“We All Are Minorities – a Plea for Pluralism”

European Abrahamic Forum Zürich Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Auslandsbüro Amman Regional Human Security Centre Amman

“We All are Minorities – a Plea for Pluralism”

Challenges and Chances of Religious, Ethnic-Cultural, and Political Diversification in Contemporary Societies

Zürich & Amman 2010

Europäisches Abrahamisches Forum European Abrahamic Forum EAF Evropski abrahamski forum

Regional Human RHSC Security Centre

European Abrahamic Forum Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Zürich Auslandsbüro Amman Regional Human Security Centre Amman

“We All are Minorities – a Plea for Pluralism”

Challenges and Chances of Religious, Ethnic-Cultural, and Political Diversification in Contemporary Societies (from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives) Focus on Middle East

International Consultation Amman (Jordan), 15 – 17 November 2009

Zürich & Amman 2010

EDITED BY Prof. Dr. Stefan Schreiner

PUBLISHED BY European Abrahamic Forum Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Regional Human Security Centre c/o Zürcher Lehrhaus Auslandsbüro Amman P. O. Box 36 Limmattalstrasse 2 P. O. Box 831025 Jubeiha Amman 11941 CH – 8049 Zürich Amman 11183 / Jordan Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Tel. +41 (0)44 341 1820 Tel: + 962 – 6 – 59 29 777 Tel: +962 – 6 – 53 45 274 Fax +41 (0)44 341 1829 Fax + 962 – 6 – 59 33 087 Fax: +962 – 6 – 53 45 261 [email protected] [email protected] http://www.rhsc.org.jo/

PRINTED BY Druckerei Maier GmbH Rottenburg a. N. (Germany)

ISBN 978-3-00-033176-3

The present volume records papers presented to the – third – International EAF Consultation which was held in Amman (Jordan) in November 2009. At the invitation of the European Abrahamic Forum Zürich (EAF), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – Amman Office (KAS), and the Regional Human Security Centre Amman (RHSC), about forty scholars, leading experts from seventeen Middle Eastern and European countries representing the three Abrahamic faiths and faith communities came together to discuss “Challenges and Chances of Religious, Ethnic-Cultural, and Political Diversification in Contemporary Societies (with Focus on Middle East)”. To the papers presented at the consultation two further studies are added here, widening not only the scope of the consultation, but also dealing with issues that were mentioned more than once during the deliberations, though not explicitly discussed in depth. The purpose of this volume is not only to document the consultation that took place some months ago. Recording the papers and, thus, outlining and illustrating the many facets of the topic and reflecting the variety of approaches to it, the volume wants to offer fresh, new insights into the nowadays much debated issue of minority- majority relationship in the context of a process that has been described as diversification of our societies due to migrations for whatever reason. At the same time, the volume wants to invite the reader to pick up the thread and continue the discussion on issues which deserve to be considered carefully, because they are essential to the process of building multi-religious, multi-cultural, and multi-ethnic societies which we live in, and do justice to all their members irrespective of their religious affiliation, cultural or ethnic background, and political orientation.

Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) I have the honour and pleasure to welcome all of you here in the very heart of the city of Amman. At the same time, I would like to thank you very much for kindly having accepted the invitation to be with us tonight and express my appreciation of your presence at the opening session of this – Third – Interna- tional EAF Consultation held in Amman. To emphasize that today dialogue between people of different religions and religious commitment is more needed than it was yesterday or the day before yesterday, sounds not much challenging these days, and to advocate the need to promote understanding and cooperation between people of different religious commitment, cultural background and / or political orientation likewise is hardly more than a commonplace. Though less than two or three decades ago it was still generally accepted that the process of increasing secularization would, to a great extent, lead to the marginalization of religion and religious communities, if not quite leading to their disappearance or, at least, loss of influence, we nowadays are experiencing the opposite development. Whereas it was assumed, if not taken for granted, that religion and religious communities would lose their importance as political and societal factors, at least in our – secular – societies, we know today that this assumption has been wrong. On the contrary, in recent years we, particularly those of us living in so-called western societies, had to learn that religion, religions and religious communities are playing not only once again, but more and more, a significant role, not only within the public consciousness, but also as factors to be considered in politics and in society as well. It is, however, not just the mere fact that “religion returned into the public sphere”, as the philosopher Jürgen Habermas said some years ago. What we experience is, likewise an increase in what might be described as an instrumentalization of religion, i. e. an increase in using religion for whatever political purpose. In light of this development, it goes almost without saying that encounter of, and dialogue between, people of different faiths and religious commitment becomes top priority. In light of this development, it is of paramount importance, indeed, that people of religion, be they Jews, Christians, Muslims, or professing other faiths, men and women alike, meet and come together to raise their voices not just against the instrumentalization of their respective religion, but suggest, and prove, that the potential for playing a constructive role in building a world of peaceful living together, which is based on mutual understanding, respect for the otherness of the other, and shared responsibility for the wellbeing of all, is not alien to, but implicit in, their respective religious traditions and deeply rooted in their cultures. In November 2005, when we had our First International EAF Consultation, we discussed visions of a society we wish to live in, a society that rightly deserves to be called a community which is pluralistic in terms of its religious traditions and cultures as well as political orientations, but unanimous in its determination to help creating a world of peace and justice. At the Second International EAF Consultation, it was the quest for a responsible relationship between religion and – secular – society and state that was put on the agenda. This time it is the process of what is called diversification of our societies, which brought us to invite you to take part in this third international, interreligious, and intercultural Muslim- Christian-Jewish consultation on “Challenges and Chances of Religious, Ethnic-Cultural, and Political Diversification in Contemporary Societies, with special emphasis put on the situation in the Middle East”. Wherever we live, in Europe or in this region, we share experiences that appear to be similar: profound changes in our societies, their shape and composi- tion, due to migrations – for whatever reason – of people from various angles of the world, the result being that in many cases traditional concepts of majority-minority relationships prove to be no longer valid. In addition to that, that likewise due to the just mentioned migrations, also problems migrate from one country or region to another country or region, since people moving from one country or region to another country or region, carry with them not only their religious, cultural etc. heritage, but also all the problems which they had in their country or region of origin and import them into their country or region of destination. Against the backdrop of these experiences, and in light of the aforementioned return of religion into the public sphere, i. e. politics, questions come up whether “traditional” definitions of majority-minority relations and their implications as well as likewise “traditional” models regulating of majority-minority relations still provide sound, acceptable concepts and accepted means to deal with them in a way that eventually helps us to build societies that rightly maybe described as communities of people peacefully living together in diversity. To discuss matters arising from this question, there seems to be no better, no more appropriate place than today’s Amman. Therefore, I am delighted that we can meet here, and it is not only my duty, but my heartfelt wish to say thanks to all who allowed and helped us to convene in this beautiful, thriving city of Amman. Most importantly, in the name of all participants of this conference, including myself, I would like to express profound gratitude to His Royal Highness Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal for graciously having agreed to be the patron of our conference. Our gratitude is also due to Her Royal Highness Princess Sumaya Bint El-Hassan, for very kindly having allowed us to convene in the premises of the Royal Scientific Society. Likewise, I would like to thank our partners here in Amman, who have worked very hard and done their utmost to make us feel as welcome and comfortable as possible. In particular, I would like to thank His Excellency Mr. Hasan Abu Ni’mah, Director of the Regional Human Security Centre, together with his staff, and Mrs. Afaf Maraqa, executive officer of the Amman Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and her staff. Both put in a tremendous amount of work; without their efforts and thought we would hardly have been able to meet here. Last, but not least, special words of thanks are due to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. Without their generous financial support, the consultation could not have taken place. I would thus like to ask Her Excellency Mrs. Reichlin, Swiss Ambassa- dor to Jordan, to convey our profound gratitude to her government. Once again, very warm welcome to you all. I wish us all fruit-bearing deliberations. Thank you for your kind attention. Prof. Dr Stefan Schreiner European Abrahamic Forum (EAF)

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, This meeting is yet another good result of cooperation that has been taking place between the European Abrahamic Forum and the Royal Institute for Interfaith studies for years. Al- though I had to leave the Royal institute since September to resume another duty at the Re- gional Human Security Centre, I am very pleased to renew my commitment to the goals which we earlier sought to serve from our different positions. Therefore I am here, and so is the Hu- man Security Centre whose mission is by no means different from that of the many distinguished organizations and embassies that support and sponsor this effort. Allow me at the beginning to convey to you the warm greetings of HRH Prince Hassan bin Talal, who has graciously agreed to patronize this conference. Most unfortunately though, and due to pressing unforeseen obligations, HRH is travelling to Scotland and will not be able to be with us this evening. He instructed me to convey to you his support, not only for this meeting but for the all the greatly appreciated work you have been doing all along doing. He also instructed that all the means available at Regional Human Security Centre, and all the other organizations functioning under his Highness's umbrella, be placed under the organizers disposal to ensure a smooth and a successful event. His Royal Highness looks forward with much attention to review the fruitful results of our discussion, and certainly for more of the same good work to follow. As far as I am concerned, it certainly is my great pleasure, as well as my distinct honour to welcome you all and to thank you for your much appreciated presence, especially for our guests and friends who took the trouble of reaching us from outside Jordan. It has always been a stimulating exercise to meet, debate, review issues, exchange experience, learn from each other, try to sincerely diagnose our problems and difficulties away from preplanned agendas, and to come up as a result, with hopefully useful recommendations. By way of preparation we did that just over six months ago in Zurich at Lehrhaus, where we were graciously hosted for a brainstorming consultation session skilfully organized by Pro- fessor Schreiner, on the very theme that brought us together here in Amman this week. We are all minorities. We indeed in a sense are. We are all minorities. We are only different in size, and that should never be the reason to distinguish one group from the other, if the intention is to grant undue privilege on any other basis than merit. If it is democratically correct to recognize the right of a majority to rule, it should never be accepted under any circumstance to recognize the right of any majority to distinguish itself as different; or to view the numerically fewer communities as unentitled to absolute equality. This is primarily the theme which we will be debating in the next two days reflecting on the experience of countries from the region including Jordan. The hope is that we commit to make this seminar part of a process. Fruitful dialogue has no end, and if we agree that it started amongst people since they were created on this earth, then it has no beginning either. No amount of endeavour, no amount of debate can resolve enough of our current pressing issues. Therefore we need to keep this lively and purpose-guided discussion moving. Even if we succeed in resolving a set of problems, new ones merge again afterwards. And if that applies to normal conditions and situations, we unquestionably, in this region in particular, are not living normal conditions. Neither our region nor the circumstances prevailing in it are isolated from the rest of the world. Therefore we need to intensify our cooperation and to unite our work towards our common goals. We have an ambitious plan at the Regional Human Security Centre, very much in line, if not outright identical, with the goals of this meeting’s sponsors, as well as many of our guests and the organizations they represent. We are engaged with similar organizations in the West Asia and North Africa region and are in a process of deepening and multiplying these link- ages. The concept of Human Security allows is to identify many problems and threats to people in the region and to see that regional cooperation is essential to ensuring the human security of future generations. In all of our activities we seek to promote knowledge and dialogue throughout the region and to advance the concept of human security. We are currently working closely with the Canadian government and the UNHCR on a host of issues related to refugees (Iraqi refugees at the moment), reconstruction, and social trauma resulting from conflict in addition to the limitless issues related to human security. We receive solid support from the Jordanian government through the Higher Council of Science and Technology, where the centre is hosted. The prospects for additional cooperation with other governments are very good too. We are engaged in discussions towards that end. In addition we hope to be working with the Swiss government, the U.S. Government, the Norwegian, the Swedish, the Japanese, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and with UNRWA, to mention only a few, as well as with a large number of organizations dealing with Human Security or related issues. It may be of interest to announce that we are in the process of signing memoranda of understanding with the Anna Lind foundation with the Arab Organiza- tion for Human rights, with the European Abrahamic Forum, and with the Institute for Peace studies at the Alexandria Library. We just signed a memorandum of understanding with the Scholar Rescue Funs in New York. That agreement is enabling us to host Iraqi academics who have not been able to continue to work at home as a result of the difficult situation there. We are hosting some already engaged in research relevant to Iraqi post war construction and other issues. Undoubtedly our work has a political dimension. It will be a mistake to draw distinct lines between different types of dialogue and politics. Dialogue has a purpose. It is to promote, or even create understanding amongst people. Understanding is the prerequisite for better human relations, which in turn is the grounds on which peace can thrive. Is peace not the ultimate goal of all our activities? We all agree that hatred, prejudice, fanaticism, xenophobia, exclusion and ultra nationalist racist tendencies are evils that feed on ignorance and misperception of the other. Therefore the absolute emphasis on education. We also I hope agree that injustice creates the proper environment for all such evils to prosper, and for the evil doers to cultivate people's despair and to channel it into rebellious behaviour and eventually violence. The more the so called international community and the United Nations Organization delay action to address injustice the more chance and time is offered to the evil harvesters. Much of the violence prevailing in our region for decades, and now spreading far, is primarily the result of entrenched injustice. Of course there are other factors, but they would not be as effective in a more balanced and more even political and social environment. Our working together is not, and should not, be meant to remedy the consequences of such failings; our work is due in all times. When not for repair it should aim at continued improvement. I should highlight the significance of education and the need to make it available for most people as a guarantee to the creation of firm, solid and immune societies. Although it sounds so, Human Security is by no means a new concept. What is new is the significance attached to this subject thanks to the Canadian government a decade ago. We only realize how deeply insecure large sectors of world population when we examine the matter. Sources of insecurity are many and varied. They include food and nutrition insecurity; we are conducting studies on that. They include health insecurity, environmental and natural resources, personal, political, educational and cultural, employment, habitat, other human rights issues, academic, religious, personal and pre-emptive; the list can indeed grow longer. It is quite a vast field and no amount of good work can claim to resolve much; it is our cooperation and our working together that holds promise. I wish to end by once more expressing my deep gratitude to our partners with whom we organized similar activities before, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, European Abrahamic forum, and the embassy of Switzerland. I thank you all and wish you a successful conference. Ambassador Hasan Abu Ni’mah Regional Human Security Centre (RHSC)

Your Royal Highness, Excellencies and honourable Participants, I am very honoured to greet the distinguished scholars of this International Consultation and stress the importance of the topic of this event: Minorities and Pluralism is and will always be at the heart of the reason to be of a multi-ethnic state like Switzerland. Therefore, the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs feels privileged to join as a partner in this event. As a great blessing, Switzerland can look back to over 150 years of intercultural peace. And this achievement is by no means the end result of a successfully implemented master plan. On the contrary, the longer term impacts of the decisions taken in the historic process were often uncertain. Among the key “ingredients” contributing to the process of accommodating the pluralistic society and establishing governance mechanisms anchored in today’s political system, one can mention in a nutshell:  Non concentration of power and distribution of power among many  Building on the past: recognizing different understandings of Swiss history  Create a common feeling of identity and incorporate the value of diversity  Accommodate territorial demands  Combine the internal self-determination of the territorial entities with shared decision making at the federal level  Promote compromise driven decision making based on representative democracy and direct democratic governance  Accommodate linguistic and religious diversity based on equal recognition for the language communities and relative neutrality and special protection with regard to religious diversity  Build a trusted and multicultural judiciary  Expressing solidarity through wealth sharing at all levels  Create context adopted security forces. It would be far beyond my task to substantiate this catalogue. But it remains important that like the experiences in your respective countries, Swiss state building did not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, by researching different models, scholars have always pointed out, that the success or failure of state building is indeed heavily dependent on context: Context makes a difference and context matters. That is certainly what we can observe in the Swiss case. For instance, the power sharing issues were in our case not debated among former enemies as a way out of violent conflict – like in many post conflict situations - but among voluntary associates. In contrast to what can be observed in disaggregating processes Switzerland was fortunate to build on pre-existing decentralised structures and successively on voluntary aggregation. This voluntary aggregation was indeed no free gift to a new power centre but a calculated decision of the entities to preserve, maintain and promote the pre-existing territorial, religious and linguistic diversity against the background of international pressure. In addition, we were only confronted with a limited degree of societal fragmentation: 4 languages/cultures and 2 religious communities. In other words, our situation was manageable. Looking back, the pluralistic state model has been built upon characteristics of a homogeneous rural society. From the late 19th up to mid 20th century, territory was the main reference and the influx of migration limited. Since then, the “de-territorialized” lifestyle of the Swiss population and especially the influx of outer European cultures, are and remain a challenge to the society and the political system. Indeed, the system is pressured and the mechanisms that have successfully forged cross- cutting markers and built bridges between the historic population and immigrants have again to be strengthened. For immigrants the risks of marginalisation exist if ethnic, linguistic and religious demarcation lines coincide. In recent history, several popular initiatives aimed to limit residence rights of foreigners currently making up over 22% of the population. Such proposals were rejected through ballots by the citizens. Recently, a committee has tabled a proposal that could infringe intercommunal respect and peaceful coexistence. I refer to the regrettable attempt to discriminate the Muslim faith through the launch of a popular initiative aiming to prohibit the building of Minarets. Indeed, the initiative “against the building of Minarets” is put before the electorate at the end of this month. The government, the parliament and number of important institutions, parties and civil society organisations have clearly rejected this proposal and recommend turning it down because its objective runs counter to basic values and fundamental rights. While constituting a clear infringement of important international agreements, it has to be emphasized that neither the constitutional rights guaranteeing the freedom of individual faith and conscience nor the practice of religion of the Muslim population in Switzerland would be harmed. Nowadays, over 150 places of worship and Islamic cultural centres exist and at large, the Muslim population is well integrated and organized. From the government side, we trust the good judgement of the electorate on how to read the intentions of the initiators and its wisdom on how to preserve the plurality which is so fundamental to the intercultural peace. Let me close by referring to Confucius and the three ways of acting wisely: first - thought, the most noble way, second imitation – the easiest way; and third, experience - the most painful way. The Swiss state system was built as a combination of the three and it is understood as an experience, rather than a model. As such, it might be useful and interesting for others. On behalf of the Swiss government I wish that the spirit of the Amman Declaration will inspire deliberations and deepen mutual understanding amongst the distinguished participants. Thank you very much for your kind attention. Ambassador Andrea Reichlin Embassy of Switzerland, Jordan

ACCEPTING VARIETY LIVING WITH DIVERSITY

CONCEPTS AND EXPERIENCES OF REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNIC-CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES

Ambassador Hasan Abu Ni„mah (Amman / Jordan) THE JORDANIAN INTEGRATIVE EXPERIMENT: ETHNIC PROFILE OF JORDAN

Jordan, like any other country in this world, includes amongst the various components of its population, citizens of different ethnic origins. The Jordanian society is also made up mainly of Muslims and Christians. I will present a brief summary of the main ethnic and religious groups in Jordan. I will also portray the constitutional and the legal means by which a very successful level of integration and a true spirit of togetherness have been achieved. Before I start I must point out that legal and constitutional guarantees alone, no matter how effective, cannot guarantee social harmony. More important is education and the development of a healthy communal climate where citizens of different origins learn the art of living together and of working together towards common and unifying goals.

THE CASE OF JORDAN Circassians: They number about 190,000 and were historically forced to emigrate from their homeland towards the Arab East after they suffered from persecution by the Czarist Russia in the 1800s. Although Circassian communities in Jordan have their own language and traditions, they were able to fully integrate into Jordanian society, through mixed marriages, schools and mainly by being part of it. They all master the Arabic language, written and spoken. Neither did they want to nor were they ever required to abandon their own language, or their traditions. In fact, their music and dance is very popular in Jordan. Chechens: Another ethnic minority who also emigrated from Russia and found home in Turkey, Syria, and Jordan at the turn of the twentieth century. They belong to the Naqshbandi Tariqat. Their estimated number in Jordan is approximately 15,000. Both Circassians and Chechens have full citizenship and both communities enjoy the Jordanian Nationality. Armenians: In 1948 the number of Armenians living in Jordan was estimated to be 16,000. They migrated to Jordan as a result of persecution and political turmoil during the First World War. Yet, as a result of the high unemployment rate in the early seventies of the last century, many left Jordan for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, making their number drop to 3500. Even though Armenians in Jordan have integrated into the prevailing cultural patterns they, like the others, have retained a strong sense of their Ar- - 17 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity menian identity and they have held on and preserved their native language and culture. This integration can be felt on several levels including acceptance of mixed marriages and affiliation with Arabic social institutions. Armenians in Jor- dan speak Arabic fluently besides their Armenian language which they have inherited from their ancestors. Armenians in Jordan are mostly Roman Orthodox. Kurds: It is estimated that there are 30,000 Kurds in Jordan. The number includes those who settled in Jordan during the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century and the first quarter of the Twentieth Century, and those who came from Palestine as refugees in 1948 and 1967. Kurds live in various cities and towns around the country and they, like the others, are a part of the social, political, and economic fabric of Jordan. They have also had their share in the building of modern Jordan. There are a number of factors that contribute to the concord between Arab Jordanians and Kurds most important of which are the similarities in traditions and customs, shared faith which is Islam, geographical proximity of Kurdistan and Bilad Al Sham and Iraq, common history and intermarriages. Turkmens: The number of Turkmens does not exceed 25,000. They have integrated completely into Jordanian society to the extent that they have become Arabs of Turkmen origin. This can also be safely said about other ethnic communities as well.

RELIGIOUS GROUPS: Muslims account for approximately 90% of the population where the vast majority are Sunnī with a small number of ShīÝī Muslims (from Iraq mostly). Islam by constitution is the official religion of the state in Jordan. Christianity has deep roots in Jordan, where Jesus Christ was baptized. Most Christians in Jordan descend from Arab tribes and they follow the Orthodox Church. They enjoy their full rights of nationality and citizenship guaranteed by the constitution and make up approximately 5% of the Jordanian population. Christians play a vital role in all spheres of public life in Jordan, and in spite of their relatively small number their contribution and presence surpass their small number. They have seats in Parliament and they occupy high ranking government jobs, including at the ministerial level. Druze: The estimated number of Druze in Jordan is about 1300. Most of them live in al Azraq area in the western desert of Jordan. Some live in Amman and other big cities. Druze people started moving to Jordan from Jabal Druze (their homeland) which is close to al Azraq, due to the deteriorating situation during French occupation of Syria and Lebanon. Although the Druze integrated into the Jordanian cultural patterns they have retained a strong sense of their identity and culture, which again can be said of all the others too. The Jordanian state as a whole with all of its different branches is very influential and supportive of providing a common shared living for all the cultural, ethnic, and religious components of Jordanian society.

- 18 - Concepts and Experiences

INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL COHESION: The social institutions, traditional like the family and tribal systems and modern like the family associations and charitable organizations are influential in the preservation of the identity of the smaller groups at the same time supporting a collective Jordanian cultural identity and personality for the society at large. Political, social, and religious leadership are also very influential. Further- more, civil society organizations play an important role in preserving diversity. The legal framework in Jordan provides for and promotes tolerance. The constitution allows for the freedom of religion and faith to all Jordanians, regardless of his ethnic or religious origin. Access to political, civil, and welfare rights is guaranteed by the Jordanian constitution and law to all Jordanians regardless of their ethnic or religious background. While in family matters, the law is heavily influenced by Islamic Jurispru- dence (ShariÝa), the Christian community has its own judiciary councils to solve disputes between followers of different denominations of Christianity. The Jordanian constitution and the body of Jordanian legislations ensure and provide for complete equality for all Jordanians regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or cultural background. The constitution allows for the freedom of religion and faith to all Jordanians. The policies designed and carried out by the successive Jordanian governments provide for, and promote coexistence and common living. The Jordanian law provides protection to all Jordanians against any aggression or any discrimina- tory treatment. Special attention is given by the law enforcement agencies in combating actions that might cause harm to communal harmony and peace. Celebration of religious holidays publicly at the national level is a very important and good practice. The main religious celebrations include ‘Eid el Adha (after the Pilgrimage) and ‘Eid al Fitr (after Ramadan) in Islam, or Christmas and Easter in Christianity. The public celebration of these activities provides an opportunity for reminding all components of society about the others. Also the patronage of His Majesty the King and the participation of the top political and religious leadership in these celebrations send a very strong message at all times. In the Jordanian parliament, the main religious and ethnic groups are represented to allow for access to the political and legislative systems. On the societal level, religious and social activities are celebrated in total freedom, with acceptance and participation of other groups. For example, interfaith marriages are becoming more common and better accepted by the society. Generally, ethnic and religious groups are allowed, and sometimes encouraged to establish community groups and cultural societies to preserve their cultural, ethnic, or religious identity and to better communicate their needs and requests to the government and other public decision making bodies.

- 19 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity

Director Mu‘in A. Khoury (Amman / Jordan) LEGAL STATUS OF NON-MUSLIMS IN JORDAN JORDANIAN EXPERIENCE1

Jordan prides itself today of a generally unique state of ethnic-cultural and religious diversity and pluralism with minority groups within society that are able to maintain differences and share overall political and economic power. In her book, Briser la mosaïque, Géraldine Chatelard, research fellow at the French Insti- tute for the Near East (Ifpo), Amman speaks even of “Le „modèle‟ jordanien de gestion du pluralisme confessionnel […].” While the overwhelming majority of Jordanians is Sunni Arab Muslim and hence the state religion is Islam, and while we are here to celebrate that “We are All Minorities – a Plea for Pluralism”, Jordan, maybe, exemplifies best what ethnic- cultural and religious pluralism is all about with all its challenges and opportunities. Jordan‟s population is a fairly integrated mix of Bedouin Muslim and Chris- tian Arabs; Muslim and Christian Arabs of Palestinian origins who arrived in modern Jordan before and after the Palestinian Nakba of 1948 and the Naksa of 1967; Circassian non-Arab Muslims originally from the Caucasus region of western Asia who arrived en masse in what was known then under the Otto- man rule as southern „Greater Syria‟ during the last quarter of the nineteenth century; Chechens, another Caucasian people, who migrated from Grozny in waves during the late nineteenth century; small minorities of Druze live in Jordan, mainly near the Syrian border and in Azraq, in the east of the country; and a small community of Armenians of an estimated 3,000 people. And to complete Jor- dan‟s social mosaic, the north Jordan Valley hosts a small community of Turko- mans and Baha‟is, who moved from Iran to escape persecution in 1910. When we talk however about non-Muslim Jordanians we mean an overwhelming majority of Christian citizens whose number today is estimated any- where between two and four percent of the population. Official government figures estimate that four percent of the population is Christian, other sources and Christian officials privately estimate the true figure to be closer to three. According to representatives of the respective communities, there are a small number of Shi„a Muslims in Jordan, approximately 1,000 Baha‟is, and an estimated 14,000 Druze. The annual US State Department‟s International Relig- ion Freedom Report states that “the Government does not recognize the Druze religion and the Baha‟i faith, but does not prohibit their practice…On

1 References: Wikipedia. Interviews with Church Tribunal fathers and other Chris- tian community members with related issues. Various press articles on Christians in Jordan. Official reports. - 20 - Concepts and Experiences national identity cards, or “family books”, which normally identify the bearer's religious community, the Government records Druze as Muslims. Moreover, the Government does not officially recognize the Druze temple in Azraq; four social halls belonging to the Druze are registered as “societies”. In this respect their status is similar to non-recognized Evangelical Christians which we will discuss later in this paper. “Baha‟is face similar official „discrimination‟…and I still continue to quote the same report…On national identity cards the Government either records Baha'is as Muslims, leaves the space blank, or marks it with dashes. The Baha'i community does not have its own court to adjudicate personal status matters. Such cases may be heard in Shari„a courts. The Department of Civil Status and Passports does not recognize marriages conducted by Baha'i assemblies, but it does issue passports on the basis of these marriages”. One and probably the only explanation for this lack of „recognition‟ is that Islam regards itself the „seal of religions‟ and thus does not recognize any other „faiths‟ or religious communities that came after Islam [11th century for the Druze and nineteenth century for the Baha‟i]. Jordan's Christian population has dropped from about 5% in 1970 to the current estimated 3% and from as high as 18% in the early beginning of the twentieth century according to certain estimates. This drop is largely due to lower birth rates, a strong influx of Muslim immigrants from neighboring countries and an economically driven immigration to the US, Canada and Australia in pursuit of better fortunes. Christians are well integrated in Jordanian society. Article 6 of Jordan‟s 1952 Amended Constitution stipulates that there shall be no discrimination in the rights and duties of citizens on grounds of religion. Jordanian Christians are allowed by the public and private sectors to leave their work to attend mass on Sundays. Christmas and New Year‟s are official public holidays. Although a tiny minority, Christians in Jordan punch above their weight and occupy a larger portion of the public space. Culturally, Christians run some of the best secular schools, social clubs and charity organizations in the country. Some of the most important, and often controversial, opinion formers and shapers are top Christian journalists and colum- nists who largely influence public opinion and are leaders in the media scene. Economically, the overwhelming majority of Christians belong to the middle or upper classes. [There are pockets of abject poverty in the North]. Christians enjoy relatively high economic and social opportunities in Jordan compared to the rest of the Middle East. According to April 09 Forbes Magazine, 10 of the richest 50 families of Jordan are Christian. They solely own or have controlling stakes in the country‟s leading banking, insurance, shipping & transport, hotel & travel, manufacturing, automotive, media and trading businesses. Although they constitute currently no more than three per cent of the total population, they have a slightly larger representation, of around eight percent, in the Jordanian Parliament. Nine of the 110 parliamentary seats are reserved

- 21 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity for Christians [6 for women, 3 for Circassians / Chechens and 9 for the North- ern, Central and Southern „Badia‟]. Christians hold important government port- folios, ambassadorial appointments, and positions of high military rank. Nearly 70 – 75% of Jordanian Christians belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The other part adheres to the Roman Catholic Church with a small minority to Protestant churches. There are many missionary groups in the country, although proselytizing Muslims is not allowed. All churches must be recognized by the government. Officially recognized Christian denominations include: the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox, Maronite Catholic, Assyrian, Coptic, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-day Adventist, and Presbyterian churches. Christian churches not officially recognized but registered as “societies” include the Baptist Church, Free Evangelical Church, Nazarene Church, Assem- blies of God, Christian and Missionary Alliance, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Unrecognized Christian denominations include United Pentecostal and Jehovah's Witnesses. We cannot start to talk about the legal status of Jordanian Christians or Eastern Christians in the Levant as a matter of fact without going back in time to the Ottoman Rule and the Christian Millets which were instituted by Sultan Mehmet II after he had conquered Constantinople in 1453 “and set himself to re-organize the Ottoman State as the conscious heir of the East Roman Em- pire”. The Millet system, which is now celebrated as an early example of pre- modern religious pluralism and early experiments of decentralization, under which confessional communities were allowed to rule themselves with fairly little interference from the Ottoman government under separate legal courts pertaining to Personal Law was closely linked to Islamic rules of the Hanafi school of law. People were bound to their millets by their religious affiliations rather than their ethnic origins, according to the millet concept. The head of a millet, most often an elected religious hierarch, such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, reported directly to the Ottoman Sultan. “The special function thus assigned to the Patriarchates gave the Millets, as an institution, an ecclesiastical character; but in the Near East a church was merely the foremost aspect of a nationality, and the authority of the Patriarchates extended to the control of schools, and even to the administration of certain branches of civil law. The Millets, in fact, were practically autonomous bodies in all that concerns religion, culture and social life. Until the 19th century Tanzimat (the Reformation Era) beside the Muslim millet, the main millets were the Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian and Syrian Orthodox. In the period before World War I there were seventeen millets within the Empire [including the Druze]. In contrast to Egypt where legal reform in the 19th century went its own independent way, the reform legislation of the Tanzimat was applied in the Arab provinces under full Ottoman control. Thus Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan,

- 22 - Concepts and Experiences Palestine and Iraq were governed by Ottoman Laws when they came under British and French mandatory control. Today‟s Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was until 1918 part of the Ottoman Empire. Like other provinces in the Ottoman Empire, the legal system was formed of Shari„a courts, which applied various madhahib [schools of law] and whose interpretation of the law was greatly influenced by local traditions [Tribal and „Urf]. When the Ottoman Empire began to introduce it Tanzimat reforms during the 19th century, its provinces were expected to follow suit. This action took place at differing degrees. In the case of East-Jordan which was basically administered as part of Syria until 1920, it meant the introduction of the Otto- man Mejelle promulgated in 1877 and containing the first separate civil law in the Empire. The Mejelle was the result of the work of a committee of Ottoman legists known as Jam„yat al-Majalla which collected laws in effect in the Empire, organized and rationalized them according to updated modern categories, and placed them in one volume „containing shari„a laws and „adliya laws corresponding [mutabiqa] to books of fiqh according to the madhhab of Abu Hanifa al- Nu„man. The 1917 Ottoman Family Code was also applied in Jordan and later became the basis of modern Jordanian personal law. The Ottoman legal system was retained; in 1927 many Ottoman laws (including the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917) were re-enacted with some alterations. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was established as a fully independent state in 1947, with Islam as the state religion. The first Constitution was adopted the following year, and the state embarked on the process of developing a national legal system to replace the vestiges of Ottoman rule. In 1947, a provisional Law of Family Rights was enacted and remained in force until it was replaced in 1951 by the new Law of Family Rights. A Civil Code and Civil Procedure Code were enacted in 1952 and 1953, the former replacing the Ottoman Mejelle of 1877. The 1952 Civil Code was replaced in 1976, the new Code drawing from Syrian legislation (which in turn was modelled on the Egyp- tian Civil Code of 1948). The most important legislation however dates back to 1938 when the Law of Tribunals for non-Muslim Religious Communities No. 2/1938 was promulgated in Trans-Jordan under King Abdullah I. The Law allows recognized religious sects to form special tribunals (courts) that have the competence to deal with personal status affairs. Under this law, Christians may bequeath one third of their estate, mainly land property, by way of a duly written will [Church Tribunal]…the remainder under Shari„a law provisions. At all rates, the Greek Orthodox Church followed and has been applying the 6th Century antiquated Byzantine Law which is a „Christianized‟ Roman Law in many aspects of the personal status and family affairs. In the West-Bank the tribunal applied the Byzantine law [equal shares for males and females] or the Shari„a law. Here the church faces also challenges of culture and gender out- looks of its own Christian members of congregation […]. In Israel and Jerusa- lem the Byzantine law is strictly applied. The Canon Law, an internal ecclesias-

- 23 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity tical law governing the Eastern Orthodox churches, the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion of churches, however, never provided for „material‟ issues like inheritance. And this is an important fact of the matter. Therefore, in the absence of any „Christian‟ inheritance legislations, and the failure by the Christian denominations in Jordan, on the other hand, to reach a consensus on such legislations, inheritance matters are governed by default to the country‟s valid laws and namely the Shari„a law in matters of inheritance. In Jordan, the Law of Tribunals for non-Muslim Religious Communities No. 2/1938 is a „special‟ law [qanūn khaÒÒ] and hence in issues of inheritance the Shari„a law as a „common‟ law [qanūn „ām] prevails and precedes the „special‟ law. According to Article109.1 of the Constitution, the Tribunals are formed in accordance with the laws issued specifically for this purpose. These laws define the competencies of these tribunals in relation to the issues of personal status and respective religious community waqf, however, matters of personal status for such communities are those same ones for Muslims that fall under the competence of the Shari„a courts. While the Christian church in its „Christian philosophy‟ regards the Shari„a inheritance code as unjust towards females, even in a patriarchal society like Jordan, the Church Tribunal cannot help much. Christian parents with solely daughters, in specific, have major problems with the inheritance issue, and parents usually resort to all sorts of complicated ways of protecting their female inheritors [wife and daughters] who might end up with either negligible shares and/or sharing their legal inheritance with second and third line relatives. Nevertheless, Christians can always have the option of resorting to what is recognized as takharruj or a form of redistribution of those „unequal‟ inheritance shares that were divided under the Shari„a law [between immediate males and female inheritors]. Christian families may, and before a Church Tribunal, ami- cably redistribute the „Shari„a legal shares‟ into equal shares between brothers and sisters or offer a financial compensation in lieu of shares that were not redistributed or reassigned. Other issues of no less complication are „civil Christian marriages‟ that take place outside the country which are recognized by the Dept of Passports and Civil Status but not recognized by the Church Tribunals. Church marriage is one of the seven sacraments. This is an issue of judicial competence that the Church feels should be resolved in the interest of Christian couples and the custody of children. It just creates confusion. Another legal issue of no less social importance and which creates ruptures within the Christian family is the „conversion of convenience‟ by Christian fathers in events of family disputes where the father converts into Islam to avoid main- tenance payments to his wife and own children. Christian mothers end up, and in many cases without their knowledge, suddenly with „Muslim-Christian‟ sons and daughters [after their father]. Adult sons and daughters discover suddenly as well that they belong „officially‟ to another religion. A daughter/son becoming 18,

- 24 - Concepts and Experiences going to either university or getting engaged to a fellow Christian discovers suddenly she/he is a Muslim by default of their father‟s conversion into Islam. The church has also to contend with another case of „conversion of convenience‟ where Christians, in particular in the poor North, convert to Islam for „economic‟ reasons. There are according to church sources around 80 cases a year…which leads us to the issue of „conversion of choice‟ by Muslims to Christianity and vice versa. While the latter is prohibited by law, the reverse is „welcomed‟. I shall not discuss the complicated issue of proselytizing for religious, cultural and practical reasons. Foreign missionaries who think they can just walk in a Muslim country and tread all over cultural and religious sensitivi- ties and legal boundaries not only prove their total naïveté and cultural disrespect and insensitivity but rather dangerously tamper with social peace, co- existence and centuries long covenants and tolerance. Finally, a new Constitution was adopted in 1952, retaining the religious and communal basis of jurisdiction in personal status matters. The 1952 Constitution declares Islam to be the state religion. It does not specify the sources of legislation as a whole, although in regard to the Shari„a courts it states that “the Shari„a courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction shall apply the rulings of the Shari„a law”. The Constitution, in Article 14, provides for the freedom to practice the rites of one's religion and faith in accordance with the customs that are observed in the Kingdom, unless they violate public order or morality. Article 6 stipulates that there shall be no discrimination in the rights and duties of citizens on grounds of religion.

Prof. Dr Muhammad Sharkawi (Cairo / Egypt)

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN RELATIONS IN TODAY‟S EGYPT: FROM THE MUSLIM PERSPECTIVE

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful This paper attempts to cover briefly the five axes that form the main aspects of “the current situation of Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt”, which are as follows: (1) General notes. – (2) Acknowledgement and recognition that there is a real problem, for which there must be a solution. – (3) Identifying the problem and outlining its various aspects, its nature and requirements, and determining what is essential and urgent, and what is marginal and insignificant. – (4) Estab- lishment of the actual causes which have produced the problem, and a compe- tent examination of these causes. – (5) A proposal for some practical solutions.

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FIRST: NOTES 1. The terms Copts and Coptic, are both derived from the word “Coptic”, which means “Egyptian”, thus every Egyptian is in fact Coptic, or a Copt, regardless of whether he or she is a Christian or a Muslim. The common use of the word “Coptic” tends nowadays to be associated only with the Egyp- tian Christians. If we know the linguistic meaning of the term, we can see that this is a mistake, but it is a common one which we have to tolerate. 2. The Christian communities in Egypt include both majority and minority groups, reflecting the population, and they display the usual symptoms which arise with minorities and majorities in general (religious, ethnic, genre, and even language). As regards Christians in Egypt, most of them are Orthodox, but there are also Protestants, Evangelical Christians, Catholics, Presbyterians, and so on. Dealings between the majority Christian group and the Christian minorities could not really be described as a model of understanding and harmony. 3. All Egyptians put together (Muslims and Christians) make up one ethnic (ethnic or national) group, and they form a single unity. 4. Respecting the minority religion is an essential aspect of the majority religion, as a Muslim cannot be considered to believe fully, unless he believes in Jesus Christ, his mother, the Virgin Mary, the Bible and what was revealed therein in the way of guidance, light, and the criterion between right and wrong. There are dozens of QurÞanic verses and prophetic Traditions which con- firm this essential part of the Islamic creed. 5. All Egyptians are religious people. Egyptians have historically played a key role in the formation of modern Christianity, and in protecting Islam, both scientifically and militarily. 6. Christian internet forums, as well as actions of Christian Copts in the Dias- pora, present and represent a negative outlook on this current problem, often tending to be dealing purely with emotional expression. They are in dire need of discipline, rationality, and realism.

SECONDLY: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT As a Muslim scholar I cannot but admit that there are problems, communication difficulties and tensions, under a surface that sometimes appears to be quiet. Meetings and hugs between The Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar and Pope Shenouda actually highlight the tensions more than they conceal them. If you were to make a fair observation of such problems, you would con- clude that these problems – and other factors – have led to a kind of isolation of Christians and to their withdrawal from political life, as well as from the social, artistic, sporting, military and administrative spheres. They have, however, broken into the economic field with vitality and strength, with the result that more than thirty percent of the country‟s wealth lies in their hands, according estimates of some non-governmental organizations. - 26 - Concepts and Experiences They have gradually retreated into the Church, which has expanded its role to represent a kind of alternative to those institutions that they have withdrawn from or become disinterested in. (It is to be noted that the Christian minority has found refuge in the Church, whereas the Muslim majority has not found a safe haven to retreat to. This has left some young people in danger of feeling frustrated and of falling prey to extremism). The situation has deteriorated to the extent of representing a potential danger to Egyptian society as a whole, to its security and stability, particularly since the arrival of the era of globalization and of open skies. The open border has sometimes also meant a diminution of state sovereignty, and the growing influence of the world outside - with all its power - is felt inside Egypt at all levels. A number of Christian thinkers, opinion leaders, and well known activists have tried to diagnose and identify the most salient problems requiring urgent national solutions: among these Christian thinkers – taking into consideration the disparity in their thoughts – are Msgr. Father Andrea Zaki, Father Ikram LamÝai, Bishop Yuhanna Qilta, Jamal AsÝad, Samir Morcos, Hanna Grace, Rafiq Habib, and Nabil Luqa Bibawi.

THIRDLY: DIAGNOSIS OF THE PROBLEM I have carefully considered and examined the demands that are put forward by most of these writers. They are real patriots, seeking to work in the national interest to achieve integrity and to secure the future of the country. I found that their demands are limited to the following areas: 1. Solving the problem of building and repairing churches. (I think it is a positive step to facilitate the building of houses of worship and to remove all restrictions that prevent or restrict such building, that is, to completely solve the issue). 2. Solving the problem of the rest of the Christian endowments. (It is to be noted that the Islamic Waqf have been confiscated by the State for its own benefit; this whole problem should be re-examined). 3. The proportionate representation of Egyptian Christians in parliaments and local councils, according to the proportion of their number in relation to the whole population. 4. Solving the problem of the appointment of Christian citizens to senior and sensitive positions within State departments; in a manner that considers the suitability of the candidate and his or her ability to occupy a public position effectively. 5. Appropriate presentation of Christians in State-owned media, including radio, press and television, at the same time addressing media discourse, and its focus on the rights of all Egyptian citizens and the preservation of their dignity. 6. Preventing Muslims from behaving in an offensive or inflammatory manner towards Christians, as this might be seen as showing lack of respect, or as expressing doubts of their beliefs.

- 27 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity There are, of course, other demands in addition to these. In fact the Copts in the Diaspora have over twenty demands, but many of them are marginal and not real demands. These are examples of the problems that result from specific claims. Dealing with such demands incorrectly from both sides, Islamic and Christian, often leads to tensions, breakdowns in communication, crises of confidence, mutual apprehension, and Christian isolation and withdrawal from State institutions and retreat to the community of the Church. In my opinion – as an Egyptian Muslim scholar – many of these existing problems are real ones. Though they are sometimes presented in an emotional or provocative way by Christian citizens at home and/or abroad, this does not in any way justify ignoring, overlooking, or forgetting them. Furthermore, neg- ligence – combined with lack of national sensitivity – could lead to an underes- timation of the problems, and to the loss of a sense of how dangerous they may be, both at the present time and in the future. In my opinion, underestimating or ignoring such problems will compound and magnify their effects and have negative repercussions on the whole Egyp- tian community, Muslims and Christians alike. A theoretical, scientific as well as a practical solution needs to be found that is capable of producing the intended results, a solution providing mechanisms for its implementation. If this solution will not be found, it will be an ominous sign for the present and for the future of this great nation, and may lead – literally – to results for which we would neither wish, nor hope.

FOURTHLY: DIRECT AND INDIRECT CAUSES, OR NEAR AND FAR ONES: When attempting to find out what the real causes are that have produced the situation as it is, it is of paramount importance that we use scientific, scholarly methods only, in terms of objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and integrity. The same applies, when we start an in-depth-analysis of their various aspects, i.e. problems and demands. Each of these problems has a particular direct cause. It also has its set of conditions and its history, from which it has emerged. The following is a list of problems as well as claims that have resulted from them. The list itself has been stimulated by, and eventually based upon, general observations rather than by specific ones. Having tried to find out what the real grounds of the aforementioned problems might be, we found that part of them is related to: 1. The Egyptian state and the way it executes its policy within Egyptian society, as regards to both, Muslims and Christians alike, and the state‟s keen- ness to achieve political reform, with real democracy, freedom, equality, justice, participation and real representation in a parliament that plays its role in legislation, accounting, auditing, in enforcing justice in the occupying positions of authority, and in basic human rights. Thus, it hopes to enhance the concept of citizenship and participation.

- 28 - Concepts and Experiences It is well known, however, that when a State takes an inclusive approach to policy management, citizens will tend to isolate themselves and the security forces will take on the real role of the political institutions, even though the structures and buildings of the State remain in place. Thus, politics becomes a game or a skit, where the effective player/actor and President is represented by the security forces. This impacts negatively on Muslims and Christians alike, not just on Christians. A number of Chris- tian thinkers are aware of this, and have spoken out loudly and confidently on the subject (Dr. Hanna Grace: Coptic absence from politics is not an exception, as well as all of Samir Morcos, and Ikram LamÝai). 2. The Church: Disagreement between Sadat and Pope Shenouda in the seventies added insult to injury, had a negative impact on the situation and aggra- vated the problems on the Christian side. Jamal As‘ad spoke about the reasons for the political isolation of the Copts into the Church, “It is the clash between Sadat and the Pope Shenouda [...] that force the Pope to try to at- tract more of the Copts into the Church, so that he can form a Coptic political leadership, represented by himself, and at this moment the real participation of Copts in political life is zero”. Dr. Ikram LamÝai summarizes the situation as follows: “When Pope Shenouda came to power in the early seventies, the equation was completed. He is a religious leader wanting to play a political role, and the mass of humanity (Coptic masses) wants someone to represent them in political life. At this moment the Church becomes the political crossing for Copts, and their isolation from society becomes even more marked”. This is a clear trend; the State and the Orthodox Church, headed by Pope Shenouda, are responsible for the isolation of the Copts from the practice of real political life in Egyptian society, a situation that still persists. This prompted the priest Dr. Andrea Zaki to call to the alert in a recent article, published on the occasion of the approaching elections... In a clear, high voice, he complained about the ruling party, saying: “They have been marginalized by their traditional ally, the ruling party ...” (Al-Ahram 24-10-2009). 3. The announcements and practices of some Islamists: I cannot omit to mention here that one reason which should not be ignored is the rejection by many Christians of some of the statements issued by the leaders of the Mus- lim Brotherhood – the most important Islamist group, who are seeking to participate in political life in Egypt. I am of the opinion that some of these statements were both unsuccessful and incorrect, seen from the proper Is- lamic perspective, and that they gave out a negative message, damaging the relationship between Christians and this group. This has also had a negative effect on political life in Egypt. Some of these group leaders are, however, trying to reform, clarify, and mitigate these negative effects! 4. Violence: It must also be remembered that Christians have been the victims of a number of acts of violence by extremist groups and this has left its

- 29 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity mark, in their hearts and in their memories. Such negative associations strengthen the case of suspicion and fear, despite the fact that Muslims in general denounce and condemn such deviant practices, which also have a negative effect on Muslims themselves. 5. We also need to take into consideration the recent spread of the Islamic thought directive, or literal form, which has wrongly been called the “ances- tral” way of thinking. It is characterized by a closed and narrow way of thinking, its attitudes lying far away from values of sobriety. It is indeed far from being a systematic and in-depth understanding of the superior purposes of Islam, with its values of tolerance, compassion, justice and humanity. An increasing number of Muslim youths have been attracted to this way of thinking, with its statements and provisions, and walk the path of exag- geration and hyperbole, towards an extreme and violent end (social violence or material violence), directed against both Christians and Muslims. All this has played its role in contributing to the status of seclusion, isolation, and withdrawal of the Christians in Egypt. I must mention here that there is a lack of trust in the official scholars among people in general and among young people in particular. Through their power these scholars are designated religious symbols and endowed with rewards, titles and positions, and this has caused young people to turn their backs on them and look instead to the teachings of half-educated people, then putting these teachings into practice in their lives. The situation of the sultan scholars may have seriously restricted the spread of a sober and correct understanding of Islam, and a moderate, rational explanation for moderate teachings, values and objectives. This represents, to some degree, a kind of setback for a correct understanding of Islam. 6. The religious discourse of the priesthood in the Church has reached a kind of stalemate and seems preoccupied with the preservation of tradition and with the hatred of diligence. They do not take into account the fact that religious texts have many possible interpretations as regards the living conditions, circumstances and inequality of people in their actual daily lives. The priest Dr. Andrea Zaki wrote an interesting piece on this subject, entitled “Towards an attempt at new Christian religious discourse”, in which he called for the building of bridges between the Church and society, accepting the variety of interests and predilections, and suggesting that the Church ought not to focus on the individual way and ignore the community way. We also note that the sovereignty of the patriarchal system within the Church tends to reduce the spirit of individual initiative and to cripple the effectiveness of such initiative. It looks rather to ecclesiastical community authority, relying on following its directives, without actually moving forward in solving problems or offering new visions.

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FIFTHLY: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: We need to deal with the reasons given above in a practical and methodological manner; to propose solutions for the problems and to respond to the legitimate and urgent claims: 1. One of the current stated rights which a large number of Egyptian people, Muslims and Christians alike, claim with all the legal, peaceful and civilized means available to them is the legitimate right to experience real political reform in order to achieve real democracy, justice, equality, dignity, human rights, and proper parliamentary participation and representation. When this has been achieved, the door will be opened for all to participate in the politics of their country, regardless of their faith or their beliefs or affiliation. Unless it happens, there will be further frustration, isolation, and withdrawal from all aspects of society. 2. A culture of acceptance of religious, cultural and political pluralism should be promoted, and that pluralism should be the Law of our being and of our life, as should the culture of freedom of religious belief and the human right to choose one‟s religion without coercion or fear or compulsion of any kind. All this would bring us to a kind of reconciliation with ourselves and with others, and it would reflect its positive effects on both Muslims and Chris- tians as Egyptian citizens, both of whom would then be positive and active participants. This could be achieved with the help of educational curricula, media programs, drama [...] etc. of cultural instruments. 3. Openness is needed between the scholars of the two religions. There should be meetings with dialogue and distinct methodological debate, which could shed brilliant light on all that concerns Egyptians as a whole, both Muslims and Christians, provided that they are carried out with accuracy, transparency, positive spirit, and in good faith. We need to get away from the lack of confidence that people have in the opinions and religious discourse of the official scholars on both sides. 4. We should highlight the similarities and common religious background which is, in many cases, shared between the two religions. We also need to correct some errors of recognition, either truly historic, scientific or practical ones, and we should also have the courage to apologize. 5. In conclusion, I would like to offer a practical suggestion that we start with the formation of common committees and organizations of civil society, which should consist of scholars, thinkers and activists from both Muslim and Christian sides, their task being to study the current situation in Egypt and to make an in-depth investigation of the background to this situation, whilst at the same time developing solutions. This work should start as soon as possible and not miss this opportunity, because Egypt deserves this, and more, from all of us. 6. Christians need to start participating in the social and sports‟ spheres and, in doing so, they will gradually emerge from their chosen isolation, so that they can fully and effectively become integrated into society. - 31 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity

Morcos B. Abd-el-Malek (Alexandria / Egypt) RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EGYPT COPTIC EXPERIENCES

It is with pleasure that I accepted the invitation to this well organized meeting to discuss one of the critical issues in our area in the spirit of love, peace, and respect. I came here from Egypt, from Alexandria, i.e. from the land that was blessed by the visit of the Holy Family in the first half of the first Century C.E., and from the city that was blessed by the preaching of St. Mark the Evangelist, who was mar- tyred there in the second half of the first Century, on May 8 of the year 68 C.E. In Egypt, according to the Government‟s estimate, Muslims, our brothers, make up ca. 90% of the population, whereas the number of Christians living in Egypt varies, reaching from an official 6% up to an estimated 14.2% of the population. The exact number, however, is not known to us. Anyhow, 92% of the Chris- tian population are members of the Coptic Orthodox Church under the leadership of His Holiness Pope Shenouda the Third, being St. Mark‟s 117th successor. The remaining Christians are either Coptic Catholics or Coptic Protestants. In today‟s Egypt and its political system, Copts are increasingly marginalized. In addition to that, they suffer from various forms of discrimination, e.g. when looking for a job, trying to get a position in the administration or government, and sometimes even when simply hoping to be raised in rank or position. Traditionally, the following positions are occupied by Muslims: President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and heads of the various branches of the Egyptian Armed Forces; furthermore, Chairman of the Egyptian People‟s As- sembly, heads of all government offices, chiefs of police, and presidents of universities. Copts are also under-represented in the diplomatic service. Despite making up 6 to 14% of the population, among the 440 Members of the People‟s Assembly, there are currently 6 Christians only (i.e. 1.20% of the MPs), none of them being elected, but all appointed by the President. All of them are members of the National Democratic Party (party of the majority). Two more Copts are found among the cabinet ministers. Another issue: building of churches. The Ottoman Hamayouni Decree of 1856 gave Christians the right to construct churches, but required that they submit a respective request to the Sultan. After Egypt gained its independence, this De- cree was amplified in 1934 by al-Ezabi Pasha, then Deputy Minister of the Inte- rior. This Al-Ezabi Decree formulated a set of 10 conditions which had to be met before the application was presented to the President for approval. Part of these conditions was that: the distance between a church and a mosque is not less than 100 meters, and the neighbouring Muslim community agreed to the church construction before the permit to build a new church may be issued.

- 32 - Concepts and Experiences In response to strong criticism of this decree, in 2005 the President issued the decree no. 42. This decree authorizes the country‟s 26 governors to give Copts (at their respective request) permission to expand or reconstruct existing church buildings, but Copts are still facing various problems in this regard, because the decree does not include the construction of new churches, and provides that the aforementioned permissions are subject to approval of security authorities. Even though the issue of mosque and church reconstruction is regulated today by the same law, the law seems to be applied more strictly in case of churches than in case of mosques, so that Copts still feel discriminated in that regard. The awareness of the significance of human rights is deeply rooted in Egypt; people believe in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which we consider natural to human beings who know that their rights and the rights of the others are interdependent, that their freedom will not be real freedom if it is built upon the ruins of the freedom of others. The Constitution stands for a set of basic principles that regulate the relationship between state and society, stipulates the rights of rulers and ruled, defines principles and rules how to regulate the relationships between authorities and people etc. In its chapter on Human Rights, the Egyptian Constitution states (Article 40) that: All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without discrimination due to sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed. Article 46 obliges the State to guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practising religious rights, while Article 47 guarantees freedom of opinion. Thus, Articles 40 and 46 are in agreement with Article 18 of the Universal Dec- laration of Human Rights: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. The basic problem in Egypt is that over the last 20 years a wave of Islamic fundamentalism swept over Egypt, creating tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim Egyptians, Christians, who look like their Muslim neighbours, wear the same clothes, eat the same food, drink the same water from the River Nile, and visit the same cafes and shops. Many Copts, however, complain of discrimination. Furthermore, in Egyptian public schools only part of the history of the Copts and their civilization is taught, or to put it differently, the school curricu- lum does not cover the pre-Islamic history of the Copts (i.e. the first six centuries AD). Consequently, Muslim students grow up without having full and accurate information about their Coptic Egyptian fellow-citizens; therefore, the other is not accepted, because he is unknown to me. To be honest, the government is trying hard to remove most of the barriers between the majority and minority, but at the same time it meets with denial by part of the majority. For example, few years ago the president declared the - 33 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity

Coptic Christmas Day (January 7th, according to the old calendar) an official holiday in Egypt, and since then, government officials usually attend the divine services in Christian Churches in Egypt during the eve of the feast. Also, Coptic writers are free to write and contribute their articles to national, private, and / or parties‟ newspapers. Shared citizenship strengthens the awareness of belonging to the same people and society with its various ethnic backgrounds, religions, and sects. Differ- ences between them may be overcome by sharing and cooperating in building up and developing their state, and by protecting their coexistence. All these sensitive issues and their solutions are dependent, I think, on the way families raise their children which quite often is but a reflection of what is said in the media or echoes what is heard in the streets. To deal honestly with these issues and solve the problems emerging from them, I suggest the following: (1) The State authorities should conduct a census that eventually provides accurate numbers of Copts as well as Muslims living in Egypt. (2) In elected / appointed councils and committees, Copts should be represented in a way that reflects the balance among the parts of the population. (3) Coptic history and culture as well as contribution to the growth of civilization should be included in school curricula of all levels of education. (4) To end favouritism and discrimination between citizens, in official documents (except birth certificate) religious affiliation should no longer be mentioned. (5) Senior staff appointments in governmental offices should be based not only on qualification, but also on fair representation.

Dr Christiane Paulus (Cairo / Egypt) EGYPTIAN MUSLIM AND COPTIC VIEWS ON MINORITIES – FROM AN OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE

The title of the conference “We are all Minorities” raises the question whether the difference between minority and majority is still a relevant issue nowadays, or whether we should think about another difference? 1. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS FIRST: WHO SETS A DIFFERENCE? Tolerance towards religious or other minorities has gone beyond the question of faith in our modern context, i.e. there is no doubt about this, no discussion: Tolerance towards religious minorities – as we heard and know - is treated as a topic of human rights, and the only way to consider it is to look, where and why this tolerance has not been realised yet. So there is always something to claim, maybe it is impossible to be fully realized.

- 34 - Concepts and Experiences Every idea or every thought reflects a certain point of view and thus, dem- onstrates the standpoint of its observer, so first there is the question who sets the difference, the difference between minority and majority, furthermore the meaning which is ascribed.1 Accordingly, the immediate association of minor, i.e. weak, and major, i.e. strong, is a special issue in western modern societies. However, it is not valid in other (cultural) contexts and has no universal verifi- cation although it seems that a majority in the global discourse represents this attitude. It is not necessary to refer to the Apartheid regime in South Africa, to the ancient Roman Empire or other countries, in which a small number of people owned the power over a majority. The ‘who‟, who sets the difference, has become clear: the minority in its self-description and its claiming. Two sorts of claims can be distinguished: equality and tolerance, both are claimed to be absent or not enough, and consequently must be granted from the majority. Both together seem to be a contradiction because this request implicates to become similar and different with the people of the so-called majority at the same time. For this reason it can‟t be realized. Hence, the famous motto, that a state has to be measured under the value, if and how it tolerates its minority groups has to be questioned. Does it really respect the opinion of the majority at all? The political system of democracy has already shown its debility, so haven‟t we to pose the question without a fixed category, i.e. to ask for a state that is able to create a frame and suitable conditions for a co-existence and living together of its different religious organisations? However, if we look in the past, we remark that the topic majority-minority itself is a reflection of western or better of European history. Due to the special reasons of European Christianity and its problem to deal with the secular world, violence against any stranger or other people in general arose during the middle ages and at the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment. In comparison with the Islam for example, Christianity had no tools to differentiate between different denominations, religions or faiths. After the 3o-year religious war, Catholics against Protestants and as well after the Enlightenment which concentrated on the theoretical conception of equality and of nation – there is an antagonistic tension between both, with reference to J. F. Lyotard2 – and especially after the Holocaust the claim of tolerance towards minorities emerged strongly. As the westerners have the trend with their power of colonialism in order to universalize their social attitudes, this issue has become, famous all over world – and it functions as a normative control of Europe and the West over the rest of the world or as a social justification of economical interests.

1 NIKLAS LUHMANN: Soziale Systeme. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt am Main 1987, esp. pp. 92ff. (Engl. translation: Social Systems, Standford 1995). 2 JEAN FRANÇOIS LYOTARD: Das postmoderne Wissen. Ein Bericht, Graz / Vienna, 1986 (= The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge, Manchester, 1984; originally French: 1979). - 35 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity The Europeans began to set this difference with its special meaning. They ex- ported it without considering whether it matches in other contexts. And the European perspective simply reproaches a subordinated morality towards those, who do not deal with both terms: We Europeans have had a problem which we have resolved, but you, especially third world or Moslem countries, did not yet resolved. Hence, the attitude matches with Islamophobia. It is logic that the local groups who could profit from the setting of the majority- minority-difference picked up the subject and applied it to themselves. The black/white picture of minor and major for these groups, who are setting this difference, has to be contested. Furthermore, in western contexts and in the local Egyptian non-Muslim groups it can be remarked that it became almost a standard to blame Muslims for something they are not responsible for, merely because they are majority. So where is the fault? One can ask about the function of this discourse, which is widely spread in Egypt and reached the level of sectarian strife every now and then in connection with certain issues such as: church-building, conversions especially from Coptic girls to Islam – together with stories of raping -, land dispute and others. These issues are all documented by the Center of Arab-West Understanding and show a high level of reproaches and animosities.3 2. THE CATEGORY OF BORDER AND THROUGH THE DIFFERENCE OF INCLU- SION AND EXCLUSION OF A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION From the Muslim side the fact is mentioned, that there is no exchange of information with the Copts. And this lack of contacts should represent the bottom of the problem: a sort of black box situation in the livelihoods. Conse- quently, it can be proposed to institutionalize dialogue on different levels of the society. On the other hand, the Coptic side refers the problem with the term of marginalization to the political and educational systems. Therefore, we have to ask about the meaning of the claim to be presented in the society, its institutions and livelihoods and in the social discourse in general. In my empirical field study4, the importance of time emerged beyond the local factor. – (In passing,) with a look in the past, you can remark that the Copts during the centuries worked in high levels of administration, especially in fi- nance. – The main difference between the test persons of both groups, Mus- lims and Christians could be noticed with respect to their age. They differ in describing their relationships towards the respective other: The description of the older generation is almost positive. They mention a good neighbourhood and solidarity in their livelihood and at their working place. They visit each other in the feasts or other religious occasions and change their

3 www.cawu.org. 4 I referred to it at the conference of the Abrahamic Forum 2005 in Bosnia-Herzego- vina: Non-Muslims in Islamic societies: Legal Implications and Everyday Experiences, in: STEFAN SCHREINER (ed.), Visions of a Just Society, Sarajevo 2006, pp. 112-118. - 36 - Concepts and Experiences cookies and let their children play together in the streets. But they never talk on religious issues because they do not want to risk a quarrel with their friends. The younger generation sometimes reflects on nice common memories from their childhood. But when they grow up, during the age of the adolescence, when the process of modern self-reflecting starts, they see “huge” con- tradictions between both religions and begin to refrain from the others. Espe- cially the Coptic youth tries to form their own groups in schools and universities. Children play football in the church, instead in the streets or in the clubs. The Muslim youth sometimes tries to talk to them without refraining from religious issues and gets frustrated because the Coptic youth closes such discussions immediately. According to them, it makes no sense to talk about faith or religion; this could only result in a quarrel. Altogether, the younger go beyond the elder generation, i.e. the border for the youth is not only fixed concerning religious subjects, but further on livelihood relations as neighbours, friends, colleges at school and universities. This phenomenon is the result of the modernisation of religiosity, i.e. that religious life has become more conscious and more organized. The Sunday School can be seen as such a modernisation. On the Muslim side there are sometimes religious groups for children or Islamic Schools, who are also sepa- rating, like the Sunday School. However, a difference concerning modernisation of religiosity at the Coptic and the Muslim side can be observed. While the Muslim youth has become able to talk and to discuss, i.e. to communicate their faith during this process, the Coptic side is characterized by more or less activities and almost no communication on religious issues. If we look deeper in the Coptic Orthodox religiosity, we find the line concerning holiness relatively high, in comparison with Catholic, Protestant or Islamic believes. Holiness means no communication of these subjects at all, a taboo of great extend. Fur- thermore, the silence or the hush concerning discussing religious topics matches with the attitude of suffering and endure, therefore with the attitude to be persecuted from the beginning. This has become almost a collective consciousness in the Coptic Church, as it is famous that the Coptic Church goes back on St Mark, the martyr and suffered extremely under the roman persecution during the first three decades.5 Hence, the conception of border or limit differs in Coptic and Muslim belief and consciousness. Therefore, the respective meaning of limit or of inclusion and exclusion of both religious organisations has to be focused: Every religious

5 See OTTO F. A. MEINARDUS: Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christianity, Cairo 22000, pp. 28f. The city of Alexandria with its big importance in the ancient religious sphere, due to the strong heritage of the old Egyptian religion, underwent the heaviest persecution of the Christians. At the same time the conception of desert monasticism emerged. In mz point of view both events can be affiliated or connected: It is plausible to assume that the important people of the early Christian communities flew into the desert and interpret it as their destiny, as a trial from God. - 37 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity organisation has its way to include and exclude people: The commitment to the dogma and its consequences leads to a special behaviour. Everybody who is not like this is seen as an unmarked space and is excluded. Furthermore, every religious organisation has to be related to the philosophical categories of time and space, i.e. they are cultural and historic. Under modern circumstances we observe a decrease in the traditional fixed social frame of religion and of the self evidence of religious issues. Every subject can be discussed, due to the increasing education of its members in general. Accordingly, the demand to discuss the decisions of authorities has risen. The Muslim community and the Coptic Church react in different ways concerning modernity: While the Muslims – beside their worship – accept and adapt the culture of talking inside and outside, the Copts, however, have not developed this culture, whereas in Muslim tradition the dogmatic discussions emerged very early with „Ilm al-kalām. Because of their culture and ability to discuss, Muslims more or less seem to have no fear to communicate with the excluded population from their side, as they practice and institutionalize interreligious dialogue. Hence, they use the possibility to prove themselves, a factor which has become important for modern religiosity: to be able to deal with different points of views and to grow with them. Partners of Muslim-Christian dialogue are until today only Catholics and Protestants, not only from western countries. However, the orthodox side, especially the Copts in Egypt, refrains from interreligious dialogue with Mus- lims and with Christians of different confessions. The conception of limit or frontier seems to be the old one of the taboo (Luhmann): “remaining in the relation of reciprocity of priests, monks and religious followers”, which shows its fragilities through the outcome of many internal and external problems.6 It seems that these issues concern a fear to deal with the fragile phenomena of the modern or postmodern society. 3. THE CATEGORY OF TABOO AND COMMUNICATION The claim by the so-called minority, to be more presented in the society can be realized through administrable work, which is directed to improve livelihood conditions. A person cannot be forced to communicate, but to be present in the society without communication is not possible. Hence, as a consequence, the claim to be not enough presented in the society asks for communication and dialogue, as for example the Coptic side claims for the entrance of a detailed Coptic history in the curricula in general.7 But this implies that there will be discussions on religion in the classrooms and so everywhere. The line of holiness and taboo will be exceeded by communication. However, is it possible in a modern society to forbid the discourse of several subjects or to set taboos?

6 NIKLAS LUHMANN: Die Religion der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main 2002, pp. 235f. 7 Coptic history is already been taught in a very short way in civics. - 38 - Concepts and Experiences It would be more far reaching if the discourse asks how a state can organize a frame for the relation between its religious organizations, a frame which guarantees transparency and communication of its members in general beyond the minority-majority difference. It seems that there is no alternative to the communication, i.e. to keep the old taboos under modern circumstances where there are no limits on the spreading of information. A political or social agreement concerning respect of the taboos between the different sides would break them in the same way; the setting has to be discussed. The elder generation had unconsciously accepted the taboo, not to talk on religious issues, due to their lack of education. On the other side, the relationship between the Muslims and the orthodox Christians was good in the past, with no problems of sectarian strife like nowadays. It seems that not the fact of being a numeral minority made the situation in Egypt worse, but the increase of the modernity in connection with the attempt to communicate the taboo or to communicate in the field of the taboo or the holy secrets: In general, holy objects or pictures create timidity and keep the ambivalence of reality and non- reality,- something is there and not, something from beyond the everyday live is transmitted to it, seems to be perceivable. The secret cannot be known, it is a mystery. Someone who does not see or feel it blames himself for his faith not to be strong enough. The social side of the taboo represents people who have the necessary special knowledge of the mystery and how to deal with it and others not. With the increase of codification the more abstract a difference of immanence and transcendence emerged.8 In every society there are two sorts of speech codifications, communication and the ban on communication. Taboos are implemented to prohibit communication and the symbolic has the function to intermediate between both sides, the allowed and the forbidden communication: for example, to differentiate between God himself and his appearance. Problems of communication are solved by oppression of communication; at least they can be structured through taboos. Only men who served a special rite of several years possess the essential knowledge to speak in or about these domains. It results in a limit of organized mistrust between both sides, which splits the society. Secrecy is a must: “The knowledge has to be protected from communication because it is created by this protection.” On the other side, it could be found out easily that the bones are just bones.9 The symbolic presentation of the secret was invented to show the unity of the visible and the invisi- ble, it creates the unity of the paradox. And the ritual makes a communication possible, which actually is forbidden. Luhmann indicates this as a communication which avoids communication because “its forms and performances are stereotyped and contingence is just reduced on necessity.”10 The ritual is not

8 LUHMANN: Die Religion in der Gesellschaft, pp. 60ff. 9 NIKLAS LUHMANN: Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1998, p. 234. 10 LUHMANN: Die Gesellschaft, p. 235. - 39 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity performed as communication, but as a quasi-object, because it does not differentiate between expression and information, it just gives information on itself and on the rightness of the performance. The ritual exists where a communication would be a big risk. Sure, the invention of the printing affected an increase of complexity concerning the secrecy. With the communication of the taboo or the holiness of a special relic, place or domain it can only be deconstructed, also if it is discussed as secret itself, i.e. by giving reason why it has to be kept as a secret.11 The only equivalent in this case is to transfer the forbidden communication of the taboo on a second level and allow to discuss the causes of the setting itself. But it will be hard to show its plausibility. On the other side, even with the transfer, the floor is open for discussions. Hence, the floor is open for the discussion of the taboo, the holiness or the secrecy in its different characteristics, conceptions and shapes in the different religions. The limit of the taboo with the pressure of modern society to break every taboo seems to play the most important role in this difficult relationship between both religious organizations in Egypt. The comparison of the particular taboos of both religions, of (Egyptian) Islam and of the Coptic Orthodoxy in pre-modern and modern circumstances will explain the causes of the sectarian strife. For the Coptic Orthodox Church Luhmann‟s whole description of the taboo setting can be applied. As it was mentioned before, the Coptic Church is characterized by a taboo with great extent. It is represented by the men of knowledge as the pope and the high clerisy. They are all recruited from the monkhood12 and this, together with their special clothes, awards them a sanctuary. This can be easily observed with regard to the behaviour of the ordinary Coptic people who like to approach and to touch them for taking their bless- ings. There are a lot of holy objects for the daily live, for example oil, which is sanctified by the church and which is distributed to the believers. Furthermore the high number of icons – beneath the old icons from the Middle Ages or the old church there is a production of painting new icons – , which make the divine appear for the believers, represents an accurate example for the taboo as unity of the present and the absent. And it cannot be discussed: neither the feeling itself nor the setting. Many stories of miracles are told, old and new one. They function as the extensive rituals, services and learning of the old “holy”

11 Luhmann: Die Gesellschaft, pp. 235ff. 12 The monkhood with its singleness, because it is seen as a higher way of worship, refers to sexuality as a moral problem in the Coptic Church. Almost the same critics concerning the Catholic Church and its celibacy were published under gender or feminist aspects in the Christian Theology in the 80ies, particularly in the USA and in Eu- rope. On the other side, the marriage is from the theological side with its character of a sacrament absolutely overloaded, which results in big problems today, especially for couples within the Coptic church who want to divorce and have no possibility. This circumstance refers to the lack of an open discourse on marriage in general and on its Christian meaning. - 40 - Concepts and Experiences Coptic language, as a communication with its own standards which withdraw an open communication. Last but not least this religious culture as a collective standard is not able to communicate religious issues with others or in a more or less reasonable way. It is well known that these domains of religiosity where communications is prohibited represent a more afterworld orientation, so this refers to the problems with the real world. Hence, the concentration on the first events of Christianity within the Coptic Church, and here on the Roman persecution in particular, matches with the attitude of suffering as collective consciousness. The very problematic connection with the here-world seems to be on hold until today, during the modern organization of the pre-modern or antique religiosity of that manner, which seems to be able only to survive in a complete ghetto situation.13 In comparison with Islamic or Muslim religiosity14, the limits of the taboos are low, marginal. From the beginning on, the Islam tried to keep both worlds, the here- and the afterlife, together with a result of an enormous interest concerning knowledge and consequently for education and communication in general. The religion and its organization did hardly set any taboo, i.e. communication on every subject is not only allowed, it is required. The only exception is the fact of the revelation, hence, the holiness of the text, the Qur‟an, itself and the shape of God, Allah. The understanding of the Qur‟anic descriptions of his shape is interpreted in a metaphorical way. Not to be rejected are the five obligations for Muslim believers, the commitment to the only God and to the prophet Mohammad, the five times prayer, the fasting in Ramadan, the alms giving and the pilgrimage to Mecca, if the person is able to do so. Muslims differentiate between the necessary and the Sunna which represents the setting of the difference, the necessity has the character of a ritual, to avoid communication. On the other side, they can be explained and discussed scientifically as a matter of fact, this happens all over the world before and nowadays. Further- more, the Shari‘a as setting of the law seems to prohibit discussions, but theoretically the possibility to discuss the law for a new fatwa is reflected, thus, it can be described as a limited taboo.15 The knowledge is not reserved for a particular group of men, everyone has the right to get religious education, women not excluded. Islam does neither

13 Coptic laymen are already begun to criticize the ghetto situation, that every activities and events take place only in the church, see CAWU. 14 Namely Sunni Islam, which is the most spread in Egypt and in the Arabian countries. 15 Luhmann shows why morality is always connected with religion: This connection represents the solution of problem of communication. Because of the codification of the language setting itself, yes and no, morality has to be deprived from the possibility to negate. Hence, morality has to be transmitted to religion. He defines morality wherever a person does not depend on someone or on a special situation for his judgment of the other, i.e. the codification is built on respect and disrespect, which is a complicated mechanism of social coordination and needs reduction of complexity and therefore cannot be discussed. See his Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, pp. 242ff. - 41 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity know a holy institution like the church, nor a hierarchy, nor celibacy. Sexuality is not a taboo too, whereas the marriage, as fixed by Shari‘a law, is exclusive, but as an institution it can be discussed. Divorce is allowed. The gender contacts in general are limited. Because of their sexual dimensions they seem to have the character of a fixed taboo in some contexts, but in other contexts not. Diversity of this issue can be found in the religious or theological discourse. The particular place Mecca is called ḥaram, but at the same time there is an ex- plication of it, which can be discussed. The black stone, which the believer are used to kiss, seems to have a certain sanctuary, but in the same time they are conscientious to look at it as an ordinary stone, which is only be kissed because the prophet Muhammad did so. Of course there are phenomena of popular religiosity which include a wider sanctuary, holy shrines, magic handling with Qur‟anic verses, and water of the source Zamzam in Mecca. These domains of popular religiosity are sometimes shared by Muslims and Coptic Christians in daily life because there is no danger of communication for the Christian side. 4. CONCLUSION The comparison of the taboos and their intercourse in both religious organizations refers to the heart of the problem of their relationship: The setting of the taboo on communication about their faith or any other religious issue. Due to the fact that this setting seems to have no more plausibility under modern – or global circumstances, which are characterized through a high increase of communication in general, the taboo zones are protected with fences and walls. This can be taken literally. Every event of the Coptic community takes place inside the church with the result that – in contrast to the elder generation – the new taboo-line extend to the whole society, i.e. the world outside, which can be called the Muslim, modern society, and also the place of the other Christian denominations such as Protestants or Catholic. The Coptic conception of inclusion and exclusion is very strict. This results in the fact, that for most of the Coptic believers the rest of their own society has become a black box. The lack of knowledge of “the other”, that is to say Muslim, Jew or other Christian, evokes a big scepticism and a systematic mistrust of the Copts towards the society in general.16 This large mistrust is expressed by blaming the others in daily live surroundings of discrimination, which on the other side is not understandable for the Muslims or Christians of other denominations. Hence, the aggressions emerge.

16 See also CHRISTIANE PAULUS: Interreligiöses Lernen aus systemtheoretischer Per- spektive (Interreligious learning from a Systemtheoretical Perspective), in: GERHARD BUETTNER / ANETTE SCHEUNPFUG & VOLKER ELSENBAST (eds.): Zwischen Erziehung und Religion. Religionspädagogische Perspektiven nach Niklas Luhmann (Between Education and Religion. Perspectives of Religious Education according to Niklas Luhmann), Berlin 2007 (= Schriften aus dem Comenius Institut), pp. 95-116. - 42 - Concepts and Experiences The systematic mistrust seems to be the main reason concerning the Coptic problem in Egypt. This main reason is located beyond the majority-minority difference, which only abstracts from the special case. Therefore this difference is not able to clarify the situation, in contrary. In this context the role of the Coptic Church inside and the design of the Coptic religiosity in the modern- global context have to be taken under consideration. And from this thought it can be extracted for a more or less general perspective that the transparency between the religious denominations or religious organizations with the willing and ability to talk would be the best frame for a living together in a multi- religious state. In this sense a wise understanding of the market of religions could be reached and furthermore the highly problematic term of the (Euro- pean) equality could be avoided and replaced by communication of all sides within democratic procedures.17

Prof. Dr Fadi Daou SJ (Beirut / Lebanon) DECONSTRUCTING MINORITIES: THE LEBANESE INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE

1. INTRODUCTION Leaving his very valuable Testament in December 2001, just one month before his death, Shaikh Muhammad Mahdi Chamsedine, President of the Lebanese Islamic Shi‘ite Council said: “Shi‘ites are not a minority in the Islamic world, nor are they a minority in the Arab world; the same goes for Christians in the Arab world. There- fore, any appeal for a protection of minorities and for equal rights for minorities, is a great peril that we should not walk into and that we ought to stop” (Testament, 84). Last week, the Lebanese Druze leader Walid Joumblat communicated to the press that, in the current framework of the region and the tension between Sunnis and Shiites, the Druze and the Christians in Lebanon became “Red Indians”. Joumblat explained to the journalist that this is his own conviction, no without influence on his political acting. Yet, he – Joumblat – was not sure that the Christians are realizing this new situation.

17 Consequently the question concerning the lack of equality granted as a constitutional right, which can be remarked in the constitution of may Islamic states, could so far be discussed on another level: The religious clause which prevents non-Muslim men to marry a Muslim woman would not be normatively compared with the secular constitutional law and its no-limited or indifferent conception of religious freedom, but the issue of the marriage ruling itself could be disposed to be discussed and negotiated openly by the religious denominations and their members themselves. - 43 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity Though the duration between these two talks is only eight years, the cultural, social and political gap between the two discourses is enormous. In fact, the situation between the beginning of the 21st Century and now has known some drastic changes, in Lebanon and in the region. This is to be taken in consideration while we are trying to analyze the minorities‟ issue in the Middle- East. The contrast between Chamsedine‟s and Joumblat‟s words reflects not only an evolution in the reality but also an ideological disparity in dealing with the same issue. Thinking minorities in an integration process leads to different choices and policies than conceiving them in a protection strategy. The question is complex and subject to different and divergent analyses. Moreover, in this region of the world, the concept of minority is also related to the communities‟ memories not in a positive way. On the one hand, the Christians in the Arab world refuse to be addressed as minority, because this image might re- mind them of the dhimmitude situation in previous centuries. On the other hand, the same concept can represent an echo to the Question de l‟Orient and the Ca- pitulations during the 19th century, when the main European political powers (France, England, Russia, and Prussia) pretended the protection of the different Christians minorities within the Ottoman Empire. The 1860 tragic conflict and massacres in Mount Lebanon and Syria were an indirect effect of these international policies. For all these reasons and examples, one has to be very careful when he wants to talk about minorities in the Middle-East and especially in Lebanon. Thus, my presentation will be in three points as follows. I have first of all to present the diversity in the Lebanese society. There are of course different perspectives of this reality, and different manners to present it. I will do it, based on the constitutional approach of the Taef amendments of 1989. My second point will be more related to the actuality, and the new changes in the situation, trying to answer this question: why some Lebanese are becoming “Red Indi- ans”? My third and last point will be more conceptual, where I will try to rethink the concept of “minorities” in its relation with pluralism and integration, always from a Lebanese perspective. 2. LEBANON, COUNTRY OF MINORITIES, OR NATION OF CONVIVIALITY? The Lebanese constitution recognizes 18 different religious sects. Five are Mus- lim (Shi‘a, Sunni, Druze, ‘Alawite and Isma‘ilite), representing nowadays around 60% of the population. Twelve are Christian (Maronite, Greek Ortho- dox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catho- lic, Syrian Orthodox, Roman Latin Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt and Protestant), representing around 39% of the population. And the eighteenth group is the small Jewish community. There are of course other religious groups that are present in Lebanon, or some non-religious people; yet they don‟t have a constitutional recognition. Since there is no civil law regarding Personal statutes, but only religious laws, (marriage law for Christians, marriage

- 44 - Concepts and Experiences and inheritance laws for Muslims), all the Lebanese are formally related to one of these 18th communities. One can look to this picture in different ways. We can say for example that in Lebanon there is a small majority, talking about Islam, and a big minority talking about Christianity. But we can also say, if we consider the diversity within each religion that all the communities are minorities in Lebanon, and this is true too. However, at the end of the war in 1990, the Lebanese people gave to their national diversity another sense and representation. In fact the Taef agreement, representing the constitutional base of the second Republic in Lebanon, has stipulated that the political responsibility, in its different components, should be held in a balanced way (50/50) between Christians and Muslims. This choice was made not on a statistical basis, but on a cultural one. The new constitution considered the Christian-Muslim conviviality criteria for the legitimacy of the political power in the country. This means that the integration of all the Leba- nese and their communities within the national culture of conviviality matters more than the demographical situation of each community. In one word, they chose integration as a process of mutual recognition and solidarity between different communities and towards their own cultural and spiritual heritage, to face and overcome the risk of national disintegration and country partition. The choice of the integration process in the framework of a reconciled diversity in a common mission of conviviality was adopted by most of Lebanese communities in the early nineties. Talking about the Christian presence in Lebanon and all the Arab countries, the Catholic Patriarchs of Eastern churches wrote in 1992: “Presence means that we are, in the middle of the society where we live, a sign of God's presence in our world. This invites us to be ‘with‟ ‘in’, ‘for‟ and not ‘against‟, ‘outside‟ or even ‘in the margin of‟ the society we live in. It is an essential dimension of our faith, our vocation and our mission.” And the Catholic Patriarchs define that “presence is situated between two opposite pitfalls: ‘marginalization‟ and ‘dissolution‟. One and the other represent a mortal evil. Marginalization cancels our mission and dissolution does the same for our identity, while authentic presence ensures both mission and identity. It is presence in fact that deepens our fidelity to God, to ourselves and to the society that God willed as a space for our earthly journey... The image people have of us depends, in one way or another, on the quality and intensity of our presence and not on the more or less large number of our communities.” (PLCPO II, 17) They also presented a vehement critique to confessionalism, considered as a dangerous distortion of religion and a flagrant contradiction with the meaning of the Church. Confessionalism worries primordially about survival, self defence and the safeguard of rights and acquired privileges, a lot more than it worries about the knowledge of faith itself and its spirit. (cf. PLCPO IV, 11) Thus, the Patriarchs think that due to an authentic comprehen- sion of their faith, “Christians are eager to be considered as citizens in the full sense of the term and not as a minority seeking protection.” (PLCPO III, 35)

- 45 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity We can hear a very similar exhortation coming from Shaikh Chamsedine in his Testament, when he says: “I repeat, for the third time I think in this Testament: Shiites in Lebanon have to wholly integrate in their Islamic Lebanese surroundings, and not take any step that differentiates them from others among their Muslim brothers in Lebanon. In the same time, this integration cannot be set on a confessional basis, but in harmony with the general integration in the country, with all the Lebanese population and on the basis of the constants of the national Pact of the Lebanese people, that emphasizes primordially that Christianity in Lebanon is a constitutive part of it, as is Islamity, and that Lebanon cannot be unless by complementarity and by the not only common but also one life of its children.” (Testament, p. 69) 3. WHY ARE SOME LEBANESE BECOMING “RED INDIANS”? Time has changed and the situation of different Lebanese communities too. While in the early nineties, the different Lebanese groups wanted to assure that their so important and unique experience of making from the Christian-Muslim conviviality the national culture, hasn‟t been broken by the 15 years of war, their concerns nowadays seem to be different. In fact, on the one hand, Leba- nese Christians are increasingly under the stress of losing their influence in the public sphere, because of their continuous emigration and negative demographical balance. And on the other hand, the regional tension, since the war on Iraq, between Shiites and Sunnis is implicitly concentrating the political competition between these two communities and their regional extensions. For multiple reasons, that I don‟t have time to present here, the problems that we are collecting now are the result of what we, or others, have planted during the last twenty years. The two main problems that we are facing can be identified as follows: the generalization of communitarianism among the different communities, and the weakness of the State of Rights and law. Only with these circumstances, we can reasonably talk about minorities issue in Lebanon. While integration develops and enriches both the public sphere with its political institutions and the civil society with its different organizations, communitarianism disintegrates both of them, transforming the political institutions into a tribune for the community interest and the civil society for the homogenization of its own culture and the control of the discourse of its members. In this sense, a minority tends to become tyrannical, as pointed out by Yves Charles Zarka, in his book difficile tolerance. An oppressive minority, he writes, is one that does not recognize and therefore does not apply the fundamental principles of individual autonomy and equality of rights and human rights in general, on its own members (cf. p. 105). Just a month ago, we had in Beirut, with the collaboration of Adenauer foundation, a conference on religious diversity. During the conference, one of the prominent lecturers was expressing his deep concern and pain to be a kind of “no land‟s man”. I mean because of his disagreement with the main cultural and political positions of his community, he feels that there is no place for him

- 46 - Concepts and Experiences in the public sphere. Due to this situation, some Lebanese are becoming what Joumblat called “Red Indians”, in transforming their community into a “reserve”, or in being lost in the nature (the opposite of the public sphere).

4. DECONSTRUCTING MINORITIES: PLEA FOR INTEGRATED PLURALISM Minorities of concern to Minority Rights Group International (MRG) are disadvan- taged ethnic, national, religious, linguistic or cultural groups who are smaller in number than the rest of the population and who may wish to maintain and develop their identity. According to this definition, the minority question is an issue of Rights, private and public, and of identity and cultural recognition. The first article of the United Nations declaration on minorities, adopted in 1992, emphasizes the responsibility of the States in protecting the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories. Although it‟s an essential mission that each State should assume, I don‟t think that we can build a positive approach of pluralism only on such basis. Instead of asking us and each one to look to himself in the minority perspective, saying that we are all minorities, I would prefer, in a national framework and with the Lebanese experience, to seek an integrated pluralism where people can freely express their particularities for the benefit of all the society, and appreciate the acculturation process, enriching each one of them. Jürgen Haber- mas, in his last book, Between naturalism and religion. The challenges of democracy, ac- curately declares that “the democratic process derives its strength of legitimating conviction from two components: on the one hand, the equal participation of citizens... on the other hand, the controversy regulated by discussion” (p. 179). And we should remember that, according to him “Fair regulations cannot be reached unless the persons concerned learn to also adopt the perspectives of all the others.” (p. 178) Therefore, to protect democracy, each society needs a mechanism that helps its citizens to be able to represent at the same time the particularity of their community and the comprehensive national identity including the particularities of all other communities. I call this mechanism an integrated pluralism, opposing it to communitarianism. In Lebanon, I believe that we are actually facing huge challenges in regards to the new political and cultural situation. I will just mention two of them: reaf- firming the legacy and the authority of the State as a State of Rights and law, the same for all on the one hand; and enhancing the civil society activities, especially in an intercultural and intercommunitarian approach, on the other hand. In this field, working together and without the complex of minority, the Lebanese may find the existence within their society of new categories that are really minorities, in the sense of discriminated population, as women, migrant workers or free intellectuals. Advocacy and help provided to these categories in a common trans-communitarian perspective can constitute a chance of promising social renewal, and a sign of hope.

- 47 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity

Prof. Dr. Aman Kabbara Cha„arani (Beirut / Lebanon)

CHALLENGES FACING RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN LEBANESE SOCIETY IN A CHANGING WORLD – REALITY AND FUTURE VISION

1. INTRODUCTION There is always the hope that there might, at any moment, be some new achievement or new findings which would make the waiting Lebanese citizens rejoice at having arrived at the crossroads of solutions. They have already been waiting for a long time, however, and they are faced only with further difficulties and challenges, whilst trying to make a decent living at a time of accelerat- ing change. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a series of religious conflicts which have led to the emergence of ethnic and sectarian groups within the State. This has brought to the fore the issue of identity, thus paving the way for the defence of ideals or values of a religious nature. Further, religion has become a tool used for political purposes and has also been used as a means of self-affirmation, sparking off conflict between groups, especially between the multi-sectarian communities which make up Lebanese society. This is a society which, after successive civil wars, has turned into a group of divided and conflicting sects, living in a turbulent regional climate, a society in which the people are divided between religious identity, on the one hand, and the vision of globalization on the other. It has also been the scene of battle between regional and international forces, ending in 1990 with the TaÞif Agreement, whose terms focused on the abolition of sectarianism. Yet, the agreement was unable to achieve reconciliation and co- existence among the people of this one nation, and it failed to remove politics from religion and prevent the latter from being used in political conflicts. The philosophy of the TaÞif Agreement was to solve the national problem by establishing balances and guarantees between the various Lebanese sects so that they could all participate in building society, while at the same time retaining their religious and cultural freedom, and their national role in solving social and cultural problems. However, this agreement was in fact not put into practice, except in respect of the terms relating to sectarian balances. Instead of addressing sectarianism, the ruling regime went further towards strengthening it, with all its features and tendencies. All ideas of development came to nothing and the phenomenon of sectarian and zone loyalty was strengthened, as was the role of the sect leaders. Mean- while the democratic culture began to weaken and challenges grew in the areas of religion, ethics, culture, politics, the economy and the media. - 48 - Concepts and Experiences

2. THE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGES FACING RELIGIOUS, CULTURAL, PO- LITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MEDIA DIVERSITY IN LEBANESE SOCIETY IN A CHANGING WORLD 2.1 Political sectarian system In Lebanon, the political sectarian system presents the most important challenge for society. The problem of sectarianism is highlighted by the existence of multi-religious or multi-sectarian tendencies, a situation in which conflicts and struggles are heightened. The issue of sectarianism differs from one country to another. The type of sectarianism which is prevalent in Eastern Europe differs from that seen in Asian or in Muslim countries. The sectarianism found in Egypt, for example, is different from that found in Iraq or Lebanon. Lebanon has a historical legacy which deepens the problem of sectarianism, and the political system there is in fact based on sectarianism; namely, on official recognition of the rights of sectarian identities and multiplicity. This recognition is not only in terms of the cultural dimension, but also deals with the organizational dimension of the sects, which is placed at the forefront of public life, and with the regulation of relations between sects in practice, at the level of politics and power. When we talk about a political sectarian system, we are talking about the organization of the sectarian conflict for power. If we look closely at the democratic system as adopted by the Lebanese constitution, we will see that the democratic system in Lebanon is an interface for political life, and if we go a little deeper into the so-called Lebanese democracy, we can see that it is no more than a kind of peaceful organization of the political conflict between political groups and sects. The current function of Lebanese democracy is to keep guard over sectarian multiplicity and to organize conflicts arising between the sects. Our politics has become a struggle for power. We have lost our moral values and have gone back to tribalism; we have gone from being a group concerned with the future of Lebanon and the region to one that is only interested in its individual and sectarian rights. Between 1990 and 2009, the political system focused on strengthening sectarian federalism and on dividing State power across a huge sectarian base. During this period, an absolute client-based system was adopted. Put differently, all services were monopolized by the chiefs of the sects, under the cover of a security system guarding these sites and interests, and democracy was completely crippled. The parliamentary elections from 2005 to 2009 produced a climate loaded with sectarian tension, as well as destiny-related concerns, due to regional and international shifts in the main sectarian centres. On this basis, the small amount of political pluralism already in existence was abolished, turning the country into a set of sectarian counties, each jostling for power in a background

- 49 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity of regional and international clashes of interest. This led to the paralysis of the State constitutional institutions, causing them ultimately to cease to exist. Since Lebanon became independent in 1943 and up until today, there has been no form of the State in the true sense of the word; namely, constitutional institutions organized on a national level by unified collective interests. Such sectarianism represents the opposite of the State, as the former causes division of State facilities and thus prevents any kind of integration. Accord- ingly, the general budget is distributed among the sects and regions, each according to its share. 2.2 Cultural and educational conditions The socio-cultural legacy, passed down through customs and traditions, has an impact on the formation of Lebanese public opinion. A conflict has arisen here between desire for change, on the one hand, and, on the other, traditional mentality with its set customs and traditions, which has difficulty accepting change. These customs and traditions have in some cases been exploited by politicians in order to influence public opinion and thus serve their own interests and work towards their own personal goals. The fragmentation of Lebanese public opinion is a symptom of a weak culture of democracy and human rights and its limited spread. The Lebanese plural society is nevertheless in desperate need of such a democratic culture, as the inherited system of tribalism can only be overcome by a culture of democracy and human rights. As for the consensual democracy on which the political system is now built, it has in practice deviated from its publicized intentions and has turned into a quota system at the expense of democracy. This is a result of the absence of a culture of democracy among officials and at grass-roots level. That is, choices in elections are often made randomly, as they tend to be influenced by personal considerations and partisanship, not to mention that there is an absence of overseers and of accountability. All these issues point to the lack of a culture of democracy, without which sound rule and consensual democracy in Lebanon cannot be realized. Moreover, Lebanon has not been able to get rid of sectarianism in its public and private educational institutions. There is undoubtedly a direct relationship between fixed, sectarian beliefs and the human ones which change through the generations. But the more time passes, the more these sectarian ideas are growing in the psyche of the new generation, and the more they are being reflected in the behaviour, choices and future priorities of that generation. If we look at schools and universities in Lebanon, there is little mixing between sects in public and private schools and universities (i.e. between Muslims and Christians). We can also observe a growing split in the educational system, which can be attributed to the variations in sects. This can be seen in the teaching of Lebanese history and in religious education, or in the teaching of new subjects such as sexual education, human rights and women‟s rights.

- 50 - Concepts and Experiences It is worth mentioning here that there is a constitutional and legal duality as regards women, making a separation between their rights on a private and on a public level. There is also a kind of duality between civil legislation and that derived from Christian and Muslim teachings. Through false interpretations of the teachings, which are contrary to their interests, women have become subject to repression within the family. This, added to their general feelings of insecurity, means that their chances of social independence and ability to participate in public life are very limited. 2.3 Religious Conditions: Lebanese public opinion is influenced by religious factors, which affect private matters and sometimes extend to influencing public life, in particular those issues relating to public affairs. The influence of religion can also be seen in the behaviour and actions of individuals and its effects can be felt in Lebanon in religious legislation and in the political system. In Lebanon, religion had and still has an impact on the lives of people, spiri- tually, morally and culturally, as its sources are considered sacred and its concepts absolute and indisputable. They are the reference which people look to when seeking guidance in making decisions. It seems that religion is a factor which affects the formation of Lebanese public opinion, firstly through the exercise of religious rituals and secondly through the sermons of clerics and men of religion. The attitudes which they put across in these sermons make an attempt to mobilize citizens and direct political approaches which should be adopted by political authority, and they sometimes try to get involved in the finer details of the political situation. 2.4 Economic Conditions: The economic system in Lebanon is a liberal, non-productive service economy, which co-exists with a status of national fragmentation. There is no doubt that economic conditions also affect Lebanese public opinion, especially in the light of the poor economic situation there. Such conditions have a detrimental effect to the standard of living and, consequently, to the lives of the Lebanese citizens, causing them to be preoccupied with the demands of making a living. Because of the close relationship between politics and the economy, political differences are sometimes used to distract public opinion away from those direct economic problems of making ends meet, so exploiting the economic crisis as a means towards achieving political goals. 2.5 Media Conditions: Public freedom is protected to a large extent in Lebanon, in particular freedom of expression. The proliferation of media on a large scale helps in forming Lebanese public opinion on those issues relating to the fate of the State and of the people.

- 51 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity However, a number of factors have led to the fragmentation of Lebanese public opinion - the political fragmentation caused by sectarian partisanship, client-oriented relations, semi-absolute dependence of political leadership, and the growth of narrow loyalties to the detriment of national affiliation. These factors have thus prevented the formation of a consensual public opinion which would focus less on the details and particulars of policy, and personal or group interests, in order to concentrate on those major national issues which call for mutual agreement. All of this can be seen reflected in the media. The protection of public freedom in Lebanon does not mean that democracy is working well there. In other words, freedom is only one of the values of democracy and the latter cannot be achieved without the fulfilment of all of these values. Freedom must be accompanied by equality, equal opportunities and the right to differ. These values should govern relations between citizens as well as their relations with those in authority. But, in order for democracy to achieve the desired goals, it needs to be achieved in both its political and its social implications. The main condition for achieving democracy is the spread of the culture of democracy, in addition to the planting of its values in the minds and behaviour of the Lebanese citizens. Democracy does not come as a present granted by the rulers, but rather in response to the demands of the people.

3. THE FUTURE VISION OF OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES FACING LEBANESE SOCIETY The crises that afflict Lebanon re-emphasise the need to take a fresh look at the hard-to-reform sectarian system. 3.1 The political civil system The sectarian system lacks a reference able to resolve issues, with a democracy which is disabled because of the control exercised by the chiefs of the sects. The best way of ending the civil wars would be to renounce the sectarian system and adopt the civil state concept. This calls for the formation a body for national dialogue, in order to find an alternative system to the sectarian one, which has up until today proved to be ineffective. We hope to change the course of events in our homeland Lebanon, by going back to the essential message of those religions which honour man, based on his individuality and uniqueness. This can only be realized if people learn how to avoid falling into the trap of violence, so that they can live in peace. Humanity of man cannot be achieved unless we learn to live in the presence of the “other”. We can hope for change if we return to our original values and answer the fundamental question that determines our destiny: How can we live together with equal rights and duties, and yet with different religious affiliations and personal choices?

- 52 - Concepts and Experiences We can hope for change when we can live together and get rid of our inherited sectarian fears; when we can abstain from seeking security within a certain tribe, be it a sectarian or a partisan tribe, be it a traditional or inherited choice, or newly adopted for a particular religious symbol, a certain colour or flag. We can hope for change when we have learnt how to live together without mutual suspicion, and without making differences into a reason which allow us to control or reject others. We can hope for change when we live together in the knowledge that our relationship with the “other” is not only a necessity, imposed by the fact of our common life in a diverse society, but that it is also a source of enrichment for us and for our society. We can hope for change when we are convinced of the importance of a partnership between the State and civil society, with all its institutions and individuals, a society which imposes conscious and responsible institutional and individual behaviour, as well as a democratic institutional approach within the civil institutions themselves. The growing role of civil society organizations in Lebanon is a good indica- tor that citizens will be stimulated to adopt responsible and participatory behaviour. This should not deter us, however, from working hard to develop our political institutions and to strengthen their democratic performance, this being a key link in the transition to a truly democratic society. 3.2 Building strong ties between the different religions Nowadays, the concept of "living together", or co-existence, in multi-sectarian societies enjoys unprecedented importance in the world. This is especially so in this part of the world, where one war has followed another without interrup- tion for more than half a century. First of all, we, as Lebanese citizens, need to re-build ties between Muslims and Christians within our own society. We need to avoid the deadly conflicts which have taken place, and to start by taking a look at ourselves and thinking back to refresh our memories of the Islamic and Christian East, while showing the courage to recognize our shared responsibility for the war that has destroyed our country, Lebanon. Such recognition is the step which will enable us to embrace the future. The richness of our Lebanese society and of our way of life does not come simply from neighbourhood and co-habitation; it comes from co-existence, which allows for creative interaction between the different elements of society. This makes Lebanon into an ideal human “melting pot”, at a time when the issue of co-existence, set against the background of the massive changes brought about by globalization, represents a serious challenge for all mankind. 3.3 Improving the relationship between the Arab and Western worlds We also have to contribute to the re-building of links between Lebanon and the Arab world, through active participation in the efforts being made for the reali- - 53 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity zation of a better Arab system and a new Arab renaissance. Lebanon's contribution in this area could be decisive, as it possesses abundant natural and human resources, as well as a number of scientific institutions (e.g. universities, publishing houses, the press, hospitals, banks) and, most importantly, it has democratic experience in an Arabic-speaking and very diverse society. It also has a model for escaping from a culture of violence, and this model could be passed to the people of those regions who are still living with violence on a daily basis. We should also contribute towards improving and strengthening the relationship between the Arab and Western worlds, on the basis of a three- dimensional approach: • Peace: Based on the Arab Peace Initiative launched at the Beirut Summit (2002), confirmed in the Riyadh Summit (2007) and reaffirmed by the President of the United States in his famous speech (June, 2009). • Dialogue: Between the three major monotheistic religions. Dialogue has seen a significant start, following the meeting held between Pope Benedict XVI and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, and the invitation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, under the heading “Dialogue among cultures and religions for the sake of peace”. • Co-existence: Where Arabs can present a model for an original experience of co-existence, designed to highlight a glorious experience in their history. On the basis of these moral, cultural, national and human commitments, we, the Muslims and Christians of Lebanon, can again play our former international role, representing for the world a space of cross-fertilization between civilizations and a beacon for its stock of intellectual and cultural heritage. 3.4 The political democratic culture We should try to fulfil our ambition for a political culture which meets society's need for modernization and which copes with changes on a global level, yet without requiring that cultural identity or particularity be given up. Evolution does not mean abandoning the self and imitating the other; it is instead the acquisition of particularity. It means survival, the fulfilment of citizens‟ needs, allowing them to express themselves as individuals and live in a world where amazing developmental steps are being made at all levels. The political culture we aspire to is the culture of democracy and of human rights. The values of culture are universal and are linked to human dignity, as well as to the values of freedom, equality and justice. The importance of democracy lies in the fact that it allows man to participate in making decisions concerning the management of society affairs but, at the same time, requires people who are able to put it into practice; people who believe in democracy and its values; people “cultured” with the culture of democracy and of human rights.

- 54 - Concepts and Experiences Democracy is not only a political system; it is also a system of values, governing both the relationship between citizens and their relationship with power. The democracy value of a given political system can be measured in the extent to which the system of values is rooted in the culture and mentality of the people. Finally, it is our hope that the forthcoming generations living in “the swamp and furnace” of sectarianism will be able to build the future of Lebanon as a homeland for its citizens and not for its sects.

Fr. Gandolf Wild OFM (Abu Dhabi / United Arab Emirates) CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCES IN THE ARAB ISLAMIC WORLD

Preliminary Remarks: The Arab World is widespread embracing the Arabian Peninsula, The Middle East, and the entire Northern part of Africa: from Mauretania in the West to Somalia in the East. My report is focussed on experience in the Gulf: in the meantime Dubai, and even Abu Dhabi, are well known cities in the Western world, but, as regards Christianity in that same area, most people stick to the old image of desert sands inhabited by Arab Bedouins of strict Muslim religious observance allowing no room for a Christian presence. Regular reports in the Western media depicting Saudi Arabia as having a traditionally hostile attitude to any Christian presence reinforce this picture. I have been asked to speak about "Christian Experiences in the Arab Islamic World." Therefore, I would like first to give you a glimpse of my personal experience and offer to share it for your consideration.

A VIBRANT CHRISTIAN PRESENCE Every visitor to the Gulf who happens to enter a Christian church is over- whelmed by the sight of the crowds of people attending the religious services. This phenomenon overshadows anything to be found in the heart-lands of Chris- tianity today where religious practice is in steep decline. Whereas here in private cars, taxis, hired buses or on foot, thousands of people go to church every week to pray, sing, and receive the sacraments. The visitor can witness well prepared and organised volunteers forming choirs, acting as ushers, readers, and communion ministers. To be seen are technical assistants for sound and screen, servers in the sanctuary, and collectors in the nave. The faithful are hungry for the Word of God and receive the sacraments in great numbers. Their piety is genuine and their participation whole hearted. The children, in all age groups, attend and follow weekly catechism classes, given by well prepared volunteers. Baptism classes, confirmation and marriage preparation courses are regular features. In addition

- 55 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity Bible study groups, charismatic prayer meetings, youth groups, associations for married people, counselling services etc. are organised and filling the available rooms every evening. A vital instrument of unity is the parish council, with its members drawn from the various language groups of the many nationalities and religious traditions present. This variety enriches the religious celebrations with a wide selection of hymns, prayers, and devotions. We can ask: Why is this so? Part of the answer is that a majority of the faithful come from India and the Philippines whose people are by nature deeply spiritual. An unexpected spiritual challenge reaches all the people from the daily call to prayer from the muezzin of the numerous mosques, inviting even the Christians not to lag behind but be motivated and serious in their own religious observance. The Church compound provides an oasis of peace and opportunity to encounter family and friends, especially for the numerous low-wage earners who often have to live in crowded conditions, with little privacy at home and no- where to go and feel free. The faith of the people, its simple and straight forward expression, being neither naive nor a-critical, is contagious and invigorating; a welcome change from the distant and critical attitude displayed by many of the Europeans.

THE CHRISTIAN PRESENCE IS A RECENT PHENOMENON. For most countries of the Arabian Peninsula the Christian presence is a recent phenomenon, linked to the economic growth after the discovery of oil and the influx of numerous foreigners from many countries. Traces of pre-Islamic Christianity in the form of archaeological remains and archival documentary evidence can be found in all Arabic countries of the Peninsula. In more recent centuries the Portuguese had a foothold in the Gulf. They were followed by a British maritime commercial presence in settlements all along the coast. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt had a Christian presence throughout their history. In the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789), these countries were strongly influenced by Western thought, education and economic development, while the Bedouin populations of the Arabian Penin- sula upheld their Islamic heritage and Arabic culture and remained for a long time untouched by modernity. However, the 19th century contact with the West led, as a reaction, to a revival of Islam, most visibly realised in Egypt with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1930s, but spreading all over the Arab world, supported by the Wahabbis of Saudia Arabia, who thus helped weld the Muslim religion, society and politics into one dynamic cultural entity. When Christians in recent decades began to move into the Gulf, in ever growing numbers, initially from Europe and America, but later from India and the Far East, they found a strong and compact Islamic society. When the United Arab Emirates were founded in 1971 by the wise and vi- sionary leadership of His Highness Sheikh Zayed, the Constitution was based on Islamic Law.

- 56 - Concepts and Experiences

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. The United Arab Emirates have a population of over 5 million but only 900 000 are Emiratis with full citizenship. These are all Muslims with no freedom to change their religion. At this point I would like to emphasize and make clear from the beginning, that the Christian presence in the UAE has nothing to do with the evangelisation of Muslims. We turn down any request for conversion from a Muslim. This is a question of security for him/her and us. Ag- gressive and naive modern Christian sects have been expelled for proselytising. It is estimated that 85% or more of the population are foreigners. The majority of the immigrants are from nearby Islamic countries, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, North India, Iraq, Iran and the Middle East. Approximately a quarter of the immigrants are Christians, roughly calculated, to be around a million. No exact figures about the strength of the Christian presence are available. The Catholic Church (for which I can speak more knowledgeably) has over 500 000 followers in the UAE, served by only 7 parishes/church compounds. They all recognise the authority of the Pope in Rome, but belong to a variety of "rites" such as: the Latin Rite Catholics, the Maronites, Melkites, Copts, Chaldeans and others from the Middle East and Iraq besides the Syro-Malabar and Syro- Malankaran Christians from India. Name them and we have them!! In most countries in the Middle East and the West, these different churches have their own structures of parishes, and dioceses with their own bishops/eparchs, major archbishops and patriarchs. But this is not so in the Gulf, where there is a special arrangement based on a rescript of the Holy See of 2003. All the Catholics of all the rites and the various languages are under the jurisdiction of one and the same Bishop, who at present is a Swiss Capuchin Franciscan of the Latin Rite, residing in Abu Dhabi but with jurisdiction for 5 Gulf countries and Yemen. He governs the Apostolic Vicariate of Arabia, established in 1889 when Aden was the See and had just a few hundred Christians belonging to foreign government services and trading companies. At present the Vicariate comprises 2 million Catholics in 6 countries, organised into 17 parishes which are served by 65 priests from several Asian and European countries. These are able to offer services in up to 15 languages. About 70 sisters are either involved in education in the 8 schools managed by the Catholic Church or in the 4 centres run by the Missionaries of Charity of Mother Teresa in Yemen. The Catholic Church is not involved in the medical field but the lay people are very involved in all the activities of the church and play a prominent role.

WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT THE CHRISTIAN PRESENCE IN THE GULF COUN- TRIES? BASIC CHARACTERISTICS: 1. There are no indigenous Catholics in the Arabian Peninsula. Islam is the State Religion. In the United Arab Emirates full citizenship is restricted to the

- 57 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity original members of the Arab Bedouin clans living in the territory at the time of the creation of the Union (1971). The political power is in the hands of a ruling family or cluster of families in close collaboration with the religious authorities. 2. All the Christians are migrant workers with an employment permit that gives them temporary residence, but without the possibility of ever becoming permanent residents or full citizens. This norm applies to all foreigners, Mus- lims, Christians and others alike. The bishops, priests and pastors are all immigrants and are subject to the same immigration laws. 3. The presence and all the activities of the Christian Churches depend on the good will of the rulers and the benevolent concessions they make. POSITIVE ASPECTS: 1. There is respect for Christians and freedom of movement. There is no problem concerned with the wearing of the religious dress in public. There is widespread appreciation of the work of the churches for the welfare of the immigrant workers. Our people can visit the sick in hospitals, and with special permits, even the prisoners. 2. There is freedom of worship within the boundaries of the church compounds. 3. There are personal contacts with the rulers and officials who often help to resolve issues concerning the churches. Written agreements are rare and negotiations for new concessions often take a long time to process. So patience is an important virtue. 4. Most countries have diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The Apostolic Nuncio resides in Kuwait which was the first country to establish diplomatic ties in 1996. He is accredited to the other countries in the region. The Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have not yet established diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 5. Many countries are, in one way or another, involved in Inter-Religious Dialogue initiatives.

NEGATIVE ASPECTS: 1. There is no freedom of religion for Muslims: No Muslim can ever become a Christian. He would lose his standing in society, all his rights and even risk his life. Christians on the other hand are welcome to become Muslims. In some cases they have to do so, when for example, a Christian man marries a local woman. 2. Limited freedom of worship: Christians are only allowed to worship in places allocated to them for this purpose. Abu Dhabi, with one million inhabi- tants and over 100 000 Catholics, has only one Catholic church, St. Joseph's, in a central location on the island. On a normal weekend, over 10 000 faithful attend the services in church. However, during Easter and Christmas, a multiple of that number participate in the liturgy. Although there is a growing need for more

- 58 - Concepts and Experiences services, the Bishop is not free to buy a plot of land in the suburbs to construct another very much needed church. Moreover, the Church is not free to celebrate religious services outside the assigned compounds, for example, in a rented hall, or in one of the numerous labour camps where thousands of Christian workers dwell. These are prevented by distance, lack of transport and cost from going to attend the prayer services in the town. For some, like the housemaids, restrictions of a more prohibitive nature make church-going difficult, as they often do not get permission to leave the employer‟s house on their own. 3. Another difficulty arises from the restricted number of work permits granted for priests /pastors, regardless of the number of Christians they have to serve. This is a severe limitation on the scope of their work. In Saudi Arabia, the situation is much more difficult: no churches can be built and no priests are granted visas, although 8 million foreign workers live in Saudi Arabia; 1.4 million come from the Philippines and most of them are Christians. With the introduction of modern technology in all departments, the respective laws are easily enforceable. Immigration officials, at the click of a mouse, know the exact number of employees of a registered organisation, the number of visit-visas issued and their expiry date.

CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED. 1. The rapid economic growth of the area under consideration leads to a greater institutionalisation and increase in bureaucracy. The former, traditionally easy, access to the rulers becomes more difficult as the intermediate stages in the presentation of petitions and the decision-making process become more intricate and time consuming. 2. A further complication is the deliberate promotion of the Arab culture, including Islam as religion and the Arabic language, which tend to result in a greater reserve in the granting of various concessions, for example, for plots of land and visas to the Christian churches. One can understand the legitimate concern to preserve the national identity but, in the long run, it would seem questionable to uphold a policy of exclusion towards immigrants. In the West, there are many countries where migration is coupled to a grad- ual process of integration, with the granting of equal opportunities for all and finally full national citizenship. 3. Inequalities seem to be part of the political system. As Islam is the only officially recognised religion, all others are granted only some concessions. In the workplace, salaries and promotion are differentiated between local and expatriate employees with a strong bias in favour of citizens. For example, a local nurse will earn three times the wage of a foreign nurse whose chances for professional promotion are also curtailed. 4. Politically, the need for greater democratisation is not considered a desired end. Bahrain and Kuwait being older national countries, are the only two with Parliaments. However, it is patently necessary for the good of the society,

- 59 - Accepting Variety – Living with Diversity to develop more citizen participation and greater equality towards expatriates. The Federal National Council of 40 members is so organised that half of the members are appointed by the Rulers of the 7 Emirates while the other half is elected by an electoral body of "Notables". This FNC has no decision-making powers, cannot pass laws, nor freely discuss problems arising in society. This autocratic system should be complemented by more consultation and institutional contacts with and including, citizen groups, expatriates and churches. For a long time economic development was the prime interest of the government. Now, however, social issues are being tackled in such areas as education in which traditionally men have shown little interest, for example, 54% of university students are women; and Arabic, which is being poorly taught. There has been a drive to improve preventive health care in fields such as obesity, diabetes, and genetic diseases as these are increasingly realised to be national problems needing national remedies. Today, demographic issues arising from a falling birth rate (from 5.7 40 years ago to a current 2.0, the lowest in the Gulf) are a matter of concern. They have become part of a greater attention to marriage stability given the alarming increase in divorce, especially among young couples in the first years of married life, when 33% of all marriages end in divorce. 5. Discrepancies between law and practice can be observed in the application of labour laws, working hours, free days and benefits: for example, com- plaints of unjust treatment are not always followed up by the police and the judiciary. Furthermore, human rights issues regarding exploitation, harassment and domestic abuse are still being neglected. I know that the Philippine community runs shelters in Dubai and Abu Dhabi for run-away women, mostly domestic workers. The Human Rights Body of the United Nations plays an important role in the heightening of awareness with regard to these issues. Its views are taken seriously as the country is very sensitive to criticism and wants to project a good international image. 6. The cultural question is a challenge for locals and expatriates alike. The local people being a minority in their own country, tend to keep among themselves, resulting in little inter-action with the expatriates. Consequently, only a minimum of integration of these foreigners takes place, especially for those staying only a few years, Moreover, the majority of expatriates do not speak Arabic. This is also true for the Church personnel, who rarely make an effort to learn Arabic or to become familiar with the local social and cultural environment in which they live. Most prefer to interact only with their compatriots. 7. The internal divisions of Christianity are a serious handicap in so far as the Christian witness is concerned. One cannot help but realise that for the Rulers and their officials a strange impression arises when they receive requests from dozens of entities, all claiming to be Christian, and all wanting to be

- 60 - Concepts and Experiences granted permission to practise their religious beliefs. Fortunately, not all faith communities can afford to build their own centres. It may be interesting to know that the Anglican Church in Abu Dhabi offers space for religious worship on a rental basis to more than 60 different Christian denominations!! CONCLUSION Christians and Muslims have to learn a lot about and from each other, to do away with stereotypes and prejudice: to know the salient points of the other's religion, their holy book/s and practices; what they have in common and what their differences are. Genuine personal and communal witness of our religious convictions will lead to mutual respect and acceptance by the adherents of other faiths, resulting in the longed-for religious harmony so necessary today.

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FROM DIVERSITY TO PLURALISM: PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AND CIVIL STATE

RE-THINKING PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTUALIZING EXPERIENCES

Dr Naseef Naeem (Göttingen / Germany) NORMATIVE PLURALISM AND THE MAIN DILEMMA OF EQUALITY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF STATES WITH ISLAMIC CHARACTER: THEORETICAL ASPECTS

I. INTRODUCTION As it is clear from the title of this article, this is a legal paper focusing on the norms and the characteristics of normative systems. Moreover, the paper will concentrate on the constitutional norms, constitutional contents, the interpretations of these norms and the contents as well as the rights behind them. The legal situation will be made recognizable through the consideration of both the legislative and the executive norms, as well as through the decisions of the judiciary, especially when the acts of the three organs of the state powers have a direct connection to the rights within the provisions of the constitution. Thus, the central question in this article will essentially presuppose the legality of the positive constitutional law. The question regarding the legitimacy of the constitutional provisions or other state norms will be treated only when it is relevant for the understanding and analysis of the legal concept according to the constitutional provisions.1 Furthermore, it should be emphasized that this article deals only with the norms of states with Islamic character2 and not with the norms of Islam itself as a religion. Islamic religious norms are therefore considered only to the extent that they are directly integrated into the normative system of a state or reflected therein. The theological, historical or general religious analyses and discussions about the aspects of pluralism and equality in a just Islamic context, or within the framework of comparison between Islam and other religions, will not be considered. The social and political aspects will also not be analyzed.3

1 For a basic explanation of the historical concepts of legality and legitimacy, see DAVID DYZENHAUS: Legality and legitimacy, Oxford 1997, pp. 1-6, 51-85, 161-217. 2 Through the use of the term “states with Islamic character” in this article, it has been attempted to guarantee a neutral standard of observation and to avoid the use of the term “Islamic states” which could connote the islamization of all aspects of the state and its public life or could be understood in the sense of “Good states”. For the explanation of the origin of the Idea of “Islamic states” by some scholars, see MO- HAMMED AYOOB: The many faces of political Islam, Michigan 2008, pp. 66-73. 3 As examples for religious, theological, historical, social and political discussions regarding the situation in the states with Islamic character as well as in the Western states of Europe and North America, see MAHMUT AYDIN: “Religious pluralism: A - 65 - From Diversity To Pluralism Based on the preceding explanation, the article will begin with an analysis of the meaning of the term “states with Islamic character”, in order to determine exactly which type of states are to be examined and their general constitutional characteristics. Afterwards, the general aspects of pluralism and equality in the constitutions of these states will be clarified. Following this, it will be shown on the basis of two examples of norms from states with Islamic character how the principle of equality as an element in a pluralistic concept of state has been limited. In conclusion, the contribution will endeavour to discuss several sug- gestions to resolve the constitutional dilemma between equality on one side and the Islamic character of the states on the other side.

II. STATES WITH ISLAMIC CHARACTER: DEFINITION FROM CONSTITUTIONAL POINT OF VIEW The term “states with Islamic character” connotes various states with different constitutional settings which stipulate the normative base of the state entity and its legal framework. As such, it can be argued that all states with Islamic character can be described as constitutional states, at least in a theoretical perspective.4 challenge for Muslims – A theological Evaluation”, in: Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38/2- 3 (2001), pp. 330-352; ASMA AFSARUDDIN: “Celebrating pluralism and dialogue: Qur‟a- nic perspectives”, in: Journal of Ecumenical Studies 42/3 (2007), pp. 389-406; WILLIAM GALSTON: “Jews, Muslims & the prospects for pluralism”, in: Daedalus 132/3 (2003), pp. 73-77; JULIA D. E. PRINZ VDMF: “The relationships between the inner and outer dimensions in Islam as a foundation for inter-religious dialogue”, in: Islam and Christian- Muslim Relations 15/2 (2004), pp. 171-184. 4 The constitutional state in a formal sense simply refers to a state with a constitutional document, separate from the question of the form of this state as established in the constitution, whether it is democratic and how the state powers deals with the fundamental rights of the individuals. In contrast to that, the constitutional state in a substantive sense could be defined as the state which has a democratic system based on the Rule of Law and the protection of human rights on the basis of the constitution. More- over, both the democratic system and the protection of human rights should additionally be a part of the constitutional reality in the substantive constitutional state. The reference to this point above in the text aims at the neutralization of the discussion here, because the substantive aspect regarding the constitutional system of the states with Islamic character will be analyzed below. For explanation of the formal and substantive meaning of the constitutional state and its development, see (detailed) JOSEF ISENSEE: “Staat und Verfassung” (State and constitution), in: JOSEF ISENSEE ET. AL. (eds.): Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. II, Heidelberg ³2005, pp. 3-106, esp. pp. 4-19, 41-64; (briefly) HANS JÖRG SANDKÜHLER: „Rechtsstaat und Menschenrechte unter den Bedingungen des faktischen Pluralismus“ (Rule of law and human rights under conditions of the actual pluralism), in: Dialektik 1998, no. 3, pp. 67- 86, esp. pp. 74-77, 79-83. On the other hand, there is a controversial discussion about the Islamic substantive constitutionalism and its direct connection to the Koran. This is remarkable especially within the framework of the drafting of the Basic Law of Saudi- Arabia 1992. The framers of the Basic Law of the kingdom of Saudi-Arabia explicitly say in art. 1 that the constitution of the state is the Koran and the Sunna of the Pro- phet. For the explanation of the religious criteria of the political and constitutional - 66 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State Moreover, there are some similar characteristics which can be identified in the constitutional systems of each of these states upon which a common constitutional framework for the state dynamic in these countries can be built. Accord- ingly, this constitutional framework could be perceived and understood as “similar principles in different constitutions”. Generally, these principals can be found in the structures of the constitutional documents, the formulation of the constitutional provisions and/or the regulation of all areas in the constitutions (e.g. state characteristics, state powers and fundamental rights).5 For the topic of this contribution it is important to focus on the constitutional status of Islam as the main factor which characterizes the constitutional systems of states with Islamic character in a similar way. 1. Islam as a clause in the constitution: Religious Clause Before examining the dual concepts of Islam and constitutional law, it should be stated that a “state with Islamic character” in the most general of senses can be simply defined as a state in which the majority of the population officially believe and belong to the Islamic religion. Geographically, these states could be divided into: Arabic states, African states, the Asiatophone states (e.g. Afghani- stan, Pakistan and Indonesia), Iran, Turkey and the states of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (the union of former Soviet Republics) as well as European states such as the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.6 Organiza- tionally, most of the states with Islamic character are members of the Organiza- tion of the Islamic Conference.7 Apart from this common factor and according to the constitutional provisions of the respective states, the constitutions of states with Islamic character

system in Saudi-Arabia, see „ABD AL-RAHMAN SHALHUB: an-niÛām ad-dustūrī fī al- mamlakah al-„arabīyah as-sa„ūdīyah (The constitutional system of the Kingdom of Saudi- Arabia), Riyadh 1999, pp. 37-39, 89-92, 335-336. It has been aimed to avoid this discussion here through the reference to the formal side of the constitutional state above. 5 E. g. Apart from Iraq, Sudan and United Arab Emirates (UAE), the framers of the constitutions of the Arabic states opted for political centralism as the principle of building a government system. For an explanation of centralism as a general aspect in state building in the Arab world, see NASEEF NAEEM: Die neue bundesstaatliche Ordnung des Irak (The New Federal System of Iraq), Frankfurt am Main 2008, pp. 47-53. 6 Cf. EMILIO MIKUNDA-FRACO: „Gemeinislamisches Verfassungsrecht. Eine Un- tersuchung der Verfassungstexte islamischer Staaten in rechtsphilosophisch verglei- chender Perspektive“ (Combined Islamic constitutional law. A study of the texts of the constitutions of Islamic states from comparative perspectives of the legal philosophy), in: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 51 (2003), pp. 21-81, esp. p. 26. However, Mikunda- Franco divided these states into only five areas and did not speak about the non-Arabic African states with Islamic character. For detailed explanation about the role of Islam in the African constitutionalism, see ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAÝIM: African constitutionalism and the role of Islam, Philadelphia 2006, pp. 99-159. 7 For detailed information about the Organization of Islamic Conference, its structure, purposes and the member states, see the website of the Organization: www.oic-oci.org. - 67 - From Diversity To Pluralism can be identified mainly through references to Islam in different ways, as in the following: a) In some constitutions, Islam is explicitly provided for as the religion of the state8 or the official religion of the state;9 b) Other constitutions describe the state explicitly as an Islamic state;10 c) Some constitutions speak about Islam (or exactly Shari„a or sometime juris- prudence fiqh) as source, mean or official source, the source or the mean or official source of legislation;11 d) Furthermore, some constitutions guarantee the special position of Islam in the state system through special clauses, such as one providing for the re- quirement that the president of the republic be a Muslim12 or that the king should be the prince (better leader) of the believers amir al-mu‟minin;13 e) Additionally, in the constitutions of both Iraq and Afghan, which are the two relatively modern constitutions in the contemporary Islamic world, the nexus between the legal system and Islam is closer. According to both constitutions, it is explicitly prohibited to enact a law which contradicts the principles of Islam.14 Indeed, the Egyptian constitutional court has firmly interpreted the reference of the principles of the Islamic Shari„a as the main source of legislation in Art. 2 in the same sense. According to this interpretation, all the legislative and executive norms in Egypt are bound to adhere on the absolute principles of the Shari„a.15

8 As in art. 2 of the constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, art. 2 of the constitution of Kuwait, art. 2 of the constitution of the Arabic Republic Egypt, art. 2 of the constitution of Pakistan and in art. 2 s1 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan. 9 As in art. 7 of the constitution of the United Arab Emirates and in art. 2 s1 of the Iraqi constitution. 10 As in art. 1 s1 of the constitution of Pakistan, in art. 1 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic Iran, art. 1 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic Mauritania, art. 1 of the Basic Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and art. 1 sA of the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain. 11 As in art. 2 of the constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain, art. 2 of the constitution of the Sultanate of Oman, art. 3 s2 of the constitution of Syrian Arab Republic, art. 1 of the constitution of Qatar and in art. 3 of the constitution of the Republic Yemen. 12 As in art. 3 s1 of the constitution of Syrian Arab Republic and art. 73 no. 2 of the constitution of Algeria. 13 As in art. 19 of the constitution of Morocco. 14 Cf. art. 2 s1/a of the Iraqi constitution; art. 3 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan. 15 As in no. 1 & 2 of the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt in the case no. 8/17 of May 18, 1996 and in the decisions nos. 113 & 208 of the year 1994. For an opinion about the interpretation of art. 2 from the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, see KILIAN BÄLZ: “Shariah versus secular law?”, in: BIRGIT KRAWIETZ ET AL. (eds.), Islam and Rule of Law, Sankt Augustin 2008, pp. 121-126, esp. pp. 122-123. - 68 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State The constitutions of states with Islamic character can and do have one or more of these references side by side. Nevertheless, some states could be described from a constitutional law perspective as states with Islamic character, although their constitutions do not include explicit reference to Islam, a case in point is Indonesia as a country with a population that is 88% Muslim. In the political discussions and in the normative system of Indonesia in general, Islamic principles in the form of formal justification for certain legal norms play a role which cannot be ignored. This role is premised, directly or indirectly, on art. 29 of the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which explicitly underlines the belief in God – only one God as the Muslims strictly believe – and the religious freedom as two pillars of the state.16 Apart from this discussion on the status of Islam in the Indonesian state system, it is remarkable that the aforementioned references to Islam in the constitutions of the states with Islamic character linguistically are generally and widely formulated. Notably, these Islamic references directly refer to Islam as a legal concept or as the source of Islamic law and at the same time to the provisions of Islam as a belief in a theological sense.17 So it can be argued that the framers of these constitutions essentially aimed to elevate Islam with its religious and legal character within the constitutional legal order of their respective states. The formal positioning of Islam in the constitution structure can be described as a constitutional clause, precisely because this clause is provided for in the constitution. Moreover, this clause can be considered as the Religious Clause of Islam, not least of all because it makes reference to the divine norms of the Islamic religion and legal norms of Islamic law at the same time. Further, this reference could help to more precisely define the understanding of Islam in the constitutions of the states with Islamic character, which otherwise would not easily be understood if it is merely based on its legal perspective, for example, if the term were only Islam Clause. Indeed, it appears appropriate to use the

16 Cf. MASYKURI ABDILLAH: “Ways of constitution building in Muslim countries: The Case of Indonesia”, in: KRAWIETZ ET AL. (eds.), Islam and Rule of Law (fn. 15), pp. 51-64, esp. pp. 58-62. Moreover, it can be stated that Islam for instance is not mentioned in the Lebanese constitution too, although the Muslims from all denominations constitute more that 70% of the population. This is understandable, because Lebanon is a state with a multi-religious and denominational social structure. However, it is provided for in art. 9 of the Lebanese constitution that the State has an obligation to respect all demands of God which are found in the religions and denominations of Leba- nese society. Accordingly, the State has a constitutional obligation to respect the principles of Islam as one of Lebanon‟s religions. Theoretically, it could be stated that Leba- non – or the Islamic part of Lebanon – belongs to the states with Islamic character. 17 For detailed explanation of the relationship between Law and theology in an Is- lamic context, see IRENE SCHNEIDER: “Islamisches Recht zwischen göttlicher Satzung und temporaler Ordnung?” (Islamic law between God‟s rules and temporal system), in: CHRISTINE LANGENFELD ET AL. (eds.), Recht und Religion in Europa, Göttingen 2008, pp. 138-191. - 69 - From Diversity To Pluralism term Religious Clause as a compromise between the two terms, as the term Reli- gious Clause in this context connotes Islam.18 2. The substantive influence of the Religious Clause The establishment of the Religious Clause in the constitution, as shown in the analysis above, can initially be viewed in a purely formal sense. However, the formal existence of the Religious Clause in the constitutional legal structure forces a reexamination of the substantive influence of this clause on the other basic constitutional principles as well as on other state norms. Simply stated, the substantive influence of the Religious Clause could be found in the integration of the religious “dos and don‟ts” in the general context of the state norms. In other words, many religious Islamic duties and prohibitions would be considered not only as religious ones but also as legal ones. It may thus be argued that the states benefit through this. As the Religious Clause is generally formulated abstractly in their constitutions, it opens the possibility of a certain ambiguity between purely religious duties and those which are of a legal nature but with Islamic character, allowing the state in question to define the matter to its own advantage. Accordingly, it is easy for the state powers to integrate the religious duties in the normative system and to change their status into legal norms, mainly because they do not need to differentiate strictly between legal and religious contents in Islam.19 Normally, each religion strives to regulate the personal life of an individual to fulfil and reflect the requirements of that particular religion. Through the religious duties and prohibitions, the person feels bound to the divine “dos and don‟ts” already prescribed, yet, ultimately, these “dos and don‟ts” play a decisive role in the states` determination of the rights and duties of its citizens. Accordingly, within a constitutional legal framework, the substantive influence of the Religious Clause can be found in the field of fundamental rights and freedoms provided for in the constitution.20 In other words, the constitutional Reli- gious Clause gives rise to consider the Islamic “dos and don‟ts” on the same level as the constitutional fundamental rights. Examining various Islamic religious prohibitions enshrined in these constitutions, it can be argued that they negatively and directly impair the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms.21 The problem in this limitation process is the existence of the fundamental rights in an absolute linguistic formulation in the majority of constitutions of

18 Cf. NASEEF NAEEM: “The influence of religious clauses on constitutional law in the countries with an Islamic character”, in: KRAWIETZ ET AL. (eds.), Islam and Rule of Law (fn. 15), pp. 71-79, esp. p. 73. 19 Cf. HANS-GEORG EBERT: “Arabische Verfassungen und das Problem der islamischen Menschenrechte” (Arabic constitutions and the problem of Islamic human rights), in: Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 30/4 (1997), pp. 520-532, esp. p. 525. 20 Cf. NAEEM: op. cit. (fn. 18), pp. 74-77. 21 Those fundamental rights which are more affected than others could be e.g. personal freedom within the framework of sexuality, religious freedom or the freedom of press and publication. - 70 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State those states with Islamic character.22 This absolute form of providing for the fundamental rights is directly comparable to that of the Religious Clause, as shown in this contribution. It can generally be argued that the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms is justified through the state norms which are enshrined under the constitutional norms. Indeed, it is worth noting that the limits of the fundamental rights through the legal “dos and don‟ts” based on Islam can be found not only in legislative norms, but also in the acts of the executive power and in the decisions of the courts. The reasons for this fact are, on the one hand, the absence of a normative obligation in the constitutional law of some states with Islamic character, especially of the Arabic states, that the fundamental rights can only be limited through the norms enacted by the legislative organ;23 and on the other hand the dominant view that the state powers are directly bound by the Religious Clause provided for in the constitution, or some aspects derived from it.24 The normative limitation of some fundamental rights according to the Is- lamic principles constitutes exactly the special characteristic of the states with Islamic character. Moreover, it could be highlighted that the Islamic character is to be seen in this point or maybe only in this point, because the state is the state.25 Nevertheless, it should be indicated here that not all the states with a Muslim majority are states with Islamic character in a constitutional legal sense, as there are no Religious Clauses provided for in the constitutions of some states with an Islamic majority and no religious influence on their normative systems.26 This should be recognized in contrast to what was previously men-

22 Apart from some details, the lists of fundamental rights in the constitutions of the states with Islamic character can formally be compared with such lists in the constitutions of European states. 23 Besides the absence of such an explicit obligation in the provisions of the constitutions of the Arabic states, the problem of the limitation of fundamental rights through state norms is related to the special power of the head of the states – president or monarch – to enact decrees with the force of law, e. g. art. 111 of the constitution of Syrian Arab Republic. However, it is provided for in art. 46 of the Iraqi constitution as a relative new constitution in the Arabic world that the limitation of fundamental rights can only be either through a law or on the basis of a law. In addition, the President of the Republic of Iraq doesn‟t have the right to enact decrees with force of law. 24 For detailed discussions with different opinions about the binding nature of the Religious Clause in art. 2 of the constitution of Arab Republic Egypt, see JÖRN THIEL- MANN: NaÒr Íāmid Abū Zaid und die wiedererfundene Îisba (NaÒr Íāmid Abū Zaid and the Îisba made up again), Würzburg 2003, pp. 71-74. 25 Cf. NASEEF NAEEM: “Zum Verhältnis von Legalität und Legitimität in „islamisch‟ geprägten Staaten” (The relationship between legality and legitimacy in the states with „Islamic‟ character), in: GAIR-Mitteilungen 1 (2009), pp. 37-38 = http://www.gair.uni- erlangen.de/GAIR-Mitteilungen%2001-2009.pdf. 26 All the states which explicitly or implicitly have the principles of laicism or secularism in their constitutions– e.g. Turkey, the states of the Commonwealth of Inde- pendent States (CIS) (the union of former Soviet Republics) and the European states with Islamic majority of population – are not states with Islamic character in the sense of constitutional law, because – at least normatively – it is prohibited to limit the fun- - 71 - From Diversity To Pluralism tioned regarding the existence of those states with Islamic character without a Religious Clause, as in the case of Indonesia. In this sense, the states dealt with here are the states which could be considered as states with Islamic character from both a formal and substantive constitutional point of view. Simply stated, these states are the states in which a normative limitation – or at least definition – of the fundamental rights or some of them is justified on the basis of religion.

III. THE NORMATIVE PLURALISM AND EQUALITY IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES WITH ISLAMIC CHARACTER Apart from the different and extensive meanings and theories of pluralism,27 the term as a social concept in general could connote the duty to preserve the integrity of social coexistence through the protection of the principles of justice, freedom and equality between all the different members of society.28 From this brief definition, it can be argued that there is an inseparable nexus between pluralism on one side and equality on the other. Moreover, pluralism may lose its vital component, or indeed its entire meaning, when and if members of the society are treated differently by the state organs and institutions. For this reason it is necessary that the concept of normative pluralism in a state system signifies primarily a decision for the normative equality of individuals. More- over, such normative equality constitutes the main element of the entire concept of rule of law in the state.29 Thus the norms of the constitution, laws and administrative acts as well as the decisions of the court in a pluralistic state must deal with individuals on the same level as it does with other individuals of equal status. Accordingly, this duty of equality as an aspect of pluralism should not allow states to differentiate between individuals due to their religions, denominations, ethnicities and/or races, etc. For states with Islamic character it is important to underpin a normative equality between the Muslim majority and non-Muslim minorities, mainly be- damental rights on the basis of religion. For detailed explanation, see MIKUNDA- FRACO, op. cit, (fn. 6), pp. 49-62, 72-75; FIKRET KARČIĆ: “Secular state and religion(s) – Remarks on the Bosnian Experience in regulation religion and state relations in view of the new law on freedom of religion”, in: STEFAN SCHREINER (ed.), Religion and secular state, Zürich / Sarajevo 2008, pp. 15-25. 27 For a brief view of some Ideas of Pluralism, see ROBERT CHR. VAN OOYEN: “Die „Kopftuch-Entscheidung‟ des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zwischen Pluralismustheorie (Kelsen/Fraenkel) und Staatstheorie (Hegel/Schmitt)” (The Headscarf-decision of the federal constitutional court between the theory of pluralism „Kelsen/Fraenkel‟ und the state theory „Hegel/Schmitt‟), in: Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 56 (2008), pp. 125-140, esp. pp. 131-135. 28 Cf. JÜRGEN HABERMAS: Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates (Facticity and application. Inputs of the discourse theory of the law and the democratic rule of law), Frankfurt am Main 1992, pp. 263-264; HANS JÖRG SANDKÜHLER: op. cit. (fn. 4), pp. 68-70. 29 Cf. HERIBERT FRANZ KÖCK: Recht in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft (The law in the plural society), Wien 1998, pp. 146-165, 169-174, 177-182. - 72 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State cause the majority of states with Islamic character are multi-religious states.30 As such it is necessary to enquire within the framework of the constitutional law about the norms provided for in the constitutions of the states with Islamic character which deal with the equality between the persons professing different religions. More precisely, it should underpin the normative equality of both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.31 1. The explicit decision for variety and pluralism In some constitutions of states with Islamic character it is explicitly provided for that the state, state system, society or social system is pluralistic or based on the values of pluralism and/or variety. Moreover, some constitutions speak explicitly about the variety of religions in the state.32 Terms such as “pluralism” and “variety” are used in the provisions of the constitutions in an abstract and general way. Accordingly, one could argue that the framers of the constitutions in these states aimed to integrate all aspects of pluralism including the equality between all citizens regardless of their religious affiliations in the normative systems of the states. 2. The freedom of belief, Religion and religious praxis Principally, the freedoms of belief and religious practice are guaranteed in most constitutions of states with Islamic character.33 However, it is worth emphasiz- ing that the framers of the constitutions in these countries do not use terms such as “religious freedom” or “freedom of religion” and combine the exercise of the aforementioned freedoms with the caveat clause requiring their practice to be in accordance with the public order and traditions of the state societies.34

30 The states with Islamic character are not only multi-religious, but also multi- ethnic and/or multi-denominational. However, the following will only concentrate on equality between the believers of different religions, in order to exactly show the special nature of the constitutions of the states with Islamic character in this point. 31 Above the only reference has been to citizens because the framers of the constitutions concentrated more on the rights of citizens collectively than on the rights of individuals in general. This point is especially relevant in the formulation of the constitutional norms regarding fundamental rights. As such, most fundamental rights provided for in the constitutions could be described as citizen‟s rights more than individual rights. More- over, this position is applicable with regard to some fundamental rights of extra meaning, as the equality before the law (e.g. in art. 17 of the constitution of the sultanate of Oman, in art. 29 of the constitution of the Republic Algeria and in art. 40 of the constitution of the Arabic Republic Egypt) which provides for it only as the right of citizens. 32 As in the preamble, art. 3 of the Iraqi constitution and in the preamble of the interim national constitution of Sudan. 33 As in art. 20 of the constitution of Pakistan, in art. 46 of the constitution of Ara- bic Republic Egypt, in art. 35 of the constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, in art. 14 of the constitution of Hashemite kingdom of Jordan and in art. 36 of the constitution of Algeria. 34 As in art. 28 of the constitution of Sultanate of Oman, in art. 32 of the constitution of the United Arab Emirates and in art. 22 of the constitution of Kingdom of Bahrain. - 73 - From Diversity To Pluralism Accordingly and especially on the basis of the constitutional provisions as well as of the reservation within the framework of the conventions of international law from the states with Islamic character, it could be argued that the framers of the constitutions of the states with Islamic character explicitly do not aim to protect the right of religious freedom itself as in Western states, but rather to protect merely the right to practice each religion.35 Apart from the possibility of contradictory discussion about this view,36 it could also be stated that the framers of the constitutions consider equality in general here, because each one – Muslim or non-Muslim – principally should have the right to at least believe in his or her religion and to practice it. 3. The recognition of special normative status for each religion In addition to the aforementioned freedom especially of belief and religious practice, the system of personal affairs have been regulated for each individual on the basis of his or her religious affiliation in the states with Islamic character. More- over, the religious affiliation of each person determines not only the regulation of his personal affairs but also the judicial system which deals with the matters related to this system. The matters related to marriage, divorce and inheritance etc. – save for few notable differences among states with Islamic character –are principally decided by special courts on the basis of the different religious norms. That means: Muslims have their own courts which decide cases of personal system on the basis of Islamic norms according to the different Islamic legal schools and the non-Muslim have their own courts and own normative systems based on the norms of each religion.37 Normally, the religious authorities cooperate with the state within the framework of enacting laws regulating the personal system and the courts which have the task of implementing the legal rules of this system. In some countries, these religious authorities themselves – Islamic or non Islamic – exercise the jurisdiction in this field.38 Accordingly, the plural character of these states within the framework of the personal system is based on an equal form of differentiation according to the religious affiliation. The equality here can formally be seen in the treatment of

35 Cf. LUKAS WICK: Islam und Verfassungsstaat: Theologische Versöhnung mit der politischen Moderne? (Islam and constitutional state: Theological reconciliation with the political modernity), Würzburg 2009, pp. 125-130; EBERT: op. cit. (fn. 19), pp. 526-527. 36 Such discussion could be initiated on the basis of the meaning of the term “belief”, especially in the Arabic language i„tiqād. It is an extensive term which definitely includes the religious belief as one component. 37 The regulation of the affairs of personal system and of the courts dealing with these matters is based either on the constitutional provisions, as in art. 103 s2, 105 no. 1, 106, 109 s1 of the constitution of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan and in art. 41 of the Iraqi constitution, or on the general constitutional clause of the freedom of religious practice. 38 For instance, the so-called spiritual courts for the affairs of personal system of different Christian denominational in Syria are headed and administered through the religious authorities of these denominations, as in art. 79-92 of the Law Nr. 23/2004 of the personal system for the members of the Roman Orthodox Church. - 74 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State all religions on the same level precisely because no person is compelled to follow the norms of another religion within the framework of the regulation of the affairs of his personal system against his or her wishes. This aspect is crucial especially for the non-Muslim minorities who consider this autonomy as a possibility and an avenue to express their own identities within societies with an Islamic majority.39 Some framers of the constitutions recognize these minority groups as lawful constituents with a special normative status in the existing constitutional system. Moreover, their right to have their own education institutions and system catering to their needs as well as their right to regulate their internal affairs is well enshrined in some constitutions.40 4. The equality between the citizens and prohibition of discrimination In the constitutions of states with Islamic character there are a considerable number of provisions which explicitly provide for the equality of all citizens before the law.41 Moreover, some constitutions make provisions regarding the duty of the state to create and promote equality, especially regarding some groups and regions which were historically marginalized for different reasons.42 Clearly it can be argued that most constitutions prohibit discrimination against and the marginalization of any individual in the society regardless of one`s religious affiliation.43

IV. TWO EXAMPLES OF THE LIMITATION OF NORMATIVE EQUALITY IN STATES WITH ISLAMIC CHARACTER The aforementioned explanation shows that the framers of the constitutions in the states with Islamic character generally aim to create equality between all citizens as a part of a pluralistic state concept in the norms of the constitutions. At the same time, the fundamental rights – or some of them – would be defined and limited on the basis of the substantive influence of the Religious Clause

39 Cf. MAGDI KHALIL: “al-dawlah fi muajahat „aqidat al-aqbāt” (The State against the Christian Egyptian), in: ElMassry Newspaper, 21.03.2008 = at: http://www.elmassry.com/articals.php?id=1266. 40 As in art. 19, 108, 109 of the constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It is to highlight here that the framers of the interim national constitution of Sudan 2005 has been gone somehow far and divided the normative system completely into matters for the Muslims which should be ruled through the Islamic norms and matters for non Muslims which should not ruled through these norms, as in art. 5, 156, 157, 158. 41 As in art. 25 s1 of the constitution of Pakistan, in art. 29 of the constitution of Kuwait, in art. 40 of the constitution of the Arab Republic Egypt, in art. 25 s3 of the constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic and in art. 5 of the constitution of the kingdom of Morocco. 42 As within the frame of distribution of wealth according to art. 185 s5 of the interim national constitution of Sudan and of the revenues of oil according to art. 112 s1 of the Iraqi constitution. 43 As in art. 17 of the constitution of sultanate of Oman, in art. 29 of the constitution of Algeria and in art. 22 s1 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan. - 75 - From Diversity To Pluralism as a constitutional factor. However, it is difficult to find any direct nexus provided in the constitutions of the states with Islamic character between the Reli- gious Clause on the one hand and equality as a constitutional principle on the other. Accordingly, it could be stated that either there are no limitation of equality regarding religious affiliations in states with Islamic character, or the limitation could be determined through the norms of legislative or executive powers or through the decision of the courts. Through the explanation of the following two examples, it can be shown how normative equality in the constitution is limited on the basis of Islamic norms through the law or the decisions of the courts. 1. The prohibition of change of religion only for Muslims According to the religious norms of Islam, a Muslim is not allowed to leave or change his religion to another religion. The Islamic scholars and law schools hold this view.44 Indeed, this is not the problem within the framework of the constitutional law. Moreover, this cannot be a problem for equality and the pluralistic concept of the states with Islamic character, if the state powers normatively do not integrate this prohibition in a manner differentiating between Muslims and non-Muslims. The problem is that states with Islamic character generally allow non-Muslims to change their religion and to enter into Islam, while this is not allowed for the Muslims. This is clearly a normatively unequal treatment of individuals who have the same positions as citizens of the state despite their different religious affiliations. Moreover, states with Islamic character justify this unequal treatment of their citizens on the basis of the Religious Clause in their respective constitutions. In fact, this kind of justification can also be found in decisions of the courts of the different countries with Islamic character.45 It is remarkable that the Reli- gious Clause is actually elevated through this kind of justification to a status over and above the freedom of belief and the equality explicitly provided for in the constitutions. Save for the discussions about the freedom of belief or religious freedom in general, it can be argued that equality and the concept of pluralism based on these constitutions are not absolute in the states with Islamic character, although the provisions of the constitutions make the enjoyment of the rights reflected in these provisions appear absolute. This is a normative problem for the societies of those states with Islamic character in which religious affiliation forms the basis of the society itself and groups within it. Accordingly,

44 Cf. WICK: op. cit. (fn. 35), p. 130; MATHIAS ROHE: Das islamische Recht (The Islamic Law), München 2009, pp. 134-135. 45 As in the judicial decisions of the administrative court of Egypt rendered on 13.06.2009 in cases no. 53717/62 & 22566/63 respectively. The court explicitly opined that Egypt is not exactly a civil state, but a civil democratic state with Islam as the religion of the state which should have an influence particularly on the change of religion. Form this decision; it is clear that the Islamic character of the state was considered to be above the principle of citizenship in art. 1 of the constitution of the Arab Republic Egypt. - 76 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State this is a problem for the entire concept of citizenship and its meaning in states with Islamic character, especially as the judiciary emphasizes the duty to deal with Muslims and non-Muslims differently, especially with regards to the right to change one`s religion on the basis of the Religious Clause which has an unlim- ited character in this point. 2. The possibility of marriage between religions (mixed marriages) According to Sunni Islam it is prohibited for a Muslim woman to marry a non- Muslim man. Yet, Muslim men have the right to marry Jewish and Christian women.46 Apart from some countries such as Iran, in which the Shiite law schools have had an influence on the legal system, the authorities in most states with Islamic character have integrated these rules into their legal systems, especially those on personal laws explicitly prohibiting the marriage between Mus- lim women and non-Muslim men.47 In the case of a non-legal prohibition, marriage agreements of this kind could be declared invalid through a decision of courts on the basis of so-called hisba-case48 or by refusal of recognition from the administrations. Generally, marriage between Muslim women and non- Muslim men is considered to be an illegal relationship which violates public order in states with Islamic character. In principal, unequal treatment between groups is reflected in the following cases: a) Inequality in the right of a Muslim man and a Muslim woman to choose his or her partner; b) Inequality in the right of a non-Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman to choose his or her partner; c) Inequality in the right of a Muslim man and a non-Muslim man to choose his partner; d) Inequality in the right of a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim woman to choose her partner. Accordingly, it is remarkable that the constitutional provisions which are affected through this inequality are not only those provisions which provide for the equal rights of all citizens, but also the provisions dealing with personal freedom.49 Theoretically, a Muslim man and a non- Muslim woman have a wider normative scope to choose their respective partners than a non-Muslim

46 Cf. ROHE: op. cit. (fn. 44), pp. 82-83. 47 As in art. 48 of the Law of the Syrian personal system and in art. 29 of the decree with the force of law no. 20/1996 regarding Yemeni personal system. 48 Cf. THIELMANN: loc. cit (fn. 24), pp. 74-88. 49 For a detailed explanation of personal freedom in the constitutions of the Arabic states, see NASEEF NAEEM: “Zwischen Einschränkung und neuen Entwicklungen: Das Grundrecht auf heterosexuelle Selbstbestimmung in den Verfassungssystemen arabi- scher Staaten” (Between the limitation and new developments: The fundamental right of the heterosexual self-determination in the constitutional systems of the Arab States), in: HATEM ELLIESIE (ed.): Beiträge zum Islamischen Recht VII, Frankfurt am Main 2010, (in print). - 77 - From Diversity To Pluralism man or a Muslim woman.50 This normative inequality is a problem for the patriarchal societies of states with Islamic character, especially for the non-Muslim communities. For them, the state occupies a role as a guardian of Islamic honour without protecting their rights as equal citizens of the society.51

V. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF EQUALITY WITH REGARDS TO THE CHANGE OF RELIGION AND TO MIXED MARRIAGE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DUALISM BETWEEN THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSE AND RULE OF LAW Apart from the discussions of the limitation of equality and the concept of plurality on the basis of religion in other frameworks,52 the two aforementioned examples show the direct substantive influence of the Religious Clause on the principle of equality between citizens. As such it can be persuasively stated that equality and pluralism are limited concepts in the constitutional law of states with Islamic character.53 Furthermore, the hegemony of the Religious Clause embodies a problem for the principle of Rule of Law, as the constitutional provisions which explicitly provide for not only equality, but also the freedom of belief and personal freedom are always limited and actually, at least within the framework of change of religion and mixed marriage, devoid of meaning. This challenge to the Rule of Law could be determined here not only in accordance with substantive international standard or democracy in its wider sense,54 but also formally according to the provisions of the constitution itself, precisely because the wide formulation of the constitutional provisions completely contradicts the constitutional reality. The first possible solution to address this dilemma is a clear decision for one side.55 Thus one of the two criteria – equality between the citizens or Islamic character of the states in form of Religious Clause – should be provided for explicitly in the constitutions. Yet, this suggested solution may prove untenable mainly because it is hardly imaginable that states with Islamic character could afford to remove either the Religious Clause or the equality perspectives from their constitu-

50 Cf. BARBARA HUBER-RUDOLF: “Die christlich-islamische Ehe im Kontext des in- terreligiösen Dialogs” (The Christian-Islamic marriage in the context of the interreligious dialog), in: Münchener Theologischer Zeitschrift 52/1 (2001), pp. 56-66, esp. pp. 62-63. 51 Cf. KHALIL: op. cit. (fn. 39). 52 Besides the two aforementioned points, there are many points which could be mentioned with regard to unequal treatment of non-Islamic minorities in comparison with the Islamic majority from normative or political sides, as within the framework of the division of the positions in the state system or the right to build churches or further temples in comparison with the right of Muslim to build mosques. 53 Cf. ROHE: op. cit. (fn. 44), pp. 255-258. 54 Cf. HANS JÖRG SANDKÜHLER: “Wissenskulturen, Pluralismus und Recht” (Cul- tures of knowledge, pluralism and law), in: Dialektik 2002, no. 2, pp. 41- 52, esp. p. 52. 55 For the explanation of suggestion of the solution to the problem of religious freedom through new thinking about the Shari„a concept in states with Islamic character, see ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM: Islam and the Secular State, Cambridge 2008, pp. 117-125. - 78 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State tions. In case of such an attempt to remove the Religious Clause from the constitution, such states would be confronted with a problem of legitimacy with regards to their Muslim majority,56 especially in this era of religious extremism and consideration of Islam as an identity.57 Similarly, states would have a problem with the international community which could most certainly reject an explicit inequality in the constitutional system of states with Islamic character. It should be noted that the prohibition of religious change for Muslims is derived not only from considerations related to the individual conscience of an actual person, but also from political considerations established during the early Islamic movement. During that period, Islam represented the political direction of the new state and its only ideology. Thus apostasy theologically embodies the defection of the individual who as an apostate separates from Islam and the state and society as whole. This perception of apostasy as a crime prohibited by the state, political and social system continues to exist.58 Apart from the theological discussion, the decision of the supreme administrative court in Egypt rendered on 09.02.2008 could be mentioned as a notable development within the framework of the freedom of religion conversion. In this decision, the court opined that some converts to Islam could legitimately return back to their original Christian faith. And in the event of such a decision, the Court argued that the state was required to accept said decision. Indeed, the supreme constitutional court of Egypt approved this decision later. However, the major challenge emanating from this decision of the court was the declaration that an indigenous Muslim or a person who was born as a Muslim is not allowed to change his religion under any circumstances. Clearly, this decision makes it harder for anyone wishing to convert from one religion to another to do so. Furthermore, the solution to the aforementioned problems of the equality of citizens in the constitution should possibly be addressed through the acceptance of the fact that the framers of the constitutions of the states with Islamic character provide for a special normative system which guarantee dualism between the Religious Clause on one side and the equality between citizens regardless of their religions on the other side. It can also be argued that that there is a contradiction between both aspects of this dual system regarding the change of religion and mixed marriage. However, this contradiction can be discarded taking into account the existence of the two kinds of prohibitions on the basis of Religious Clause and equality which are provided for within the respective constitutions. Accordingly, a balance between the prohibitions must be achieved taking into account both sets of norms. In other words the prohibitions of

56 Cf. PATRICIA CRONE: “Islam and religious freedom”, in: RAINER BRUNNER ET AL. (eds.), online-publications of the XXX. Deutscher Orientalistentag, 2009, p. 9 = at: http://orient.ruf.uni-freiburg.de/dotpub/crone.pdf. 57 Cf. FAREED ZAKARIA: “Islam, Democracy, and constitutional liberalism”, in: Po- litical Science Quarterly 119/1 (2004), pp. 1-20, esp. pp. 12-15. 58 Cf. WICK: op. cit. (fn. 35), pp. 130-136. - 79 - From Diversity To Pluralism Muslims to change his or her religion and of Muslim women to marry non- Muslim men must be recognized on the same level as the prohibitions of the unequal treatment of the citizens on the basis of the principle of equality provided for in the constitution. Perhaps to strike a balance between the two, such prohibitions should necessarily be premised on the expansion of Islamic religious prohibitions. This could mean that each citizen, regardless of his or her religion, should not be allowed to change religion or to marry outside of his or her religious community. Thus, everyone in states with Islamic character should stay in the religion in which he or she is born. Such equal treatment of citizens conforms to the formal definition of the Rule of Law, as all citizens are simply treated in an equal fashion by the state. They are all prohibited from changing their religions and/or marrying someone from another religion. Broadly speaking, the suggestion above does not conform to the principles of substantive Rule of Law and substantive democracy which largely characterize the state and constitutional liberal setting of Western countries. Thus, it could be considered as suggestion which tend to influence the discourse in modern constitutional law regarding the rule of law itself as well as fundamental rights. How- ever, this solution is the only one which could be realized on the basis of the factual dualism between the Religious Clause and equality in the constitutional systems of states with Islamic character. It is the only way to achieve a truly pluralistic concept of the state based on the complete equality of citizenship.

Prof. Dr Carmen López Alonso (Madrid, Spain) PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AND CIVIL STATE FROM A EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW

Europe is often cited as being the realm of the pluralistic society and of the Civil State. Both are considered to be the outcome of the long tradition of Ren- aissance humanism and of the religious emancipation which was brought about by the Reformation movement and by the philosophical and political ideas of the Enlightenment. The first step in this process is considered to have been the affirmation of rights and freedom for the individual, which are to be regarded as irrefutable limits to the former absolute political power. This is seen as the backbone of a development which ended with the proclamation of autonomy for the individual and its corollary, the sovereignty of the citizen. Before accepting this model we need to take into account not only the various diverse and somewhat conflicting manifestations within the Reformation movement, but also the strong tradition of Counter-Reformation which was

- 80 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State present at that time in some parts of the continent and in the larger part of Southern Europe. A similar consideration applies with regard to the Enlight- enment, whose ideas as a path towards Modernity have been defended and interpreted in two different ways, as has been discussed elsewhere.1 We find a parallel situation of non-homogeneity when we move from ideology to the actual ways in which these ideas have been implemented. Taking into consideration these differences in opinion, this paper will look at the ways in which European and Western countries have, throughout history, faced the question of the rights and duties of their member citizens. In particular, we will look at how they have dealt with the issue of diversity and the status and treatment of their religious, cultural and ethnic minorities. To follow will be a summarized panorama of the changes which have taken place from the early 20th century up to the present day and, to end, an open conclusion giving an indication of some of the typical problems which can arise in the application of pluralistic principles.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Although the prolegomena could be dated back to the late Middle Ages and the Quattrocento, it was mainly after the 16th century Reformation and the development of the Modern and of centralized states that the question of minorities and of different ways of thinking and behaviour became a political and social problem in Europe. Finding a solution was in this case more difficult and more complex than it had been in the Spanish kingdom in 1492, only a few years before. In this year, a turning point in European history, the kingdom of Granada, the last Mus- lim kingdom in the Iberian Peninsula, was conquered by the Reyes Católicos. This victory over the “infidels” and the religious and political unification of the kingdom was completed with the implementation of the decree of March 1492. Un- der this decree the Jewish community was confronted with a tragic dilemma – to accept conversion to Christianity or be expelled from Sefarad, the Hebrew name for Spain, the country where they had been living for centuries. Later this same year the Columbus expedition, sponsored by the Castillian kingdom, discovered the “New World”. Here they found an indigenous population, whose status as human beings and subjects of the Spanish Kings became the object of an important debate among Spanish politicians, theologians and scholars, as did the question of the legitimacy of the conquest and occupation of these new lands. This was in part normatively translated into the “Leyes de Indias”.2 The social, political and spiritual bouleversements which accompanied the changing conditions at the beginning of the 16th century formed the background

1 CARMEN LÓPEZ ALONSO: “Laicité or Separation of the State from Religion in (Western) European Tradition”, in: STEFAN SCHREINER (ed.): Religion and Secular State, Zürich / Sarajevo 2008, pp. 34-41. 2 Leyes de Burgos (1512) and Leyes Nuevas. Leyes y ordenanças nuevamente hechas por su Ma- gestad para la governación de las Indias y buen tratamiento y conservación de los Indios (1542). - 81 - From Diversity To Pluralism for the Reformation movement, with its defence of the capacity and responsibility of individuals in their relationship to the Holy. This replaced the former exclusive intermediation of the Church and its priests and clergy. The door was thus opened for the admittance of a diversity of approaches, though religion continued to be at the centre of political life and the social and political adscription.3 In his second Treaty of Civil Government, John Locke writes about civil and political society and the true aims of government. Like Thomas Hobbes before him, he starts from the concept of the “state of nature”. Both authors coincide in the idea that the social pact by which the State is established originates in the free will of a group of rational individuals who agree to create a political body in order to assure their lives as human beings. There is, however, a fundamental difference in the way in which they picture the “state of nature”. Hobbes sees it as being a situation of anarchy, scarcity, chaos and perpetual war and fear, one in which man behaves like a wild beast - like a wolf - towards his fellow man, and where not a single individual right is warranted. Locke, on the other hand, thinks that men will behave as social and human beings who enjoy natural and subjective rights. It is the state of uncertainty and the inability to fully imple- ment their rights in the “state of nature” which drives them towards signing a social contract “to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name - property”.4 Under this pact, whosoever “out of a state of Nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community”.5 This majority implies then the existence of a minority, and this minority fully belongs to the political community created by the consent of every one of its members. This is in contrast to its suppression by Hobbes, who is the main defender of the absolute power of the State. In line with his acceptance of the minority, Locke makes a separation between the civil and religious domains, and defends the idea of religious toleration, his principle being that no person should be compelled to belong to a particular creed or church. There are excep- tions, nonetheless; Locke excludes from his tolerant attitude those creeds who could adversely affect public order or peace, by keeping fidelity to external

3 There is an impressive bibliography on this subject. See, e. g., JEREMY WALDRON: God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke‟s Political Thought, Cambridge 2002. MICAH J. SCHWARTZMAN: “The Relevance of Locke‟s Religious Arguments for Tolera- tion”, in: Political Theory 33 (2005), pp. 678-705; ROWAN WILLIAMS, “Convictions, Loy- alties and the Secular State”, in: Political Theology 6/2 (2005), pp. 153-164 (quoted in CARMEN LÓPEZ ALONSO, “Separation of Church and State: Meaning and Role of Re- ligion in Secular Societies”, in: STEFAN SCHREINER (ed.): Visions of a Just Society, Sara- jevo 2006, pp. 58-64. 4 JOHN LOCKE: Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690), London / New York 1924, chap. IX, & 123-130. 5 Ibidem II, chap. VIII, & 99. - 82 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State powers – as the Catholics do to the Pope - or those whose moral values are incompatible with English civilization, as is the case, in Locke‟s opinion, with Muslims and atheists.6 The first liberals called for a limitation of political power, maintaining that this power should not interfere with the right and duty of the individual to preserve him/herself, that is, his/her property in the lockean sense of the word (body, soul and the product on which his/her work is incorporated). This idea, as well as the liberal argument in favour of toleration, was further developed in the 18th century during the French-kantian Enlightenment. Leaving aside the condescending connotations of the word, the liberal-lockean idea of toleration towards difference is restricted to the private domain, while sovereignty remains with the State and its executive head. The real turning point came when the idea of tolerance gave way, without dis- appearing completely, to the idea of equality. This was one of the main points of the liberal revolutions in America and in France. The 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l‟Homme et du Citoyen asserted the obligation of the State to guarantee the rights of every citizen, on an equal basis, independent of the religion or the ethnic or social origins of the individual7. This principle of formal and legal equality, which is the starting point of the secular State and political-institutional secularization, marked the formal end of the Ancient Regime, with its primacy of privilege (particular laws) in a society that was conceived of as being an organism. This change could not have been accomplished without the Enlightenment and its affirmation of the individual autonomy of man. This individual autonomy implies the assertion of individual sovereignty and its corollary, national sovereignty. The Nation, as the place of origin, the homeland, now became imbued with new liberal-political meaning, which implies a State (whether in the form of a monarchy or a republic) in which the key for membership is the condition of citizenship. This concept, common to all the various trends of European tradition, entails that, where sovereignty resides, the nation is formed by citizens (either active or passive) who are entitled to choose their form of government and to elect and change their representatives.8 Nonetheless there is no universal agreement on how political power should be organized. While the individual represents the main basis of “liberal liberalism”, “republican liberalism” places the community at its centre (either in its

6 JOHN LOCKE: Epistola De Tolerantia, trans. W. POPPLE: A Letter concerning Toleration (1689). Locke published two new letters on the same issue: A Second Letter concerning Toleration (1690); A Third Letter for Toleration (1692). See ALFRED C. STEPAN: “Religion, Democracy and the „Twin‟ Tolerations”, in: Journal of Democracy 11/4 (2000), pp. 37-57. 7 Text available at: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/dudh/1789.asp. 8 This classification was introduced in 1791 for the election to the French Assem- bly. Active citizens: electors and those with voting rights to nominate the minority that formed the body of the electors; passive: those with no voting rights but entitled to protection by law with relation to their belongings and their liberty. - 83 - From Diversity To Pluralism Rousseaunian version or in its various communitarian ones). Closely related to both concepts is their idea of the Nation, conceived either from a civic or from an ethno-cultural point of view. The ideological and actual conflict between these different approaches, as well as interactions between them, has left its mark on contemporary European history and has indeed led to clashes, sometimes of an extreme nature.

INDIVIDUALIST, MULTICULTURALIST, PLURALIST? If we leave aside the criticism of reactionary anti-liberals9 and concentrate on liberal criticism, we find that one of the main points of concern is the risk that a literal interpretation of majority rule could result in the reality of government by a tiny elite, whose actual practice may not be very different from that of the governments of the Ancient Regime, yet without any of their obligations or constraints. In European thinking and practice there are differing opinions on how to confront this risk, either on the one hand, by placing emphasis on the individual and universal basis, or on the other, by giving fundamental weighting to communities and corporate bodies, as well as to individuals, in the belief that corporations can serve as a counterweight to the potential absolute power which lies hidden behind purely individual sovereignty and its actual translation into political power. In the French-Jacobin model, citizenship rights and duties are seen as individual rights, whereas corporative or communitarian rights are rejected. In the first debate on the “Jewish Question” (September 28th, 1789) Clermont-Ton- nerre asserted that “the Jews as a nation should be denied everything, but as individuals, they should be granted everything”, because “there cannot be a nation within a nation”. Two years later (September 27th, 1791) a decree was passed on the French Jews, granting them complete emancipation as individuals, but not as a separate national community.10 The Jacobin-Rousseaunian model sees the Republic (Nation-State) as representing the superior good; what is good for the Republic is also good for the individual. Rousseau‟s republic, far from being the perfect natural community of Aristotelian-scholastic political philosophy, is conceived of as the result of a rational and voluntary decision, taken by men who are trying to resolve the problem of finding « une forme d‟association qui défende et protège de toute la force com- mune la personne et les biens de chaque associé, et par laquelle chacun, s‟unissant à tous, n'obéisse pourtant qu'à lui-même et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant »,11 for « renoncer à sa liberté c‟est renoncer à sa qualité d‟homme, aux droits de l‟humanité, même à ses devoirs ».12

9 See ZEEV STERNHELL (ed.): The Intellectual Revolt against Liberal Democracy, 1870- 1945: International Conference in Memory of Jacob L. Talmon, Jerusalem 1996; ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN: The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy, Cambridge, Mass. 1991. 10 The same individual trend characterizes the French Le Chapelier Law (June 1791), banning workers‟ associations and strikes. 11 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: Le Contrat Social (1762), Livre I, chap. 6, Du Pacte Social; - 84 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State The Rousseaunian solution to this problem is a social pact, signed under the same formula by all the participants: « Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la suprême direction de la volonté générale; et nous recevons en corps chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout ».13 The pact creates a moral and collective body « composé d'autant de membres que l‟Assemblée a de voix, lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son „moi commun‟ sa vie et sa volonté ».14 Closely linked are moi commun and volonté génerale - the general will, which is different from the aggregation of individual opinions or interests, which only pay attention to private benefits and which Rousseau calls volonté de tous, the will of all15. The question is raised as to what happens when individual will does not coincide with the general will. In Rousseau‟s theory, the social pact, in which each citizen becomes part of his homeland, secures him against all personal dependence, for only civil engagements are legitimate.16 In order not to be an empty formula, the pact « renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d‟obéir à la volonté générale, y sera contraint par tout le corps; ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu‟on le forcera à être libre ».17 The difficulties of the concept of general will have already become clear in Rousseau‟s work, when he concedes that few people are enlightened enough to acknowledge this volonté générale in a rational way. He thus proposes the instatement of a Legislator to play a founding role in the creation of national institutions.18 The risk of totalitarianism which is embedded in the concept, especially when a solid institutional framework and effective forms of control are lacking, can be seen in examples where it has been put into practice (Robespierre‟s dictatorship, as well as

(the problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each one, while uniting with all others, may still follow his own will, and remain as free as before). 12 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: Le Contrat Social, Livre I, chap. 4, De l‟Esclavage; (to renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, the rights of humanity and even its duties). Rousseau asserts that this kind of renunciation is incompatible with human nature. 13 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: Le Contrat Social, Livre II, chap. 3 (Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole). 14 Ibidem, (composed of as many members as the Assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its „common I”, its life and its will). 15 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: Le Contrat Social, Livre II, chap. 3 (« Il y a souvent bien de la différence entre la volonté de tous et la volonté générale; celle-ci ne regarde qu‟à l‟intérêt commun; l‟autre regarde à l‟intérêt privé, et n‟est qu‟une somme de volontés particulières »). 16 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: op. cit., Livre I, chap. 7, Du Souverain: « car telle est la condition qui, donnant chaque citoyen à la patrie, le garantit de toute dépendance personnelle, condition qui fait l‟artifice et le Jeu de la machine politique, et qui seule rend légitimes les engagements civils, lesquels, sans cela, seraient absurdes, tyranniques, et sujets aux plus énormes abus ». 17 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: op. cit., Livre I, chap. 7, Du Souverain (it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free). 18 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: op. cit., Livre II, chap. 7. - 85 - From Diversity To Pluralism those that followed). In confronting this potential risk there are, on the one hand, those who defend a renewal of tradition, adapted to the new circumstances, along the lines started by the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and Ed- mund Burke. As Burke says in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), tradition protects us against totalitarian seeds, rooted in abstraction and reason, as the sole criterion to find the common good.19 This line of thought continues to be present in contemporary political conservatism, without a real solution of the con- tinuity, especially among neoconservative and neoliberal thinkers.20 More nuanced, on the other hand, is the theory that not only individuals, but also communities and groups (either religious, ethnic, work, culture, etc.) have to be taken into account and given a real voice in politics. Together with the necessary separation of powers, supporters of this view consider this to be a means of assuring that « le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir », the well-known Montes- quieu formula by which power stops power and, in so doing, permits the necessary political and social equilibrium to be achieved. It is on the basis of respect for equality and individual difference that Rousseau makes one of the first critiques of this plural participation of groups, for “each citizen should think only his own thoughts”, but “if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal”.21 Nonetheless, to this day, what lies behind the debate is the question of the existence, or otherwise, of a set of universal principles that can be applied to everyone on an equal basis, supposing that there is a form of radical equality among human beings. The fundamental point to be established is not whether these principles belong to natural law or are the direct product of reason - the latter not being contradictory with the former - but whether the admittance of these universal principles puts at risk the possibility of diversity, both between individuals and between groups and communities. Further, we need to address the question as to how these differences can be reconciled with the principle of equality, which is the main basis of liberal democracy.22

19 “Society is indeed a contract. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born” (EDMUND BURKE: Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), ed. L. G. MITCHELL, Oxford 1993). 20 ZEEV STERNHELL: Les Anti-Lumières. Du XVIIIe Siècle À La Guerre Froide, Paris 2006; JACOB L. TALMON: The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, 2 vols., New York 1960. 21 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU: Le Contrat Social, Livre II, chap. 3. « Il importe donc, pour avoir bien l'énoncé de la volonté générale, qu'il n'y ait pas de sociétés partielle dans l'état, et que chaque citoyen n'opine que d'après lui : telle fut l'unique et sublime institution du grand Lycurgue. Que s'il y a des sociétés partielles, il en faut multiplier le nombre et en prévenir l'inégalité, comme firent Solon, Numa, Servius. Ces précautions sont les seules bonnes pour que la volonté générale soit toujours éclai- rée, et que le peuple ne se trompe point ». 22 This is a subject too wide to be treated here and needs to be more deeply de- - 86 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State

MODELS, IMPLEMENTATION, CRITICISM We will now move on from theoretical debate to the effects of real implementation on individuals and minority groups. We should, however, make a distinction between those minorities (religious, cultural, ethnic) who are already citizens of the Nation-State and those characterized by their immigrant condition (either for economic, religious or political reasons). We will find that both models, both the Jacobin-Rousseaunian and the conservative-traditional model, have defended assimilation into the frame of the Nation-State, whether defined in its civic or in its ethnic-cultural sense. This assimilation into the national majority was the norm in the European model from the nineteenth century onwards and through part of the twentieth century. Assimilation can be congruent with the liberal model of toleration of private observance of religion, as well as with the political practice which permits its public manifestation. This can be seen in the more open liberal regimes and in those democracies which grant equality for every religious creed, despite having their own established religion. Nonetheless, the general model is that of a state which, by being secular and neutral towards each one of its citizens, assures their freedom of thought and religion, as well as of association, within the limits of the Rule of Law.23 The introduction of compulsory elementary education for all, on a national level, taught in the language and culture of the majority, as well as general military drafting, have been two fundamental mechanisms which have contributed towards achieving this assimilation, which is always to be understood as a transitive process. However, assimilation is not the same as integration. We can find various examples where groups are prepared to become integrated, but do not accept assimilation. Their reasons may be either strictly religious or ethnic-national, as is the case when, irrespective of whether or not they are believers and actively practise their religion, they consider it to be an integral part of their distinctive culture and identity, one which they keep a commitment to, and which they see as both as a right and a duty. A well-known illustration is the case of a significant number of members of Jewish communities, mainly in Germany but also in France and other European countries, including Russia and Eastern Europe, who have rejected complete assimilation even in cases where this was the only way to enjoy full citizenship.24 There have been a number of different reactions bated. Just as an example, vide the criticism made, among other, by CHARLES TAYLOR: Multiculturalism and „the Politics of Recognition‟, Princeton, NJ, 1992, and WILL KYMLICKA, Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, 1995, IDEM: Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, Oxford / New York, 2007. 23 See LÓPEZ ALONSO, op. cit. 2006, 2008. 24 There is a huge bibliography on this question. See, e. g., DOMINIQUE VIDAL, Le Mal-Être Juif- Entre Repli, Assimilation & Manipulations, Paris 2003; JONATHAN FRANKEL & STEVEN J. ZIPPERSTEIN (eds.), Assimilation and Community. The Jews in Nineteenth- Century Europe, New York 1992; PIERRE BIRNBAUM, Géographie De L‟espoir: L‟exil, Les - 87 - From Diversity To Pluralism in the face of the dangers of assimilation, ranging from nationalism (Zionism, in the case of the Jews) to various forms of political activism in the cause of political and cultural autonomy (the Bund party as the principal example in the case of the Jews) or in favour of a real democracy, neutral and open to full liberty of thought and belief, both in the private and public realms. The panorama was transformed in the aftermath of the Second World War, and there have in particular been changes since the 1960s, a time when economic and demographic developments brought about a series of social and political changes. There have also been geopolitical developments, among them the relative détente in Europe and the process of decolonization, with its ensu- ing population movements within states, as well as between them. These changes have brought with them new ways of dealing with minorities, and the pluralistic and multicultural way has been openly defended. Multiculturalism, in its literal sense, means the co-existence of people with many cultural identities in a common state or society. Multiculturalism is also to be understood in the sense that these different cultures should be treated not just with respect but as a source of positive value for the whole and plural society in which they live. This implies that members of the various cultural groups should be able to live in their own culture, as well as being allowed to propagate it. Nonetheless, there are others who support a less extreme interpretation of the multiculturalist concept, which is seen as one of the necessary manifestations of a democratic and pluralistic system, namely democracy as polyarchy. In R. Dahl‟s well known definition,25 the different groups that are members of an open society may freely participate to defend their own interests. First seen in the USA, and later in a number of European countries, multiculturalism not only represented an intellectual trend but also a social movement, one which was very influential in the 1970s and 80s in the expansion of academic curricula to encompass the history and works of marginalized minorities (African-American, Native-Americans, women, immigrants, etc.), as well as works appertaining to non-western tradition. Although written from a different perspective, a pivotal work on this theme is Orientalism, the book published in 1978 by the late Palestinian intellectual Edward W. Said.26 One of the problems which has arisen with the multi-cultural model is that, in some of its manifestations, “respect” has been understood in too essential a way. As a consequence, the rejection of the assimilation model has not been translated into proper egalitarian integration but instead into a ghettoization of

Lumières, La Désassimilation, Paris 2004; DAVID VITAL, A People Apart: The Jews in Europe, 1789-1939, Oxford / New York 1999, and ZYGMUNT BAUMAN: “Entry Tickets and Exit Visas: Paradoxes of Jewish Assimilation”, in: Telos 77 (1988), pp. 45–77. 25 ROBERT DAHL: Polyarchy, New Haven, Conn.:, 1971. 26 EDWARD W. SAID: Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient, New York, 1978. A very interesting comment on the book can be found in his conversation with Tariq Ali, see TARIQ ALI, Conversaciones Con Edward Said, Madrid 2010. - 88 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State minority groups, in some cases reminding us of the situation of the natives in the ill-fated American Indian reservations.27 Nonetheless, the most important objection is that, when applied in an essentialist manner, respect contradicts the principles of equality and political participation, which are fundamental to a democratic regime. There has also been political criticism which has pointed out that the multi-cultural celebration of diversity, with its potential encour- agement of separatism, brings with it the danger of the relativization of West- ern values, and represents a threat to political and social cohesion. Such criticism has come not only from outside but also from within, from “the „cultural left‟ itself, from persons sympathetic to the claims of cultural difference, yet uncomfortable with absolutism”.28 To put this criticism into context, we need to take into account the impact of the terrorist attacks in the USA (09.11.2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005), as well as the outbursts of violence that characterized the social uprising in French urban neighbourhoods in 2007, in areas mainly inhabited by second and third generation immigrants. As a result of this process a new assimilationist trend has been observed which differs from the accepted idea of the 19th and early 20th century, that of assimilation as meaning total acculturation and homogenization. There are two main versions of this recent trend. The first takes its point of departure from the Rousseaunian-Kantian Enlightenment ideas of equality and rationality and from the concept of politics as a rational elaboration, as a deliberative process, the result of which is “constitutional patriotism”. This assures unity as well as diversity and, in contrast to the former idea, is seen as an intransitive process.29 In the second version, in contrast to this view of politics as a deliberative process, politics is seen instead as being the result of competition between different interests in an open market which is presided over by the rules of a free economy and where members of the public can make their own particular choices.

PLURALISM: DIFFERENT AND EQUAL We are now at a critical point in history - socially, economically and politically; a time when we need to rethink our concepts and actions in order to secure the

27 RONALD WRIGHT: Continentes Robados, Madrid 1993. 28 ROGERS BRUBAKER, “The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States”, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 24/4 (2001), pp. 531-548 (= at: http://works.bepress.com/wrb/9); CRAIG CALHOUN: “Multiculturalism”, in Dictionary of the Social Sciences, Oxford 2002. 29 The first author to use the concept of “constitutional patriotism” was Dolf Sternberger in an article published in 1979 in which he alluded to the process of collective identification that had taken place in Germany in the last three decades. The term was later utilized and popularized by Jürgen Habermas in the Historikerstreit (historians‟ debate). See CHARLES S. MAIER: The Unmasterable Past. History, Holocaust and German National Identity, Cambridge, Mass. 1988 (²1997); PETER BALDWIN (ed.), Reworking the Past. Hitler, the Holocaust and the Historians‟ Debate, Boston 1990), MARTIN BROSZAT & SAUL FRIEDLÄNDER: “A Controversy about the Historicization of National-Socialism”, in: New German Critique 1988, no. 44, pp. 264-300. - 89 - From Diversity To Pluralism values of equality, autonomy and respect for the diversity which is indivisibly associated with democratic citizenship. Perhaps we will need an “optimism of the will,” for the situation does not look very promising, taking into consideration the results of the recent EU elections (2009) and the increase in ultra-right and ultranationalist movements, as well as the signs of xenophobic tendencies which can be seen in some areas of the European Union. Actions have to be added to this optimism of the will, however; one fundamental step is to start treating the “other” as equal and different, but not as separate, for this can lead to ghettoization, whether from within or imposed from above. This requires a deliberative and pluralistic framework, one which is not just political but also social in nature. It should assure formal political equality and should lay the foundation for real equality of opportunity among citizens. In certain cases this equality of opportunity may require some positive discrimination, for, as the present economic crisis has fully demonstrated, the market does not necessarily regulate itself. What is needed to accomplish this goal is a constitutional framework, 1) which includes the basic set of Human Universal Rights as an indisputable limit which cannot be transgressed in the defence of any communitarian, religious, cultural or corporative tradition; and 2) which assures the Rule of Law, the Law being the product of the rational and deliberative participation of the whole citizenry (either directly or by means of its political representatives), applied on an equal basis for all. The only mechanism that can assure both diversity and equality is the neutrality of the State, which means the separation of State from religion. As it has been argued elsewhere, in its full meaning this separation supposes that there is no established religion, but it could nonetheless allow the establishment of a particular religion, on condition that there is a guarantee of total equality of belief and practice for the other religions, equality which is included in the constitutional right of freedom of thought and association.30 Real pluralism is not possible without democracy, for pluralism means respect for the individual, both as an individual and as a social human being who can enjoy a range of identities and belong to a varied series of communities and groups. His/her right to freely enjoy each of them, both within and without, can only be fully guaranteed if the same rights and duties are also guaranteed for every citizen, under the protection and the rule of Law.31 As we have already said, in order to fully accomplish this balance of equality-diversity, political equality must be accompanied by the foundation of real equality of opportunity. Nonetheless, we still have to keep in mind that we need to fight, both intellectually and politically, against the stereotypes of the “other”. This requires

30 See notes 1 & 4. 31 A useful summary of the history and meaning of pluralism can be found in ROBERT DAHL: “Pluralism”, in: JOEL KRIEGER (ed.): The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, Oxford 2001. - 90 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State critical vision which refuses to accept the essentialist concept whereby whole communities - religious, ethnic, national or other – are branded by the deeds of a tiny section of their members. The best prescription against this ill-fated es- sentialism is that of individual autonomy and responsibility of the individual. For, even in the case of the most isolated shipwrecked sailor, a human being is in fact not a monad but a social being.

Dr Cengiz Aktar (Istanbul / Turkey) NATION BUILDING AND LAICITÉ IN TURKEY: PAST DILEMMAS AND PRESENT CHALLENGES

National identities are, especially in non-homogeneous countries, artificial makings. Turkish nation is no exception to the historical process of nation creation. Chronologically speaking it was the last nation that emerged from the Ottoman Empire right after its collapse. Exactly like Massimo d‟Azeglio who, following Risorgimento in 1860ies reminded that “now that we have created Italy we need to create Italians”, Turkish elites had to undergo similar works. Theorizing the nation, Ziya Gökalp, a Republican of Kurdish extract reminds us right at the early days of the Republic of Turkey that “we need a nation for this new state”.

THE GERMAN NATION MAKING PROCESS AND FRENCH NATION MODEL The Ottoman Empire is a pre-national structure in which no distinctive feature was superior to the next. The Turkish nation that was imagined by the Young Turks had to be new and eventually homogeneous, i. e. clear of non-Muslims. For the Republicans who inherited a half done „national‟ environment the nation had to be the expression of a togetherness embracing all of the components present in the territory of Turkey in 1923 but without referring to the past marked by the twin universalisms :communitarian Islam and a cosmopolitan Empire. Here lies the cruel dilemma. The models the elites had before them were the elective, legal, citizenship based and universalistic French model and the hereditary, historical, culturalistic and communitarian German model. The leading theorists of the German model such as Herder and Fichte con- ceptualized and created the German difference through a hereditary, historical, and culturalistic nation model in the face of the imperialism of the „gallomanes‟ and the French humanist tradition that imposed, albeit imperceptibly, a model that had no slightest regard for cultural differences. The German Unification and the German nation state happened in 1871 as the culmination of this process. - 91 - From Diversity To Pluralism Just like the German thinkers, Turkish Republicans had to create or dig out the Turkish difference which was dwindled to almost nothingness from where it had gone out of sight. Turkishness had been constricted in between the twin universalisms, the cosmopolitan Empire and the communitarian religion of Islam. For the Republicans, however, the relevance of the German model wouldn‟t go further than challenging the twin universalisms under which Turkishness had disappeared over centuries. Because the Turkish difference or peculiarity necessitated the definition of an identity with a national feature that looked only forward, never turning around for even a momentary glimpse into the past, and had to possess a newly written history, a newly imagined culture, and even a new definition of heredity. For the Turkish nation that was to be created, there was no objective reference to lean for support, no homogeneous local identity or structure existing otherwise in the German model. Maybe the language and even there the homogeneity was imperfect, but certainly the religion. Objective limits of a historically homogeneous nation Let‟s have a look to existing patterns at the moment of the creation of the Republic of Turkey. In terms of lineage, the Anatolian Muslim mosaic that is supposed to shape the future Turkish nation is as follows:  Turks and Turcomans that got mixed to the utmost extent and became extensively hybrid as a result of collective religious conversions taking place since XI century;  Kurds and Arabs handed down by the Empire;  Muslim communities who had migrated to seek refuge and asylum throughout the XIX century, either from the east (Caucasus) and north (Crimea) as a result of Romanov's Russia push over the Caucasian Muslim communities, or from the west as a result of the loss of the Balkan territories to Austro-Hungarian Empire of Habsburgs. In their overwhelming majority these Albanians, Bosniacs, Chechens, Circassians, etc. were no ethnically Turks;  Finally the exchanged populations. Among those who came to Turkey the majority were no Turks. Some even did not spoke Turkish. The most typical example of this feature was the Muslim Cretans who were hellenophones. Actually, the criteria for the exchange were the religion. Elefterios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who were the architects of the exchange of populations first contemplated the operation on the basis of language but dropped the idea. Thus, Karamanlides who lived in Karaman region in the centre of Anatolia who were turkified Anatolian Roum/Greeks and Orthodox by religion but Turkish speakers had to leave for Greece without being able to speak a word of Greek. The same feature but on the opposite direction happened to Cretan Muslims who were hellenophones but had to depart during the exchange. Even the Islamic reference as the sole cement of the nation is not free of problems as it contains a variety of sects which are not necessarily in peace - 92 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State among themselves. Alevis who are second biggest group after Sunnis are not even considered as belonging to the Islamic community and are labelled as heretics by the vox populi. From the historical aspect, the recent imperial and cosmopolitan past is burdened to the maximum, thus making the „common past‟ inadequate for assuming the function of basic reference for the nation. The tragic consequences of the responses shown to other national claims, in particular to Armenian and Roum / Greek claims were severe enough to discard the common past. Armen- ian massacres wiped out the entire Armenian populations of Anatolia and well orchestrated terror campaigns and pogroms chased Roum / Greek populations and ethnically cleansed western Anatolia even before the population exchange. A comparison between the population figures gives the extent of the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the period corresponding to the nation building. Hence in 1910, right before the Balkan wars and the WWI, the population of the Ottoman Empire was at 27 million of which % 40 were non-Muslims, in Turkey of 1923 the population was at 13 million of which a mere % 2 of non- Muslims. Finally regarding the common political past, opportunities were no better to build togetherness upon. Indeed through their anti-imperial stance the Republi- cans accuse the imperial policies to have precipitated not only the end of the state, imperilled its very existence but almost annihilated the Turkish component. History is therefore a bad memory, unsuitable to build the nation upon. These insurmountable difficulties could have drawn the Republican elite into a negative, exclusive, and aggressive nationalistic avatar that could well lay the groundwork for the national-socialist monster to which the German model gave birth. And indeed, there were some attempts in this direction. The so-called “Sun Language Theory”, the artificial bond established with the pre-Hellenic Anatolian heritage by sidestepping ancient Greece, a brand new History that is tantamount to a mythology, and a string of aphorisms uttered by top rulers for the purpose of instilling confidence in one‟s nation and identity… These are all signs that efforts had been made especially during World War II to have this exclusive nation model adopted. But ultimately, it did not turn out to be the path that was chosen. The reason it did not, is the almost physical impossibility of bringing together such a rich mosaic under a brand new national identity by excluding so many different faiths, languages, cultures, and customs other than those of the Turks. Thus adopting the model of nation française instead of the Deutche Volk seemed suitable to solve the quandary. But there again difficulties become apparent as that nation gets more tangible.

OBJECTIVE LIMITS OF A NEW AND HOMOGENEOUS NATION The national entity under creation is supposed to be new, elective and legal, i.e. based on citizenship. It has to embrace, integrate and in fact assimilate. As for

- 93 - From Diversity To Pluralism the existing cultural and ethnic variety among the Muslim masses it has to over- look those differences. In practice, for those Muslims who arrived recently in Anatolia, voluntary assimilation made things easier, as well as for Arabs and some other minorities, but not for Kurds. Kurds could make part of the nation as Muslims but definitely not as Kurds. Islam on the other hand, indirectly assumed and understood as the single common denominator among the participants of the new nation not only excludes the non-Muslim groups but also clashes with the imposed principle of secularism, in a totally schizophrenic manner from the very beginning. Al- though the cement holding the Turkish nation together is Islam, politically it cannot serve as the cultural reference and basis of the identity of the fledgling nation. Thus right from the beginning the non-Muslims become the non-nationals. In Turkey, popular idiom identifies them as Christians, non-Muslims, „gavour‟ but never Turks as they are not Muslims. Similarly Turks automatically mean Muslims. Paradoxically enough for ordinary secularist Turks as much as for their devout Muslim fellows, missionary activities are dangerous…for the future of the nation. Ceteris paribus, if Kurds were to convert to Christianity that might mean the end of the nation. As for devout masses who actually are the very object of the new nation, their religious culture, behaviour or choices although fundamental for national togetherness, are declared incompatible with the secular nature of the new nation. In that sense in Republican Turkey the religion was nationalized by all means. Administratively, like ideologically. CHALLENGES AHEAD How to proceed to recover from this schizophrenia, to shake off these dilemmas and become modern? Present day‟s Turks need to realize why the several times millennial Armenian existence has been annihilated in few decades, learn who the Alevis and Bektashis are, find out about the Muslim- Orthodox exchange between Greece and Turkey, acknowledge the existence of Arabs, Kurds and others who are non-Turkish Muslims, and of course accede to the presence of the Sunnite Muslim majority in the public sphere. In other words, a nationwide reconciliation. Remembering the differences, learning the history and comparing conflicting memories do not mean „scratching the wounds‟ and having the ethnic/exclusivist/egocentric/nationalistic demands rise from the grave. Re-read- ing history, mutually opening up the memories to each other, means acknowledging the sufferings that different religious, ethnic, and linguistic entities did not mind inflicting upon one another – in other words, „empathy‟. The foundations of a brand new approach to nation and patriotism may be laid by abating the excessive egocentricity of the historical nation model

- 94 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State through questioning itself, but without going back to the legalistic but amnesiac nation model which refuses to face history. One way to surmount the difficulty lies within the framework of the Euro- pean Union which is irresistibly marching towards a new, modern, universal, citizenship based, elective, history-friendly, cosmopolitan structure where the differences the nation could not assimilate can still express themselves. Just as in the Ottoman era, when – with all due reservations – different identities were recognized and protected. Imperial cosmopolitanism and religious choices as richnesses should be ac- commodated in this new and confident nation. If not, they will continue to haunt and make periodic comebacks every time they are chased out to become chronic illnesses at the end.

Dr Giusep Nay (Valbella / Switzerland)

CONCEPTS OF BELONGING: A SWISS PERSPECTIVE

With its four national languages and cultures, Switzerland is an essentially multicultural state, an attribute it shares with many others. There are two things which make Switzerland different, however: first, the view that it has, and has always had, of its role as a Confederation, and, second, the factors which hold the country together.

A STATE BUILT FROM THE BOTTOM UP The first element exemplifying Switzerland‟s characteristic concept of belonging together is the way in which the country is constructed from the bottom to the top, with its municipalities and cantons as the foundations on which its national structure as a Confederation rests. To this day, Switzerland has never had a monarchy nor has it been subject to any strong centralised authority. Napoleon attempted to divide Switzerland up according to his own model and to have the country centrally governed, but he quickly realised that this approach was impracticable and that the Swiss had to be allowed to maintain the federalist structures which they had developed over time. These structures are exemplified in the way in which, to this day, the cantons and municipalities maintain authority over such matters as education or the state‟s relationship with religious communities. Switzerland‟s government and parliament must always pay great heed to the areas of authority maintained by the cantons, while the cantons must do the same with regard to their municipalities. In fact, the cantons are autonomous in all matters in which Switzerland‟s Federal constitution does not specifically vest authority in the Confederation.

- 95 - From Diversity To Pluralism The nature of Switzerland‟s state structures is relevant to our meeting today only in as far as it affects Swiss citizens‟ feeling of belonging together. One aspect which is of particular pertinence here are the rules governing citizenship. To this day, no one becomes a Swiss citizen directly. People are either born as, or must become, citizens of a municipality. For those who are not born citizens, some municipalities still hold democratic votes on who may and may not acquire municipal citizenship. Only when a municipality has approved an application for municipal citizenship does the applicant acquire cantonal and then Swiss citizenship. These last two steps are more formal and administrative in nature. General awareness and appreciation of this distinct process is on the wane. This is mainly the result of internal migration within Switzerland‟s borders – which has resulted in fewer and fewer Swiss citizens living in their municipality of origin – and partly also as a result of immigration from abroad. Besides the procedures governing citizenship, an even more important factor contributing to Swiss citizens‟ sense of belonging is probably the direct democratic decision-making rights which all Swiss citizens living in a municipality enjoy. Citizens who still have extensive rights to vote democratically on matters in their municipality which affect them directly feel much more a part of their community and, through that community, also feel closer ties to their canton and their country than is the case for citizens of a unitary state with a centralised government. It can certainly be said that the way in which the Swiss state is constructed from bottom to top makes the relationship between its citizens and the state one of its special and distinguishing characteristics.

A NATION FORGED BY THE WILL OF ITS PEOPLE The Swiss Confederation evolved as a result of a web of treaties between various sovereign districts, beginning with the original cantons of Central Switzer- land, which were then joined by those of Zurich, Bern and Lucerne. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, as a result of pressure from Napoleon, other areas then joined. These included the former vassal districts in the French- speaking Western part of Switzerland and the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino, along with the Grisons and its Raetoromantsch-speaking area. These changes were formalised by Switzerland‟s European neighbours at the Congress of Vi- enna in 1815, thus creating what was initially a fairly loose association of states within Switzerland‟s current borders. The subsequent enactment of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1848 then marked the declaration by Switzerland‟s citizens of their desire to create a Federal state with four languages and four cultures. Unlike Germany or France, for example, it was thus not a common language and culture which resulted in the creation of one state and one nation. Switzerland is therefore, if you will, a nation state made up of four peoples or ethnicities with a common will to create one nation. It is thus not a nation which has been forged by one common language and culture, but is instead a

- 96 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State nation formed by the constantly re-iterated will of its people for the historic ties between their four languages and cultures to continue to unite them. When considering this historical evolution, it is important to emphasise that the political boundaries between municipalities and cantons are not always congruent with Switzerland‟s linguistic and cultural contours. While it is true that the majority of the cantons are German-speaking only, that four cantons are French-speaking only and that one speaks only Italian, there are also three cantons where both French and German are spoken and the canton of the Grisons is trilingual, with German, Raetoromantsch and Italian all being spoken there. Within these multi-lingual cantons there are also municipalities where two and sometimes three languages are spoken. My reason for explaining this is to illustrate that the political constituency to which individual citizens belong is not determined by their language or culture. Nor does Switzerland exclude any of its minorities, acknowledging instead German, French, Italian and Rätoromantsch, a language now spoken by fewer than 100,000 people and which also happens to be my mother tongue. This is the only way for people with four distinct languages and cultures to form one strong nation-state. It is thanks to the way in which it has evolved historically – which I have sketched out only in summary detail - that Switzerland has been able to achieve this. Where Switzerland has, and continues to experience difficulties, is in areas where linguistic and cultural affinities are dominant, and where a sense of belonging together politically has relatively shallow historical roots, as is the case in the Jura.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AS CORPORATIONS UNDER PUBLIC LAW Switzerland‟s lack of uniformity is not limited to its languages and its cultures. Since the Reformation, Christians of both the Protestant and Catholic churches have lived here. Once again, while the majority of cantons were of one religion only, ever since the Reformation there have been several cantons and municipalities in which both churches have existed. Over time, all cantons of have since become more or less multi-religious. Jewish religious communities are also very well integrated and are recognised under public law, as are their Christian counterparts. The Muslim community constitutes a religious minority which has grown rapidly in the last two decades. While most Muslims are already well integrated in Switzerland, they are still viewed with considerable scepticism and indeed rejection by some right-wing, conservative groups. The extent of this rejection among the wider population will be put to the test in a referendum to be held in two weeks‟ time. This will vote on a people‟s initiative put forward by a right-wing, conservative political party, which, regrettably, has canvassed for it in an unspeakably provocative manner. Current opinion polls indicate that the proposal – which seeks to ban the building of mosques - will be rejected. The

- 97 - From Diversity To Pluralism Federal Council and the opponents of this initiative are hoping that it will be rejected as decisively as possible and are actively promoting this outcome. But, to return to today‟s subject, the Swiss cantons - with the exception of Geneva and Neuchâtel, both of which have separated church and state by legis- lating that their religious communities are governed by private law – have created a very particular kind of relationship between the state and the religious communities. This is largely the result of Switzerland‟s bottom-to-top Federal structure which I mentioned earlier. As already stated, it is the individual cantons, and not the Confederation, who have always had authority over the relationship between church and state and that remains the case to this day. At the municipal level, and at the cantonal level in those cantons with one single church, unity between church and state existed for many years in as far as the state also played a part in determining church matters, particularly church finances. In cantons with more than one church, arrangements of this kind were not possible. In the early days, these cantons resolved this by splitting their parliaments into a Protestant and a Catholic part, each of which then administered its respective church in the canton concerned. Since Switzerland‟s Federal constitution guarantees religious freedom, the cantons have since found themselves obliged to enact an ever greater separation between the two spheres of church and state. A solution was found by enabling the churches to establish themselves as public law corporations at both municipal and cantonal level and giving them the right to levy tax from their religious communities and to administer ecclesiastical matters in them. These municipal parishes and cantonal churches, both Protestant and Catholic, are corporations recognised in public law in the constitutions of their cantons, and they now administer themselves with a large degree of autonomy. However, in order to be entitled to levy church taxes they must have democratic legal organisational structures. The law also permits religious communities to be established without placing any requirements on them other than that they be of public benefit. These communities are then granted certain more limited rights, such as the right to provide religious instruction in state schools and to provide religious services for people of their faith in hospitals and in prisons. In several cantons, Jewish religious communities enjoy the same status as Christian churches. Given the guarantee of religious freedom and legal equality between religions which current legislation provides, this same status will be accorded and, indeed, will have to be accorded to Islamic religious communities, if they organise themselves accordingly and wish to acquire this status. Discussions and initiatives to achieve this are currently under way. I should mention that those religious communities which – unlike the Prot- estant cantonal churches – find that a democratic legal organisational structure is not compatible with their sense of identity are in fact obliged – in order to enjoy the right of religious self-determination which is enshrined in the principle of religious freedom – to create dual structures, encompassing not only a

- 98 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State structure compatible with their sense of religious community, but also, alongside it, a corporation organised under public law principles. In Switzerland, this applies to the Roman Catholic Church. Alongside its Catholic ecclesiastical structure, with its hierarchical organisation under its own church law and its bishoprics and parishes, there are also Catholic municipal parishes and cantonal churches which are organised as corporations under public law. This is another example of a particularly Swiss characteristic, which differs from the situation in Germany, where the Roman Catholic Church itself is recognised as a corporation under public law – albeit as one which is sui generis, i.e. of its own particular nature. This dualism makes it possible – also to other religious communities than the Catholic Church – to establish an organisational structure, based on public law principles, to handle its external, financial or, if you will, worldly affairs, and for this structure to co-exist with a hierarchy and organisation based on its religious principles. Because many religious communities do not recognise democratic and public law legal concepts, they cannot themselves acquire the recognition as corporations under public law which would give them the right to levy taxes and thus be granted a degree of state authority. The dualistic system I have just described makes it possible to overcome this obstacle, and this is indeed its greatest advantage. There must, however, be a clear link between a religious community‟s organisation as a public law corporation and its internal religious structure, and this must ensure that the former serves the interests of the latter. This does admittedly give rise to some demarcation issues, but the mutual trust which currently exists makes it possible to overcome these. It can also not be denied that the means of putting this approach into practice are challenging and not always easy to understand. I must admit that my somewhat cursory explanations are probably also not all that easy to understand for those who have never been confronted with them before. I apologise for this. The essential point I want to make is this: belonging to Switzerland as a nation state does not in any way depend on the institutional separation between the organisation of the state and the organisation of its religious communities, nor does it citizens‟ sense of belonging to Switzerland in any depend on whether they are members of one religious community or another, or indeed of no religious community at all. And yet despite this, everyone who has a faith, and whose religious community is recognised as a corporation under public law, can feel a particular bond – through their religion and through the public law structures of their church or other religious community in their municipality or canton – with Switzerland as a nation state.

STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES As a result of the ever greater significance of fundamental individual and human rights, our Western philosophical values require a liberal democratic state

- 99 - From Diversity To Pluralism to grant civil society the right to determine and informally to regulate all matters which it is in that society‟s power to do. That is why many organisations and institutions in Switzerland, most of which are private, are working to maintain language and culture. These organisations do, however, also receive financial support from the state and some of them have a semi-official status. Religious freedom, which is a fundamental human right, requires the state to see itself and to behave in a religiously neutral manner. This does not, however, mean that religion should be entirely assigned to the private sphere. That would be a negative form of neutrality, of the kind practised in the United States of America or in France. Indeed it is precisely the examples of those two countries which demonstrate that it is now virtually impossible for a state to be entirely secular. France, for example, despite its secular status, is, as far as I am aware, the first Western country in which a central Muslim council was established as a body to engage in dialogue with the state. The structures which Switzerland and other Western states have established by recognising religious communities as public law entities or their equivalent represents positive neutrality. The essential justification for this approach can be found in a statement made by Ernst-Wilhelm Böckenförde, the celebrated German expert in state law who also sat as a judge in Germany‟s Federal Con- stitutional Court. As he put it, “A liberal democratic state depends on the existence of conditions which it cannot itself guarantee without encroaching on its own liberalism.” The state depends on values which religious communities and other forces in civil society propagate and promote. But churches and other religious communities also depend on conditions which they themselves cannot guarantee, specifically and in particular the substantial areas of freedom which the state accords them and secures for them as a result of the guarantee of religious freedom for all citizens and of the right to self determination granted to all religious communities.

Dr Milan Lyčka (Praha / Czech Republic) THE MINORITY – MAJORITY PROBLEM RECONSIDERED

REDUCED VIEW: A “SOCIAL” PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION When considering the problems of minority vis-à-vis majority, we can and do tend to look at various different partial perspectives: legal, psychological, socio- logical, economic, etc. We usually take this procedure for granted, ignoring the broader context, disregarding the presuppositions and preconditions of each perspective. The outcomes of such analyses, that is, the “legal” measures taken

- 100 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State to solve certain social problems, then reflect the starting positions: they are tendentious, rather protective than creative. We care about the social status of the minorities. We fight for their rights (sometimes forgetting about their duties). We start campaigns for better job opportunities (positive discrimination) and for equality of educational opportunities, irrespective of cultural background, as well as for proportionately equal female representation in politics and other spheres. We very often forget, however, that the social model we are applying is itself a product of a very specific historical development which, through fa- vourable conditions, has been generalized and has become in a way the accepted social standard for planetary civilization, the “global village”. We thus use such terms as democracy, human rights and sexual equality indiscriminately, trying to avoid any possible offence by using “politically correct” language, something which in itself can sometimes have absurd consequences.

“DEFINITION” OF A MINORITY To be able to see the problems of minorities in a broader context, be they of a social, racial, cultural, religious, or of any other nature, we have to turn to the prerequisites of the definition of a “minority”. Seen purely in mathematical terms, a minority means a group of people which is smaller in number than that of another group of people sharing the same geographical, cultural, political or other space. This “definition” does not say anything about the nature of the people involved, or about the mutual relations of such groups in the given context. It says nothing about exploitation, tolerance, rights and duties, etc. How- ever, it gives us a neutral general context, that is, a society considered as being a group of abstract, countable individuals. Throughout history, we can see an almost endless series of examples in which being a greater number of people also meant holding greater power, that is, power over those who were outnumbered. The mathematical equation in this case is very simple. We can also find examples of the opposite, however, where the outnumbered group has become the more powerful, either in a military or in an economic sense. In this case, if we want to be able to explain this “anomaly”, we have to take into consideration other aspects than purely mathematical factors. Even in the former case, the situation is usually not that simple. In certain areas of life, a minority might have some advantages in society which are not directly accessible to the majority; these can then become the subject of a political “bargain”, leading to changes in the original political pattern. What is common to all these models, however, is the fact that we start with the “counting” of individuals.

“EUROPEAN” MODEL This procedure is not as self-evident as it might appear. It is in fact an approach based on the ideas of the European Enlightenment. In the 17th and 18th centuries, a doctrine came into being in Europe which promoted the ultimate value of the human individual. A concept of society then followed, being defined as a

- 101 - From Diversity To Pluralism collection of otherwise separate human beings who have voluntarily agreed to certain limitations of their natural individual rights, in exchange for security and prosperity (contrat social). In some societies, however, the starting point is not the individual but a collective group, be it a family, a clan, a tribe, a community or a nation. In the “European” model, the political structure primarily ema- nates, at least in theory, from the interplay of individual interests. In the second example, however, the role and worth of an individual stems from the social “weight” of the group to which he or she belongs. In these respective cases, we can see two different views of the minority. In the former, a minority is determined by the specific interests of individuals, who organize themselves into groups of their own free will; in the latter by the primordial sense of belonging of individuals to a certain existential entity.

HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN PATTERN The “enlightened” ideas of the value of an individual were born out of a crisis in European society. On the one hand, there was a new economic model, characterized by the growing productivity of work and the intensification of human effort. Production expanded into new spheres of human life, and thus there was a crossing of traditional geographical, political and social borders. On the other hand, there was the traditional social structure, with all its provincial and parochial features. This situation, highlighted by prominent European intellectuals and philosophers of the time, called for a solution, and eventually yielded a completely new theoretical concept of human history, namely the re-evaluation of the role of an individual human being in the historical process, together with a significant change in the view of the essence and meaning of human society. These theoretical maxims were subsequently translated into the political programmes of the representatives of the different social strata and were eventually materialized, at least in principle, by the French Revolution. Due to the expansion of the economically and militarily superior European civilization, this model spread out into the farthest corners of the Earth and heavily influenced its political future. The presence of Europeans in almost all parts of the world began to be perceived as “natural”, and the political system which they brought with them, with all its variants and modifications, was seen as being the only possible solution. The turmoil of the 20th century substantially changed this overall picture, but the impact of European ideas, both in a positive and in a negative sense, has remained discernible in all areas of human life, throughout the entire world.

THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY Within this context, we can now discuss the problems of minorities. As we have seen, the starting point of the theoretical European concept is the individual, his or her rights of liberty, equality, personal integrity and social welfare. The absolute value of a person is not to be compromised; every human life is unique, indispensable. In political terms, this concept is manifest in the status

- 102 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State of the individual as a citizen. Legally, every member of society, that is every citizen, enjoys the same rights (and duties), with some reservations. In other words, every actual human being becomes, for legal purposes, an abstract unit - a monad - regardless of his or her social status, natural disposition or cultural background. Individual differences become, in this respect, purely secondary. The fundamental nature of the abstract individual is, on the other hand, determined by the general concept of society, that is, the idea that all people were originally independent, “free”, isolated from each other, and only came together in order to enhance their power and secure their survival. By giving up part of their freedom in exchange for the secured continuation of life, they created a community based on mutual agreement. So, we could say that the individual has at least a theoretical right to break the covenant, to get out of the vehicle of society and to retire to his/her original state of solitude.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION WITHIN CIVIL SOCIETY Although hard to imagine in practical terms, this radical feature of an individual has found its way into a more moderate concept, that of personal freedom of choice. The above-mentioned secondary traits, of cultural self-identification, religious affiliation and so on, have become a matter of personal choice, of individual taste. There is no longer a “natural”, pre-determined association with a certain social group or community. People can change their “club colours” as they wish, under the condition that the basic rights of other individuals are not endangered. Any such grouping of individuals, however, is only possible if it does not impair the rights of individuals not belonging to this unit. It is obvious that a balance between different interests must be found, in order to secure the functioning of society as a whole. On the one hand, this state of permanent tension within society might give it a welcome flexibility and creativity. On the other, it could lead to an impasse, freezing any movement within the community, with all the negative consequences which would follow. History has taught us that both scenarios are possible, although not in their pure forms. Creative periods are often followed often by stagnation, which in turn might be resolved by various kinds of revolution. Thus, the development of the European social model is far from being a predictable and smooth process, as the history of the 20th century has shown.1

LEGAL STATUS OF SOCIAL GROUPS IN CIVIL SOCIETY Under “normal” conditions, the status of a “fan club” is fixed by the laws and general rules of the society in question. This presupposes the fundamental law, that of the origins and functioning of society, based on the social contract. This means that theoretically there is social equality among the constituent partial “societies”, the political parties, sports teams, religious communities, and so on.

1 WWI meant, among other things, the breakdown of “historical optimism”. - 103 - From Diversity To Pluralism This also means that the respective groups cannot claim special rights which would go beyond what has been agreed upon by general consent. A religious community, with its potentially absolute requirements of total submission to heteronomous religious traditions, might be in conflict with the rules of the community as a whole if it tries to apply its specific demands beyond its own limits, which is very often the case. In a sense, the general laws of society distinguish between the private sphere, the peculiarities of which are to be honoured in many respects, and the public sphere, where general legislation is to be followed unconditionally. In their attempt to mould a comprehensive pattern of life, religious communities are very often pushed into a schizophrenic situation in which they, too, have to differentiate between the public “external” life and the quasi-private “internal” life within the community. In each sphere a different set of religious laws is applicable. Moreover, a new kind of legal activity must be entered into in order to be able to mediate between the divergent law systems; to accommodate the demands of society in general, yet without com- promising the principles of one‟s own religion. This does not mean that the respective religions must be at odds with the ideals of society as a whole, or of other religious groups. However, the all-embracing requirements of religious maxims, as well as the unrestricted loyalty shown to them, have the potential to be in a state of permanent tension with the rules of “the others”.

IDEAL CONCEPT VERSUS REALITY The image just depicted is purely an ideal. As mentioned above, this theoretical concept is the outcome of certain specific historical developments. The idea of a society with absolutely neutral values has never materialized. On the contrary, the ideal arose out of a situation in which Christianity was dominant, and this is, therefore, the situation which has, from the beginning, been identified with the general ideal. The concept of a general or even secular society developed from a somewhat idealized form of Christian society. The position of non-Christian entities within the predominantly Christian societies was also determined in this way. During the Enlightenment, the ancient concept, according to which religious minorities had been subordinated to the dominating power – a situation covering a whole range of attitudes, from persecution to co-operation – was abandoned in favour of formal equality, “multi-religionism” and tolerance. Re- gardless of this shift in the perception of “the other”, however, the main emphasis was placed on individual rights, at the expense of collective rights which had in the past been granted to non-Christian religious groups in a different scope and form. Paradoxically, this development eventually worked against its Christian intellectual initiators, who had to concede Christian exclusivity to their social ideal, at least in political terms. This somewhat ambivalent situation, in which Christianity represents just one of a number of religious groups, has lasted until today. To be sure, on account of to its long tradition and, in some cases even today, its superiority in terms of sheer number in Europe, Christian-

- 104 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State ity in its various denominational forms plays a much more important role than it theoretically should, according to its legal status. In principle, however, the scope of influence of the Christian church on matters political is limited.

WEAKNESSES OF THE EUROPEAN PATTERN This overall situation has been changing recently; the historical pendulum has started to swing back – from an exaggerated openness for external incentives to the resurrection of traditional life patterns, from “Europeanizing” globalization to a Western provincialism. This process has been backed, from outside, by the growing political role played by the new economic giants of non-European origin. It has been further encouraged by the influx of new immigrants from unstable regions in the world and by the infusion of “non-European” values into the traditional European worldview. These values are very often identified with extremist doctrines, which are by their nature hostile towards Europe and its heritage. From within, the movement has been driven by a certain crisis of self-identification, a loss of perspective, and the general fatigue of an “out- worn” civilization. In order to be able to understand what is going on here, we need to look back to the precursors of the process, which have led to the current crisis. On the theoretical side, we also need to take another look at the philosophical foundations of the “enlightened” political and social model, particularly in the light of new discoveries in such disciplines as biology, medicine and psychology, and of new theories created on the basis of these discoveries.

THE BIRTH OF THE UNIVERSAL HUMAN BEING The first observation to be made here is one concerning the process of the creation of a universal human being. Hand-in-hand with the concept of the individual as a unique, irreplaceable entity, endowed with an absolute worth, goes the idea of a neutral, universal environment in which the respective individuals live and move about. The modern epistemological concept was construed from this general prerequisite. The active, knowing subjects, human individuals, meet one another within a homogeneous environment which, by its very nature, is passive, only the object of the process of their getting to know one another. This is the fundamental basis of the subject-object epistemological concept. Combined with the theory of the basic equality of all human beings, the way people approach reality, and also one another, must be the same for all individuals. All people perceive the world in which they live in the same manner; on the one hand, because the sensuous world has the quality of stability and, on the other, because all people have the same capacities of perception, and not only of perception but also of reasoning, this being the consequence of the radical concept of equality. The most prominent philosopher of this epistemological concept is Immanuel Kant. He believed that people not only have the same perception through their senses, due to their shared “physiological” structure, but that they also have an identical rational apparatus, that is, a priori. The basic worldview must then be the

- 105 - From Diversity To Pluralism same for all human beings throughout the world, with modifications caused by the irregular distribution of world resources, on the one hand, and by the uneven actualization of individual rational potential, on the other. Theoretically, however, people could all have the same world concept and, if this idea were put into practice, all people could also fully recognize the sense of their life, the meaning of being with “the other”. In the eyes of the “enlightened” thinkers and their modern heirs, this could be achieved through a process of education in the basic principles of humanity. According to the promoters of this view, the lack of such an education is the root of all evil in the world. We have, however, a lot of evidence to show that it does not work that simply.

THE MYSTERY OF THE ORIGINS OF SOCIETY Another theoretical problem linked with this concept of the monadic existence of a universal human being is that of the origins of society. The “social contract” theory presupposes a Robinson Crusoe situation as the starting point, with individuals who then have no problems joining together in a community based on shared interests. If we abandon this somewhat naïve idea, however, and begin to reflect more theoretically, we very soon arrive at the likelihood that there will be fundamental problems between the originally separated and isolated entities, as regards communication and co-operation. With the exclusion of the concept of a “prearranged harmony”, we have as yet not found a key to this mystery.

THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF ORIGINS In order to find a solution to this theoretical problem, with its subsequent possible practical impacts, we need to change the original scenario. Supposing we start not with individuals, but with a community. The universality of humankind is to be understood from above, not from below. The whole of human existence should be perceived as being universal, as human as such. If we go a little deeper below the surface, however, we find a whole scale of differentiations, which make humankind a very complicated and complex structure, not only on the social level but also on the epistemological level. We come across not only a collection of very different social orders, but in fact a whole line of different world concepts. These are not due to there being various levels of one epistemological process, as the evolutionary view might suggest, but are based on the different experiences of the respective communities. An individual‟s perception of the world is derived from the specific perception of the community to which he or she belongs. The perspective on which individuals base their life and in which they place their destiny is fully conditioned by the worldview of their community. It is not as in the modern corporate and social class systems which are, in fact, based on the indi- vidualistic concept, whereby the individual is subsequently suppressed, then being subordinated to the central idea, be it a state, nation, working class or any other.2

2 The most notable examples of such social structures are the National Socialist and communist regimes of the 20th century. - 106 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State In this case the individuals essentially belong to their clan, tribe, nation etc., and their perception of life is essentially identical to that of their specific group. This feature can be observed on a social level, where we can detect different levels of solidarity among those belonging to the same entity, which serves towards its own self-substantiation and survival. It can, however, also be recognized on a more theoretical level, that of the worldview, world perspective. This is possible through an analysis of the language, myths, “philosophy”, religion, and other forms of cultural and spiritual expression of the respective communities. By doing this, we can arrive at a variety of world concepts which are not reducible to one universal basis, but which must each be taken seriously in their essential originality and disparateness.

RADICAL CHANGE OF PERSPECTIVE True, it is much easier to begin with one universal principle, in our case with the abstract “humanity” of humankind. It clearly fits in with the tendency of the human spirit to find the lowest possible number of fundamentals of any given thing, and then to attempt to get an understanding of the whole structure from these fundamentals, using a strictly defined procedure. This is the way of modern science. Starting from a number of basically incompatible, complex entities, on the other hand, seems to contradict this “natural” inclination. To the modern, “globalized” human, it might appear even impossible. This “per- verse” attitude, however, may bring with it certain advantages. If we begin with the concept of an individual, universal human being, we face the problem of the “construction” of an abstract society, with all its substructures, including majorities and minorities. We have to define their mutual relations, with regard to the functioning of the abstract whole, which may lead to a kind of social schizophrenia (public versus private, individual versus collective, etc.), all the time threatening to bring the whole set-up to a collapse. If, on the other hand, we take seriously the existential uniqueness of the primordial social entities and the absolute worth of those belonging to them, we have to “construct” mutual relations between such entities with regard to their specific qualities, both internal and external, that is, oriented inwards and outwards. This means that there cannot be a definite set of abstract rules and principles determining all possible social, international, inter-religious and other relations; each and every specific situation demands a specific, unique attitude. This, of course, would very much complicate any negotiations; the “universal” negotiating rules would no longer apply. However, the problem of minorities vis-à-vis majorities would be seen in a new dimension, the status of the respective groups not being measured according to their political or economic power (the “number” of members), or any other social function, but according to their existential weight, their metaphysi- cal worth.

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CONCLUSION However idealistic, even naïve, this stance might seem, it is worth consideration. It may be understood as an incentive or an invitation towards deeper reflection on certain specific problems of the modern world, which have been caused by the great variety of human cultures and religions. It is indisputable that, in many cases, both in domestic and international politics, the traditional recipes are not working. Sometimes it is necessary to take a radically different perspective. The view proposed above is only an outline. It calls for more sophisticated analyses, both on the theoretical, as well as on the practical level. As regards the former, we need to reconsider the entire Western social concept in the light of philosophical theories such as, for example, that of epistemological pluralism. With reference to the latter, thorough analyses would be needed of the mutual influence of radically different civilizations, and of the possibility of the introduction of “foreign” elements into existing cultural patterns. It would at least be worth a try.

Dr Carsten Wieland (Frankfurt am Main / Germany) ORIGIO OR RATIO? THE ETHNICIZATION OF POLITICS AND THE BANKRUPTCY OF HUMANISM

A man like you does not stay where the accident of birth has thrown him; or if he stays, he stays out of insight, reasons, choice of the better. (Sultan Salahaddin to Nathan1)

In the 18th century the German writer Gotthold Ephraim Lessing pledged to consider birth as an accident, to qualify one‟s birth and to put it into perspective. It didn‟t matter where the accident of birth had thrown people. According to him everybody could change because of his or her own will and rationality. What mattered was tolerance as a common ground of humanity. Everybody was free to go and leave – away from the place where birth had thrown him to towards a different destination. Maybe he or she may come back one day, but then because of insight, not because of any “natural law”. Maybe he or she will never return to the starting point but decide to take another place, just because of insight and will of one‟s own. This starting point serves as a contrast in the discussion about ethnicity and nationalism, because today not many people can opt out of their roles, can

1 GOTTHOLD EPHRAIM LESSING: Nathan der Weise, Stuttgart 1987 (orig.1779). - 108 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State qualify their birth, and put their origin into perspective. They are pinned down to a place, a group and thus to a certain social and political role. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many people had hopes of a new world of global citizenship, and of widening horizons. But contrary of many expectations, so-called ethnic conflicts flamed up in Europe and destroyed hopes of a more peaceful future based on universal values and ideas, as some scholars had pointed out at that time. The principle of origin had again become more and more important – and it gained political relevance. The principle of origin has turned into a political resource. It was a matter of life or death, if one was born a Muslim, an Orthodox or a Catholic in Bosnia in the 1990s, if someone was a Hutu or Tutsi in Rwanda. The same had already happened during the separation of colonial India in the 1940s where neighbours were suddenly divided into who was a Hindu and who was a Muslim. All this came back to the political scene with a big bang in the 1990s - 200 years after Nathan the Sage thought it to be evident that birth and origin were a coincidence of life. The “accident of birth” has become a political instrument whose subject and object is the individual. People are separated into groups apriori and irre- versibly without taking into account what they really think – independently of their external features like skin, language or customs.

FUZZY TERMS Origin – a supposed common origin – is the main ingredient of ethnicity. It forms the key of its concept, although historians, political scientists, anthro- pologists and ethnologists have not found a consensus in defining this term. And probably they never will.2 Without going too much into details here, it is important to note that in this sense, “nation” is the politicized form of “ethnicity”. The grist of nation, as it is mostly used today, has something to do with this “ethnic” origin. In the literature we cannot find a universal definition of nation either. But somehow it is a group of people who share some political ambition for a common cause – in clear demarcation to self-defined “others” – in form of a zero sum game in the fight about resources such as territory, power or people. It is a fight for exclusive political goals. As several authors have pointed out, nations consist to a great deal of emotions. This means we are dealing with a feeling of common descent. Not more but not less! This is enough to make ethnicity politically relevant. When a politicization of ethnic groups takes place, an ethnicization of politics can follow

2 More details on the discussion on ethnicity can be found in: CARSTEN WIELAND: Nationalstaat wider Willen: Die Politisierung von Ethnien und die Ethnisierung der Politik – Bosni- en, Indien, Pakistan, Frankfurt / New York 2000 ()Engl.: Nation-state by Accident: The Politicization of Ethnic Groups and the Ethnicization of Politics, Bosnia, India, Pakistan, New تسئس االتٌيبث و أتٌٌه السيبست, البىسٌت, الهٌد, :.Delhi: Manohar Publishing House, 2006; Arab .Damascus: Mada Publishing House, 2007 ,الدولت القىهيت خالفب إلزادتهب: ببكستبى - 109 - From Diversity To Pluralism swiftly and determine the paradigm in which domestic politics and even foreign policies are being shaped. Nobody asks those people who live together in a society what values they share, what legal principles they accept, as the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) defined his term of nation. In his idea, individuals associate themselves in a state by free will with a self-determined constitution and government.3 This played a role in the French Revolution. Therefore, the French definition of nation is based on the citoyen. A nation is formed in a state with existing borders because of the enlightened consciousness of people with common convictions. It is a community of choice and not of ascription. It is an ideal type in the Weberian sense, of course, but it helps us to define the fundamental values behind a political construction. When people speak of “nation” today, they mostly do not have the French model in mind. They think of a term of nation that is based on presumed descent, emotions and sometimes even the idea of a “blood community”. This idea is called the organic or German term of nation. So today, when the word nation is used, it is almost always used in the German, the organic sense, the ethno-nation with apriori assumptions. The other person is defined by origin, not by his rationality (origio instead of ratio). It doesn‟t matter what people think, what political, social, economic and ethical interests they have. What matters is where they come from. Nathan the Sage seems forgotten. Reframing it in the terms of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1855- 1936) this means that ethno-nationalists want to transform a society into a community. A purely “ideal, mechanical” link of otherwise separated people is sub- stituted by the bond of “real and organic life”, an apriorical “unity of will”. Tönnies describes the contrast between society and community as follows: “Society is the public, is the world. In the community of his own one is bound right from birth, with all weal and woe. One goes into society like into alien lands.” And in the society no activities take place, “which can be traced from a unity that exists a priori and necessarily”.4 There is, of course, a problem of tension between multiplicity and unity in every state, and there are different forms to manage it. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (*1929), for example, doesn‟t conjure any primordial factors in order to define loyalty to the state. In his view, loyalty to the modern

3 „Die erstlich nach Prinzipien der Freiheit der Glieder einer Gesellschaft (als Men- schen), zweitens nach Grundsätzen der Abhängigkeit aller von einer einzigen gemeinsa- men Gesetzgebung (als Untertanen) und drittens nach dem Gesetz der Gleichheit dersel- ben (als Staatsbürger) gestiftete Verfassung – die einzige, welche aus der Idee des ur- sprünglichen Vertrags hervorgeht, auf der alle rechtliche Gesetzgebung eines Volkes gegründet sein muss – ist die republikanische.“ (IMMANUEL KANT: Zum ewigen Frieden (1795), Stuttgart 1984, pp. 10-11 (original italics). 4 FERDINAND TÖNNIES: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1972 (acc. to edn. 1935) [1887] (Community and Association, London, 1955), pp. 3, 40 [1887] (orig. italics; own translation). - 110 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State nation state comes and should come from the performance of a state. He links confession for a nation to the efficiency of the welfare state. This is the substi- tute for the emotional and ideological glue from the times of nationalism, as he terms it. Civil rights must pay off: “My suspicion is that a liberal political culture can hold together multi-cultural societies only if democratic citizenship pays in terms not only of liberal and political rights, but of social and cultural rights as well.”5 This means pointedly: If the nation can no longer “buy” the citizens, they turn their back on it.

A CIRCULAR DYNAMIC By contrast, the ethno-national concept is problematic in yet another aspect. When nations enter into this circular paradigm, the focus is on group rights, not on universal human rights anymore. The constitutions of the Balkan states mention principle nations and other groups, e.g. Macedonia is composed of Macedonians, but also Albanians, Bulgarians, etc. If a civil democratic state mentions equal rights to all its citizens, it evades the problem of having to mention every single group up to the tiniest minority - if the intention is to mention all of them at all and to respect all of them. If Israel intends to define itself as a “Jewish state”, it will enter into the same vicious circle of ideological classification and discrimination. There is a controversial debate among sociologists in Israel itself that dates back for many years as to whether Israel is a civil- democratic or an ethno-national state.6 Meanwhile, under Prime Minister Ben- yamin Netanyahu this paradigm has reached the political stage at the highest level and will continue to cause polarized debates and ideological discrimination if minority rights are not strengthened and respected at the same time. Ethno-nationalists presuppose that an ethnic community must have common political interests as well. This is an automatic assumption. Everything is clear from the beginning. No political decision-finding process is necessary. This is why, in this paradigm, it makes sense to live in a state of one‟s own and to form exclusive political institutions. Nationalisms (including the Arab and the Jewish versions) have both a content and a function. The function of Arab nationalism consisted of liberalization – anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and to some extent, political reforms. The content was and is clearly ethno-national. Arab nationalism, defined by the Arab language, is not a civic democratic nationalism of the French kind. However, the advantage of Arab nationalism is that it can integrate different religions, because language is the main contrasting feature and not religion. The first Arab nationalists in the modern sense were Christians of Lebanon, who received the ideas from Europe. Arab nationalism has the disadvantage though that it excludes other groups defined by language like Kurds and others. A po-

5 JÜRGEN HABERMAS: The European Nation-state: Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Souvereignty and Citizenship, in: GOPAL BALAKRISHNAN (ed.): Mapping the Nation, London / New York 1996, p. 290. 6 URI RAM: The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology, New York 1995. - 111 - From Diversity To Pluralism litical solution has to be found to come to grips with this innate problem of an ethno-nationalism such as Arabism and to avoid confrontations. The question is what has remained of the function, of the reform part of Arab nationalism and its movements. Or is it only the content, the “Arab” that has remained? Other cases of Risorgimento, of emancipating reform nationalism have also turned into a reactionary nationalism that is contracting itself and confronting others. If Arab nationalism today is seen as “Arab” only, then one has to ask what is behind it, what is still the function, what is left? The lack of social, political and economic reforms is a big problem in the region, the focus on primordial issues like religion and tradition as the solution for today‟s complex problems. If in Bosnia, India/Pakistan, Lebanon or Iraq: Religion has mostly been the key element of contrast against others, the key element to form an apriori group of – presumed - common interest up to the political level. But as history shows, religion alone has never been enough to mobilize people, and to mobilize them against each other. Neither have other ethnic features been strong enough to serve as a political mobilizer, such as language, customs, etc. What was needed to achieve a political mobilization around these elements were other factors that sharpened the contrast between religious groups. Very often religion is the centre around which further elements of contrast are being constructed. Let‟s call it the “ethnicentre” as the political epicentre of concussions. In the following, I will present some of these contrast boosting factors in the contexts of the politicization of ethnic groups and the ethnicization of politics in India/Pakistan in the 1940s and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. It shows how ethnicity as a factor that is interpreted and influences by other factors (dependent variable) turns into a factor that determines political outcomes by its own (independent variable).

CONTRAST BOOSTERS 1. History History and historiography are shaped by ethno-nationalists as a proof of a “common descent” and origin. The further one‟s own history reaches into the past, the best it serves to justify their present political purposes. History also serves to forge an emotional community. Therefore, a highly selective historiography is needed. Selective history becomes the “national history” in the end. In Bosnia, for example, the so-called Bogomil myth existed and was refreshed each time when the ethno-national debate turned violent. It is no coincidence that the Bogomil myth experienced a boost whenever the Zeitgeist suggested up- grading Bosnian Muslims (Bosnjaks) as an ethno-nation – against the ethno- national competition which viewed „the Muslims‟ as Serbs, Croats, or Turks. This is especially true during the Austro-Hungarian period of Bosnia-Herzegovina (from 1900 onwards) and later in Tito‟s Yugoslavia (from the 1960s onwards). In a nutshell, the myth holds that the whole of the Bosnian noble class (adherents to the Bogomil Church) converted to Islam all at once as a group after

- 112 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in 1463 and Herzegovina in 1482. Since the majority of the Bosnian population consisted of Bogomils as well, they were also converted en masse. So the idea behind is that Bosnian Muslims (Bosnjaks) are not Muslims only, but an ethnic group by their own, which includes many other features as well such as costumes, a common culture, class consciousness, and a common history. Historians have proved that this is a myth indeed, because conversions took place gradually and one by one, mostly because people were looking for more social and political opportunities which the Ottoman Empire granted to Muslims. There were no compulsory conversions either.7 In India, the Arian myth served a similar purpose. Some Hindu nationalists like to refer to a phenomenon around 1500 B.C.: An Indo-Germanic tribe named “Aryan” allegedly immigrated from central Asia to northern India (and another part to Europe). It defeated the high civilization of the Indus valley and formed the ruling class in the northern part of the sub-continent. Historic myths are supposed to endow a religious group with “ethnic” characteristics – in this case even racial-biological ones. Their argument was: The true Hindus are the Aryans, the highest “race” of India which had laid the foundations of Hindu religion and culture. The fairer-skinned, upper-caste Hindus are their direct descendants. This turns all others into strangers, especially the later “immigrants” like Muslims and Christians.8 Thus Hindus are supposed to be more than a religious group, but an ethnic group or even a “nation” as also ethno-nationalist Muslims saw themselves as in Mohammed Ali Jinnah‟s Two Nation Theory. The British as the colonial power in the end agreed to this Two Nation Theory and followed the logic that “the Muslims” in India needed a state of its own. 2. Territory The notion of territory is linked to a special (ethnic) group. Notorious is the construction of the idea of a “Holy Land” for one ethnic group in order to strengthen its identity in place. The battle of Kosovo 1389 was pushed to be a “battle of destiny” for the Serb nation (used frequently by Slobodan Milosevic 1989 and in the subsequent years), although Kosovo today is not even part of Serbia anymore. “Mother India” was symbolized by the milk of cow for Hin-

7 More details about the Bogomil discussion: NOEL MALCOLM: Bosnia: A Short History, London ²1996; SRECKO M. DZAJA: Die “Bosnische Kirche” und das Islamisierungs- problem Bosniens und der Herzegowina in den Forschungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich 1978 and SRECKO M. DZAJA: Konfessionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Herzegowina: Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463-1804, Munich 1984. 8 This argument has been particularly clearly disclosed and refuted by: ROMILA THAPAR: The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics, in: Social Scientist 24 (1996), pp. 1-3, and: Interpreting Early India, Oxford / New York / Delhi 1992, and ROMILA THAPAR: The Past and Prejudice, New Delhi, 1975; SATISH CHANDRA: Historiog- raphy, Religion and the State in Medieval India, New Delhi, 1996; CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT: The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925-1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilization, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 26ff. - 113 - From Diversity To Pluralism dus, whereas Muslims, it was said, belonged to the Arabic Peninsula. All of a sudden, a notion of territory was ascribed to each group. 3. Language The ethno-national logic goes as follows: The one, who is different and consequently thinks differently, must have a different language, too. If there is no language available, it has to be constructed. Language is a factor of solidarity. In each case in Bosnia and in India/Pakistan the different “ethnic groups” were not constructed on grammatically different languages (Abstandsprachen). But each group was constructed upon the same linguistic raw material from which different languages (Ausbausprachen) were engineered by political motiva- tion. In the Balkan case, the linguistic basis was Serbo-Croatian as the language of the South Slavs from which Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian was carved. In the Indian case it was Hindustani from which the languages Urdu (= Muslim = Pakistan) and Hindi (= Hindi = India) were developed in the ethno-national point of view. Persian words were adopted to make Urdu more “Muslim”, and Turkish words have entered the Bosnian language in order to strengthen the semantic differences between the ethno-nations. But still today, in Pakistan youngsters watch Bollywood movies from India without subtitles, because it is simply the same language, just with a different script. Only a tiny fraction of Pakistanis spoke Urdu when it became the official language after Pakistan‟s independence. The majority language was Bengali in East Pakistan, and it was, among other things, a fight of equal opportunities in the Urdu speaking government service of Pakistan that escalated into the separation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a new state in 1971. So when Pakistan (West- and East Pakistan) once existed, the “ethnicentre” suddenly turned from religion to language. Punjabi and many other regional languages have remained influential idioms in Pakistan thereafter, the same as in India. On the Balkans, the inconsequentialities have remained equally obvious. US Special Envoy to the Balkans in the 1990s, Richard Holbrooke, recalls a scene during the Dayton peace negotiations in 1995: There were six language channels for translation: English, French, Russian, Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian. In the latter three channels the voice of the same translator could be heard!9 4. Customs Customs are never as rigid as ethno-nationalists would like to have it; they cross-cut with different beliefs, social layers, etc. In India, for example, some Muslims, i.e. converted Hindus, still do not eat beef (apart from refraining from pork), pray at certain temples at important occasions or consult a sadhu who reads the stars before marriage. Also in Bos-

9 RICHARD HOLBROOKE: Meine Mission: Vom Krieg zum Frieden in Bosnien, Munich / Zürich 1998 (orig.: To End A War, New York 1998), p. 359. - 114 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State nia there existed and still exists a great tolerance of different customs or members from one religious group visit the celebrations of others. Customs gained political relevance in an ethno-national context only. It was important that customs became a visible sign of group cohesion and demarcation against the other so-called ethnic group. Particularly problematic are conversions when religion is the “ethnicentre” of conflict. Conversions are a problem for ethno-nationalists (as they are for religious fundamentalists) because these acts have political implications. Belief is no personal matter anymore but a political asset. Conversions reduce the number of personal resources that define the ethno-nation. Nobody is supposed to opt out from this constituency. In an ethno-national context, customs become more radical, are purified and (over)loaded with relevance ex-post. 5. Violence At the final stage of the process in which “ethnicity” becomes more relevant to the political process, violence may enter as a reinforcer of separation and often irreconcilable contrast. Minor arguments or debates that would have caused a shrugging of shoulders in earlier contexts grow into symbolic proportions. The inevitable objective ascription of people can mean life or death for anybody. Techniques of provocations resemble each other very much in Bosnia and colonial India. Neighbours become enemies, marriages separate, etc. Violence erupts in cases of real or alleged conversions, because the other side suspects a missionary movement behind every action and tries to defend its social and political turf. Women suffer in particular, because they are the reproducers of the political good of the „right human being” as a political resource. Thus rape can turn into a strategic component of warfare like in India at the time of separation and in Bosnia in the 1990s. Rapes by the political ethno-national opponent prevent a “right birth” and deeply humiliate women as much as their husbands, brothers and children. Violence or communal riots as they are called in India have convinced more and more people that different “ethnic groups” cannot live together and should have own borders that separate and protect them from each other.

DISTORTED POLITICAL OUTCOMES These examples have shown that several factors are at play strengthening the notion of “ethnic groups” in increasingly hostile political environments. Ethnic- ity is a situative concept that can be constructed accordingly and change its shape from region to region, depending how the contrast boosters are used to strengthen the “ethnicentre”. Of course, primordial material that already exists somewhere and in some diffuse form is tapped in order to transform it into instruments of separation and mobilization. This is why the concept of “ethnicity” consists of a primordial basis and a great deal of situative engineering.10

10 The discussion between primordialists and situativists – and a suggestion of compromise – can be followed in: Wieland (see fn. 2). - 115 - From Diversity To Pluralism In the case of Bosnia and Pakistan there was no Muslim mass movement for a nation-state as it can be found in various other countries as it is laid down in the modernization theory of nationalisms, where nationalism grows in different stages until it reaches a mass dimension. It starts out with an intellectual group and gradually widens its constituency through publications etc. until it turns into a mass movement. In these cases, however, this did not take place in such a scheme. In colonial India, people were mobilized along ethno-national lines in the “last minute”, in the last few years before India‟s independence and breakup with support of the British in 1947. In the Bosnian context, there remained no alternative in a crumbling Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent with the help of the European Community, and Serbia tried to dominate the rest. Everything fell apart around the Bosnian Muslims (Bosnjaks). But still they were the group who felt most “Yugoslavian” of all other sub- nations according to opinion polls under Tito. Many Bosnjaks defended the multi-culturalism of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and were far from forming a mass movement in favour of a Muslim homeland on the Balkans. The Bosnjaks were the least nationally conscious ones and the least politically active ones. What took place was a reactive – or a “negative” - nation and state building. The paradigm of “ethnicity” has a very strong circular dynamic. Once actors like the European Community in Bosnia or the colonial British in India accepted the notion of an “ethnic conflict”, they were looking for solutions within the “ethnic” paradigm. A zero sum game of exclusive bargaining started. You give something to one group, and the other one starts complaining. At the same time, political resources are being taken away from those few left who are trying to run a supra-ethnic platform with political contents such as the economy, social issues, etc. Who would vote for a supra- or trans-ethnic politician if everybody has to define himself as a member of an “ethnic group”? For example in Yugoslavia: Those who wanted to start a political career and enter the Communist Party could not become a member of a Yugoslav communist party. Already under President Josip Bros Tito people could enter the Croatian, Ser- bian, Macedonian, etc. communist party only. Everybody had to define himself as part of an “ethnic group” first in order to become a communist politician. With ethno-national parties, no sophisticated political discourse is necessary because everything is clear by definition. The contrast to the (ethno-)political foe seems obvious. No opinion-building process is necessary. The party programs of ethno-national parties in Bosnia, for example, used to be thinner than those of social democrats or communists. Ethno-national parties had no elaborated vision of society, economy, and domestic politics. But because of their intrinsic nature, they can fill a political vacuum much more quickly when institutions collapse. At the high end of “ethnic” outcomes in politics are physical separations such as tunnels, bridges or bypass roads like in Israel. But also in Bosnia the confederation model (Owen/Stoltenberg Plan) triggered the haggle over territorial percen- tages up to behind the decimal point. During the Dayton negotiations the strong- est outbursts of rage arose while debating on maps. The chief negotiators arbitra-

- 116 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State rily drew the internal boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina on big drawing boards and with the joystick in computer cartographies.11 The details of the plans seem to be absurd, too. The Owen/Stoltenberg Plan intended to build a three-storey highway flyover over the so-called Serb corridor near the north Bosnian city of Brčko. On the first level Serbs were supposed to drive, on the second Muslims and on the third Croats. And a five kilometer long bridge was to span “foreign” territory so that “the Muslims” could have access to the sea.12

MISTAKES REPEATED IN IRAQ A very recent example where the ethnic paradigm strongly ruled is the post-war situation in Iraq. What has happened in Iraq since 2003 is the ethnicization of politics, a very familiar phenomenon that reminds us of the darkest chapters of ethno-national politics and flawed “conflict solution” in Bosnia, Lebanon, and in colonial times with the partition of India and Pakistan (which left behind a still simmering ethno-national or “communal” conflict in Kashmir). These were and are all solutions within the “paradigm of ethnicity”. Some critics even hold that “Lebanonization” will become the feature of pluralism in the Middle East if the U.S. administration continues to pursue the same policy of playing out religious and ethnic groups against each other like it has been the case in Iraq even long before the war.13 The US administration went into Iraq with the notion that they were confronting three groups: Shiites, Sunni, and Kurds. After the war, the attempt to reconstruct Iraqi political institutions was short-sighted and stayed within the same paradigm without any profound socio-political reflection. The Iraqi Gov- erning Council was composed, of all possibilities, according to an ethnic and religious ratio. At least, this category played the dominant role for the Council‟s com- position. The alternative would have been a clear emphasis, in politics and the media, on ideologies and social forces like trade unions, women, peasants, communists, liberals, conservatives, and maybe amended by regional representatives. Because of his narrow domestic and business background, then US adminis- trator Paul Bremer objected to the appointment of communists in the Iraqi parliament, although they were the only trans-ethnic alternative at that time. The UN representative in Iraq, Viera de Mello (who later died in a terrorist attack in Baghdad) had a hard time to convince him otherwise.14 Nevertheless, the “ethnic” paradigm predominated clearly. Although, for example, one of the 25 members of the Governing Council was the secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party (Hamid Majeed Mousa) and another one was from the Iraqi Women‟s Organization (Songhul Chapouk), they were listed and

11 HOLBROOKE: op. cit. (fn. 9), pp. 392ff. 12 SEIFUN TOKIC: „Ethnische Ideologie und Eroberungskrieg: Zur Kritik der Auf- teilung Bosnien-Herzegowinas“, in: NENAD STEFANOV & MICHAEL WERZ (ed.): Bosni- en und Europa: Die Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1994, p. 180. 13 Salama, in: Al-Ahram Weekly 2/3-9/05 14 GEORGE PACKER: Assassin‟s Gate: America in Iraq, New York 2005. - 117 - From Diversity To Pluralism counted as a Shiites, respectively as a Turcoman, first and foremost.15 This mis- conception has helped to reinforce primordial and parochial alignments that found their latest expression in the first elections in January 2005. The compo- sition of the interim cabinet that was created in September 2003 followed the same rationale: Among the ministers were 14 Shiites, 5 Sunni, 5 Kurds, one Assyrian. Among the Shiites and Sunni there was one Turcoman each. This context provides the ground for the typical problem that one primordial group feels neglected vis-à-vis the other(s). There is no way out within this paradigm. Political claims are and can be articulated only through ethno-national representatives. There is no room for trans- or supra-“ethnic” political forces. After a war like in Iraq, after a complete regime collapse, with following occupation, quasi colonization, and a comprehensive international mandate for political and economic reconstruction (through the controversial UN Resolu- tions 1483 in May, and 1511 in October 2003) there was enough of a political vacuum to set the points into a new direction. It could have been a step into the direction of a democratic state with the development of a civil society that has suffered so much under Saddam Hussein. Of course, religious and other primordial elements would have pushed into politics, especially after decades of unjust distribution of resources and political power. But when, if not after such a moment of destruction and new beginning is there a chance to at least try to escape the “paradigm of ethnicity”? This opportunity was definitely missed and primordialism became a self-fulfilling prophecy with the policy makers.

A BREAK OF PARADIGM IN TURKEY? Recent developments in Turkey suggest the first possibility of a counter development to the primordial view of nationalism. The process has just started and is still far from being accomplished. Nevertheless, the changes that have taken place in Turkey since 2002 under the ruling Justice and Developing Party (AKP) are breaking paradigms. The pillar of modern Turkish identity and state ideology has been secular, etatist and populist Kemalism whose ingredients include a very consequent form of ethnic nationalism. This was in line with the paradigm in which most other European nations developed in the 19th and 20th centuries, and this helped to bridge the transition from the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire to a “modern nation-state” after World War I. This definition of Turkishness has thrown the nation into decade long conflicts with its religious and ethnic minorities and neighbours, above all with

15 The Governing Council, as chosen by the US administration in Iraq in July 2003, was made up of 25 people: Thirteen members were Shi„a, five Kurdish (most of the Kurds are Sunni), five Sunni Arabs, one Christian and one Turcoman. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1500 in August 2003 described the Govern- ing Council as “broadly representative” and praised its formation as “an important step towards the formation by the people of Iraq of an internationally recognized, representative government […].” - 118 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State Armenians and Kurds. Now after Turkey has reached an increased level of political and economic stability, a change of paradigm with regard to its definition of nationalism is gradually underway. In fall 2005, for the first time in the nation‟s history, Recep Tayyip Erdogan conceded that there was a Kurdish problem and that the state has made mistakes. He offered a solution by redefin- ing Turkish nationalism. The moderate Islamist Prime Minister spoke of a Turkish “supra-identity” of all citizens below which there can be “sub- identities” of ethnic definition, like Kurds, Armenians etc. without turning them into minorities.16 A new “civil” constitution is envisaged to mention “Turkish citizens” instead of “ethnic Turks”. Using the Kurdish language in state broadcasting and education is no taboo any longer. This paid off politically as well, since in the 2007 elections the AKP gained more votes from Kurds than the ethnic Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). However, in the local elections in March 2009 the Kurds voted more ethnically aligned again. With what he calls the “democratic opening” Erdogan hopes to solve the domestic Kurdish conflict and, at the same time, to improve relations with historically uncomfortable neighbours like Armenia with whom Turkey in Sep- tember 2009 announced to establish diplomatic relations. In other words, Turkey is in a process of changing its ideology of nationalism from the German to the French model – if the process moves on without distur- bances, ethno-national backlashes from ethnic Turks and opposition parties or an ethno-national cum political revival of Kurdish nationalists. The AKP government is trying to use soft power to solve a problem of highly military significance. Even Turkey‟s top military commander, General Ilker Basbug, has argued along Erdogan‟s line: “Turkishness is a generic identity (supra-identity) referring to the all equal citizens of Turkey, regardless of their ethnic background.” 17 A foreign policy of “zero problems” with its neighbours, Neo-Ottomanism and Islam as a new driving force of social and political identity are the ingredients of today‟s Turkey. Since Islam as a factor of national identity is gaining legitimacy in competition with the Kemalist ideology, ethnicity as a demarcating factor is losing ground. Some scholars already speak of a process of “de- ethnicization of national identity” in Turkey.18 Islam in its theology is a supra-ethnic religion. However, using Islam as a factor of common identity shifts the demarcation line away from ethnic minorities towards people of different faith. Indeed, the relationship between the

16 HEINZ KRAMER: Türkische Turbulenzen: Der andauernde Kulturkampf um die richtige Republik, SWP-Studie 2009/S 11, März 2009, p. 25 = available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5856. 17 AYHAN SIMSEK: “Election result complicates Kurdish reform”, in: Southeast Euro- pean Times, April 20, 2009. 18 WILLIAM HALE, Emeritus Professor in the department of Politics and Interna- tional Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of Lon- don, at the international conference “Turkey and the Middle East” in the Danish Insti- tute in Damascus, November 10, 2009. - 119 - From Diversity To Pluralism Turkish state and its Jewish and Christian minorities remains tense. It is an open question if the de-ethnicization of Turkish identity will turn into a model of French-style citizenship or if the religious factor will take over as the next dominant primordial ingredient of nation-building. It remains also to be seen if this de-ethnicization of Turkish national ideology will affect the Arab neighbours as well, especially Syria with its oppressive Kurdish policy.

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION The Turkish case is an interesting exception where ethnicity is seen as part of the problem. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, ethnicity has prevailed as an important paradigm in international politics. Even though the attacks of Septem- ber 11, 2001 might suggest that the attention was diverted from ethnic conflicts to issues such as Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, there was no real shift of paradigms. The fundamental common denominator of both ethno- nationalism and religious fundamentalism is the focus on primordial features, on descent, not on rational, flexible or even multiple identities. People are con- demned to allegedly unchangeable ethnic or religious ascriptions. In philosophical terms this expresses the bankruptcy of humanism. Not only is the unimpeachable moral value of human beings increasingly ignored in the conflicts and conceptions that have dominated since 1989 through asymmetric conflicts that tend to ignore international conventions of warfare and human rights. People‟s moral equality regardless of religious conviction or descent as well as the freedom of individual choice have equally been ignored. People are not judged according to what they think but on what they “are” by birth. The hopes in the first months and years after the fall of the Berlin Wall have not been fulfilled. For a moment many people hoped to see a world that would transcend national borders and be based on an enlightened world citizenship that could tackle global problems. When the wall came down in Berlin in 1989, two new potential paradigms opened up: One was the paradigm of humanism (e.g. Czempiel hints at that possibility19) and the other one the paradigm of primordialism. This is a philosophical problem, too. Ideals and achievements of enlightenment are in ruins, such as that individuals are a) equal no matter what convictions they follow, and b) have their right and properties to determine their own position in the ethic, social, and political framework - and the right to opt out without being targeted. Nathan the Sage was far ahead in his time when he said to the guardian of the temple: Ah! If only I had found one person more in you for whom it was sufficient to be a human being!20

19 ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL: Weltpolitik im Umbruch, München 2002. 20 LESSING (1987), p. 69. [1779] (see fn. 1). - 120 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State

Rabbi Prof. Dr Reuven Firestone (Los Angeles / USA) CHOOSING ONE‟S RELIGION: CONVERSION AND APOSTASY

One of the overriding questions that comes up in interreligious dialogue is how to find common ground while respecting the integrity of religious difference. While it is profoundly true that we, the “Abrahamic” religions, find extraordinary commonalities that we all recognize, we all belong to separate and distinct religious traditions. In fact, we have historically defined our religions to a significant degree by noting how we are different from one another. Typically, the defining of difference includes a judgment about merit and value. Our traditions all teach that we are not only different from the others, we are better than the others. This definition of self against the other occurs in scripture and tradition, in revelation and its commentary. It therefore tends to be deeply imbed- ded in our personal religious identities. Christianity, for example, identifies itself in the New Testament as a new dispensation that is different from Judaism. If Judaism were adequate from the standpoint of the Christian, there would be no need for Christianity. This is of course a critique of Judaism. Christianity is different, and of course, from its own perspective, better. In a key passage from the New Testament Letter to the Hebrews (8:6-13), this is stated outright in relation to the Jews: In fact, the ministry which has fallen to Jesus is as far superior to theirs as are the covenant he mediates and the promises upon which it is legally secured. Had the first covenant been faultless, there would have been no need to look for a second in its place. Any Jew, for obvious reasons, would disagree, but we would all agree that the very act of defining Christianity here rests on disparaging what came before. Although Islam emerged into history at a different place, in a different time and among different people, it exhibits a similar position vis-à-vis earlier religions. We can easily observe how the Qur‟an describes Islam as a corrective to what it deems the errors or inadequacies of Christians and Jews. This also represents a critique, of course, and Muslims naturally feel from their perspective that their religion is the best. ,(Sura 5:12-14) سورة المائدة For example, in 12God made a covenant with the Children of Israel […] 13But because of their breaking their covenant We have cursed them and made their hearts hard […] 14And those who say: 'We are Christians,' We made their covenant but they forgot a part of what they were reminded [through revelation]. So We incited enmity and hatred between them until the Day of Resur- rection, when God will tell them what they have done.

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فَبِ َوب ًَ ْق ِض ِهن ِّهيثَبقَ ْهُن لَعٌَّبهُ ْن َو َج َع ْلٌَب قُلُىبَ ْهُن قَ ِبسيَت ... َو ِه َي الَّ ِر َيي قَبلُ ْىا إًَِّب ًَ َص َبزي أَ َخ ْرًَب ِهيثَبقَ ْهُن فٌََ ْسُىا

َح ّظب ِّه َّوب ُذ ِّك ْسُوا بِ ِه فَأَ ْغ َس ْيٌَب بَ ْيٌَ ُهُن ْال َع َد َاوةَ َو ْالبَ ْغ َضبء إِلًَ يَ ْى ِم ْالقِيَ َبه ِت َو َس ْى َف يٌَُبِّئُ ُهُن ّّللاُ بِ َوب َكبًُ ْىا يَ ْصٌَ َعُىى Needless to say, Jews and Christians would not agree. My point here is not to criticize Christianity and Islam, but rather to acknowledge a phenomenon of identity formation. Lest I appear unfair here in my citation of Christianity and Islam, I hasten to point out that the same phenomenon of critique occurs in Jewish scripture and tradition. The Torah refers repeatedly to the practices of the neighboring religions as disgraceful abominations. In the Torah (Deuteronomy 18:9), we read Do not learn to practice the abominations of the peoples [in the land]. And in Deut.29:15- 16, You have seen the abominations [of the nations], their idols, wood and stone, silver and gold…. Like Christianity and Islam, Judaism appears in these texts as a corrective to the errors of prior religions. It is highly disparaging of them. We are who we are, we all claim, because we are not making the mistakes of those who came before us. Notice the directionality of all of these critiques. Our most sacred texts critique the religious communities who came before. We learn to define ourselves not only by being different, but also by being better than those who preceded us. But the critique does not move in only one direction. We also define ourselves as better than the religions that came after us. According to Judaism, anyone who claims to be a prophet after the biblical prophets cannot be a true prophet. From the perspective of Jewish tradition and law, Jesus cannot be anything more than a mortal with normal human powers, and by no means a prophetic. Therefore, those people who followed him were simply mistaken or fooled. From the perspective of Christianity, Christ brought a finality to the divine will communicated to humanity. Muhammad, therefore, simply cannot be a true prophet. Needless to say, Judaism takes the same position regarding Muhammad for the same reason that it cannot accept any extraordinary status for Jesus. And of course, Islam cannot countenance the appearance of anyone who claims prophecy after the death of the last prophet, Muhammad, the seal of divine prophecy. This excludes Baha‟is, Ahmadis (if their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is considered a prophet) and any other religion that emerged in history after Islam. What I have just described to you is a phenomenology of religion. It describes an observable fact that is common to our three religious traditions. I do not believe that Jews were trying to be evil in their refusal to accept Christ, and I do not believe that Jews and Christians were being evil in their refusal to accept Muhammad. They were acting with deep integrity toward their religion. Neither do I consider Muslims and Christians evil in renouncing the religions that came before them. If they had accepted the religions that came before them, they would not be Muslims or Christians.

- 122 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State We all know and agree that faith cannot be forced. We agree that one cannot compel belief. Anyone who joins a faith under the threat of the sword cannot be a trusted believer. And anyone who is forced to remain within a faith system that s/he no longer believes in cannot be a true believer. One of the ways in which religions maintain discipline within a faith community is through the denigration of other religions. It may be obvious or it may be subtle, but it is virtually universal. There are of course exceptional people or even movements within our religions that do not denigrate other religions, but they are small, of little influence, and if anything, prove the general rule of disparagement. I am a Jew today because I was born into a Jewish family and community, and because I was raised to practice my religion. I believe in it and I believe that it brings me into relationship with God. I love my religion. I am passionately dedicated to its values and traditions and practices. And not surprisingly, I was raised to believe that my religion is of greater ultimate value than other religions. I think I am correct in assuming that Christians and Muslims in this room were raised similarly. However, I dare say that if my parents were Christian or Muslim, I would feel the same way about Christianity or Islam. But I was not born into a Chris- tian or Muslim family. I was born into a Jewish family and raised as a Jew. I therefore naturally tend to privilege my own religion of Judaism. I would argue that those of us here have transcended a great deal of the feeling of superiority that is naturally acquired as a member of our religious communities. We have learned humility from dialogue – from the transcendent experience of coming face-to-face and soul-to-soul with deeply loving, religious people from other religions. Those of us here in this meeting have learned to live with the tension between believing at some level that we are living out God‟s will more fully than our compatriots of other religions – and yet respecting them and their religions deeply. The great task for religious pluralism is to train our communities to learn how to love and practice our religions deeply and fully, but at the same time provide space and understanding for the religions of others. This is what pluralism is all about. I believe that one can be a pluralist without being a relativist. That is to say, I believe that we can each appreciate our own religion – even more than the religion of our friends and neighbors – while fully accepting our friends and neighbors‟ religious beliefs as fully suitable, at the very least for them. The bottom line is, of course, that to know God‟s will fully we must fully understand God. But is that ever possible for us mortals? How do we know that we are more right than our neighbor? We may believe it, but we cannot truly know it. To claim to understand God better than our religious compatriots is to exhibit conceit and arrogance that belies the religious quest. Teaching confidence in the truth of our own religions, while simultaneously teaching and personally exemplifying pluralism is a difficult task. It requires

- 123 - From Diversity To Pluralism both clarity and subtlety, which is very difficult to teach, very hard to transmit to others. Teaching pluralism also requires a certain confidence and security within our religious communities. For example, it is much easier to be accepting of others when we feel that others are accepting of us. That confidence and security within our religious communities is quickly destroyed by acts of violence committed against us in the name of religion – or interpreted by others to be committed in the name of religion. When we feel threatened we retreat into our homes and communities and close our doors. But we are not threatened only by violence. Our sense of religious security is threatened by certain other acts as well. We are often deeply disturbed when a member of our religious community abandons our religion for the religion of another. Such an act raises many questions to a believer. Why did you abandon us? Is my religion not good enough for you? Is it therefore lacking, deficient? Could I be mistaken in my own faith? The reaction to abandonment or deser- tion is to shut down communication. We are deeply threatened by it. On the other hand, when a person of another faith tradition joins our religion, we are flattered. It conveys to us that our faith is compelling. It confirms to me that my religion has meaning to people raised in other faith traditions. It affirms my own faith. In short, conversion “in” is an affirmation, an endorsement of my faith. Conversion “out” is an affront, a refutation of my faith. The words “conversion” and “apostasy” are mirror terms. “Conversion” means to transform. It derives from the Latin term vertere meaning “to turn,” and the connotation is usually positive. Converts come into our religions from outside. That is a good thing. “Apostasy,” on the other hand, comes from the Greek apostasia or apostasis meaning “revolt” or “defection.” Literally, it is “a standing off (apo = “away from” + stenai = “to stand”). Apostates forsake our religion. They abandon us, rebel against us. They are defectors. This is very much a bad thing. The one affirms our faith. The other critiques it. The one is complimentary. The other is an affront. I argue for the purposes of this discussion that conversion and apostasy are mirror images of the same phenomenon. They define the act of leaving one religion for another. The difference between them is in the directionality of the act. From the standpoint of the religious community accepting the new believer it is conversion. From the standpoint of the religious community losing the member it is apostasy. When religion becomes a matter of personal choice in a society that cham- pions freedom and individual rights, there can be no state control of religious conversion or even any kind of state interference. In a society or state that values and protects religious pluralism, one will find much more occasion for individual conversion or apostasy. Let us be frank about this.

- 124 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State Conversion/apostasy is always threatening to one party, always flattering to the other. It invites resentment and anger, and the results can be dangerous. As we seek greater religious pluralism and protection for religious minorities, we must factor this into our discussions and our efforts, and especially in our education. True religious freedom requires that we all agree that conversion/apostasy is a part of human religious discourse. Historically in the West, religious freedom only occurred as a reaction to the failure of the state to regulate and enforce religion. Only after centuries of religious wars that devastated the landscape of Europe did Western thinkers, social philosophers and political and religious leaders finally agree, many very reluc- tantly, to remove state control from religious practice. The result has in some ways been problematic and in some ways has proven advantageous. One of the most obvious disadvantages for religious institutions is that religious freedom allowed individuals to choose not to choose – to remove themselves from religion and to remove God from their lives. Of course the most obvious advantage has been that religious wars virtually ceased, ending the bloodshed that brought Europe to its darkest hours. But true freedom of religion has offered other advantages as well. It has created a kind of religious market where religions are required to compete with one another for their support among the people. With personal choice, people can vote with their feet. They can leave one religion and join another. They can seek the truth wherever it may be. And they can force religious leaders to be honest, to deliver the services that are promised, and to engage for the benefit of the believers rather than simply for the benefit of the religious leadership. True religious pluralism is threatening to some religious leaders, but the result can be better religion, more compassionate religion, and real spirituality rather than the manipulation of religion for power and wealth. Monotheism teaches the truth of one great God who created the universe in compassion and love. It does not necessarily follow that there is only one path to know that one great God. Sometimes arrogance or pride may move us to think that this must be so, but true modesty and self-knowledge would prove otherwise. There are too many Christians and Muslims in the world who are much wiser than I and who travel on a different path for me to believe that I must be right and they must be wrong. As much as apostasy from my religion pains me, therefore, I must be willing to accept conversion out as well as conversion in. On the other hand, and with this I will end my remarks, I have been trained not to accept converts to Ju- daism without question. Judaism of course admits converts and is proud to do so. Keep in mind that conversion in is a compliment. The Jewish reluctance to accept converts has been a result of history, since it was a capital crime for Jews to seek or even accept converts for more than a thousand years due to state control of religion.

- 125 - From Diversity To Pluralism But partly as a result of that sad reality, I have been trained to ask any seeker who enquires about Judaism to ask a question back at the questioner. “What do you know about your own religion?” The answer is, usually, “not much.” I then counsel the questioner to seek out his spiritual answers from within his own religion, to study with a religious teacher from her own tradition. How do I know that my religion is the best path to truth for this individual? I must be concerned for the individual seeker – not for my own ego. Only much later, if what she learns is not personally satisfactory, would I be willing to engage the seeker in a course of study. And only after that period would I be willing to enable conversion. I must be willing to accept conversion out as well as conversion in. But in either case, I hope for the sake of the seeker, for the sake of my own integrity and for the integrity of my religion, that the conversion will be done with honor and compassion. True pluralism can only exist when conversion and apostasy are options, as painful and as difficult these challenges may be. Our greatest task is to teach the rightness of our own way while fully respecting the rightness of other paths to God.

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FROM DIVERSITY TO PLURALISM: PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AND CIVIL STATE

REFLECTIONS AND REPORTS ON PRACTICES AND EXPERIENCES

Angelika Pantel (Berlin / Germany) “SCHOOLS IN TRIALOGUE – EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND CULTURAL PLURALISM” – A COMPETITION FOR SCHOOLS

It is a great honour to present to you the competition for schools organised by the Herbert Quandt Foundation and I would very much like to thank Professor Schreiner for inviting me to the conference. Today I will be speaking to you as a representative of the Herbert Quandt Foundation, The Herbert Quandt- Foundation is a private foundation in honour of one of the most influential in- dustrialists in Germany, the former owner of BMW. We have worked closely with Professor Schreiner not only in the European Abrahamic Forum, but also in the context of his exemplary activities as a participant in our Trialogue confer- ences and, above all, as a juror over the last four years in our school competition. Let us now go to Europe and, more specifically, to Germany, and go down to a very practical level, to the hands-on practitioners, namely the schools themselves. I would like to present to you an example of how what we have been hearing about for the past few days has been successfully implemented: “Schools in Trialogue: European Identity and Cultural Pluralism”, the Herbert Quandt Foundation’s competition for schools. Integration and intercultural relations are of a particular interest in today´s Germany. Many guest-workers immigrated from Turkey and other countries to aid in post-war reconstruction efforts. This has resulted in a third of school students and 15 million or 20 percent of the population having a migrant background. This poses a number of interesting integration and intercultural challenges. So, firstly I will outline briefly the foundation’s Trialogue programme, so that you have an idea of where the school competition fits in with our other activities. In a second step, I´ll explain the competition’s goals and modalities before, finally, presenting its outcomes. With what we call our Trialogue of Cultures programme and the projects carried out within the programme, the Herbert Quandt Foundation has been promoting interreligious and, in particular, intercultural understanding among Jewish, Christians and Muslims since 1996. The foundation is active in two fields within the Trialogue programme, since we believe both areas are home to agents of social change: the media, on the one hand, and educational actors, on the other, or more concretely, schools, including both teachers and students. Through our activities in these areas we are, for example, promoting next- generation journalists in Israel, the Palestinian territories and Germany, and - 129 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State each year we organise a major conference – which, by the way, will take place in just a few days, addressing the topic of “Migration and Media” for the second time. In addition, for more than five years we’ve been carrying out our competition “Schools in Trialogue: European Identity and Cultural Pluralism”. The competition is supplemented both by regional continuing education programmes for teachers and by the German-Turkish Teachers Academy, which took place this year also for the second time – but I’ll leave a description of those events for another occasion. Back to the competition: How did it come about in the first place? In 1999, the Herbert Quandt Foundation commissioned a four-year study from the University of Birmingham to look at how schools in eight European countries impart an understanding of the influence these three religions have had on Europe’s past – firstly by looking at the textbooks in use and, secondly, by carrying out qualitative surveys among students. The study’s findings were sobering. While they showed that a number of good practices did exist, they also revealed that, on the whole, too little was being done to disseminate information about the Abrahamic religions in Europe, their impact there and their significance for Europe’s cultural heritage and cultural identity. Following completion of the study, its three authors put together recommendations for practitioners. One result of those recommendations was the competition launched by the Herbert Quandt Foundation – which I will now present to you. Let me begin with the goals the foundation hoped to achieve by organising the competition. What were they? Through the competition, the foundation wants to help people of different backgrounds come in contact – in this case, of course, we’re talking primarily about school students. This contact is meant to provide students with the opportunity for diverse, concrete experiences which increase their awareness of other individuals, of course, but which simultaneously increase their knowledge of other cultures and religious backgrounds. In addition, by facilitating this contact, we want to increase an awareness of both differences and similarities, to strengthen students’ identities and, as a result, to counteract ignorance, fear and prejudice. At the same time, as a result of the related project work and interdisciplinary learning experiences, our competition is designed to help schools develop further and to have an impact on students and teachers for as long as possible. Ultimately, we are interested in seeing the concept of the Trialogue anchored in schools and teacher training programmes over the long term.

A FEW FACTS AND FIGURES: This year, the competition is being carried out for the fifth time. Including this year’s round, a total of 71 schools have now participated, mostly from the state of Hesse and from Berlin. That means the competition has now reached an

- 130 - Reflections and Reports estimated fifteen thousand students, not to mention the students’ parents and friends, as well as other actors that come in contact with the schools and the partners who cooperate on the projects organised by the schools as part of the competition. From primary schools to vocational schools, all types of primary and secondary educational institutions have participated. This diverse range is reflected in the projects that schools have used to qualify for the competition – from a “Trialogue” cook book and art objects to film festivals, web forums, confer- ences and interfaith religious celebrations. The socio-cultural spectrum represented by the students at the participating schools is also quite broad, extending from urban schools where almost 90 percent of students are from immigrant families, to rural schools with a highly homogenous student body. The vast majority of the students attend state schools, although a number of private schools have also participated, most of which have religious affiliation. To date over one million Euros has been donated by the foundation to the project.

HOW THE COMPETITION IS CARRIED OUT Every year the foundation develops a new topic that helps illustrate the competition’s motto: “Schools in Trialogue – European Identity and Cultural Plural- ism”. In past years these topics have included What do you believe?, Shalom, peace, salaam – the potential for conflict and peace among Judaism, Christianity and Islam and, this year, Growing up – reaching adulthood. Childhood and adolescence in Judaism, Chris- tianity and Islam. At the beginning of each year, the foundation writes to all schools in Berlin and a majority of those in Hesse. That means school principals and the heads of select departments receive a pamphlet from us describing the competition and the current topic, as well as information on how they can enter the competition and how the winners will be selected. The pamphlet thus serves as a call to participate in the competition. Schools that choose to do so then design a project, and are given a free hand in approaching the topic. They have approximately two months to complete their applications. By April, the foundation has received the entry forms. As a rule, up to 40 schools apply on average to compete in the competition. Each application is usually about fifteen pages long. What happens to the applications now, and who decides which schools will actually take part in the competition? This is where our independent, expert jury comes in. The jury is made up of twelve high-level academic experts and practitioners. It includes representatives of the three Abrahamic religions as well as educational specialists, not to mention individuals representing students and parents. They are the ones who then meet, consider the application forms and choose the schools that will be asked to participate.

- 131 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State What are the criteria employed by the jury to evaluate the submitted project summaries? Criteria for judging applications In keeping with the competition’s objectives, the following criteria are used for judging the projects outlined in the submitted applications in order to determine which schools will participate: Firstly, the project’s planned focus is looked at to see if it sufficiently includes all three religions and in a way that is as equitable as possible. The project’s methodological and didactic approaches are then considered, and they should be as multifaceted, contemporary and student-centred as possible. In addition, projects are looked at to see how they reflect everyday school life; in this regard they should be as concrete as possible and should be integrated into the normal classroom experience. The projects should also be broad-based and interdisciplinary; they should include students of all ages and, in terms of implementation within the classroom, a majority of the teaching staff. If possible, teachers still complet- ing their training should also be actively included in the project and – in the ideal case – they should present the project to their peers in their university seminars. The planned project should also include the participation of as wide a range of non-school partners as possible, such as representatives of the three religions in question, community organisations involved in school life, museums and other intercultural educational institutions. A very important aspect is cooperation with the students’ parents, since that ensures successful long-term learning. Each school is also expected to develop a suitable PR campaign for its project, which ensures the project will reach as wide an audience as possible. Finally – and in terms of long-term impact, this is the foundation’s overriding goal – the project should include ideas and initiatives that will anchor the Trialogue concept within the school over an extended period of time.

WHAT HAPPENS ONCE THE SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN SELECTED? The schools invited to participate – there are around 15 as a rule – receive what we call a “starting purse” of three thousand five hundred Euros, something that is unique to our competition. That means each school that makes it past the initial application round receives this money with the understanding that it will use it during the coming school year to carry out its proposed project. In addition to this financial support, the schools receive in-depth support from us over the course of the entire year they are realising their project. That means we visit the schools at regular intervals, monitor the projects’ implementation and support and coach the participating teachers. In addition, the foundation organises regional continuing-education programmes addressing that year’s topic or other topics relating to Trialogue issues. In Berlin, for example, we organised an event that looked at the controversies that have occurred when Muslim communities have announced plans to build new mosques.

- 132 - Reflections and Reports Once the year is half over, what is known as the “Marketplace of Possibili- ties” takes place. This is where schools present their project outcomes to date to their fellow competitors, the jury and, of course, the foundation. On the one hand, this allows the schools to reconsider their project planning and reflect on how things have gone so far. On the other, it provides the schools with the opportunity to share their experiences and learn from each other. At the end of the year, the schools document the outcomes from their projects. The documentation then becomes the basis for the jury’s decision, which is taken when the jury convenes once again to choose the winners. Six schools are usually chosen to receive either a first, second or third prize, with all winners receiving a total of sixty thousand Euros in prize money. Every autumn, the winners are invited to an award ceremony in Bad Homburg, along with high-level representatives of the relevant ministries of education. The winning schools are asked to prepare a short video for the ceremony, in which they introduce themselves and their projects. In this, the final part of my presentation, I would like to talk about the outcomes of the past five years of the “Schools in Trialogue” competition. What have we learned? What makes this competition special? And what impact is it having? Here we can make a distinction between its impact on the schools and its impact in a stricter sense on Trialogue-related issues and intercultural education. First I should note that the competition has brought new momentum to school development efforts and has increased the abilities of the participating teachers to carry out and manage school projects. In terms of addressing the Trialogue concept and reinforcing intercultural and interreligious competence and awareness among students, as well as among teachers and, ideally, parents – which is in fact the competition’s main goal – the competition has successfully helped the participating schools increase awareness in this area. The competition’s outstanding strength, however, is its ability to focus on the unique characteristics of children from immigrant families and, above all, to take them seriously. The competition shines a light on these children and trans- forms them from a topic for study, indeed, into experts. Through their project activities and their participation in the competition, students – not to mention parents – discover both the similarities and differences to their peers. That, in turn, strengthens the identities of everyone involved, something that can be seen as a major step toward improving how we in Europe approach our religious and cultural differences. The results of the competition clearly demonstrate the success the competition has achieved in promoting integration and intercultural relations in Ger- many and Europe.

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Rifa’at Lenzin, M.A. (Zürich / Switzerland) INTER-CULTURAL SCHOOL EDUCATION AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL TASKS FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW

In matters of education Switzerland is rather a complicated country, since Swit- zerland is divided into 26 cantons which are more or less autonomous regarding education. As for inter-cultural and inter-religious matters, there are different approaches, especially in the French and German parts of Switzerland. Un- til recently, all cantons adhered to the principle that priority was to be given to the teaching of the other national languages, that is: French, German, or Italian, in preference to English as a non-national language. A couple of years ago, however, some cantons decided to allow the teaching of English as first foreign language to the detriment of either German or French. The situation is just as confusing when it comes to the teaching of religious matters in schools. In some cantons either the Catholic or Protestant Church or both offer religious instruction for their members in public schools. The teachers are either parish priests or educators who are paid by either the Church or the public administration. Parents can get their children exempted from such classes if they wish to do so. Muslims are generally not allowed to teach Muslim pupils about Islam in public schools. For a couple of years now there has been a tendency to abolish the teaching of specific religious beliefs. Instead, pupils are being taught about different religions. This kind of instruction is compulsory for all children regardless of what religion they may adhere to. Teachers must hold a degree in pedagogy, which excludes for instance priests.

EXPERIENCES AND OBSTACLES IN INTER-CULTURAL DIALOGUE People belonging to minorities learn from daily experience that many of their values and norms are not shared by everybody. Therefore it is obvious to them that these values and norms are not universal. There is, however, no such corrective for the majority society. People belonging to the majority are mistakenly lead to believe that their own values ought to be accepted universally and that they should be the norm. Many find even the thought disconcerting that also members of the majority ought to be open and willing to learn. They are, after all, the majority. Are they not then automatically the ones to set the norm? In the debate about integration one continually hears such arguments. It is very difficult for the majority society to accept the fact that their own values are tied to their specific culture and are therefore relative. But it is quite essential that this fact be accepted.

- 134 - Reflections and Reports My experience with an inter-religious group of women working together on a book is a good example for these mechanisms. The Muslim approach with its genuinely Islamic argumentation and rhetoric met with vehement criticism from Christian feminists who were unable to accept the Islamic approach and Islamic view of the sources. They simply could not understand that the Qur’an might play a different role for Muslim women than the Bible does for them. Likewise they could not accept at all that for Muslim women a feminist criticism of the Qur’an – like the feminist criticism of the Bible – would be unthinkable. Furthermore they could not accept that Muslim women did not share the view of western feminist theologians, namely that the (sacred) texts emerged from patriarchal structures and were written and handed down by men. A truly effective dialogue is in fact possible only between partners with equal rights. This leads us to talk about the main difficulty. In matters of equal partnership the asymmetry and structural imbalance between the majority society and the religious and cultural minorities appear most blatantly. It is not only a matter of different ideological and social-political options, but rather and above all of access to resources, of economical imbalance and social balance of power. Minorities, particularly migration societies, do not as a rule have at their disposal either the necessary economic or personal resources in order to make themselves heard as equal partners in a dialogue and are not able to gain attention for their justified requests. Within the dialogue, we find on the one hand representatives of the churches or governmental institutions who are well qualified and officially appointed for such a time-consuming task. On the other hand we have representatives of immigrant workers who are neither qualified for the task nor can afford to invest the necessary time. All they have to offer is their wholehearted commitment in their spare time. There can be no question of a dialogue between equal partners of the same standing. As long as there are no institutions on a university level to promote contemporary Islamic thinking and development in a Swiss environment, no changes are to be expected. An exception to the rule of structural imbalance between the majority society and religious minorities is the Zürcher Lehrhaus. The Lehrhaus with its offer of a wide range of educational, cultural and journalistic activities aims at getting to know each other’s traditions in order to better understand and respect oneself and others. The institution is unique in Switzerland, uniting Christian, Jewish and Muslim experts under one roof. This promotes an intensity of collaboration which could otherwise not be attained. It means in fact living the dialogue. An ever present challenge can be summed up in the question: How can I communicate to others what is important to me? And what is really important for me? Such questioning of oneself is essential for a dialogue to be productive. The Lehrhaus does not only promote discussion and analysis of questions about religion, but aims at introducing its visitors to a whole variety of cultures, due to its understanding of the inter-religious

- 135 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State dialogue as part of an inter-cultural dialogue. Apart from seminars about complex areas of religiousness, it also offers courses, for example on Islamic callig- raphy, or encounters with Jewish life in Zurich. Such rather modest offers are more apt to prove interesting to the audience, since, generally speaking, it is rather difficult to reach a broad public. Still, those who are already sensitive and open to such topics also have to be helped along. Inter-religious dialogue, after all, is moreover an opportunity to critically examine one’s own faith. With the offer “Lehrhaus out and about” dialogue-experts of the Zuercher Lehrhaus also work proactively, for example by counselling municipalities or schools who are working on inter-cultural projects on the spot. In those cases an important aim is to inform organizers about how to avoid possible snares. Many projects about dialogue end in disappointment because one group decides what should be discussed and then assigns particular roles to the remaining groups. Such a procedure totally ignores the fact that adherents to different religions often have totally different questions. What is incredibly important for one person may be of no interest whatsoever for another. That is why the dialogue starts already by defining which topics should be examined. At the Zuercher Lehrhaus such topics are therefore always decided on jointly by the three responsible experts. Even if inter-religious dialogue does now fill a definite place in the socio- political scene, it still is not at all easy to awaken people’s interest in it. More- over the dialogue doesn’t prove to be equally easy in all directions. The majority is interested in a minority, but the reverse is not always true, even if these days one might find many Jewish participants in a course about Islam. That would have been unthinkable not so long ago. The differences in social standing result in the fact that particularly many Muslims are still too occupied with coming to grips with their everyday life and are just not able to want to learn about Chris- tianity. Sometimes, however, they are simply not interested. It might take decades before measures for the promotion of trust meet with success and a dialogue on a larger scale becomes possible. Unfortunately it takes very little to destroy painstakingly built-up confidence.

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Prof. Dr Michel Sternberg (Paris / France) THE TWELVE POINTS OF BERLIN AND THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MINORITIES

The International Council of Christians and Jews (ICCJ1) was founded in 1947 with the Meeting and Declaration of Seelisberg.2 In july 2009 it was time for a re-commitment of this organisation of 38 national Jewish-Christian dialogue associations world-wide with the Berlin Declaration.3

THE 12 POINTS OF THE BERLIN DECLARATION ISSUED BY THE ICCJ AND THE PROMOTION OF TRILATERAL ABRAHAMIC DIALOGUE It has become traditional that the schedule of the ICCJ annual meeting includes one or several sessions dedicated to trilateral dialogue with Muslims. While con- firming the specificity of ICCJ for a dialogue between Christians and Jews, the general assembly of ICCJ had insisted also on the importance of a common dialogue with Muslims, taking advantage of the experience of more than sixty years Jewish-Christian interreligious exchanges. This has been particularly the case in Sidney in 2007,4 where we celebrated the 60th anniversary of the 10 Points of Seelisberg. It was also the case in Jerusalem in 2008.5 This happened again in Berlin in 20096 where the 12 Points of Berlin were promulgated. The introduction of the Berlin Declaration begins as follows: “In the summer of 1947, 65 Jews and Christians from 19 countries gathered in Seelisberg, Switzer- land. They came together to express their profound grief over the Holocaust, their determination to combat anti-Semitism, and their desire to foster stronger relationships between Jews and Christians. They denounced anti-Semitism both as a sin against God and humanity and as a danger to modern civilization. And to address these vital concerns, they issued a call in the form of 10 points to Chris- tian churches to reform and renew their understandings of Judaism and the relationships between Judaism and Christianity. Now, more than 60 years later, the

1 For details on the ICCJ see www.iccj.org. 2 For the text of the 10 points of Seelisberg see “A Time for Recommitment”, Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009, pp. 44-45, at www.kas.de/wf/en/33.17086/ 3 For the complete text of the 12 points of Berlin and the list of the contributors see: “A Time for Recommitment”, Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2009, pp. 13-20 and 83, at www.kas.de/wf/en/33.17086/. 4 See www.iccj.org/en/index.php?item=301. 5 See www.iccj.org/en/index.php?item=361. 6 MICHEL STERNBERG: “Le Dialogue Abrahamique Trilatéral à la Réunion de l’Amitié Judéo-Chrétienne Internationale à Berlin en 2009”, in: Fraternité d'Abraham, no. 144, Paris, Dec 2009 (in French). - 137 - Pluralistic Society and Civil State International Council of Christians and Jews issues a new call [...]. It commemo- rates the anniversary of the Seelisberg gathering, which was also the genesis of the International Council of Christians and Jews. Today’s call reflects the need to refine the Ten Points of Seelisberg, consistent with the advances in interreligious dialogue since that groundbreaking document of 1947.” Whereas the 10 Points of Seelisberg were addressed only to Christians and Christian Communities, the 12 Points of Berlin are addressed much more widely: the points 1-4 to Christians and Christian Communities, the points 5-8 to Jews and Jewish communities, and, last but not least, points 9-12 to all communities around the world, “Jews, Christians and Muslims, together with all people of faith and goodwill” (Tables I & II). POINTS 9-12 OF THE BERLIN DECLARATION AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES Point 9 (to enhance interreligious and intercultural education, see Table II) insists on the importance of education for facilitating interreligious dialogue and promotion of the rights of religious and cultural minorities. At the ICCJ meeting of Berlin, a workshop was organized on “violence in biblical and coranic sacred texts”;7 this was precisely an example of mutual study of religious texts. Besides we can cite various programs of interreligious education of interest among others:  “Schulen im Trialog” initiated by the Herbert Quandt-Stiftung in Germany;8  the “Institut für monotheistische Religionen und Frieden” (directed by Rabbi Chaim Rozwaski) in Berlin, Germany;  the program for the studies of other religions at the “College des Bernar- dins”, Paris, France;9  the Centre for Multicultural Studies of Al-Qasemi Academy of Education in Baqa el-Gharbia, Israel, aiming “at advancing dialogue among religions and cultures in the Israeli society [...] and advancing education for tolerance and social equity”;10  the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies in Amman, Jordan.11 Point 10 (To promote interreligious friendship and cooperation as well as social justice in the global society) directly calls for the rights of minorities (by recognizing as equal citizens members of faith traditions who have migrated to new homelands where they may have become part of a religious minority). The various “minorities” are recalled in the following sentence (striving for equal rights for all people, regardless of their religion, gender or sexual orientation). The “feelings of religious superiority” are then presented as an insidious cause of denial of rights for religious minorities, which should be corrected. Point 11 (To enhance dialogue with political and economic bodies) deals with the social, economical and political actions for minorities. We can remember for example

7 Ibidem, part 2 8 www.herbert-quandt-stiftung.de. 9 www.collegedesbernardins.fr. 10 www.qsm.ac.il/PR/ 11 www.riifs.org/. - 138 - Reflections and Reports the European Jewish-Christian cooperation for drug supply to African groups of AIDS patients.12 Point 12 concerns the care of the Earth and of the Creation. An example of application of this objective may be the joint Jewish-Christian declaration of Paris about the end of life.13 Thus the rights of the group of incurable patients were stressed. POINTS 9 - 12 OF THE BERLIN DECLARATION AND THE DUTIES OF MINORITIES Do the twelve points of Berlin, and particularly points 9-12, deal also with duties of minorities? We think so. These duties concern not only attitudes towards the majority of a country, but also towards other coexisting minorities. All the following objectives may be meaningful in this point of view:  to enhance interreligious and intercultural education.  combating negative images of others, teaching the foundational truth that each human being is created in the image of God.  making the removal of prejudices against the other a high priority in the educational process.  encouraging mutual study of religious texts, so that Jews, Christians, Muslims and members of other religious groups can learn both from and with each other.  to promote interreligious friendship and cooperation.  rejoicing in the uniqueness of each person.  striving for equal rights for all people, regardless of their religion, gender or sexual orientation.  recognizing and grappling with the fact that feelings of religious superiority – and an accompanying sense that other religions are inferior – are present in each tradition, including one’s own.  collaborating with political and economic bodies whenever possible to promote interreligious understanding.  initiating discussion with political and economic bodies around the urgent need for justice in the global community.  fostering commitment to the belief that every human being is entrusted with the care of the Earth.  recognizing a duty toward creation, and the responsibility to bring it to bear in public discourse and action. CONCLUSIONS The twelve points of Berlin were signed on July 5, 2009, by 22 international delegates at the condition that the text might be amended / corrected in the following years by taking in account the remarks of the national affiliated associations after extensive study. Therefore remarks are welcome by Jews, Chris- tians and Muslims and others for points 9-12. The twelve points of Berlin can help religious communities to play their role in the elaboration of peace all around the world.

12 See Yahad projects and achievements at www.yahadinunum.org/en/projects/. 13 See the declaration signed by Cardinal André Vingt-trois and Grand Rabin David Messas on March 26, 2007, at www.catholique-paris.com/IMG/pdf/fin-de-vie2.pdf (in French). - 139 -

CONTENTS

Greetings ...... V

ACCEPTING VARIETY – LIVING WITH DIVERSITY CONCEPTS AND EXPERIENCES OF REGULATING RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNIC- CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES Ambassador Hasan Abu Ni‘mah (Amman / Jordan) The Jordanian Integrative Experiment: Ethnic Profile of Jordan ...... 17 Mu‘in A Khoury (Amman / Jordan) Legal Status of Non-Muslims in Jordan: Jordanian Experience ...... 20 Prof. Dr Muhammad Sharkawi (Cairo / Egypt) Muslim-Christian Relations in Today’s Egypt: From Muslim Perspective ...... 25 Morcos B. Abd-el-Malek (Alexandria / Egypt) Religious Minorities in Egypt: From Coptic Perspective ...... 32 Dr Christiane Paulus (Cairo / Egypt) Egyptian Muslim and Coptic Views on Minorities: From an Outside Perspective ...... 34 Prof. Dr Fadi Daou SJ (Beirut / Lebanon) Deconstructing Minorities: The Lebanese Integration Experience ...... 43 Prof. Dr Aman Kabbara Cha‘arani (Beirut / Lebanon) Challenges of Religious, Political, and Economic Diversification of the Lebanese Society in a Changing World: Presence and Future Prospects ..... 48 Fr. Gandolf Wild OFM (Abu Dhabi /United Arab Emirates) Christian Experiences in the Arab Islamic World ...... 55

FROM DIVERSITY TO PLURALISM – PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AND CIVIL STATE RE-THINKING PRINCIPLES / CONCEPTUALIZING EXPERIENCES Dr Naseef Naeem (Göttingen / Germany) Normative Pluralism and the Main Dilemma of Equality in the Consti- tutional Systems of States with Islamic Character: Theoretical Aspects ...... 65 Prof. Dr Carmen López Alonso (Spain) Pluralistic Society and Civil State: From an European Point of View ...... 80

- 141 - Dr Cengiz Aktar (Istanbul / Turkey) Nation Building and Laicité in Turkey: Past Dilemmas and Present Challenges ...... 91 Dr Giusep Nay (Valbella / Switzerland) Concepts of Belonging: A Swiss Perspective ...... 95 Dr Milan Lyčka (Praha / Czech Republic) The Minority – Majority Problem Reconsidered ...... 100 Dr Carsten Wieland (Frankfurt am Main / Germany) Origio or ratio? The Ethnicization of Politics and the Bankruptcy of Humanism ...... 108 Rabbi Prof. Dr Reuven Firestone (Los Angeles / USA) Choosing one’s Religion: Conversion and Apostasy ...... 121

FROM DIVERSITY TO PLURALISM – PLURALISTIC SOCIETY AND CIVIL STATE: REFLECTIONS AND REPORTS ON PRACTICES AND EXPERIENCES Angelika Pantel (Berlin, Germany) “Schools in Trialogue – European Identity and Cultural Pluralism” – A Competition for Schools ...... 129 Rifa’at Lenzin M.A. (Zürich / Switzerland) Inter-Cultural School Education and Other Educational Tasks for Today and Tomorrow ...... 134 Prof. Dr Michel Sternberg (Paris / France) The Twelve Points of Berlin and the Rights and Duties of Minorities ...... 137

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ISBN 978-3-003-033176-