Mediterranean Neighbourhood?

European Abrahamic Forum

On the Way to Renewed Partnership or How to re-build European – Mediterranean Neighbourhood?

Zürich 2016

European Abrahamic Forum

“On the Way to Renewed Partnership” or How to re-build European – Mediterranean Neighbourhood?

International Conference Zürich, 06 – 08 September 2015

Zürich 2016

EDITED BY Prof. Dr. Stefan Schreiner European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) - Zurich (Switzerland) - University of Tübingen Dept. of Comparative Study of Religions - Tübingen (Germany) -

PRINTED BY Druckerei Maier GmbH Rottenburg a. N. (Germany)

ISBN 978-3-00-052766-1

The present volume records papers presented to the 5th International European Abrahamic Forum Conference, which was held in Zurich in September 2015. At the invitation of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) and the Zurich Institute for Interreligious Dialogue (ZIID) – the former Zürcher Lehrhaus –, about thirty scholars and leading experts from a number of Middle East- ern/North African and European countries came together to continue not only to assess recent developments in the Arab Islamic World, but also to ask and discuss what impact all these developments in our European-Mediterranean neighbourhood have on the situation within European countries South and North of the Alps alike. At the same time, the conference marked the 10th anniversary of the founding of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) and was part of the programme of the Zurich Institute for Interreligious Dialogue / Zürcher Lehrhaus prepared and offered to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its foundation. Thus, the conference provided the opportunity to look back, to review and evaluate ten years of efforts to promote trilateral inter-religious, cross-cultural encounter and dialogue, and to foster exchange of ideas, cooperation, and understanding between Muslims, Chris- tians, and Jews across the Mediterranean as said in the founding exposé. From its very beginning convinced that (a) the potential for a peaceful living together, based on mutual understanding, respect for the otherness of the other, and the awareness of shared responsibility, is implicit especially in the cultures deriving from the three monotheistic world religions, and, therefore, (b) dialogue and understanding between people of different religious commitment, different cultural background and/or different political orientation are possible, and (c) in view of the tensions and conflicts in our torn global village the uncovering of this aforementioned potential is of particular significance and needed, today more than ever, it was, and still is, the EAF’s foremost objective to serve the improvement of relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews across geographical, cultural, and religious borders, through encounter and learning together as well as from each other, and to help paving the way towards better mutual understanding, peaceful co-existence, and living together. The purpose of this volume is, above all, to document the conference that took place some months ago. Recording papers presented to the last year’s conference, and reflections shared to introduce the respective sessions and, thus, outlining the many facets of the topic and illustrating the variety of approaches to it, the volume wants to offer also fresh, new insights into recent developments in the Middle Eastern/North Afri- can region and, thus, contribute to creating objective our European-Mediterranean neighbourhood. At the same time, the volume wants to invite the reader to pick up the thread and join the discussion on issues which deserve to be considered as seriously as carefully, because they are essential not only to understand the unfolding events in the Arab-Islamic world, but to remain being aware of whatever happens in one part of our European-Mediterranean neighbourhood, has an im- mediate impact on the other. We cannot change the geography. We remain neighbours, irrespective of whether we live on this or that shore of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the only question that counts is: How do we (re-)build and live this neighbourhood?

Greetings

Excellences, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends and Colleagues, On behalf of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) I have the honour and pleasure to welcome you here in the premises of the Zürcher Lehrhaus. At the same time, it is my wish to thank you very much for kindly having accepted the invitation to be with us these days, and I would like to express my appreciation of your presence at the opening session as well as at the conference table of this – Fifth – International European Abrahamic Forum Confer- ence to be held on this and the following two days. As mentioned in the exposé and invitation letter, this fifth EAF conference – in fact, the fourteenth in the line of the EAF’s (major) conferences and (minor) workshops – marks at the same time the 10th anniversary of the founding of our European Abrahamic Forum and is included into the programme, which the Zürcher Lehrhaus prepared for and organized to celebrate the 20th anniversary of its foundation. And I would like to add that it is the last time that we convene here in this charming pavilion under the roof of the Zürcher Lehrhaus. In a few months’ time, the Zürcher Lehrhaus will not only move from here, then having its domicile under another roof, but it also will widen the scope of its activities and, therefore, continue its work under a new brand. From January 2016 onwards, the Zürcher Lehrhaus will be called Zurich Institute for Interreligious Dialogue (ZIID). Our EAF, however, remains to be part of the ZIID’s activities. Allow me, please, a few remarks on the conference and its objectives. It was not for the first time that the developments in the MENA – Middle East/ North Africa region were put on the agenda of an EAF conference. Without going into details, I would like to recollect briefly the way that brought us to this conference table. As you remember, right from the beginning of the revolutionary changes that once were called – quite optimistically – the “Arab Spring,” but soon turned into a hot summer and stormy autumn, ending up here and there in a nightmare-like new strong winter, figuratively speaking, we tried to make and keep ourselves aware of what happened and continues to happen in our neighbourhood. Continuously, we tried to assess the unfolding developments. The first conference (workshop) focussing on the “Arab Spring” In View of the Changes – Reflections on developments in the Near East/North Africa region and their impact on the future EAF agenda, took place already in Mai 2011 here in Zurich, with

IX its follow-up, quite prematurely titled In the Aftermath of the Changes: Problems and Future of Euro-Mediterranean Relations, a few months later in July 2011 in Amman (Jordan). The third conference, at that time focussing on the consequences of the changes, was held under the title Between Turmoil, Change, and Renewal: Religion and its Role in Re-shaping Post-Revolutionary Societies Chance or Threat to Build up Civil Soci- ety in Rabat (Morocco) in September 2012.1 To prepare for this conference, the European Abrahamic Forum invited to two more workshops, both under the headline Assessing Recent Developments in the Middle East. Whereas the focus of the first workshop, held in Amman in March 2014, and jointly organized and hosted in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) – Office Amman, and the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies (RIIFS) in Amman, was on the future of Christians and Christian-Muslim co-existence in the Middle East.2 The second workshop, held in Zurich in November 2014, tried to answer the question what is the impact of the developments in the MENA region not only on the countries and region involved, but also on Europe. Indeed, from today’s perspective, we had to learn that the so-called revolutionary changes that started in Tunisia and subsequently spread over much of the Arab Islamic world went far beyond their original regional context and scope: In some countries, we observe an accelerating process of what has been called (a) accelerating denationalization, a process that makes states not just fail, but fade out of history, and (b) increasing privatization of power. Countries and states – de facto no longer ruled by central governments – collapse and fall into pieces, i.e. into the hands of rivalling groups and/or factions. Not to mention the various civil and proxy wars like in Syria and Yemen. Internationally recognized borders are no longer respected. Self-appointed militant groups claim control and power, persecuting at the same time all those not belonging to their respective group, exercising violence and unprecedented crimes, particularly against dissenting others, religious minorities etc. These developments, however, do affect not only the adjacent neighbouring countries of those in turmoil like, e.g., Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, sweeping more and more into the maelstrom of unsolved problems. They have an increasing effect also upon those in greater distance, on the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, in Central and Western Europe. Along with that, the relationships between those living on the Northern shore and those living South and East of the Mediterranean dramatically changed, too, because:

1 Stefan Schreiner (ed.), Between Turmoil, Change, and Renewal: Religion and its Role in Re-shaping Post-Revolutionary Societies – Chance or Threat to Build up Civil Society (Pro- ceedings of the European Abrahamic Forum, vol. 4), Zürich / Rabat 2013. 2 Stefan Schreiner (ed.), Assessing Recent Developments in the Middle East – Shedding Light on Intercultural Relations (Proceedings of the European Abrahamic Forum, vol. 5), Zürich / Amman 2014.

X Whatever happened, and continues to happen, in our European–Mediterranean neighbourhood has an impact on both sides, also on the situation inside European countries and societies, which are facing an unprecedented increase in ethnic-cultural, religious, and/or political pluralization and diversification not least due to the growing migration movements for whatever reason. Increasing numbers of refugees and/or asylum seekers risk their lives to cross the Medi- terranean hoping to find shelter and, eventually, a new home somewhere on the Northern side of the mare nostrum. Arriving there, they carry with them the heavy burden of what they went through, thus “importing” at the same time the potential of conflicts into the societies and countries, where they are looking for shelter. New situations bring new challenges and require new answers, we said three years ago. Therefore, as to the conference agenda, it has been suggested that the following topics should be its main objectives: (1) Making ourselves aware of (1a) what happened and continues to happen in our European–Mediterranean neighbourhood and (1b) what changed within the involved North African / Middle Eastern countries since the revolutions there began. Where, and in what sense, they differ from what they have been before etc. (1c) the ‘repercussions’ of change, or what still needs to change for ‘change’ to take place? (2) Trying to assess the unfolding events focussing, particularly, on (2a) recent developments in e.g. Egypt, in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (in the shadow of Syria), and (2b) the lessons to be drawn from, and answers to be given to, them with focus on their impact on European–Mediterranean neighbourhood relations, on the one hand, and the requirements to re-shape them, on the other. (2c) the possibility of a future Middle East without its minorities? (3) Discussing (3a) the effect that the changes in the North African / Middle Eastern region had, and continue to have, upon the situation in European countries and societies facing an unprecedentedly increasing religious, ethnic-cultural, and political pluralization and diversification not least due to the growing migration movements for whatever reason, and(3b) the – emerging from them – chances of, but also challenges (of uprooted religions and transferred cultures) to, integration policy today. (4) Pondering (4a) consequences of the aforementioned recent developments as well as the caused by them changes that occurred in European countries and societies (from imported conflicts, “return of religion into the public sphere” to “Islamophobia” and “new anti-Semi- tism”), and (4b) possibilities to respond to the challenges mentioned above with special focus on the needs and requirements of new (primary, secondary, and tertiary) educational systems. In view of all this, and encouraged by the experiences and insights gained particularly from our last three workshops, it seems more than appropriate that we again study this area and continue trying to assess the unfolding events in our neighbourhood, and making ourselves understand them. The more so, as from its very beginning, it was, and remains, the foremost

XI objective of our EAF to serve as a forum for dialogue, and to help establishing and a network of committed people and, thus, contribute to (re-)shape neighbourhood relations across the Mediterranean. An objective that can be described as the attempt to sharpen the vision and awareness that we are and remain neighbours, belonging to the same neighbourhood, irrespective of whether we live on this or that side of the Mediterranean. Following along these lines, I once again extend a very warm welcome to you all thanking you for having accepted the invitation and being with us these days. To conclude, I would like to thank and express my profound gratitude to all whose contributions helped this conference to happen. Thank you for your attention. Prof. Dr Stefan Schreiner European Abrahamic Forum (EAF)

Excellences, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honour and pleasure as President of the Gemeinderat (municipal council) of the City of Zürich, to welcome you all in Zürich on this particular occasion. Indeed, it is a particular and unprecedented occasion that tonight we have the honour and pleasure to welcome You, Your Excellency, President of the Jordanian Senate, here in the premises of the University of Zürich, as Guest of Honour, and we are eager to listen to your lecture. Today, encounter and dialogue of people representing the three faith communities Juda- ism, Islam, and Christianity, is much more needed than ever. They not only contributed, each in its way, to the development and growth of all countries around the Mediterranean, the Middle East no less than Europe, but also deeply influenced and shaped their cultures. In times like ours, i.e. times of turmoil, times of “old” and “new” conflicts and wars, sometimes misinterpreted as clashes of religions or even civilizations, times of increasing migration movements for various reasons – in times like ours, it is all the more important if not essential, that we remind ourselves that the potential for peaceful living together, is implicit especially in our cultures deriving from the three Abrahamic religions. The potential for a peaceful living together, which is based on mutual understanding, respect for the otherness of the other and shared responsibility. We should remind ourselves that the most

XII bright and prosperous periods in our respective history were those when people of different religious commitment, of different ethnic-cultural backgrounds, of different political orien- tations came together, peacefully learned from each other, and worked together. When the ancient Romans established their Imperium Romanum North, East, and South of the Mediterranean, they called the Mediterranean Mare Nostrum (“our sea”) or Mare Internum (the “sea in the middle”). They did so, because they were convinced that the Mediterranean is not a border dividing the three geographical parts of their empire and separating them from each other, but a bridge. Indeed, they regarded the Mediterranean as a bridge that connects people living around it and allows them to come together. Moreover, they perceived the Mediterranean as a table, with all people living North, East, and South of it sitting around it. Of course, there were also conflicts, wars etc. in these times, waged especially to integrate the regions at the coast not belonging to the Roman Empire before. Nevertheless, there was at least a vision of a peaceful living together. From today’s perspective, this ancient Roman view and vision seems to be farther away than ever before. The geography did not change, to be sure. We continue to live around the Mediterranean, continue to live in the same neighbourhood, but a neighbourhood with neighbours divided and separated from each other. The Mediterranean is no longer the bridge that it was. To the contrary, it has become a strictly guarded border (almost) invin- cible for those regarded as not entitled to cross it. Is it more an irony or lack of sensitivity that politicians called an operation to protect the Mediterranean border and assist ships with refugees in distress – Mare Nostrum? It seems that not much remained from the great vision of the ancients except for that much needed but fiercely criticised operation of the Italian Marine. In these times of turmoil, conflicts, and wars, your country – Excellency – the Hashe- mite Kingdom of Jordan occupies a special place. Countries in our respective neighbourhood cease to exist and fall into the hands of rivalling groups or factions. Self-appointed militant groups claim control, exercising unprecedented violence, persecuting at the same time and quite often killing all those not belonging to their respective group or faction, particularly members of dissenting religious minority groups etc. Your country, however, proves that even in times of turmoil peaceful living together of all people is still possible, irrespective of their religious commitment, cultural background and/or ethnic belonging. Therefore, we are eager to listen to your lecture, Excellency, and to learn from the experiences of your country these days. As president of a local parliament, I am particularly eager to get an idea of the role of the Jordanian Senate in this difficult situation. Once again, allow me to extend a very warm word of welcome to all of you and thank you for joining us for this evening. Matthias Wiesmann President of the Gemeinderat of the City of Zürich

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(President of the Jordanian Senate)

When I received the kind invitation to address such a distinguished audience in this great University, I had to think very carefully about the theme of my speech. Upon considering a number of relevant issues, the only one subject that kept erupting at the top of my list of choices, is the situation in our region and the place of Jordan vis à vis the prevailing uncertainty around it. But before embarking on what may look like a gloomy narrative about the current situation in a region, where my country, Jordan, sits in its centre; before that, let me assure you that Jordan remains stable, secure, safe, politically sturdy, and despite tough challenges and trouble all around, Jordan continues to make sustained progress. For more than four years now, Syria, our northern neighbour, has been tom by a war, which has been severely impacting all aspects of Jor- danian life. It is not just the refugees from Syria, who sought safety for their lives across our northern border, but the closure of the Syrian Jordanian border has enormously harmed our economy and trade, not only with Syria, but with other countries that used the Syrian territory as a transit point to and from Jordan, namely: Turkey, Europe, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf States. What is more critical than the humanitarian and the economic burdens, which Jordan is currently coping with, quite effectively, is the security factor. Our borders with Syria are long and exposed. To keep them safe we needed to substantially intensify monitoring, and to maintain constant

XV presence of forces to prevent illegal infiltrators, arms and narcotic smug- gling, irregular entry of larger numbers of Syrians escaping the woes of war. This has been a huge and a very costly military task, adding enormously to the other economic burdens, caused by the Syrian crisis. There were a number of attempts by the extremist aimed groups, operating in Syria, to cross into Jordan, but all were dealt with instantly and drastically. Not just the so-called Da’esh, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), but many of the other fighting groups in both countries, view Jordan as a target for their destructive schemes. As a matter of fact, those terror organizations target every one and every legitimate order in the region. The only reason .that all their attempts against Jordan have failed, is the competence and the alertness of the Jordanian security forces as well as the alertness the Jordanian people. That has not been an easy un- dertaking and success in defending the land comes usually at a great cost. For that reason, we decided to join the world coalition for fighting Da’esh in both Syria and Iraq. Da’esh and its appalling practices against religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq and Syria, Christians and Yazidis in particular, has been causing irreparable damage to Islam as a noble faith, as a great civilization, as well as a comprehensive matrix of cardinal values. Da’esh, merely, is a force of destruction and as such a threat to any community and any existing order. While honouring the martyr, unity and resolve were demonstrated by all Jordanians to continue the war against terror to the very end. If the criminals’ purpose was to divide Jordanians, and to shake their belief in confronting the intruders on religion, as well as on Arab values and tradition, they reaped adverse results. The resolve, the unity of purpose, and the unwavering determination of all Jordanians were sharpened to the end. One of our young pilots, participating in the aerial war against Da’esh in Syria, was taken prisoner by this group, as his plane was downed. As our standard policy is never to negotiate with terrorists, or submit to their blackmail, we stood firm against any such financial extortion. Our hero, Mu’ath Al-Kasasbeh, was burned alive in a scandalous ceremony in a manner unprecedented in its callousness and cruelty. Apart from the limitless complications over the years, our position regarding the Syrian crisis remained stable. Right from the start, our leadership, from His Majesty King Abdullah II, to all other state compo-

XVI nents, believed that there is no military solution for the Syrian predica- ment. The only option in our view has been all along, an internal political settlement worked out by the Syrians themselves. With the Iraq situation, and the collapse of the state and its institutions there as a direct result of the war in 2003, with that dark chapter in the history of that great country, standing clearly in front of our eyes, we warned against a repeat of the disastrous Iraqi blunder in Syria. Iraq has yet to recover from that calamity after more than twelve years now. The transfer from dictatorship to democracy in Iraq was due and it was right and required. But it could have been reached by less violent means. And with respect to Syria, we believed then, as we do believe now, the Syrian people’s quest for freedom, political reform, good government, power sharing, dignity and fair distribution of national wealth, is legitimate. The status quo in Syria was not possible to last forever. However, that also could have been reached by political compromise, not war. Un- due delay in addressing the crisis within the Syrian family unfortunately had opened the country for foreign intervention of all types. Let us hope that despite the huge devastation, a political settlement preserving Syria, its great history, the Syrian historic cities and antiquities, the culture and the legacies, and most importantly, the society and the people; let us hope that peaceful compromise is still possible. Recent developments in Iraq are cause of deep concern for us in Jor- dan too. The sharp rise of sectarian violence, instability and inadequacy of services, have been depriving the great Iraqi people from normal, tran- quil and orderly life, since the 2003 war. Last summer Da’esh invaded the province of Nineveh and in lightning speed managed to occupy its provincial capital of Mosul, the second largest city in the country after Baghdad. Mosul is still occupied till this day. Moreover, Da’esh currently controls about one third of the Iraqi territory, including the Anbar region, which is adjacent to Jordan’s eastern border. Our borders with Iraq are also closed, due to the fact that the border, like the case in Syria, is no more under the control of the Iraqi government. Trade with Iraq is almost at a standstill. The resulting damage to our economy is great, bearing in mind the volume of trade, between Jordan and Iraq. Many of our industries that relied heavily on the Iraqi market are now slowing down, if not suspended completely. Neither in Syria, nor in Iraq does it

XVII look possible to predict a time limit for the prevailing violence and political uncertainty to end. In both countries the state structure is either collapsing, as is the case in Syria, or facing serious challenges as in Iraq, and it may take years before normal conditions can be restored. Chaos in both countries has opened the door for extremist organisations, espousing weird ideologies and attracting adventuress, anarchists, opportunists, mercenaries, and outright murderers from all over the world to join in an aimless war, bent primarily on killing and destruction. We, in Jordan, have been, warning for decades, that the failure to address the gross injustice that befell Palestine and its people a century ago, is the major source of much of the mounting trouble, all over the Middle East, and further. The United Nations Organisation, which was born at the same time as the Question of Palestine, has kept the Palestinian file on its annual agenda since; but the World body had also failed in dealing with this major issue effectively, in accordance with the provision of its Charter. The UN accrued failure in implementing international law, as well as dozens of Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, dealing with the Arab Israeli conflict, for more than six decades, is beyond comprehension. Israel’s abnormal and injudicious influence with some UN member states, as well as with the UN organization itself, has been the main reason behind this UN failure. This ongoing conflict, and the many Arab Israeli wars resulting from it, have impoverished the region, squandered its wealth, dis- rupted its natural development, and paralyzed its potential, to build competent institutions, and solid democratic states. But much worse, is the rise, all over the region of dangerous trends, such as radicalisa- tion of societies, extremist tendencies, desperation of successive generations, and hence, preparedness of young men and women, to be easy recruits for the very dangerous, and the very extremist terror organisations, that feed on people’s frustrations, and dominate the scene to day. The late King Hussein, King Abdullah’s father, had dedicated his entire rule, which lasted for 47 years, struggling to end the Arab Israeli conflict, by negotiated and peaceful means. The trademark of his enlightened rule,

XVIII was moderation, dialogue, negotiation, openness, and most importantly, was his ironclad commitment to peace. He worked hard for peace, but his noble efforts, were routinely obstructed, mainly by Israeli greed for illegal acquisition of other nations territories, as well as by Israel’s insist- ence on consolidating its war gains unlawfully. It is a distinct fact that King Hussein’s efforts, decade after decade, not leaving one stone un- turned, in his meticulous and persistent search for peace, had culminated in the Jordan Israel Peace Treaty, in October 1994. Nevertheless, it was always his great hope, that this treaty would only be part of a larger, a comprehensive, and a lasting Arab Israeli peace, so that the region in its aftermath would leap into a prosperous future, for all the countries, and for all the peoples of the region, including Israel. The Israeli occupation of Arab lands is the longest lasting occupation in modem times. Israel continues to occupy, and to colonise Palestinian occupied land, namely the West Bank including East Jerusalem, since 1967. This is the land that is supposed to be the seat of the future Pales- tinian state, under the “two state solution” formula; a formula that has been reduced to a mere slogan by Israel’s disregard for International Law, as well as its denial of the Palestinian legitimate rights, mainly their right to statehood and full political independence on their homeland. Unfortunately, that remains a remote goal. Israel is primarily responsible for turning the 20-year old peace process, into a futile and an end- less process, but without peace. Since the June war of 1967, all efforts towards that grand ambition, that serves the best interests of Arabs and Israelis alike have miserably failed. King Abdullah II, on his part, right from his first day, since ascending the Jordanian throne, had demonstrated the same resolve, and the same unwavering commitment, for reaching a peaceful settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The 2002 “Arab Peace initiative”, which Jordan was very instrumental in formulating, offered Israel permanent peace, normal relations and recognition, not only by the 22 Arab League member states, but by all the 57 Muslim states as well. Israel turned this offer down, as it did with many other offers before it, preferring violence, chaos, instability, insecurity and perpetual conflict instead. At the Madrid Peace conference in 1990, where the so-called peace process was launched, Israel was offered Peace for returning the Arab

XIX occupied territories its invading armies occupied in June 1967: the West Bank in Palestine including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights in Syria, and the remaining strips of land in Lebanon. Israel did not like the formula “Land for Peace”, insisting on keeping the land, even if at the cost of peace. That is the main obstacle that remains stubbornly in the way of any Arab Israeli peace till this day. The continued occupation by Israel of Palestinian, Syrian and Leba- nese lands for 48 years now, in addition to the -8- year old Gaza siege, in addition to the settler colonization of those lands, is a certain recipe for more regional wars and constant instability, and that will not spare any of the region’s countries, including Israel. All around us in Jordan there are wars and trouble. Violence, perpe- trated by many extremist organizations is spreading farther than Syria and Iraq, into Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, Gaza, Tunisia, Libya, Kenya and it continues in Somalia. It is also reaching Europe and it is hard to predict when and where the fast expanding terror would stop. Unless and until a major international plan, is put in place, to collectively and effectively check this danger, we all have to pay attention. I am aware of the fact, that I am painting before you, a spectacle of doom and gloom. I can see that clearly on your faces. Believe me the reality is worse, and I am doing my best to downplay the gravity of the situation. Let me now present to you, what you may view as the brighter side of the picture. As said at the start, Jordan, despite turmoil all around, and despite mounting challenges and economic strains, remains an oasis of stability, civility, and peace. Many wonder how we managed to remain out of all trouble for so long. The answer is simple: the wise Hashemite Leadership; the efficient and competent Jordanian security network; and the mature Jordanian society. Jordan, which in few years will celebrate its centennial jubilee, is part of the Arab world. Jordanians, according to our constitution, are part of the Arab nation. Thus, we are not different from our Arab brethren, except that this country had been created as a result of consensus. As a product of the Great Arab Revolt, led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the dean of the Hashemite dynasty, against the Turks during the First World

XX War, the plan was to unite all Arab countries, after liberation from Turk- ish rule, in one kingdom, under Sharif Hussein (King Hussein the First). Unfortunately, and as there were contradictory commitments, and secret plans for the region, by major European powers, the British promises to Sharif Hussein did not materialise, except partly in Iraq and Jordan. The majority of the six million Jordanians is Muslim Arabs. But Jor- dan is home to other thriving ethnic and religious communities, who lived in the country for centuries as equal citizens. Not once in the history of our country was there an incident of ethnic or religious discord. The Jordanian experience in this sense, the equality of all citizens before the law, the mutual respect, the ultimate tolerance, and the freedom of worship, is recognized as exceptional. We are united by one Jordanian national identity, but we also respect and encourage the preservation of the tradition, and the indigenous cultures, of the other Jordanian communities, such as Chechnians, the Cirassians and others. The Christian citizens of Jordan are not too many, but as a community, they are influential and their presence in all walks of life is clearly evident. To ensure that all those communities are represented in our parliament, the Jordanian election law provides for a certain number of seats, a quota, for those communities in both the lower and the higher chambers of the National Assembly. Since the creation of Modem Jordan, in the aftermath of the First World War, the country received waves of newcomers and immigrants: newcomers from neighbouring Arab countries, because during four centuries of Ottoman rule, movement of people was free, and there were no political borders. The first large wave of refugees came from Palestine, as a result of the first Arab Israeli war, in 1947/1948. The small, but highly profes- sional Jordanian army participated with other Arab League member states armies, in that war. The Jordanian army saved the West Bank with East Jerusalem from falling into Jewish hands. As a result, the Palestini- ans demanded those territories to be united to East Jordan, forming the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanian Palestinian unity was ex- emplary in every aspect. It was interrupted by the Israeli invasion of 1967. That is why a large portion of Jordanian Citizens is of Palestinian Origin. The second large wave of newcomers happened in the summer

XXI of 1967 when in that war the West Bank including East Jerusalem was occupied by Israel. Then Jordan received more Palestinians, Iraqis and Asians during the Gulf war in 1991, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; and again during the second war on Iraq in 2003. Many Iraqis are still in Jordan till today. We now host about 1.3 million Syrian refugees, and although that adds substantially to our economic difficulties we decided to open our borders and to offer our Syrian brothers and sisters all their humanitarian needs, with or without the scant International assistance, amounting, at best, to no more than 30% of the refugees’ needs. It is a combination of the Jordanian healthy, harmonious and constructive society; with a wise and a visionary Hashemite leadership, and a competent state security system, that is keeping Jordan a remarkable oasis of peace, right at the centre of a vast region of turmoil and conflict. In fact, it is the extraordinary leadership of King Abdul- lah, whose wisdom and exceptional abilities are recognised worldwide, that has been instrumental, in keeping Jordan so immune and so safe. The Arab spring passed through Jordan, but very gently. Political reform in Jordan has always been an ongoing process. There is continued demand for developing our democratic experiment, for better government, for modernizing our education, for social equity, for allowing larger space for civil society, for enabling the women and youth, for better management of our scarce resources, and for empowering our institutions to make Jordan truly a state of law and institutions. By the way, women occupy a significant share in our political system and in high office, apart from their participation in all other official and private activities: as ministers, members of parliament, senators, judges, army officers, executives and prominent community leaders. There was hardly any dis- agreement between the top leadership, the king and the executive authority, over expressed popular demand for reform. King Abdullah has not only been positively responding to his peoples’ calls, but he has always been leading in a major reform operation that ended up updating a large part of our constitution, just to mention one example. The King’s goal is to reach parliamentary governments formed by the political party, or the coalition of parties, that win general elections, to function in a system of checks and balances, with the winning party in the executive

XXII office while the parliamentary opposition, the party that lost the vote, acting as a shadow government. According to our constitution, Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. King Abdullah nevertheless is insisting that all aspects of model constitutional monarchy should be asserted. On the long road of reform, we did a lot, but the process continues. Our mission has constantly been extraterritorial. There is no question that the Interests of our country come first, but we never ignore our regional and international obligations as a responsible part of a world community. For the last four decades, and despite our scarce resources, our armed forces have been participating regularly in UN sponsored peacekeeping missions worldwide. There were risks and human losses, but that was no cause for reneging. Our UN record is brilliant white. Our greatest asset is our excellent relations with every country in the world without any single exception. Our motto is to respect and be respected. Our tolerance for putting interest before principle is zero.

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Texts and Reflections

Middle East / North Africa in Turmoil and Transition or Shaping a New Political Map

Prof Dr Martin Beck (Odense, Denmark)

Summary: The article attempts firstly to critically discuss political change as triggered by the Arab uprisings, which started five years ago. On the one hand, it is shown that the Arab world, which with few exceptions was until then characterized by consolidated authoritarian regimes, became politically more colourful. On the other hand, not all Arab countries to which political transformation is often attributed to are undergoing deep political change. Moreover, in some countries – particularly Syria, Yemen, and Libya – transformation processes are overarched and deeply shaped by a high degree of political violence. The second part of the article assesses the response of the European Union toward the Arab Spring. It is argued that the major novelty in terms of policy approaches – the more-for-more principle – lacks sophistication and coherent application.*

(1) Introduction Five years ago, many observers of the Arab uprisings did not take long to overcome their initial confusion that the supposedly ever-stable authoritarianism of the Arab Middle East got deeply shattered and seriously challenged: The trend then was to be “open” for and “optimistic” about a transition to democracy,1 although quite some scholars working on Middle Eastern affairs were among the more pessimistic and sceptical voices from the very beginning.2 Five years

* Major parts of this chapter were published first on E-International Relations on Decem- ber 1, 2015, available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2015/12/01/the-arab-uprisings-five- years-after/. 1 For instance OLIVIER ROY, The transformation of the Arab world, in: Journal of De- mocracy 23/3 (2012), pp. 5-18; OLIVIER ROY, The myth of the Islamist winter. Egypt and Tunisia aren’t sliding into chaos – they are simply learning how to be democracies, in: New Statesman, December 13, 2012, available at: http://www.newstates- man.com/world-affairs/world-affairs/2012/12/myth-islamist-winter. 2 For instance MICHAEL L. ROSS, Will oil drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the resource course, in: Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011.

- 3 - after the uprisings, it is safe to say that the Arab systems – with the possible exception of Tunisia – have not been undergoing a smooth transition to democracy. The following essay attempts to shed some more light on this finding by elaborating what kind of political change is (not) happening in the Arab world as an outcome of the uprisings. The analysis on this key question is followed by a brief assessment of the European Union’s response to the “Arab Spring”.

(2) Impact of the Arab uprisings As the term “Arab Spring” implies a positive assessment, it is – or rather: was – often used with the expectation that the Arab uprisings triggered a transition to democracy. The democratic transition in Eastern Europe after the downfall of the Soviet Union often served explicitly or implicitly as a comparative model.3 Thus, it left many observers baffled when it became clear rather soon that – with the possible exception of Tunisia – no smooth transition to democracy took place.4 However, it would mean to throw out the baby with the bath water to conclude from the (tentative) lack of (successful) democratization processes that the “Arab Spring” did not bring along any significant change. Before assessing the impact of change triggered by the Arab uprisings from an empir- ical angle, it is crucial to discuss critically the underlying theoretical concept, the transition paradigm. Almost ten years before the start of the Arab uprisings, Thomas Carothers titled a well-received scholarly article “The end of the transition paradigm.”5 In the light of observations on the development of transformation processes triggered by the overthrow of authoritarian regimes mainly in countries of the Global South, he questioned the teleological moment of the transition paradigm: there is no one-way road leading from the downfall of authoritarian regimes to the establishment of consolidated democracies. In the words of Morten Valbjørn, political change may simply, take the form of a “transition to somewhere.”6 Thus, the transition paradigm in its traditional form was already

3 Cf. TAMSIN WALKER, Eastern Europe can guide, but not lead, Arab Spring countries, Deutsche Welle, May 27, 2011, available at: http://www.dw.com/en/eastern-europe- can-guide-but-not-lead-arab-spring-countries/a-15109918. 4 Cf. ALFRED STEPAN and JUAN J. LINZ, Democratization theory and the Arab Spring, in: Journal of Democracy 24/2 (2013), pp. 15-30. 5 THOMAS CAROTHERS, The end of the transition paradigm, in: Journal of Democracy 13/1 (2002), pp. 5-21. 6 MORTEN VALBJØRN, Upgrading post-democratization studies. Examining a re-polit- icized Arab world in a transition to somewhere, in: Middle East Critique 21/1 (2012), pp. 25-35.

- 4 - outdated when the Arab uprisings occurred. Due to the success story of democratization processes in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, however, it was then present and popular beyond social science, thereby fuelling high expectations on political developments in the Arab world. Note that the statement of a transition to somewhere is not trivial in the case of the “Arab Spring”, because not all Arab regimes affected by the Arab uprisings were shattered up to a degree that the ruling leadership lost control over the political process. In other words, in some cases there can be no doubt that an authoritarian regime was overthrown and because of that political change is in the making there. Libya and Tunisia are cases par excellence. A much less clearer case is Egypt: There was a far-reaching process of political change set in motion when Egypt held its first free democratic elections in history in 2011/12. However, the military coup in July 2013 and its aftermaths clearly points into the direction of re-authoritarianism; a core actor of the Mu- barak regime – the military – controls also the allegedly “new” political system. There are differences between the rules of Mubarak and Sisi,7 yet not in terms of democratization.8 At the same time, note that even most of those transformation processes in other world areas that finally opened up to democratic systems went through some phases of retard. In other words, the question whether the major politicization of Egyptian people and issues, as it happened in 2010/11, can be mastered by pure authoritarian means in the end is still unsettled. An indicator for a new nervousness of the old Egyptian political elite is Abdul Fatah al-Sisi’s decision to extend the voting in May 2014 Presidential elections for a whole more day, when he realized that he got much less support than expected.9

7 DINA RASHED, What al-Sisi’s will mean for Egypt, in: Muftah, March 31, 2014, available at: http://muftah.org/al-sisis-presidency-will-mean-egyptian-politics-2/#.Vki H-E-FN9A. 8 By sending an observation mission, the European Union contributed to legitimize unfree and unfair elections (LARS BROZUS and STEPHAN ROLL, Egypt. The EU election observation mission was a mistake, in: SWP Point of View, June 4, 2014, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/point-of-view/egypt-the-eu-election-observation-mission-was-a-mistake.html). Whether this policy was a result of a failed assessment of the character of authoritarianism in Egypt after the military coup or a deliberate policy based on the interest to strengthen the regime of al-Sisi and to “stabilize” the Middle East, is a question beyond the scope of the present article. 9 Egypt voting extended amid poor turnout. Officials blame hot weather but analysts say boycott and apathy are responsible for low voter numbers, Aljazeera, May 28, 2014, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/egypt- elections-extended-amid-weak-turnout-20145287538994650.html.

- 5 - Furthermore, with some very few exceptions (such as Qatar), most regimes of the Middle East witnessed some demonstrations and were confronted with some demands of political change. It is rather clear that not in all cases the demonstrations triggered profound political change, for instance Saudi Arabia. Yet, there are cases in which it is contested whether a “transition to somewhere” is underway. There are strong indicators that in Jordan, for instance, the political agenda is still controlled by the Hashemite elite which sets the reform agenda according to the Lampedusa principle that everything must change in order that nothing change.10 However, Western political actors tend to portray the Hashemite Kingdom as democratizing. Be it because of the convincing democratic rhetoric of the Jordanian regime or the European interest in stabilizing the most reliable Arab security partner to Israel, Jordan enjoys a privileged position in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).11 Transition to somewhere may result in the establishment of a fully-fledged democracy. Yet, it also may end up in re-authoritarianism. Another alternative is that the process of change leads to systems that cannot be attributed clearly to the ideal-types labelled authoritarian or democratic systems: hybrid regimes.12 As long as a “democratization” process does not reach its “final” stage of a consolidated democracy, the “option” of a hybrid regime should be taken into account systematically. As the “Arab Spring” only occurred five years ago, this also applies to Tunisia as the most advanced Arab system in terms of transition. A hybrid regime may be the outcome of a transformation process triggered by the breakdown of an authoritarian regime (as potentially the case in Post- Ben Ali Tunisia) as provoked by “non-systemic” means such as mass demonstrations (and ongoing high degree of political participation efforts) and/or political violence. Yet, a fundamental transformation process may also be triggered as the result of a liberalization process that so-to-speak goes wrong from the perspective of the ruling elite: It is a common strategy among Arab authoritarian regimes to oscillate between periods of liberalization and de-liberalization.13 Liberalization processes embedded in Arab authoritarianism are de-

10 VALBJØRN (see note 6 above); MARTIN BECK and SIMONE HÜSER, Jordan in the “Arab Spring”: no challenge, no change? in: Middle East Critique 24/1 (2015), pp. 83-97. 11 Press Release of the European Commission, EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”. The state-of-play after two years, February 8, 2013, available at: http://europa.eu /rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm. 12 LARRY JAY DIAMOND, Thinking about hybrid regimes, in: Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2012), pp. 21-35. 13 EBERHARD KIENLE, More than a response to Islamism. The political deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, in: The Middle East Journal 52/2 (1998), pp. 219-235.

- 6 - signed and controlled from above and meant to stabilize the authoritarian regime by broadening its social basis.14 Thus, what sometimes looks like a democratization process is rather “authoritarian upgrading,”15 by whose application an authoritarian leadership aims at fostering the existing order. However, in a complex globalized world authoritarian leaderships sometimes miscalculate the side effects of authoritarian upgrading, which inter alia may lead to electoral victories of non-regime parties. The success of the Justice and Development Party in the Moroccan parliamentary elections – which were held early on No- vember 25, 2014, as a result of demonstrations inspired by the “Arab Spring” – has been discussed from this angle.16 However, in comparison to the Moroc- can royal palace, the institutional power of the parliament and the government is so much lower that it appears rather unlikely that Morocco entered the path away from an authoritarian monarchy toward a constitutional monarchy whose king is subordinated to democratic institutions. In several Arab countries – particularly Syria, Yemen, and Libya – the transformation process is accompanied, or even dominated, by a high degree of political violence. In Western analyses, these developments are very often described based on the “failed state” concept: This approach portrays the polity as broken down – the central state fails to deliver security and other services to its citizens. Although the concept catches the crucial issue of the state monop- oly of force and its absence, respectively, it fails to grasp that there are actors that – in the wake of a crumbling central state such as Hafez al-Assad’s Syria – establish new authoritarian orders. Islamic State is often portrayed as a terrorist group – which it certainly also is; yet, it is also a state-like actor which attempts to control a certain territory and its people with coercion and legitimacy. Due to the shocking videos documenting beheadings, it is often overlooked that quite many propaganda videos of Islamic State convey the message of a functioning state providing its citizens with services they need – contrary to the regimes based in Bagdad and Damascus.17 The state-like activities of Islamic

14 MARTIN BECK, Paving the way for democracies or strengthening authoritarianism? Re- forms in the Middle East, in: HENNER FÜRTIG (ed.), The Arab authoritarian regime between reform and persistence, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007, pp. 1-24. 15 STEVEN HEYDEMANN, Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world, in: Saban Cen- ter Analysis Paper 13, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/ files/papers/2007/10/arabworld/10arabworld.pdf. 16 AYMANE SAIDI, The Arab Spring and monarchies. Could Morocco lead the way? in: The Global Observatory, July 18, 2012, available at: http://theglobalobserva- tory.org/2012/07/the-arab-spring-and-monarchies-could-morocco-lead-the-way/. 17 MARGARET COKER and ALEXIS FLYNN, Islamic State tries to show it can govern in Iraq and Syria. Terrorist group’s media machine steps up positive propaganda in its sales pitch describing a utopian state to Muslims, in: The Wall Street Journal, October

- 7 - State indeed do not only encompass exploitation but also include legitimizing activities such as distributing financial means.18

(3) The response of the European Union toward the “Arab Spring” “The EU will develop stronger partnerships and offer greater incentives to countries that make more progress towards democratic reform – free and fair elections, freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, judicial independence, fight against corruption and democratic control over the armed forces.”19 The “more-for-more” approach is based on an overly simple idea of positive conditionality. Due to the complex and conflictive political developments of many Arab systems after the Arab uprisings, the ENP would have been in need of a comprehensive approach, including sophisticated instruments of monitoring and implementation. This would have included developing a concept of how to deal with cases in which the reform agenda of Arab states does not point into the direction of deepening the transition process. The general conditions for developing a comprehensive concept of conditionality are admittedly rather difficult: Deep monitoring and reasonable support of a transition process requires high expertise and the – preferably institutionalized – readiness to be self-restrictive not to abuse conditionality for egoistic self-interests. Moreover, other relevant donors such as the US, Saudi Ara- bia, Qatar inter alia have lesser and/or contradictory standards of conditionality. Yet, critically speaking the European Union failed to improve conditions for conditionality. The main reason why transition processes in Eastern Europe became a success story was that positive conditionality was combined with high incentives: the perspective of full membership. Yet, when it comes to the so- called “neighbourhood” areas beyond its Eastern and Southern borders, the European Union refrained from being engaged with a costly project that could be suitable to set incentives proportionate to conditionality. In the light of these findings, the question arises whether the European Un- ion genuinely acts because of an identity as a civilian power whose policy approach is value-based and that is genuinely interested in promoting democracy.

13, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-a-shift-islamic-state-tries-to- show-it-can-govern-1444779561. 18 The viability of Islamic State, in: The Middle East Online 7 (2015), available at: http://www.themiddleeastmagazine.com/wp-mideastmag-live/2015/07/exclusive- to-the-middle-east-online-the-viability-of-islamic-state/. 19 European Union External Action Service (EEAS), European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm.

- 8 - There are quite some indicators to question that. Conditionality in general is not applied in a coherent way: Particularly in comparison with Jordan and Mo- rocco, Tunisia is much less of a privileged beneficent of ENP as it would be appropriate if the more-for-more principle would be taken seriously. At the same time, the major motive to privilege Jordan appears to be the stabilization of Israel’s most reliable security junior-partner in the Arab world. Furthermore, European support in general and financial assistance in particularly has increased toward Tunisia.20 However, many activities, particularly the mobility partnership formally established in March 2014, serve security interests – as unilaterally defined by the European Union – to a much higher degree as Tu- nisian development interests.21 In many cases, factual foreign policies of the European Union can be made better sense of when applying approaches based on the idea that political actors in the international system pursue egoistic self-interests rather than spreading democratization. In foreign relations on crucial policy fields securitized by the European Union – such as migration and refugees – the European Union pri- oritizes its “security needs” over the Arab needs of developing human capital.22 In its economic and trade policy toward the Mediterranean South, the Euro- pean Union often acts like a “trading state”23, thereby taking advantage of the socio-economic development gap between Europe as part of the Global North and the Arab world as part of the Global South.

20 European Commission (see note 11 above). 21 PETER SEEBERG, Mobility Partnerships and the EU, Part II. The Cases of Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, in: Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark, July 2014, available at: http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/D/5/E/%7BD 5E8A7CB-EBFB-4B54-9B0F-6BFAAFE78F5D%7D060714_Mobility_Seeberg2.pdf. 22 For the concept of securitization, see BARRY BUZAN, OLE WÆVER, and JAAP DE WILDE, Security. A new framework for analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 23 Cf. RICHARD ROSECRANCE, Trading states in a new concert of Europe, in: HELGA HAFTENDORN and CHRISTIAN TUSCHHOFF (ed.), America and Europe in an era of change, Boulder: Westview, 1993, pp. 127-146.

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Dr Abdulrahman Al Salimi (Masqat, Oman)

To help us understand these challenges it might be useful to take note of the historian-philosopher Fernand Braudel’s (1902–1985) observation that Eu- rope’s southern border is not the Mediterranean but the Sahara. If we bear this in mind, we will be able to get a clearer idea of the challenges that are faced by the Arab world and the Middle East along with Europe especially during the last decades. In brief, these may be summarized as follows:

Firstly: The main challenges faced by the Arab world over the past forty years: A – There has been massive demographic change, particularly in that section of the population between the ages of fifteen and thirty. In most Arab states, this group now accounts for around 60% of the total. This has resulted in – or been accompanied by – a deterioration in the quality of services, with millions of young people of school age not attending school, worsening economic conditions and transport facilities and, inevitably, high unemployment. Experts es- timate that a hundred million job opportunities will need to be created over the next twenty or thirty years. This situation has led to widespread and deeply rooted social unrest that cannot be controlled by repression and strong-arm security measures. It has also resulted in mass migration in search of work in Europe and less accessible parts of the world, particularly the Gulf States. With the spread of unrest in 2011, millions of people left their countries to seek a better future. According to United Nations estimates, some five million people have moved to countries outside their region over the past five years, while around fifteen million have migrated within the region. Therefore, the demographic challenge of the Arab world has taken on global proportions. In this connection, we should note that: (1) In its “second phase”, i.e. in the post-Cold-War period, the Arab nation- state has shown itself incapable of managing its affairs competently or protecting its territory. This has led to serious upheavals that have threatened its domestic security and laid it open to aggression from beyond its borders. (2) This has had a number of significant consequences, including the problem of refugees. We are all aware of the 1948 and 1967 Palestinian refugees and we have observed how the Lebanese Civil War and the Iraq-Iran War further

- 10 - exacerbated the refugee problem. Then during the post-Cold War period we have also seen Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990, followed in the later 1990s by chaos in Somalia, civil wars in Algeria and Sudan and, [from the beginning of the present century], the US occupation of Iraq and its aftermath. Moreover, since February 2011 there has been the so-called Arab Spring – a series of events that continue to this day. One major consequence of all this has been a new Arab refugee problem, the impact of which can be seen on both sides of the Mediterranean, generating a heated debate between Europe, the Arab world and the Middle East. B – Failure to give due attention to training and education is one of the major reasons why governments have been unable to face up to the demographic challenge - a challenge which came to a head in 2011 in those Arab countries that were ruled by “security” and military regimes. Several of these states descended into chaos and violence, to which their rulers responded with harsh and repressive counter-measures. After 2011, the situation became even more anarchic, and this has continued to be the case in most Arab countries apart from the Gulf Co-operation Council states. Even today - in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring - governments are still unable to get to grips with the problems. There are still disagreements over the way forward and issues such as citizenship and democracy, so that the Arab people today find themselves caught between two opposing poles - the military and the Islamist political parties. This has created economic, political and educational paralysis, resulting in crushed hopes and rising levels of violence. C – Religious extremism has also contributed to the rise in violence. Islam appears to be exploding from within and its societies seem to be disintegrating under intense and savage pressures, which are assailing them from two direc- tions: violence on the part of the authorities and religious violence. As the public and their rulers have become increasingly unable to respond positively to each other and work together in a fruitful and constructive way, certain young people have begun to carry out acts of violence in the name of religion under the pretext of replacing the existing brutal (yet at the same time powerless) nation-state regimes with religious rule. This religious revival has produced violent conflict, because the religious parties follow extremist ideologies – as exemplified by al-Qaʽeda, the Taliban and Daʽesh. D – A further challenge lies in the dysfunctional nature of the Arabs’ regional and international relations and the fact that there is a “strategic vacuum”. States have become increasingly incapable of exercising sovereignty over their territories. The United States has intervened twice in Iraq and now it is inter- vening for a third time in Iraq and Syria to fight Daʽesh in partnership with an

- 11 - Arab and international coalition. Meanwhile, regional states such as Iran and Tur- key have intervened directly or indirectly in various Arab countries and continue to do so. These interventions are designed either to uphold regional or international security, or to establish or extend spheres of influence in the Arab world. Following Russia’s direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, the Middle East’s problems have now taken on a global dimension involving a range of different players, and this has made a complex situation even more convoluted, particularly when it also involves the settling of scores between the big powers. E – National identities are disintegrating in the Arab world, which is a multi- ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural region. A rift occurred between the Muslims and Jews after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948; later, this also happened between the Muslims and Christians, and then between the Muslims themselves as a consequence emerging of religious radicalism and sectarian conflict. In the present situation, the diversity of races and creeds, which has char- acterised the Arab world and the Near East for five thousand years, is now making it hard for the different peoples of the region to unite and live together in harmony.

Secondly: The main changes in the Arab world of today. As we pointed out earlier, during its “second phase” (i.e. [post-] Cold War) the Arab nation-state has shown itself incapable of managing its affairs competently or protecting its territory. There are several factors at work here:  The Arab League was established after the Second World War in 1945, but over the past three decades, it has been ineffective in representing Arab interests, particularly since the signing of the Camp David Agreement 1978. This has led to deepening rifts between Arab states, mainly over two issues: firstly, over international co-operation and, secondly, in relations with international organisations at a time when the global trend is towards the creation of international blocs. While most organisations such as the European Union and the Latin-American bloc have been able to adopt common positions and policies, the Arab League has become increasingly disunited and ineffective and its problems have consequently worsened. There have been no moves to reform it or come up with a new vision on ways of improving it; nor is there any alternative to it such as another international body.  Following the departure of the colonial powers, the Arab development models have been flawed. The period of “economic liberation” and limited “political openness” in most Arab countries in the 1980s and 1990s benefited elites who were even more heavy-handed and domineering than their prede- cessors. This “warped openness” enabled personal, bureaucratic and parasitic

- 12 - interests to flourish in a climate of privatisation and distorted liberalism, thus creating ideal opportunities for crony capitalism and the burgeoning of sudden, illicit wealth. There was an upsurge of corruption in political and economic life as well as in administrative practices and social relations. With the growing wealth enjoyed by those classes with close ties to the regimes, the gap between the rich minority and the politically and economically marginalised poor (who formed the overwhelming majority) grew ever wider.  After five decades of botched and thoughtlessly improvised economic policies, it has become difficult for the economic observer to determine whether the systems of production in the Arab states today are feudal, capitalist or socialist. This is because they manage to combine elements of all three, thereby creating a mysterious modus operandi that defies classical definition. At the same time, while centralised production is a pivotal element of the economies of several Arab states, the macro-economic indicators show that they lack a solid industrial sector. Instead, the Arab economies are generally based on a centralised “productive-agricultural structure” built round narrow tribal and clan identities. Meanwhile, the petroleum producing countries are dependent upon oil royalty payments and variations on this kind of practice - i.e. the “royalty payment system” – have become common in the other non-oil Arab states.

SENATOR HASAN ABU NIMAH (Amman, Jordan)

It is not possible to speak of a European or an Arab/Middle Eastern position with respect to the Syrian crisis as various countries on each side not only have different policies, but contradictory attitudes towards the crisis. This awkward situation on both sides has been primarily responsible for the stalemate, the lack of progress for reaching a political settlement and the escalation.

- 13 - There are European countries -Britain, France with US support- that insist that any possible political compromise for resolving the Syrian conflict should not allow any role for president Assad in any such compromise. They, as well as some Arab states –mainly Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates in addition to Turkey- exclude any possibility of any kind of political settlement or even negotiation of a settlement before president Assad steps down. Each side has been supplying their militias in the battlefield with weapons, money and additional volunteers. Each side was encouraging their clients in the Syrian opposition not to moderate their positions. Each side was actually hoping to win the war. But that proved not to be possible and the tragic result is more destruction, rising death toll mainly of innocent Syrians and millions of refugees and dis- placed Syrian families inside and across the Syrian border to neighbouring countries. The more serious consequence of the prolonged war, however, was the rise of significant terrorist groups in Syria, spreading quickly into Iraq and in other Arab countries as far as Libya and Yemen. Da’esh is not the only one. Al-Nusra, also powerful in Syria, is also linked to Al Qaeda. In the summer of 2014, forces of Da’esh managed in matter of days if not hours, to overrun the entire province of Nineveh in Iraq occupying its capital of Mosul following the instant collapse of the Iraqi army there. Da’esh also controls large areas in Syria after establishing Al Raqqa as its provincial capital. The barbaric atrocities they committed against Christians and other ethnic and religious minorities in both Syria and Iraq were barely enough to make the external powers in the Arab world or in the West rearrange their priorities. The complexity of the Syrian political as well as military theatre rendered impossible any talk of an internal Syrian political crisis between the regime and a home-grown opposition demanding democratization and reform as the case was at the very beginning. The Syrian government claim, when unrest started peacefully in the southern town of Der’a, that there was a foreign conspiracy to destabilize the country, manufactured by foreign powers, and that the country was under attack from foreign groups armed and financed by those powers, proved eventually to be self-fulfilling prophesy. The situation now in Syria is just that. Obviously, there is Syrian opposition but it is hardly united behind a national project for reform. The lines between what is Syrian, what is foreign, what is outright terrorist and chaotic, what is opportunist and what relates to regional power struggle are hard to detect. In Syria, there are many players, many conflicting interests and many out of any control fighting factions. As earlier indicated, Middle Eastern countries are sharply divided over the Syrian situation. Iran, another significant regional power along with Iraq, Hez- bollah in Lebanon and Russia, is totally on the Syrian regime side helping Syria

- 14 - militarily and financially. The rest of the Arab countries, other than those directly and deeply involved - Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar- are wavering in accordance with their interests and inclinations, not only with Syria, but also with the other Arab or even the other foreign countries concerned. Right from the very beginning Jordan has been calling for a political settlement in Syria; a settlement that takes into consideration the legitimate rights of the Syrian people, the unity the stability and the territorial integrity of the country. Jordan has repeatedly warned against the possible complications and the serious consequences of prolonged fighting and all the Jordanian fears have been proven right. The Syrian crisis has placed Jordan, right from the beginning, before serious challenges that required costly extensive precautions. It is not only the humanitarian responsibilities that the Jordanian government and the Jordanian people had to cope with when no less than 1.3 million Syrian refugees crossed into Jordan, not only seeking safety but eventually a full scale program of services including in addition to decent shelter, food, health care, education as well as all the other services a community of this size requires. All that was needed was fully done despite the scarcity of the Jordanian means and the meagre international help. The humanitarian load continues to increase. But the other challenge relates to security with the Jordanian border with Syria long and exposed. There were repeated attempts by terrorist to infiltrate into Jordan but were instantly detected and destroyed. Both tasks, the security and the humanitarian, are heavy on a Jordanian strained economy. All attempts and pressures to lure Jordan to consider active involvement in the fighting have failed. Jordan is against any attempt to settle the war militarily in favour of reasonable political compromise. I am not going to give a detailed account of why Russia, Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah are throwing all their political and military weight behind the Syrian regime, quite determined, no matter what the price is, not to allow the regime to fall, because I am sure that is all clear. Russia does not want to abandon its only naval base on the Mediterranean; Iran is a traditional ally of both the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, the existence of which would be seriously threatened if the Assad regime falls; Iraq is aligned with both Iran and Syria. It might be much more difficult to explain the positions of those other countries who are spending tens of billions of dollars on a war the sole purpose of which is to topple the Assad regime. It is hard to believe that it is in favour of either democratization or reform. It is amazing that despite the destruction and the ongoing human tragedy the position of such countries has not been changed. If the Syrian state is to be dismantled, the way Iraq did in the aftermath of the US-led war on the country in 2003 the entire region will sink into

- 15 - perpetual chaos for decades to come. Should we all not learn from what happened in Iraq and is now happening in Libya and Yemen? Let me now say few words about the Iranian deal with the five plus one that President Obama was strongly behind despite stiff Israeli resistance. Jordan supported the deal in the hope that it would reduce much of the chronic tension in the region. I personally thought that when Iran is brought back to the family of nations, when dealt with as a respected state, not as part of the “axis of evil” and when engaged in meaningful and objective dialogue with former adversaries, it would act differently and far more responsibly than when under constant threat of attack from Israel and its western supporters. This still is my hope. But on the other hand, some Arab countries saw the deal as a serious swing of American policy towards Iran at the very expense of US Arab allies. There is no question that the Saudi concerns over a more aggressive Iranian interventionist policy in the region following the deal and the lifting of sanctions. If Iran was able to spread its influence in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iraq while under strict sanctions and threats, how much more could it achieve once sanctions and threats were removed, became a very pressing question. The deal did harden the positions of the Arab countries that opposed Assad lest Syria would also fall into Iranian hands. The possibility of a more pragmatic Iranian policy towards Syria in favour of a political settlement was outweighed by the heightened fears of the Arab countries that see the impending Iranian political expansion in the region as the prime threat. On what Europe could do to help, we see a clear European role from a Jordanian perspective. We have been repeatedly warning that chaos in Syria, indeed now all over the region, and the rising threat of terrorism, is not to remain confined to the Middle East. Eventually we cautioned it will head in the direction of Europe and most depressingly, we have seen examples. We hope that the EU or individual European countries would see the creeping danger and help efforts towards a quick peaceful settlement that keeps Syrian institutions functioning while planning for major reforms in the country. But the first step all ought to join hands to achieve is to end the war, eradicate terror and negotiate a deal. Europe could also help the Syrian neighbours, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan cope with the refugee issue, which, if remains unresolved, could affect the stability of those countries. At the moment there are three active wars raging in the region; one in Yemen, the other in Libya and the third is in Syria. The prospects for ending any of them seem rather slim. It is in the interest of every other nation in the Middle East, in Europe and elsewhere to end the fighting. Otherwise, other countries could be affected and that should be avoided at any cost.

- 16 - The good news is that Jordan remains stable and safe. I did, in our previous session, brief you on the factors that helped us in Jordan stay away from trouble. I mentioned the wise role of the Jordanian leadership; the efficiency and the capability of the security forces; the maturity of the Jordanian population and their unity behind their Hashemite leaders. One other important factor is that reform in Jordan is seen as an ongoing process. As in any other modern country, we continue to update our legislation to remain compatible with the changing trends and the developing requirements of mature democracies. In the last few years, much has been done and much more awaits promulgation. What is unique about Jordan is that King Abdullah has been leading the process of reform. He constantly urges the executive authority to speed up the process of constitutional and political reform towards a parliamentary system based on strong political parties and regular alternation of power amongst them. Despite severe economic difficulties resulting mostly from the impact of external crises, Jordan managed to protect its territory and maintain its stability. The challenges nevertheless remain high and one hopes they would not keep intensifying. One last word about the blocked situation between the Palestinian Author- ity and Israel. The last US-sponsored attempt to prolong the negotiations between the two sides had miserably failed, mainly due to Israel’s intransigence. Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu has refused any advice from its best allies in the US and Europe to stop building illegal settlements on occupied Palestinian land so that talks can be resumed. Israel is in no mood for serious negotiations towards a peaceful settlement preferring instead to create irreversi- ble facts on the ground to colonize as much of the Palestinian land as possible rendering the two-state solution as an empty slogan. Apparently, Israeli leaders are encouraged by the prevailing chaos in neighbouring Arab countries believ- ing that it would eventually translate in their favour. It is the exact opposite. Israel will be equally harmed if the uncertainty continues. The Palestinian individual knife attacks against Israelis are just the beginning of what could be a widespread uprising. The status quo could not be kept forever. The Palestinians will not put up with the occupation and its cruel practices indefinitely. I am sorry to end by saying that the situation is dangerous and the hopes of any breakthrough in any of the cries soon are very slight.

- 17 -

Dr Naseef Naeem (Berlin, Germany)

Lots of books and articles have been written already about the phenomenon called “Islamic State” (IS) or Daesh – according to its Arabic acronym (al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi’l-‘Iraq wa’l-Sham), so that it could be thought and asked: Is there anything, let alone anything new, that can be added to what already has been written and said about IS or Daesh? This is certainly not the case. Nevertheless, in order to avoid mere repetition, it seems to me appropriate and necessary to do something else in this presentation and (1) focus especially on questions, which thus far have not been raised and sufficiently answered, and (2) try to discuss them in the wider context of topics related to the concept of state in general. Otherwise than usually practiced when presenting papers at conference tables, I will share with you my ideas in a rather unsystematically way referring here and there to discussions and opinions held and expressed by others and likewise trying to interpret them in the context of the general question mentioned in the headline of this paper, i.e. whether the Islamic State (IS) is a state in the sense state is understood in theory and practice of the state in our time. Therefore, most issues discussed here have their point of departure in the concept of state as developed in political sciences and constitutional law.

1. First Question: What is the Islamic State (IS)? The general question: What IS is, could be asked also in other ways, e.g., should or could we understand the IS as a state-like construct? This question may be paradox, because according to the self-definition of those representing IS, the IS is a state: al-Dawla al-Islamiyya. However, should we accept this self-definition? Or to put it in another way: We have to ask and check, whether the attributes generally accepted as criteria of what o state, a state system is can be found also in the IS? In the theory of state, we speak about three elements or attributes of the state, which any socio-political system should display in order to be defined as state. These three are: state territory, state people, and state power.

2. Does the Islamic State have an “IS State Territory”? The first visible element of any state system is the state territory, a territory within clearly defined borders. On this basis, we may raise the question whether the territory controlled by IS, is a state territory in the sense of the accepted definition. Actually, the IS-territory covers a large area in the North-western

- 18 - part of Iraq and East and North of Syria. This is what we all know. But it is a matter of fact that this so-called “IS-Territory” is not originally an “IS-Terri- tory”, but consists of territories that are part of the state territories of two different and independent states: Iraq and Syria. If we go further with this question, we can say that the IS occupied territories belonging to Syria and Iraq and established a new state system on these territories according to its self-definition. Remarkably, the IS does not only not deny the fact of occupation until now, but also claims that – quoting the words of one of its leaders – “it does not have borders, only frontiers”. Therefore, if we (would) accept that the IS established a new state system with/on its own new territory previously being part of the two states Syria and Iraq, we would accept and recognize two as important as distinct legal features: (1) We would recognize occupation as an accepted means in international law to establish a state system. If we do not want to speak about international law, because of all the problems and examples existing in that regard, including, e.g., Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, we could speak about occupation as a state sponsored instrument used in international politics or political relationships, which is highly problematic. (2) Even more important: in the end, we would accept the violation of integrity and disregard of sovereignty of both states Iraq and Syria in their current form and, thus, the end of their present statehood. Even though one may argue that the end of both states could be a first step to the solution of many problems in the region, in this time it would be more than problematic to agree to the end of both of them even theoretically, let alone practically. To the contrary, it seems that the international community wants to do everything to keep the unity and integrity of both states. In addition to that, the acceptance of occupation would send the signal it is an appropriate instrument to change the territorial map of the states entirely, which is not compatible with the international law and politics. A completely different question is whether the IS itself is inclined to, and aims at, defining its presently held territory (within its current “borders”) as its state territory? In that context, it was, and still is, remarkable that fundamentalist Islamic movements like Boko Haram in Nigeria, the IS in Yemen and in Afghanistan and others, declared, that they are belonging to IS and are part of it, thus not only claiming, but proving that they see their territories automatically as part of IS state territory, irrespective of the fact that the distance between the IS state- territory and the territories on which these movements are operating, is thousands of kilometres.

- 19 - In view of all this, it is very difficult and problematic to see in the territories occupied by IS its state territory in the sense a state territory is defined in political sciences. Therefore, the answer to the question “does IS have an ‘IS state territory’?” is simply and definitely “no”.

(3) Are the People living under the Islamic State an “IS State People”? This is likewise a very question difficult to be answered, because it is related to another very important question, which is: Do all people living under IS domination, belong to IS in a way that they might be regarded as “IS state people”, like all other IS fighters from all over the world, or only the IS-leaders? This leads to a next set of questions. We could argue, like in the case of territory, which means: The same way, we reject occupation to be an instrument to establish rule over people, we now reject that IS’s conquests and occupation of Iraqi and Syrian territories put an end to the Iraqi and Syrian belonging and identity of those people living on the former, now IS occupied territories of both countries. Considering this question further, we may, and should, ask: Does that mean that we have to do now with two kinds and groups of people living under IS: people, who accept IS and feel belonging to it, and people, who do not belong, and do not want to belong, to IS, but simply are living there? Is it possible to differentiate between both kinds and groups of people? And what are the criteria for this differentiation? On the other hand, when discussing the state character of the IS and raising the question whether there is a kind of relationship between the people under IS and IS that could be compared to something like citizenship?, it cannot, and should not, be overlooked that IS is treating the people under its domination as its “citizens”, collecting taxes from them in the form of Zakat, rendering public service for them, providing electricity and the like. All this gives evidence for the notion that the IS regards and recognizes the people living on its territory as its people, its citizens. However, does all that suffice at the beginning of the 21st century to see in these “practical” issues sufficient proof for recognizing the relationship between the people and IS as citizenship? Or in other words, can the concept of citizenship be limited in our time to the existence of o merely formal relationships between citizens and the state, such as paying taxes and receiving public services? Certainly not. Therefore, we have to emphasize here that the concept of state in political sciences clearly and unmistakably maintains that the relationship between people and state cannot be limited to the aforementioned formal aspects of the relationship. In addition to them, the modern concept of citizenship is also based on the following three additional criteria, which should be included and taken into consideration here. These three are: justice, security

- 20 - and personal as well as political freedoms. Needles to add, I think, that personal and political freedoms, as understood in the West, are just not there under the IS. And what about security or justice that people do have under the IS? They can be tortured and murdered at any time for whatever word spoken or action taken. If anybody now argues that many of the personal and political freedoms, justice and/or security are not existent in many other countries either, which nevertheless are recognized in theory and practice – without discussion and hesitation – as states, e.g., Saudi Arabia, I would answer that the time has come to differentiate between states and states and separate them into two categories according to the accepted criteria of statehood and citizenship, i.e., into a “club of states” and a “club of non-states”. That means that all that do not display the accepted level of political and personal freedoms and do not comply with the accepted criteria of security and justice according to our western understanding and standards, should be counted among those belonging to the club of non-states. In view of, and based on, the aforementioned essential criteria and standards of statehood and citizenship, we may clearly say that the relationship between IS and the people living on its territory is definitely not to be defined as citizenship. Therefore, the answer to the question, whether the people living under IS are “IS state people”, definitely cannot be, but “no”.

(4) Is the Islamic State itself a “State Power”? Further to what has been discussed before (i.e., the occupation of territory as a way to build up state power, thus ending at the same time the state power of Iraq and Syria over Western Iraq and North-Eastern Syria), the recognition of IS as state power would imply that we understand all actions taken by IS as “actions within the framework of its state legality” according to the modern state theory, or in other words, as “actions” proving their lawfulness by virtue of their conformity to the state’s legal statute The term legal is used here in a rather abstract way, either in a negative sense or in positive one. Is this possible? To be sure, this question here is not related to the international standard, but based only on the understanding of the normative construction of the state. It is linked directly to the question of the constitutionality of the IS, and/or of the “IS powers”. In this same context, it is to be asked too, what the system (and government) of the IS is: a republican or a monarchic? a presidential or a parliamentary one? or something completely different? According to the IS declaration, the IS claims to be a Caliphate with the Koran being its legal basis. In other words, IS does not define itself as a state power in the modern sense, but as a “traditional Islamic power” and as a kind of “traditional Islamic governmental form” (The Caliphate). This implies that

- 21 - it is impossible to use the modern constitutional state or the legality in the modern state as reference point against which the traditional governmental form of the IS can be measured and evaluated. On the other side, the self- definition of the IS as Caliphate includes that the IS cannot be considered as a republic nor as a monarchy, and its form of government is neither a presidential nor a parliamentary one. Bearing these well-known facts in mind, we now have to ask, what is the legitimization system of power under the rule of the IS? It is definitely neither election (no-one in power is elected) nor dynastical inheritance (those in power are self-appointed). Those exercising power in the IS are dealing with all issues on its territory by way of practicing a kind of unlimited absolutism. There are no limits for any action set in advance nor norms, which obligate the IS powers / IS leaders to do something or not to do it. However, it should be noticed that IS powers / IS leaders pretend to apply and implement Islamic norms as setting the limits for all aspects of live under the rule of the IS. And not only that, for each and every IS fighter claims to be entitled to act according to his or her own belief or according to his or her own interpretation of religious norms etc. Everything is being done in order to implement his or her own personal understanding and interpretation of Islamic norms and traditions. Since the absolutism is practiced in the IS not only on the highest level of the IS hierarchy, but on all levels down to the ordinary fighters, the ruling system of the IS can best be described as an “asymmetrical absolutism of power”. The fundamental, underlying principles of IS ruling system are a combination of non-constitutionalism, non-Legality, no direct or indirect legitimization of power, no known constitutional systems like republic or monarchy. In view of all that, there is no way to understand and identify the IS as “State Power”.

(5) Résumé Based on what has been discussed very briefly in this short paper, I finally would like to state that the IS definitely does not display any state criteria. It is definitely not a state in the sense of theory and practice of the state according as accepted and agreed among political scientists. This brings us to the con- cluding question which is still not answered yet, namely: If the IS is definitely not a state, what is it, then? Summarizing the aforementioned, my answer to this question can be short: • The Islamic State is – above all – an occupying power. • Since the power exercised by the IS is directed against people, against nature, historical monuments, against everything under its domination, it is a kind of unlimited hegemony.

- 22 - • Being permanently at war against Syria and Iraq as well as other states, the IS appears as a warrior state, • Fighting permanently not only against soldiers or armies of these other states and countries, but no less fiercely also against civilians. • Considering the recruitment policy of the IS, and recognizing the fact that other Islamic extremist and terrorist groups avowed loyalty to it, it could be stated, that the IS sees itself as a permanently expanding power, which does not know of geographical borders. Therefore, the IS eventually could be defined as a hegemonic occupying power with boundless territory being at permanent war against all other states, countries and people that do not recognize its ultimate superiority.

Prof Dr MOHAMED A. AL SHARQAWI (Cairo, Egypt / Madinah, KSA)

First of all, I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Prof. Dr. Stefan Schreiner, the EAF coordinator and well-known religions scholar of the Uni- versity of Tubingen, for inviting me to participate in the international conference, which took place in Zurich from the 6th to the 9th of September 2015, and I would like to thank him for giving me the chance to contribute in the conference publication with a paper.. My concise paper aims to shed light on the current events in the Middle East and North Africa and the relations between Europe and South the Medi- terranean in the past and present in order to unearth new constructive thoughts which can lead to applicable plans and strategies capable of building relations between both parties which are based on integration and cooperation. Such relations can help the peoples of both parties to live in peace, stability and prosperity which are unlikely to happen for one side without the other, because of geographic and demographic factors which left no chance but a common fate for both sides.

- 23 - The interactions between Europe and the South Mediterranean region has been present since a very long time, there has always been constructive and peaceful cooperation among the different nations living around the Mediterra- nean, this cooperation has contributed significantly to the development of the human civilization. On the other hand, it is also noticed that there has been some kind of negative contact which was also present for long times, the main observation on this negative contact was that it was related to the flow of power; whenever a state or a party enjoyed some power, it tended to expand its dominance and its reign over other nations. Such expansions have been witnessed with the Car- thage Empire, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Umayyad Em- pire, the Crusades, the Ottoman Empire the European Imperialism, and in other occasions. Such negative and violent contact has always caused unfortunate events and resulted in innocent victims, and finally yet importantly, it created an impassioned relation between Europe and the South Mediterranean region based on this historical rivalry. It is very important to highlight the fact that the tensions between North (Europe) and the South (North Africa and Levant) of the Mediterranean have been older than the appearance of both Christianity and Islam.(1) Thus, it is inaccurate to claim that Religion is the reason behind the historical and current tensions across the Mediterranean; however, Religion has been occasionally used as a cover for the ambitions of expansion from several empires on both sides (North and South). The importance of taking into consideration that Re- ligion is not the main cause behind the tensions is to face the claims of some people who argue that as long as there are religious differences between the different nations of the Mediterranean, there will always be tensions and unrest, (indicating to the historical rivalry between the Christian North and the Muslim South. Such arguments weaken and impede the hopes of finding harmony and peace across the Mediterranean because their claims imply that as long as the religion difference is present, tensions will subsist, while in fact, abandoning of Religion by the people is impossible. The last straightforward scene of the alternate dominance seeking across the Mediterranean was the colonialism era, in which, Imperialist Europe colo- nized the south Mediterranean region, but what distinguished this experience than the previous ones, was the everlasting effect it caused, and how Europe have ended this era in a way which guarantees the continuation of its influence and its indirect interference in the affairs of the liberated nations.(2) And when I say Europe in this context, I mean the Governments and the ruling elites, as we must differentiate between the governments’ negative Machiavellian attitude and the positive and ethical attitude of the vast majority of the European

- 24 - peoples and civil society which in many cases showed marvellous leadership by being more caring for the interests of the south Mediterranean peoples than the elite and the rulers of those peoples. The negative role that Europe has played in the South Mediterranean region in the colonial and post-colonial period was manifested in the unjustified interference in the internal affairs of that region, and in the evil operations that some of the European intelligence agencies have executed against their neighbours. Many of such operations were later revealed by the European agencies themselves; they included political assassinations, stimulating wars and conflicts, providing coverage for financial corruption, backing corrupted rulers, warlords and war criminals, and other things.(3) The Sykes-Pico agreement, which divided the south-eastern area of the Mediterranean between the European Ma- jor Powers as areas of influence was an important reason for the Balfour promise and the unjust founding of the state of Israel which caused a serious human tragedy that millions of people are suffering from till today. This attitude from some of the European governments was arrogant, completely against the human rights, and contradicting with the moral values. And in the recent times, when many things seemed to be changed and improved, and the collective mind of the Mediterranean Arab intellectuals started to believe that Europe has changed in a way that the colonial and postcolonial attitude was just history, unfortunately, everybody got surprised from the way Eu- rope dealt with the Arab spring and its subsequent events. In this regard, I would like to discuss five points: the cooperation, alliance and sometimes subordination of Europe to the United States, the recognition and welcoming of the dictatorships that countered the Arab spring, the repression of the moderate Islamic political parties and groups, the immigration problem across the Mediterranean, and finally the problematic growth and evolution of terrorism in the Arab Mediterranean countries and its implications. Obviously, after the Second World War, the power of the United States and its international influence has significantly increased. Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, the United States nearly manipulated the scene and I don’t think that it is necessary to talk about the various negativities of this manipulation and its catastrophic consequences. What was really disappointing to the Arab peoples was that in most of the cases, Europe was allying or following the United States, and in the best cases not opposing it. I believe that this did not only affect the south Mediterranean region, but it also affected Europe itself in a negative manner, while the United States was apart from such effects due to geographic and demographic reasons. As we are witnessing the dawn for the end of the United States manipulation and the unipolar world order, we hope that Europe would act in a different way in this regard, and to give priority

- 25 - to the common interests with the Mediterranean nations and this will inevitably have a very positive and constructive return on both parties. We have recently seen the apology of the former prime minister of the United Kingdom about his country’s role in invading Iraq,(4) and his admitting that this invasion was based on lies, and that it was the main reason behind the formation of Isis. Mr. Blair’s partial apology is the price for turning Iraq into a failed state, death of more than one million innocent Iraqis, displacement of millions, creation of Isis with all its catastrophic consequences, and much more. I suggest that this is a very important lesson for all the other European countries in disapproving the unfair policies of the United States and resisting it robustly. I appreciate the German and French stand against the Iraqi war, however it was not strong enough to make any change, and most of the people in the Arab world believe that their position was a political show more than of a real opposition. After about 13 years now, Germany and France are suffering from the outcomes of the rise of Isis –which were obviously one of the outcomes of the Invasion of Iraq- in the form of the Syrian immigration crisis and the unfortunate radicalization of some of the European Muslim youth, much more than both Britain and the United States themselves, who led the war. A very important and crucial note which must be mentioned in this context, is that the West (including Europe) has always been a main source of weapons and arms for the very same dictatorships that they decide to crush later on (5), such as both the Iraqi Saddam Hussein’s Regime before the sanctions, or the Libyan Muammar Al Qaddafi’s army which was equipped by German, French, Italian and other European arms(6) This paradox is has never been understood by the Arab people, and they compare it to the master who keeps haying one of his sheep till a certain point, for some reasons, decide to slaughter it. Appar- ently, the only losers in this are the Arab peoples, whether for being ruled for decades under dictators, or for having to bear turmoil and the unstable situation that follows the Western interference or the natural expiry of Western backed dictatorial regimes such as Mubarak’s regime in Egypt. The Arab spring has clearly shown how eager are the peoples of the South Mediterranean nations to live in democratic states and enjoy the same level of freedom and integrity like the one their northern neighbours enjoy. The youth and the middle class faced the dangers of the suppression and the brutality of security forces of their dictatorships, thousands lost their lives as a result of this confrontation, and nothing countered their efforts but the big gap in the capa- bilities between the revolutionists and the rich deep state which led the counter revolution. Another important point, which if addressed can significantly improve the relation between the Mediterranean neighbours, is the continuing support and

- 26 - recognition for the dictatorships which led counter revolutions in some of the Arab countries,(7) till today and after the Arab spring. There were noble and respectful stances from some European politicians such as The Speaker of the German parliament, Norbert Lammert, who cancelled his meeting with the Egyptian President on the basis that there is nothing to discuss, given Egypt's lack of democratic progress.(8) But these noble stances in fact highlight how Machiavellian are the other stances that recognized and welcomed such dictatorial regimes which according to the international and even European democratic standards deserve to be sanctioned if not taken to court. What was very obvious and clear to both the Arab and European political analysts is that Eu- rope welcomed those dictators for the sake of the economic benefits of Eu- rope. Several European newspapers commented on the buying of French war- ships by Egypt saying: “Egypt saves France’s budget by an arms deal”,(9) and the same economical motives also drove Germany even – despite the fact that its economy is doing well - and Spain earlier, and England later. Such attitude from the European governments destroys trust between the Arab Mediterra- nean peoples and Europe and makes them think that the European politics is not based on values or morals but only on the same economic benefits and wealth creation motives that were behind the crusades and the imperialism earlier. Especially when democracy is not important for the West, the NATO, and Europe except in the countries which have oil, such as Iraq and Libya. In several cases, the Arab spring resulted in moderate Islamic parties winning the elections in a democratic way. Regardless of whether those parties were the best choice or not, it is a fact that they have reached power through democratic elections which the world witnessed it probity. The counter revolutions which resulted in new dictatorships crushed the moderate Islamic parties and left millions of Islamists, who only few years back voted for the Islamic parties, between either despair about the future and feelings of discouragement or replacing the ballot by the bullet, losing their faith in democracy and thinking that violence is the only way for justice. Europe’s attitude towards this situation was very passive, Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief did not even criticize the military coup, and she was even trying to put pressure on the Democratically Elected former president to step down (10). It is now evident and proved by trial that the West does not support or even want the Arab countries of Middle East and North African countries to be democratic. Noam Chomsky expresses this opinion when he says: “The West Is Terrified of Arab Democracies”. And, unfortunately, the South Mediterranean nations, whether Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon or Syria, regardless of their ideologies, are very convinced that their neighbours in Europe want to monopolize the welfare of democracy

- 27 - for themselves, and are very eager to keep their neighbours in the south under dictatorial regimes, full of corruption, which benefits Europe significantly. I have heard, in many occasions, from Arab political activists, students, and common people, that the scenario happening in the region is: first the supports the dictators in the Arabian area, then when the uprisings and revolutions happen against those dictators opening an opportunity for democracy, the west support the counter revolutions and contribute in restoring the dictatorships but with new faces, as a result, extremism grows and terrorist groups appear, this opens the door to more intervention from the west under the excuse that this terrorism may affect Europe, and also opens the door for more support for the repressive dictatorships. This level of lack of trust between the two groups is not a healthy indication, and must be fixed. Regarding the illegal immigration problem from the south to the north, we cannot claim that it is a result of the turmoil and instability in the southern countries, because this phenomenon has been there long before the Arab spring and its related events. But we can assure, with no doubt that the turmoil, especially in Syria, has caused an ascertainable increase in the numbers of the immigrants and consequently in the number of the victims. This problem has three major complexities. First, the human tragedy which it causes, and the huge number of victims who sell everything they own in order to reach Europe but most of them end drowning in the Mediterranean Sea. The second complexity is the social and economic pressure that it causes to Europe. And the third complexity is its negative effect on the relations between the peoples of the South and the North. Putting into consideration that the West (with Europe representing its half) is playing an important role in preserving dictatorship, tyranny, corruption which leads to poverty and insecurity, and adding to this that people from the South are drowning while trying to flee to Europe itself, this further spoils the relationship between the neighbours, especially with the rise of the Islamopho- bia, the White supremacy groups, and the Anti-Islamic movements which are aggressively criticizing the immigration based upon hatred propaganda. On the other hand, a great responsibility lies on the Islamic society leaders in Europe, who in some cases are affiliated to big religious institutions in the South, and this makes the responsibility common between the society leaders in Europe and the headquarters in the south Mediterranean countries, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt or Ez-Zaituna University in Tunisia or others. Firstly, the Islamic society leaders must wisely face the extremist understanding which affected some of the Muslim youth in Europe, they must educate them about Islam and make them understand the truth that violence, hatred and retaliation are not Islamic values. They must also help and support the integration and

- 28 - merging of the Muslims within the European society and make it clear to them that Islam is a religion of building bridges not barriers. Secondly, the traditional international Islamic leadership in the Muslim majority countries must exert more effort in taking care about the Muslims living in Europe, and understanding their unique position. This leadership must understand that the religious outreaching discourse targeting the European Muslims should be different and unique and should focus in certain subjects that can improve the harmony inside the European societies, and thus reflects positively on the general situation and relation between Europe and the Mediterranean. Last but not least, I would like to talk about the growth and evolution of terrorism in the Arab Mediterranean countries, which I believe is a very important factor in increasing the tensions across the Mediterranean. As discussed earlier, one of the reasons behind the growth of extremism is the suppression of the moderate Islamic parties in the Middle East and the lack of democracy and Human rights in those countries, thanks to the European backed dictatorial regimes. But there are other main reasons in addition, such as the poor perfor- mance of the traditional Islamic entities such as Al-Azhar, which have failed in developing its strategies and its discourse in a manner than can contain and attract the Muslim youth. Many of those Islamic well known entities, unfortunately, became tools in the hands of the dictators, and have been harnessed to give religious legitimacy for the dictatorial regimes. The civil society, weakened by long decades of consecutive repressive regimes, failed to introduce new al- ternatives, and the extremists did not find it difficult to recruit the desperate, religiously uneducated and angry youth who were already enraged by the invasion of Iraq, the leaked photos of Abu Ghuraib prison, the news of killing and rapping innocents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the overwhelming support of the West for Israel, the use of excessive violence by Israel against Gaza, and the international bullying that Israel has been pursuing for decades. All this led to the unjustified, albeit expected and explained, growth of terrorism and extremism in the South Mediterranean. But what converted this growth into a real negative factor affecting the inter-relations across the Medi- terranean was the negative role that the Western media played in horrifying the Europeans from ISIS, and creating from ISIS an enemy to Europe and using it to stimulate fear and panic among the European citizens, despite the fact that ISIS is operating only in the Muslim majority countries and that – literally – more than 99% of its victims were Muslims. Regarding the travelling of some European youth to join ISIS and that they can form a threat in case they returned, I think that this was exaggerated and part of the media strategy to create a scarecrow out of ISIS. According to Gilles de Kerchove, the European Union’s counterterrorism chief, there are about

- 29 - 4000 Europeans who joined ISIS and the vast majority of them are well known to the European security agencies. Anyway, everybody knows the very strict rules the European borders protection authorities has, which are capable of preventing the return of those terrorists, in case they survived the war in the Middle East. The growth of terrorism in the area, whether in quantity or in quality, raises the concerns of a considerable sum of the Arabian citizens if this will be mis- used by the West for a new Sykes-Picot plot that may lead to the Balkanization of the Middle East for the interests of the neo Imperialism, especially, that the Western media, research centres and think tanks have already started talking about this. On the ground, the first version of Sikes-Picot has already disap- peared and the sectarian conflicts in Syria and Iraq has reached to an extent that makes people believe that it is impossible for some countries to stay united. Finally, after reviewing the many different reasons behind the growing tensions across the Mediterranean and Europe, I suggest that the following steps should be considered:  Europe should stop supporting the Dictatorships ruling many of their Mediterranean neighbours. Whether the support is economic, political or related to the military aid.  European governments should stop being biased for the favour of Israel.  Europe should show more resistance to the military interventions or at least not be a part of it.  More cooperation should happen to solve the tragic illegal immigration consequences.  Muslims in Europe should work harder in order to integrate within the European societies and work on elimination the potential extremism that is present among their communities.  The European governments and Civil Society should work together with the European Muslims in order to face Islamophobia.  The Civil Society in the South Mediterranean countries should work harder in their communities to slow down the lack of trust and hatred of their people towards Europe, explaining the difference between the Gov- ernments and the People.  The Civil Societies in both Europe and the Mediterranean should intensify their cooperation and work on building more bridges and bondage between the neighbours. I salute the European Abrahamic Forum, and appreciate the very important efforts that go in the right direction towards the noble goal of creating peace and harmony among humans.

- 30 - I hope that the intellectual elite from Europe and the Middle East and North Africa will work hard in order to establish joint associations and organizations, which can make activities capable of strengthening the relations and the bonds between the peoples.

Bibliography: 1- New World Encyclopedia, Carthaginian Empire. 2- WALTER RODNEY, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London, 1972 (Washington, DC 41982). 3- BERTRAND TAITHE, The Killer Trail: A Colonial Scandal in the Heart of Africa, Oxford, 2009. 4- http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/25/europe/tony-blair-iraq-war/ 5- http://www.businessinsider.com/swedens-dirty-secret-they-arm-dictators-2014- 5?IR=T 6- http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports- libya 7- http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/eu-legitimising-sisi-coup- egypt-20144161181767834.html 8- http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/speaker-german-parliament-rescinds- sisi-invitation-150519233639231.html 9- http://www.franceinfo.fr/actu/politique/article/le-budget-2016-sauve-par-l- egypte-733513 10- http://www.algemeiner.com/2013/07/31/report-morsi-rejected-safe-exit-offer- from-eus-catherine-ashton/

- 31 -

Prof Dr Carmen López Alonso (Madrid, Spain)

The MENA, Middle-East-North-Africa region is undergoing a profound transformation. If its origins could be traced at the turn of the century, its outbreak began half a decade ago in coincidence with the so-called ‘Arab springs’. The changes (geopolitical and political, economic, social and cultural) are not confined to the MENA region, neither in their origin nor in their repercussions. Interconnected along the Mediterranean, these changes reach the whole of the European region posing a global and urgent challenge to both Europe and the Western world. The answer to this global challenge has to be local, regional and global, as local, regional and global are the actors and the situations involved.

Changes in actors and changes in political and geopolitical situation New social actors and new instruments in social action • There is a growing role of the civil society and the new social movements: not just the ‘left’-democratic movements, demanding in both sides of the Mediterranean a ‘real democracy now’, but also the growing expressions of Xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, in many occasions chan- nelled by new or renewed ultra-rightist political parties • Related to this are the new instruments used in their action, especially the social media, the web, the social networks with its new language, that is binary, rapid, urgent and, most important, volatile, the images often prevailing over the content. One of its results is the construction of a new type of political discourse. New geopolitical situation, with the presence of new, or renewed, geo-political actors • After the Arab Spring, we face different situations going from fragmentation and /or failed states (Libya), civil war (Syria), to the reversal of the democratization process (Egypt). • Rogue actors, that are not new but whose role is now growing: mafias whose main source of money is human trafficking, migration, nowadays

- 32 - more profitable than drugs and arms, which nonetheless continue to be an important part of the illegal traffic in the Mediterranean. • Changes in the real weight of the EU and the USA as well as changes in the priorities of the US foreign policy progressively focused in Asia-Pacific and Central Asia. Related to this is the relative loss of the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even though it continues to be at the rhetorical centre of the political discourse. • The growing relevant role of China, Russia & Eastern Europe, Africa (Sa- hel, South), and most important, in what relates to the MENA region, the Gulf States and Iran. • And last, but not least, new political actors with an international reach, principally the auto-called Islamic State (DAESH) • others The reactions and the reflections that these changes are bringing about in Eu- rope and all over the West are revealing (in the sense of ‘un-cover’) the way in which the Western-European democracy and their acting governments actually work. The present treatment of the immigrants-refugees (political, social, and economic) in the Mediterranean is probably one of the most striking examples.

Democratic values: universal or with artificial borders? The cornerstone of the European-Western democracy lays in the affirmation of, commitment to, and defence of the most fundamental democratic values: Human Rights, Equality before the Law, Liberty, Freedom from Want, Free- dom of communication (ideas, religion, goods, persons, etc.), Separation of Powers, Responsibility (individual and public), Accountability, Transparency. The foundational value of these principles is a basic tenet of democracy, the political and social system that continues to be the European-Western basic identity. One of the main questions to be answered is if the implementation of these principles has a universal character as linked to the human condition and dignity, or if it has to be confined to artificial borders, that is, State borders. As early as in 1950, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Hannah Arendt pointed to the need to find a new principle that could assure the human dignity, because “antisemitism (not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) – one after the other, one more brutally than the other – have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee, which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must com- prehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited,

- 33 - rooted in, and controlled by, newly defined territorial entities”.1 But human dignity has frequently been jeopardized by the imperatives of national sovereignty.2 The universal scope of those democratic principles is the reason to inter- vene in cases of crimes against humanity, because they were first defined in the aftermath of the Second World War, to the contemporary formulation of the principle of “Responsibility to Protect”,3 included into the report “A more secure world: our shared responsibility” (UNO, 2004) adopted by the UN Gen- eral Assembly in 2005. Nevertheless, both in the past as well as in present times, this has not prevented that in many occasions those values have been used as one of the major arguments to defend and justify intervention, colonization, if not direct occupation and conquest of lands and peoples in the name of the implementation of those very values. Today, the defence of Human Rights and Democracy continues to be the main European “identity card” even if, at present, both domestic and foreign policies (on local as well as European level) are mostly oriented to the security and safety, not just physical but, even more, the security of raw materials (gas, oil, water, land) as well as to keeping alive and safe the local and regional (Eu- ropean / Western) economy.4 In the recent years of crisis and fear, the defence of Human Rights and Democracy have been frequently secondary goals, not primary and substantive policy,5 and, unfortunately, in some cases they have served as a mere instrument to cover this reality with a legitimizing veil.

1 Preface to the first – 1951 – edition of her The Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt 1973:ix With timely words Arendt continues: “We can no longer afford to take that which was good the past and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load which by itself time will bury in oblivion. The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition. This is the reality in which we live. And this is why all efforts to escape, from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past, or into the anticipated oblivion of a better future, are vain” (ibid). 2 JEFFREY C. ISAAC, “New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights,” in: American Political Science Review 90 (1996), pp. 61-73, here p. 61. 3 GARETH EVANS and MOHAMED SAHNOUN. “The Responsibility to Protect,” in: Foreign Affairs 81 (2002), no. 6, p. 99 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 2002-11-01/responsibility-protect). A useful introduction in: MARY KALDOR and IAVOR RANGELOV (eds.), The Handbook of Global Security Policy, Oxford, 2014. 4 BENOIT CHALLAND, “Revisiting Aid in the Arab Middle East,” in: Mediterranean Politics 19 (2014), no. 3, pp. 281-298. 5 KRISTINA KAUSCH (ed.), Geopolitics and Democracy in the Middle East, Madrid, 2015.

- 34 - The question of content and meaning of democracy is one of the basic issues that have entered the debates and reflections among those new social movements that question the ways, which the governments of the liberal-representative democracies are actually working. Their demands of “real democracy now” – understood as a transparent democratic system, free of corruption, allowing people, citizens, to participate in the political process really and freely – include the defence of a system of universal values and culminate in its call for their unlimited implementation. Similar demands could be heard from movements that were the first to the streets, when the “Arab Spring” began. The question raised by Hannah Arendt in the aftermath of the Second World War continues to be relevant today when, in a situation of serious crisis, the implementation of these ideas and principles remains the main challenge. Nevertheless, the values that are the cornerstone of democracy have to be implemented in concrete situations, both in terms of time and geopolitical space. These situations are always intertwined with social emotions, feelings and ideas that have an important role in the ways policies are made. Without taking them into account there is no real way to transform both situation and policies, all the more so in the actual crisis, that is not just economic but social, political and cultural. We should keep in mind that, by definition, a crisis is a process of transformation, agonal perhaps, but open and not necessarily ending with negative results.

Fear and compassion (piété) Fear and compassion (what Rousseau called piété) are two of the most basic and powerful human emotions. Sound political and social life should be based on a combination of the Hobbesian (fear) and the Rousseaunian (solidarity, piété) approaches, which are complementary and not forcibly contradictory. These reflections presuppose that it could be helpful to consider them for the sake of renewal of the relationship, and building of new bridges between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Even if solidarity and compassion continue to be practiced and present, it is however fear that seems to be the dominating power now, with its different forms of expression, from paralysis to action. Fear could be the result of both ignorance and knowledge, either right or wrong – most frequently via inten- tional, deliberate disinformation. As far as fear about the economic future is concerned, it is knowledge that seems to dominate today, as can be learned from the present economic crisis that has put an end to the simplistic vision of a lineal, harmonic, and uninterrupted economic and social progress, con- ducted by an ‘invisible hand’ regulating the whole process. In the present

- 35 - situation of high unemployment rates6 – higher among young people, both in the EU7 and in the MENA region,8 it is however, the fear of a new financial crash, which feeds the feeling of uncertainty and nurses doubts about a possible better future. In addition to that, the increasing number of immigrants trying to enter the EU likewise could be a factor fuelling the fears. Quite often, immigrants are perceived and presented as strangers,9 as “others” endangering not only the lives and safety of Europeans menaced by terrorist attacks,10 but putting at risk also the very European culture and identity. This is the message that political-ideological discourses of mainly right-wing politicians and their followers convey when they maintain that the refugees’ / immigrants’ culture and identity are radically opposed to “our own civilized Christian culture and

6 European Union Unemployment: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explai ned/index.php/unemployment_statistics. 7 European Union Youth unemployment, 2014: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/index.php/File:Table_1_Youth_unemployment,_2014Q4_% 28%25 %29.png. 8 Global Employment Trends for Youth 2015: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the- ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_412014/lang--en/index.htm/. – For youth unemployment rates by region, 1995 and 2005-2014: http://www.ilo.org/global/ab out-the- ilo/multimedia/maps-and-charts/WCMS_411962/lang--en/index.htm. 9 As defined by Georg Simmel: “[…] person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going. He is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself” (GEORG SIMMEL, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated, edited, and with an Introduction by Kurt H. Wolff, Glen- coe, Illinois 1950, p. 402). 10 In 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US, the EU adopted a European arrest warrant and established the first anti-terror blacklist. After the 2004 Madrid trains bombing ant the 2005 London bombings, the EU tightened its measures, with the adoption in 2005 of a counter-terrorism strategy (http://register.consili um.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204) completed in 2010 by the EU’s “Internal Security Strategy for 2010-2014”. The 2015 attack to the French satirical paper Charlie Hebdo (January) and the recent multiple terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) are prompting changes in a wide range of fields, included those related to freedom of movement across the borders of countries in the Schengen area. – For an account of EU measures: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/counter-terrorism-coordinator/

- 36 - heritage”, a heritage that is at risk to be damaged or even destroyed by this alleged “invasion”.11 Beyond these simplistic affirmations, we can also find real concern about how the present situation could affect the maintenance of the democratic social system, its rights and values. Here, the concern is multifaceted: It is not just the fear of potential harmful influence of imported culture and social behaviour not based on a respectively long education in liberal and democratic values. There is also the concern that this new situation could lead to the change of rights and alter principles that are the cornerstone of “our” democracy, with cutbacks and restrictions in liberties and social rights; a trend that has been growingly present since the responses given to September 11 attacks.12 This latter question sends us back to the beginning, to the real content and practice of our democratic values and principles. To assure the always difficult balance between liberty and security or, in other words, the preservation of life in the broadest sense, is at the core of the liberal political thought and cannot be resolved with a simple formula, as far as security is a necessary but not a sufficient element to assure the full realization of the fundamental human rights.13 But there are ways to restore the broken links and to keep open a bridge that peacefully and productively connects both shores of the Mediterra- nean, making it a real Mare Nostrum with shared problems and shared solutions. Ways that, as in a patchwork, sew the holes by resorting to what we already

11 As in the declarations of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who referred to asylum seekers not as refugees but as “illegal aliens”, affirming that their “exodus” threatens to undermine Europe’s culture and way of life, “We shouldn’t forget that the people who are coming here grew up in a different religion and represent a completely different culture. Most are not Christian, but Muslim,” he said. “Or is it not worrying that Europe’s Christian culture is already barely able to maintain its own set of Christian values?” quoted in http://www.politico.eu/article/orban-migrants- threaten-christian-europe-identity-refugees-asylum-crisis/ (last accessed 2/11/2015). 12 Shortly after the Paris terrorist attacks, Judith Butler warned: « Il semble que la peur et la colère puissent conduire à se jeter violemment dans les bras d’un Etat policier » in : JUDITH BUTLER « Une liberté attaquée par l'ennemi et restreinte par l'Etat », in : Libération 19/11/2015; see: http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/19/une-li- berte-attaquee-par-l-ennemi-et-restreinte-par-l-etat_1414769. 13 This concern was already clear in the UN’s 1994 Human Development Report. The politics of security, the report said, have ‘for too long been interpreted narrowly . . . it has related more to nation- states than to people […] [whereby] security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards’ (UNDP 1994: 22), quoted in LAURA J. SHEPHERD (ed.), Critical Approaches to Security. An introduction to theories and methods, London / New York 2013, p. 25.

- 37 - have: the shared, intertwined and common history, not in the quest of an impossible symmetry but, as the late Edward Said proposed for the open and yet unresolved Palestine-Israel conflict, finding ways of shared compassion.14 Ed- ucation, and knowledge of the other, in both sides of the Mediterranean, is perhaps one of the most effective and reasonable tools to overcome the fears coming from lack of knowledge and misinformation. Overcoming unreasonable fears is a first step in the mutual understanding. But there are reasonable fears based on real dangers (fears of poverty, of bad health, of social fragmentation and insecurity, of terrorism, as well as fears about the negative effects of climate change, among many others). Although in very different levels, those fears, which are felt by people in both sides of the Mediterranean, could be a starting point for finding and building together ways of solution.15

Towards a shared understanding and a shared basis for a good common life: education and right knowledge as the main tools. The idea of a shared knowledge is not new. As a matter of fact it is at the basis of some of the most fruitful intents to resolve conflicts among communities living in the same space, but not together, with long histories of violence and memories that have not been healed. For a true shared knowledge a necessary but not sufficient condition is to have an accurate information about the present, to know the real data of what is shown as a problem, an ‘invasion’, a global danger, etc.; to know, for example, the real number of refugees-immigrants, their different situations, culture

14 The idea of “communities of suffering”, exposed by Turner in 1991, was developed by Edward W. Said in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict: “For there is a link to be made between what happened to Jews in World War Two and the catastrophe of the Palestinian people, but it cannot be made only rhetorically, or as an argument to demolish or diminish the true content both of the Holocaust and of 1948. Nei- ther is equal to the other; similarly neither one nor the other excuses present violence; and finally, neither one nor the other must be minimized. There is suffering and injustice enough for everyone. But unless the connection is made by which the Jewish tragedy is seen to have led directly to the Palestinian catastrophe by, let us call it “necessity” (rather than pure will) we cannot co-exist as two communities of detached and uncommunicating separate suffering,” (in: EDWARD W. SAID, Culture and Imperialism, New York 1993, ³2001, pp. 205-9; cf. also, CARMEN LÓPEZ ALONSO, “Israel. Shoah y Nakba. Entramados, diferencias, comunidades de su- frimiento.” in: Claves de Razón Práctica 147 (2004), pp. 68-74, here p. 74). 15 As Hobbes formulated in the XVII century, fear of individual death and of social chaos is at the basis of the creation, out of a mathematical and secular reason, both the State and the Citizen.

- 38 - and/or religion, as well as the real economic and social burden and potential benefits that they represent, etc.16 This is a primary step to cope with the unreasonable fears, as well as to find ways to resolve those which could have a basis. As important as to have an accurate information about the present is to know the history and the memories of the past – either open, concealed or repressed – not just because they have a real weight in the lives of individuals and societies but because their long shadow on the conceptions of the “other”.17 A shared knowledge, especially about history, is not a synthesis that sum- marizes in a unique narrative the very different experiences and stories, but an effort to construct a “contrapuntal reading”,18 which takes into account the intertwined facts, both positive and negative, that conform the process leading to our present reality. The starting point, thus, has to be the affirmation of the differences, but also the similarities and common interests of people who have to live together as good neighbours. Coexistence is a first step. Let’s return here to Edward W. Said’s critique of those who claim “that we should forget the past and go on to two separate states”. Even if he is talking about the Israel-Palestinian conflict, his argument has a general validity. To forget the past “is as insulting to Jewish memories of the Holocaust as it is to Palestinians who continue in their dispossession at Israel’s hands. The simple

16 This information shows that many preconceptions, are in fact misconceptions that do not resist the reality test; this is the case in the recent “refugee crisis”. See, for example, “5 Major Myths of Europe’s Refugee and Migrant Crisis Debunked. It’s time to put these falsehoods to rest” Nick Robins-Early http://www.huffing- tonpost.com/entry/europe-refugee-migrant-crisis- myths_55f83aa7e4b09ecde1d9b4bc (retrieved 30/09/2015). 17 ANNA TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, Immigrants and National Identity in Europe, London / New York 2001. 18 Borrowing Edward W. Said’s formula: “In practical terms, ‘contrapuntal reading’ as I have called it means reading a text with an understanding of what is involved when an author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar plantation is seen as important to the process of maintaining a particular style of life in England. Moreover, like all literary texts, these are not bounded by their formal historic beginnings and endings. References to Australia in David Copperfield or India in Jane Eyre are made because they can be, because British power (and not just the novelist's fancy) made passing references to these massive appropriations possible; but the further lessons are no less true: that these colonies were subsequently liberated from direct and indirect rule, a process that began and unfolded while the British (or French, Portuguese, Germans, etc.) were still there, although as part of the effort at sup- pressing native nationalism only occasional note was taken of it” (SAID, Culture and Imperialism [note 14 above], p. 66)

- 39 - fact is that Jewish and Palestinian experiences are historically, indeed organi- cally, connected: to break them asunder is to falsify what is authentic about each. We must think our histories together, however difficult that may be, in order for there to be a common future”.19 Also historically connected are the past and present developments in both shores of the Mediterranean as is their inevitable common future. What is needed is a right knowledge of the intertwined history, the mutual interdepend- ences, failures and achievements as well as the past and present responsibilities, avoiding the temptation to create a deceptive single synthetic narrative or a unique history, either of victimhood or of guiltiness, for the processes are not lineal not symmetric. A necessary condition for this to be accomplished is to have a corpus of scholarly literature that presents accurately the facts, both in their multifaceted sights and interconnections, either negative or positive, as in their imprint in the historical social process. The historical approach has to be comprehensive, including not only the geo-political history but, as important, the history of culture and religion, because we are living in a situation of “sacred ignorance” that not only produces misconceptions but disaster.20 This implies a political will, as the education policy has to include, or at least to promote, the interconnected history and to defend open and accurate information. The scholarly research has to be completed in the classroom by the work of well-formed teachers and educators. Education, which means both information and formation, is not a one-way alley, but implies a process of interaction between teachers, students and their social settings. The most successful educational experiences in what relates conflict resolution are those in which this issue has been taken into account, using the different narratives of those involved in the conflict as in the PRIME project related to the Israel-Palestinian, or in the WAS-NS (Wahat al-Salam – Neve Shalom)21 the village founded in 1970 near Latrun as a Peace Oasis to demonstrate, by living together, the possibility of peace among both peoples. As a result of the work in the classroom, teachers meetings and seminars, in which members of the students’ family also took part, PRIME project published a timely booklet, The History of the Other (2003), with the two narratives,

19 SAID, Culture and Imperialism (see note 14 above). 20 OLIVIER ROY, La Sainte Ignorance, Paris 2008; English translation: Holy Ignorance. When Religion and Culture Part Ways, Oxford / New York 2013; OLIVIER ROY, “Le djihadisme : une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste,” in: Le Monde (Paris) 24/11/2015. 21 http://nswas.org, see also NATHAN ZERGER, “Equality Within Difference: The Story of Neve Shalom / Wahat al-Salam,” in: Peace & Change 32 (2007), no. 3, pp. 255-300.

- 40 - the Israeli and the Palestinian, concentrated in important dates of the history of the conflict; the booklet, translated into Hebrew and Arabic, has an empty space in between “for the pupils and teachers to add their own responses”.22 A similar model is employed by the Parents Circle, the joint Palestinian Israeli organization established in 1995 and integrated by “over 600 families, all of whom have lost a close family member as a result of the prolonged conflict”. The organization conducts joint activities as they “have shown that the reconciliation between individuals and nations is possible…./and/… a prerequisite to achieving a sustainable peace”.23 The model, which has been followed in different historical and regional settings, as in the Jewish-German encounters related to the Holocaust memory24 as well as in various transitional processes, has proved its efficacy in building bridges of peace and cooperation. What is important to emphasize is that a shared understanding needs, not only an open disposition to revisit our own particular situation and history but also to let and help the other to do the same process with theirs. It is impossible to share something that does not belong to us, both in a material, cultural, ideological or symbolic realm. It is why such a project requires political, social and personal will, as well as time, for to achieve a positive result requires a carefully, slow and systematic process of learning and disseminating this learning.

22 “This would mean that each student will learn also the narrative of the other, in addition to the familiar own narrative, as a first step toward acknowledging and respecting the other. We assumed that a joint narrative would emerge only after the clear change from war culture to peace culture took place. This requires time and the ability to mourn and work through the painful results of the past” “ Studies have shown that teachers have more power than the mere written texts in forming children's understandings and value systems…/… this project focuses on the central role of the teachers in the process of using shared history texts in the classroom. The teachers should therefore develop these narratives and try them out with their 9th- and 10th-grade classrooms, after the booklet has been translated into Arabic and Hebrew. There will be an empty space between the narratives for the pupils and teachers to add their own responses” (DAN BAR-ON and SAMI ADWAN, “The PRIME shared history project. Peace-Building Project under Fire [Ch. 19],” in: Ed- ucating Toward a Culture of Peace 2006, pp. 309-323, here p. 312) 23 http://www.theparentscircle.org/. For a list of their projects among “The Parallel Narrative Project” see, http://www.theparentscircle.org/Content.aspx?ID=30#.Vm QEFuL08uE 24 BAR-ON and ADWAN, “The PRIME shared history project” (see note 20 above), and Dan Bar-On and Fatma Kassem, “Storytelling as a Way to Work through In- tractable Conflicts: The German-Jewish Experience and Its Relevance to the Pal- estinian-Israeli Context,” in: Journal of Social Issues 60 (2004), no. 2, pp. 289-306.

- 41 - In practical terms it means that a broad policy has to be implemented both by the singular European states and the EU in order to build a new curriculum that teaches a comprehensive and analytical history both of the single European nations and the EU as a whole, as well as the history of their intertwined relations with the history of the other side, Mediterranean and else. This policy has to be complemented by specific assistance, both economic and academic, to the countries in the south shore of the Mediterranean, for them to implement a similar policy. Many projects on this issues have been launched since the Euro-Mediterra- nean Partnership, also known as Barcelona process (1995),25 including the 2005 UNAOC.26 When the Arab revolts erupted the EU policies began to be more proactive, after a first “wait and see” period: in October 2011 an “incentive based” initiative (+ x +) was launched.27 The same principle of conditionality was kept in the next EU projects.28 In 2014 the differentiation principle was introduced adapting ENP to different countries, with three types of programs for 2014-2010: 1/3 to the East, 2/3 to the South; that same year the IS (Instru- ment for Stability, 2007) was transformed into the IFSP (Instrument Contrib- uting to Stability and Peace) to prevent conflict around the world. To this should be added the EU migration policies29 as well as those included in the recent “Horizon 2020” program,30 especially in the section “Europe in a changing world - Inclusive, innovative and reflective societies” one of whose aims is

25 See, The European Initiative-Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 2001; The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 2003-2004; European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 2006; European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), 2007–13; Instrument for Stability (IFS) 2007; Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 2008; Lisbon Treaty, 2009, European External Action Service (EEAS), 2010 / Commission Del- egations / Two new institutions: 07.2011 EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediter- ranean, 2011, Creation of 3 Task Force (Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan). 26 United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, established in 2005 at the political initiative of the former UN Secretary general and co-sponsored by the Government of Spain and Turkey www.unaoc.org 27 A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterra- nean on an incentive based, according to the formula “more for more” also known as the Ashton’ 3 Ms (money, mobility, market access). 28 Changing Neighbourhood 2011 (05); Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING), 2011 (09). 29 The scope of this issue is too wide for be treated here, lets only point to the lack of a common European policy, except for some measures taken, mainly of a de- fensive character. 30 http://eu-crf.net/horizon-2020/

- 42 - the “ transmission of European cultural heritage, uses of the past, 3D modelling for accessing EU cultural assets”.31

As an open conclusion The above mentioned top-down initiatives are necessary but not sufficient to build bridges between the two shores of the Mediterranean; as important are the bottom-up ones, those coming from the civil society, in the broad sense of the concept. In what relates education, initiatives searching a better understanding of the particular/local history as an intertwined process (social, cultural, political, international), have to be backed, especially if they aim to a mix young population, of which the second and third generations of former immigrants are part. The shared understanding has to begin ‘at home’ in order to form individuals able to share with the others their learning and experiences, both in what they have in common as in what is different. The knowledge of religion as well as the history of religions, is a fundamental point, as is the interreligious dialogue, especially the one between the three Abrahamic faiths.32 This should be promoted, and funded, in both shores of the Mediterranean. This comprehensive and analytical approach needs a corpus of literature and data, as it was already said. Only by working on this way there is a possibility of overcoming fears and, eventually, confrontation and violence, stem- ming mainly from ignorance and misinformation. The expressions of Xeno- phobia, Islamophobia or anti-Semitism are cases in point. As proved by the experiences in the Shared History project, the relevancy of these initiatives is indisputable.33 The fact that they have been launched and

31 https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/europe- changing-world-inclusive-innovative-and-reflective-societies/ 32 The European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) being one of the best examples on this encounter and dialogue. www.zuercher-lehrhaus.ch 33 For the uses of the Conversational Analysis tool and a comprehensive study of the Teaching Contested Narratives activities, see ZVI BEKERMAN and MICHALINOS ZEMBYLAS, Teaching Contested Narratives: Identity, Memory, and Reconciliation in Peace Education and beyond, Cambridge / New York 2011, and IFAT MAOZ, “Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict? Appraising 20 years of reconciliation- aimed encounters between Israeli Jews and Palestinians?” in: Journal of Peace Research 48 (2011), no. 1, pp. 115-125. As IFAT MAOZ, “Peace Building in Violent Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Post-Oslo People-to-People Activities,” in: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17 (2004), no. 3, pp. 503-574, here p. 572, explains: “1) These activities maintain an infrastructure of constructive relationships between the sides, not letting the ties between sides be completely broken but keeping what can be preserved. 2) These activities provide a support system for those of both sides that still believe in peace, creating a safe place where these people—who are

- 43 - carried out mainly by individuals politically and socially committed is one of its features but the results are clear: in what respects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, those who participated in the encounters promoted by the Parents Circle, showed more hope about the future and more capacity to forgive.34 Comparable results are obtained in the study of the activities carried out by similar groups along two decades: in the four models applied: Coexistence, Joint Projects, Confrontational and Narrative-Story-Telling) the best results are those obtained by the Narrative model, but “the success of the encounter also notably depends on the extent to which it produces constructive intergroup interactions“.35 The ways are open; here we have presented some that can help to build and re-build bridges, essential not just for the sake of our security and safety but, most important, for the defence of our own democratic values and principles.

often marginalized and feel isolated in their own societies—can meet, share ideas, and support each other in their quest for peace. 3) These activities do not let the extremists win, but still do things for peace despite the general atmosphere of violence. 4) These activities prevent further escalation of violence, mutual dehumani- zation, and de-legitimization by maintaining some constructive interactions between the sides.” 34 NATALIE WEDER / REBECA GARCÍA-NIETO, and DAPHNA CANNETI-NISIM, “Peace, Reconciliation and Tolerance in the Middle East. The Impact of People-to-People Peace Building Initiatives Among Israeli Jews and Palestinians Who Lost a First- Degree Family Member Due to the Conflict: A Pilot Study,” in: International Journal of Mental Health 39 (2011), no. 4, pp. 59-81, have compared two groups, CP and non-CP members. Their study “shows that both groups (CP and non-CP) differed in most of the attitudes studied: the importance given to peace talks (PCFF members tend to give them more importance), the hope for the future (PCFF members tend to be more hopeful about the future), and the ability to forgive (PCFF members seem to be more able to forgive). However, we did not find a significant difference in the political involvement variable. Both groups reported a similar level of political activity” 35 MAOZ, “Does contact work in protracted asymmetrical conflict?” (see note 31 above), p. 122.

- 44 -

Texts and Reflections

Impact of the Changes in Middle East / North Africa on European Countries and Societies

Djénane Kareh-Tager (Paris, France / Beirut, Lebanon)

Since Prof. Schreiner invited me to participate in this conference, and I thank him so much for that, a question is bothering me: It is more than four years ago that the so-called Arab spring began, that for many became a strong Arab winter. Should I be more optimistic or more pessimistic, for the Arab world as well as for Europe? I am continuously asking myself this question, and still I have no answer. In fact, I admit and tell you frankly: I am waiting for your answer. I can tell you very quickly, why I am so hesitant. Why I am so pessimistic and so optimistic, at the same time. Let me start with Europe where I am spending most of my time. I wish I could tell you that what happens in Syria and/or in Iraq, the crimes committed against the various minorities, is tragic, but has no or no more impact on Europe that what happens in Myanmar or Vietnam regarding its minority groups, which is also tragic. However, this is definitely not the case. I wish I could tell you that the three thousand European jihadists in Syria is not a huge number compared to the twenty millions of our fellow citizens who are Muslims like them. But in reality, the three thousand European jihadists are not three thousand; they are many more. They have their circles, very widely spread, backing them. Among them, they have, e.g., one of the Ramadan brothers, Hani Ramadan, the elder brother of Tariq Ramadan, himself head of the Islamic Center in Ge- neva, insinuating that what happened recently in the speed train “Thalys” on its way to Paris is but a conspiracy, a media manipulation to enhance the pres- tige of the US Army. How do I know? How do you know? His intervention on August 25, 2015, posted on his blog hosted by the Tribune de Genève can be found on all websites, all networks, it is related, and – applauded. However, until now I did not find any website, any network that would have posted a single voice that can be called the voice of a “Muslim authority”

- 47 - denouncing him and sending him to hell. These voices exist of course, I am sure they do, but I do not hear them. Around this table, there are only people of good will, from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. I know, we all know other exceptional people, Muslims, Christians, Jews, atheists, whatsoever, who are not around this table. But they exist, they are there. The problem, however, is – and we must confront it –, that we, people of good will, are not alone. We are perhaps the majority even, and I would underline the word perhaps. During our last meeting, I already told you about the demonstration that took place in Paris on January 11, after the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo. It was an impressive demonstration, but a very “white” one, and I regret to say that. On the other hand, you like me are aware of the rising of right-wing, na- tionalist, racist parties all over our European countries. The waves of migrants arriving in Europe contribute to the increase of their influence. Likewise, Daʽesh demonstrations, demonstrations of Daʽesh supporters even inside Eu- rope, though they are still very few in numbers, are on the rise, too. With one consequence: the normalization of such parties. In France, a few days ago, the Bishop of the VAR (the Diocese of Fréjus-Toulon) invited Marion Maréchal Le Pen, the hardest representative of the Front National, the French national- ist-racist party, to take part in a meeting of young Catholics. When he was asked why he had extended that invitation, he answered: They are a strong part of the political and social reality in France. These parties are our “Daʽesh”. And Daʽesh, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, helped them a lot. I am scared for Europe. I am not talking about one or two terrorist attacks, one or two decapitations, as we had in France. Thus far, they are isolated acts of madmen. I am scared of our “Daʽesh”, of these parties. In Switzerland, you say, “there is a fire at the lake”. What could, should, can we do to stop it? There is, around the table, much more competent people than me to speak about the Arab world where I have a foot. I see Daʽesh, I see the sectarian divisions and conflicts between Sunnis and Shiʽis, and I see whatever you want me to see. But I see also, and even more so, the emergence of what we can call a middle class, an educated class, young people who are able to speak, who have one wish only: to conduct a normal life. They are using and uttering the words, which we are more used to hear coming from the West: democracy, dignity, freedom. One day, it will be them to take over control. This is inevitable. The question, however, is, when this will happen? In five years? In ten years? They are moving forward, and I am afraid: we are going back. During these almost five

- 48 - years, we were observing the Middle East, watching what is happening there, without doing anything. Four years ago, these people could have taken over control. Two years ago also. But today? Will they be able to continue moving forward? If I were a Syrian, if I were a Muslim, perhaps, I would have supported Daʽesh, too. I do not know it for sure, but I would not exclude it. It is a possibility, a likelihood. I am thinking about it. Two years ago, I made a book together with a young secular Syrian woman. She was allergic to Islamists! Today she is wearing a veil. She sees in them the only hope. Not for herself, but for her children. She told me: They are unavoidable and an ineluctable destiny, and we must support them. I told you all that, hoping that I did not bother you. It is my wish to encourage a discussion that goes beyond political correctness. Although I am generally optimistic, I still think, there is a fire at the lake… Thank you.

Muin Khoury (Amman, Jordan)

Get out you, Christians, of Damascus, Ma’aloula, Mosul, and Nineveh, from our homelands, from our towns. Get out you Lebanese and Palestinian Christians from our mountains, val- leys, and shores. Get out you, original inhabitants of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. Get out you all. We hate you. We have become tired and bored with progress and civilization, openness and tolerance, love, brotherhood, coexistence, and forgiveness. Get out so we have time to kill each other. Get out so we do not get embarrassed when we look each other in the eyes, and your eyes are full of questions of what happened and happens. Get out and take with you the mercy and compassion because with Al- Nusra, Da’esh and Al-Qa’eda and the remainders of the Muslim Brotherhood gangs we no longer need mercy and compassion.

- 49 - Go out you, Christians, and take with you the heritage and body remains of Gibran, Sargon Boulos, Anastas Al-Karmali, Yousef Al-Sayegh, Sa’adi Al- Maleh, the sons of Tekla, Yaziji, Bustani and Bishara Al-Khoury… Go out with your culture, which we have replaced with the culture of grave digging. That is what Ahmad Al-Sarraf wrote in the Kuwaiti paper Al-Qabas (July 22, 2015). The Palestinian-American writer and university professor, Abdul Hamid Siam appealed to Palestinian Christians: “Stay, put, and don’t leave us alone! We don’t want an Islamic state in Palestine nor a Jewish one!” Are these lonely voices or do they express a wider audience? Maybe. Maybe not. Or has indifference to diversity become mainstream? Probably so. Strangely, even Abdul Rahman al-Rashed, editor-in-chief of Al-Sharq Al- Awsat laments the lack of protest (if that is an indicator) in the Arab streets against Arab-Muslim extremism: “Protests against the recent terrorist attacks in France should have been held in Muslim capitals… it is Muslims who are involved in this crisis and stand accused. ... The story of extremism begins in Muslim societies, and it is with their support and silence that extremism has grown into terrorism that is harming people.” Thomas Friedman rightly says, “The truth is there is a huge amount of ambivalence toward this whole jihadist phenomenon in the Arab-Muslim world, Europe and America. This ambivalence starts in the Muslim community, where there is a deep cleavage over what constitutes authentic Islam today…Because Islam has no Vatican, no single source of religious authority, there are many Islams today. The puritanical Wahhabi/Salafi/jihadist strain is one of them, and its support is not insignificant.” (The New York Times, January 13, 2015). “Ambivalence runs through Washington’s ties with Saudi Arabia. Ever since jihadists took over Islam’s holiest shrine in Mecca in 1979…Saudi Arabia has redoubled its commitment to Wahhabi or Salafist Islam — the most puritanical, anti-pluralistic and anti-women version of that faith. This Saudi right turn — combined with oil revenues used to build Wahhabi-inspired mosques, websites and madrassas across the Muslim world — has tilted the entire Sunni community to the right.” “Because of our oil addiction U.S. presidents never confronted Saudi Arabia as addicts never tell the truth to their pushers.” “Ambiv- alence runs also through Europe today with a failed multi-culturalism.” Minorities, mainly Christian, Kurds and Shiites in many parts of Arabia, have become the trade off to Western favouritism and addiction to oil and the status quo, and in appeasement to Arab dictators and Muslim regional actors and players. Hisham Melhem, Bureau Chief of Al-Arabiya in Washington, wrote, “Middle East Christians: death, exodus, betrayal and silence”. The report by the Center for American Progress titled “The Plight of Christians in the Middle East” describes the “reactions from the United States, Europe, and

- 50 - other key powers to this new wave of destruction as having been marginal.” Corporate America and Europe’s state arm dealers are at work. Friedman calls upon the Arab-Muslim world and the West to shed their ambivalence and stop playing double games. The Egyptian intellectual Ma’moun Fandy writes in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: “Muslims need to ‘upgrade their software,’ which is programmed mainly by our schools, television and mosques. There is no choice but to dismantle this system and rebuild it in a way that is compatible with human culture and values.” Finally, Christians in the Arab world have also to shed their ambivalence, get down from the fence and behave like full citizens and not as an intimidated minority. In a piece titled ‘Christians: Minority or Citizens’, (AmmanNet April 23, 2015) the Jordanian Christian journalist, Tamara Khuzouz explains that “when the tribal logic feeds into the feeling of power and domination by the ‘majority’, it provokes a reflex of exclusion and marginalization by the ‘minority’, transforming it in a constant state of internal struggle and identity crisis.” This becomes the case when Christians of the orient regard themselves as a minority and not as citizens. The developing extremism around them makes them reconsider their terms of belonging, choosing religion over nationalism. They have no other option but to fight for a civil society that protects the rights and freedoms of the individual. The Jordanian state faces the test of seriously dealing with pockets of extremism that threatens to delete the other, frightens the ‘minority’ and promotes a sense of alienation and neutrality within their homeland. Emigration is not an option. The Christians in Palestine are not faring better. Churches are being torch- ed… Denied access to Jerusalem’s holy sites by Israel... Loss of right to resi- dence in Jerusalem. Discrimination of Christian schools. Attacks on Christians doubled in the last five years. Ten were registered in 2012, but twenty-two in 2013. Jewish extremists publicly promote burning of churches as legitimate under Jewish law. The recent arson against the Church of Multiplication in Tibe- rias is one recent example. Right now, there is heavy protest of the construction of the wall, which aims to separate the mostly Christian-populated Beit Jala and the Cremisan Valley near Bethlehem. It will also separate the Cremisan mon- astery from its sister convent and school. Christians in Palestine amounted to 10 % before the Nakba. 78 % of the inhabitants of Bethlehem were Christians before 1947; today they make up a mere 12 %! In Jerusalem, they counted 19 %, today a mere 1 % or 8,000 only. There were 340,000 Christians inside the green line (1948), today they are 125,000. In the West Bank they total today around 200,000. Between the ‘chosen people’ and the ‘best nation’, the Christian Arabs seem also to be hitting the ‘Arab Boat’, as Ramzy Baroud called it. But they are not

- 51 - alone. 10,000 Arabs are made refugees every day. “The boat could be the last chance. Innocent people from all walks of life, sects and religions are dashing around in complete panic along with their children and carrying whatever they could salvage”. The majority of the Arabs /everyday Muslims are feeling as estranged and threatened with the phenomena of extreme Islam, as Christians, since they consider the trend to be one that violates the true spirit of humanity and peaceful Islam. There is reason however for optimism, Baroud sums up. Now most Arabs are equally sharing the burden of war, revolutions, destitution and exile. There is an Arab-Palestinian Nakba in the making. We are all in this together, Chris- tians, Shiites, Kurds, Yazidis, and last but not least every day Muslims. We must make it together. Sinking is not an option.

Dr Mahmoud El Guindi (Zürich, Switzerland)

The subject of “Religion and Violence” has been discussed on various occasions at the Zurich Forum of Religions as well as at the Zurich Institute for Inter-Religious Dialogue (ZIID, former “Zürcher Lehrhaus”). Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) said: "There are many causes for which I would be prepared to die, but no cause for which I would be prepared to kill". However, he was killed by a fanatic Hindu. Yitzhak Rabin (1922–1995), Israel’s former president, won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to establish peace with the Arabs and he was murdered by an extremist Jew. Anwar As-Sadat (1981–1981) of Egypt obtained the Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to achieve peace with Israel, and he was assassinated by a fundamentalist Muslim. Though Christianity is regarded as a per se religion of peace and love, two World Wars took place, let alone the Holocaust tragedy performed by a system,

- 52 - which was within the Christian Culture. From Muslim perspective, we never say they did that, even though they were Christians. The well-known golden rule of “World Ethics”: “Don’t do unto others what you don’t want others to do unto you” applies to all Religions (and can be found in all religious traditions) and is based on the ancient wisdom that violence brings more violence and kindness brings more kindness. Mahatma Gan- dhi said: “An eye for an eye will make the whole world blind”. Therefore, violence could not be seen primarily as a “Religious Phenome- non” but rather as a “Human Phenomenon”. According to the Book of Gen- esis of the Bible, Cain was the first human born, and he was the brother of Abel, who was the first human to die a not-natural death: Cain committed the first murder by killing his brother Abel. Interpretations of Genesis by ancient and modern commentators have typically assumed that the motives were jeal- ousy and anger. The Cain and Abel story is also found in the Qur’an and the text refers to them as the sons of Adam. The reason in both holy books was given as human weakness and not as religious fanaticism. A serious root cause analysis will abstain from merely viewing religions as source of all evils and main cause of violence, but will make due effort to go deeper in the human, political, economic and social factors, which could lead to violence under certain conditions or in certain patterns of conflict. While analysing conflicts around the world shown in various references,1 Religion is observed as one parameter which could have a varying influence according to conflict dynamics. Looking at the apparently religious conflict between Hindu India and Mus- lim Pakistan, one could be tempted to reduce the conflict to the single cause or dimension of Religion. A closer look to the nature and development of conflict, which caused several wars since the foundation of Pakistan, shows that religion is merely one of several dimensions. When the Muslims formed Pakistan after the Second World War, and were supported by Gandhi to reach their goal, some hundred Million Muslims have decided to continue living in India maintaining their dual identity as Muslims and Indians. They saw no conflict in that, and chose to seek their rights as a minority within a Hindu majority of a billion Hindus. As many minorities in the world they exerted more than average efforts to achieve good social standing in “their” country. This resulted in apparent paradox situations. In the war between India and Pakistan, the Chief Commander of Indian Air Forces was a Muslim, who made a successful career in the Indian

1 See, e.g., http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/index.html.

- 53 - Army. It is also known that Muslim scientists contributed with their Hindu peers in India jointly developing the atomic bomb, which was also developed in Pakistan as a part of the power balance in this region. It is interesting to note that the Islamic Fundamentalism was partially originated in Pakistan by Abdul Ala’ Al-Mawdoodi (1903–1979), who endeavoured to promote Islamic values and practices as a reaction to the dominating Hindu culture and in an attempt to emphasize the rights of the Muslims as a minority to maintain and defend their identity. His thoughts were also transmitted to countries where Muslims formed a majority and did not have the same desire requiring defending Muslim values. Accordingly, Religion could play a role in conflicts, their dynamics and es- calations, but is to be understood as one parameter within a large number of parameters leading to violence, which could even be escalated in the form of terrorism and/or war. The oversimplification of causes of violence relating them to religion is usually based on populist or superficial considerations, which also form a sort of misuse of religion for political purposes. There are good reasons to assume that believers of each religion statistically follow a “normal” or so called “Gaussian” probability distribution similar to a bell. There is the main stream of the majority in the middle, the liberal persons on one side and conservative or even extremist persons or groups on the other side of the probability distribution. This latter part could develop the potential for violence under certain conditions, and could always find in the holy books a justification for their attitude or actions. They become a security risk to their or other communities. Problems intensify when extremists of various religions turn against each other leading to the so called “Clash of civilizations”. From a Muslim perspective, civilizations (or cultures in another “nomenclature”) do not clash but could compete or communicate; otherwise, they cannot be called as such. The Charlie Hebdo tragedy was seen as an example of conflict of cultures and values. On one side, the value of the freedom of speech and expression or « l’art pour l’art ». On the other side, there were, and are, values of showing respect towards the faith of others and therewith avoiding provocation of certain aggressive groups. The inter-cultural understanding is an important prerequisite for appropriate risk mitigation in an enterprise, be it a publishing house or a commercial entity. The challenge is in the art of how to convey the required or intended message to the public without hurting the feelings of believers of any faith. For example, a cartoon, a caricature was shown in which a fundamentalist Muslim was shouting “Islam is a peaceful religion, and I would kill any person,

- 54 - who would claim otherwise”. Such a statement could be brought to demonstrate certain paradoxes within a particular religion or culture. It does not show disrespect towards any persons of holy values but conveys a certain message, which is accepted or even desired. Basically, Islam is not against humour. If the intention is to criticize persons or groups with the intention of drawing their attention to paradoxes or shortages it could be encouraged. In oriental cultures, “Nasruddin” is an interesting figure combining humour with wisdom in a provoking, but at the same time pedagogic funny and sympathetic manner. Contrary to business and politics where results count, in Islamic Religion it is the good intention, which counts. One learns in school the condition that must be fulfilled to ignite a fire, namely burning material, Oxygen and ignition. One does not learn the conditions, which could be fulfilled so that violence occurs. Are there similar elements, such as: Unsatisfied persons or groups + subjective or objective lack of freedom and/or justice + triggering through provoking events? We do not know. Researchers have to find it out. What we know is that referring violence to religion as a root cause reflects a lack of due diligence and dispassionate intellectual contemplation and does not significantly contribute to real understanding of the phenomenon, let alone making a diagnosis or leading to a cure. Neglecting or denying that everything that is or happens has more than just one cause, suggests that an oversimplification is deliberately attempted to ignore or avoid addressing the many other causes, which should be seriously considered. The Global Ethic Foundation “Weltethos” emphasizes that there will be no peace in the world without peace between Religions. While we view this as very essential and crucial to world peace, it still seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for peace. We could also use the statement that there will be no peace in the world without having inner peace in the individuals. Inner peace could be achieved through a balance between material and spiritual needs and could be better realized by achieving perceived justice. A striking example is the situation of nourishment in the world. While statistics show that there is enough food in the world to nourish 12'000 Million inhabitants of the globe, almost 1'000 Millions are under nourished due to shortages in logistics or income. A new world order should exert itself to reach better distribution and more satisfaction in the poorest parts of the world. Whether this could contribute to reduction of violence in the world and more peace between religions, is then to be seen.

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Texts and Reflections

From “Return of Religion into the Public Sphere” to “Islamophobia” and “New anti-Semitism” or How European Countries and Societies Changed

Prof Dr Michel Sternberg (Paris, France)

Let us start with the Events of January 2015 in France: (a) the murder of twelve journalists, co-workers and guardians of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, who on January 7th, 2015, were killed by two Islamist terrorists (Cherif and Saïd Kouachy) in Paris; (b) the murder of a policewoman in Arcueil, near Paris, killed on January 8th, 2015, by another Islamist terrorist (Amedy Cou- libaly), and (c) the assassination of four Jewish citizens in a kosher food store by Amedy Coulibaly at Porte de Vincennes (Paris), on January 9th, 2015. The three murderers were pursued and shot dead by the police. On January 11th, 2015, a giant demonstration of national and inter-national personalities was organized in Paris, and two million people from all over France and neighbouring countries took part proclaiming: « Je suis Charlie » (“I am Charlie”) and honoured the Jewish innocent victims. Two more million people assembled in other towns of France – an unprecedented gathering in the history of France! The satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, has a long-standing tradition of coming out with famous caricatures Of ALL religions, including Islam. Thus, on Feb- ruary 8th, 2006, under the title « Mahomet déborde par les intégristes» (Muhammad overwhelmed by fundamentalists) the front page showed a cartoon portraying a weeping Muhammad exclaiming: « C’est dur d’être aimé par des cons… » (It is hard being loved by jerks). In the same issue were also reproduced the twelve Danish caricatures of Muhammad that previously were published in Jyllands-Posten.

A Legal issue in 2007: Since 1992, it was no less than 49 times that criminal proceedings were initi- ated against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo for satires and caricatures

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pillorying certain aspects of various religions. Nine times, Charlie Hebdo was convicted, but never of having published cartoons caricaturing the Prophet Muhammad! In 2006 the Grand Mosque of Paris placed a formal charge against the chief- editor of Charlie Hebdo, Philippe Val, blaming him for violating France’s hate speech laws that protect individuals and groups from being defamed or insulted because of their religion. The lawsuit was limited, however, to three specific cartoons published in February 2006, including one of the Danish cartoons depicting Muhammad carrying a bomb in his turban. In March 2007, the Tribunal de Paris acquitted Val, arguing that it was not the Muslims or Muslim community, but certain fundamentalists, who were being ridiculed in the cartoons. Recollecting the events of January 2015, they emphasize (a) the importance of freedoms of speech and liberty of expression in France, attesting at the same time (b) to an increment in Islamophobia in response to Islamist terrorism or manifestations of extremism, and (c) to an increase in feelings of insecurity among the Jewish community, as can also be learned from the statistics of anti- Semitic acts committed in France in 2015: From January to May, anti-Semitic acts amounted to 508 in 2015, this means that, compared to 276 in 2014, and 195 in 2013, anti-Semitic acts increased by 84% in 2015 compared to 2014, and by 161% compared to 2013. During the same period, from January to May, among these anti-Semitic acts the category of acts of violence increased by 59% in 2015 (= 121 incidents) compared to 2014 (= 76 incidents), and by 124% compared to 2013 (= 54 incidents). According to Le Monde (July 17, 2015), the year 2015 marks likewise an increase in acts of Islamophobia in France: Between January 1, 2015 and July 1, 2015, 274 anti-Muslim acts were registered, that is an increase of 281% compared to the same period in 2014 (72 incidents). A particularly dramatic increase in acts of Islamophobia could be observed in France in January 2015. Again, according to Le Monde (January 14, 2015), between January 7 and January 12, 2015, within six days only (!), 54 anti-Muslim acts were registered (outside Paris and its sub- urbs): among them 21 acts of violence (including armed attacks on seven mosques, and putting pig heads on the doors of two prayer houses), and 33 “in- sults” (including many graffiti on the walls of Muslim community centres).

When looking for an answer to the question of what caused and motivated these acts of Islamophobia in France, the following aspects should be taken into consideration:

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(1) Feelings of rejection: Islamophobia in its literal sense: i.e. fear of the religion of Islam as such, focussing on certain specific aspects of Islamic religious law and Muslim customs understood as contradicting secularity or French laïcité, e. g. wearing head scarfs by women in public administrations or the like. These practices may generate hostile reactions of “ultra-secular” political leaders. (2) Racism against Arab Muslim people (?): This aspect is often neglected. It was underlined particularly by Stéphane Char- bonnier (“Charb”), the assassinated director of Charlie Hebdo, in his last book, which came out in January 2015. (3) Rejection of Islamists or Muslim extremists: Focussing sometimes on extremist intolerant religious leaders, sometimes more on Islamist terrorists (like those implicated in the January events) ++. It is, however, important to add that this rejection is directed against the extremists, and does not affect Islam in general. (4) Impact of migration movements and immigration: Attitudes like these are not limited to France alone, but widely spread all over Europe, gaining momentum particularly in connection with the massive influx of refugees and migrants from the Middle East and Africa. (5) The role played by new converts to Islam: On August 19, 2015, Le Monde reported that the overall number of converts to Islam in France amounts to an estimated figure of about 100’000 people that is 2% of the Muslim population in France (consisting of estimated 5 million). The vast majority of the converts are pacific, peaceful Muslims. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that 25% of the 1000 French jihadists are converts, who recently only embraced Islam!

Let’s now turn to the issue of anti-Semitism in France. There too are various aspects to be taken into consideration: (1) Classical anti-Semitism (Antisémitisme) directed against the Jewish people and so-called “Jewish race”: This type of anti-Semitism was of special importance in France, e.g., at the time of the Dreyfus Affair and played a terrible role in Germany and Vichy France under the Nazi regime. (2) Traditional anti-Judaism (Antijudaïsme), a term rather used to characterize and describe hostility against Jews (homines religiosi) and Jewish religion for religious, theological reasons:

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This type of anti-Jewish sentiment and hatred of Jews is a well-known phenomenon inherent in Christian tradition and based primarily on religious prejudices derived inter alia from certain Christian interpretations of New Testa- ment texts (mis)taking the Jewish opponents of Jesus (mainly the Temple authorities) for all the Jews not only of that time, but for all the Jews of all times! In fact, anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism may be associated not only, bur are interrelated, the two sides of the same coin: Traditional anti-Judaism prepared the ground on which modern anti-Semitism could grow.

To fight anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, important initiatives were launched during the last decades; a special role in that context played Jules Isaac. For many years, Jules Isaac (1877–1963) dedicated a large part of his efforts to research the history of anti-Semitism, its origins, emergence, and growth. His ideas, laid down in his book Jésus et Israël, written in the years of Second World War and published in 1948 in Paris (few years later followed by his Genèse de l’antisémitisme, Paris, 1956) served as a source of inspiration for “The 10 Points of Seelisberg: An Address to the Churches” (adopted by the international Conference of Christians and Jews, held in Seelisberg/Switzerland from 30 July to 05 Au- gust 1947), and paved the way to the foundation of the “Amitiés Judéo-Chré- tiennes” in 1947 (in fact, he was one of the co-founders). All his life, he was engaged in fighting anti-Semitism, particularly its Christian origins and ingredi- ents, which he saw as decisive. In 1949, Jules Isaac advised Pope Pius XII to initiate a revision of the liturgy for Good Friday services and re-formulate its main prayer, which previously contained offensive references to the Jews calling them not only infidels, but “perfidious Jews”. He also observed that Catholics did not kneel down when praying for the Jews on Good Friday, though they did so when uttering all other petitions. Pope Pius followed Jules Isaac’s suggestion and advice and introduced the change of liturgical practice; but it was Pope John XXIII only, who revised the negative language of the text of the prayer concerning the Jews and introduced a new formula. That way, he helped to embark on o new road to Christian-Jewish understanding that eventually led to the declaration Nostra ætate adopted by the Second Vatican Council (1965), whose paragraph #4 still today is regarded as the magna carta of the new theological thinking about Jews and Judaism within the Roman Catholic church.

To mention here but a few initiatives launched to fighting anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism and respective steps taken:1

1 Cf. my article “Interreligious Movements and Dialogue Groups Promoting Dialogue

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(a) The Amitié Judéo-Chrétienne de France (AJCF) (Judeo-Christian Friendship As- sociation in France) and its activities. (b) In November, 2010 a new edition of the TOB ecumenical translation of the Bible was available. Thanks to the intervention by the Amitié Judéo-Chrétienne de France an important point was revised: i.e. the translation of the Greek term hoi ioudaioi as used in the Gospel of John. Previously this term was generally rendered as “the Jews”; but now, whenever the opponents of Jesus are meant, it is translated “the Jewish authorities”. (c) Rome, June 30, 2015: Pope Francis welcomes a delegation of the Amitiés Judéo-Chrétiennes Interna- tionales (International Council of Christians and Jews, ICCJ) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the promulgation of the Nostra Ætate Declaration stress- ing: “The development of an authentic fraternal dialogue has been made possible since the Second Vatican Council, following the promulgation of the Declaration Nostra Ætate. This document represents a definitive ‘yes’ to the Jewish roots of Christianity and an irrev- ocable ‘no’ to anti-Semitism.”

To the above mentioned aspects of anti-Semitism in France, one more is to be added and considered here: (3) Anti-Zionism (Antisionisme): Because of their solidarity with the Jews living in Israel (but not necessarily with Israel’s politics), many Jews in France are exposed to that (new) type of anti-Jewish enmity and became victims of this anti-Zionism generated by the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict and present in France as an imported conflict as could be observed particularly during the January 2015 events. Anti-Zionism (Antisionisme) pretends to be the response to Zionism (Sionisme). But what does Zionism exactly mean? Zionism aims at establishing a publicly and legally assured national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (First Zionist Congress 1897). In order to get the land, the Jewish National Fund was founded and commissioned to purchase land in Palestine (Fifth Zionist Congress 1901). The purchase of land was practiced during Ottoman rule over Palestine (which lasted until 1917) as well as during the time of the British Mandate (that ended in 1948). That way, e.g., Tel-

between Jews, Christians and Muslims in France”, in: STEFAN SCHREINER (ed.), Re- ligion and Secular State. Role and Meaning of Religion in a Secular Society from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives. International Consultation Sarajevo (BIH), 21–24 October 2007 (Proceedings of the European Abrahamic Forum, vol. 2), Zürich / Sarajevo 2008, pp. 161-167.

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Aviv was founded in 1908 on the sand hills near Jaffa under Ottoman rule over Palestine. In November 1947 the United Nations adopted a resolution to divide Pal- estine into two parts in order to enable the creation of two separate states, a Jewish state and an Arab state in Palestine. I assume, all of you are familiar with the rest of the (hi)story that followed. From this original Zionism, we have to distinguish the present day ultra- Zionism of extremist Jews questioning not only the right of Palestinian Arabs to their land, but tending to take by force, illegally, all Palestinian land west of the Jordan river in order to establish new colonies and eventually annex the entire land to the state of Israel. In France, anti-Zionism (antisionisme) is in fact mainly directed against the extremist colonialist ultra-Zionists; but distinction is not always made between Zi- onism and ultra-Zionism. And it should not be overlooked that this anti-Zionism comes along and appears more and more in vestiges not different from traditional anti-Semitism (antisémitisme) mixed even with “classical” racism.

Let’s now turn to the issue of Freedom of expression or Freedom of speech as the political right to communicate one’s opinions and ideas freely, an issue raised time and again not least in connection with the publishing activities of Charlie Hebdo: In France, the liberty of conscience (liberté de conscience), the liberty to practice religion or not (liberté des cultes), and the freedom of expression or speech are basic values and essential rights. The articles on offence of blasphemy or the like, let alone permission to impose death penalty for that, have been abolished from the penal code as early as in 1791 already.2 This has to be kept in mind in order to understand the situation of religions and religious communities in our secular democracy and the events of January 2015. However, these basic values are ignored by religious extremists. Contrary to them, all French and foreign participants of the gathering on January 11, 2015, including King Abdallah of Jordan, President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and 2 million other people, agreed and emphasized the right to freedom of expression, which Charlie Hebdo too has, even when publishing strongly satirical and agnostic texts and cartoons.

2 Only in Alsace and Moselle, the articles on offence of blasphemy (forbidding public blasphemy against God!) survived in the local penal code as holdover from the old German criminal code of 1871 (validated by the French authorities in October and November 1919), but are no longer applied. At least, not a single case of conviction under the respective articles is registered.

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Why are Freedom of expression or speech and Freedom of conscience so essential in France? (1) France has a long history of “religious wars” or rather of wars between religious communities: These were mainly conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, to be sure, culminating in St. Bartholomew’s Night (August 24, 1592), and again in 1685, when the famous edict of tolerance, the Édit de Nantes (Edict of Nantes), prom- ulgated in April 1598 to grant the Huguenots (Calvinist Protestants) basic rights in France, was abolished, and many French Protestants were forced to leave and seek asylum in other European countries, quite a number of them in Ger- many (Berlin), to mention but these two here only. (2) Remembrance of the Death Penalty imposed on heretics, e.g. Michel Servet (1509–1553) in Geneva, who contested the Trinity of God and – under the pressure exercised by John Calvin (Jehan Cauvin; 1509–1564) – was condemned and burnt on the stake (1553). (3) The Tradition of the – particularly – French enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century (Siècle des Lumières), e.g., Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet; 1694–1778), writing in his Discours « De la Liberté » (1734): « Ah ! Sans la liberté que seraient donc nos âmes ? » (“Ah! Without liberty how would our souls be?”) (4) The legacy of the French Revolution: « La Liberté ou la Mort » (Freedom or Death) was not just one of the slogans of the revolutionaries, but – in addition to the famous « Liberté, égalité, fraternité » (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) – the proclamation of their intention and goal.

How far may freedom of expression be used? Or is there a limit to it? In France, advocacy of hatred, any expressions of hate or insult against any citizen, based on religious affiliation, ethnic-cultural background or “race”, gen- der or sexual orientation, is prohibited by the French Hate Speech Laws. These laws are intended to protect people, individuals and groups, from being insulted. They do not forbid expressions of hate against any religion, they do not know of any article against offence of blasphemy or the like. However during the criminal proceedings against the chief-editor of Charlie Hebdo for the caricatures published in February 2006, the French President Jacques Chirac personally condemned overt provocations, which could incite pas- sions and harm. “Anything that can hurt the convictions of anyone else, in particular religious convictions, should be avoided.”

How to fight the growing anti-Semitism and Islamophobia?

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(1) By taking religions seriously, but strictly and precisely criticizing those aspects of religions leading to extremism. (2) By recognizing that freedom of religion (liberté du culte) includes agnosticism as well. The right to practice religion includes the right to be an agnostic and to question religions at all. Remember the Dialog between Blaise Pascal and Jesus: « Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m’avais déjà trouvé ! » (“You wouldn’t search for me if you hadn’t already found me!”) Blaise Pascal, Pensées : « Le mystère de Jésus ». (3) By promoting tolerant and open-minded interpretations of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, ready to fully respect views and beliefs that differ from one’s own. When Pope Benedict XVI met with representatives of various religions in the United Kingdom (September 17, 2010), he said: “Cooperation and dialogue between religions calls for mutual respect, the freedom to practise one’s religion and to engage in acts of public worship, and the freedom to follow one’s conscience without suffering ostracism or persecution, even after conversion from one religion to another. Once such a respect and openness has been established, peoples of all religions will work together effectively for peace and mutual understanding, and so give a convincing witness before the world.” Similarly, the Qur’an proclaims: Surah II, 256: “Let there be no compulsion in religion.” Surah XI, 118: “If thy Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind one People: but they will not cease to differ.” Surah XLII, 15: “Allah is our Lord and your Lord: for us (is the responsibility for) our deeds, and for you for your deeds. There is no contention between us and you. Allah will bring us together, and to Him is (our) final goal.” etc. (4) By promoting principles of civil society and civic education focussing not only on tolerance, but respect for the otherness of the other, for believers and nonbelievers alike. (5) By fostering inter-religious, inter-cultural encounter and dialogue, facilitat- ing the dissemination of ideas of Judeophilia instead of anti-Judaism and anti- Semitism, of Christianophilia instead of Christianophobia, of Islamophilia instead of Islamophobia. This was, and still is, the intention and goal of the French Fraternité d’Abraham, founded in 1967 by André Chouraqui, Father Michel Riquet, Jacques Nantet, and Si Hamza Boubakeur, and – I have no doubt – it was, and is, the intention and goal of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) as well.

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Rabbi Prof Dr Reuven Firestone (Los Angeles, USA)

Islamophobia and anti-Semitism have much in common, though they arose from different historical circumstances. Both vent personal anxiety and fear by pro- jecting them onto innocent others, and both are deeply embedded into the very fabric of Western culture and society. Via a visual journey through history and the arts, this presentation will explore the origins of the problem, trace how and why it has become a basic part of our common culture, and suggest a way to overcome it in order to build a society and world in which we can all live and benefit together. Islamophobia and anti-Semitism are facts of life in this country and elsewhere. They are actually a small part of a much larger, universal problem found in all human communities. Human groups, from the largest mass societies to the smallest school groups and often even family units, tend to identity a community (or family) member and use him or her (or them) as a scapegoat. The term “scapegoat” comes from an ancient ceremony described in the He- brew Bible, in which the High Priest sym- bolically transfers all the sins of the community onto a goat and then sends it deep into the desert. The purpose of the act was to remove the sin and guilt of the community by placing it on the head of the goat – and then get rid of the guilt by destroying the goat. This ritual of placing evil onto a goat and driving in into the wilderness is very old. It was found in the 24th century BCE cuneiform Ebla texts in today’s Syria.1

1 IDA ZATELLI, “The Origin of the Biblical Scapegoat Ritual: The Evidence of Two Eblaite Texts,” in: Vetus Testamentum 48 (1998), pp. 254-263.

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It was also part of ancient Greek society. But there it was not a goat but rather a cripple, or beggar or criminal who was beaten and then caste out of the community. This is not only an ancient problem, but a modern one as well. All communities seem to have their desig- nated scapegoats. anti-Semitism and Islam- ophobia are only certain kinds of scapegoating. They don’t represent some evil or a disease that can be eradicated, but rather a human tendency that will remain with us in some form or another forever. We cannot eliminate what appears to be a natural and virtually universal human social phenomenon. But we can learn how to control it and remove its poison. In today’s presentation we will learn something about the origins of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. More important than its origins, however, is to understand why they have persisted for such a long time in our cultures and societies. Anti-Jewish and anti-Is- lamic prejudice saturates both traditional and modern media. Negative portrayals of Jews and Muslims are found repeatedly in folklore, literature, art, music, poetry and even fairy tales and children’s stories. In this country we live in what Jews and Muslims would mostly agree is a Christian country (though some Christians would not agree!). While Is- lamophobia and anti-Semitism are deeply embedded in Western society, they are not the problem only of Christians. They are also the problem of Muslims and Jews. The Muslim and Jewish communities here and elsewhere need to face the truth that members of our own faith communities have become active in promoting hatred of one another. I will try to show how this is not simply due to the conflict in

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Israel / Palestine, and I will show how prejudice is embedded not only in secular society, but also in our religions, perhaps the most important pillar of the societies in which we live. The world has always been made up of hundreds and thousands of faith communities. But faith communities have always been in competition with one another over membership. Religions want to help people, to bring them to religious enlightenment, to provide a moral-ethical and spiritual life for all humanity, to help people achieve salvation. I argue that while God provides revelation and prophets to many peoples, God and religion are separate entities. God communicates through revelation but God does not organize religious institutions. In our attempt to understand the reality of our religions experience, we respond to God’s call in various ways. God did not speak only once and then remain forever silent. Divine guidance has been conveyed in many ways over the centuries and millennia, and God continues to provide guidance. But that guidance is understood differently by different individuals and different communities. For example, God never told humans to organize themselves specifically around leaders called imams, or priests, or ministers, rabbis, caliphs or popes. Each of these types of religious leadership has formed differently, as different communities have responded to the divine dis- closure in different places and at different times. Religions reach out to people because they truly wish to help humanity. All religions stress love and respect for God’s creatures. But religions are not God. Religions are human responses to God. Religions form in response to revelation and the traditions of the ancients, along with the efforts of many smart and inspired people who were neither prophets nor companions of prophets. Despite all good intentions, those who practice religion, including religious leaders, can feel competition, resentment and jeal- ousy toward those who preach a different message.

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God gives revelation whenever God decides the time is right. But whenever a new revelation is given it challenges those who already live within a religion based on an earlier wisdom or revelation. Let us think about this from multiple points of view. From the standpoint of an established religion, and especially a religion with a divine scripture, any claims of a new revelation are, to put it mildly challenging. Why would God give a new revelation if the old one were adequate? New Scriptural revelations can only occur after the older, established revelations are col- lected and canonized. What does canonization mean? All scriptural religions determine at some point in their development that revelation has ceased. It is over. The records of revelation are then gathered and made official. Scripture is the “inscribed” or “scripted” result of putting revelation into writing. Moreover, when it is written down it is as if it were inscribed in stone. Anything that is suspected of not being a part of the divine revelation is eliminated. So all possible divine utterances are carefully examined, checked and determined by a body of experts either to be authentic or inauthentic. What is determined to be authentic remains in – all else is out. All that is out is destroyed and all efforts are then made to preserve the authentic text of scripture – the written record of divine revelation. After a religion has canonized its scripture, it can never accept any fresh claims for a new revelation. So here is rule #1 of religious relationship: “Established religions do not accept the claims of a new divine revelation from any individual or community.” Newer religions can look back at previous revelation and give them a great deal of respect. However, they can never accept them fully. If they gave full credit to prior revelation, then there would be little reason for a new revelation! Therefore, Christians can give some credit to the Old Testament, but it is meaningless without its fulfilment in the New Testa- ment. In addition, Muslims can respect the NT and HB to a limited extent, but they see these prior revelations as flawed,

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distorted and corrupted. If they were not, there would be no reason for God to provide a new revelation in the Qur’an. Another inevitable event in the formation of new religions is “the test.” Members of established religions inevitably question the leaders of new religious movements to see whether they are authentic – whether they are whom they say they are. So we have stories in the NT about Jews “testing” Jesus, and references in the Qur’an and Hadith to Jews and Chris- tians “testing” Muhammad. In the left picture, the Jewish High Priest Caiaphas is testing Jesus as depicted in the Gos- pel of Matthew (ch.26). Below, the Christian monk Bahira is testing Mu- hammad as depicted in al-Sīra al- Naba- wiyya, the sacred biography of the Prophet. In the other panel below Buddha is shown as he was tested and questioned by Hindu Brahmans. Here is an interesting observation about these test sequences. The same stories are often found in the religious literatures of both the established religions and the new religions – but with very different outcomes. In Christian writings, the Jews who tested Jesus are confounded by his divine wisdom; but in Jewish versions of the same stories, Jesus is proven not to fulfil the Christian claims. So too with the stories associated with Muhammad. The Christian monk Bahira proves Mu- hammad’s authenticity in the Islamic versions, but the same story is found in both Jewish and Christian literatures – and with the opposite results. The very same stories are used by each side to “prove” the truth of its claims. Few people know this because people rarely read the sacred literatures of other religions. We find a similar testing sequence in the Torah as well. This picture depicts the Moab- ite King Balak in the Book of Numbers, who calls upon the Moabite holy man Bilaam to curse the Israelites. Try as he would, the Mo- abite prophet is unable to curse them. Every time he tries, his curse becomes a blessing. This proves in the Torah that the Israelites

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are bound to the true God, tested and proven authentic by a foreign prophet. We unfortunately do not have the Moabite version of the story, which must have depicted the curse as taking effect. The Moabites had their own established religion before the Israelites came along and threatened it with their new revelation. New religious movements are never accepted by established religions. What do we call new religious movements in our own lingo? Cults. Cult, sect, religion. Most new religious movements die out… But some succeed and grow into respected religions. Joke: What is the difference between a cult and a religion? 100 years! Inevitably, when new religious movements become larger and more successful, they become threatening to established religions. Established religions always try to prove that the new movements are false. They do this in a variety of ways. But because the revelation of established religions has ceased by the time a new religion emerges into history, established religions can never attack new religions through scripture. It does not say anywhere explicitly in the HB, for example, that the New Testament is not a true divine revelation – but it also does not say anywhere that it is not! Same with the NT in relation to the Qur’an. New religions usually claim that the old revelations contain some message confirming their new revelations, but it can only be argued – never proven. Members of established religions nevertheless try to prevent new religions from succeeding. Remember that all new religions begin as something like “cults,” at least from the perspective of establishment religions. It is not that the established religion is being “evil.” From the perspective of the establishment, the new religion is – by definition – not authentic. Think of it this way: no true believer wants his/her children to abandon them and follow another religion. So believers in established religions always try to show that new religions are false. Now let us try to see both sides of the coin. From the standpoint of the established religion, the leaders of new religions make false claims of prophethood or messiah-ship. But from the perspective of believers in the new religion, those who oppose them are committing a terrible sin by trying to prevent God’s true word from being spread in the world. In the inevitable struggle between established religions and new religions, the established religions have the initial advantage because they are well-established. They have material resources that they can use to attack the new religion, and they inevitably use them. Most new religions fail and die out for many reasons, including the opposition of established religions. But when the new religion sur- vives those attacks, it then has an awesome advantage – and the unfortunate legacy – of its position being articulated in the inerrant medium of the divine word.

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Matthew 23: 13‘Alas for you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! You shut the door of the kingdom of Heaven in people’s faces; you do not enter yourselves, and when others try to enter, you stop them…31So you acknowledge that you are the sons of those who killed the prophets. 32Go on then, finish off what your fathers began! 33Snakes! Vipers’ brood! How can you escape being condemned to hell? These verses refer to some Jews who tested Jesus and tried to ridicule him – they were trying to prove that he was not what he claimed to be. That was 2000 years ago, and the reference to those scribes and Pharisees does not refer to all Jews. But these words were used later as a “proof” that all Jews are evil, are hypocrites, and are condemned to hell. And the source of this unfortunate viewpoint is derived from scripture itself, so for billions of Christians through the ages it served to prove that all Jews are bad – by definition – evil. What is not portrayed here, however, are positive references to Jews or Judaism in the NT. For example: Romans 3: 1What advantage, then, is there in being a Jew, or what value is there in circumcision? 2 Much in every way! First of all, the Jews have been entrusted with the very words of God. 3 What if some were unfaithful? Will their unfaithfulness nullify God’s faith- fulness? 4 Not at all! […]. There are a variety of ways to read and understand the message of scriptural verses. Sura 2 (The Cow) 109“Many of the people of the Book would like to return you to unbelievers after your having believed, because of envy on their part after the truth has become clear to them. But forgive and be indulgent until God gives His command, for God is the Power over everything.” The Qur’an acknowledges that Jews and Christians (People of the Book) tried to prevent the success of the new religious community led by Prophet Muham- mad. This is a natural sequence in the tension between established religions and new religious movements. Sura 3 (Family of Imram): 78There are some among them [People of the Book] who distort the Book with their tongues and you would think it is from the Book, but it is not from the Book. But they say, "It is from God." But it is not from God. They lie against God and know it! Now with our understanding about the tension between new religions and established religions, can you imagine why this accusation might be found here? And think of the next citation. Sura 5 (The Set Table): 51O Believers, do not take Jews and Christians as friends [or patrons]. They are friends [only] of one another. Whoever makes friends with them is one of them. God does not guide an unjust people! The Torah also notes the tension between new and established religions, but the Torah version is extremely harsh – much more so than either the New Testa- ment or the Qur’an – in its response to the attempt of established Canaanite religions to prevent the success of the Israelite monotheists.

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Deuteronomy 7: 1When the Lord your God brings you to the land that you are about to enter and possess, and He dislodges many nations before you -- the Hittites, Girgashites, Amorites, Canaanites… 2Lord your God delivers them to you and you defeat them, you must doom them to total destruction: grant them no terms and give them no quarter. 3You shall not intermarry with them: do not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for your sons. 4For they will turn your children away from Me to worship other gods, and the Lord's anger will blaze forth against you and He will promptly wipe you out. Perhaps surprising, given the bad press that surrounds Islam these days, the qur’anic critique of representatives of established religions is less harsh overall than that of the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament. And like other scriptures, the Qur’an has good things to say about those communities that opposed the religious movement it represents. Sura 2 (The Cow): 62O you Believers, Jews, and Christians and Sabeans: whoever believes in God and the Last Day and who has acted rightly has their reward with their Lord. They shall not fear nor grieve. The purpose of this exercise is not to “compare” religions and then make value judgments about which is “better.” That is a completely subjective program and leads nowhere. The truth of the matter is that you can find positive and negative references to Jews and Christians in the Qur’an, and you can find positive and negative references to Jews in the New Testament. None of the negative references represents blatant anti-Semitism or hatred. They represent, rather, the anger, frustration, and resentment of new religions that are tested and criticized by established religions. But what began as expressions of anger and frustration have over the years, become fodder for the development of extreme and savage hatred through scapegoating. We just examined some aspects of the academic study of religion and religious competition. Some scholars relate the competition between religions to the competition between businesses in a free market. This analogy isn’t exactly fitting for a number of reasons, but I want to use some of the language because it makes a very good point. This is how it is sometimes explained. Religions exist in what can be called a “religious economy.” Like business, religions have a “product” to “sell.” Those who promote the new religion claim that it provides satisfaction that is similar but better than the satisfaction available through the current religions. Before buying a new car, you will want to know if it is safe, comfortable, and does what the ads say it can do. Before buying a washing machine, you will want to know that it will fulfil its advertised promises of making

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your clothes clean and comfortable. So too, before you join a new religion or religious movement, you will want to know that it will provide you with the advantages that it promises. You will be happy to know that the believers in that religion are happy. And the truth is that millions of Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus and others are happy. There are always some, however, who are unsatisfied with their religious or spiritual life and may be open to something new. When a new religion comes onto the religious market, it needs to demonstrate that it can provide the same kinds of happiness and compensation that established religions do – and more. If it succeeds, it then gains a large enough market-share of consumers (that, is new believers) who join the religious community. With enough joiners (consumers), the new religion attains a critical mass of economic, social and spiritual support. Numbers are necessary to ensure the ongoing success of the religion. Without a significant market share, new religions collapse into oblivion. Established religions do not like competing products in the market, so they try to demonstrate that the new religions cannot really offer what they promise: no truth in scripture, no true prophecy, and no true salvation. No real happiness. New religions need to show that their believers are happy. The new religions, meanwhile, also critique the establishment religions as being out of touch, irrelevant, in need of replacement. This is not simply an issue of business competition. The stakes are much higher than a monetary bottom line. Salvation is, to put it bluntly, worth dying for. Therefore, the religious gloves often come off when religions engage in negative advertising. That is where the embeddedness of prejudice comes in. Now let us consider what this means in real history. While some Jews accepted Jesus as messiah and even as the son of God, the Jewish community as a whole did not. Christianity was a universal religion and truly expected the entire world to accept Jesus as Lord.

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Now let us consider what this means in real history. While some Jews accepted Jesus as messiah and even as the son of God, the Jewish community as a whole did not. Christianity was a universal religion and truly expected the entire world to accept Jesus as Lord. But the Jews as a religious community never did. Jews and Christians competed against one another for some 200 years at the same time that both were persecuted as minority religions by the pagan Roman Empire. They were competing, it turns out, for the greatest prize possible – the Roman Empire itself. The Christians won when the empire Christianized in the 4th century. From that moment onward, the Christian religious establishment implemented a policy of containment and eventually, degradation of Jews. Most Christians logi- cally and honestly believed that the conversion of the Roman Empire to a Christian empire now called the Byzantine Empire was an act of God – divine proof of the truth of Christ and the irrelevance of Judaism. According to this perspective, history proved theology, and that proof became institutionalized in the degradation of a hateful minority that stubbornly would not accept Christ. Yet the Jews remained Jewish. Even under immense pressure and without armies or protection, Judaism survived and even thrived. It was the consistent pressure of anti-Jewish legislation, theological speculation and general social degradation that, over the centuries, became deeply embedded in Christian society. We’ll see how that played out shortly. Christians were enormously successful as a religious community and religious civilization. But while Christianity succeeded in becoming a world religion, it never succeeded in becoming the religion of the entire world. In fact, the very conviction that history proves the truth of theology was soon turned entirely on its head from a Chris- tian perspective when Islam so quickly became a very successful competing world religion. If history was thought to prove the truth of theology, then the very argument that was used against Judaism could be used against Christi- anity, for it became very clear in a very short time that Muslims were enormously successful as a religious community and a religious civilization.

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This confounded many thinkers in the Church. Some concluded that the success of Islam was an acci- dent. Others argued that Muham- mad was duped by the devil who gave him a false scripture and that the transcendent moments describ-

ed by his followers when he received a divine revelation were either moments of satanic possession or moments of ep- ileptic seizures. These comments began emerging in the Christian world in the early Middle Ages and have been repeated to this day. The controversy over recent irresponsible caricatures of Muhammad has made it seem like negative portrayals are a new development. In fact, however, art has always been a medium for argument and for ridicule, and not only against Islam, but against competitors of all types. It is important to understand that negative portrayals of opponents and adversaries are found everywhere. In the West, it is culturally acceptable to delegitimize adversaries through art and caricature, and it has been a custom for millennia, since even before the emergence of Christianity. It is important for Muslims to understand that while the visual propaganda against Islam is despicable and unacceptable, it is not directed only against Islam. We shall see how in the West it was more com- monly directed against Jews. It was directed even against competing Christian communities. Sometimes the negativity is obvious, but sometimes it is subtle. In this set, we see Muhammad portrayed as a fish in a 12th century Qur’an translation into Latin. He is portrayed as an effeminate warrior in the picture on a Latin biography of the prophet. And in the middle he is portrayed in hell. We will see more of this theme later in our exploration. It is the cultural embeddedness of prejudicial religious stereotypes, which perpetuates and legitimates majority persecution of religious minorities. Put simply, if prejudice is allowed to remain active in a society for a significant length of time, it becomes embedded in culture. When that happens, negative stereotypes are perpetuated in all the avenues through which culture is passed on from generation to generation: in literature, the plastic arts, folklore

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and folk stories, even music and poetry – and today through the new media of cinema and the blogosphere. The negative literature ranges from theological treatises (religious polemics) to high literary tradition such as Shakespeare and Chaucer, to folktales. Although the fear and hostility may have originated in religious competition, religious hatred infiltrates the common culture and becomes “secularized” – the abhorrence and re- vulsion of the other become, then, simply a “fact” of life. What follows, are some famous examples that come out of the Christian majority culture of Europe. Here is the famous Shylock, the ruthless and heartless Jewish moneylender in Shakespeare’s “Merchant of Venice.” Shylock of course symbolized the role of the Jew as cruel moneylender. He demands a pound of flesh from a man who was unable to repay a loan from him. "A pound of flesh" is a figurative way of referring to a harsh demand or spiteful penalty—the consequences of defaulting on a desperate bargain. But the evil Shylock demands a literal pound of flesh as security when the merchant Antonio comes to borrow money for a friend. This sensational bargain fascinated its first audience as it fascinates us. When the play was first published, its title page advertised "The most excellent History of the Merchant of Venice. With the extreme cruelty of Shylock the Jew towards the said merchant, in cutting a just pound of his flesh. . . ." Shylock was foiled from carrying out his evil desire and forced to convert to Christianity. Shakespeare’s play was written at the very end of the 16th century and reinforced nasty stereotypes about Jews in England – despite the fact that Jews were forcibly expelled from England in 1290. Jews had not lived in England for 3 centuries, yet the prejudicial stereotype nevertheless persisted. That’s because it was so deeply embedded in English culture. In medieval France, the chansons de geste was one of the earliest forms of French literature. These are epic poems about heroic deeds of ancient French warriors such as Charlemagne. One series of chansons de geste is called the Song of Roland. It tells the story of Muslim raiders who viciously attacked the weak stragglers led by Charle- magne’s nephew Roland. Although he puts up a defence against impossible odds, Roland is savagely dispatched.

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Never mind that the people who actually did attack the rear-guard were Basque Christians – not Muslim at all! Nevertheless, the gallant song depicts the raiders as cowardly, barbarous Muslims, a stereotypic image that became embedded generally in French and European culture. Both the disgusting Shy- lock and the despicable Muslims were duly punished, according to the legends. And the stories are both resolved by the culprits finally converting to the true religion and becoming Christians. Geoffrey Chaucer (d. 1400) is known as the father of English literature. He was an author, philosopher, al- chemist and as- tronomer. In his Canterbury Tales, he tells “The Prioress’s Tale.” about a little Christian boy who lived in the Jew- ish quarter of the town. The Jewish quarter was “…maintained by a lord of that country for foul usury and shameful profit, hateful to Christ and His followers.” For some reason, the little Christian boy lived among the Jews. This little boy loved singing a kind of hymn in honour of the Virgin Mary, called Alma Redemptoris Mater. The little boy would sing the hymns wherever he walked, including in the Jewish quarter. As the story goes, “From this point on the Jews conspired to drive this innocent one out of the world. To this purpose, they hired a murderer who took up a secret place in an alley, and as the child went by; this cursed Jew seized and held him tight, and then cut his throat and cast him into a pit. I must say that they threw him into a latrine, where these Jews purged their bowels. O cursed race of modern Herods, what good is your evil intent? Murder will be revealed, truly it will not fail, and chiefly where it touches the honour of God. Blood cries out on your cursed deed.” But Mary mother of Christ saw this and brought the child to life to continue to sing the beautiful Alma Redemptoris Mater, meaning “loving mother of our saviour.”

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Most people in medieval Europe could not read, so messages were often conveyed in church sculptures, reliefs, woodcuts, and especially beautiful stained- glass windows. To this day, pictures are found in churches throughout Europe depicting Jews suckling milk from a pig, the so- called Judensau – “Jewish pig.” Never mind that pigs are abhorrent to Jews. Perhaps that was why the two were associated in these images. The Judensau associates Jews with disgusting practices that makes them virtually into animals themselves, to be treated like animals. Another interesting common church image is the famous representation of the Church vs. the Synagogue, which symbolized the new covenant of Christianity superseding the old and irrelevant covenant of the Jews. This motif is found in medieval churches throughout Europe. The synagogue is always represented by a forlorn and broken woman, blinded by ignorance and stubborn refusal to see the truth of Christ, standing in relation to the proud woman of the Church. There is much symbolism in all these portrayals, some of which has been lost to us today. However, some details in the wood-carv- ing from the cathedral of the German town of Erfurt are particularly clear. Here we see the two figures of Church and Synagogue in motion. The image works like a TV western with its black hats and white hats. The hat worn by the figure of Synagogue is the helmet-shaped badge of shame prescribed for Jews in medieval

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Germany, and Synagogue herself is carved in much deeper, more realistic relief than Church. Church has a bland generic face and rides a beautiful horse, but Synagogue's face under her helmet is a grimace out of remembered nightmare, and her mount is… yes, you saw correctly: the Judensau, reserved in German folk art specifically for Jews. Now we will see some images depicting the infamous Blood libel directed against the Jews. Here you see Jews murdering a Christian child in order to drink his blood and use it for ritual purposes. It looks like the poor child is still living as they drain his blood. This panel shows Gandolfino d’Asti’s (15th c.) presentation of the martyrdom of Simonino di Trento – Simon of Trent. In the late 15th century, an itinerant Franciscan preacher names Bernardine of Feltre came to Trento, a town in Italy, and delivered a series of sermons in which he vilified the local Jewish community. Shortly afterwards a little boy named Simon went missing. His father decided that he must have been kidnapped and murdered by Jews. According to his story, the Jews had drained poor Simon of his blood. In the top panel you see Gandolfino d’Asti (15th c.) on the martyrdom of Simonino di Trento – Simon of Trent. In the late 15th century, an itinerant Franciscan preacher names Bernardine of Feltre came to Trento, a town in Italy, and delivered a series of sermons in which he vilified the local Jewish community. Shortly afterwards a little boy named Simon went missing. His father decided that he must have been kidnapped and murdered by Jews. According to his story, the Jews had drained poor Simon of his blood, supposedly for use in baking their Passover Matzot and for occult rituals. Some Jewish men were interrogated. That meant tortured until they “confessed” of the crime. They were executed. The entire Jewish community (both men and women) were then arrested and forced to confess under torture. Fifteen were sentenced to death and burned at the stake. The case at Trent inspired accusations of ritual murder against Jews throughout the surrounding regions. Meanwhile, Simon became the focus of veneration for the local Catholic Church. He eventually was sainted and considered a martyr and a patron of kidnap and torture victims. For years his entry was read in liturgical readings of martyrology. Each time this horrific story was told, it reinforced the evil of the Jews. Note the yellow circles on Jews’ cloaks. The bottom image is an anonymous 15th c. Italian engraving. There are many more such images. The martyrdom of Simon of Trent was a popular story.

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To the list of anti-Jewish stereotypes belongs also the “Host Desecration libel.” This is different from the blood libel. You can see how in a massive synagogue or perhaps the Temple in Jerusalem, Jews are stabbing little round disks. These disks are actually consecrated wafers, the transubstantiated “Host” that is consumed by Christians at the altar in churches. Because the Host is the actual consecrated body of Christ, if Jews managed to get their hands on them, they would subject them to horrible torture, which was, essentially a re-enactment of the Jewish murder of Christ. According to the legend, the Jews were not satisfied with killing Christ only once, but wished to continue to do so forever. In this image, a full narrative of the desecration of the Host of the Eucharist is told, supposedly, by the Jews of Passau in southern Germany in 1477. Beginning in the upper left corner, sanctified hosts are stolen by a poor Christian woman who is in debt to Jews and cannot get out of their plan to steal the Host from a church. The Jews then torture it in a Jewish ritual, but the host screams in pain. Angels hear the screams of the poor wafer and report to local gendarmes who catch the treach- erous Jews in the act. They are duly punished by torture, paraded through town, some are beheaded and others are burned for torturing Christ and re-enacting their perfidious act of killing God. The survivors are expelled from the town after their feet are bound and held to the fire. Finally, at the end, the good Chris- tians pray. Just in case you are illiterate, you see the complete illustrated story. The legend of the Miracu- lous Sacrament is presented in many works of art, e.g. in the Brussels Ca- thedral from tapestries to sculptures as well as a large series of stained glass windows from about 1436 till 1870, which depict the following legend: In autumn 1369, a prominent Jew from Enghien bribed a Jewish convert to Christianity to steal communion wafers, in order to desecrate them. Shortly afterwards he was

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murdered. His widow passed the hosts to the Jews in Brussels, who stabbed them with daggers in their synagogue on Good Friday 1370. The sacred hosts began to bleed. A Jewish woman who had converted to Christianity was bribed to conceal the hosts among the Jews of Cologne. But she repented and confessed the whole story and gave up the miraculous hosts. Based on her testimony Jews were publicly burnt at the stake. The remaining Jews were expelled and their property confiscated. The miraculous sacrament was subsequently transferred in procession to the chapter church of St. Gudula. The local devotion to the Miraculous Sacrament survived up to the Second World War. Let’s now move to Islam. People have studied the cultural rootedness of anti- Semitism in Europe for some time now, but little has been said about the cultural embeddedness of Islamophobia in European culture. Whereas the European stereotype for Jews and Judaism is directed against “the Jews,” the European stereotype against Muslims and Islam is directed almost entirely against the Prophet Muhammad. Why the difference? “The Jews” are guilty as a community in rejecting Christ. But Muhammad is guilty of being a false prophet and of bringing a false scripture. He is therefore punished by God with eternal damnation. Accordingly, one of the most common medieval images of Muhammad in the West depicts him suffering in Hell. The Florentine, Dante Alighieri made the image of Muhammad’s damnation famous in his Divine Com- edy (Inferno, Canto 28), written in the early 1300s. That Muhammad suffers in hell “proves” that he is not a true prophet nor is his religion a true religion. Dante demonstrates this in the record of his im- aginary visit to heaven and hell. We see here an image of Muhammed (in the middle) showing his entrails to Dante and Virgil (on the left), from one of the earliest sur- viving illustrated manuscripts of the Inferno, dating from the third quarter of the fourteenth century (1350–1375). It is currently held in the Bodleian Library in Ox- ford, England. The artist is unknown. But the Inferno is not really about Muhammad. It is about all the bad people of Dante’s generation: political opponents, Christian heretics, schematics,

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theologians with the wrong ideas, and so forth. But Muhammad’s appearance placed him in a company of evil, and while most other people identified in the Divine Comedy have been lost to history, the repeated negative portrayals of Muhammad ensured that his role as heretic became canonized in European civilization. Another repeated image is one that cannot imagine why Islam forbids the consump- tion of alcohol. If you remember, I mentioned the Is- lamic story about the Chris- tian monk that confirms the future prophetic role of Mu- hammad. Jewish and Chris- tian versions of the story have a different message. This scene depicts the story of Prophet Mo- hammed and the Christian monk, who is called Sergius in many Christian versions. Moham- med, when in company with his Christian friend Sergius, drank too much wine and fell into a drunken stupor. While he was passed out, a soldier killed the monk and placed the sword in Mohammed’s hand. When Muhammad awoke, the soldier and his companions told him that while drunk he had slain the monk. That is the reason, then, that Mohammed forbade the drinking of wine by his followers. The enculturation of prejudice against Muslims in Europe was not merely static, conveyed silently through images. There were also festivals in which Mus- lims and Islam are denigrated. Some of these festivals continue to take place to this day. The Moros y Christianos festivals in Spain have been held for centuries and continue to be held to celebrate the success of the Reconquista. The climax of the festival is the burning of Muhammad in effigy. There also remains to this day in Arezzo and other Italian towns “La Giostra del Saracino,” the “Saracen Joust.” This is a kind of “Whack-a-mole” in which knights on horseback strike a wooden image of a swarthy dark “Saracen” with their lances. Another “othering” festival activity that was quite common in Europe was the Eastertide stoning of the Jews. Jewish houses were stoned during Easter

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Week and Jews stayed indoors for their own protection. The ‘Ordinary’ or mass of St. Vincent of Chälon-sur-Saone records that on Palm Sunday, “The Jews were stoned by the clergy and people, because they stoned Jesus.”2 This custom was apparently brought to Europe through the influence of Byzantine practice. Medieval European perceptions of Jews were actually closely associated with Muslims. Jews were often thought of as “fifth-columnists” ready to betray Christian Eu- rope to the Muslim enemy because of their vir- ulent hatred of Christ and all things Christian. Here is an interesting image that might con- flate (not clear whether this is so) Jewish and Islamic religious symbols: The “Muslim crescent”, and the “Jewish star”. Modernity did not end the prejudice, but it thoroughly secularized it. In fact, the notion of the nation-state has typically included a definition of “the nation” in relation to the “other,” that often being “Muslim” or “Ottoman” in the Euro- pean context. And because Jews were defined in Europe as thoroughly other, it was a big hurdle to include them within the liberal nation-state. But the modern period just has so much material that it is impossible even to survey it here. We could venture into many areas, but I will survey only a few. The first is school textbook descriptions of Muslims in the 19th and 20th centuries. In a Catholic German textbook published in 1803 and used in Catholic schools, we read: Mohammad wrote a book of law full of ridiculous insinuations; however adding the strongest law of all that nobody permits himself to question even one syllable. The main characteristics of this sect can be summed up in the following manner: There is only one God (only in this point they do not err). Mohammad is his prophet. Christ also is a prophet but only one of Mohammad’s servants. There will be a day of atonement when Mohammad is transformed into a large ram and the Turks into fleas who hide in his fleece and he will swim over the ocean to Paradise where there exists a spring 70,000 miles in length, filled with honey-sweet wine. Otherwise he has forbidden his followers from drinking so that they may battle without drunkenness. The book of law is called Al-Quran.3

2 Cited by CECIL ROTH, “The Eastertide Stoning of the Jews and Its Liturgical Ech- oes,” in: Jewish Quarterly Review 35 (1945), pp. 361-370. 3 ANSELF DESING. Kurze Anleitung der Universalhistorie,, nach der Geographie der Landeskarte. Für die studierende Jugend herausgegeben. Augsburg, 1803. Cited in: GERDIEN JONKER,

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Modernity did not end our ancient culturalized prejudices. In fact, it has continued the tradition of perpetuating prejudice to this very day. But the modern period just has so much material that it is impossible even to survey it here. The Orientalist perspective was first brought to our attention by Edward Said (1935– 2003) in his book Orientalism (New York NY: Pantheon Books, 1978), describing how the Arab or Muslim was sexualized and objectified into stereotypical types. One of the dominant features of this Orientalism and much a part of the Orien- talist imagination was the presentation of nudity provoking heavy sexual phanta- sies and suggestions. It suffices just to recollect the list of the greatest and most beloved painters – including Auguste Renoir (1841–1919), Paul Desiré Trouil- lebert (1831–1900), Henri Matisse (1869–1954), Fer- dinand Roybet (1840–1920), Jean-Auguste-Domi- nique Ingres (1780–1867) and others – and their respective works, which are all part of a genre called by the name of a female harem slave in Ottoman times: odalik, known in European languages as Odalisque. Not incidentally, a detail of The Snake Charmer (1880) by Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824–1904) covers the first edition of Edward Said’s book. “Othering”, however, is part of human nature and found in most cultures. Europeans did not objectify and sexualize only Arabs or Muslims. They had a similar attitude toward virtually all non-Europeans. The great impressionist painter, Eugène Henri Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), e.g., is known for his nudes of Tahitian women. But in the case of portrayals of Islam, the Orientalist tradition fits into a long history of stereotypes and prejudice that has become fully implanted in Western consciousness. The modern Orientalist perspective was not only sex. It also perpetuated the older stereotypes of Mus- lims as violent, even if romantic, adventurous charac- ters, as can be learned e.g. from paintings by Eugène Delacoix (1798–1863. Much of the medieval stereotypes were “revital- ized” by the anti-Semitic Nazi propaganda. It was

“Imagining Islam: European Encounters with the Muslim World through the Lens of German Textbooks,” in: HAKAN YILMAZ & ÇAǦLIA E. AYKAÇ, Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and the Muslim Other, London / New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012, p. 132.

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very powerful and played on older Eu- ropean Christian stereotypes extremely effectively. The cap- tion to this cartoon is “Every little Jewish baby grows up to be a Jew.” Sadly, some of the worst images from Nazi propaganda have been re-used in the Arab media in relation to the Israel- Palestinian conflict. Take a look at this, from the Egyptian quasi-governmental newspaper, al-Ahram, in 2001. Some of the same savage European stereotypes to de-humanize Jews have become deeply embedded in the Muslim world in the 20th century, as we can see

from two images from Arabic language newspapers. The same process has come to implant violently hateful stereotypical images in Islamic culture and society as well. Finally, we will end with an examination of one of the most interesting and effective – dan- gerously effective – sources for perpetuating negative stereotypes: the movies! This book cover makes a point that is vividly articulated by its author Jack Shaheen (publ. 2001), about how Arabs or Muslims are portrayed in Hollywood (these two identities are generally equated in film). The contents and perspective of the book was subsequently made into a documentary film by Satvinder “Sut” Jhally, professor of communication and cultural studies at the University of Mas- sachusetts, Amherst (2007).

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Not a lot needs to be said about these images. The movies further many stereotypes, which you have seen yourselves. In fact, we can re-examine the visual stereotypes we looked at and probably remember how the movies reinforce them, as you certainly will know from your own experience. One can argue that all ethnic groups suffer from being victims of negative stereotypes. That is true, but there is a difference in the depth and negativity of stereotyped groups in every culture and society. When a group is singled out negatively for many generations, it is less likely to “recover” from the negative prejudice directed against it. The Irish were severely stereotyped in America for a period, but the negative perspective has largely recovered. Negative stereotypes of the Irish are not deeply embedded in American culture. Negative stereotypes directed against Africans, however, and especially African Americans, have been a part of American culture virtually since its inception. I argue that it is impossible to remove these negative images. Same with Anti-Semitic and Anti-Islamic stereotypes. We need to think about what we can do in light of this fact. I grew up with “Popeye the Sailor-man, meeting Ali Baba and his Forty Thieves” (1937). Innocently, I absorbed negative images of people who do not look like Northern European “types,” notably the obvious Arab “bad guy.” And now consider the “eternal bad guy” of the series, “Bluto.” What does he look like? South European? Italian? Arab? “Other.” And the creepy un-identifiable types in the non-European grass skirts? I doubt whether the writers were trying to be mean and denigrate others on purpose. They were simply appealing to already-established stereotypes in order to entertain – and in doing so they further the stereotypes and embed them ever deeper into our consciousness and our culture. I watched Popeye growing up, but my kids watch contemporary movies. Another, very recent image that works on stereotypes is the new comic-book character, “Foreskinman.” making almost blood sacrifices of babies, like the medieval libels, to placate an evil God. Some believe that these kinds of horrific slanders were over once we left the Middle Ages. But it simply isn’t true. Interestingly, there is a variation on the theme that “Is- lamizes” the issues of circumcision that had always been associated strictly with Jews in Western culture. This time, however, the message to be conveyed is to show what a physical threat the circumcision of girls is. I have been concentrating on the problem of Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic stereotypes in Western culture and society. I could conduct the same exercise to treat intolerable Anti-Semitic and Anti-Christian stereotypes in Arab and Islamic cultures and societies, and unacceptable anti-Arab and anti-Christian stereotypes in Israeli and Jewish culture and society.

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I have shown European images here. I could do the same for Japanese or Thai or Zimbabwean or Chinese cultures and societies. It is a human problem, and I have no intent to single out Christian cultures and societies as the source of the problem. But we live in the West, and we need to begin to resolve our problems at home. Religions all include trajectories of thought and action that are violent. Religions also include trajectories of thought and action that strive for peace and reconciliation. Our job as religious people is to make sure that we motivate the activist trajectories in our own religious and cultural traditions that strive for peace and reconciliation, and to stand up against those who strive for violence as a way of resolving issues. We also need to learn how to recognize negative stere- otyping in our own culture and tradition, and work toward teaching respect for all creation – and all religion. But, enough from me. Now is a good time to have an open discussion on these issues. Thank you!

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………………………………………………………………... IX

HE Dr Abdur-Ra’uf Rawabdeh (Amman, Jordan) Jordan’s Resilience at the Centre of Regional Turmoil ………………... XV

Prof Dr Martin Beck (Odense, Denmark) The Arab Uprisings and Europe five years after ………...…………….. 3 Dr Abdulrahman S. Al-Salimi (Masqat, Oman) Understanding the Changes Taking Place in the Arab World Today …... 10 Senator Hasan Abu Nimah (Amman, Jordan) The Syrian Crisis. Reviewing the Positions of the Countries of the Middle East and Europe after Four Years of Change from a Jordanian Perspective …………………………………………………………... 13 Dr Naseef Naeem (Berlin, Germany) The Islamic State (IS) and the Criteria of a State ……………………... 18

Prof Dr MOHAMED A. AL SHARQAWI (Cairo, Egypt / Madinah, KSA) Towards Constructive Relations Across The Mediterranean ………… 23 Prof Dr Carmen López Alonso (Madrid, Spain) How to re-build European–Mediterranean Neighbourhood relations – challenges, chances, and requirements (political, cultural and economic) 32

Djénane Kareh-Tager (Paris, France / Beirut, Lebanon) Where is the Answer? ………………………………………………... 47

- 91 - Muin Khoury (Amman, Jordan) Tell the Arabs, I tried my best to stay! ……………………………….. 49 Dr Mahmoud El Guindi (Zürich, Switzerland) Religion based Violence – Clash of Civilisations or Globalisation of conflict ……………………………………………………………… 52

Prof Dr Michel Sternberg (Paris, France) From “Return of Religion into the Public Sphere” to “Islamophobia” and “New anti-Semitism” or How European Countries and Societies changed – The Example of France, a Secular Democracy …………..... 59 Rabbi Prof Dr Reuven Firestone (Los Angeles, USA) Islamophobia & anti-Semitism – Roots & Remedy …………………… 67

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ISBN 978-3-00-052766-1