“Between Turmoil, Change, and Renewal”

European Abrahamic Forum Zürich Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. Bureau au Maroc مركز تواصل الثقافات Center for Cross-Cultural Learning Rabat

Religion and its Role in Re-shaping Societies in Transition in the Arab Islamic World

Zürich / Rabat 2013

Europäisches Abrahamisches Forum European Abrahamic Forum Evropski abrahamski forum EAF

European Abrahamic Forum Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Zürich Bureau au Maroc مركز تواصل الثقافات Center for Cross-Cultural Learning Rabat

“Between Turmoil, Change, and Renewal”

Religion and its Role in Re-shaping Societies in Transition in the Arab Islamic World

International Consultation Rabat (Morocco), 31 August – 02 September 2012

Zürich / Rabat 2013

EDITED BY Prof. Dr. Stefan Schreiner

PUBLISHED BY European Abrahamic Forum Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Center for Cross-Cultural Learning c/o Zürcher Lehrhaus 11, rue d`Agadir, Av. Laalou, Derb Jirari Limmattalstrasse 2 Quartier Hassan Zkt Hassani # 11 CH – 8049 Zürich B. P. 559 Rabat Chellah Rabat Medina, Morocco Tel. +41 (0)44 341 1820 10010 Rabat, Maroc Tel: +212 537 20 23 65 Fax +41 (0)44 341 1829 Tel: +212-5 377 612 32 / 33 Fax: +212 537 20 23 67 [email protected] Fax +212-5 377 612 35 http://www.cccl.ma/

PRINTED BY Druckerei Maier GmbH Rottenburg a. N. (Germany)

ISBN 978-3-00-040837-3

The present volume records papers presented to the – fourth – International Euro- pean Abrahamic Forum Consultation which was held in Rabat (Morocco) in Au- gust/September 2012. At the invitation of the European Abrahamic Forum Zürich (EAF), the Kon- rad Adenauer Stiftung – Office Rabat (KAS), and the Center for Cross-Cultural Learning in Rabat (CCCL), about twenty scholars and leading experts from eleven Middle Eastern/North African and European countries representing the three Abrahamic faiths and faith communities came together to discuss “Religion and its Role in Re-shaping Societies in Transition in the Arab Islamic World”. The purpose of this volume is not only to document the consultation that took place some months ago. Recording the papers presented to introduce the respective sessions and, thus, outlining and illustrating the many facets of the topic and reflecting the variety of approaches to it, the volume wants to offer also fresh, new in- sights into recent developments in the Middle Eastern/North African region and, thus, contribute to create a better understanding and awareness of the changes in the Arab-Islamic world. At the same time, the volume wants to invite the reader to pick up the thread and continue the discussion on issues which deserve to be considered as seriously as carefully, because they are essential not only to understand the unfolding events in the Arab-Islamic world, but also to build new good neighbourly relations between people living on all sides of the Mediterranean.

Greetings

Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished guests, Dear friends and colleagues, On behalf of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) I have the honour and pleasure of welcoming you to Morocco’s charming capital city of Rabat. At the same time, I would like to thank you very much for kindly having accepted the invitation to be with us tonight, and I would like to express my appreciation of your presence at the opening session, as well as at the conference table of this – the fourth – International EAF Consultation, which is to be held in Rabat on this and over the coming days. More than a year has passed now since the beginning of what has been called The Arab Spring, needless to say, an event which has begun to change the world dramatically. Indeed, since then, we have been and still are witnessing both radical and far-reaching changes taking place in the Arab Islamic world and beyond, changes which eventually led to regime and system change in more than one country in the Near East / North African region, changes which mark the dawn of a new era. For this reason, we set out last year to try to get – if not a full, so at least – a better understanding of what was happening and continues to happen in our “neighbourhood” and tried to make an assessment of what we – at that time quite optimistically – called “the aftermath of change”, a change that started in Tunisia and Egypt and then spread across to other countries in the Arab Islamic world. Today, however, we know that speaking about “the aftermath of change” was rather too premature because, seen from today’s perspective, there is as yet no “aftermath of change”. We are still in the middle of change. Even a year on, it still seems to be too early to be talking about this, and it is not at all clear what the result of the process of change and renewal is going to be. The only thing that seems to be sure and can be taken for granted is that the process of change and renewal has become irreversible, despite any setbacks along the way. The will, the courage, and – above all – the determination of the people to change the political landscape of the North African and Near East region and to re-shape the political map and re-structure the social and economic order in their respective countries, will not stop at the point it has reached now. In addition to this, it cannot and should not be overlooked that, here and there, the first important steps have indeed been taken to implement the idea of change and renewal: new constitutions have been developed and adopted, new parliaments and governments elected etc.

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As noteworthy as it is remarkable in all this is, however, the fact that wherever elections have taken place thus far, and new governments have been installed, it has been the so- called moderate Islamists and their parties, such as the an-Nahda party in Tunisia or the Muslim Brothers’ Party of Freedom and Justice (Ḥizb al-Ḥurrīya wa’l-‛Adāla) in Egypt, which have won the majority votes, followed by the more traditional, conservative or even fundamentalist Salafi parties, such as the Party of Light (Ḥizb an-Nūr) in Egypt. And those who were the first to demonstrate in the streets, on the other hand, are hardly, if at all represented in the newly-elected legal bodies. Politically it is now the “religious” parties that will shape the post-revolutionary countries and will leave their imprint on societies. There certainly are a number of reasons for this development which gives rise to questions like the following: why was it precisely the religious, i. e. Muslim parties that emerged victorious and were the winners of elections? What does their “victory” mean for the others, the unsuccessful parties, and what will be the impact of the Muslim parties’ “victory” on the situation of other religious communities, e. g. Christians, Copts, in Egypt, Jews and Christians in Tunisia? And what chances and prospects are still left of building civil societies? New situations bring new challenges and require new answers, as we said last year. Encouraged by the discussions that we had and, in view of the aforementioned recent developments in the Arab Islamic world, it seems therefore more than appropriate that we should continue our study of this area. All the more so as, from the very beginning, our aim as EAF has been, and remains, not only to provide a forum for dialogue, but also to establish a network that might be described as an attempt to create an awareness of being and remaining neighbours, who belong to one and the same neighbourhood, irrespective of whether we live on this or that side of the Mediterranean. Thus we hope to contribute towards the building of a civil society across the Mediterranean. Following along these lines, the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation –Rabat office, and the Center for Cross Cultural Learning in Rabat agreed to organize and jointly host this new EAF consultation, to discuss these new challenges and to look for the new answers and solutions which are needed. At this point, I would like to extend my thanks to our partners, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Center for Cross Cultural Learning and their respective representatives, for their readiness to work with us, thus giving us this opportunity to convene here in Rabat and discuss matters related to the question – “religion and its role in re-shaping revolutionary / post-revolution societies – chance or threat to the building of civil society?” Once again, a very warm welcome to you all. I hope this will be a fruitful consultation process for us all. Thank you for your attention. Prof. Dr Stefan Schreiner European Abrahamic Forum (EAF)

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Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very honoured to have been invited to address the distinguished participants of the IV International European Abrahamic Forum Consultation. May I express my sincere thanks to the Coordinator of the European Abrahamic Forum, Prof. Stefan Schreiner, as well as to the representatives of the Zürcher Lehrhaus Foundation, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Centre for Cross Cultural Learning Rabat for this initiative. Since 2005, the Forum is engaged in interreligious dialogue including all three Abraham- ic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – and in building bridges across and around the Mediterranean. Its aim and activity have become even more important since the popular upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East last year. Where in consequence democratic reforms were undertaken, they reinforced political plurality of these societies and created political space for parties which refer explicitly to Islam. In Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Libya they rose to power by free elections, though they don’t govern alone, but form in each case a coalition government. In Morocco the Islamic “Justice and Development” party governs together with the conservative nationalist party Istiqlal, the conservative party “Popular movement” with roots in rural Morocco and the ex-communist party of “Progress and Socialism” (PPS). During the last decades, Morocco has experienced in addition a vast and diversified development of civil society, militating in favour of universal human rights, women rights, and cultural rights or forming Islamic movements outside the political party spectrum. Furthermore, Morocco’s political picture, and its intersection of religion, politics and the public sphere is very much monitored by the royalty, the King being Commander of the Faithful as well as Head of State and “Supreme Arbiter”.

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Following the last year protests, Moroccans new Constitution of July 2011 met some of the demands of the population, even if many of the revised provisions still have to be enforced by law. The new Constitution opened up space for political parties, empowered government and parliament, established a constitutional court and codified the fundamental universal human rights and freedoms along with the primacy of international law. The king is no longer sacred, though the integrity of his person is inviolable. Equal rights for women are recognized as well as the official status of the Amazigh or Berber language. The Constitution portrays Morocco as a convergence of its Arab-Islamic, Amazigh and Saharan-Hassanic components, enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean affluents. The pre-eminence accorded to the Muslim religion is described as consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, moderation, tolerance and dialog for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world. The Constitution guaranties “the freedoms of thought, of opinion and of expression under all their forms”. However, one could observe that during the constitutional reform process there was a non-debate about the liberty of conscience: Whereas the first draft of the new Constitution included a reference to it, it had disappeared in its final version. Correspondingly, there is no explicit quotation of Islamic law in the Constitution, but Morocco maintains and defends its reservation to the UN Conven- tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by referring to the provisions of Islamic Shariah. Looking at the region of North Africa and the Middle East as a whole, Switzerland had already prior to the popular upheavals of 2011 publicly addressed the human rights situation and sought dialogue with all religious groups and civil society actors. Switzerland takes a pragmatic approach by promoting projects that enable parties with differing world views to meet and work together. Such activities have been developed in the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs within the framework of peace promotion since 2004 and go hand-in-hand with others such as the United Nations initiative for the Alliance of Civilizations. In response to the last year’s protests across the region, the Federal Council has adopted as early as in March 2011 a strategy for North Africa, defining three areas of cooperation: Supporting the transition to democratic government and strengthening human rights, promoting economic development and reinforcing partnership to address migration issues. In addition, Switzerland participates actively in the relevant international organizations to promote human rights, including the freedom of religion and belief and to prevent any form of religious intolerance. Quoting our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Federal Counsellor Didier Burkhalter, it is above all through knowledge and through contacts and dialogue in everyday situations, that coexistence of different cultures and religions can be successful. Respect and tolerance through knowledge and education is the basic value of human rights. In this regard, I reiterate my thanks for this invitation and I would like to felicitate all the distinguished participants for the important contribution to build a civil society across the Mediterranean. Dagmar Schmidt Tartagli Conseillère Ambassade de Suisse au Maroc

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Ladies and Gentlemen, سيداتي وسادتي 3.5 mio people live in Berlin. Out of these, one fifth are protestant Christians, 10 % Catho- lic, more than 5 % Muslims, about 1 % Jewish. Many other religions are present, albeit in small numbers, Buddhists, Baha’i, and so on. Yet by far the biggest group, and as a matter of fact an absolute majority of the inhabitants of Berlin, are those who do not belong to any religious group at all. Does that indicate that religion is no longer relevant in Berlin? A few days ago, a Berliner together with his six-year-old daughter was attacked on the street in broad daylight by a bunch of young hooligans only because of his religion. And I need not remind you of the bitter controversy triggered by a regional court in Co- logne who stated that in its view circumcision was tantamount to bodily harm and ought to be outlawed. No - religion remains very relevant, and I do not think an audience in Morocco will beg to disagree with me on this point. The German authorities understand this very well and have long ago initiated a dialogue among various religious groups in our country, but also worldwide. This dialogue is extremely important when it comes to Islam, because relations between Western & Islamic societies are often dominated by misunderstandings and misperceptions. We conduct this dialogue through a wide range of instruments. We attach great importance to activities that stimulate debate, generate new ideas and challenge traditional stereo- types. What we seek is a genuine exchange about values, standpoints and opinions. Such a dialogue cannot be realized merely through political talks at the highest level. What we need are concrete projects with civil society partners that have a long-term impact. Among our most important partners in this respect are the Political Foundations. Through their activities in the fields of civic education and dialogue, they foster mutual understanding and play an important role in the dense network of our cooperation with partners and friends beyond our borders. The presence of four foundations here in Morocco is an indica- tor of the excellent bilateral relationship between Germany and the Kingdom of Morocco. The foundations are free to define their priorities themselves, without any instructions neither from the Foreign Ministry in Berlin nor from the German Embassy in Rabat. Yet I should like to stress that we at the Embassy welcome that the fact the Konrad Adenauer Foundation defines religious dialogue as one of its key fields of activity. I would like take this opportunity to express our support for the work of the KAF as well as the other foundations here in Morocco. Finally, my deep gratitude to the European Abrahamic Forum and to all those who par- ticipated in the organization of this event. .Thank you very much ,شكرا جزيال لكل المشاركين Christoph Blosen Service de presse Ambassade d’Allemagne Rabat (Maroc) - XIII -

Texts and Reflections

Farah Cherif D’Ouezzan (Rabat / Morocco)

In recent news Morocco has been presented as a country that is described as rather an exception, because it remained stable throughout the waves of the Arab Spring, or because it was able to suggest reforms to subdue the anger of the streets, the reason for that being that it is a country that has strong monar- chical foundations. In this introduction to the Moroccan experience, I am speaking from the perspective of a Moroccan citizen, who has done research in comparative religion, worked in the field of cross-cultural understanding, and a participant observer of the changes that happened, and are still happening in my country. I do not represent any trend; I am basing my argument both on my own readings and on my experience as an educator of cross-cultural learning. I will raise four points focusing on Morocco with the hope they will trigger an interest on the broader topic of re-shaping societies in transition in the Arab-Islamic World.

THE TENANTS OF MOROCCANNESS: I believe that Moroccans feel very strong about four foundations that reflect who they are: territory or homeland, monarchy, religious homogeneity and ethnic and tribal diversity. (1) When speaking about territory, I have in mind the questions: where do the Moroccans live? What is the territory that is considered to be Morocco? Although the borders of Morocco have changed over the centuries, Mo- rocco as it exists today constitutes a stable nation an country extending from Tangier to the Sahara. The international community has not recognized the Sahara as Moroccan or being part of Morocco, however, there is a solid consensus among Moroccans that the Sahara belongs to them and is an unquestioned part of “their” Morocco. (2) Monarchy: Morocco has always been a monarchy, and in spite of the fall of monarchies elsewhere including the Arab World, in Morocco the monarchy remained stable. There is a large, general consensus that the monarchy symbolizes the unity of the Moroccan nation. The Arab Spring has demon-

- 17 - The Moroccan Experience

strated that the monarchy was neither questioned nor rejected. There has been pressure, indeed, for a need of change and reform, but this is not a new phenomenon in Morocco, and there are several moments of our history where Moroccans have claimed to more freedom, more dignity, and more equality. (3) Religious homogeneity: The large majority of Moroccans are Muslims. In spite of the proximity of Morocco to the Christian world, Moroccans did not embrace Christianity. The Jews have constituted the only religious minority in the country. Throughout history Moroccan Jews have had a significant impact on Moroccan culture, economy, and politics. (4) Ethnic and tribal diversity: The Moroccans are made up of diverse tribes, ethnic groups and races due to the tribal structure of the country due to migrations from the Arab world, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Andalusia. The present constitution of Morocco is the first in history that recognizes explicitly this diversity. The tribal system has melted with the modern political, social, and economic approach that Morocco has taken; the presence of diversity has imposed itself strongly on the Moroccan reality.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: Moroccans are very attached to the tenants of their Moroccanness, and consider stability as part of the continuity of these tenants. Yet, they also aspire at seeing positive and continuous change as long as this change does not threaten the foundations of their country and life. These tenants were consolidated over the centuries by family structures, religion, cultural traditions, tribal solidarities, and attachment to the nation especially during moments of wars and conflicts with neighbors. Moroccans want to see a modernity that does not exclude tradition(s); they want autonomy as long as the family remains strong and present in case of need; they want reforms, freedom and respect of the universal human rights as long as it is compatible with their understanding of their religion; they also want the monarchy to reform itself and offer better options for better lives. Moroccans believe that continuity is in the hand of those who are “responsible” for making political decisions, and not in the hand of the people. There has been indeed some growing criticism in the country against certain aspects of traditional and archaic methods, however, it remains very limited and does not call for any radical changes. Family, religion, traditions, community, and the nation remain very important foundations and guarantees of continuity. While Morocco has maintained these tenants, the country has nevertheless witnessed significant transformations due to urbanization, education, and the rise of the individual as a consequence of modernization. Economic and cultural exchange with the rest of the world has strengthened the globalization of Morocco as well.

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What one sees in Morocco today in terms of the role of women, the uses of new technologies (internet, tramway), etc., are indicators of these significant changes. While these changes have led to instability in other parts of the world, Mo- rocco succeeded in maintaining an impressive political stability.

CHALLENGES: However, stable as it is, the country faces important challenges that I would like to summarize as follows: (1) Religious extremism: People are using different appellations to religious extremism, such as terrorism, fundamentalism, Islamism. I define religious extremism as the one-dimensional perspective of oneself and the rejection of the other. However, this form of extremism does not only touch the religious groups and minds. Since rejecting the other is also reflected through any thought or action where lack of tolerance and acceptance of the difference is the reason for considering everybody else to be wrong. Some of the Moroccans act this way due to several forms of phobias: phobia of the male, of the female, of the neighbours, of the rural and other cultures, religions, countries, etc. (2) The other in this case, is not only the outsider to the country, but the other can also originate within society, such as the neighbours next door, the women, the gender roles, the rural people, the other tribe, the next region, the larger or smaller or newer city… (3) These phobias are deepened due to several realities, such as underdevelopment or different forms of authoritarianisms. (4) Underdevelopment appears in Morocco under different aspects, such as poverty, illiteracy (40% of the population being illiterate), poor health conditions, corruption, unfair judicial system; these are also major challenges to Morocco today. (5) Authoritarianisms both of State and society threaten the peaceful coexistence within Morocco. A lack of transparency, communication, and misin- formation could lead to creating more anger and thus create a loss of trust between the people, their leaders and their societal systems. Moroccans do not differ from many other people in this world who, even though they live in the most democratic systems, at times lack confidence in those systems, and demand changes and reforms and claim them by using the streets, social media, strikes, and boycott.

PROSPECTS: In my opinion, there are two views about the prospects of Morocco in the near future: One view is a rather pessimistic one. According to it, the future of Mo- rocco to some extent looks bleak, threatened by violence, wars, conflicts, and –

- 19 - The Moroccan Experience isolationism. I read this time and again in some writings by both Moroccans and non-Moroccans. The other view is an optimistic view that is focusing on the solid existence within Morocco of a long and persistent history of (mutual) understanding, tolerance, acceptance of the other, dialogue, and pluralism. My view is somehow between both those views; I am not as pessimistic nor as optimistic; however, I see that there is a possibility, and chance, of positive prospects which require constant hard work in the areas of cross-cultural education and learning both among Moroccans as well as between Moroccans and the rest of the world.

There is no one global culture, and there is no possibility of its existence one day. There has been, and there will be only diverse and different cultures. Mohammed Abed Al-Jaberi, Moroccan Philosopher (Figuig, Morocco 1936 – 2010 Rabat)

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Prof. Dr Muhammad A. Sharqawi (Cairo / Egypt)

First of all I would like to thank the organizing committee of this conference for inviting me to take part in this meeting. I would also like to extend my thanks to Professor Schreiner and to all my esteemed colleagues, the participants of the conference. I am very pleased to be present here to speak to you about current developments in Egypt, a year and a half on from the glorious Revolution of 25th January. Egypt deserves to be a democratic state that enjoys stability, political strength and economic growth. We Egyptians believe that this is achievable, and that we can build this democratic, stable, and strong state, as will be demonstrated in this presentation. We are of the firm conviction that the stability and strength of Egypt is vital to the Arab and Muslim world, as well as to Africa and the West. Our goal is to place Egypt on track to start the journey of achieving the demands of the Revolution by the end of 2012. Over the past year and a half, Egypt has been struggling through hard times of change and transformation. In this period we have overthrown the Mubarak regime, elected a civil president, ended military rule, and made preparations for the drafting of a new constitution that will pave the way for a civil democratic state. We look forward to having this new constitution within a couple of months, followed by parliamentary elections within the next four months.

THE CRUCIAL QUESTION NOW IS: THE VICTORY OF MUSLIM PARTIES – AN OPPORTUNITY OR A THREAT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIVIL SOCIETY? It is, indeed, too early to give a clear or sound answer to this question, but – judging by the current discussion, public debates and events – we can assume that the rise of Muslim parties does not create any kind of threat to the building of a civil society. It has to be pointed out here, however, that establishing a civil society is conditional on the presence of a well-founded civil state. It is, therefore, essential to discuss first of all what a civil state actually means in the Egyp-

- 21 - The Egyptian Experience tian context, before going on to explore the idea of a civil society in relation to the political rise of Muslim parties in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

THE CIVIL STATE According to the majority of Egyptians, a civil state is a democratic constitutional state in which there is neither military rule nor theocracy (such as in Eu- rope in the Middle Ages, or Iran or the Taliban in the present days). In the Egyptian context, the civil state can only be translated into reality by fulfilling the two crucial conditions of ending military rule and adopting a modern and democratic constitution. 1. Ending military rule: Military regimes are, by default and definition, not democratic. They can, therefore, never form a civil democratic state. Military rule started in Egypt in 1952 and continued for more than 60 years, until its official end on 14th August 2012, with the presidential decree of annulment of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This was a drastic incident in Egypt's modern history and represented a huge step, much applauded by the Egyptian people. Politically speaking, it is a step towards 2. Adopting a modern and democratic constitution: This issue is very critical because the constitution must guarantee the civility of the state and must precisely define the relationship between religion and state. This relationship is highlighted in the second article of the former Egyptian constitution (1971) which is still valid in the short term, until a new constitution has been prepared and adopted. The second article reads as follows: Islam is the religion of the state; Arabic is its official language and the principles of the Islamic law (Sharia) are the primary source of legislation.

ORIGIN OF THE SECOND ARTICLE: This article is essentially based upon article 149 of the Egyptian constitution of 1923. It was entitled: “General Rules” and it stated that Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is the official language. The committee that was set up to draft this constitution was made up of thirty members; six of these were non-Muslims (five Christians and one Jew), among them Bishop Yo'anes, Archbishop of the Coptic Orthodox Egyptian Church and secretary to the Pope, and Yusuf ‘Aslan Qattawi (Cattaui) Pasha, then president of the Sephardi Jewish Community Council of Cairo. All of the thirty members accepted and welcomed this article. The philosophical background behind the second article: The second article is revealing in the sense that it reflects a cultural and sociological reality and describes an Islamic identity that already exists, a reality

- 22 - The Egyptian Experience which is deeply rooted in Egyptian society, and does not impose a new condi- tion or a new identity on Egypt. This means that, in Egypt, complete separation of state and religion is unre- alistic. This does not contradict the idea of a civil state. Nevertheless, in both the legislative and the executive domain, some separation must exist between the State, on the one hand, and Muslim and Christian leaders, on the other. Members of the legislative and/or executive bodies must fulfil their duties as politicians, not as leaders of a given religious community. The philosophical foundation of this principle is related to the concept of the centrality of the human being, a concept which emerged with the advance- ment of secularism, and which denies any affiliation of holiness that goes beyond the human race. The human being with his or her logos (human mind) and scientific skills is seen as representing the centre, and is the measure of all things. In Islam and Eastern Christianity, however, God is perceived as being the centre of the universe and not the human being. This way of viewing things is what has caused Egyptian political parties on both sides to emphasize the importance of keeping the second article in the new Egyptian constitution, both those parties with an Islamic reference and those without such reference. Moreover, Islam also rejects the historical model of the Western religious state. The majority of Muslim scholars perceive the State in Islam as being a civil one, yet with an Islamic philosophical reference base. This Muslim rejection of the religious state has moved on from the level of ideological conviction to one of application, as demonstrated by the presence of those political parties in Egypt such as: Al-Wasat Party and the Muslim Broth- erhood, who emphasize in their (new) political agendas their belief in a civil state with an Islamic philosophical base. Among those Muslim scholars mentioned above, we can include Muham- mad ʽAbduh, ʽAbdul Raziq al-Sanhuri, Hasan Ashmawi, Tawfiq al-Shawi, and Muhammad Salim al-ʽAwa. Al-Sanhuri sees that it is necessary to make a distinction between Islam and the Muslim state, because religion refers to God-man relationship, whereas state affairs are a matter of the human mind and vary according to time, place and development; nonetheless this should take place within the framework of the philosophy of religion. This leads us to be able to say that, whilst the mainstream view of the Mus- lim state is that it is not in agreement with the religious state, it does possess some attributes of secular state. On the basis of the aforementioned, we can conclude that there is consensus among Muslim scholars that the State in Islam is not religious, but that it could almost be said to bear close resemblance to a secular state, for example in the way it views certain state issues, such as the nation being the source of authority, and its being responsible for the appointment and dismissal of rulers. It

- 23 - The Egyptian Experience is rule by the people, in which the Heads of State are not regarded as God’s representatives on earth. Let us not make the mistake of assuming that the importance of religion seen here is only present in, and limited to, Eastern or Islamic societies. The impact which religion has on Western societies is likewise undeniable. As Prof. Stefan Schreiner said: “Only two or three decades ago it was generally accepted that the process of increasing secularization would, to a great extent, lead to the marginalization of religion and religious communities, if not quite leading to their disappearance or, at least, loss of influence. It was generally assumed that they would thus lose their importance as political and social factors, at least in our – secular – societies. Today, however, we know this assumption to have been wrong. On the contrary, religion, religions and religious communities are once again playing a significant role, not only within the public consciousness, but also as factors to be considered in politics and in society.” Reviewing the political life in Christian and post-Christian countries in the twentieth century, one cannot overlook the fact that, and the way that, Christian-Democratic parties have emerged and flourished in Western Europe, and indeed are still flour- ishing. They are making a fundamental contribution to the democratization of these countries, for example in Germany and Italy, countries which had previ- ously experienced some of the most authoritarian forms of government of the twentieth century. These parties were – and to some extent remain – moderate- ly religious parties in their outlook.

THE NATURE OF THE ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEM: There cannot be said to be any particular or specific political system that has been dictated by or even suggested by Islamic teachings. Thus, we cannot label any of the well-known systems (monarchy, republic, Khilafa or Caliphate, etc.) as being either Islamic or non-Islamic. However, Islam does give some specifications or rules which qualify a ruling system as being Islamic, in the sense that the said system follows principles developed by Islamic teachings. These principles are: (1) Shura (Arabic word for “consultation”. The Holy Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad advised and encourage Muslims to deal with their affairs in consultation with those who will be affected by the decisions made and with field related experts). (2) Equality between all citizens. (3) Justice. (4) Eligibility: He who reaches a position of power must gain the acceptance and support of the people (by way of baiʾa or election) and remains in duty as long as he is needed. (5) Freedom and dignity. (6) Responsibility.

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These are the main principles which can be derived directly from the Qur’an and Sunnah. Once they have been implemented into a ruling system, it then qualifies to being “Islamic”. There is no disagreement among Shariʽa scholars concerning these principles. It is also very clear that the principles referred to in the second article are consistent with the main principles inherent in the revealed religions, as well as with the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which serves to ensure justice and equal rights for all citizens. In the meantime, after January 25th, 2011, there has been vehement debate about this second article. The views and arguments of the main contenders involved in the debate on this issue (that is, Al-Azhar scholars, the political parties, representatives of the Copts and Coptic Church, as well as intellectuals interested in the issue), can be summarized as follows: 1. Al Azhar's declaration concerning the relation between religion and state: Al-Azhar (the Major Sunni Islamic institution in the Islamic world), participating in the current debate, came up with the following important declaration, issued after due consultation with Egyptian intellectuals: We declare that we have reached consensus to the following principles which outline the nature of an enlightened Islamic reference point embodied in a number of comprehensive issues derived from definite and sound religious texts, reflecting a sound understanding of religion: First: Supporting the establishment of a modern, constitutional democratic nation-state, based on a constitution accepted by the nation, which separates between the State’s authorities and its legal ruling institutions; determines the boundaries of governance; guarantees the equal rights and duties of its citizens and offers the people’s representatives the power of legislation in accordance with the precepts of true Islam, a religion that has never, throughout its history, experienced a theocratic State such as that humanity has suffered from in certain historical periods. In contrast, Islam allowed people to administer their societies and choose the mechanisms and institutions that would best serve their interests, provided that the principles of Islamic Law (Shariʿa) are the main source of legislation, and guarantee that the followers of other heavenly religions would have recourse to their own religious laws in matters of personal status. Second: Embracing the democratic system, based on free and direct elections, which represents the modern formula of implementing the Islamic precept of Shura (consultation). Democracy guarantees pluralism, peaceful rotation of power, and role identification, perfor- mance monitoring, accountability to the people, seeking public interests in all legislations and decisions, governing by the rule of law and nothing but the law, tracking corruption, and ensuring complete transparency and freedom of information. Third: Commitment to a system of freedom of thought and expression, with full respect to human rights and the rights of women and children, while emphasizing plurality and full respect of all heavenly religions, and to citizenship as a social responsibility. Fourth: Full respect of difference and the ethics of dialogue; and the necessity of prohib- iting labelling others as disbelievers or traitors, and abusing religion to disunite and pit

- 25 - The Egyptian Experience citizens against each other; considering incitement of religious strife or sectarian and racist calls as crimes against the nation; and the promotion of even dialogue and mutual respect among citizens without any discrimination in rights and duties among citizens. Fifth: Commitment to all international conventions, resolutions and insistence of the achievement of human civilization in the realm of human relations as consistent with the tolerant Arab and Islamic traditions, the extensive cultural experience of Egyptians throughout the ages, and with the examples of peaceful co-existence they set up throughout the ages seeking the welfare of humanity at large. Sixth: Full commitment to preserving the dignity of the Egyptian nation and its national pride, to protecting and fully respecting places of worship of the followers of the three heavenly religions, to safeguarding the free and unrestricted practices of all religious rites, to respecting different worship practices without demeaning the people’s culture and traditions, and to maintaining freedom of artistic and literary expression and creativity within the context of our established cultural values. Seventh: Education and scientific research are the cornerstones of development in Egypt. All efforts should be geared at catching up with what we missed in these areas, mobilizing the community to eliminate illiteracy, and investing in human resources to achieve major projects. Eighth: The adoption of the principle of jurisprudential priorities in achieving development and social justice, fighting despotism and corruption, and eliminating unemployment. Harnessing community energies on the economic, social, cultural and media levels should be the people’s top priority; noting that adequate and serious health care is a duty of the State toward all citizens. The al-Azhar scholars and intellectuals who drafted this declaration urge all Egyptian political parties to commit their efforts to Egypt’s political, economic and social development in accordance with the principles stated in this declaration. 2. Al-Azhar's second declaration of rights and freedoms: In addition to the declaration quoted above, al-Azhar also issued a second declaration to explain the relationship between the principles of Islamic Law (Sha- riʽa) and public freedoms. This declaration focussed on four main points: (1) Freedom of Religion: The divine texts (Qur’an and Sunnah) and the constitution confirm freedom of religion for every citizen. There are many Qur’anic verses which confirm this interpretation, for example: “There is no compulsion in religion” (Surah 2, Verse: 256), and “Say the truth from the Lord, then who so ever will, let him believe, and who so ever will, let him disbelieve” (Su- rah 18, Verse 29). Of course, the freedom of religion leads to the recognition of religious pluralism. Al-Azhar confirmed that all citizens are equal regardless of their religion or sex.

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(2) Freedom of Scientific Research (3) Freedom of opinion and expression (4) Freedom of artistic and literary creativity and innovation: arts and literature reflect society and contribute to creating progress by raising public awareness. How the political parties have dealt with the second article: All of the Egyptian political parties – regardless of their ideological background – have emphasized in their programs the importance of the second article of the Egyptian constitution and the necessity of its existence in the new constitution. 3. The Free Egyptians Party: Founded by a Christian businessman after the Revolution of 25th January, this party is considered to be a very liberal party and one of the main opponents to the Islamic parties. The party’s programs states: We clearly support the existence of the second article in the new constitution, in addition to the rights of the other religious groups to follow their own religions' teachings in the family rules. The party considers that the effective implementation of the Islamic sharia principles is the real assurance to the achievement of justice, freedom and equality for all citizens without any discrimination. 4. Al-Nour Party: The Salafi party Al-Nour believes that the second article must be present in the new constitution and, further, that the principles of Islamic Shariʽa should form the main source of legislation. However, the party promises that it will allow Christians to have their own separate laws for their internal matters. 5. Freedom and Justice Party: The Muslim Brotherhood party declares in its political program: Granting the people their deserved freedoms and establishing an enlightened viable political system, the rules and principles necessary to ensure a sound democratic political life where political parties and national stakeholders race in an honest, free and fair competi- tion for the votes of the People, who are the source of authority. That is real pluralism which safeguards the people's freedom. They also call for the executive power to be held accountable, as well as for a truly peaceful transfer and distribution of power. Thus they hope to achieve an overall stability and to provide a healthy environment for integrated development and social justice and real leadership; this would lead to the establishment of the features of the desired civil Islamic State. A new constitution is required, using the principles of Shariʽa in an enlightened form as its frame of reference, and the source of its articles, and subsequent changes in the legal system would then be needed. This would safeguard the entire social, economic, political, and other rights of the Egyptian citizens, yet without prejudice. Granting citizens freedom and rights is seen as the way forward on order to

- 27 - The Egyptian Experience engage their energies and abilities in active, effective participation and interac- tion in the progress, development and defence of their country. The wise and wonderful words of Caliph ‛Umar still ring true across time: When did you en- slave people who were born free?! 6. Al-Wasat Party: This party asserts that its aim is to promote a tolerant version of Islam with liberal tendencies. As proof of this openness, its founder Abu ’l-‛Ala Madi high- lights the fact that there are two Copts and three women are among the party’s top 24 members. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, al-Wasat “seeks to interpret Islamic sharia principles in a manner consistent with the values of a liberal democratic system. Although al-Wasat advocates a political system that is firmly anchored in Islamic law, it also views sharia principles as flexible and wholly compatible with the principles of pluralism and equal citizenship rights”. The party's manifesto accepts the right of a Christian to become Head of State also in a country with a Muslim majority population. Madi compares the ideology of his party to that of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP). 7. Egyptian Copts opinion regarding the second article: There are indeed some Egyptian Copts who do oppose the second article; most of them do not live in Egypt, however. It is clear that many of the Christian leaders of thought and opinion, both clerics and secularists, in fact support its existence. They do not see it as posing any kind of threat, or as restricting their (minority) rights as Egyptian citizens. Let us quote the late Pope Shenouda III, who said: “Copts under Islamic law (Shari‛a) will be happier and safer, and this was how they were in the past when the Islamic law was dominant. We hope that the true Islamic Law can be dominant again and the great Islamic Rule ‘Every citizen enjoys equal rights regardless of his/her religion’. The regime has been acquiring laws from abroad for decades, and we (the Christians) don’t have the detailed laws that Islamic laws have. So how can we accept the foreign laws and don’t accept Islam!?” In addition to that: yesterday I spoke to my friend, Bishop Yuhanna Kolta, Vice Patriarch of the Catholic Coptic Church, and I asked him for his opinion on the second article. He answered: “I completely agree to be an Egyptian Christian under Islamic civilization, my culture is 100% Islamic and I am a member of this civilization, I affect it and get affected by it… The prophet Muhammad (pbuh) allowed the Yemeni Christians to perform their Passover prayers inside his holy mosque. This Islamic civilization urges the Islamic state to fight for the sake of the Christian captives, and it emphasizes the dignity of humans… So it honours me, and I am proud to be a Christian living in an Is- lamic state and being a member of the Islamic civilization.” The vice president of the Egyptian Anglican Copts said: “Muslims have been always committed to preserving the rights, safety, peace and freedom of

- 28 - The Egyptian Experience their non-Muslim fellow-citizens – especially Christians – through all of the historical periods.” Margret Azer, a Christian political activist and Member of Parliament says: “I am pretty sure that the Copts are not worried about the implementation of the Islamic Shari‛a laws. They have lived under the Islamic laws since the constitution of 1923 and 1971 and they haven’t suffered from any problems.” Many Egyptian Christian secularist intellectuals hold the same view, including George Ishak, Amin Eskandar, Raouf Nazmi, among others. Answering the question as to the effect of the revolution on the Christian- Muslim relationship, we can safely say that there is strong belief that the spirit of the Egyptian revolution will support the rebuilding of a great and very positive relationship between Egyptian Christians and Muslims. It has become quite clear that the problems that arose between Christians and Muslims before the revolution were, in most cases, the results of the dictatorship and the former regime. This regime made a point of ensuring that relations between Muslims and Christians remained in a state of conflict, in order to find an excuse for breaking the rules and working beyond the law. The former regime also worked on encouraging conflicts within the Christian communities themselves, such as those conflicts between the Orthodox Christians and the other Catholic and Protestant Christians in Egypt, in such a way as to enable the dictatorship to feed on the dispersions between the Egyptian people. Thanks to the revolution, a spirit of unity and dialogue has been allowed to come to the fore, one which will build strong bridges between all the religious groups and faith communities inside Egypt. It is worth mentioning in this context that some of the 1egal experts, such as the judge Tareq al-Beshri, are seeking to ensure that the second article sup- ports the rights of the non-Muslim citizens in Egypt. (The percentage of Coptic Christians in Egypt is close to the percentage of Muslims living in Germany.) Most significantly, a process of reform is taking place within the Orthodox Church, and I trust that, as a consequence of this process, the mood of Islamo- phobia should, and will, disappear from the Christian media in Egypt. A DIFFERENT FUTURE I would like to assure you that there is no way that Egypt can become another Iran or Afghanistan, for the following reasons: a) The nature of the cultural and religious reality prevalent in Egypt promotes moderation. b) The existence of al-Azhar and Dar al-‛Ulum, two of the most important and respected educational institutions in the Islamic world. They are working on the teaching and dissemination of the true Islam. c) If we look at the agendas and political programs and declarations of all the political parties in Egypt, Islamist and others, we find that all of them empha-

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size the civil, democratic nature of the Egyptian state. Further, they all acknowledge its Islamic culture and history and believe in the principles of the Islamic Shari‛a as being the reference and source of legislation in such state. d) Even the so-called Islamists are now revising and rapidly amending their views towards democracy and civil society. e) The various Islamist politicians on the current scene come from a range of different backgrounds. There are those from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, Al-Wasat Party members and others who are independent. This diversity opens the door for free discourse and healthy discussion between the different groups.

CIVIL SOCIETY The preceding review, which showed how significant and vital the civil state is in the Egyptian case, was necessary in order to highlight the point that a civil society in Egypt would be protected by the existence of a civil state. The proof for this can be seen in the fact that, for Egyptians, a civil society is not a new, let alone alien, concept. It is worthy of note that Egypt in fact enjoyed a strong and solid civil society for many decades throughout its history, during the time when it was ruled by a monarch. However, this civil state vanished after the 1952 coup d’etat which marked the beginning of military rule in Egypt. The establishment of a civil state in Egypt will, therefore, eventually lead to the rise of a healthy civil society which exhibits all the features of social inter- dependence and social tolerance (with real NGO’s and non-profit making organizations having an active and extended impact on society, supporting all forms of human rights and dignity, and playing an important role in detecting violations carried out against society). In addition to this, there will be strong and healthy relations between Muslims and Christians, reviving the Charitable Endowment system that formerly operated in Egypt, and, finally, healthy extended relations with European civil societies. It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian president Dr. Morsi has emphasized several times: “Egypt is now a civil state, which means that it is a modern, constitutional, democratic and national state.” CONCLUSION: EUROPEAN NATIONS: In conclusion, it is highly important to point out that the Egyptian people and other Arab and Islamic nations value the role of the European nations in supporting the Egyptian revolution and other uprisings in the Arab world. Yet, such support needs to be turned into government actions. We ask you to stand behind your governments and put pressure on them to change their attitudes and stop supporting dictatorships and military rules (and rulers) in our countries, but rather to foster the creation of civil states which will pave the way for the formation of civil society. Only then can we achieve what we hope and dream of: a free democratic country.

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Ambassador Hasan Abu Nimah (Amman / Jordan)

Eruption of violence has been causing serious concern in Jordan for many valid reasons. Syria is an immediate neighbour whose citizens need no visa to enter Jordan (it is also the same for Jordanians); therefore, an influx of Syrian refugee waves which was expected, was soon realized. Jordan has also security as well as serious economic consequences as a result of what looks like a prolonged period of internal trouble in the Northern Jordanian neighbour. Let me first remind that Jordan has over the decades been used to refugee waves from neighbouring countries. The first wave came from Palestine during the first Arab Israeli war in 1947-1948. What both Jordanian hosts and Palestin- ians escaping the woes of war believed would be a brief movement remains until this day over six decades after. The Palestinians who crossed the Jordan River east in large numbers and settled in various Jordanian cities, in refugee camps in the Jordan valley and around Amman, in Zarqa and elsewhere had helped to create an economic boom in the country. They were warmly welcomed as the East Jordanians were deeply involved in the Palestine issue. They strongly supported the Palestinian struggle and the Jordanian army was the main force to defend Palestinian land. It actually did save the Eastern part of Jerusalem and the West Bank. The second wave of Palestinian refugees came into Jordan, also in large numbers in 1967 when Israel invaded and occupied the West Bank and Arab Jerusalem. Although access to the West Bank has been possible, with much difficulty though, many of those who left in 1967 were not allowed to return. With time the second wave was absorbed. The third Palestinian wave arrived in Jordan from the Gulf countries during the first Iraq war in 1991-1992. Most of the Jordanians working in the Gulf states, numbering hundreds of thousands with their families, were forced to leave Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and others because, both the PLO and Jordan were accused of supporting Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Those expatriates who came with their savings managed to

- 31 - The Jordanian Experience stimulate the economy and as a result helped to create a favourable economic boom. Most of them remained in the country since then. This same period witnessed the first Iraqi refugee wave. Iraqis who also did not need visas to enter Jordan crossed the desert West to seek safety in Jordan. The 1991-92 war had also forced other foreign and Asian workers to flee Iraq across Jordan in transit back home. Jordan at the time had to cope with close to a million refugees, arrange temporary shelter for them until they were able to proceed to their native countries. That was an enormous task for Jordan to cope with. During the period when the UN paced Iraq under a strict regime of economic sanctions from (1992-2003), Iraqis, mainly without resources, continued to arrive, engage in any kind of illegal employment, and add to the country’s economic burdens by providing Iraqi guests with schooling, health care and any other services. They were provided the same services as the Jordanians. Many more Iraqis came after the 3003 war. This time they came with lots of cash, they purchased property, owned big cars which consumed much subsi- dized petrol, they also needed schools and other services for their accompany- ing families. They did stimulate some economic movement but they also pushed property prices, and indeed other prices, up to the extent that they became unaffordable for many Jordanians. More than any time before Iraqi presence in Jordan became clearly, and quite uncomfortably, visible. Many Iraqi former and current officials chose to reside in Jordan. At some point estimates of Iraqis in Jordan ranged from 750,000 to over one million. Many Iraqis are still resident in Jordan today. Movement of Iraqis into Jordan was restricted following the simultaneous terrorist attacks on 4 hotels in the Jordanian capital of Amman on 9 November 2005 leaving more than 70 people dead. The perpetrators came from Iraq. Before I move to Syria, I would like to remind that Jordan had in the past (in the 20’s of last century) received other waves of Caucasian, Chechnyan, Bosnian and other incomers, who settled the country and now constitute an integral part of the Jordanian society.

SYRIA: Eruption of violence has taken both Jordanian people and authorities by sur- prise. It started quite close to the Jordanian border in the southern Syrian town of Der’a, just across the border from the Jordanian town of Ramtha. There is no space between Jordan and Syria with much contact across the border in between neighbouring towns and villages. Many hoped the trouble in Syria would not last, but it did. There is a lot of movement of people and goods between Jordan and Syria. We import food, vegetables, fruits, manufactured products, clothing, house- wares and many other essentials at reasonable prices from Syria. We also export

- 32 - The Jordanian Experience a lot. Syria is also our transit route to and from Lebanon and Turkey, and further afield. Most of our imports from Turkey, Lebanon and Europe come across Syria. Much of the traffic across Jordan into the Gulf States comes across Syria too. Disruption of such huge amount of traffic has been causing us in Jordan some difficulties that will increase with time. It will put further strain on our economy. Syrians used to cross and work in Jordan where needed without difficulty. They also visited. Jordanians made daily tours in Syria for shopping and vaca- tioning without difficulty too. The trip from Amman to Damascus is about 2 hours. That has been slowing down. Economically, Jordan stands to loose with a prolonged crisis in Syria. Syrian refugees in smaller numbers started to arrive right from the beginning, but they merged with friend or relatives. The phenomenon was not that obvious until they started arriving in larger numbers and needed help. Not many of them were able to find or even afford accommodation on their own. The authorities at that point had to deal with the issue. The impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordan has economic/humanitarian, security, and political dimensions. I will take them one by one, beginning with the economic/humanitarian. The Syrian situation evolved at a time when Jordan was facing severe economic difficulties of its own. On top of the limitless demands Jordanians themselves were pressing their government to meet it was hard to respond with ease to additional burdens related to Syrian neighbours. They needed shelter, food, Water, electricity, schools, medical care, administrative help and protection. The burden would be proportional to size and the size of the incoming population was steadily and fast increasing. At the beginning the government was reluctant to build camps but that became inevitable. Despite the risks involved, on top of the cost, Jordan for obvious humanitarian reasons could not close the border. Also Syrian neighbours are close to us and our historic ties, blood ties, daily dealings and cordial relations would not allow border closure. At the same time it is highly risky to allow any one in without checking their identities and intentions. The risk of infiltrators with different agendas was not to be taken lightly following the Iraqi experience, and bearing mind president Assad threats that he would destabilize the whole region if his position would be threatened. One refugee camp was opened to house the refugee body but problems started to emerge. People there protested the quality of life although the Jorda- nian authorities did their best under the circumstances of course. There were clashes with the police resulting in injuries to the police themselves. Expected help from the international community has been meager; well below the bare minimum. The situation is likely to worsen if the numbers increase or if the trouble takes much longer.

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There was also a security concern. No country in the region would be wise to open its borders without control in a region where many groups, terrorists and extremists included would take advantage. Already some infiltrators across the Syrian border were caught with sinister communication devices in their possession. They entered as refugees. That was one reason for keeping people in controlled camps; not an ideal situation but what safer alternative did the Jordanians have? The political implications have been no less complex. The Syrian Jordanian political relations have always been tense and complex. The Jordanian government dealt with the Syrian case very cautiously. It did not rush to condemn the regime for its brutal onslaught on its people, its failure to introduce meaningful reform and to show any willingness to end a four- decade old dictatorship. Jordan did that in the hope of reducing the level of resulting hostility. At the same time the Jordanian authorities were unable to ignore the deterioration, the senselessness of the Assad regime and the cruelty it was subjecting the Syrian population to, particularly while the Arab League was taking tough positions and actions. Jordan refused to sever diplomatic relations or to intervene directly lest that may aggravate the situation. Unfortunately the situation is rapidly worsening and so is the level of death and destruction. There are no signs at the end of the tunnel so far.

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Dr Naseef Naeem (Göttingen / Germany) & Kai Kreutzberger (London / UK)

From a political science perspective, Syria today can be described as drifting towards fragility and on the verge of becoming a “failed state”. From a constitutional and public law point of view, new “asymmetrical” local power structures are emerging. Restoring a functioning legal order on the state level in Syria will thus likely be a difficult task. In spite of this, it would be wrong to declare a failure of the current Syrian legal system per se and to dismiss its possible role in creating a functional framework for reform. After all, the Syrian legal and judicial system has proven over the years to be a functional structure—albeit not without deficiencies. This paper seeks to focus on a number of topical aspects in Syrian constitutional theory and legal reality that could form the basis of a project to reform Syrian constitutional law while taking account of the continuity and stability of the legal order.

I. THE CONSTITUTION IN THEORY AND REALITY It would be naïve to assume that the New Syrian Constitution adopted in 2012 could immediately create a novel framework for constitutional thinking an theory. Syrian constitutional theory emerged in the years following independence and was influenced by the attitude of various governments towards constitutional provisions and rights, particularly after the coming to power of the Ba’th- party. The pertinent aspects of the resulting constitutional theory, thinking and mentality can be summarised as follows: 1. A catalogue of basic rights has been a part of all Syrian constitutional documents in force since the founding of the state (see e.g. Articles 33 to 49 of the New Syrian Constitution). However, these constitutional rules are not applied to positive law as a matter of course, neither during the legislative process nor in court. Even the faculties of law do not teach a system- atic procedure for determining the constitutionality of positive laws or de- claring them invalid based on a breach of basic rights. The main reason for this lacking procedure is that not even the Syrian Supreme Constitutional

- 35 - Syrian Experience

Court has a mandate to entertain claims for breaches of the Constitution or complaints based on an infringement of basic rights; this procedure was simply not been conceived to be part of that court's duties. In this regard, Article 146(6)(2) of the New Constitution is a novel development; it envis- ages a procedure allowing the ordinary courts to refer constitutional questions to the Supreme Constitutional Court if these arise in an action before them. This rule might lead to the development of a new constitutional practice allowing claims for breaches of basic rights – i.e. a principle of basic rights protection under the constitution – together with an academic discourse and research effort on that topic. It appears unlikely, however, that the protection of basic rights under Syrian law would take the form of a direct court action open to citizens based on breaches of the Constitu- tion. This comprehensive control mechanism is widely rejected in Syrian constitutional scholarship; likewise, the wider Arab constitutional scholarship has not developed a coherent legal theory on the protection of basic rights yet. 2. The problem of basic rights protection in the framework of a constitution cannot be separated from the more fundamental problems connected with the enforcement of constitutional rights in court. Under the Old Constitu- tion, the Supreme Constitutional Court was in fact responsible for little more than controlling elections for Parliament, and its power even in this area was confined to issuing recommendations for the annulment of parliamentary mandates obtained in breach of law. The final decision on such annulments, however, lay with Parliament. In practice, Parliament invaria- bly chose to ignore the court's recommendations. The New Constitution, in giving the court an outright power to oversee elections both on the presidential and parliamentary level, constitutes a novel development in this regard. Under the Old Constitution, the Supreme Constitutional Court also had – at least in theory – a mandate to review the constitutionality of a law prior to its enactment on an application from the President or a certain number of Members of Parliament. In reality, however, the Supreme Constitutional Court would mostly undertake a form of “unofficial constitutional review”. The Office of the President would raise certain constitutional questions to the court “off the record” at the drafting stage of a new law. These questions, as well as the court's responses, are not made public and do not reach the public sphere or academia. The new constitution does not make any changes to the theoretical mechanism of constitutional review. It introduces a new route of constitutional review on the application of a court in a specific case before it. It does not give the Supreme Constitutional Court a power to adjudicate disputes between different state organs. Furthermore, the appointment of judges remains solely in the hands of the President of the Republic; Parliament does not play a role in this process. A reform of the Supreme Constitutional Court's structure

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could therefore be a suitable topic for future reform projects. Giving the Supreme Constitutional Court a mandate to adjudicate disputes between state organs is also worth considering. The possibility of court proceedings between different branches of the state, including the President, would be a significant departure from the hegemonic traditions of the Ba’th era. 3. Separation of Powers has not been explicitly spelt out in either the Old or the New Constitution. As in case of the German Basic Law, it is however implicit in the manner in which certain rights and duties are allocated to bodies of the Executive, Legislature or Judiciary. However, both in the constitutional text and in legal reality the President exerts a dominant power over the work of all three branches of the state. In addition to being the head of the Executive Branch and presiding over the Council of Ministers, the President is also the de facto main legislative organ in the Syrian state. Besides his power to dissolve parliament, most laws are in fact enacted by presidential decree. Over time, the Office of the President has developed a formal structure for preparing and drafting legislation. It determines topics for future legislation and proposes these to the President. If the President takes the decision to issue a decree concerning a certain topic, the Office of the President will take the necessary steps to prepare that decree in a form allowing it to be enacted. It would normally inform Parliament as well as the Department for Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Justice, but this happens voluntarily without a legal duty to do so. This monopolisation of legislative action in the Office of the President has caused a certain lethargic attitude amongst Members of Parliament and academia, as people have grown accustomed to the President's legislative power and practice. It is therefore imperative when rebuilding the Syrian state structures to convince political and other stakeholders that legislation ought not take the form of diktats “from above”. This means in consequence that the legislative power of the presidential decree must be abolished to strengthen the role and activity of Parliament. 4. The problematic amount of power concentrated in the President under the Syrian constitution is also apparent in his absolute command over the armed forces. The Syrian army is not accountable to Parliament, but solely to the President as its commander-in-chief. The concept of a “Parliament Army” is also largely absent from Syrian constitutional debates, and experiences from the wider Arab region show a tendency – at least at the moment – to stick with concepts of unitary leadership over the armed forces. A counter-example could be found in the Iraqi constitution of 2005 which names as commander-in-chief the Prime Minister, i.e. a state office accountable to Parliament. Most Iraqi jurists and and some political actors however doubt the success of this structure, noting that to day no effective parliamentary control over the Armed Forces has taken place. A reason often mentioned is the absence of an explicitly stated mechanism for

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Parliament to exercise its control right as concerns the armed forces. With regards to the situation in Syria it is of paramount importance to make the armed forces accountable to Parliament and to develop effective means and mechanisms of parliamentary control over the forces and its com- manding personnel if a national order is to be re-established. 5. Despite this already long list of pressing reforms in the Syrian constitutional order, the problem of legal pluralism and the Islamic law tenets in Syrian family law is also worth mentioning. The Syrian constitution men- tions Islamic jurisprudence (Arabic: fiqh) as a source of legislation. In consequence, Islamic legal norms have been made part of the Personal Status Law. This law applies to Muslims and explicitly prohibits the marriage of a Muslim woman with a non-Muslim man. The state distinguishes in matters of family law between citizens based on religious and occasionally confessional grounds, i.e. each Christian denomination has its own legal system in Syria as regards family law matters. These laws are enacted by the state in cooperation with representatives of the relevant religious or confessional group. Membership in a group is mandatory for the individual as it forms the fundamental category for determining and applying personal status rules. This legal pluralism has been explicitly endorsed in the New Constitution. It must therefore be noted that this segregation of Syrian society into different religious and confessional groups is intended, maintained and supported by the state, a finding reflected in Syrian public opinion. It is not currently conceivable that this notion would shift in the near future. Hence, while creating a unified family law is the only possibility to strengthen a notion of “citizenship” within the country, at the moment it appears neither feasible to remove the references to Islamic law from Syri- an legislation, nor the separate family laws of the Christian denominations, which are supported and even demanded to be extended by the leader- ships of the Christian churches.

II. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Syrian public Administration is largely based on French principles of public and administrative law and ultimately derives from structures created by the French mandate power. Hallmark of that system are centralism and the concentration of administrative processes, despite certain recent initiatives for decentralisa- tion, particularly in a new law on local administration. At the top of the administrative structure is the Council of Ministers. The administrative system is locally divided into 14 provinces, each headed by an elected Provincial Council and with province-level executive bodies. While the Provincial Councils are headed by a president elected by the Council members, the Provincial Gover- nor is appointed by the President of the Republic as the representative of central government. It is the Governor who heads the powerful provincial executive. Furthermore, all important decisions on a provincial level need approval

- 38 - Syrian Experience from the Council of Ministers or the relevant functionally responsible Minister. This applies in particular to financial affairs which cannot be decided without the approval of the Minister of Finance. Each province is divided into districts, sub-districts and villages. All those units are strongly dependent on the provincial administration. Administrative reforms will be necessary on a local, but also provincial level; this is widely accepted in Syria and has been actively demanded in many circles of society. The transformation of the country into a federal state appears – at least at the moment – impossible and far from Syrian reality. Any reform project must however lead to a true autonomy of the local administration, particularly allowing for fiscal independence of local bodies. In part the legal framework for such a reform is already in existence and can be directly implemented; in part the relevant laws will have to be created. This involves challenging a centralist mentality that might call for some form of central control over the actions of provinces. Yet while such a central control, particularly in the area of fiscal affairs of the provinces, is in conflict with the ideal of local autonomy, it might be necessary for a transitory period. Particularly during the time following a regime change there is a need for a balanced system that rec- onciles local autonomy with a central control over state spending. On a comparative view, Iraqi law for example gives the national parliament certain measures of control over provincial councils, a structure theoretically in conflict with the principle of federalism in the Iraqi constitution. Strengthening the independence of the existing Syrian provinces can be helpful in developing balanced local and regional identities, creating a middle ground between the current extremes of state centralism and local autonomy movements. This might in turn reduce confessional and religious conflicts. If the conflict in Syria develops further into a confessional conflict on both the national and local level it might even become inevitable to pursue a re- development of state institutions “from below”, i.e. from a local or regional level. Already now there are signs of an emerging division of the Syrian territory along religious, confessional and – in the case of the Kurdish areas – ethnic lines. A possible solution for the conflict might even take the form of an “asymmetrical regionalisation”, granting the Kurdish northern territories a balanced form of autonomy, and in particular fiscal independence. Despite all criticism of its structure and operation, the Syrian public administration has proven itself a functioning system over the years. This is for example visible in the documentation of administrative work and decisions which has ensured the formal correctness of processes. The Syrian Land Registry in particular operates on a high standard. Disputes concerning real property are decided by a special judge. There is however a wide discretion of the administrative bodies in relation to compulsory seizures of land. The powers of the administration in this area are essentially derived from French notions of administrative law, granting the administration a special role vis-a-vis the individual. When seizing land, the administration is under an obligation to maintain certain

- 39 - Syrian Experience legal standards and the courts have a power to rescind illegal dispossessions. In this area the Syrian Administrative Court has shown its readiness to issue decisions against the administration in cases of infringements. However, in many instances the only resort of an affected person will be to claim compensation, as the administration will frequently try to pre-empt a rescission, e.g. by building on the land or putting it to some use, making a full return of the land to the previous owner difficult. Particularly difficult cases arise where a dispossession is ordered by the Min- istry of Defence. In such cases, the Administrative Court has been prepared to grant compensation as well, yet the enforcement of a claim against the Ministry of Defence has proven more difficult than against other ministries or government departments. A general problem of enforcing court decisions against the administration is also apparent in other areas, such as the review of emergency orders of the Minister of the Interior by the Administrative Court. A state of emergency was declared in Syria in March 1963; it lasted until 2011 when it was ended by presidential decree. Under the emergency legislation, the Interior Minister, as representative of the President, could order the arrest of any person pending further notice and without recourse to the courts. As these orders of the Interior Minister were however in the nature of an administrative act, the Administrative Court declared itself competent to review the Minister's decisions, despite an outright statement in the law exempting them from judicial control. However, the Administrative Court's review was of a merely formal nature and addressed only the procedure leading to an arrest order. The Ad- ministrative Court did not render decisions on the material basis of any order. Nevertheless, there have been several cases in which the Administrative Court declared the invalidity of arrests. The court also regularly emphasised the need to limit such arrest orders to six months for them to be formally correct. Although the enforcement of court decisions against the Interior Minister has been often difficult, those decisions of the administrative courts have played a major role in reducing the number of arrests under the emergency legislation in recent years. It has to be added, however, that the emergency legislation must not be confused with the legal powers of secret service organs. The Secret Services are a problematic part of the administrative structure, in that they do not have to account for persons in their custody. This refusal to inform of their arrests is based in explicit legislation hence there is little opportunity for the judiciary to intervene. The Administrative Court has however been able to take action in relation to dismissals of civil servants and state em- ployees , even where those dismissals were ordered on security grounds. Again, the court's review of such dismissals remains formal and concerns only proce- dural grounds, not least as the law explicitly makes dismissals based on the emergency legislation immune from judicial control. In most dismissal cases the relevant government departments have accepted the court decision even though it was based on formal grounds. In more difficult cases the government

- 40 - Syrian Experience departments did however insist on the termination of employment, often by ordering a second, now formally correct, dismissal. It is obvious that there is a need to reform the state security apparatus and legislation. This reform should – at least in its formal aspects – be informed by the previous decisions of the Administrative Court. It is imperative to abolish any form of immunity of executive actions vis-à-vis the courts. In this regard, there needs to be a profound change in Syrian legal mentality and practice.

III. THE JUDICIARY The need to reform the system of constitutional enforcement has already been pointed out above. In this regard, it must be noted that there are no – or very few – jurists in Syria today who are qualified to assess and analyse constitutional problems in a satisfactory manner in theory and practice. This weakness of constitutional legal method becomes apparent also in the wider region, e.g. when looking at the decisions of the Iraqi Supreme Court, acting as constitutional court. It is even visible in the work of the Egyptian Supreme Constitu- tional Court in in the situation after the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. The doctrinal shortcomings of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court's decisions come despite that court being a well-established entity in Egypt for decades. It is therefore submitted that Germany's unique experience in the jurisprudence of its Constitutional Court (the Bundesverfassungsgericht) can play a significant role in developing a Syrian constitutional jurisprudence. In this regard, the opinion of some German legal scholars has to be criticised. These scholars, active in the field of “Law and Development” particularly in Islamic countries, consider the decisions of the German Constitutional Court too complex for legal professionals in the Middle East to serve as examples in education programs. Instead, they prefer decisions of constitutional courts from countries of a “similar cultural background”, e.g. those of the Indian Constitutional Court. It is submitted that this deprives legal scholars of an opportunity to study the third dogmatic foundations behind decisions of the German Constitutional Court. German legal scholarship does not have to hide its advantages when it comes to legal transfers of that kind – after all, the German Constitutional Court has attained a high level of mastery in the dogmatic reasoning that sup- ports its decisions. In comparison, as explained above, Syrian administrative jurisprudence is of a more “robust” quality, and traditionally richer. Its general problem is the ine- quality of citizen and administration before the administrative courts. In a system with a French-style conseil d'etat as the main body of administrative jurisprudence, the administration traditionally exerts a dominant role. It would be de- sirable to effect a profound change of paradigms in this regard, based on a true notion of equality between citizen and state before the administrative courts. Particularly the office of the “State Representative at the Administrative Court” needs to be abolished and replaced by a research service working for the judges.

- 41 - Syrian Experience

Further, the sole power of the President to appoint administrative judges must be abolished. For reasons of judicial independence alone it is imperative that judges are not appointed by the head of the Executive and the administration; after all, decisions against the administration are a central part of their role. The dependency of the judges on the executive is a striking feature of the Syrian judiciary. Judges' affairs are decided by the Supreme Judicial Council which is chaired by the Minister of Justice, acting as representative of the Presi- dent. There is a pressing need to reform this system, enabling the judiciary to decide autonomously on the affairs of their members. A possible solution might be to hand the power for such decisions to the Supreme Constitutional Court, or to a commission of judges from several senior courts. Yet the formal independence of judges does not automatically entail their societal independence and would of its own not be sufficient to ensure a proper administration of justice. From a sociological point of view, the judges' social surroundings, their confessional, religious and familial ties, exert a strong influence, in many ways to a higher degree than intermeddling of the Executive. The methods of training and appointing judges are part of this problem. Legal professionals in Syria are educated as one group only during their four years of theoretical legal education; after that, the different professions, judges, state prosecutors and private attorneys, are educated separately. The German example of a common Second State Exam after a period of vocational training (the Referendariat) might be instructive in this regard. The description above is by far not exhaustive – indeed, it would be possible to write an entire book about the deficiencies and the reform needs of the Syrian justice system. Problems range from the sheer endless duration of trials to the potentially indefinite term of investigative custody or the problem of military courts. It must however be pointed out that the majority of the branches in the Syrian court system follow a rule of law standard of sorts in most of the cases before them. This does obviously not apply to matters of state security or proceedings involving powerful families or persons. Outside of such matters (which will require a wholesale reform and/or abolishment) it will be possible to pursue reforms on the basis of the current system. The Syrian justice system does not require a restructuring in its entirety. To put it differently – instead of discussing the abolishment of military courts in a country with as many as 400,000 people in the armed forces, one should consider a reform of those courts, e.g. by emphasising the principles of fair trial to a higher degree.

IV. FINAL REMARKS In view of these findings, the first principle of all legal reform should be not to treat Syria as a country without legal order or jurisprudential tradition. The country's future legal development largely depends on the manner in which an end of the current violence can be reached. The greatest danger at the moment lies in treating the current regime and the state structure as a single unit, threat-

- 42 - Syrian Experience ening a repetition of the Iraqi mistake, where the entire administrative and security apparatus was dissolved. As hard as this may sound today, to ensure the stability of any future Syrian state order it is inevitable to pursue the integration of all stakeholders into a project to reform the Syrian justice system, including those involved with the former regime. A first step in such an integrative approach could be to connect with legal faculties in Syria. All topics mentioned above have been the subject of scholarly research, comment and teaching, at least in courses for advanced students. Further, not all professors teaching in those faculties are supporters of the current regime. Many are well-respected scholars who have advocated reform – including along the lines stated above – in public. Their current silence is less out of support for the regime then due to the opposition's failure to present valid programmatic alternatives to the current setup of the state. An attempt from the European side to include some of these legal faculties into a reform process might be a useful first step towards an integrated solution of the Syrian problem.

- 43 -

Dr Nayla Tabbara (Beirut / Lebanon)

INTRODUCTION “One population in two countries”: For more than twenty years, I read this slogan every day, on my way to school, then to university, then to work. It was handwritten on a quite large banner, next to the portrait of Hafez al-Assad, to which were added later on that of the son who was to succeed to him (Bassel al-Assad, but passed away in a car crash) and a portrait of Nabih Berri, leader of Amal Party since 1984 and head of Lebanese Parliament since 1992. The slogan represented the stronghold of the Syrian regime over Lebanon, accepted by many Lebanese at the time for ideological reasons or for personal and sectarian interests or even as a simple acknowledgement of the state of things, and totally refused by an equally large number of other Lebanese. On the other hand, this slogan represented and still represents another more humane reality: that of the visceral connection between Lebanese and Syrians as people, not regimes. It comes back to mind daily as Lebanese hear the news of killings, slaughters and growing massacres all over Syria, and talk to Syrian refu- gees1 and workers in Lebanon. It also comes back to mind as Lebanese ache for a situation in Syria that stirs up memories and fears: memories of the Syrian regime’s actions in Lebanon and of the Lebanese civil war, and fears on the present and the future of both countries and populations.

LEBANON IN THE SHADOW OF SYRIA AND SYRIA IN THE SHADOW OF LEBANON (1976-2005) The influence of the Syrian Baath Regime on Lebanon over the past 40 years, since the Baathist coup in 1972, is common knowledge. A regime based on one ideology, gradually replaced by the cult of one leader, and sided by two watch dogs: intelligence service and suppression.

1 UNHCR numbers for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: 51000 (August 2012). Unofficial numbers from NGOs estimations: 100 000.

- 44 - The Lebanese Experience

Yet the use by the Syrian Regime in Lebanon of slogans such as “One population in two countries” shows that the regime itself knew that the influence was mutual, and that it was a two way thing. Among its five neighbors: Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Israel and Lebanon, it was the little country of Lebanon that has always presented to Syria the biggest threat because, among these neighboring countries, it was the one that represented the most two realities at the opposite of the Syrian regime’s politics and ideology: 1-Freedom of expression, 2-Plurality, whether plurality of political parties or coexistence between the different religious communities. Thus, one can argue that the entire history of the Syrian regime’s meddling into Lebanese affairs can be seen as a reaction to those two realities represented by Lebanon, in addition to a third factor: whoever becomes strong in Lebanon can become strong in Syria. With an antiquated definition of political leadership as balance-keeping by striking all intention of independence and every entity emerging with strong popularity or power, the Syrian regime is accused of having spent 40 years un- dermining, subjugating or simply liquidating symbols of power or symbols of the two threats to the regime’s ideology (freedom of expression and plurality), with the help of its different tactical allies in Lebanon, that it constantly played against each other. To give a few examples, it is accused of having tried to undermine, since the 1970’s, the Lebanese army, syndicates, political parties by playing on their disagreements, then in the 80’s, of working on weakening the Palestinians in Leba- non by encouraging dissident factions and offering them asylum in Syria (the Tahaluf), and by besieging through its ally, the Amal party, Palestinian camps in Lebanon during a period of 6 months. In the 80’s and 90’s, the regime is accused of having killed political and religious figures as well as press figures, in addition to banning TVs and newspapers, applying strong censorship on news, as well as playing on dissensions within religious communities by encouraging dissensions inside Christian and Muslim political parties or by gaining on its side communitarian figures …. Besides this, it reverted to a policy of instigating fear and of accusation of treason of all those who were not affiliated to it. A simple equation was: if you are not with Syria, then you are with Israel2.

2005: THE TURNING POINT AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT With the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14 2005, a major shift happened in the relation between Lebanon and Syria and in the internal balance within each of the countries.

2 Thus it seemed quite ironical for Lebanese to hear that Syria has started talks with Israel with the mediation of Turkey.

- 45 - The Lebanese Experience

The assassination of this symbol for the majority of the Sunni population of Lebanon propelled the Sunnis 180 degrees in their political position. After decades of living in the shadow of the Syrian regime, by force of habit or by force of a remnant blurry ideology of Lebanon being part of a greater Syria, or a greater Arab world, the Sunnis shook off the equation (if not with Syria then you are with Israel) and became opponents of the Syrian regime, accused of Hariri’s assassination, finally believing in an independent Lebanese entity and catching up with their fellow christian nationals who had been opposing Syrian for almost 3 decades. A new element was now a threat to Syria, especially since the ties of the Sunni Lebanese with the Sunni Syrians go back in history, and particularly in a context where two factors had been growing in the area: Sunni Salafism, and Sunni-Shia tension. Following the assassination of Rafic Hariri, and the massive anti-Syrian demonstrations (the Cedar revolution), the pro-Syrian government of Omar Karami resigned (Feb 28). On March 5 2005, Bashar al Assad announced the retreat of Syrian troops from Bekaa and border. In April 2005, all Syrian troops retreated, after 30 years of presence/occupation. It is noteworthy to remember that 2005 also witnessed on the Syrian internal scene the dissention of Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Damascus Declaration (June 2005) on behalf of the opposition joining Muslim Brotherhood, Liberals, and civil society representatives, demanding reform, democracy, the abolition of the law number 49 (Exe- cution of MB), ending the state of emergency, and changing law 8 (that gives the reigns of Syria to Baath). Syria retaliated to this great defeat in Lebanon- and probably to its own internal challenge- by intensifying its old policy of liquidating in Lebanon all per- sonalities representing threats to it, through a series of killings of representatives of freedom of speech. The only ally in Lebanon being now the March 8 movement, composed of Hizbullah and Amal (Shi‛a) and Aoun’s Movement, the Syrian regime was being forced by Lebanon to enter the Sunni-Shi‛i divide, a divide that represents a great threat to the Syrian Alawi regime as Sunnis in Syria represent 74% of the population3. The way to resolve it was thus in Lebanon, by diverting this divide. A quick overlook of the names of the people assassinated or whose assassination was attempted in 2005 and 2006,4 mostly Christian, begs the question if the Syrian Regime was not trying to avert the Sunni-Shi‛i divide by re-creating a Muslim-Christian tension, especially since these assassinations were followed by explosions in Christian regions.

3 Alawis and Shi‛ites 13%, Christian 10%, Druze 3%. 4 Gibran Tueini, Goeorges Hawi, Samir Kassir, Pierre Gemayel, Antoine Ghanem, Francois el-Hajj (Walid Eido); attempted assassination: May Chidiac; Elias El Murr (Marwan Hamadeh).

- 46 - The Lebanese Experience

In parallel, the regime played a more dangerous card: that of forging pacts with Sunni Salafism and trying to use Salafis as pawns in its tactics in the region.

DANGEROUS WATERS OF SUNNI SALAFISM AND THEIR EXTENSION TO THE PRESENT DAY Sunni jihadi Salafism (neo-Salafism) has been growing in the Middle East since the 1980s. Its havens in Lebanon have been the Palestinian camps and poor Sunni areas around the camps, especially in Tripoli and Saida. In Tripoli, the mid 80’s showed a bloody clash between Sunni Salafis and the Syrian regime, aided by the Alawis of Tripoli, ending with massacres of hundreds, and remaining in the memory of the Sunni population until today, fuelling enmity towards the Syrian regime and its Alawi allies in North Lebanon. Yet the 90’s witnessed an encouragement on the part of the Syrian regime of internal division in the Sunni Salafi scene, between opponents to Syria and partisans to the Syrian regime, as it had done with Palestinian factions. By the turn of the millennium, the Syrian regime knew that it could tap into this potential, not only try to gain it on its side, but use it, first in Iraq, and following the success in Iraq, in Lebanon. 2005, then, following the forced retreat of the Syrian army from Lebanon, was the year of another form of retaliation on the part of the Syrian regime: the brewing of jihadi Salafis to send to Lebanon, in a prison in Saydnaya / Syria. This is where Chaker al-Absi was formed before being handed over to the “Palestine section” of the Syrian intelligence forces then given leeway to come to Lebanon and start Fath al-Islam in the Palestinian camps of Tripoli5, which amounted in 2007 to an entire summer of combat between the armed jihadists of Fath al-Islam and the Lebanese army, and resulted in a massive destruction of the Nahr al-Barid camp and the displacement of its inhabitants. For at least a decade thus, the Syrian regime had been preparing Salafi Ji- hadists to send to Iraq then to Lebanon, with a tacit agreement that this leeway gave Syria immunity from Salafi jihadists on its territory. The regime must not have well calculated the ideological strength of the Sunni-Shi‛i growing tension and opposition, fuelled by the two major powers in the area: Iran and Saudi Arabia. It had not calculated either that it was not the only on to play on men- talities and people’s fears, for Sunni Salafis played on that fear too, in the context of the Sunni-Shi‛i tension and the growing strength of the Hizbullah after the 2006 war with Israel. A fear of the Shiites taking over the region in an axis joining Lebanon-Syria-Iraq and Iran, managed to mobilize large numbers of Sunni Salafis and non-Salafis in a jihad against Shi‛a where the Alawi regime of Syria represented a key point.

5 See Bernard Rougier: L’Oumma en Fragments. Contrôler le sunnisme au Liban, PUF, 2011.

- 47 - The Lebanese Experience

Whatever the reality of the situation in Syria is today as to the number of Salafis in the opposition (between the overestimation on the part of the regime’s propaganda and the underestimation on the part of the Syrian National Council), the reality of the situation is that the Regime bred a monster that turned against it, and that all Salafis in Syria today are against the regime, seen as a Shi‛ite regime, and that most Salafis in the north of Lebanon are clearly opposing the regime and helping out the revolutionaries in Syria as well as playing their own part in the Tripoli combats between Sunnis and Alawis. An overview of the names of the factions, either the revolutionary fighting factions in Syria or the Sunni factions in north Lebanon show that we are in the midst of Islamist groups with Salafi undertones. The name of one of the retalia- tor factions in Lebanon to the kidnappings of the Lebanese Shiites in Syria by counter kidnapping (August 2012) also shows that we are in the midst of a Sunni-Shi‛i divide: Katibat Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, Mukhtar al-Thaqafi being a survivor of Karbala that according to the Legend was able to kill all the people responsible for the killing of Imam Hussayn.

LEBANON’S OFFICIAL NON-INVOLVEMENT STRATEGY The spillover between Syria and Lebanon remains constant and continues to be a two-way spillover. On behalf of the Syrian regime, it is a strategy of diverting and exporting its internal situation to Lebanon (at least since May 2012) and to Turkey (at least as of July 2012) by playing on the Kurdish card. In parallel, both in Syria and in Lebanon, the regime has been trying to involve the Druze community as well as Christian communities in the conflict, and a number of religious leaders on both sides have been trying to avoid involvement, on the lines of the Lebanese Official non-involvement. With a government of March 8 (pro-Syrian) and an opposition of March 14 (anti-Syrian), the politics of non-involvement is the least that can be done officially in Lebanon, for on the ground, both March 8 and March 14 are involved in the Syrian situation. Official non-involvement means not taking sides, either with the regime or the revolutionaries, and this policy is well acclaimed among the March 14 and even by the international community, as the government is March 8 and a clear position of that government with the regime would put Lebanon straight in the Axis of Syria-Iran, and thus in expectance of a massive retaliation from Israel, worse than that of 2006. This non-involvement also allowed the Lebanese Prime minister to uphold the Lebanese financial responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, to the dismay of the Syrian regime and its supporters. Yet it puts Lebanon in an unclear and ‘cowardly’ position: 1- not voting in international and Arab resolutions against the Syrian Regime;

- 48 - The Lebanese Experience

2- not cutting diplomatic ties with a Regime that has no shame and consequently putting Lebanon and its highest officials anew in a position of being treated with disrespect by Syrian officials; 3- a total disregard for human rights in handing over to Syria members of the Free Syrian Army that sought asylum in Lebanon. On the ground, and even if the official position of Lebanon is non-involvement, both parties (March 8 and March 14) are quite involved: March 14 is being accused of smuggling arms to Syrian revolutionaries from Lebanon since the beginning of the revolution (as arms for Hizbullah had been smuggled from Syria in the past years), and some argue that some border towns of Lebanon with Syria are used as strategic places for the Free Syrian army and helped by March 14 supporters6. March 8 on the other hand is being accused of sending fighters to aid the regime in Syria. This is for their involvement in Syria itself. As for their involvement in Leb- anon in connection to Syria, both camps have been playing the game of starting off combats, especially in Tripoli between Sunnis and Alawis,7 manifestations, blocking roads and kidnappings (mainly on the part of March 8 and its affiliates who are kidnapping anti-regime Syrians on Lebanese grounds, as a retaliation for the kidnapping of 11 Lebanese Shiite pilgrims in Syria). With the recent arrest of Michel Samaha, Lebanese former minister and deputy as well as consultant of Bashar al-Assad, smuggling explosives from Syria to Lebanon to assassinate high officials related to March 14 in the North of Lebanon (rumors also held that the Maronite Patriarch was targeted), the situation seems less likely to be contained in comparison with the previous months where the Leb- anese had shown a will not to let the situation turn into an internal conflict.

CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO NOW? As the Syrian revolution is dragging, the situation in Lebanon is dragging too, with an elevation of the chaos on the ground, especially with the new wave of kidnappings, not only for political reasons but also for ransom reasons, in all areas of Lebanon and targeted now at foreigners in the country (Turks, Kuwei- tis …), as well as a wave of random violence and killings happening all around Lebanon. This fact, like many other events on the ground, sadly reminds the Lebanese of the beginning of the civil war of 1975. A fear of a civil war outbreak in both Syria and Lebanon is thus not to be excluded.

6 Border towns that are constantly bombed by the regime and witnessing exactions by the regime (kidnapping people from the Lebanese territory). 7 Starting mainly as of May 2012, with the killing of Shaykh Abdel Wahid at an army check point on route to a rally organized by MP Khaled Daher in Halba to com- memorate the death of Future Movement supporters during the Sunni-Shi‛i clashes of 2008.

- 49 - The Lebanese Experience

Moreover, following the inevitable fall of the Syrian regime, the challenges for the new Syrian regime are quite high and the balance between Democracy, Diversity and Security required is a fragile one. The new government will have to form a “state of national unity” that would join the different factions of the revolution: the Free Army, the independent factions (mainly Salafis), the Mus- lim Brotherhood, the leftists and civil society, as well as representing all religious and ethnic communities: Kurds, Christians, Sunnis, Shi‛ites, Alawis, Isma- ‛ilis, Druz. The rise of political Islam, the emergence of independent fighting factions and the fears of the minorities make this challenge quite a difficult one. Even if, with the fall of the regime, Lebanon would be rid of direct incur- sions on its land and on its autonomy, the fact remains that an unstable situation in Syria will keep on influencing Lebanon and the entire region if the re- quirements for a new regime representing all social components on Syrian ground are not met. Likewise, Lebanon has to step up and uphold its role of example in the Middle East as the only country where political power is shared between communities and where the constitution does not specify an affiliation to one single religion.

The urge to gear dialogue among peoples and cultures towards serving the universal objectives of humanity as a whole is strongly felt today more than any other time in the past. It is all the more a pressing need since it is not easy to see why constructive cooperation and actual intercultural and intercivilizational dialogue have any significance in an ever changing world without the principle of cultural diversity being confirmed as a recognizable fact. There- fore, in order to build up a common future in which peace, solidarity and coexistence prevail, there is no other alternative but to ground people in dialogue along with the respect and preservation of cultural diversity. Fourth Islamic Conference of Culture Ministers (Algiers, 2004)

- 50 -

Prof. Dr Kamel Abu Jaber (Amman / Jordan)

I was asked to talk about the idea of “Christians’ hopes and fears”. The Chris- tians are part and parcel of the Middle East, and they have always been part of the scene; they are not guests to the area; and in fact, Islam came, let us say to Syria; and Syria at that time included Jordan, Palestine, today’s Israel and the Occupied Territories, Lebanon, and Syria. Here the vast majority of the population was Christian people, some polytheists, and few Jews. When Islam came, the Christians were already there. I would like to think that we, today’s Chris- tians, are the remnants of the original Arabs; we have not mixed, we have not intermarried, and so we are the “purer race” of Arabs. The problem is that the entire Arab world, in fact maybe the Islamic world at large, is passing through a crisis, a terrible crisis of identity, as to which way to go. Should the Arabs go to the left, should they go to the right, forward or backward? It is a confused and a chaotic region; chaotic not only politically, militarily, but also in terms of ideas and ideologies. One of the tragedies that are unseen in the Arab world is that it is leaderless. We have leaders on the local level, but no leader who can command the Arab world. People talk about “the Arab world” as if such a world truly exists, when in fact no such world definitely exists. Yet, it exists in the mind and in ideas. What truly exists, in reality and on the ground, are Omanis, Moroccans, Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, etc. That is what exists. No Arab world with one will exists. This multifaceted Arab world was shocked when modernity arrived at the end of the 18th century. The first contact of course was with Napoleon Bona- parte; from that moment, on the 1st of July, 1798, the Arab world has been in total confusion as to which way to go. Then, we had one source of knowledge: religion; and religion is very important. It is not only important for Muslims; it is important for Christians, too, as it is important for Jews. It is important for everybody, not just for the Arabs. Religion is important and plays a role in every society in the world, in Germany no less than in Switzerland or in America, because it is part and parcel of the identity of the human being, especially in these times where the world has be-

- 51 - Reflecting Christian Experiences come “villagized”. Thus, when we are told that Europe is post-religious, etc., this, to our minds, sounds like pure nonsense, because even the Swiss who are civilized, and probably on top of civilization, make restrictions for Muslims not to build minarets. In France, the then President Sarkozy says that Muslim women cannot wear the hijab. If a woman wants to put a flower on her head, whose business is it to interfere? It is no one’s business to say whether a woman can put on a hijab or not. So, religion is very important, whether in a positive or a negative way, and in any society. In western societies, especially after the peace of Westphalia in 1648, Eu- rope was divided according to the principle cuius regio, eius religio, that is, into one nation, one language, one religion or religious community, and one nationality, so in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and elsewhere. Where there were two religious communities in a country, the country divided as in Germany, where the Catholics went to the south and the Protestants to the north. In Belgium, where there were two religious and ethnic groups: the Walloons took one part of the country and the Flemish took another one. In France, where they had a small protestant minority called Huguenots, the French annihilated them at the Mas- sacre of St. Bartholomew’s Night in 1572. In the West, societies are simple and much less complex than our mosaic complex societies in the Middle East. When Jews and Muslims were expelled from Spain after 1492, there was not one European country willing to take them, except for the Muslim world, where Sultan Bayezid II welcomed them and said that the Islamic world is open to them. Our societies are used to pluralism. Even in small Jordan, there were, and still are, the Catholics, the Protestants, the Baha’i, the Druz, the Greek Orthodox, the Latin, the Shi‛i Mus- lims, the Sunni Muslims, the Armenians, the Assyrians, the Chechens, the Cir- cassians, the Chaldeans, and many others. الَ إِ ْك َرا َه فِي :The Islamic system accepted the Christians, for the Qur’an says There shall be no compulsion in the religion” (Surah 2, Verse 256), and“ ,ال ِّدين ”For you is your religion, and for me is my religion“ , َل ُك ْم ِدي ُن ُك ْم َولِ َي ِدين :confirms Had God willed, He“ , َل ْو َشاء هّللاُ َل َج َع َل ُك ْم أُ َّم ًة َوا ِح َد ًة ,Surah 109, Verse 6). Therefore) would have made you one nation” (Surah 16, Verse 93); but God wanted varie- and made you peoples …“ ,… َو َج َع ْل َنا ُك ْم ُش ُعوباً َو َق َبائِ َل لِ َت َعا َرفُوا َيا أَ ُّي َها :ty and diversity and tribes, [so] that you may know one another” (Surah 49, Verse 13). Traditionally, these various communities accepted, not tolerated, each other. I do not tolerate a Jew; I accept him; he is there in the Middle East; he is part of Morocco. If he is prosperous, it is good for him; if he is poor, it is bad for him; he is like any other Moroccan. Ours is a system that is very complex when con- trasted to the West. It is a system that existed until 1917 throughout the Otto- man Empire, as was known as the Millet System. The different communities or groups always coexisted next to each other on the basis of mutual acceptance. This does not mean that there were no moments of tension, but the idea was

- 52 - Reflecting Christian Experiences that the different communities acknowledged the right of each other to live side by side. No attempts were made to convert others by force. And once again, the suddenness of modernity in the Middle East came like a bolt from the blue. It came with the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt. The Remarkable History of the Past in) عجائب اآلثار في التراجم واألخبار In his book the Form of Descriptions of Lives and Events), a beautiful title, by the way, the fa- mous historian Abd ar-Rahman al-Jabarti (1753-1825) records – among other things – the French invasion of Alexandria and the French advance into Cairo. Since then the technological imbalance between the Arabs and the West became obvious and has never been redressed. There you had a civilization that uses muskets and canons, while the Egyptians fought very bravely using primi- tive weapons. They fought bravely from Alexandria all the way to Cairo, but they were fighting with swords and arrows, whereas the French were mowing them down with canons ... This imbalance has never been redressed, and it is not redressed until now. We do not understand you in the West; and you do not understand us. You can if you try, but you do not want to. There is a delib- erate misunderstanding, and I say that to you with all due respect. Now, we come to the number of Christians in the Middle East, where most of them live in Egypt. In Morocco there are very few only. In fact, most Mo- roccans are amazed of Arabs who are Christians and speak Arabic. Christians in the Middle East are about 14 to 18 million; the vast majority of them are the Copts of Egypt, Orthodox Christians, one of the oldest churches of Christiani- ty. They say frankly that Islam came to the Copts, and not the other way around. The same applies to the Christians of Iraq who also state that they welcomed Islam when it arrived. Last year the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies in Amman held conferences on: “Christianity in the East” and “Christi- anity where to?” with scholars and clergy from Egypt, the Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and even Iran participating. I asked them a very simple question, “What is happening to the Christians in the Middle East?” In one of the meetings, an Iraqi bishop, Assyrian, said to me: “Oh doctor, the land is throwing us out now; not just the people. Our land is throwing us out now”. And of course, he was crying when he said that. Iraq, the land of some of the earliest Christians in history, the Nestorians, is losing its Christians now. The Christians in Jordan have their hands on their hearts out of fear of what is happening in Syria; not because they love Bashar al-Assad. They do not; they are very afraid of what is going to happen to the 2 million Christians, about 10% of the population. On my way from Amman to Paris and Rabat, an Iraqi at the Amman airport told me that Air France is busy these days transporting Iraqi Christians from there to Europe, Canada, and the United States. In Iraq there were a million and a half Christians three years ago, and now there is less than three to four hundred thousand Christians left; some are still in refugee camps in Jordan waiting to go to Australia, Canada, the United States, or elsewhere.

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The western world, I am sorry to say that, is encouraging this exodus of Christians. The man who told me this is not a political man. He sells tickets. He says, “Every night, we have thirty to forty of these family travellers”. And he added that not only Air France, but other companies as well carry loads and loads of Christians out of the region. In Palestine, there is less than 1.5% of the population Christians. One and a half year ago, I spent one week in Jerusalem near Bab al-‛Amoud, where I could walk to the old holy city, to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, right next to it is al-Aqsa Mosque. Every day with my wife, I would visit al-Aqsa first, and then we went to the Church of the Holy Sepul- chre. In five days, I have never met one Arab Christian in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which has become practically a museum. I saw groups of Span- ish, French, Italian, Greek, Australian, Indonesian, and Japanese tourists taking pictures. The Church has become a museum. Israel has emptied the land of its Christians. Now, why is Israel keen on doing that? It is another question that will require some more time to answer. Israel is keen not only to empty Palestine, but also the entire Middle East region of its Christians for several reasons. One of them is that the Christians, since Napoleon’s time, since the early 19th century, have espoused the call to Arab nationalism. And Christians are Arab national- ists until today. Many leaders of the nationalist parties in the eastern part of the Arab world, in Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and even Iraq are Orthodox Christians. My neighbour here at the table is a Muslim from Jordan, and I am a Chris- tian. Both of us are under the umbrella of Arab nationalism. When we identify ourselves in religious terms, the difference immediately appears. That was a reason why Arab Christians espoused the cause of Arab nationalism, from George Habib Antonios (1891-1942) to Hisham Zreiq, from Antun Sa‛adeh (1904-1949) and Michel Aflaq (1910-1989) until now, because Arab nationalism has room for both, Muslims and Christians in its folds. Israel became aware of this fact, especially after 1967. Following the Arab defeat, many hidden facts were revealed. Most im- portantly, the Israeli steady move of its political spectrum to the political right, today it is moving from the extreme right to the more extreme right. The reason has to do with the West, especially when Christians, like in Jordan, travelled to the west to explain the Palestinian problem with each delegation including not only Muslims, but Christian clergy and scholars, too. Sometimes westerners, especially Americans, were surprised that there are Christians in the Middle East. Some westerners think that they brought Christianity to our region. They are amazed when they see this grand-looking Patriarch of the Christian church visiting their land with all his entourage, crosses and paraphernalia in his hand, and he is speaking Arabic, very fluent Arabic, defending the Arab cause in Pal- estine. So the Arab Christians became a source of trouble and annoyance to Israel. This is not to say that we, Arabs and Muslims, are anti-Jewish or sup-

- 54 - Reflecting Christian Experiences porting violence. We continue to seek peace with Israel. I had the honour and pleasure of leading, as the Foreign Minister of Jordan, the Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. The problem before us, Christians and Muslims and also some of the peoples of the west, now is how to bring back humanity into the Jewish culture that has become so “zionized”, how to get the Israelis out of the mentality of fear. To give you an example, when I went to the peace talks in Madrid, and for the opening session, where I sat across from Isaac Shamir, the then Prime Minister, who led the Israeli delegation. For three hours I was trying to look into his eyes, like I am looking into the eyes of the Rabbi across the table here. I wanted to see something in that man’s eyes, but I could not. He sat with his hands covering his face for three hours ... and then I remember the man’s tattoo, as he was a graduate of one of the German’s Concentration camps, and I felt sorry for him. Modern Zionism is a child and graduate of European culture, not of the culture of the Middle East. I watch the Israeli television at night, when I can, in Amman, and sometimes I see Iraqi Jews crying for Iraq; Egyptian Jews literally lamenting their beautiful places in Cairo, Aswan, and Alexandria. The problem is that those governing Israel since 1948 are European Jews, children and grad- uates of that culture. My concluding remark is if the situation continues as it is – where the Chris- tians in Lebanon are in trouble, and are but a minority now; in Syria where no one knows what is happening; in Iraq where, of course, they are almost fin- ished; in Egypt for thirty some years, Mubarak never allowed them to fix a church or build a new church –, it appears to offer no solution or hope. Now President Muhammad Morsi is ruling Egypt, and hopefully he will ad- here to the code of Islam. The Christians of Jordan have the best and fairest situation in the Middle East. I am a Christian; I led the delegation to Madrid; I held the office of Foreign Minister; I spoke for Jordan for three years; I attend- ed Islamic conferences, summit conferences, at least twice and spoke on behalf of my country. In Jordan, the position of Christians is excellent. They cannot complain. Politically we are overrepresented; socially we are very well-accepted; and economically, the percentage of the Christian population is about 4%, yet it controls at least 20% up to 30% of the economy. Yet, and in spite of that, Christians are leaving Jordan, they too are emigrating. Christians like all minorities want a stable society. The Christian minority in Syria is not supporting the Syrian regime; they just want stability; their fear and horror is when the situation becomes unstable; in Iraq, they were not supporting Saddam Hussein; they did not support even Mubarak; they were supporting stability ... Back to Jordan, the situation as I said is excellent, but it is excellent because of the regime, not because of the people; people are people. As I said: I am a Christian by faith, but I am Muslim by culture; and I am proud of my two identities, both Muslim and Christian.

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The last I would like to mention here and bring to your attention is a message that Mar Gregorios Yuhanna Ibrahim, Metropolitan of Aleppo, sent me in an email three days ago. It is an urgent call, a lament if you wish and cry for help signed by all the religious leaders of Aleppo. Perhaps I should read just a few lines of it. Communique of Aleppo issued by the church leaders in Aleppo, Syria: We, the Church Leaders of Aleppo, met at the Syrian Orthodox Archdiocese on Friday 24th August 2012, in an extraordinary circumstances to discuss the current political im- passe in Syria and its unprecedented and foretold consequences, which are currently unfolding with an ugly magnitude aöö over Syria and witnessed and suffered by all Syrians and especially Aleppians ... The gist of the statement that follows is an outcry, a cry for help based on the fact that the Christians of Syria were in the middle of an uncivil violence. It is a very long message, and I will leave it with you if you would like to distribute it, because they asked me to air it; and in Amman I sent it to our radio station. They have demands, they want stability: As in the past Christians in the Middle East and their churches’ leaders today, in spite of their reduced circumstances and numbers, will not spare any effort in endeavouring with all peace loving people in the region and worldwide to get Syria out of this vicious circle of violence and anarchy that undermined the national fabric and eroded our unity and to re-establish truces, law and order, security and advocating for reform, inclusiveness, social justice, and peace. They are currently working to highlight the inhuman conditions and plight endured of their fellow Syrian citizens as a result of this relentless violence, urging humanitarian and benevolent organizations in neighbouring countries and further afield to step in to relief the suffering of the Syrian people … At the end, they say: We declare that 1 – We welcome the visit of his Holiness the Pope Benedict XVI to Lebanon in September 2012 […], and they think that this is good for them, too. 2 – We refuse all kind of immigration as a response to the recent crisis in the Middle East and strongly condemn all propagators, instigators, and provocateurs who call to Middle East- ern Christians to emigrate. 3 - We refute and refuse all kinds of religious extremism and radicalism and the evolved language of intimidation and threat that that is directed toward the demographic components of our homeland regardless of their religion, creeds, and affiliations. We also repudiate the arming of the churches under any pretence […]. 6 – We reiterate our conviction and believe that the only path to achieve justice, peace, and the rebuilding of our homeland is through love, co-operation and accepting each other. This can only be achieved by constructive and meaningful dialogue between all belligerents of our country […]. There you are. Thank you for attention.

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Muin A. Khoury (Amman / Jordan)

For centuries, religion has played an important component, if not the most important component in the life of societies and peoples. It has also been one of the important references in shaping and moulding perceptions, outlooks and opinions of individuals and whole communities. In modern Arab and Middle Eastern history, religion has been gaining on importance to become, in the absence of the civil state, the only reference point in the life of people, in particular in the aftermath of the so called ‘Arab Awakening’. Not that Arab regimes, republics, and much more monarchies, were not embedded in religion all along, drawing their legitimacy therefrom, but they have adeptly sought to align themselves to the religious institution in their respective countries. Juris- prudence, Sharia, Fatwas and other ‘interpretations on command’ were often used to pass or rather to impose certain policies and state resolutions, or hide behind them. In return, religious institutions allied themselves in the first instance to regimes in power, and benefited from a ‘consultative’ and ‘legitimacy-seeking’ role to foster and promote their status and authority, and more often, fill a certain vacuum wherever the opportunities were available and offer much needed ‘services’ to the state. Religion’s other ally was traditionalism and conservatism. Regimes exploited religion for legitimacy, traditionalism and conservatism referenced religion to re-enforce paternalism, patriarchy and status quo, and religion as in institutions and clergy gave themselves away to be co- opted by both regimes and traditionalism. The result was to the detriment of the development of a healthy and necessary civil society where the mainstay is a conscious, responsible and free thinking citizen that has learnt to be accountable and bold enough to draw government and institutions to accountability. So, religion has proliferated to become a ‘safe haven’ and a refuge for all. While regimes let down their people almost in every aspect of life, and particularly in the sphere of creating responsible citizenry, religion appeared to the average man on the street, to the pious, believers and God fearing people, as

- 57 - Reflecting Christian Experiences the only positive factor influencing their daily livelihood. Moreover, responsible citizenry is a costly and burdensome affair. As a citizen, the state calls upon you in exchange for your rights. Taxes, fees, and dues which include respecting the law, political commitments on days of national reckoning, such as election days, and national allegiances at times of national distress, tightening the belts in times of austerity, and above all the courage to hold governments and representatives accountable. On the other hand, religious affiliations is a less costly and painful affair. You pay your religious dues at free choice and financial dues if you can ‘afford it’. There is no other commitment except to God, the Proph- et (PBUH), and Jesus, and that’s strictly unaccountable. Religious affiliations are glamorous and social, you get to see and be seen at religious gatherings; you can exhibit in various ways that you are a God fearing man or woman; you can be oblivious to the sickly, elderly, children and care needy members of society, and you can likewise be oblivious to compatriots by chanting away through the loudspeakers at odd hours of the day, and night. All this is unaccountable. You are also at free will to block residents driveways if they are fortunate to live next to a mosque or church, double and triple park and get away with obstructing traffic and breaking the law. LG (life’s good) with religious affiliation. There are of course those God fearing good citizens in every society who pay their dues, and have the ‘other’ well placed in their lives, and more. In the aftermath of the so called Arab ‘awakening’ (just from sleep as it seems), the focus of the debate today are the million dollar questions: “Will genuine democracies develop under religious identities?”; “Is the renewed attachment of the nation to religion and tradition reason to celebrate the ‘awakening’ and the ‘future’?”; “Does religion cramp societies in motion and transformation?” “Does Egypt’s president Mohammed Mursi, his brothers and sis- ters, give us a clue of what awaits cultural and individual diversity, the rights of other-believers and the non-believers, the rights of youth, women and children, a modernity that is compatible with family, religion and tradition?” We can’t tell when Arab identity started to blur, confusion started to set in and schizophrenia to spread. The Moroccan grand philosopher Mohammed Abed Al-Jaberi (God bless his soul) (Figuig 1936 – 2010 Rabat) confined or defined modern Arab history to three eras. First, there was the independence era, a ‘nationalist’ era led by the middle classes, urban and city elites for whom identity was closer to ‘patria’ the homeland, the genuine pride of being Egyp- tian, Syrian or Algerian. An era, that is characterized by being proud of who you are, of the ‘achievement’ of fighting colonial occupiers, of the ‘national’ and patriotic sense of community, belonging and shared cause. An era, that witnessed the golden days of cultural diversity and emancipation of women and men where the ‘other’ still had a place. Then, Nasserism came (and a failed attempt of a revived pan-Arabism). While driving city elites and urban middle classes, and with them Egypt into social, cultural and financial bankruptcy, under the banner of a socialist ‘every-

- 58 - Reflecting Christian Experiences body’s equal’ he created a new class of military and rural elite. With the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and ensuing Suez campaign by Britain, France and Israel, the alignment to the Russian pole to spite the ‘imperialist’ novice, the USA, Gamal Abd El-Nasser (Alexandria 1918 – 1970 Kairo) rekindled ‘Arab- ism’ as an identity when Arabs felt ‘Arabs first’ than ‘Egyptians first’. Around the banners of anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, the Algerian struggle for independence, the failed unities with Syria, with Libya, with Sudan, interventions in Yemen and Arab western allied ‘monarchies’, the charismatic and orator Nasser rallied Arab masses around the ‘Arab cause’. Being ‘Arab’ was trump. Those were the days of Ahmad Sa’eed, the director, chief announcer, and political commentator of ‘Sawt El-ʿArab’ radio (The Voice of the Arabs) who had a listenership that reached levels unachievable by any of modern day Arab satel- lites, including Al-Jazeera. Secular ‘Arabism’ meant the persecution of yonder days ‘infidels’, the Muslim Brotherhood. Then the 1967 defeat came, the emergence of the petro-dollar boom, and along with it the re-emergence of Wahhabism and Salafism, and the early ji- hadist movements in Egypt and other parts of the Arab world whose first vic- tim was no other than an ‘Islamic President covert’, i.e. Anwar El-Sadat assassinated on 6 October 1981 by fundamentalist army officers, who probably at the counsel of the United States ushered the soft ‘reconciliation’ with Egypt’s per- secuted Muslim Brotherhood. The Iranian ‘revolution in the name of God’ of 1979 and the Afghan ‘crusade’ against the communist ‘infidels’ were probably the landmarks of the third and current era of political Islam, Muslim awakening, conservatism and traditionalism, that signalled the end of pan-Arabism as a collective identity. The last three decades saw religious identity increasingly replacing the national and pan-Arab identities, both in stark contradiction to ‘religious’ identity as a ‘sub-culture’. Let down by Nasserism, socialism, and oppressive regimes benefitting from the so-called ‘East-West conflict’, the desperate and humiliated Arab masses turned to religion for consolation, hope and above all individual and collective dignity. Not incidentally, those being the first in the streets when the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt started did not call for democracy first, but for freedom (hurriyya) and dignity (karama). With the fall of various Arab regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and what is dawning upon us in Syria, and the electoral victories by political Islam- ists, Muslim Brothers and Salafis, and the Egyptian experience in particular, Arab Christians are today engaged in a debate of not only ‘who we are and where we stand’, but also ‘where we are going from here’. There are an estimated 20 million Arab Christians who are left in the Middle East today, over half of them Egyptian Christians and the remainder is distributed between Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and dwindling numbers are in Israel, Palestine and Jordan. While Arab Christians constituted the original Bedouin tribes in the greater Syria and the cities on the Mediterranean Coast, primarily Alexandria, Egypt, they lived

- 59 - Reflecting Christian Experiences under Muslim rule as ‘protected’ minorities both as jizya (‘protection tax’) paying communities (ahl al dhimma) and later the Ottoman millet system. Many of course converted to Islam over the centuries to avoid paying the ‘protection tax’. Treated as citizens, as they were, but under certain restrictions, Arab Chris- tians survived the Islamic state and the Ottoman Rule. Projecting what is happening today, it was Arab Christians who started pan- Arabism and the an-Nahda (‘Revival’) movement around the turn of the 20th century, ‘an ideology espousing the unification – or sometimes close cooperation and solidarity against perceived enemies of the Arabs’. It is closely connected to Arab nationalism, which asserts that the Arabs constitute a single nation, resembling in a way the almost simultaneously developed idea of the Jews constituting a single nation, too, irrespective of the place and country of their residence. Its popularity was at its height during the 1950s and 1960s. However, pan-Arabism was associated with ‘secularism’, and as early as the turn of the century rejected by Muslim conservatives. A more formalized pan-Arab ideology was first espoused in the 1930s, notably by Syrian thinkers such as Constantin Zureiq (Damascus 1909 – 2000 Beirut), Zaki al-Arsuzi (Alexan- drette 1901 – 1968 Damascus) and Michel Aflaq (Damascus 1910 – 1989 Paris). Aflaq and al-Arsuzi were key figures in the establishment of the Arab Ba’ath (‘Renaissance’) Party, and the former was for long its chief ideologist, combin- ing elements of Marxist thought with nationalism to a considerable extent rem- iniscent of nineteenth-century European romantic nationalism. All were Chris- tians of Syrian or Lebanese descent. Christian led Pan-Arabism was maybe the first civil movement in modern Arab history. Antun Saadeh (Dhur ash-Shuwair 1904 – 1949 Beirut), an orthodox Lebanese Syrian nationalist philosopher, writer and politician founded the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Nayef Ha- watmeh (born 1938 in as-Salt), a Jordanian Catholic Christian is the General Secretary of the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) since its formation in a 1969 split from the Popular Front for the Lib- eration of Palestine (PFLP), of which he was also founder. He was active as a left-wing leader in the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), which preceded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). George Habash / Georges Habache (al-Ludd 1926 – 2008 Amman) was a Palestinian Christian who founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and served as Secretary-General of the Palestine Front until 2000, when ill-health forced him to resign. Today Arab Christians are an integral component of society. A minority in number, they punch in many countries above their weight socially, politically, and economically. While they are basically ‘happy’ about their situation in Jor- dan and Lebanon, they have every reason to worry about the future. The Iraqi Christians were the first victims of sectarian strife and violence that took place after the fall of the secular Ba’ath regime in Baghdad. Hundreds of thousands fled the country and took refuge in Syria and Jordan. The lucky ones were ac-

- 60 - Reflecting Christian Experiences cepted as refugees in Western countries. Egypt’s Copts have been suffering for many years antagonism of both the state and certain segments of Egyptian society. One of the latest attacks was the bombing of the Coptic Christian Saints Church in Alexandria just as worshipers were leaving the church after New Year’s mass, 1 January 2011. The attack was the deadliest act of violence against Egypt's Christian minority in which 21 died and a hundred left injured. The Maspero demonstrations in October 2011 by a group of Egyptian Copts in reaction to the demolition of a church in Upper Egypt left 28 dead, mostly among the Coptic protestors, and 212 injuries, most of which were sustained by Copts. The debate around the Egyptian constitution and the recent developments in the country is a major source of concern not only for Egypt’s, but for all other Arab Christians in the Middle East as well. The horrifying stories coming out of Syria of massacres committed against Syrian Christians are also another reminder of where the region seems to be, or already is, heading. The greatest fear today among Arab Christians is that they, along with women and children, have become the ‘trade off’ for a new Western diplomacy that – as it collaborated with dictators and totalitarian regimes in the region for decades (at the expense of the Arab masses) – is now seeking appeasement towards the new post-Arab Spring Islamic regimes. There should be no doubt, however, that it is, after all, the Arab Christians who are the guarantee for religious, cultural, and in a way political diversity in the region. They are the guarantee for building a modern society, the corner stone of which is ‘citizenship’ as opposed to an antiquated patriarchal social contract of tradition – religion – family that undermines the relationship between state and constituent.

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Prof. Michel Sternberg (Paris / France)

Catherine Dupeyron, a former student and graduate of the Institut d'Études Poli- tiques in Paris, worked as a journalist in the Middle-East since 1999 writing as correspondent for the French newspapers Le Monde, Le Parisien, and Les Echos and founded the bilingual web-based periodical Jerusalem & Religions2. She is regarded as an excellent observer of the life of Christians in Palestine and Israel and a renowned expert in this field. In her book she gives a very lively and detailed description particularly of the changes that occurred in the situation of Christians there. In both countries they constitute a minority, often overlooked or even forgotten in the western world, with some exceptions, e. g. when Pope Benedict XVI visited the Holy Land in 2009, or Christian pilgrims from the West taking notice of them when they encounter them on their ways through the Holy Land.

CHRISTIANS IN PALESTINE According to Catherine Dupeyron, there are 13 different Christian Churches with an estimated total of 50 000 souls representing 1% of the entire population. “But statistics are very complex and complicated here,” says Father Pierbattista Piz- zaballa OFM, the Custos Terrae Sanctae, the “Guardian of the Holy Land,” because each Christian faith community expresses not only doubts as to the reliability of these figures, but also claims to be the first rank. Almost half of the Christians (about 50% of them) or roughly live in the regions of Bethlehem and Ramallah, others mainly in Taybe, Jericho, Nablus, or Gaza. Jerusalem with her 10.000 Christians remains a special case, and Bethle- hem, the city where Jesus was born, retains her symbolic value and special meaning for all Christians, irrespective of the fact, that the number of Chris- tians living there - Greek Orthodox (being the majority), Latin Catholic, Arme- nian, Protestant... - is constantly shrinking. Nowadays only 10 % of Bethle- hem’s population is still Christian. Palestinian Christians, or Christians living in Palestine, constitute a rather homogeneous community of Arab culture and language, in contrast to the

1 Catherine Dupeyron, Chrétiens en Terre sainte. Disparition ou mutation? Paris 2007. Some information was updated by Catherine Dupeyron in the French periodical Sens, Jan- uary 2012, N° 365, pp. 45-48. 2 http://www.jerusalem-religions.net/

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Christian community living in Israel. In Palestine, there are less and less Chris- tians, as said. The reason for that may be found, on the one hand, in the fact that Christian families have less and less children, and in their continuing emigration, on the other. The latter may be due to the still unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine and due also to the increasing Islamization. Howev- er, emigration of Christians from the region is not a new phenomenon. A significant emigration began already at the end of the 19th century, well before World War I; and it is this old emigration that facilitates the new one. As we know from the then British census, in 1931 the percentage of Christians living in the sub-district of Bethlehem was 45% of the entire population. Thus, even before World War II and the establishment of the State of Israel, Christians were already a minority in Bethlehem.

CHRISTIANS IN ISRAEL In the Jewish State of Israel, one out of four Israelis is not Jewish. Since its foundation, the state guarantees freedom of religion and the right to practice it in accordance with one’s own respective religious tradition. Soldiers, e. g., when being sworn-in, put their hand either on the Tora, or on the New Testament or on the Koran, according to their religious commitment. In general, the number of non-Jews living in Israel is growing. Since 1948 until today, the percentage of non-Jews has constantly increased from then 13.6% to now 25%. Otherwise than in Palestine, in Israel Christians are more and more present. But, when speaking about Christians in Israel and their growing number, we have to realize that it is not essentially the local Arab Christian community that is growing. Nevertheless, in 1944 there was 8.600 Christians living in Nazareth, 12.900 in 1961, and 18.500 in 1995. In general, Christians in Israel can be divided – a bit schematically – into three different groups, living side by side, but rather separated from each other: (1) The first group is composed of Christian Israeli Arabs, about 125.000 souls (1.6% of the entire Israeli population). For them, Arabic is not only the language used in everyday life, their culture is Arabic, and Arabic is also their “religious language”, the language of prayer and liturgy. Most of these Ara- bic speaking and praying Christians live in Galilee (c. 20.000 in Nazareth; c. 10.000 in Nazareth Illit). The majority of them belong to the Greek Catholic Church, Greek Orthodox and Latin Church. Their relationship with Jewish Israelis largely depends on the history and fate of their families after the 1948 war. A typical representative of this group is Father Emil Shufani, principal of the Greek-Catholic St Joseph’s College, in Nazareth, to whom the 2003 UNESCO Prize For Peace Education was awarded.3 (2) The next group, so-called foreign Christians, includes Filipinos, Africans, South Americans, Romanians whose total number is even difficult to esti-

3 http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12590&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC& URL_SECTION=201.html

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mate, because not one of them is an irregular immigrant and who finds his- or herself without the proper documents, in an illegal situation. Among them, unconsummated marriages are not a rare phenomenon. There are about 185.000 foreign immigrant workers, but not all of them are Christians (like those coming, e. g., from Thailand or Nepal). Generally, it is assumed that the number of Christians among these foreign immigrant workers may exceed 100.000. Often they are not mentioned in official statistics, but they are there and make themselves known, for instance when the need a place for worship! These Christians live mainly in or around Tel-Aviv, have their services on Saturday evening or Sunday and pray in their own language, sometimes also in Hebrew. (3) The third and, by far, the largest group are Russian Jews or rather “Crypto- Christians,” mostly new immigrants (1.2 million people) from Eastern Eu- rope. Among them, about 300.000 to 400.000 are not Jewish according to the halakhic definition. The reason for that is: if a Russian Jew (a man) married a Russian Christian woman, and together they have two children, then he and his family may well benefit from the “law of return” to Israel, but his wife and their two children (that is, 3/4 of the family) are not regarded as Jews. They may remain Christians, unless they decide to convert to Judaism according to the accepted rules of the rabbinic halakhah. In general, these people speak Hebrew. Although having mostly Russian Orthodox background, they may join the Catholic Church and attend their services with prayers conducted in Hebrew, as it is practiced by the new Hebrew speaking Catholic community, that established itself as a distinct faith community and Church with its own religious leadership under the auxiliary bishop, Father David Neuhaus SJ. In addition to that, there is the group of so-called “Messianic Jews,” Jews who believe in Jesus the Christ, but wish to keep their Jewishness and stick to the Jewish tradition by observing Jewish rites and customs. (4) A fourth and last group are Israelis “without religion”, as said in the official statistics. To this group belong some Israelis of Russian origins who do not wish to be considered officially as Christians and thus to be mixed either with the Arab Christian citizens or with those foreign European Christians responsible for the Shoah. Privately, they may take part in Christian services or family celebrations, e. g. at Christmas; and it is, by and large, due to them that Christmas trees begin to appear in Tel-Aviv, too. In the eyes of Jewish Israelis, these “Russian Jews or Christians” are something new, the “new other”: Christians who speak Hebrew like them and thus, share their Hebrew culture and language with them, but differ from them in their religious identity. For them, the Shoah is not part and parcel of their identity, and as newcomers, they also have very little, if anything, to do with the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and sometimes are lacking even the necessary awareness of it. On the other hand, these new Christians may well allow an easier dialogue between Israeli Judaism and Christianity.

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Dr Abdulrahman S. Al-Salimi (Masqat / Oman)

The transformation of the Middle East today, in particular in the Arab countries, can generally be considered as being the result of popular youth movements which aim to reform the authorities on a democratic basis. The need to restructure has been manifest in most Arab countries for more than three decades now. Most of the Arab regimes emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, as a result of military coups; the military took the initiative because they were the only organized groups with strong leadership. They were considered to be the most likely to be able to carry out the necessary modernization processes following the newly acquired independent status of countries in Asia and Africa. Partly due to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and also in view of the fact that the Arab World became a strategic region between the three con- tinents on account of its oil resources, this area has been a strategic battleground since the Second World War; for the World War players on the one hand and, on the other, for the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War in the 1950s. There are those who believe that the USA may even have been behind some of the military coups in Arab countries because the powers that had formerly been ruling those countries were British and French colonizers, and the Americans may have wanted to replace the old colonial powers and establish strong regimes capable of ‘protecting’ their countries from communism and the influence of the Soviet Union. However, due to the conflict with Israel caused by Western powers and on account of the major developmental needs that the United States repeatedly failed to meet, it was in fact the case that, amidst attempts from the two major powers to create coalitions with them, the military regimes decided in the 1960s to side with the Soviet Union. Thus the United States and its allies retained their strong relationships with the Gulf States and the Shah of Iran, whilst the Arab military regimes tended to lean towards the Soviet Union. This consequently led to undesirable internal changes in these countries which could hardly be considered pro-democracy. The slogans of the regimes were progressive socialist, and they had a one-party system of rule, under the leadership of the senior military officer who had carried out the coup.

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The Arab regimes developed a number of goals and slogans for themselves: Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine and self-development. Indeed, many unions or attempts to create unions were made, but they all failed on account of disagreements, or because the military officers did not want to give up the power they had acquired through their coups. With regard to the liberation of Palestine, a number of wars flared up between the regimes and Israel. These were lost by the regimes, resulting in the struggle for Palestine being left to the Palestine Liberation Organization, under the leadership of the late Yasser Ara- fat. The regimes then concentrated on liberating the territories occupied by Israel during its conflicts and wars with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. They also continued their development plans through their five-year plans, nationalization and land reforms, although all plans were frozen in the 1970s. The assassination of President Anwar Sadat at the hands of a fundamentalist organization in 1981 gave a clear indication that the military regimes were by then experiencing a period of major crisis. Yet, in spite of this and the fact that they had almost come to a standstill in terms of development, they did not change their policies. The severely oppressive systems practiced for four decades, during which emergency laws prevailed in nine of the Arab countries, indeed helped the military regimes to survive. The other reason for their survival was their gradually growing alliance with the United States, a country which came to dominate the world after the obvious weakness of the Soviet Union during the 1980s and its eventual collapse in 1990. Egypt switched allegiance in the 1970s, as did Algeria and some of the other Arab countries, while those countries that did not change over, such as Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, ended up being invaded, block- aded or experiencing unrest. There might have been a third reason for the survival of the military regimes in the Arab world, too, — the emergence of the Islamist ‘bogeyman’. Ameri- cans and Europeans were convinced by the propaganda which suggested that, if these regimes were to be ousted, Islamist extremists would take over. Such propaganda was the practice of Bin Ali, Gaddafi, Hafiz al-Assad, Mubarak and the Algerians. Thus, since the 1990s, the idea has prevailed that the Arabs are an exception to democracy, based on the belief that their rulers are tyrants and their young men fundamentalists. ***** In 1995, the late Nazeeh Naseef al-Ayyoubi (1944-1996), an Egyptian political analyst, mentioned in his book Over-stating the Arab state – politics and society in the Middle East that in most countries of the Arab world three phenomena are manifest: a greater extent of disruption in the functions of the State, the transformation of the authorities into security and dictatorial powers, and the blockage of channels and means of peaceful change. Al Ayyoubi was, thus, able to antic- ipate the armed revolutionary outbursts led by Islamic extremists. This argu-

- 66 - Omani Perspectives ment was re-enforced by the weakness of Arab political life, civil social movements and the emergence of al-Qaeda and its terrorism, which made Islam into a world problem. When the USA invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, it proclaimed that it wanted to spread democracy to the Arab states, even if it had to do so by force! However, what the United States failed to do was in fact done by the civilian Tunisian and Egyptian youth, who believe in democratic values (such as the rotation of power, fair elections, combating corruption and the rule of law), and there are similar movements in Libya, Yemen, Algeria and Bahrain. These movements have now even extended to stable countries like Morocco and Oman. There was no place where the Islamists’ power appeared to be stronger than in Egypt and Yemen, but their ideals in these countries do not in fact appear to differ from those of the youth who move with them or follow them. Consequently, after initial hesitating on account of their fear of Islamists, the Americans and Europeans are now encouraging change. At the same time they are calling upon the Army to maintain order, and for young men to form temporary governments, while the Islamists gain the right to legitimately establish political parties in order to participate in elections. They have used Turkey as an example of this order; in this case the Army protects the secular or civil system and the moderate Islamists form a government through free elections. Despite the fact that the situation in Egypt differs from that in Turkey, the armies of both countries protect the pillars of the system to prevent disorder, but do not interfere with political life. ***** What are the anticipated effects of this change and what will happen next? It is, naturally, not possible to predict the future. The youth of these countries surprised everyone with their emergence in tens, hundreds and thousands. It is anticipated, however, that the remaining regimes, such as Algeria, Yemen and Sudan will also in turn collapse. It is also anticipated that free elections will be held in a number of Arab countries for the first time in many decades. The process of development and stabilisation is expected to be faster and smoother in Egypt, Tunisia and Oman than it will be in Sudan, Yemen, Libya and Algeria because the structure of the former three states is stronger and their armies are unified and strong, while, in the latter cases, sectarian and political divisions dominate the scene. There are those who say that the current struggles will bring about a rapprochement between the various elements of the struggles, something which was not possible during the past under the military regimes. In addition, there are others who say that the formation of the new power structure will take time, and that this will adversely affect stability, as well as having an impact on the development process. However, this can be more than compensated for by the newly acquired freedom, the rule of law and the fight against corruption and exploitation.

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It is not anticipated that these movements will have any impact on Western interests because Western countries have not opposed the change. However, the strategic situation in the region will change dramatically, resulting in particular in a negative outcome for Israel and Iran. This does not mean, for example, that Egyptians will start fighting against Israel again, because the agreements between the two countries are still in place and secured by the Army. This impact arises rather from the fact that Israel will be no longer the only democracy in the Middle East. Moreover, it can no longer gain Western support if it in- tends to attack Syria or Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is now probable that the Americans will, once again, attempt to organise negotiations between the Israe- lis, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and Syrians, on the other. In any case a resolution to the Palestine-Israel conflict can no longer be delayed if the West wants to avoid another outbreak of religious extremism. The new democracies offer new opportunities and the West would do well to make use of their strength to work for stability and peace. If we look at the two big states neighbouring the Arab World – Turkey and Iran – we find that Turkey seems more comfortable with the progressive changes taking place there than Iran does. Erdogan had urged President Mu- barak to step down, and the Turkish foreign minister had visited Egypt and met with its senior military officers and expressed his pleasure over Egypt’s return to its natural role and power through democracy. In the beginning, the Iranians and Hezbollah showed their support for the removal of their opponent Arab leaders, but then kept quiet. In fact, during the past ten years, Iran has been expanding along the same lines that the United States had done before. It has built up areas of influence in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. The American- Iranian agreement in Iraq has, however, now come to an end and the Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki (who is the symbol of partnership between the two parties) is now suffering under popular resentment because of corruption and poor infrastructure. In addition, there are many problems in the Kurdish region and there have been powerful demonstrations there. It is thought that Erbil’s agreement with al-Maliki has ceased to exist, and, as a consequence of it, Iran will suffer during the coming year on account of its diminishing influence in Iraq. The Syrians will soon have no alternative but to enter into negotiations for peace with Israel, brokered by the Americans and Turks, and this will lead to tension between Syria and Iran. Hezbollah is still strong in Lebanon and was able, quite recently, to nominate a prime minister who does not come from the majority. It is, however, still suffering from a problem caused by the fact that Iran is busy dealing with its own internal affairs and by the Israeli withdrawal. To sum up, exporting the revolution outside the Shiite circle has now become impossible and, in particular, within the Arab Shiite population. There are many complaints about Iran, and the Iranian opposition is starting to regard Egypt and Tunisia as their role models, accusing Ahmadinejad's followers of being traitors and hypocrites!

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***** Preliminary results in the elections in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring have shown decisive yet unexpected wins for the Islamic parties. These parties have also performed well in Libya and the next scenario will be Yemen, where an election is due to be held shortly. This result has not only aroused fears in the international community about a rise and/or increase in Islamic fundamentalism; it has also raised doubts about the future of the Arab Spring and the goals which young Arabs are seeking to achieve in their unforeseen revolution. Indeed, these fears may have an impact on the future of democracy in the Arab world and its revolutions in the days to come. Where elections took place thus far, the elections were free and fair, and reflected the will and choice of the Arab man-on-the-street. The parties went to the polls with a democratic commitment to win or lose, according to the results of the vote. Yet the latest results now pose the challenge of how to deal with the international political system as a whole. Three aspects of this challenge in particular will affect the Islamic parties’ approach and ideology, both in domes- tic terms and vis-à-vis the international community. (1) The economy. This poses one of their toughest challenges, in two respects. Firstly, with regard to economic development and the diversification of the sources of national income, taking into consideration the fact that tourism represents over 30% of national income in these aforementioned three countries. Secondly, there is the problem of how to deal with the international economic system and its markets from a global perspective. While classic views on Islamic banks and Islamic insurance companies have begun to surface in global financial operations in recent years, they only represent a partial set of solutions. Ideas on diversifying the economy and national resources, put forward by the winning parties, indicate that their ideology is incompatible with the global financial system. This means that they will find themselves forced either to adopt a new vision of their own, in opposition to the global system, or come to terms with the demands of international realities. (2) The second aspect concerns the position of women – not from a feminist point of view, but with regard to women’s issues, their right to education and equality and their right to take part in public life and politics, work and crea- tive activity. International reports indicate that women in the Arab world suffer from widespread illiteracy – over 40% in some countries, according to the United Nations. Moreover, unemployment, social problems, honour killings, etc. are all issues which widen the social gap between men and women and make it harder to overcome within the short term. This was a major topic of discussion among Islamic reformers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1902), a Syrian author and, in his time, one of the most influential supporters of Pan-Islamic Arab solidarity, regarded it as a symptom of the breakdown of Islamic societies. Of

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particular relevance is the question of the hijab – a subject that will continue to create endless controversy in civil society and produce a range of conflict- ing views on how it should be resolved. This is something that has already begun to manifest itself in Tunisia. (3) The third aspect of this challenge is how the parties should respond to the issues of global security and the fight against terrorism. We are all aware that over the past two decades we have fought a bitter battle against this disease – a disease that has become widespread in Islamic communities (both in the Muslim world and abroad), breeding Islamophobia and trigger- ing a conflict over Islam which has turned Islam into a global problem. The challenge, then, is how to enable the Islamist parties’ vision to coexist with that of the international community. While we know that the Palestinian- Israeli conflict is part of the problem, the parties’ main responsibility lies in the implications of their ideas for Muslims and their problems abroad. They can either take up a position in which they oppose Islamic fundamentalist policies – particularly in the West – and by doing so put an end to the fundamentalist ideology in both the Muslim world and the regions in which Muslims are in a minority; or, alternatively, they can adopt a completely different political approach from that of the rest of the world and face certain international isolation. Consequently, they would face losing subsequent elections, unless the societies in question were wholly in favour of confron- tational, anti-Western policies – and this is extremely unlikely at the present time. So it is clear that international security is a part of the world order and one must be either with it or against it. ***** These scenarios, which I have described above, give us a picture of how these fundamentalist parties are likely to fare in the future. The results will represent a wide disparity between the various Arab states. In Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and Jordan, too, if general elections enable the religious parties to form constitutional governments – and indeed in Syria, which is destined to follow the same path – they will lose their ideology. This will be partly as a result of pressure from civil society, and partly in order to attract voters at the next elections; this is something they will have to do if they decide to remain bound by the constitution. In Yemen there will be unrest and competing “fronts”, and the religious parties will succeed in winning over the majority of the public. They will then either confront and challenge the opposition according to the rules, or operate outside the scope of the elections and impose their will in an arbitrary manner, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. In Libya the main challenge will be the divisions between the Salafists and the traditional schools of thought and between the “Arabizers” and the supporters of recognition for the Berbers. Other problems include that country’s huge oil wealth and weak infrastructure, and

- 70 - Omani Perspectives the presence of large numbers of weapons, still in the hands of the revolutionaries. These problems will drag the country into a state of unrest and instability. In the case of Iraq, despite the fact that it is now nine years since the US-led invasion, the religious and other parties have not yet come up with a clear vision of the democratic challenge. This has been due to the country’s sectarian divisions, which have brought about a state of violence and quasi-civil war. Moreover, in this case the country did not experience a revolution against a regime, but rather a transfer of power from one section of the middle class to another section of the middle class which had been waiting to take over power. This meant that the latter was already prepared to take direct revenge on its predecessors. Iraq will have no difficulty in embracing democracy. It must, however, first resolve the problems of its oil and the plundering of its resources and has to be willing and able to stand firm against this robbery, and it must establish a society that embraces the whole of the nation. This is the distinction between a vision of the national interest as a whole and one concerned merely with control of the nation’s resources. These more or less expected outcomes have generated theories on the Mid- dle East which maintain that those Arab countries which are not dependent upon oil are more capable of embracing democracy. This is because the economic challenges they face will force them to try to create economic opportunities and attract foreign investment, which in turn will produce broader-based and more robust middle classes, as well as more job opportunities in the private sector than the public sector. The main problem in the region then is how to exploit oil resources while, at the same time, ensuring a minimum of corruption and the establishment of a balance of power between civil society and the State. To sum up, while the fundamentalist parties may still be enjoying the intoxi- cation of victory, they will soon have to come face to face with reality. Demo- cratic polls produce unexpected results and indeed difficult choices – i. e. whether to accept the results or to seize power and marginalise the constitution, which would put them in conflict with the Army and bring everything back to square one. If the Islamist parties continue to operate in accordance within the democratic process, they will have to become Islamist in name only. In other words, this will mean the end of the era of fundamentalist ideology – perhaps marking the beginning of a new phase in history, rather than the end of an old one.

- 71 - Rabbin – Prof. em. Michel Serfaty (Paris/ France)

Le printemps arabe tourne au cauchemar. Au totalitarisme succèdent les crises, les guerres, les révoltes, et l’émergence de nouvelles formes de totalitarismes religieux. Est-ce là ce dont rêvaient les populations de ces pays ? Peut-on encore parler de printemps arabe sans être pris pour des naïfs ? La guerre fratricide de Syrie, les derniers attentats commis au Pakistan par le Lej d’obédience sunnite contre la communauté Chi’ite pousse au pessimisme et laisse certains penser plutôt à un « hiver islamique ». En dehors du Maroc qui a accueilli le dernier séminaire du Forum Abraha- mique à Rabat, on observe que du Pakistan à la Tunisie, du Yémen à l'Égypte et de la Libye à la Syrie, aucun de ces pays ne semble laisser rêver d’une société plus libre. A quoi assistons-nous ? On croit assister plus à une désintégration des états qu’à une transition. Et, même si l’on suivait les regards optimistes de ceux qui veulent croire en une transition, on ne peut s’empêcher de leur demander : de quelle transition parle-t-on ? Certainement pas d’une démocratie à l’occidentale. Et par ailleurs, la prise de pouvoir par des partis islamistes radicaux, comme on le verra ci-après, est loin d’être une transition. On semble plutôt revenir à la case départ : où va donc le monde arabo-musulman ? A la vérité, les spécialistes annoncent qu’ils sont à la recherche de perspectives nouvelles face à ces bouleversements. Et nombreux sont ceux qui s’interrogent et se demandent sur quels critères bâtir une théorie et orienter la réflexion ? En effet, sauf consensus miraculeux, le panorama donne le spectacle des échecs, des déchirures et des destructions toujours en marche. Le signe de l’échec des politiques des radicaux, c’est bien sûr l’assassinat politique. C’est le signe terrifiant de la dégradation du climat politique et social dans le pays. L’assassinat témoigne surtout de l’échec des partis religieux au pouvoir. Après les assassinats politiques en Iran, au Liban, en Irak et ailleurs, c’est aujourd’hui celui de Belaïd Chokri, intellectuel Tunisien de gauche.

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En tant que consultant du Forum Abrahamique, sans prétendre être un spé- cialiste des phénomènes politiques qui secouent le monde arabo-islamique, c’est le modeste témoignage de l’acteur de terrain du dialogue judéo-musulman en France que l’on se propose de formuler. On peut donc tenter deux approches : une analyse extrémiste qui rappelle- rait les situations observées sous les régimes des Talibans d’une part, une analyse optimiste ouvrant des portes et des horizons d’espoir de l’autre. L'islam radical sunnite des islamistes, autrement dit celui d’Al-Qaida, frère de l’islam des Talibans et du Mollah Omar, issu du Salafisme Wahhabite, inspire l’idéologie religieuse des Frères musulmans. Dès lors, ne serait-il pas lui aussi une idéologie de destruction massive ? Et dans ce cas, pourquoi ne s’est-on jamais penché sur sa capacité de nuisance et de destruction ? On sait que leur vision idéologique, comme celle des Salafistes et des partis religieux extrémistes, est de vouloir « moraliser » la société, autrement dit de l’islamiser. Mais pour mieux les caractériser, rappelons donc les traits principaux de leurs politiques. D’abord, ils se hâtent de mettre au pas la police, la justice et l’administration locale. Ils révèlent souvent une réelle inexpérience du pouvoir. Leur incompé- tence en gestion des affaires aboutit à créer un climat de terreur. Ils s’attaquent aux droits de la femme. Ils limitent leur circulation. Ils interdisent leur scolarisa- tion. Ils organisent les mariages forcés. Bref, ils opèrent un réel retour aux pra- tiques moyenâgeuses. Ensuite, ils s’en prennent aux universitaires. Ils organisent la chasse aux sorcières et persécutent les intellectuels. Ils cherchent à contrôler les medias, la presse, les réseaux sociaux. Ils s’emploient à contrôler les artistes et les acteurs. Ils créent des polices de bonne morale qui ferment les bars débi- tant des alcools et des boissons. Ils détruisent les mausolées et organisent des attaques contre les centres culturels américains et occidentaux. Ils remettent en cause les libertés publiques par l’instauration d’un régime théocratique, donc totalitaire. Point de rôle d’arbitre, point de rôle de garant de la sécurité publique et de la justice. Ils stigmatisent les juifs, les américains, les croisés, etc. et fomen- tent des mises à sac de leurs lieux de culte ou de leurs cimetières. Ils mettent en place des instances judiciaires expéditives pour prononcer des sentences barbares et inhumaines ainsi que des milices parallèles, auxiliaires du pouvoir, pour les basses œuvres qui se livrent à des exactions sauvages, barbares, amputation de mains, lapidation, etc. semant la peur, l’inquiétude et l’insécurité, enfin, assu- rées de bénéficier d’une totale impunité. Ainsi, tous les extrémistes qui préten- dent vouloir préserver la révolution, instaurent en fait les violences à différents niveaux de la société. En somme, un régime fasciste classique que l’histoire récente du XXème a bien connu. Face à la capacité de résistance de leurs populations, ces régimes politiques totalitaires n’ont jamais tenu. Leur échec s’est généralement traduit par des révoltes populaires. Et aujourd’hui, à la faveur de la circulation de l’information,

- 73 - Reflecting French Jewish Experiences des avancées technologiques, scientifiques mais aussi culturelles et éthiques, les valeurs démocratiques entrent dans ces civilisations progressivement et créent de l’intérêt pour leur mode de fonctionnement démocratique, fondé sur le suf- frage universel. Or, on a observé que sous les régimes dictatoriaux, les mou- vances islamistes se trouvent avoir développé des actions sociales qui ont con- tribué à les présenter sous un jour favorable. Et ainsi, dès les premiers scrutins populaires, elles ont réuni des majorités en leur faveur. De fait, légitimement élus, leurs partis arrivent au pouvoir sans soulever de soupçons quant à leur futures politiques. Ainsi, la démocratie, voix des peuples désireux de s’affranchir des dictatures, peut-elle être celle des extrémistes de tous bords, religieux ou extrémistes qui ne reconnaissent pas le droit aux libertés individuelles ni le droit à la liberté de conscience et d’expression ? Belaïd Chokri, leur victime, les qualifiait : «de force rétrograde, passéiste, avec sa culture de la mort, sa violence, sa négation de l’autre, sa pensée unique, sa couleur unique, son souverain unique et sa lecture unique du texte sacré. » Mais là, à n’en plus douter, le nœud du problème semble être touché : celui du rapport des hommes à leurs textes dits sacrés : rapport de soumission ? rapport de source d’inspiration ? Ou rapport de liberté d’interprétation et d’analyse histori- co-critique ? A priori, nous dirons que dans le monde arabo-musulman, c’est un rapport de soumission au texte du Coran qui va guider les choix politiques des partis politiques religieux. Or, dans ce cas, peut-on croire en des renonciations de leur côté ? Peut-on imaginer de les voir donner la priorité à la cohésion politique, à l’intérêt général qui passe par l’union nationale ? Malheureusement, tout le monde voit qu’ils pratiquent une politique partisane. Et comme de l’époque communiste, c’est d’abord une vision idéologique qui l’emporte à leurs yeux partout sur les compétences et l’expertise. Ils savent qu’en cédant sur leurs pré- rogatives au profit d’un gouvernement d’experts et de technocrates, comme le préconisait l’ancien premier ministre de Tunisie Hamadi Jebali, ils perdaient leur ascendant sur la population et diminuaient leurs chances de donner à leur ré- gime et à leur constitution une orientation religieuse extrémiste. En fait, leur jusqu’auboutisme au nom de cette fameuse « légitimité démo- cratique », comme c’est le cas des frères musulmans en Égypte et en Tunisie, le double langage de ces partis prétendument modérés, la tolérance qu’ils obser- vent à l’égard des Salafistes, leur refus radical de partager le pouvoir et de cons- truire un début de consensus, sont en train de ruiner la « révolution » et de pousser au soulèvement et à la violence les laïcs et les libres penseurs. En la circonstance, nous croyons qu’il n’y a rien de mieux que de rapporter en guise d’hommage à Belaïd Chokri, certaines de ses déclarations avant son assassinat. Par exemple, il déclarait que son crédo était : « Liberté et Dignité », puis il définissait la « Liberté », comme une valeur centrale qui réside dans le respect de la diversité et le droit à la différence.

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C’est encore lui qui déclarait à propos de la liberté de création : « Un film, un poème, une œuvre théâtrale, une chanson, aucun magistrat sur terre n’est compétent pour statuer là-dessus. La création artistique et littéraire s’évalue et se corrige par les critiques spécialisés dans ces domaines, et non pas par les tribunaux. Ces gens qui veulent imposer leur censure comptent nous engager dans l’ère de la Hisba (code draconien de censure religieuse), comme c’est le cas actuellement en Égypte. Ils veulent faire régresser la Tunisie qui est gouver- née par un système judiciaire civil datant de plus d’un siècle. » Quant à la question de savoir comment éviter à un pays de sombrer dans l’intolérance et le sectarisme, s’exprimant sur le rôle des médias dans la société, Belaïd Chokri répondait : « Ce pays, (la Tunisie) comme chacun le sait, n’a pas de ri- chesses premières. Notre unique capital, c’est l’intelligence. Nous n’avons pas de pétrole. Nous n’avons pour manne de richesse que le capital de l’intelligence humaine et ce que nous avons acquis en commun, ce qui nous a permis aux uns et aux autres de cohabiter malgré tout dans ce pays. » Puis il ajoutait : « Il n’y a pas de démocratie sans pouvoir médiatique pluraliste, démocratique et libre. Pouvoir qui prend à sa charge la volonté du peuple de tout contrôler. Tout contrôler, c’est-à-dire la tête du pouvoir, les institutions, les partis politiques, les associa- tions, la culture, l’idéologie dominante. » En somme, le bouclier à opposer à l’intolérance et le sectarisme réside dans la liberté d’opinion, la liberté de presse et le respect de la curiosité intellectuelle. A ce stade de notre témoignage, les analyses optimistes ne sont pas non plus sans intérêt ? D’abord parce qu’elles tentent de proposer un regard positif sur les évènements. Ensuite, parce qu’elles se réfèrent au passé et à la mémoire de nos sociétés : leurs expériences douloureuses, pour en dégager quelques lignes et quelques fenêtres d’espoir. Or, au cœur des crises, on observe qu’il y a toujours des initiatives de recherche de solutions négociées. Comment donc donner place à la négociation ? Est-ce qu’il suffit d’exprimer la volonté de recherche d’une solution médiane ? Et si c’est le cas, comment reconnaître celui qui veut réellement témoigner d’une volonté de céder sur ses prérogatives idéologiques ? Est-ce parmi les modérés parmi les extrémistes ? Et quand ils existent, peuvent-ils travailler à la réconciliation ? Les récents évènements qui ont secoué la société tunisienne ont révélé que la réconciliation pouvait se faire en acceptant de relever le défi de la réussite de la transition démocratique. Ainsi, par exemple, le parti islamiste En-Nahda, a montré qu’il aurait pu évoluer vers un projet politique basé sur la séparation des pouvoirs. Il a fait des pas en refusant d’inscrire la Shari‘a dans la Constitution et en adoptant le statut personnel de Bourguiba favorable à la femme. Malheureu- sement, il fut contesté par sa base proche des Salafistes, arrêtant là son aggior- namento. Alors que l’espoir de la réconciliation se dessinait, il fut contraint de refuser du coup, le « caractère civil de l’État », la « neutralité de l’administration », le « respect des droits de l’homme » et de « tenir l’administration, les mosquées et les institutions économiques et éducatives à l’écart de toute instrumentalisation à caractère politique »

- 75 - Reflecting French Jewish Experiences que lui proposait l’Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens – UGTT- dans son programme pour un : « Dialogue national. » Or, ce débat témoigne d’une certaine réalité : la lucidité et le sens des res- ponsabilités des parties en présence pour sauver la situation et tenter d’élaborer un nouveau modèle de système politique et de favoriser un développement économique et social, seul moyen pour remédier aux maux susceptibles de pré- cipiter le pays dans le chaos. On ne sait que trop bien à quel point la crise politique s’exacerbe et se nourrit de la détérioration de l’économie et à quel point elle l’alimente à son tour. A partir de là, si la crise économique prend le relais, les capitaux fuient, les investisseurs étrangers cherchent d’autres pays, la bourse s’effondre, le chômage explose, les grèves se multiplient, le tourisme chute, la consommation intérieure chute, les denrées diminuent, et l’on arrive à la soupe populaire. etc. On peut donc admettre que dans les pays arabes concernés, il se produit des mutations. Cependant, d’un pays à l’autre, chacun vit sa mutation différem- ment. Ce qui se produit en Tunisie ne ressemble pas à ce qui se passe en Égypte, en Libye ou en Syrie. On ne peut donc exclure, de parler véritablement d’un retour au «printemps arabe» dans un proche avenir. On ne peut pas nier non plus que ces populations se battent pour la liberté, engageant leurs vies chaque jour contre la dicta- ture, fut-elle celle des tyrans ou celle des religions. On rencontre même des politologues qui s’inscrivent en opposition contre les théories simplistes voire simplement racistes, qui prétendent que les pays arabes ne peuvent pas ériger de réelles sociétés démocratiques. De tels préjugés avaient circulé au lendemain de la Deuxième guerre mondiale sur les Japonais et les Russes. L’histoire en a montré l’ineptie. On peut donc s’autoriser à adhérer à l’idée selon laquelle les révolutions populaires ont fini par aboutir à des lendemains plus heureux. La Révolution fran- çaise par exemple, peut nourrir la réflexion sur les évènements actuels. Sans doute, les fruits de la Révolution furent longs à récolter. Après les années de la terreur, ce fut le tour des années du sursaut national, des droits de l’homme et du citoyen et du progrès qui s’ensuivirent. Dans cette perspective, on peut penser que l’Islam reste une civilisation foncièrement diverse et ouverte à l’harmonie et au respect des valeurs humaines fondamentales. Sa rencontre avec l’Occident se construit de jour en jour sur la base de règles communes mettant en point de mire ultime, le bonheur de l’être humain. Et parce que l’Islam est loin d’être monolithique et c’est là son principal atout, les pays qui l’ont adopté comme religion avancent certes à petits pas, mais ils avancent assurément vers l’affirmation d’un désir de vivre en paix et d’une volonté d’apporter à leurs populations, à travers la diversité et la multitude de leurs cultures et de leurs histoires, des solutions harmonieuses entre civilisations, cultures et société mo- derne.

- 76 - HE Prof. Dr Kamel Abu Jaber Professor of Political Sciences and Director of the Royal Institute for In- ter-Faith Studies (RIIFS) – Amman, Jordan. Former President of the Higher Council for Information (2001-2002), President of the Jordan Insti- tute of Diplomacy (1997-2001), Senator in the Jordan Upper House of Parliament (1993-1997), and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Jordan (1991- 1993).

HE Ambassador Hasan Abu Nimah Foreign Policy Advisor to HRH Prince El-Hassan Bin El-Talal – Amman, Jordan. Former Director of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (RI- IFS), Amman. Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations (1995-2000); Former Ambassador to Iraq, USA, United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, to the European Community, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe.

Mr Christoph Blosen Attaché de Presse; Ambassade d'Allemagne à Rabat, Maroc.

Mrs Farah Cherif D’Ouezzan Founder and Director of the Center for Cross Cultural Learning & Secre- tary General of “Thaqafat Association” – Rabat, Morocco.

Mr Muin A. Khoury Pollster, political analyst, and consultant. Former Director of Research and Director of International Media at the Royal Hashemite Court (2000-2012) – Amman, Jordan

Dr iur. Naseef Naeem Lawyer, assistant professor and research fellow at the Seminar for Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Göttingen, Germany, expert on constitutional and administrative law of Arab countries. Mr Kai Kreutzberger received his LL.M in Islamic Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Solicitor-at-Law in England & Wales (since February 2013), specialising in civil, property, and succession laws of the Middle Eastern region.

- 77 - Dr Abdulrahman S. Al-Salimi Professor in Islamic studies and Chief Editor of the magazine Al-Tafahum (Mutual Understanding) – Islamic Cultural Journal, issued (since 2004, at that time under its former title Al-Tasamoh [Tolerance]) by the Ministry of Awqaf (Endowments) & Religious Affairs, Sultanate of Oman – Masqat, Oman, to promote inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue and interfaith education. Mrs Dagmar Schmidt Tartagli Conseillère; Ambassade de Suisse au Maroc – Rabat, Morocco.

Prof. Dr Stefan Schreiner Co-Founder and Co-Ordinator of the European Abrahamic Forum (EAF) – Zürich, Switzerland; Councillor and Executive Board Member of the Foundation “Zuercher Lehrhaus: Judaism Christianity Islam”. Professor of Comparative Study of Religions and Jewish Studies at Tübingen University – Tübingen, Germany.

Prof. Dr Muhammad A. Sharqawi Head of the Department of Islamic Philosophy and Comparative Study of Religions, Faculty of Dar-ul-ʿUlum, Cairo University – Cairo, Egypt.

Rabbin – Prof. em. Michel Serfaty Professeur Emérite des Universités, Rabbin du Consistoire du Paris et pré- sident fondateur de l’Amitié Judéo-Musulmane de France (AJMF) – Paris, France.

Prof. Michel Sternberg Professeur émérite de Biochimie Médicale à l'Université René Descartes; Membre du Comité Directeur de l'Amitié Judéo-Chrétienne de France; Membre du Comité Directeur de la Fraternité d'Abraham – Paris, France.

Dr Nayla Tabbara Vice-Chairman & Treasurer of Adyan – Lebanese Foundation for Interre- ligious Studies and Spiritual Solidarity – Beirut, Lebanon. Professor of Science of Religions and Islamic Studies. Trainer in interreligious dialogue and multi-faith education. Researcher and author in Islamic theolo- gy and Sufism.

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Greetings ……………………………………………………………. VIII The Moroccan Experience: Farah Cherif D’Ouezzan (Rabat / Morocco) Morocco – Three Cultures, Three Religions, One Nation ………... 17 The Egyptian Experience: Prof. Dr Muhammad A. Sharqawi (Cairo / Egypt) Muslim Parties’ Victory – Chance or Threat to build up Civil Society? 21 The Jordanian Experience: Ambassador Hasan Abu Nimah (Amman / Jordan) First Iraq, now Syria – Jordan in the Shadow of the Syrian Uprising 31 Syrian Experience: Dr Naseef Naeem (Goettingen / Germany) & Kai Kreutzberger (London / UK) Constitutional Law and Legal Reality in Syria. A Comment ……… 35 The Lebanese Experience: Dr Nayla Tabbara (Beirut / Lebanon) Fragile Balance – Lebanon in the Shadow of the Syrian Uprising ... 44 Reflecting Christian Experiences: Prof. Dr Kamel Abu Jaber (Amman / Jordan) Hopes and Fears of Christians after Muslim Parties Winning Elections 51 Muin A. Khoury (Amman / Jordan) The Case for Arab Christians: Fears, Challenges and Opportunities 57 Prof. Michel Sternberg (Paris / France) The Situation of Christians in Palestine and Israel (according to Catherine Dupeyron's book Christians in the Holy Land. Disappearance or mutation?) ………………………………………………………. 62 Omani Perspectives Dr Abdulrahman S. Al-Salimi (Masqat / Oman) The Middle East and its Transformation and the End of the Islamic Fundamentalist Parties …………………………………………... 65 Reflecting French Jewish Experiences Rabbin – Prof. em. Michel Serfaty (Paris / France) Printemps ou hiver arabe. Politique et religion en échec ? quelles perspectives ..…………………………………………………….. 72 Contributors ………………………………………………………… 77

ISBN 978-3-00-040837-3