accidentally,according to the late Bacon, this is because heaven does not essentiallyrequire a place. What is located must be in a place, and heaven is not in the centerof the earth.86So heaven does not reallyhave a place. This is at the opposite extremefrom the firstcommentary, in which it is ordinaryobjects in movable containerswhich do not stricdy speakinghave a place.87The immobilityproblem having been solved,the containmentfunction of place assumes greaterprominence. Still,Bacon does not entirelyaccept Rufus' account. He persistsin his intuitionthat place mustbe separablefrom what it contains.Thus Bacon rejectsthe view that heaven's place is the convex outer surfaceof the outermostsphere. Since as Aristotlesays (and Rufussays), properly speak- ing heaven is simplynot in a place,88there is no reason we should seek

81J. Hackett,s.v. Bacon, Roger , in: Dictionary ofthe ; S.G. Easton,Roger Bacon andHis Search for a UniversalScience, New York 1952, 111. 82Bacon, Communia naturalium , III, ed. R. Steele,in: Operahactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi,Oxford 1911, 187, 199. 83Described in thesecond commentary as the differentia completiva notof place but the immobilityofplace ( Qso Physics IV, XIII: 193). 84Bacon, Communia naturalium , 185-6. 85Ibid, 188. 86Bacon, Communia naturalium , 187-9, 194, 230. 87Bacon, Qsq Physics , IV, VIII: 196-7. 88Aristotle, Physics , IV, c. 5, 212b 14-7; Bacon, Communia naturalium , 194.

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 246 REGAWOOD to identifya containingsurface. Where thereis no container,there is no containingsurface. Like the case of impetus,the problem of the place of the heavens promptedBacon to compromisebetween Rufus and Averroes.In both cases, Averroesis the strongerinfluence, at least initially.Where Rufus eventuallyprompts Bacon to abandon Averroes,it is to achieve great consistencywithin the Aristotelianparadigm, not to challengebasic prin- ciples.And interestingly,in thiscase when the change occurs,it is accom- panied by an exculpationof Averroes;this rejected view has been imposed on him.

6. Conclusion

Mention of Averroesbrings us back to the question with which we started,since Averroes,like Rufus,was the object of Bacon's bitterattack in 1292.89And nothingwe have seen thus far could explain the bitter- ness of eitherattack. What we have seen is a quite ordinarypattern of influenceby one thirteenthcentury philosopher on another,where both shared a considerableregard for Averroes.Bacon oftendisagrees with Rufus,but also sometimesadopts his views. There is nothinghere which would suggest that Bacon believes Rufus gave credence to the worst errors90or that Averroesdestroyed Aristotelian philosophy. Indeed, the early Bacon shows more deferencefor Averroes than Rufus does. Rufus, was alreadywriting treatises against Averroes before 1238.91By contrast, Bacon does not registera protestuntil the late 1260's when he wrotehis Communianaturalium?2 Even the late 1260's when Bacon acknowledgesand condemns Averroes'teaching on the passive intellect,he prefersnot to disagree.93Rather than disagree with Averroeson place, Bacon suggests that Averroeshas been imposed upon and did not reallyhold the view the universewas in a place in virtueof its center.In the case of Bacon's dislikefor Rufus, it is possible that Bacon did not know the views he adopted came from Rufus. Conceivably he knew these views only at - second hand perhaps as reportedby Robert Kilwardby.But thatseems

89Comp, th., p. 2a c. 3 n. 72,ed. Maloney,78. 90Comp . th., p. 2a c. 4 n. 86, ed. Maloney,86. 91De ideisand De causaindividuationis , cf.R. Wood, Individual Forms , in: L. Honnefelder, R. Wood& M. Dreyer(ed.), John , Leiden 1996, 253. 92D. Lindberg,Roger Bacon's Philosophy ofNature, Oxford 1983, xxv. 93Communia naturalium , 286.

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BACONAS RICHARDRUFUS' SUCCESSOR 247 unlikelysince Bacon was at Paris not long afterRufus left and may even have arrivedbefore his departure.Moreover, Kilwardby cited Rufuspro- minentlyenough (at least when discussingtopics like the eternityof the world as a theologian)that it would be difficultto miss the reference.94 Anotherpossibility which suggestsitself is that the animosityis per- sonal in origin:Rufus and Bacon mighthave learned to dislikeeach other while livingtogether in a Franciscan convent. But that possibility,too, seems remote.It is unlikelyin part because the two authorswere almost neverat the same convent.Between 1234 and 1238 when Rufus was at Paris,Bacon is supposedto have been in Oxfordfor most of the time.And thoughit is possible that Bacon arrivedat Paris beforeRufus left,since neitherweis a Franciscanthen, they certainlydid not live at the same convent.From 1238 to 1246 when Rufus was certainlyat Oxfordstudy- ing theology,Bacon was at Paris teachingphilosophy most of the time. Only fromabout 1246 to 1251 is it likelythat the two authorswere togetherfor an extended period, perhaps studyingtheology together at the OxfordFranciscan convent.95 Bacon was at Paris in the Springor 96 Summerof 1251, but he is generallysupposed to have been in Oxford from1252 to 1257 continuously,97a period when Rufas was in Paris most of the time,returning to Oxford in 1256 not long beforeBacon is sup- posed to departfor Paris. Finally,we suppose that Rufus died soon after 1259 allowingfor no personal contactafter 1260. Consequentlyif therewas personal animosity,the likelihoodis that it dates from1246-51. Supposingthere was a personal problem,we would expect the most violentattacks in the works writtenclosest to the pe- riod of theirtime together,perhaps as late as the OpusMaius of 1267. We would not expect fortyyears of silence followedby a bitterattack in

94Kilwardby, Quaestiones inlibrum II Sent., q. 3, ed. G. Leibold,München 1992, 15. 95Conceivably Bacon was both at Oxfordin 1250and in Parisin 1252;that would accountfor his knowledge ofthe circumstances ofRufus' lecturers and increase the period oftheir contact. Recendy J. Hackett(1995, 102) made a similarsuggestion in an article whichchallenges the accepted account of Bacon's life. I agreewith Hackett that much of thecurrent reconstruction ofBacon chronology is not conclusively documented, but do notfeel myself qualified to contributeto the debate. My purposehere is simplyto get clearon whatis uncontroversialabout Bacon's encounter with Rufus - namely, that (1) therewas not much contact before 1250 and (2) thebitter attack came more than thirty- fiveyears after that contact. IfHackett's plausible suggestion that Bacon remained in Paris after1251 is accepted,then there was more and somewhat later contact, but the attack stillcame more than thirty years after any personell contact was possible. 96Opus Majus , IV, ed. BridgesI: 401-2;Crowley, 25-9. 97D. Lindberg,Roger Bacon's Philosophy ofNature , Oxford 1983, xviii-xxi.

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1292, the date of the Compendiumstudii theologiae. When he says that he knew Rufusbest of all, Bacon is probablythinking of theiryears together studyingtheology. But what promptsthe attack on Rufus was probably not somethingfrom student days. More likely,it was the successof whichBacon complainswhich prompted the attack.Surely Bacon was angryprecisely because he lacked the eager followersattracted in immensenumbers by Rufus'philosophy. Very likely Averroeswas attackedfor a similarreason: because Bacon disagreedwith Averroesabout the agent intellect,and Averroes5interpretation attracted adherentswhile Bacon's did not. But the violentattack in 1292 should not tempt us to ignore Bacon's 1267 statementthat Averroeswas the greatestphilosopher after Aristotleand .98Bacon learned to understandAristode's libri naturales with the help of Averroes'commen- tary.Like everyother scholastiche was immenselyindebted to Averroes for his own understandingof Aristotelianphysics. Indeed, the advances we can see in Bacon's lecturesas compared to those of Rufus are owed in no smallpart to Averroes.And thoughBacon's viewsin naturalphiloso- phy did change over time,their development followed an orderlycourse. There is, as FerdinandDelorme pointed out," more continuitythan dis- continuityin the viewsstated in the philosophicaland the polemicalpeda- gogical works.The sound views on Aristoteliannatural philosophy which Bacon owed in large part to Averroescertainly were not abandoned in later years. James Weisheipl believed that Bacon never really understoodAris- totle,100because he interpretedAristode according to Avicennaand other Neoplatonicthinkers. Crowley's position is more nuanced.101He holdsthat Bacon triedto be an Aristotelianbut failed,since his approach was too eclectic. Crowley claims that though Bacon did not consciouslydepart fromAristotle, Bacon also did not grasp the implicationsof Aristotle's views.The comparisonjust made betweenBacon and Rufussuggests that such judgmentsare anachronistic.Bacon was far less Neoplatonicin his approach to physics than was Rufus; he rejected more tenets of old- fashionedscholasticism. More importantlyit is consistencywith the guid- ing principlesof Aristotle'sphysics which dictates what revisionshe accepts and what he rejects.

98Opus majus , I c. 6, ed. Bridges,London 1900, 14. 99Bacon, Qso Physic , XIII: xxvi. 100 J. Weisheipl,s.v. Roger Baco, >n> in: New Catholic Encyclopedia. WlRoger Bacon , 178-81, 201-4.

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Bacon had absorbed the of Aristotelianphysics more fully than Rufus.That is why challengesto the basic principlesof ,such as Rufus' explanationof projectilemotion, appeared absurd to him. Having absorbed the paradigm,Bacon was able to accept lim- ited criticismof Averroesand even Aristotle,when they made for an account freerfrom anomaly and inconsistency,as in the cases of place and projectilemotion. For the most part, however,Bacon preferredto gloss over such disagreements.Unlike Rufus, Bacon concurred with Averroes'strong emphasis on the substantialcontact in violent motion and deferredto Averroeson the place of the heavens. It is sign of his regardto Averroeson the topic thatwhen Bacon is eventuallyconvinced to abandon Averroes'position, he does not acknowledgethe disagree- mentbut exculpatesAverroes. Bacon's stanceon the eternityof the worldis importantin two respects. First,it showshis extremereluctance to criticizeAristotle. Second, it shows that at least in that respect he was more a member of Alexander of Hales' generationthan the generationfollowing Robert Grosseteste.Bacon - - knew Aristotle'snatural philosophythoroughly and pace Weisheipl understoodmost of it. But he was not in a positionto move far beyond it. In part because Rufus had absorbed the paradigm of Aristotelian physicsless completely,and never gained the habits of deferencechar- acteristicof later scholasticism,he was more effectiveas a critic.That explainswhy his workswere stillfresh thirty years afterRufus died. These are generalizationsto which there are undoubtedlyexceptions. One such exceptionis the case of the agent intellect,where Avicenna more stronglyinfluenced Bacon than Rufus. But since these generaliza- tionsare based on an evaluationof Rufus'and Bacon's treatmentof some of the great problemsof Aristotelianphysics, correcting them will not resultin a returnto past judgments.It is to be hoped that people will hesitateto presentBacon as incapable of understandingAristotle or Rufus as a minortheologian inferior to Grossetestein his grasp of Aristotelian physics.Instead, we may hope formore refinedand precisepresentations - of the earlydays of WesternAristotelianism where so much of what we know we owe to Bacon. Not the least of what we owe to Bacon is the informationhe provides about Rufus.Adopting the intellectualhumility Bacon preached but did not practice,Rufus almostvanished fromthe historybooks, as he prob- ably wishedto do. Bacon, by contrast,sought to escape obscurityby writ- ing for the powerfuland for posterity.Both men achieved theirwishes to a considerableextent; we know almostnothing about Rufus' life.And it is a delicious irony that Bacon's rude remarksprovide some of the

This content downloaded from 129.79.235.134 on Thu, 1 Jan 2015 20:45:33 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 250 REGAWOOD most importantinformation we have on Rufus. WithoutBacon's testi- mony,who would dare assertthat a virtuallyunknown scholastic author attractedhuge crowds of followerslong afterhis death?

New Haven Yale University

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