Heinung Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee VRÜ Law and Politics in Africa | Asia | Latin America

Aktuelle Neuerscheinung Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ Law and politics in Africa | Asia | Latin America

Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit Herausgegeben von Aus dem Inhalt: im Rechtsvergleich Brun-Otto Bryde Abhandlungen Drittes deutsch-taiwanesisches Kolloquium Philip Kunig Brun-Otto Bryde vom 02.- 03. Oktober 2006 an der Georg-August- Constitutional Law in „old“ and „new“ Law and Universität Göttingen Karl-Andreas Hernekamp Development Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Werner Heun und Francois Venter em. Prof. Dr. Christian Starck durch die 2008, 246 S., geb., 59,– €, ISBN 978-3-8329-3082-0 Globalization of Constitutional Law through (Studien und Materialien zur Verfassungsgerichts- Hamburger Gesellschaft comparative Constitution-making barkeit, Bd. 102) für Völkerrecht und Jo Eric Khushal Murkens Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Auswärtige Politik e. V. Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections

In dem vorliegenden Band geht es um Auslegung und Fortbildung der Verfassung und des Verfas- Jutta Limbach sungsprozessrechts als Voraussetzungen der Sicherungsfunktion der Verfassungsgerichte. Haupt- Globalization of Constitutional Law through themen sind die Sicherung der horizontalen und vertikalen Gewaltenteilung sowie der Grundrechte; Interaction of Judges darüber hinaus wird der Grundrechtschutz durch Individualverfassungsbeschwerde gegen gerichtli- Javier A. Couso che Urteile ausführlich erörtert. The Globalization of Latin American Verfassungsgerichte sind gebunden an verfassungsrechtlich oder gesetzlich festgelegte Antragsbe- Constitutional Law fugnisse in besonderen Verfahrensarten. In diesem Rahmen kommt es im Laufe der Zeit im Wege der Manuel José Cepeda Rechtsfortbildung zur Begründung neuer prozessualer Rechtsfiguren, die rechtsvergleichend in den The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: Blick genommen werden. Das Entscheidende für die Stabilisierungswirkung der Verfassungsgerichte A note on the Colombian Case ist schließlich die Bindungswirkung ihrer Entscheidungen. Der Band endet mit vergleichenden Be- 2008 41. Jahrgang trachtungen über die politischen Wirkungen der verfassungsgerichtlichen Entscheidungen. 1 Berichte Seite 1 – 126 Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann ISSN 0506-7286 L’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF) – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au

VRÜ service de l‘État de droit 1 Bitte bestellen Sie bei Ihrer Buchhandlung oder bei Nomos Telefon 07221/2104-37 | Fax -43 | www.nomos.de | [email protected] 08 www.verfassung-und-recht.de 2008 41. Jahrgang 1 Seite 1 – 126

BegründetVRÜ von Prof. Dr. Herbert Krüger (†) Herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Brun-Otto Bryde, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Prof. Dr. Philip Kunig, Freie Universität Berlin, Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, Universität Hamburg im Institut für Internationale Angelegenheiten der Universität Hamburg durch die Hamburger Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht und Auswärtige Politik e.V. in Verbindung mit den Regional-Instituten des German Institute of Global and Aerea- Studies – GIGA – (Institut für Afrika-Studien, Institut für Asien-Studien, Institut für Latein amerika-Studien, Institut für Nahost-Studien), alle Hamburg Beirat: Prof. Dr. Costa R. Mahalu, Rom/Dar es Salaam, Prof. Dr. Peter Malanczuk, Hong- kong, Prof. Dr. Albrecht v. Gleich, Hamburg, sowie die Leitungen der beteiligten Hamburger Regionalinstitute des GIGA Schriftleitung: Dr. Karl-Andreas Hernekamp, E-mail: [email protected]

Inhalt

Editorial ...... 3

Abstracts ...... 6

Abhandlungen / Articles Brun-Otto Bryde Constitutional Law in „old“ and „new“ Law and Development �� 10

Francois Venter Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making �� 16

Jo Eric Khushal Murkens Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections �� 32

Jutta Limbach Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges �� 51

Javier A. Couso The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law �� 56

Manuel José Cepeda The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A note on the Colombian Case �� 61 Berichte / Reports Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann L’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF) – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service de l‘État de droit �� 78

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed.) Interpreting Constitutions. A Comparative Study (O. Lepsius) �� 83

Werner Meng / Ulrich Magnus / Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte / Thomas Cottier / Peter-Tobias Stoll / Astrid Epiney Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis (M. Kotzur) �� 86

Mathias Reimann / Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Chr. Schönberger) �� 90

Christoph Antons / Volkmar Gessner (eds.) Globalisation and Resistance (N. Petersen) �� 94

Stefanie Agerer Das Recht des Koran (P. Scholz) ��99

Andrea Kramer Dezentralisierung in der Wasserversorgung in Peru, Bolivien und Ekuador (J.-Chr. Pielow) �� 102

Simon Chesterman / Chea Lehnardt (eds.) From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (D. Heck) �� 106

Bibliographie / Bibliography �� 113

EDITORIAL

"Verfassung und Recht in Übersee" startet mit dem vorliegenden Heft in den Jubiläums- jahrgang 2008. Das ist ein Grund zum Innehalten. Kaum ein anderes Projekt mit ähnlichem Themenschwerpunkt kann eine vergleichbare Kontinuität vorweisen. Die Gründung der Zeitschrift 1968 fiel in eine besonders optimistische Phase der Entwicklungsforschung, die indes bald endete. Auch "Verfassung und Recht in Übersee" hat die wechselnden Kon- junkturen in der Entwicklungs- und Transformationsforschung gespürt. Dass die vor 40 Jahren verbreitete Hoffnung auf die schnelle Durchsetzung westlicher Staatsmodelle in der "Dritten" Welt sich nicht verwirklichte, hatte auch Auswirkungen auf den Gegenstand dieser Zeitschrift. Die Verfassungsvergleichung, ursprünglich gedacht als Zentrum des Projekts, erwies sich in einer Welt von Militärregimes und Diktaturen häufig als frustrie- rend. Das Interesse von Geldgebern, Universitäten und Institutionen an den überseeischen Kontinenten ließ spürbar nach. Das belastete die internationale "law and development"- Forschung und traf auch VRÜ. Andere Themen boten einen fruchtbaren Ausgleich. Dabei konnte die Zeitschrift sich nicht, wie von ihrem Begründer Herbert Krüger einmal ange- dacht, stützen auf ein eigenständiges Institut mit mehreren hauptamtlichen Referenten zur Beobachtung der überseeischen Verfassungsentwicklung. Stattdessen musste die Zeitschrift im Nebenamt betrieben werden. Finanzieller Sorgen war sie freilich enthoben durch flan- kierende Subventionen zunächst aus dem Privatvermögen des Gründers, nach dessen Tod 1989 durch die von seiner Tochter Gabriele Krüger 1991 gegründete "Herbert-Krüger- Stiftung für Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung". Wissenschaftlich ging es ständig aufwärts: Von den Anfängen mit einem sehr überschaubaren Autorenkreis in der winzigen Gruppe deutscher Juristen, die sich für Entwicklungen außerhalb des europäisch-atlanti- schen Raums interessierten, bis zu einem internationalen, polyglotten Netzwerk. Zum 70. Geburtstag Herbert Krügers dokumentierte dies ein Heft, das ausschließlich nicht-deutsche Autoren versammelte (1975/3). Inzwischen ist – dank der neuen Bewegung hin zu verfas- sungsstaatlichen Strukturen auf der ganzen Welt – die Überseeische Verfassungsverglei- chung in der juristischen Wissenschaft angekommen. Vor allem international nahm im letzten Jahrzehnt das Interesse an der weltweiten Verfassungsentwicklung ständig zu. Die Beiträge insbesondere aus den Entwicklungskontinenten zeigen sich immer vielfältiger und selbstbewusster. Ein weltweiter Dialog über Verfassungsfragen gewinnt so deutlich an Statur. Auch in Deutschland wächst der Kreis derer, die sich mit zunehmender Professio- nalität der Erforschung von Verfassungsstrukturen und Entwicklungsrecht widmen. So kann die Zeitschrift wieder stärker auf ihr ursprüngliches Metier, die Verfassungsverglei- chung zurückkommen. Ihren breiten Zugriff auf Recht und Politik der überseeischen Kon- tinente und deren internationale Beziehungen gibt sie damit keineswegs auf. Im Sinne dieser Entwicklung konzentriert sich das erste Heft des Jubiläumsjahrgangs 2008 auf das Thema "Globalization of Constitutional Law". Verfassungsrecht hat sich zum internationalen Fach entwickelt, das auch international behandelt werden muss. Diese

4 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Erkenntnis setzt sich immer mehr durch, wie hochkarätige Veranstaltungen zu diesem Thema belegen: 2007 beschäftigten sich gleich mehrere Konferenzen mit der Globalisie- rung oder der Internationalisierung von Verfassungsrecht. So war "Globalization of Constitutional Law" Gegenstand der einzigen Plenarveranstaltung auf der großen Law and Society – Tagung in Berlin. Sie ist hier mit den Beiträgen von Bryde, Couso, Limbach und Venter dokumentiert. Ebenso hatte der VII. Weltkongress der International Association of Constitutional Law in Athen ein Plenum über "Internationalization of Constitutional Law". Ihm widmet sich der Beitrag von Cepeda. Verfassungsrecht ist Gegenstand eines internationalen Dialogs geworden. Daran seit 1968 zu arbeiten, ist nicht nur Grund, stolz zu sein, sondern verpflichtet auch für die Zukunft. Zeitgleich präsentiert VRÜ sich in neuem Gewand. Das Layout, zuletzt geändert 1980, verdiente eine Auffrischung. Künftig lässt sich der Inhalt von außen her mit einem Blick erfassen, was Neugier wecken und zur Lektüre anregen mag. Zum Schluss ein Wort besonderen Dankes all denen, die seit Anbeginn ihren Beitrag geleistet haben, dass unsere Zeitschrift nun in ihr fünftes Jahrzehnt aufbrechen kann.

Hamburg / Gießen / Berlin / Baden-Baden im Herbst 2007

Herausgeber, Redaktion und Verlag ______

With this issue, "Verfassung und Recht in Übersee" starts into its 41st year. This is a reason for celebration. There are few projects with a similar thematic focus which can look back on a comparable history. When the journal was founded in 1968, development studies were in an optimistic mood; however, this ended soon and "Verfassung und Recht in Übersee", too, shared in the ups and downs of this field. The realisation that the hope for rapid diffusion of constitutionalism throughout the world had remained unfulfilled has also guided this journal in new directions. In a world of military regimes and dictatorships comparative constitutional law – which was to be the central interest of the journal – often remained a thankless labour. Fortunately, other topics remained to be explored in “law and politics abroad”. The diminishing interest of universities and funding institutions in developing areas studies was also felt by this journal, which would hardly have survived as a commer- cial enterprise. Luckily, the journal could rely on financial support from the founder Herbert Krüger and, after his death in 1989, from the "Herbert-Krüger-Stiftung für über- seeische Verfassungsvergleichung" founded 1991 by his daughter, Gabriele Krüger. Aca- demically, however, the journal proved a success story. Starting with a small number of authors from the tiny group of German lawyers interested in legal development outside the European-Atlantic area, it managed to win an international set of contributors. In the last years, comparative constitutional law has gained a new significance especially due to the

Editorial 5

progress of constitutionalism worldwide. The constitutionalist dialogue between North and South has become stronger and more substantial. This also holds for Germany, where the group of scholars in comparative constitutional law and law and development has grown more numerous and more professional; a development that allows us to focus again on its original purpose – comparative constitutional law of Africa, Asia and Latin America – without neglecting development law, politics, and international relations of these areas. As a reflection of this development the first issue of the 41st year is a special issue entitled "Globalization of Constitutional Law". It is increasingly recognized that constitutional law today is an international subject, which has to be discussed internationally. Evi- dence of this is the increasing number of conferences devoted to this subject. In 2007, "Globalization of Constitutional Law" was the subject of a plenary of the Law and Society meeting in Berlin (here documented by the contributions of Bryde, Couso, Limbach and Venter), and similarly there was a plenary of the VIIth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law in Athens on "Internationalization of Constitutional Law" from which the contribution of Cepeda has been taken. Constitutional law has become the subject of a world-wide dialogue and we are proud to have been an active part of this growing endeavour since 1968. We have used this occasion to give a new look to the journal's layout which was last modified in 1980. This will, we hope, whet readers' curiosity even more, by allowing them to identify each issue's contents straight from the cover. Last but not least we wish to express our special gratitude to all those who have, from the first beginnings, helped to sustain our publication now entering its fifth decade.

Hamburg / Gießen / Berlin / Baden-Baden autumn 2007

Editors, editorial committee and publisher

ABSTRACTS

Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development By Brun-Otto Bryde, Giessen / Karlsruhe The internationalization of constitutional law is a very exciting development; however, it should be discussed in the light of the law and development movement's critique of the wisdom of legal transfers. The expectations of modernization theory with respect to the transfer of constitutionalism through colonial imposition proved wrong for the same reasons, which were developed in the self-critique of the law and development movement: they were naïve and they were ethnocentric. In light of these experiences, the current developments raise two questions: Firstly, whether the international diffusion of constitutionalism in the last decades will be more successful and secondly, whether socio-legal scholarship will confront the subject more maturely this time. While we again can detect attempts of one-sided insistence on foreign models and reliance on the untested reception of such models, there are differences to the “old” situation, which allow a more optimistic evaluation of the globalization of constitutional law today. The process is much more independent and self-sustaining, which implies that comparisons with colonial imposition would be inappropriate. In addition, the process is much more internationalized. Constitu- tional law has become an international subject with a worldwide infrastructure of scholars, academic societies, and journals. While "old" law and development theory should teach us to be aware of power relationships and the sociological problems of legal transfers, it would be uncritical to confer those old critiques wholesale and to overlook the much more participatory and egalitarian aspects of the new constitutionalism, especially owed to the development of international human rights law.

Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making

By Francois Venter, Potchefstroom The ebb and flow of constitutional ideas since the late 18th Century have resulted in a globally shared vocabulary of constitutional structures, rights, principles and values. This convergence of constitutional language has increased steadily through the various waves of constitution-making the world has seen since the late 18th Century. Constitutional law evolved, and still operates on the assumption that the state is sovereign and that it exists for the benefit and protection of its "nation". Constitutional rights language in recently drafted constitutions tends toward similarity, although the actual meaning of similar terms may vary in different jurisdictions.

Abstracts 7

The mechanism of prescribing a set of binding principles to the authors of a new constitution has been employed successfully in a few cases. These principles of constitution- making essentially reflect what might be described as the essence of contemporary constitutionalism. A foundational Leitmotiv for constitution-making is to be found in the notion of global values, the most pre-eminent of which is human dignity. An exact definition of dignity is elusive, but it is gaining ascendency in the 21st Century thinking on the moral foundations of constitutionalism and therefore of written constitutions and their interpretation. Global constitutionalism is not leading the world in the direction of the drafting of constitutions that are all the same. Comparative constitution-making has however become an essential characteristic of the process of drafting (and revision) of constitutions.

Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections

By Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, London The controversy surrounding the judicial use of comparative constitutional law is not new. However, the debate has recently been reignited by a number of US Supreme Court justices who have spoken out on the use of non-US law in the Court. Scalia opposes, and Breyer favours, references to ‘foreign law’. Their comments, made both within and outside of the Court, has led to a reaction by scholars. Arguably the debate is US-specific as it resembles the different views regarding constitutional interpretation, namely whether the Constitu- tion’s original, or rather its current, meaning is determinative. Yet the debate also raises broader issues of constitutional theory and politics: formal vs substantive legitimacy, globalisation of the courts, judicial sleight of hand, the cultural foundations of constitutional law, and the citation of non-primary sources of law in litigation. The present article explores these issues. It rejects radical approaches (either against or in favour of comparative constitutional law) and instead argues for a more modest process which both identifies the national specificity of law and grasps the mediating potential of law as a self-reflexive discourse.

The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law

By Javier A. Couso, Santiago de Chile Over the last few decades, the world has experienced a remarkable process of globalization of law – in particular, constitutional law – due to the emergence of what amounts to a human rights-based constitutional ius cogens. This body of global legal rules has led to the increasing homogeneity of constitutional law around the world, because it is deemed as mandatory. The globalization of constitutional law has not been confined to consolidated

8 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

democracies, but it has also reach transitional ones, such as those of Latin America. In this region, the acceptance of the new constitutional ius cogens has involved a revolutionary transformation of the content and uses of constitutional law. According to the new paradigm, constitutions involve not just rules but – more importantly – fundamental principles of public law drawn from international human rights law. Furthermore, the new paradigm includes a new conception of the role of high courts, which encourages them to assertively adjudicate the constitution.

Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges

By Jutta Limbach, Berlin / Munich During the last decades governments, lawmakers and judges have been faced with a multitude of challenges transcending national borders. These challenges call for effective ways of enforcing already existing structures of international co-operation and of creating novel approaches, such as the creation of networks between decision-makers on an international level. Thus recent years have seen the emergence of a proliferation of international gatherings of judges. Networks may connect international institutions and their national interlocutors in a vertical way with a view of enforcing international standards. In this respect the European Court of Human Rights dedicated the conference at the occasion of the opening of the judicial year 2005 to a dialogue between judges of different national and European courts and facilitated a vertical dialogue between an international court and its national counterparts in order to respond to the questions raised throughout Europe in terms of the application and interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights. Moreover networks may connect national bodies and their foreign counterparts in a horizontal way, aiming at the exchange of information and mutual support, as it does for instance the Conference of European Constitutional Courts that enables constitutional judges to entertain personal contacts and to exchange know-how and experience. Although often lacking of coercive power, the impact of these networks using “soft powers” should not be underestimated. Based on mutual respect and appreciation, an intensive and open dialogue on fundamental issues of constitutional law as well as on methods of interpretation facilitates the exchange of information from a broad comparative perspective in order to meet the demands of a globalized world.

The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case

By Manuel José Cepeda, Bogotà This note describes the relevance of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and Interna- tional Humanitarian Law (IHL) for constitutional adjudication in Colombia by the Consti- tutional Court. As elements of the so-called “constitutionality block”, IHRL and IHL have

Abstracts 9

played an important role in the Colombian constitutional order, which becomes manifest in several material functions: (1) the definition of the scope of constitutional rights, (2) the identification of specific non-enumerated rights, (3) the identification of special needs and basic standards of protection, (4) the identification of minimum standards of protection, (5) the identification of specific prohibitions that protect rights, (6) the provision of criteria for reviewing decrees that declare states of emergency, (7) the provision of grounds for the constitutional enforcement of social rights, and (8) the national projection and enforcement of preventive measures adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Each one of these functions is illustrated in this note with representative judgments by the Constitu- tional Court, in order to conclude that IHRL and IHL have borne a significant impact upon decisions concerning both the preservation and public order and the protection of rights in diverse contexts and settings, causing a very high material incidence upon the domestic legal system.

ABHANDLUNGEN / ARTICLES

Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development

By Brun-Otto Bryde, Giessen / Karlsruhe*

For an internationalist constitutional lawyer who has always deplored the parochialism of traditional constitutional law scholarship, the internationalization of constitutional law1 is a very exciting and welcome development. As a member of the German Federal Constitu- tional Court I am an active participant in this process.2 As the liaison officer of our court with the Venice Commission3 I regularly get queries from other courts on our experience with specific questions and answer them as well as I can, but never without a slight misgiving because I am also a critical law and society scholar. My introduction to this field came more than 30 years ago when I was a law and modernization fellow at Yale, and this was the time when the law and development movement had overcome its naïve beginnings4 and had become critical.5 At the centre of this critique were doubts about the wisdom of legal transfers. In the 1960s the decolonization process had already resulted in a certain kind of internationalization of constitutional law avant la lettre. We did not call it that way: we called it – positively – modernization6 or – negatively – colonialism. The colonial powers intro-

* Prof. Dr. jur., holds chair of public law and political science at Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen; Member of the Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe since 2001; 1992 – 1998 President of the German Association for the Sociology of Law. E-mail: [email protected] 1 B.-O. Bryde, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law in: T. Groß (ed.), Legal Scholarship in International and Comparative Law, 2003, p. 191 ff. 2 B.-O. Bryde, The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue, Tulane Law Review 80 (2005) p. 203 ff. 3 J. Jeffrey, The Venice Commission: Disseminating Democracy through Law, Public Law 2001, p. 675 ff. 4 On the history of the law and development movement see J. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Move- ment, American Journal of Comparative Law (AJCL) 25 (1977), p. 457 ff.; B.-O. Bryde, Die Rolle des Rechts im Entwicklungsprozeß, in: B.-O. Bryde / F. Kübler (Hrsg.), Die Rolle des Rechts im Entwicklungsprozeß, Frankfurt/M. 1986, p. 9 ff.; Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of "scholars in self-estrangement" AJCL 25 (1977) p. 492 ff; Gardner, Legal Imperialism – American lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 1980. 5 Seminal: D. Trubek/M. Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement, Wisconsin Law Rev. 1974, p. 1062 ff.; cf. Fn 4 for further references. 6 The modernization paradigm informed also the beginning of our journal: H. Krüger, Das Pro- gramm, Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) vol. 1 (1968), p. 3 ff., cf. also B.-O. Bryde, Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung nach 30 Jahren, VRÜ 30 (1997), p. 452 ff.

Bryde, Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development 11

duced their constitutional models, which resulted in very similar if not identical constitutions of either the French 5th Republic model7 or the Westminster model, all over the world.8 This heritage has influence until today. In the "old" law and development discussion this colonial imposition9 was often conceptualized as modernization. The new constitutions were supposed to lead backward societies towards economic development and constitutionalist democracy.10 This first transfer of constitutionalism was not very successful. Ten years after independence most newly independent states in Africa were either military regimes or one- party-systems11 of which only few (e.g. Tanzania and Kenya) allowed a certain amount of participation within the framework of "democratic one-party-systems".12 Similarly, in Asia only few countries retained their independence respective postwar constitution, here too military regimes and authoritarian dictatorships took over in many places. The expectations of modernization theory proved wrong for the same reasons that were developed in the self- critique of the law and development movement: they were naïve because they overesti- mated the reformist zeal of ruling elites, and they were ethnocentric because they saw the own respective model of the foreign adviser as the best road to development without due regard to the conditions of the receiving country (or even other models in other parts of the world). 13 In the last decades we have experienced a renewed process of democratization and constitution-making. This process started with the disappearance of the last right-wing dictatorships in Southern Europe, was followed by the breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe and has become a world-wide phenomenon most remarkably in Latin America but also in Africa and Asia. While setbacks are common the overall process is significant.

7 E. Kliesch, Der Einfluß des französischen Verfassungsdenkens auf Afrikanische Staaten, Beihefte zu VRÜ, Nr. 1 (1976). 8 For Africa cf. B.-O. Bryde, the Politics and Sociology of African Legal Development, 1976, p. 23 ff. 9 S. Burmann/Harrell-Bond, The Imposition of Law, 1979. 10 In his classification of constitutions according to their relation to the power process („normative, nominalist, semantic") Karl Loewenstein reserved one of the categories („nominalist“) for this case: „nominalist“ he calls constitutions still ineffective but supported by the honest wish of those in power to make them effective.K. Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre, 2. ed. Tübingen, 1969, p. 151 ff. For a critique B.-O. Bryde, Verfassungsentwicklung, Baden-Baden, 1982, p. 28 Fn. 4; a more differentiated analysis of Loewenstein’s theory in relation to constitutions in developing countries (containing some valid criticism of my own attempt at categorizing constitutions) can be found in: M. Neves, Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung, 1998, p. 90 ff. 11 For a survey cf. B.-O. Bryde, (Fn 8) p. 23 ff. 12 H. Rogge, Die Verfassung des afrikanischen Einparteienstaates, 1974. 13 Cf. References in Fn 3, 4 and L. Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and Future Look at Law and Development, Global Jurist 7 (2007) 2, p. 1 ff.

12 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

The open question remains whether the international diffusion of constitutionalism has a better chance this time. This is not just a political question, but also a question for law and society scholarship. Will socio-legal scholarship confront the subject more maturely this time, drawing on the experience of the old law and development movement or fall again into the trap of naivety and ethnocentricity? Obviously, the protagonists of the old law and development movement, including the most critical, have not given up hope but are again engaged in the project.14 There is a certain danger that the old mistakes are repeated. Like in the 1970s when the ironical name of "legal missionaries"15 held more than a kernel of truth, we can again detect a certain missionary zeal to distribute one's own model world-wide without due regard to the problems of such transfers. "What works well at home" is expected to work in the new democracies. 16 In drafting new constitutions and reform-legislation we can again detect attempts at one-sided insistence on foreign models and reliance on the untested reception of such models. Fights between legal missionaries to sell their product and the influence of international donors can all again be observed and criticised.17 This problem is reinforced by the fact that like in the 1960s the development of the field runs the risk of having its research strategies imposed by donors who pursue their own economic and political agendas. The dependence from a neo-liberal paradigm might today even be stronger than in the 1970s when alternatives to the commanding modernization paradigm were discussed with much more force (a problem, however, that might be more relevant for other fields of law, especially economic law18 than constitutional law). Like in "old" law and development, public aid agencies and foundations exert a great influence. And similar to the late 1970s funding might dry up when research turns critical19. The colonial legacy, too, remains strong. The colonial heritage still circumscribes the alternatives for constitutional drafting to a large extent: former British colonies will usually remain within the framework of commonwealth constitutionalism and former French colonies regularly adapt the constitution of the French 5th Republic to local conditions. I think scholars should therefore carefully look at the old literature. However they need not be discouraged because there are differences which allow a much more optimistic

14 D. Trubek, The "rule of law" in development assistance: past, present, and future, in: Bäuerle u.a. (Hsg.), Haben wir wirklich Recht? Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Wirklichkeit, 2004, S. 33 ff 15 Gardner, (Fn.4) p. 282 ff; cf. also P. Carrington, Spreading America's Word. Stories of Its Lawyer-Missionaries, New York, 2005. 16 M. Krygier, Parables of Hope and Disapointment, Eastern European Constitutional Review 11 (2002). 17 B.-O. Bryde, Die Erfahrungen der "Law and Development"-Diskussion und die Transformations- forschung, in: Kirk u.a. (Hrsg), Genossenschaft und Kooperation in einer sich wandelnden Welt, Fs. f. Münkner, 2000, p. 405 ff. 18 Cf. the examples criticised by Nader (Fn.13). 19 B.-O. Bryde (Fn. 4) p. 1 f.

Bryde, Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development 13

evaluation of the globalization of constitutional law today – and ask for a much more differentiated research program. One important difference is that the process – despite all international influences – is much more independent and self-sustaining. The move towards democratic constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, the defeat of the apartheid regime in South Africa and of military regimes and autocracies all over the world were the result of genuine revolutions and reform movements. While international influence and interference, possibly helpful in some cases, probably counter-productive in others, cannot be overlooked,20 comparisons with colonial imposition processes would be inappropriate. Connected to this fundamental difference is the fact that the process is much more internationalized. There is no colonial or neo-colonial transfer of a constitutional model from country A to country B. Even in view of the colonial traditions just mentioned and even where constitutional drafting relies on foreign models and sometimes is heavily influenced by foreign experts or international organizations, it is purposefully comparative. The South African case here is the outstanding example 21 The choice of the constitutional court model in a common law country, hardly thinkable some years ago, is a good illustration for the influence of comparative constitutional law. It owes much to the experience of other countries that had to overcome a non-democratic past.22Constitutional law is no longer a parochial subject but has become an international one23, with a much better – and worldwide – infrastructure of scholars, academic societies and journals than in the past when "comparative law" usually meant private comparative law. The technical infrastructure of globalization like the internet with global access to a wealth of foreign legal materials make such a comparative approach much easier than in earlier decades. At the same time they make it much more difficult to outside advisers to sell idealized versions of their own systems since the actors in the receiving countries know the reality in the adviser's own society 24 Thus, while "old" law and development theory should teach us to study these processes critically and to be aware of power relationships and hierarchies, one-way-streets in reception processes, and the sociological problems of legal transfers, it would be uncritical to import those old critiques wholesale and to overlook the much more participatory and egalitarian aspects of the new constitutionalism.

20 For examples cf. Nader (Fn 13); cf. also the three case-studies in Philipp Dann / Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant – Constitution-Making under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, in: Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 10 (2006) p. 423 ff. 21 H. Klug, Constituting Democracy, 2000, p. 93 ff; Venter in this volume. 22 B.-O. Bryde, Constitutional Courts in Constitutional Transition, in: Van Loon/Van Aeken (eds) 60 maal recht en 1 maal wijn, Liber Amicorum Van Houtte 1999, p. 235 ff. 23 The cross-cultural impact of constitutional law scholarship has also become a subject for socio- legal research cf Couso in this volume. 24 Nader (Fn 13).

14 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

An important new development which changes the process fundamentally is the influence of international human rights, and its international actors. Human rights are central to the globalization of constitutional law. Most of the discussion about globalization or internationalization of constitutional law is actually about the globalization of human rights law which has become a much more internationalized subject than, e.g. questions of state organization. Human rights form an important link between a popular, non-hegemonic constitutionalism of civil society and professional constitutionalism of courts, drafters and academics. The mobilization of human rights for development from below had already become an alternative in law and development studies at the time of the demise of the first stage of law and development25 and therefore human rights form also a strong bridge between "old" and "new" law and development. The new wave of democratization, too, has been influenced and prepared by the international human rights discourse. Worldwide, human rights movements fought (and still fight) for reforms in their respective countries by invoking international human-rights documents that were signed by their governments and are binding on them under international law (even though they are not kept in practice).26 In the process of drafting new constitutions there was heavy reliance on the international human rights conventions, which has resulted in a worldwide process of reception of international human rights law into national constitutions.27 The major distinction between different constitutional systems today might be between old constitutions which were drafted before the major international instruments were adopted and the vast majority of new constitutions drafted under the influence of international human rights law. This development of a common international human rights system transcends classical distinctions of comparative constitutional law such as between common law and civil law, presidential and parliamentary systems, or federal and unitary states. This development is also the background for the globalization of case law. The reception of international human rights documents into national law has created very similar if not identical wordings of catalogues of rights. This creates a sphere of common human rights law in which precedents and doctrines travel freely.28 The critical social scientist might question the egalitarian nature of this process. Employing the instruments used for establishing academic hierarchies ("ranking") one might empirically map lines of influence (citation indices) and to a certain extent – and

25 J.Paul / F. Diaz, Developing Law and Legal Resources for Alternative People-Centered Develop- ment, in: B.-O. Bryde / F. Kübler (Hrsg.), Die Rolle des Rechts im Entwicklungsprozeß, Frank- furt/M. 1986, p. 61 ff; B.-O. Bryde, Menschenrechte und Entwicklung in: Faber/Stein, Auf einem Dritten Weg, Fs. für Helmut Ridder, 1989, p. 73 ff.; Ginther, Zivilgesellschaft und Entwicklung, VRÜ 30 (1997), p. 137 ff. 26 Ginther ibidem. 27 For references cf. Bryde (Fn 1). 28 Cf. contributions in Markesinis / Fedke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law, 2006.

Bryde, Constitutional Law in "old" and "new" Law and Development 15

predictably – they are the old ones: new democracies of the periphery looking to old ones of the centre. But my hypothesis would be that, again, the international-law dimension is more important than post-colonial dependence structures. For the interpretation of constitutional provisions that have been drafted on the basis of international documents, the jurisprudence of international courts (and to a lesser extent other control agencies like the UN Human Rights Committees) is the most important source. These international courts appear to be a neglected field of socio-legal studies. We need more knowledge about their internal functioning and they would make a perfect field of impact studies. Perhaps more important for our subject is their influence of these international bodies on the legal culture of the member countries. To take a simple formal point: the traditional dichotomy between civil and common law in Europe, which traditionally had been a real barrier to mutual understanding needs to be overcome if judges from both systems work together in one court: they have to find a common language. This is true even linguistically and has resulted in the invention of a new version of English which one might call Euro- pean Legal English. It is very likely that the new African Court of Human Rights starting with a brilliant group of lawyers from different African jurisdictions who traditionally looked more to other common-law countries or to other francophone countries for inspiration than to their immediate neighbours will have a similar effect. Even apart from the special role of international courts I would maintain that the respective influence of courts on other courts and of academic theory in other countries can not be conceptualized as a simple transfer of power and money into legal influence. While there is probably a holder of an American LLM on most benches of the highest national courts this does not result in a special place for precedents of the American Supreme Court in the international constitutionalist case law, where the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court appears to be much more important. I do not claim that the ideal of an egalitarian constitutionalist dialogue29 has already been reached or can ever be reached in a world marked by inequality. But soft skills like the ability to give one's judgments in a form that makes them a recognizable part of an international human rights project become important, and these skills are distributed much more equally throughout the world than money and military power. As judges we should work on this project, the task of critical scholarship is to control us in this enterprise.

29 B.-O. Bryde, North and South in Comparative Constitutional Law: From Colonial Imposition towards a Transnational constitutionalist Dialogue, in: W. Benedek u.a. (eds), Development and Developing International and European Law, Essays in Honour of Konrad Ginther, 1999, p. 697 ff.

Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making

∗ By Francois Venter, Potchefstroom

1. Introduction Since the end of World War II, numerous new constitutions have been written and many have been revised.1 Constitutional systems and ideas, and therefore also written constitutions, have always tended to influence and be influenced by others. Thus e.g. the 18th Cen- tury philosophical linkages between the constitutions of France and the United States are indisputable, as are the influence in the 19th Century of the US Constitution on South American countries such as Mexico and Argentina. In the era of colonialism many parts of the world were infused with the constitutional notions of the colonial powers, especially Britain and France, though frequently in adapted forms.2 The end of World War II marks an important turning point in the history of constitution-making: the USA as primary victor emerging after the war for all practical purposes wrote the Japanese Constitution of 1947 and was a significant presence behind the work of the Parlamentarischer Rat which formulated the German Grundgesetz of 1949. After the war the scene was also set for the acceleration of the process of decolonization, not only in the underdeveloped parts of Africa, but also e.g. in the so-called British dominions of India, Canada and South Africa, causing a rash of new constitutions to be produced. The most recent wave of constitution- making was of course generated by the fall of the USSR, whereby the Soviet "empire" in East and Central Europe disintegrated into multiple sovereign states and the logistical and ideological grip of communism on the Third World was relieved. The ebb and flow of constitutional ideas since the late 18th Century have resulted in a globally shared vocabulary of constitutional structures, rights, principles and values. This convergence has particularly become evident in the process of constitution-making and revision. An interesting phenomenon in this regard is that the constitutions of many countries that are not considered to be constitutional states due to their express socialist3 or

∗ Professor of Law, North-west University, Potchefstroom, South Africa. E–Mail: Francois.Venter @nwu.ac.za 1 Gavin W Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization (Oxford 2005), 4 note 4 lists 40 instances as a "representative sample of countries which have undergone major constitutional reform over the past 25/30 years." 2 Thomas M. Franck / Arun K. Thiruvengadam "International Law an Constitution-Making" 2003 Chinese Journal of International Law 467, 500-504 for a compact overview. 3 Article 1(1) of the Chinese constitution of 2004 e.g. provides "The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants", while in article 33(3) it is provided that "The State respects and preserves human rights."

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 17

religious4 character, also, at least partially, employ the language of familiar to constitutionalism. National constitution-making continues to be an internal affair of the sovereign state, but every new constitution is written on paper watermarked by a globalized conceptions of constitutionalism.

2. Constitutional Structures 2.1 Sovereignty Constitutional law evolved, and still operates on the assumption that the state is sovereign and that it exists for the benefit and protection of its nation and the associated legal system. The key references for this assumption continue to be the famous opening words of the US Constitution of 1789 "We the People …" and the French constitutional principle of "government of the people, by the people, for the people".5 Recent reflections of this assumption are to be found in e.g. the 2003 draft constitution of Afghanistan "We the people of Afghanistan" and article 2(1) of the Albanian Constitution of 1998 which provides that "sovereignty in the Republic of Albania belongs to the people." If one considers the escalating tendency of the incursion of the global market (as perhaps the primary driver of globalization) on the freedom of choice of the contemporary state's policy making in many fields, the credibility of the constitutional affirmations of national sovereignty tend to suffer under the onslaught of globalization. However, the nation state and its sovereignty is far from becoming irrelevant, especially if one takes into account the fact that the degree of constitutional globalization is most frequently expressed in terms of its limitation of state sovereignty.6 Another aspect of the changes that the nation state as a phenomenon is undergoing, is the increasing pluralization of state populations brought about by demographic mobility, rendering it less convincing to refer to the population of a state as a "nation" in the ethnological or anthropological sense of the word. Another challenge to the sovereignty of the nation state is emerging due to a changing perception of the individual. It would appear that fundamental rights, especially as they are proclaimed and protected in international law, are perceived by many as the foundation upon which individual human "sovereignty" has been established globally. This also con-

4 Article 2 of the Constitution of Bahrain of 2002 provides "The religion of the State is Islam. The Islamic Shari'a is a principal source for legislation", while article 18 states that "People are equal in human dignity, and citizens are equal before the law in public rights and duties. There shall be no discrimination among them on the basis of sex, origin, language, religion or creed." 5 Article 2 of the current Constitution of the Vth Republic of 1958. 6 Cf. e.g. John D Snethen, "The Evolution of Sovereignty and Citizenship in Western Europe: Implications for Migration and Globalization" 2000-2001 (Vol 8) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 223, at 224-225.

18 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

stitutes a concrete challenge to what is may be referred to as the Westphalian notion of the sovereignty of the state.7 This challenge is no mere academic construction, as is demonstrated by the following statement made in 1999 by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in an article in The Economist8: State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined … States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa … [while] individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.

2.2 Separation of powers Contemporary constitution-making is consistently respectful of the desirability to spread governmental authority horizontally among the three branches of government. This is almost always implied in the structure of constitutions, and is frequently expressly stated as a constitutional principle.9 Partly, but not only due to the imprecision of the doctrine, the

7 Doyle/Gardner, 3-4: "The foundation of the current state system – and a key feature of international relations since the seventeenth century Treaty of Westphalia – is the notion that state enjoy sovereign equality: no state has the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state; this is preserved as Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. However, many scholars agree that by granting rights to individuals, the conception of human rights limits state sovereignty – human rights abuses within state borders, even perpetrated by a government against its own people, are no longer matters solely within the purview of domestic affairs. Many noted experts agree with former Sec- retary-General Annan that a state's legitimacy is tied to proper treatment of its citizens and an offending state can no longer hide behind a mantle of sovereignty alone. This issue – the nature of the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty – lies at the core of many contemporary debates in the field: the cultural relativity of rights, international humanitarian intervention, human rights abuses as underlying causes of conflict, and how to address past abuses in post-conflict peacebuilding." Also Cottier/Wüger, 242: "Das Verfassungsrecht steht in der Tradition des Nationalstaates. Es hat sich im Gefolge des Westfälischen Friedens von 1648 über Jahrhunderte entwickelt. Materiell kann es dahin beschrieben werden, dass es grundlegende Rechtsverhältnisse in Bezug auf ein Ter- ritorium bestimmt. Es wurde als nationalstaatliche Verfassung auch zur Verfassung im formellen Sinn. Das Recht selbst konzentrierte sich generell auf die Regelung so definierter Verhältnisse und verlor die frühere Universalität des römischen Rechts." 8 The Economist 18 September 1999, referred to and quoted by Michael W. Doyle and Anne-Marie Gardner in their introductory chapter of Jean-Marc Coicaud / Michael W. Doyle / Anne-Marie Gardner (eds), The Globalization of Human Rights (United Nations University Press, 2003) n 2. 9 Thus e.g. article 50 of the Indian Constitution of 1950 provides that "The State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State" and the Turkish Con- stitution of 1982 affirms in its preamble "[t]he principle of the separation of powers, which does not imply an order of precedence among the organs of State but refers solely to the exercising of

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 19

effects of granting specific powers to the various branches is not always predictable. The tendency to shift constitutional emphasis from state power to the social responsibility of the state10 is particularly evident in the escalating debate on the constitutional protection of social and economic rights.11 Be that as it may, on the frontline of the advance of enforceable socio-economic rights, the balance of powers between especially the judiciary on the one hand and the legislative and executive authorities on the other comes directly in the line of fire.12

2.3 Constitutional adjudication Whereas the US Supreme Court in 1803 established its jurisdiction of judicial review in Marbury v Madison on the basis of its interpretation of the Constitution and precedents in English law, the authority of courts to adjudicate all actions in terms of a supreme constitution has become the norm in contemporary constitutions. There are of course various models of constitutional adjudication and the nature of the courts or other bodies to which the jurisdiction is entrusted also varies, but contemporary states without it are the exception rather than the rule.13 Considerable scepticism about the justification of judicial review, founded upon the construction of the "counter-majoritarian dilemma" continues.14 Nevertheless, in the constitution-writing of our era the American example, inclusive of and despite the counter- majoritarian difficulty, has provided foundational guidance. Thus e.g. section 81 of the Japanese Constitution of 1947 explicitly empowers the Supreme Court "to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act", a power which is exercised

certain State powers and discharging duties, which are limited to cooperation and division of functions, and which accepts the supremacy of the Constitution and the law." 10 This naturally also has its implications for the doctrine of the separation of powers. The vehicle for this shift is the supremacy of the Constitution: in South African jurisprudence on the enforcement of socio-economic rights (e.g. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) paras [38] and [99]), the values underlying the supreme Constitution, as it is interpreted by the judiciary, override considerations of governmental preferences for the budgetary distribution of available resources, arguments of the anti-majoritarian difficulty and limited bureaucratic capacity. 11 Cf. e.g. Ruth Gavison, "On the relationships between civil and political rights, and social and economic rights" in Jean-Marc Coicaud / Michael W. Doyle / Anne-Marie Gardner (eds), The Globalization of Human Rights, United Nations University Press, 2003, 23-55. 12 This is demonstrated in more detail in: F. Venter, "The Politics of Constitutional Adjudication" 2005 ZaöRV (65) 129, at 155-163. 13 Cf. e.g. http://www.concourts.net/tab/introen.html (consulted on 4 July 2007). 14 Cf. e.g. DE Livel / PA Haddon / DE Roberts / RL Weaver, Constitutional Law – Cases, History and Dialogues, 1996, 9: "Criticism of the judiciary is especially intense when it strikes down legislation on grounds that it conflicts with a right or liberty not actually enumerated by the Con- stitution."

20 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

with reticence, but nevertheless exercised.15 The German Grundgesetz of 1949 requires federal legislation in article 94(2) to "specify the cases in which its [the Federal Constitu- tional Court's] decisions have the force of law", and the relevant legislation16 renders the decisions of the Court binding on all "constitutional organs as well as on all courts and authorities."17 The South African Constitution of 1996 is construed on clear assumptions as to the status of the Constitution and its enforcement: in section 2 the supremacy of the Constitution is established and it is provided that "law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid"; the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal are endowed with jurisdiction on constitutional matters (sections 168 and 169), but in terms of section 167(5) "The Consti- tutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional . . ." Judicial constitutional review therefore appears to have been accepted towards the end of the twentieth century to be an inherent characteristic of the constitutional state. There is also the view that in constitution-making, elites feeling threatened, support a powerful role of the judiciary as a means of preserving privileged positions in complex societies, and that "the global trend toward juristocracy is part of a broader process, whereby political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy, attempt to insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics."18 It does however seem unlikely that the mechanism of judicial review would survive and flourish in constitutional democracies all around the globe if the shadows of elitism and counter-democracy undermined the emergent sovereignty of the individual. Constitutional judgments are naturally always open to criticism, either from the perspective of individual interests, governmental goals or internationally supported doctrine. In the current circumstances of vastly enhanced means and speed of communication, the exercise of judicial review in any single instance is normally almost instantly accessible to anyone interested in the subject. Although it provides no guarantee, it can in itself not but have the effect of dampening any tendencies of judicial adventurism running counter to the global constitutional ethos. The judicial development of constitutional law through the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution is the inevitable implication of review jurisdiction. In fact, it may even

15 F. Venter, Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as Constitu- tional States, 2000, 87-90, and more recently, Koji Tonami, "Die Entwicklung der Verfassungsge- richtsbarkeit und die Probleme der richterlichen Prüfungsbefugnis über die Verfassungsmäßigkeit in Japan" in: Christian Starck (ed), Fortschritte der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Welt – Teil I, 2004, 37-41, 15 ff. 16 Article 31(1) of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz. 17 Venter, (note 15), 90-94. 18 Ran Hirschl, "The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism", 2004 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 71, 73 and "The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Con- stitutionalisation: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions", 2000 Law & Society Inquiry 91.

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 21

be a constitution-making tool in the sense that the actual meaning and impact of constitutional provisions are brought to life through jurisprudence. Thus, e.g. it was left to the South African Constitutional Court to determine, in the absence of explicit constitutional regulation of the point, that the Constitution prohibited the imposition of the death penalty and corporal punishment,19 thereby actually "completing" the constitution-making process. This does not occur only when a constitution is new, but almost every ground-breaking interpretative judgment of an apex court on the constitution has this effect. Some examples are the German Maastricht Urteil20, the House of Lords' recent judgement in the Al-Skeini case,21 and the Indian Supreme Court's judgment in the Minerva Mills case.22

2.4 Decentralization / deconcentration Apart from the horizontal distribution of government authority, it has become a truism of constitution-making that the vertical distribution of authority is a desirable structural mechanism by which the undemocratic concentration of power may be avoided. The term "federalism" immediately comes to mind. However, the term has lost its usefulness as a means of distinguishing clearly between the structural composition of different states based only on the terminology used to describe the form of state: it is quite conceivable that a specific formal federation will show a less effective or extensive vertical distribution of authority than another non-federal state in which government authority is well distributed vertically to multiple organs of government.23

19 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 20 Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 12 October 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155 in which the position of German sovereignty relative to the European Community was addressed inter alia. For a penetrating discussion of the continued effects of the judgment in Europe, see Julio Baquero Cruz, The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, European University Institute, Florence – Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper 2007/13, published on the internet at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/07_13.pdf (downloaded on 21 July 2007). 21 Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 (found on the internet on 13 July 2007 at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd070613/skeini-1.htm in which the Law Lords ruled that Iraqi civilians arrested and detained by British soldiers in Iraq could rely on the protection of the Human Rights Act. Para 8 of the judgment reads: "The HRA is a statute enacted by Parliament. Where an issue arises as to its meaning, it must be construed. This is a task which only a UK court can perform. The court in Strasbourg is the ultimate authority on interpretation of the European Convention, but it cannot rule on the interpretation of a domestic statute." 22 Minerva Mills v. Union of India 1980 AIR 1789 1981 SCR (1) 206 1980 SCC (3) 625 in which its doctrine that Parliament was not empowered by the Constitution to alter "the basic structure of the Constitution" was re-established in the face of government opposition. 23 Cf Schneider, Föderale Verfassungspolitik für eine Europäische Union,1996, 45 at 48: Classic constitutional theory purported to divide all states into one of two contrasted types, the unitary and the federal, depending on whether sovereignty was undivided or shared between levels of government. In the post-war years this dichotomy has been broken by the appearance in Western Europe

22 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

It would appear that, in contemporary constitution-writing, the need for decentralization or deconcentration is more prominent than for the creation of federal states out of previously autonomous or sovereign entities. More frequently there is a need for the accommodation of regional, ethnic or other interests within a single state, or simply for the prevention of a concentration of power at national level. Of this, the complexities of the Russian Federation may be considered an example.24 Nevertheless, a structured and balanced constitutional allocation of authority to national and local, and frequently also regional centres of power tends to be the norm. Although globalized constitution-making has not reached a point where a composite form of state can be seen as a universal structural standard, indications are that contemporary constitutionalism strongly favours decentralization. The most prominent example is France, traditionally the primary example of the unitary European state, which has over the recent decades embarked on a process of decentralization of state authority in favour of regional and municipal government.25

3. Rights A Charter, Bill or Declaration of Rights as part of, or contiguous to newly made constitutions has become the norm for constitution makers. Whereas this generally has the effect of the spread of fundamental rights doctrine, there are also cases of constitutional systems being strange bedfellows of rights provisions in the constitution. In socialist constitutions rights are e.g. directly associated with duties26 or heavily qualified by the authority of the state27 and in the constitutions of Islamic states the protection of religious freedom stands in stark contrast to the explicit exclusive state promotion of Islam.28

of an intermediate type, the regional state, in which ultimate sovereignty rests with the centre (as in a unitary state) but the Constitution also recognises regional communities and accords them an inviolable status and a range of exclusive powers which are constitutionally entrenched (as in federalism). 24 Cf. e.g. Cameron Ross, in: Mike Bowker / Cameron Ross (eds), Russia after the Cold War, 2000, Chapter 4, at 99: " … it is clear that Russian federalism is in deep crisis. There would appear to be almost as many kinds of federal relations as there are subjects of the federation. … the greatest threat to the federation does not come in the main from ethnic separatists, but from the reicher regions which seek ever more economic and legal autonomy." 25 Cf. e.g. Alistair Cole, "Decentralization in France: Central Steering, Capacity Building and Iden- tity Construction" 2006, 4, French Politics 31-57. 26 Thus e.g. the right to work is granted in the same provision in which the duty to work is imposed on citizens in the constitutions of Vietnam (2001, article 55(1)) and China (1982, article 42). It is however interesting to note that the preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 also stated that "Each person has the duty to work and the right to employment." 27 Article 13(2) of the Chinese Constitution of 1982 provides "The State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of citizens to private property and to its inheritance." In contrast thereto, article 6(2) provides: "The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The system of socialist public ownership super-

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 23

Various authors ascribe the increasing internationalization of constitutional law primar- ily to the effect that human rights doctrine has on constitutional practice.29 The adoption of the mechanism of constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights is not only evident in countries where profound constitutional transformations occur, but also in established democracies that had gone without modern charters of rights, the prime example of course being the adoption in 1998 of the British Human Rights Act. Against this background Anderson30 draws the inference that [t]he argument that rights constitutionalism has gone global is further supported by the growing use of comparative sources, leading to a more 'cosmopolitan' approach to constitutional adjudication. In its strongest version, it is said that we are witnessing the emergence of universal principles of constitutional law guiding the formation and exe- cution of public policy. In a thorough comparative study of the impact of international law on constitution-making, Franck and Thiruvengadam31 found that the relevance of the incorporation of the ever- expanding body of international law into national law by means of constitutional provision, has become inescapable, and that - If there is one substantive area where most states have shown great willingness to be open to principles of international law, it has been in the area of human rights.

sedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it applies the principle of 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work'." 28 The Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 e.g provides in Part I article 2: "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan." This bland statement is put into context in an Annex named "The Objectives Resolution" which opens with the words: "Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust." In Part II, article 20 provides: "Subject to law, public order and morality:- (a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions." 29 Brun-Otto Bryde, "The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue" 2005 (80:203), Tulane Law Review 203, 208: "If constitutional law is no longer a parochial subject, but has become an international one, the main reason is the development of international human rights law." Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann provides a particularly penetrating exposition of this process in his contribution "Morality, Human Rights and International Economic Law: Towards Cosmopolitan Market Integration Law" in: H.-D. Assmann / R. Sethe (eds), Recht und Ethos im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 2004, 53-86. At 58 he writes: "Justice is becoming a matter of universal and 'inalienable' human rights, democratic governance and positive national and international constitutional law in order to empower and protect individual and democratic self-development across frontiers." 30 Gavin W. Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization, 2005, 5. 31 Thomas M. Franck / Arun K. Thiruvengadam, "International Law an Constitution-Making" 2003 Chinese Journal of International Law 467, 469-470 and 518.

24 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

The natural law philosophy underpinning human rights doctrine promotes the notion that the documentation of fundamental rights in a constitution is merely an incidental application to the political community whose constitution it is, without derogating from the universal currency of the rights.32 From such a position, it is but a short leap towards the acceptance of the predominance of international human rights law over national norms. It is obvious from the divergent conceptions of human rights in the world that global acceptance of such predominance of international human rights has not yet been achieved. No consensus exists e.g. among Muslim scholars on the acceptability of human rights doctrine,33 nor has the accusation from oriental scources that the West is attempting to enforce its human rights values on the East approached closure.34 Nevertheless, constitutional rights language in recently drafted constitutions tends toward similarity, although the interpretation of similar terms may vary in different jurisdictions.35 Since the adoption of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,36 social and economic (or socio-economic) rights as constitutionally entrenched, justiciable and enforceable fundamental rights have been established in some Latin Ameri- can jurisdictions and in India and South Africa. Their global recognition as such is however far from complete. Progress in this direction is however evident from the discussions at the United Nations on the adoption of an optional protocol to the CESCR, in terms of which

32 Francis Cheneval, "Constitutionalizing Multilateral Democratic Integration" in: Philippe Mastro- nardi / Denis Taubert (eds.), Staats- und Verfassungstheorie im Spannungsfeld der Disziplinen – ARSP Beiheft Nr. 105 30, 31 e.g. writes: "Human and civil rights as well as a system of justice based on universal validity claims are a source of cosmopolitan transcendence. State constitutions only realize fundamental rights for a particular community of citizens or people residing on a particular territory. They are incomplete with regard to their own claims because they are the foundational document of a particular political community but transcend the political singularity by reference to the normative fiction of a moral, legal, and ultimately political community of man- kind. Constitutions found a specific political entity but legitimate it with universal principles that imply a cosmopolitan transcendence towards an ever more universal realization of human ideals." 33 Cf e.g. Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights, 2001, whose 28 page introduction contests various other Muslim authors’ points of view in this regard. 34 Cf Tatsuo Inoue, "Human Rights and Asian Values" in: Jean-Marc Coicaud / Michael W. Doyle / Anne-Marie Gardner (eds), The Globalization of Human Rights, 2003, Chapter 4. 35 An example is the meaning given to "equality" by the South African Constitutional Court. J Moseneke in Minister of Finance and others v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) e.g. stated (at para [30]): "… our constitutional understanding of equality includes … 'remedial or restitutionary equality'. Such measures are not in themselves a deviation from, or invasive of, the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution. They are not 'reverse discrimination' or 'positive discrimination' ... They are integral to the reach of our equality protection. In other words, the provisions of s 9(1) and s 9(2) are complementary; both contribute to the constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure 'full and equal enjoyment of all rights'. A disjunctive or oppositional reading of the two subsections would frustrate the foundational equality objective of the Constitution and its broader social justice imperatives." 36 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966, and in force since 1976.

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 25

elements of international justiciability may become possible. For present purposes it is significant that the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights and their enforceability against the state is expanding, thus increasing the likelihood that drafters of constitutions may be influenced to follow suit. It is significant that the constitutionalization of socio-economic rights has progressed further in constitutional states with populations characterized by large numbers of poor and underprivileged people. The obvious reason for this is that the state is under such circumstances called upon more urgently to address the social discrepancies and to provide for the protection and promotion of the vulnerable components of society. In the more affluent states, the emphasis seems to be more on the provision of social security than on uplift- ment. Acceptance of socio-economic rights as subjectively enforceable and justiciable rights still seems to be remote in the European context. At best they are recognized as legal principles that courts may apply in the adjudication of legal norms that are inconsistent with them.37

4. Principles Constitution-making is doubtlessly a process guided by the foundational thinking of the bearers of the pouvoir constituant. This was particularly clear from the powerful influences that political philosophy exerted on the 18th Century American and French Revolutions and the constitutional documents to which they gave birth. In more recent constitution-making processes, the mechanism of prescribing a set of binding principles of constitutionalism to the authors of the new constitution has been employed in a few cases. At the end of World War II in 1945, the former German Reich found itself occupied and administered by the military commanders of the four Allied Powers, the United States of America, Britain, France and the USSR. After it became clear at a Four Power Confer- ence in London in 1947 that the eastern part of Germany occupied by the USSR could not for the foreseeable future be included in the constitutional reconstruction of Germany, the three western Allies instructed the eleven West-German Länder governments in 1948 to have a national constitution-writing body draw up a new constitution conforming to the requirements of democracy, federalism and guaranteed individual rights. In less than eight months the text of the new Grundgesetz was formulated and adopted by the Parlamenta- rischer Rat in May 1949, whereafter it was approved by the three military governors and submitted to the various Landtage for approval. Under the circumstances it may be asked whether the Parlamentarischer Rat exercised the pouvoir constituant and if so, how it could be bound by the instructions of the Allied Powers. It is worth noting that the allied powers, Britain, the United States and France, that set the framework of principles for the

37 Cf. e.g. Laurent Pech, "Socio-economic rights jurisprudence in France" in: Malcolm Langford (ed) Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence – Emerging Trends in Comparative and International Law, Forthcoming, [found on the Internet on 14 July 2007 at http://papers.ssrn.com/SSRNonline images/SSRN_dow_over.gif] para 28.

26 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

new constitution, are the prime representatives of the historic emergence of modern constitutionalism. Some 34 years later a set of 8 constitutional principles38 for the adoption of an independence constitution for Namibia was sponsored, again by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, but also by Canada and Western Germany. All parties interested in the writing of the independence constitution agreed to those 8 principles in 1982. Eventu- ally the Principles were translated by a constituent assembly into a well-formulated modern constitution which came into operation in 1990. In South Africa a two-phased constitution-making process was followed: the first Con- stitution was one negotiated word-for-word and formally adopted by the parliament as it was still constituted under the previous dispensation. This 1993 Constitution authorized the production of a "final" constitution in accordance with an unamendable set of 34 Constitu- tional Principles clothed with foundational authority in that the "final constitution" had to be certified by the Constitutional Court as being in compliance in all respects with the Principles. This eventually led to the adoption of the 1996 Constitution, but only after the Constitutional Court had, in a wide-ranging judgment,39 referred the first draft back for the

38 Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia 1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign, and democratic state. 2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the State. It may be amended only by a designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular referendum. 3. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. It will provide for a system of governance with three branches; an elected executive branch which will be responsible to the legislative branch; a legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote. 4. The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A.1 above. 5. there will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary depravation of private property or deprivation of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights. 6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offenses with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect. 7. Provisions will be made for the balanced structure of the public service, the police service and defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment of these services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies. 8. Provisions will be made for the establishment of elected council for local and/or regional administration. 39 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 27

purposes of adapting it to conform to the Principles. This process differed from the examples of Germany and Namibia in that the binding Constitutional Principles were not exter- nally imposed, but autochthonously negotiated and quite comprehensive. Some of the Principles were couched in equivocal and generalised terms while others were crisp and concise. The Principles required inter alia the following elements to be contained in the "final" constitution: • a democratic system of government, including multi-party democracy, regular elections and universal adult suffrage; • the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances; • the structuring of government in three tiers, involving democratic representation at each level; • an independent and impartial judiciary with the jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution; • supremacy of the Constitution, also binding all organs of state; • special procedures involving special majorities required for the amendment of the Constitution; • universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution; • equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process; • open and accountable public administration, and • formal legislative procedures. These principles of constitution-making essentially reflect what might be described as the essence of contemporary constitutionalism, or of the predominant notion of a well-ordered state, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, or sometimes also (less acurately) referred to as "the rule of law". Although all three examples of the predetermination of principles for constitution- writing led to generally highly acclaimed constitutional documents, it cannot be concluded that such an approach will guarantee success. After all, constitutions are written for specific circumstances and formulated by bodies uniquely responsible for distinctive situations – and the product and its effects can never be immutable indefinitely. Constitutional law is dynamic, even in cases where constitutional texts remain static for long periods of time. However, the formulation of an objective framework of principles as a guide for constitution-making has proven itself to be an effective approach. It will also tend to promote the incorporation of globally endorsed elements of constitutionalism.

5. Foundational values If the principles of the constitutional state have achieved or are achieving the status of universal guidelines for constitution-making, one may justifiably enquire if there is a foundational Leitmotiv or set of guiding standards for constitution-making in our time. The

28 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

notion of global values presents itself as the obvious candidate. In contemporary constitutions the values upon which the state is said to be founded, are frequently expounded in express terms. Often preambles are used for this purpose, but also other provisions in the document. A few randomly selected examples are Brazil,40 the Czech Republic,41 Finland,42 Namibia43 and Paraguay.44 The values expressly enumerated in these examples include liberty, development, equality, justice, human dignity, peace and the enshrinement of fundamental rights. The enumerated constitutional values found in these constitutions are wide-ranging, but one that has emerged as the pre-eminent, often even unwritten value underlying constitutions, is human dignity. The legal ethos not only of states, but of the global community is also frequently expressed in terms of human dignity. The first paragraph of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 e.g. states that: … recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world … and article 5 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights of 1981 provides: Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. In the cases of the German Grundgesetz and the South African Constitution of 1996, substantive foundational provisions elevated constitutional values, and particularly human dignity, to a level of key importance. The German Grundgesetz isolates, and therefore emphasizes, human dignity as fundamental constitutional value by providing in article 1(1): "Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority." In article 1(2)GG human rights, peace and justice are also acknowledged, clearly in support of and not in competition with

40 In the preamble of the Constitution of 1988 " … social and individual rights, liberty, security, well being, development, equality and justice" are recognized as "supreme values of a fraternal. pluralist and unprejudiced society". 41 The preamble of the Czech Constitution expresses the resolve "to build, protect and develop the Czech Republic in the spirit of the inviolable values of human dignity and freedom." 42 Section 1(2) of the Finnish Constitution of 1999 provides that: "the constitution shall guarantee the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom and rights of the individual and promote justice in society." 43 The preamble of the Namibian Constitution of 1990 opens with the words: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is indispensable for freedom, justice and peace." 44 The preamble of the Constitution of Paraguay of 1992 recognizes "human dignity for the purpose of ensuring freedom, equality and justice."

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 29

human dignity. It is furthermore established law that the fundamental rights of the GG are all vehicles of values.45 According to the quoted statement of the BVerfG in Kalkar I, the duty of the organs of the state to exercise their authority in a manner that will ensure that fundamental rights are respected, is founded upon the express constitutional injunction that they should respect and protect human dignity. This clearly demonstrates the centrality of human dignity as constitutional value in German constitutional law. The philosophical roots of the high constitutional regard in which human dignity is held, must no doubt be ascribed to the Christian foundations upon which Western civilization was built.46 These Christian roots of the recognition of human dignity is not presented in legal doctrine as a moral or religious argument for the state's conduct to be measured against Christian standards, but Christian- ity is merely recognized as the factual historical origin of the concept. Secularized human- istic, Marxist, existentialist and behaviouristic and other approaches to human dignity naturally exist, each with a different, though related, philosophical emphasis. One should therefore not expect that the constitutional recognition and elevation of human dignity

45 A free translation of a dictum in the "Kalkar I" judgment BVerfGE 49,89 at 141-142 reads as follows: “… According to consistent jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court the protection provided by the fundamental rights does not only contain subjective defensive rights of the individual against public authority, but they simultaneously constitute constitutional value judgments of objective law that apply to all reaches of the legal order providing guidelines for the legislature, executive and the judiciary. The clearest expression of this is to be found in the second sentence of article 1(1) GG in terms of which it is the duty of all government authority to respect and protect human dignity. Constitutional obligations of protection may thus be engendered whereby it is directed that legal arrangements must be designed in such a manner that the danger of impinge- ment of fundamental rights is also contained …” In their commentary “Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland“, 4th ed. (1997) 16-17 Jarrass/Pieroth point out that various terms have been used to indicate this value-determining aspect of the fundamental rights, viz. objektiv-rechtliche Wertentscheidungen, objektive Normen, Prinzipien and the institutionelle Gehalt of the fundamental rights. 46 Cf. e.g. Christian Starck in: von Mangoldt/Klein/Starck, Das Bonner Grundgesetz 4th. ed.(1999), vol. I, 34-36 and Josef Isensee, "Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach dem Absoluten", Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, vol. 131(2006), Vol. 2, 173, 199-209. These authors separately show how human dignity, which is now dealt with as the moral foundation, kind of "civil religion" of the secularized society, originates in the biblical teaching that man was created in the image of God, and that there is a personal relationship between God and man which is manifested in the immortality of the soul. The notions of guilt and redemption require the acknowledgement of individual freedom, which also leads to the construction of equality and fraternity on the basis of the assumption that all people were equally created in the image of God. Thus the self-determination of the individual must be founded in the worth of every person. People are therefore constrained to recognize not only their own dignity, but also to acknowledge the equal dignity of others. The state is required to provide legal recognition of human dignity and to respect and protect it.

30 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

would ensure the emergence of a monolithic notion of human dignity. Its exact meaning can not be universally defined.47 In the South African case, human dignity is mentioned as the first of a range of constitutional values.48 The wording of section 10 of the 1996 Constitution, under the heading "human dignity" gives expression to the supposition that human dignity is not in need of being created con- situtionally, but that it exists independently of the law. It reads: "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected." The purport of the phrase is that human dignity is an inalienable, inborn characteristic of each individual person. Dogmatically the recognition of human dignity is therefore not dependent upon its incorporation in a constitution. In the recent South African constitutional jurisprudence, much reliance was placed on comparative foreign judgments, e.g. those of the US Supreme Court,49 to affirm this position. The Court found further confirmation in the jurisprudence

47 Cf. e.g. Egan v Canada (1995) 29 CRR (2d) 79 at 106: "Dignity [is] a notoriously elusive concept … It needs precision and elaboration." 48 Section 1 of the South African Constitution provides as follows: The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness. Various other provisions of the 1996 Constitution are worded with express or implied reference to section 1. Thus section 143(2) expressly requires provincial constitutions to "comply with the values in section 1"; section 7(1) states that the Bill of Rights "affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom"; the very important section 36(1) provides: "The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom …", and the equally important interpretation clause in section 39(1) provides: " When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum — (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom." Although section 1 is indeed foundational, it is not the only provision in the Constitution which introduces values. Thus section 195 introduces "basic values and principles governing public administration," by prescribing in subsection (1) that "[p]ublic administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution" and then adding a comprehensive additional list of "principles". Furthermore Chapter 3 of the Constitution is devoted in full to introduce and regulate the notion of "co-operative government" which might be described as a set of structural constitutional values intended to determine inter-governmental relations, i.e. between and among the national, provincial and local spheres of government. 49 E.g. para [58] of the Makwanyane judgment, referring to Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See also S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) par [37] and [38].

Venter, Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making 31

of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht,50 the Canadian Supreme Court51 and the Hun- garian Constitutional Court.52 The approach followed by the bench indicates an assumption that human dignity is the universal value which is foundational to a constitutional state and its characteristic protection of fundamental rights. In the context of the phenomenon of the "migration of constitutional ideas", Mayo Moran maintains that in jurisdictions such as Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa, due to the influential authority of constitutional values, "courts and commentators draw on a transnational judicial and academic conversation in order to forge responses within domestic constitutional orders." She demonstrates this with reference to the "estop- pel-like effect" that the values underlying and expressed in constitutionally entrenched rights have in those jurisdictions (in contrast to the United States) by the radiation of the values into the field of rights in private relationships, e.g. libel law.53 This is an interesting field of investigation which is opened up widely by the effects of the globalization of constitutional law. It can also be expected to influence future constitution-making, at least as a conceptual development which needs consideration regarding the formulation of provisions concerning the scope of fundamental rights.

6. Conclusion Do the strong indications that the drafting of constitutions in this century has inevitably become a comparative exercise due to the global tendency towards common constitutional vocabulary, principles and values lead one to the conclusion that future constitutions may simply become replicas of each other? Such an inference is not justified. Globalised constitutionalism would have to become a powerful supra-national regime to have such an effect, which would really mean the replacement of constitutional law with pervasive international legal norms. What stands between internationalism and constitutionalism as we know it, is the element of state sovereignty as cornerstone both of international law and constitutional law. Constitutions designed for unique situations may be expected to be produced for as long as state sovereignty retains its foundational importance. Nevertheless, comparative constitution-making has become an essential characteristic of the process of the drafting (and revision) of legitimate contemporary constitutions.

50 In par [59] BVerfGE 45,187 was quoted. 51 In par [60] et seq reference is made to the judgment in Kindler v Canada (1992) 6 CRR (2d) 193 SC. 52 In par [83] reference is made to the Hungarian Court's Decision No. 23/1990 (X.31.). 53 Mayo Moran, "Inimical to constitutional values: complex migrations of constitutional rights" in: Sujit Choudry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge UP 2006, 233.

Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections

∗ By Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, London

In 1997 US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia asserted in Printz v. United States that ‘comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution.1 Since then the matter has been debated by judges in and out of the courts2 as well as by scholars.3 On 13 January 2005 the American University Washington College of Law hosted a public debate between United States Supreme Court Justices Breyer and Scalia, which was chaired by Professor Norman Dorsen, on the ‘Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Deci- sions’.4 In the course of this debate, Scalia repeated his view that foreign law should not be cited by domestic courts. The reference to, and utility of, foreign law is most clearly visible on three levels: in relation to constitutional and statutory interpretation, in relation to the drafting of a new constitution, and in relation to institutional design (i.e. the creation, development and justification of state organs and constitutional practices that are efficient as well as legitimate).5 According to Scalia, only the first exercise is problematic. There is

∗ Dr. jur., Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, London School of Economics. E–Mail: [email protected] 1 Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997), at 2377. 2 The case law is discussed below. For extrajudicial comments see Justice Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, in (2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceedings 265; Justice Stephen Breyer, Remarks at the Summit of World Bar Leaders, 10 November, 2001), http://www.supreme- courts.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_11-10-01.html [visited 20 December 2007]; Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, (2002) 96 American Society of International Law Proceedings 348.; Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks to the Southern Center for International Studies (28 October 2003), http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf [visited 20 December 2007]; Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address, ‘Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts’ (2004) 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 305. 3 A.L. Parrish, ‘Storm in a Teacup: the U.S. Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law’, (2007) 2 Uni- versity of Illinois Law Review 637-680 [for extensive scholarly references see FN 9]; J. Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 119-147; M.A. Waters, ‘Justice Scalia on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Unidirectional Monologue or Co-Constitutive Dialogue?’, (2004) 12 Tulsa Journal of Comparative & Inter- national Law, (Symposium Issue) 149. See also B. Markesinis / J. Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law, Oxford, 2006. 4 Norman Dorsen, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’, 3(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law, 519-541 [henceforth ‘A Conversation’]. 5 D. Franklin / M. Baun, Political Culture and Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach, New York, 1995, 222; L. Epstein and J. Knight, ‘Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing’ (2003) 1(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 196-222, 197-8.

Murkens, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections 33

consensus that foreign law is admissible in the interpretation of a Treaty;6 in devising a constitution;7 and if it is old English law and helps to understand the meaning of the US Constitution when it was adopted.8 Scalia, as the most outspoken representative of a formal textualist, originalist, even Hamiltonian9 position, objects only to the judicial use of foreign law in relation to constitutional and statutory interpretation. The purpose of the present article is to identify the reasons for the originalists’ objections to judicial comparative engagement – which are never articulated at length – and then to reveal their empirical incoherency and normative incongruity. The debate regarding the judicial use of foreign law is not only relevant to the framework provided by US constitutional law, but also raises issues of broader relevance to constitutional theory. Constitu- tional democracy is characterised by ‘contradictory principles’ that are inherent to the system,10 and whose significance is defined by, and changes over, time and space.11 It can also be pointed out that due to its open texture,12 law is always susceptible to interpretation and contestation. This is particularly true for constitutional law which not only tends to be postulated in abstract and general terms but is also characterised by its close nexus to national politics. The interpretation of constitutional law is thus always controversial, contested, and contingent upon underlying political values. The debate is evidence, moreover, of law’s reflexivity which ultimately is the promise of comparative law. The contingent integrity of the legal order needs to be revealed by developing a self-reflexive understanding of constitutional law by viewing it as ‘intercul- tural dialogue and as contestation between interests’.13 Every constitutional system needs to have a sense of its own sovereignty, the nature of its constitution, the importance of fundamental rights, and the role of the state. The present article will conclude by arguing

6 A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 521. 7 Ibid, at 525; 538-9; although see critically P. Dann and Z. Al-Ali, ‘The Internationalized “Pouvoir Constituant”: Constitution-Making under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor’, (2006) 10 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 423–63. 8 See also K. Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, (2005) June-July, Policy Review at 34, n.2. 9 J.B. Staab, The Political Thought Of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian On The Supreme Court, Lanham, 2006. 10 J. Habermas, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?”, (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766-781. 11 R. Bellamy / V. Buffacch / D. Castiglione, Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1995), at 15. 12 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, at 128-136. 13 J. Shaw, ‘Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (1999) 6(4) Journal of European Public Policy 579, at 596. See also J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, (Cambridge , 1995, at 30. See also J. Bast, The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution, in P. Dann and M. Rynkowski (eds.), ‘The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution’, in: The Unity of the European Constitution, Berlin, 2006.

34 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

that comparative constitutional law can contribute towards ‘a self-conscious discourse of constitutionalism’ which is a necessary prerequisite for constitutional status.14

I. The Originalists’ Objections The first argument against using foreign law in the courts relates to the legitimacy of that enterprise. The objection is based on classic sovereignty theory and a state-centred image of national law which conceives law as a body of rules enforceable through adjudication, with an emphasis on rule-orientation, professional (artificial) reasoning, and procedure. The argument is straightforward. Foreign law is not recognised as a valid source of law by the national legal system, and for that reason the legal system cannot cope with the migration of constitutional ideas through a comparative approach to constitutional law. In practice, this means that courts are not permitted to rely on foreign law in order to decide hard cases and to fill gaps when national positive law is insufficient. If foreign law is not an authoritative legal source for judges, then the legitimacy of the comparative method is thrown into doubt. The legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the judges’ interpretative methodology: courts must justify any recourse to non-state law. Can judges justify the recourse to comparative law for the purposes of constitutional and statutory interpretation? Why should US judge be bound by the dicta of a judge in Zimbabwe, Scalia asks rhetorically?15 The answer to this question has implications for current conceptions of democracy and sovereignty, as well as for the sociology of law. A culturally-sensitive inquiry needs to ask whether it is legitimate to ‘import’ foreign legal ideas into the national legal arena if it means divorcing those ideas from the cultural context in which they originated. The second argument relates to hermeneutics, or the correct interpretation of the Con- stitution. It is important to differentiate between amending the Constitution and interpreting the Constiution. According to Scalia, the only legitimate way to change the Constitution is through the formal amendment process, and not through an active judiciary which (illegiti- mately) changes the Constitution based on its own preferences and prejudices (which may or may not include non-US law).16 The current divide with regard to constitutional interpretation of the text is between ‘original meaning’ (the judge interprets statutes literally, based on ‘the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended’), and ‘current meaning’ (the meaning of the US Constitution should be tailored to contemporary

14 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317-359, at 343. 15 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 528-9. 16 ‘It’s not the job of the Constitution to change things by judicial decree; change is brought about by democratic legislation’, Scalia in ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 535; See also A. Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’, (1989) 59 University of Chicago Law Review 1175, at 1179-81.

Murkens, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections 35

and changing social circumstances).17 Scalia argues that the Constitution has a meaning, and the historical and constitutional role of judges has been to determine its meaning. ‘Now, my theory of what to do when interpreting the American Constitution is to try to understand what it meant, what it was understood by the society to mean when it was adopted. And I don't think it has changed since then. That approach used to be ortho- doxy until about sixty years ago. Every judge would have told you that's what we do. If you have that philosophy, obviously foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: old English law—because phrases like "due process," and the "right of confrontation" were taken from English law, and were understood to mean what they meant there. So the reality is I use foreign law more than anybody on the Court. But it's all old English law.’18 Over time judicial interpretation will inevitably produce different accounts of that meaning, but that observation alters neither the judges’ interpretative mandate not the original meaning of the Constitution itself. Scalia views the Constitution as an anchor, as a source of social stability: ‘…the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to prevent change, not to foster change and have it written into the Constitution’.19 A Bill of Rights, therefore, expresses social scepticism of any axiom that equates ‘evolving standards of decency’ with ‘the progress of a maturing society’.20 Instead, Scalia bemoans that ‘the American people have been converted to belief in The Living Constitution, a “morphous” document that means, from age to age, what it ought to mean’.21 Judicial activism based on abstract principles of justice is not only illegitimate as ‘a form of corruption’ that debases the wisdom and virtue inherent in the original meaning,22 but also has deleterious effects on sovereignty as it thwarts the democratic will of the people. The third reason against the judicial use of comparative material is political. It would appear that it is not only in relation to strategic and foreign policy issues that ‘Americans

17 A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton, 1997, at 38; see also A. Reed Amar, ‘The Supreme Court, 1999 Term–Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,’ (2000) 114 Harvard Law Review 26. 18 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 525. 19 Ibid. See also Scalia’s further comments at 536: ‘I have no problem with change. It’s just that I do not regard the Constitution as being the instrument of change by letting judges read [foreign] cases […]. That’s not the way we do things in a democracy. Persuade your fellow citizens and repeal the laws. Why should the Supreme Court decide that question?’. 20 The famous phrase is Chief Justice Warren’s in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); criticism by Scalia in: A Matter of Interpretation, above n. 17, at 40-41. 21 Scalia, Ibid. at 47. 22 Observation by D. Levin, ‘Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and Democratic Theory’, (2004) 29(1) Law and Social Inquiry 105-126, at 109.

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are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus’,23 but also in relation to democracy, justice and human virtue.24 Scalia and Breyer portray the USA as the paragon of egalitarian excel- lence , whereas comparator countries seem only just to have emerged from the dark ages. Breyer notes that ‘[t]o an ever greater extent, foreign nations have become democratic; to an ever greater extent they have embodied that protection in legal documents enforced through judicial decision making’.25 Although Breyer suggests that US judges could learn from their foreign couterparts, especially when faced with ‘difficult questions without obvious answers’,26 Scalia states bluntly that the USA does not have the same moral and legal framework as the rest of the world. ‘If you told the framers of the Constitution that we’re to be just like Europe, they would have been appalled.’27 The xenophobic tone is evident in certain scholarly contributions as well as in the US media.28 The fourth argument against comparative law is ideological. Alan Watson observes that comparative law can be used for the purpose of corroborating a preconceived thesis.29 Scalia’s fear is identical, namely that the invocation or rejection of comparative law is determined by the political preferences of the court. In his dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons30 Scalia stated: ‘to invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry’. The Justices were not seeking ‘confirmation’ from international consensus, but were seeking to affirm their ‘own notion of how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in

America’. 31 In Lawrence v Texas32 Scalia in his dissent accused the Supreme Court of

23 R. Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New York, 2003, 3. 24 See, e.g. J. Rubenfed, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, (2005) 79 New York University Law Review 1971, at 1995-99. 25 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 523. 26 Ibid. 27 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 521. The deprecation of European legal systems by Breyer and Scalia is in turn matched by Kübler who notes that the law of the USA is no longer a ‘mere appendix or even the quantité négligeable of an exotic and peculiar development of English law, but an exemplary illustration of a modern legal order’s tendency to grow and its ability to differentiate’: F. Kübler, ‘Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagendisziplin der Rechtswissenschaft’, Juris- tenzeitung 1977, 113- 118, at 118. 28 See Parrish, ‘Storm in a Teacup’, above n. 3, see FN 53 for further references. See also D. Mil- bank, ‘And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty’, Washington Post, 9 April 2005; Page A03: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38308-2005Apr8.html (visited 20 December 2007). 29 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, (Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 1974), at 12. 30 543 U.S. 551 (2005), at 21. 31 543 U.S. 551 (2005), at 23. 32 539 US 558 (2003), at 2495.

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conveniently ‘ignoring […] the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy’. And in conversation with Breyer he added: ‘When it agrees with what the justices would like the case to say, we use the foreign law, and when it doesn’t agree, we don’t use it’.33 Richard Posner wonders aloud whether the reason for Scalia’s objections are practical rather than ideological: if the practical problem of accessing foreign legal judgements were removed through adequate translations, might Scalia himself turn to comparative analysis with a view to supporting his own views on homosexuality, abortion, capital punishment, and the role of religion in public life?34 The fifth argument is cultural. It is not appropriate to ‘import’ foreign legal ideas into the national legal arena if it means divorcing those ideas from the cultural context in which they originated. Using foreign law is difficult because judges have no insight into the ‘surrounding jurisprudence’.35 From this perspective, the comparison of two or more constitutional systems does not exhaust itself in the comparison of their positive constitutional provisions, but needs to be premised on the political, historical, socio-cultural, and philosophical foundations on which the constitutional law of the particular legal regime rests.36 Not only can comparative law sometimes require sufficient knowledge of another language, but it always requires a sound understanding of another culture; all the more so when constitutional law is the object of comparison. Judges are not expert in foreign law and thus lack the insight and information necessary for the formation of an opinion.37 These cultural limitations have resulted in a degree of selectivity38 whenever the US Supreme Court has consulted foreign law. The Court has referred to opinions from Commonwealth countries, but not to East Asia, South American or Islamic courts.39

33 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 521. 34 R. Posner, ‘No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws’, (July/August 2004) Legal Affairs, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/feature_posner_julaug04.msp [visited 20 December 2007]. 35 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 528. 36 P. Legrand, ‘Public Law, Europeanisation, and Convergence: Can Comparativists Contribute?’ in P. Beaumont / C. Lyons / N. Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2002); R. Wahl, Verfassungsstaat, Europäisierung, Internationalisierung (Frank- furt: Suhrkamp, 2003), at 96. 37 ‘…the judicial systems fo the rest of the world are immensely varied and most of their decisions inaccessible, as a practical matter, to our monolingual judges and law clerks’: R. Posner, above n. 34. 38 See also W. Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa, 2nd ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 30: ‘Global legal debates on human rights and religious law circle uncomfortably around the often unspoken but systematic denial that anything useful could be learnt from non-Western socio-legal traditions’. 39 See question by Dorsen, ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 530.

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The sixth argument relates to the dangers of manipulation. In the absence of a US decision, citing a decision ‘by an intelligent man in Zimbabwe…looks lawyerly’.40 A foreign legal source is better than none, and this kind of inventiveness invites manipulation. To be clear, Scalia does not want to prevent judges from consulting foreign cases; he only wants to prevent judges citing them.41 Waldron and Posner make similar observations. Waldron notes that ‘reference to official judgments, whether local or foreign, helps rescue judges from a feeling of intellectual nakedness’,42 whereas Posner describes the judicial search for quotations in and citations of foreign as well as previous decisions as an effort ‘to further mystify the adjudicative process and disguise the political decisions that are the core, though not the entirety, of the Supreme Court’s output’.43 This raises the broader issue of what counsel is permitted to cite in court. Posner distinguishes between precedential and informational citations.44 Although he is sympathetic to Scalia’s broader claim that the Supreme Court should never treat a foreign legal judgement as precedential authority, or even as persuasive authority,45 Posner parts from Scalia’s company when he states that ‘anything can be cited as source of information bearing on an adjudication’.46

II. Alternative Arguments In response to Scalia and other critics of comparative law, there are various approaches that could be developed with more rigour than Breyer’s utility approach (discussed below) or The Migration of Constitutional Ideas,47 edited by Sujit Choudhry (henceforth MOCI), which merely provides a desciptive counter-weight to Scalia’s normative objections. MOCI is the outcome of an international conference at the University of Toronto in October 2004 that wanted to rebut Scalia’s doctrinal hostility to the use of foreign decisions in domestic courts. However, the contributions to MOCI fail to analyse (rather than assume) the intrinsic value of comparative methodology as a judicial tool, and to address explicitly Scalia’s

40 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 531. 41 ‘I mean, go ahead and indulge your curiosity! Just don’t put it in your opinions!’, Scalia, ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 534. 42 J. Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n. 3, at 138. 43 R. Posner, above n. 34. 44 Ibid. 45 Posner makes the same argument in relation to citing unpublished opinions as precedents (which would increase the court’s workload without, according to Posner, leading to better decisions). But the law has now changed. The new Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which took effect on 1 January 2007, allows federal courts to cite unpublished cases. 46 Ibid (emphasis added). 47 S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge: University Press, 2006. For a review of this edited volume see J.E.K. Murkens, ‘Neither Parochial Nor Cosmopolitan – An Appraisal of the Migration of Constitutional Ideas’, in (2008) 71(2) Modern Law Review 303- 319.

Murkens, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections 39

doctrinal objections to comparative analysis, namely that it is undemocratic. Although Choudhry is aware that ‘courts must explain why comparative law should count’,48 MOCI as a whole fails to offer its own justifications. MOCI is clearly trying to persuade the reader that its own ‘educated, cosmopolitan sensibility’ is better than Scalia’s ‘narrow, inward- looking, and illiterate parochialism’.49 But cosmopolitanism as a new Weltanschauung (as Choudhry knows50) is insufficient justification for the judicial use of comparative law method; all the more so because the link between comparative method and improved judicial reasoning cannot be made. Having identified the originalists’ objections, the second half of this article will be devoted to revealing their empirical incoherence and normative incongruity.

1. Empirical incoherence The controversy surrounding the judicial use of comparative constitutional law is not new. It is frequently traced back to the 1958 decision of the Warren Court in Trop v. Dulles.51 In that case the Supreme Court referred to the ‘civilized nations of the world’52 in order to determine the evolving standards of decency that should be used to evaluate which punish- ments are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. In particular, the Court referred to a United Nations’ survey of the laws of eighty-four states which revealed ‘that only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.’53 Since Coker v Georgia,54 and especially in the last 10 years, Justices John Paul Stevens, Stephen Breyer, and Anthony Kennedy have looked to ‘the climate of international opinion’55 to support their views.56

48 Choudhry above n 47, at 5. 49 Ibid, at 4. 50 Ibid. 51 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 52 Ibid, at 102. 53 Ibid, at 103. 54 433 U.S. 584 (1977): international practices regarding the death penalty for rape are relevant to the Court’s ‘evolving standards’ analysis. 55 Ibid, at 596. 56 See in particular: Knight v. Florida and Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), 995-97, per Breyer J., dissenting, who cited judicial decisions from Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, and the Euro- pean Court of Human Rights; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), at 316 per Stevens J. who cites an amicus curiae brief submitted by the European Union and argues that ‘within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved’; Rehnquist J. dissented as he failed to see ‘how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the court's ultimate determination’ (at 325); Lawrence v. Texas 539 US 558 (2003), per Kennedy J. who cites decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and strikes down the criminal prohi-

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The attempt to discredit comparative judicial engagement ignores the extent to which the USA and other jurisdictions already consult beyond their own borders. Although US Supreme Court Justice O’Connor also dissented in Roper v. Simmons, she disagreed with Scalia’s insularity: ‘over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency’.57 As regards other jurisdictions, Cheryl Saunders notes that ‘at the end of the twentieth century, most constitutional systems are or were derivative in part, with the possible exceptions of the ancestor systems of the United Kingdom, the United States and France’.58 Major constitutional decisions are now discussed on a transnational basis from the UK House of Lords to the South African Constitutional Court and the Supreme Courts of India and Israel.

2. Normative incongruity a) Legitimacy More importantly, from a normative perspective the originalist objection is formalistic. It adheres to the paradigm of one national legal system, with one legitimate law-maker, and one coherent system of norms and legal reasoning. Hence, judicial references to foreign law become functionally unnecessary (foreign law is not binding) and normatively illegitimate (foreign law should have no bearing on judicial decisions). In other words, the democratic nature of law-making procedures is a necessary as well as a sufficient condition for the validity of law. An alternative conception views formal validity as a necessary but insufficient condition for law.59 Jürgen Habermas, for instance, emphasises the value of substantive legitimacy: at the ‘posttraditional level of justification’ the making and enforcement of laws must necessarily, and for the sake of legitimacy, ‘be rationally accepted by all citizens in a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation’.60 Whereas originalism presupposes a static will at the original moment of the US Constitution’s founding, Habermas treats political preferences as ‘open to the exchange of arguments’ which can be ‘discoursively changed’.61 Although Habermas’ discourse theory focuses on law-making procedure, its extension to the court poses no immediate threat to the legitimacy of judicial reasoning: the

bition of homosexual sodomy in Texas; and Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551 (2005), where the Court cites international opinion and finds that the juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional. 57 Ibid, per O’Connor J. (dissenting), at 18. 58 C. Saunders, ‘A Constitutional Culture in Transition’, in: Constitutional Cultures,Warsaw: Insti- tute of Public Affairs, 2000, at 37. 59 See generally L.J. Wintgens, ‘Legislation as an Object of Study of Legal Theory: Legisprudence’ in L.J. Wintgens (ed), Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 27. 60 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democ- racy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996, 135. 61 Ibid, at 181.

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introduction of rational arguments from other jurisdictions in domestic judicial reasoning would still need to be appraised according to its ‘internal rationality’ (the internal consis- tency and coherence of the legal order) and ‘normative rationality’ (procedural and substantive legitimacy).62 A further contrast to state-centredness is provided by legal pluralism. Boaventura de Sousa Santos conceives law as ‘a constellation of different [i.e. plural and interrelated] legalities’.63 Law does not precede political conflict but exists as a matter of communication between different legal areas, and is thus is in a constant state of flux. The intersection of different legal orders is called ‘interlegality’64 which extends the concept of legitimacy beyond the boundaries of the nation state. ‘We live in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassings. Our legal life is constituted by the intersection of different legal orders, that is, by interlegality. Interlegality is the phenomenological counterpart of legal pluralism, and [that is why it is a] key concept in a postmodern conception of law’.65 Other commentators too conceive a heterarchical ordering of de-centralised legal systems that exist independently of nation states.66 According to the heterarchical conception, established legal orders (public international law, WTO, Community law) as well as new phenomena such as transnational law (NGO’s, expert committees and agencies67) and global law (such as the administration of domain names by ICANN68) are loosely linked up in a multi-level state-transcending system of governance which challenges national law. The new legal orders do not subscribe to a territorial pattern but to a functional pattern of regulating diverse sectors, interests, products and values.69

62 Adapted from K. Tuori, ‘Legislation Between Politics and Law’ in L.J. Wintgens (ed), Legispru- dence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 105-7; see generally K. Günther, Der Sinn für Angemessenheit, Frankfurt, 1988. 63 B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense – Law, Science and Politics in the Paradig- matic Transition, London, Routledge, 1995, at 111. 64 Ibid, at 473. 65 B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading: Towards a Post-Modern Conception of Law’ (1997) 14 Journal of Law and Society 279, 298 [original emphasis]. 66 E.g. G. Teubner, ‘”Global Bukowina”’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in G. Teubner (Ed.), Global Law Without a State, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996. 67 See R.A. Higgott / G.R.D. Underhill / A. Bieler, Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System, London, Routledge, 2000. 68 See J. v. Bernstorff, ‘ICANN as a Global Governance Network: The Rise and Fall of a Govern- ance Experiment’ in: C. Joerges / I.-J. Sand / G. Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, Oxford, Hart, 2004. 69 G. Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional’ in: C. Joerges / I.-J. Sand / G. Teubner (eds), Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance, Oxford, Hart, 2004.

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A summary response to network theory is that networks are not self-legitimating orders and do not enjoy an executive monopoly, and so cannot rival the sovereignty claim asserted by the states. Networks are necessary emanations of a functionally differentiated society, but the state is still the reference point of political and social development; it remains accountable for processes which it can neither steer nor control. The point to make in relation to originalism is that discourse theory (Habermas), systems theory (Luhmann), networks (Teubner), legal pluralism (de Sousa Santos) constitutional pluralism,70 and cosmo- politanism71 are theories that emphasise formal as well as substantive legitimacy, recognise the need to adjust legal reasoning to the complexities of modern society, and challenge the continued authority of classic sovereignty theory (which views the state as the enforcer of law, the sole provider of constitutions and the embodiment of sovereignty) in which ‘other law’ is at best ‘meaningless dicta’ and at worst ‘dangerous dicta’. 72 b) Hermeneutics In order to identify and defend his constitutional interpretation, Scalia appeals to tradition, original meaning, and historical authenticity which is validated by popular consent. By treating the Constitution as a coherent product, rather than as the result of compromise, Scalia is guilty of what Lawrence Tribe calls ‘hyper-integration’:73 the idea of a unique founding moment is the originalist’s equivalent of the physicist’s big bang theory that fixed in perpetuity the legal and social qualities of US constitutional jurisprudence.74 Whereas Scalia appeals to history as the authority for a decision, the alternative appeal is to reason.75 The rule of law and constitutionalism act as the rule of reason, and can offer a legal bench- mark for the assessment of new discoveries. The purpose of constitutionalism, which is to subject politics to higher norms of reason, is enhaced in its comparative form. To be sure, the appeal to reason fills law with ‘uncertainty’:76 legal logic, clear rules, and a history book do not always provide a satisfactory resolution. And it also gives judges broader powers to interpret the constitution based on supposedly contemporary elitist values which

70 N. Walker, above n. 14. 71 U. Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’ (2002) 19(1-2) Theory, Culture & Society 17-44; D. Held, ‘Principles of Cosmopolitan Order’ in G. Brock / H. Brighouse (eds), The Politi- cal Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 72 Lawrence v. Texas 539 US 558 (2003), 2495 per Scalia, J. (dissenting). 73 L.H. Tribe / M. C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991, 24-30. 74 L.H. Tribe, ‘Comment’, in Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, above n. 18, at 87; J.A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account and Critique, (1991) 71 Boston University Law Review, 1-45, 4. 75 P. Kahn, ‘Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key’, (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 2677-2705, at 2685. 76 Breyer, in: ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 529.

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are validated by abstract principles of justice (as opposed to supposedly traditional moral norms which are validated by popular consent). It is easy to conclude that if judges are given a broader (purposive) role in the interpretation of constitutional law, then comparative analysis emerges as a natural adjunct to the process of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Yet the two phenomena (judicial activism vs judicial use of comparative law) raise separate legitimacy concerns that should not be conflated: it is quite possible for a judge to adopt a dynamic and purposive interpretation of a statute whilst eschewing the use of comparative law. In this regard, Scalia’s outright rejection of foreign law, but complete acceptance of old English law, is also noteworthy. Scalia offers no justification whatsoever for the normative superiority of his originalist position, which can easily be rejected as an incoherent and unpersuasive source of authority: ‘Why should we care more about the intent of the Founders – who are long-dead as well as culturally removed from us – than about the understandings of contemporary judges struggling with the same problems of governance of a modern welfare state in countries with which we must build a just and efficient global order of law’?77 c) Political Instead of isolating the USA or any other country (or jurisdiction) from the rest of the world in moral, political and legal terms, Breyer and O’Connor insist that foreign and international law matter because of globalisation: ‘…foreign law today comprises part of ordinary contract law or other business law’;78 and ‘no institution of government can afford now to ignore the rest of the world’.79 According to Breyer, citing foreign decisions can be justified for two reasons: because their citation does not raise a ‘technically legal’ issue, but rather a ‘law-related human question’,80 and for reasons of utility and effectiveness: ‘…the foreign courts I have mentioned have considered roughly comparable questions under roughly comparable legal standards. Each court has held or assumed that those standards permit application of the death penalty itself. Consequently, I believe their views are useful even though not binding’.81 Scalia retorts that ‘if you don’t want [foreign law] to be authoritative, then what is the criterion for citing it?’.82 Both Breyer and O’Connor rise to the challenge. Foreign deci-

77 Kahn, above n. 75, at 2678. 78 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 533. 79 O’Connor, above n. 2. For the impact of globalisation on the judiciary see A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004, Chapter 2. 80 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 528. 81 Knight v. Florida and Moore v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), 995-97, per Breyer J., dissenting. 82 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 521.

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sions are not authoritative, in the sense of being binding, but they may ‘constitute persuasive authority in American courts’,83 and as such, they may ‘cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem’.84 Another helpful conception is proposed by Mayo Moran does not conceive of legal sources in strict hierarchical terms, but develops a more supple system in which constitutional rights migrate.85 She draws a parallel between the ‘mandatory effect’ of international and comparative law on domestic constitutional law, and the relationship between constitutional law and the law governing private relations. In jurisdictions which deny the horizontal effect of human rights, individual rights have nonetheless developed an ‘influential authority’86 which must be taken into account in decision-making and justification. d) Ideological How accurate is the charge that the invocation or rejection of comparative material is determined by the political preferences of the court?87 Would an opponent of comparative law reject foreign law out of hand if it supported her position? How much emphasis would a supporter of comparative law place on the law of other jurisdictions if it undermined her own position? These are not rhetorical questions – although the answers may be obvious to Scalia. A constitutional practice in state X may be followed by state Y, but not necessarily. A good judge will – on the basis of convincing legal argument and expected standards – explain why the constitutional practice should converge, or why it should remain divergent. However, the claim that comparative analysis merely masquerades as legal argument in court to support a decision that the judges have already reached has also been made in reverse of Scalia’s originalism which Cook describes as ‘no more than an artifice for imposing [the judge’s] own political vision’.88 These claims, if true, discredit the authority of legal reasoning and the integrity of the legal system as a whole. Alternatively, it may be agreed that there is no value-neutral mechanism of constitutional interpretation and that the

83 O’Connor, above n. 2, at 350. 84 Printz v. United States, above n. 1, per Breyer J. dissenting. (Breyer mentions the federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union to support his argument favouring state implementation of federal law). 85 M. Moran, ‘Inimical to Constitutional Values: Complex Migrations of Constitutional Rights’, in S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, at 233, 239. 86 See also A.-M. Slaughter, above n. 79, at 75-78. 87 See Roper above n. 56, per Scalia J. (dissenting), at 21: ‘To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry’. In Lawrence Scalia accuses the Court of conveniently ‘ignoring […] the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy’: Lawrence above n. 56, at 2495 per Scalia, J. (dissenting). 88 A. E. Cook, ‘The Temptation and Fall of Original Understanding’, (1990) Duke Law Journal 1163, at 1164.

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claims cancel each other out. Scalia’s basic normative claim that the Constitution should only be amended after a formal legislative process, and not through ingenious judicial activism, is offset empirically (originalism has never been strictly followed by the Court) as well as normatively. Constitutional concepts (equality and liberty) and concerns (death penalty, abortion) do not attract a meaning that can be fixed or frozen for all time for the purposes of deriving original understanding. e) Cultural Aside from practical problems associated with language and accessibility, comparative law is problematic epistemologically because it i) presumes similarities in different legal systems, ii) suppresses differences, and iii) ignores the role of legal culture.89 In order to identify its subject-matter, the comparative method has to assume the unity and coherence of the public legal order. It has to treat both public law systems as comparable when, in reality, constitutional law is contingent upon culture (politics, history etc) as well as interpretation, both of which are incoherent and conflictual. The formalism of the comparative method tends to overlook the individual historical development and the internal rationalities of the two countries, and to overstress the legal characteristics of that development. The neglect of social sources results in superficial analysis of positive constitutional law with neglible scholarly insights.90 The complexities underlying comparative constitutional law do not prevent the cross- cultural exchange of information. A degree of transnational harmonisation occurs infor- mally, through global networks of social movements, professionals (which include lawyers, judges and prosecutors)91 and institutions:92 ‘the networks of national constitutional courts are explicitly focused on the provision and exchange of information and ideas’.93 Accord- ing to Breyer law emerges from a ‘complex interactive democratic process’94 that includes all legal professionals and laypersons. He likens the process to a kind of transnational

89 P. Legrand, ‘Public Law, Europeanisation, and Convergence: Can Comparativists Contribute?’ in P. Beaumont / C. Lyons / N. Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, Oxford, Hart, 2002. 90 R. Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, Aldershot, 2006, Chapter 9. 91 Slaughter, ‘The Real New World Order’, (1997) 76(5) Foreign Affairs 183, 185. 92 Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191. 93 Slaughter, above n. 79, at 100. 94 ‘A Conversation’ above n. 4, at 522.

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‘conversation’ in which constitutional court judges are engaged with each other.95 This type of conversation is reminiscent of Dworkin’s conversational interpretation96 and Acker- man’s ‘ongoing dialogue amongst scholars, professionals, and the people at large…’.97 But this conversation is emphatically transnational and is geared towards understanding the members and practices of another social culture. These transnational conversations and networks arguably even point towards the emergence of a new global civil society98 which, in turn, transforms nationally-shaped cultures and societies. Some sociology and philosophy scholars imagine a ‘cosmopolitan society’ which, they suggest, transforms the ‘moral life-worlds’ of the people, i.e. their everyday consciousness and identities, through the interconnectedness with other cultures. The consequence is that ‘a nation-based memory of the past’ is gradually being replaced by a ‘a shared collective future’.99 f) Manipulation A final concern with the originialists’ position is that it openly invites intellectual dishon- esty. Scalia does not object to judges consulting foreign law; he objects to judges citing foreign law in judicial opinions.100 Both aspects are open to criticism. First, it can neither be necessary nor acceptable for judges not to cite legal authority that filters into their opinion. Common law judges are required to provide a written and detailed opinion which, inter alia, cites, distinguishes or departs from precedent.101 What benefit can be derived from artificially concealing the identity of a legal argument simply because it originates outside the jurisdiction?102 Secondly, judges could also be positively encouraged to consult widely before reaching a decision. Niklas Luhmann points out that, when faced with a legal problem, the legal system draws a distinction between self-reference and external reference. Self-referentiality means that all operations and elements always refer to, and reproduce, the system. The system is normatively closed: it excludes morality which is external to, and

95 Kahn, above n. 75, at 2679; see also R. Badinter / S. Breyer (eds), Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International Conversation, (New York: New York University Press, 2004); B.-O. Bryde, ‘The Constitutional Judge and the International Constitutionalist Dialogue’, in 80 (1) Tulane Law Review 203-220. 96 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire London, 1986, Chapter 2. 97 B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations, Cambridge, 1991, at 5. 98 B.K. Woodward, ‘Global Civil Society and International Law in Global Governance: Some Con- temporary Issues’, (2006) 8(2/3) International Community Law Review 247-355; M. Wilkinson, ‘Civil Society and the Re-imagination of European Constitutionalism’ (2003) 9(4) European Law Journal 451 – 472. 99 U. Beck, above n. 71, at 27. 100 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 534. 101 Slaughter, above n. 79, at 75. 102 M. Tushnet, ‘When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law’, (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1275.

Murkens, Comparative Constitutional Law in the Courts: Reflections on the Originalists’ Objections 47

thus not binding on, the legal system. External referentiality, on the other hand, prevents the system from standing still by cognitively opening it up to its environment from where it is fed with new information. Although the legal system may not refer to external norms (e.g. morality), it may (indeed it must) refer to external knowledge. The reference to (not the transfer of) knowledge remains an internal operation: the external reference to information allows the system to recognise a difference to its own condition. Viewed in this way, comparative law can be treated as obiter dicta: a remark, observation, illustration, analogy or argument that contributes to the substantive (not formal) validity of a court’s judgement. Comparison as a process, be it of norms, of facts, or of facts and norms, is the staff of life for lawyers.103 Kahn goes even further and counters that it would be efficient for a constitutional court to make use of the research and reasoning of another court that had already confronted the same or a similar set of constitutional issues. ‘Comparative materials, thus, come to compete with precedents as a material source of legal reasoning’.104 In consequence, the reflexive use of transnational and comparative law can be seen as a functional requirement for, and an efficient manner of, legal reasoning in complex modern societies.105

III. Conclusion The originalists’ objections raise many additional issues. If comparative analysis is inappropriate to the task of interpreting constitutional law, does that make references to foreign law appropriate in relation to private law? Why is it acceptable to borrow from other legal systems when a new constitution is written, but not when it is interpreted? Finally, why is a historical legal approach legitimate (Scalia cites old English law), but not a comparative legal approach, when their intellectual origins (both legal history and comparative law had to be reconceived due to the codifications of the 19th and early 20th centuries) are identical.106 Scalia boasts that he uses ‘foreign law more than anybody on the Court. But it’s all old English law’.107 This smacks of inconsistency and double-standards. Scalia’s originalism only makes sense as ‘a self-justifying system of constitutional interpretation’ whose sole purpose is ‘the rejection of contemporary liberal jurisprudence…’.108

103 See A. Junker, ‘Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach’, Juristenzeitung 1994, 921-928, at 922. The US Supreme Court not only cites primary authority, but also secondary authorities (from scholarly treatises to legal dictionaries), and also non-legal material ranging from M*A*S*H* and Sesame Street to popular music and poetry, and the classics (Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Mon- tesquieu): see Parrish, ’Storm in a Teacup’, above n. 3, at 655-6 [with references]. 104 Kahn, above n. 75, at 2685. 105 N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford, 2004, 157-8. 106 Junker, above n. 103, at 923. 107 ‘A Conversation’, above n. 4, at 525; 527. 108 D. Levin, ‘Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and Democratic Theory’, above n. 22, at 109.

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The big bang theory, which freezes the legal and social values of the Founding Fathers, does not stand up to scrutiny in the real life world: ‘no research program can fetishize its own past; rather it must remain open to new “discoveries” wherever they are made’.109 Jeremy Waldron, arguing on the other end of the normative spectrum, suggests that foreign law should be viewed as a latterday ius gentium, i.e. a ‘set of principles’ that represents ‘a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around the world’.110 Waldron draws an analogy with scientific problem-solving and asks the reader to imagine a new disease or epidemic appearing within the country. In such a case scientists would ‘want to look abroad to see what scientific conclusions and strategies had emerged, had been tested, and had been mutually validated in the public health practices of other countries. We can think of citation to foreign law in Roper in the same way’.111 In other words, in deciding the ethical, moral and constitutional aspects of who or what is right or wrong, the Supreme Court should feel compelled to consult widely: ‘…to ignore foreign solutions, or to refrain from attending to them because they are foreign, betokens not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to the nature of the problems we face’.112 The accumulation of authorities represents ‘a dense network of checking and rechecking results, experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and building on one another’s work’.113 Waldron’s approach too needs to be handled with care. Decisions on rights and justice cannot be compared to consenus in the natural sciences. The philosophy of science embraces theories of knowledge (epistemology) and of learning (methodology), as well as the study of the principles of science (metaphysics),114 and thus operates with a different logic than law.115 Although only few scientitists have genuine Eureka moments, legal scholars do not generally develop hypotheses after a new discovery or an investigation based on the scientific method (i.e. conducting research, identifying the problem, stating a hypothesis, conducting project experimentation, and reaching a conclusion). Furthermore, the analogy with natural sciences masks important differences particularly with regard to constitutional law. Comparative constitutional law oscillates between ‘seeking similarity’ and ‘appreciating difference’.116 Underlying comparative constitutional law

109 Kahn, above n. 75, at 2685. 110 J. Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’, above n. 3, at 132. 111 Ibid. at 143. 112 Ibid, at 144. 113 Ibid, at 145. 114 J. Agassi, ‘The Philosophy of Science Today’, in: S.G. Shanker (ed), Routledge History of Philo- sophy, Vol IX, London, 1996, Chapter 7. 115 K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, 1992. 116 R. Cotterrell, above n. 90, at 148; see also N. Berman, ‘Aftershocks: Exoticization, Normaliza- tion, and the Hermeneutic Compulsion’ (1997) Utah Law Review 281, at 282-4.

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is a tension which gives comparative law the potential to broaden horizons but undermine national culture. Waldron’s analogy with the natural sciences on the one hand, and ius gentium on the other, ignores the role and power of national politics and the national constitutional traditions. In other words, it does not recognise crucial constitutional differences that exist between states, but sees only sameness. Moreover, the idea of sameness (i.e. a genuine constitutional paradigm) is based on a false sense of homogeneity amongst West- ern states. To be sure, there is basic consensus at the general level of human dignity and pluralistic democracy, human rights, rule of law, proportionality, and tolerance. But beyond that floor of agreement there exists great diversity in relation, say, to the constitutional protection of free speech rights, social welfare rights, civil rights (e.g. the right to bear arms), and capital punishment which ius gentium does not capture. The purpose of this article was to contrast Scalia’s objections with alternative approaches in contemporary constitutional discourse. The recourse to heavyweight constitutional principles (sovereignty, majoritarianism, original meaning, formal legitimacy), and seemingly serious extra-legal arguments (in using foreign law judges impose their own ideology, divorce legal ideas from their cultural context, and manipulate or mystify the adjudicative process), means that Scalia’s objections are easily criticised, but not so easily replaced. This article endorses neither Scalia’s big bang theory nor Waldron’s analogy with the natural sciences. Instead, the objective has been to ascribe a modest meaning to the judicial use of comparative constitutional law. If the courts, or any other institution, wish to engage in a process of comparative constitutional law, that process must identify the national specificity of law and grasp the mediating potential of law as a self-reflexive discourse. A reflexive orientation does not ask whether there are social problems to which the law must be responsive. Instead it seeks to identify opportunity structures that allow legal regulation to cope with social problems without, at the same time, irrevocably destroying valued patterns of life.117 Self-reflexion explains why the USA would not be bound by the dicta of a judge in Zimbabwe, but would want to cite a European Court of Human Rights case on the decrimi- nalisation of homosexuality. Michelman and Kahn argue that comparative analysis allows US courts ‘to clarify our picture of ourselves’,118 and that it helps ‘us to understand who we are’,119 without having to engage in constitutional borrowing. Comparative law is a

117 G. Teubner, ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’, (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239–285, at 274. 118 F.I. Michelman, Reflection, (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1737, at 1758-59. 119 Kahn, above n. 75, at 2679.

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reflexive process in order to understand law.120 Its purpose is not to import a final resolution or to contract out the judges’ duty to decide hard cases.121 ‘[Law] operates reflexively. The mode of expecting is not random, nor is it left to simple social convenience. It is provided for in the legal system itself. In this way the system controls itself at the level of second-order observations, which is a typical condition for differentiation and operative closure […]. Law is not something that is simply maintained with the help of powerful political support and then, more or less, enforced.’122 At one level, Scalia’s objections, and the objections to his objections, tell a familiar story about the ‘contradictory principles’ of constitutional law. At another level, the entire judicial and scholarly debate about the rights and wrongs of using foreign law in the courts has missed out on law’s intrinsic reflexive dimension which comparative law can, and should, nurture.

120 A. Junker, above n. 103, at 922. 121 D. Fontana, ‘Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law’, (2001) 49 UCLA Law Review 539, at 558; J. Goldsworthy, ‘Questioning the Migration of Constitutional Ideas: Rights, Constitution- alism, and the Limits of Convergence’, in S. Choudhry (ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, Cambridge, 2006, at 141. 122 N. Luhmann, above n. 105, at 157-8.

Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges

∗ By Jutta Limbach, Berlin / Munich

I. Creation of Networks between Decision-makers During the last decades, governments, lawmakers and judges have been faced with a multitude of challenges transcending national borders. Let me just mention three factors contributing to this situation: – The globalisation of trade: Whenever companies wish to export or invest abroad, lawyers are called upon to examine the applicable rules. – The development of an international and, in particular, European conception of Human Rights: The application and interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights, which is binding on 47 European States, raise similar questions throughout Europe. – People's freedom of movement: The increased mobility within Europe and all over the world necessitates the creation of a common set of rules on how to deal with complex issues, for example concerning family law or the law of extradition. These challenges call for effective ways of enforcing the already existing structures of international co-operation and of creating novel approaches. One of these approaches is the creation of networks between decision-makers on an international level. Anne-Marie Slaughter describes the evolution of “a new world order” through a multitude of more or less formal networks between law-makers, administrative bodies and judges from different countries. They may connect national bodies and their foreign counterparts in a horizontal way, aimed at the exchange of information and mutual support, or they may connect international institutions and their national interlocutors in a vertical way with a view of enforcing international standards. These networks are not intended to replace, but to supplement the existing governmental structures. They are less concerned with issues of hierarchy, but with means of improving co-operation on a transnational and supranational level. Instead of the classic instruments of coercion, they use the “soft powers” of information, socialization, persuasion and discussion – they are “powerful through attraction rather than coercion”.1

∗ Prof. Dr. jur., President of the Goethe-Institut, 1972-1989 Professor at the law faculty of the Free University, Berlin; 1989-1994 Member of the Berlin Government; 1994-2002 President of the Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe; con-founder of the German Association for the Sociology of Law. E-mail: [email protected] 1 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A new world order, Princeton University Press 2004, pp. 5, 27.

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II. Co-operation of Judges Recent years have seen the emergence of a proliferation of international gatherings of judges. Allow me to mention just three of them: 1. In 2004 the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Court of the European Union founded their own network. This Network has the declared aim to give European Institutions an opportunity to request the opinions of Supreme Courts and to bring them closer by encouraging discussion and the exchange of ideas. In the terms set out above, this association may be described as a horizontal network which aims both at exchanging know-how at an internal level and at spreading information through external channels, in particular by corresponding with European institutions. The members gather for colloquiums to discuss matters of common interest. Last year's conference, for example, focused on issues relating to the institution of Supreme Courts, such as budgetary questions, the methods of appointment of judges and disciplinary proceedings against judges. The founding members have also set up a website2 aimed at the constant exchange of information. 2. The European Court of Human Rights dedicated the conference at the occasion of the opening of the judicial year 2005 to a dialogue between judges of different national and European courts. The conference was aimed at further smoothing the co-operation between the courts and thus to strengthen the impact of the European case-law on the decisions taken by the national court. As the European Court of Human Rights functions as a last instance in all question relating to the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, this may be viewed as an example for a vertical dialogue between an international court and its national counterparts. One of the main concerns put forward by the national courts during this conference was the issue of subsidiarity, in particular the question if and to what extent the Strasbourg Court was competent to control the application of the domestic law by the domestic courts. While readily accepting the international court's supremacy regarding the interpretation of the Convention, one of the guest speakers considered that the ”loss of sovereignty (is) less readily accepted in … cases in which the European Court interprets the factual elements necessary for the application of concepts of pure domestic law differently from the domestic courts.”3 3. Let me now draw your attention to a network of judges I am more thoroughly familiar with, having had the benefit of participating in several of its events: The emerged from a meeting held in Dubrovnik in 1972 between the Yugoslav, Italian, Austrian and German Constitutional Courts. While the number of participants increased over the following decades – the Conference currently counts 39 members from as many

2 www.rpsjue.org 3 Guy Canivet, National supreme courts and the European Convention on Human Rights: New role or radical change in the domestic legal order? in: Dialogue between judges, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2005, p. 19 s., p. 30.

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European countries – the structures remained basically the same. It was not until 1999 that the conference decided to give itself a statute. Notwithstanding, the conference remained a rather informal gathering. The Conference of European Constitutional Courts does neither have a legal status nor a permanent secretariat. It does not take any binding decisions other than those related to the organisation of its conferences. In between its meetings, which take place once every three years, it basically exists as an idea in the heads of the members of the relevant Constitutional Courts4. The primary aim of the Conference, as set out in its statute, is “to promote the exchange of information on the working methods and case-law of its member courts together with the exchange of opinions on institutional, structural and operational issues as regards public – law and constitutional jurisdiction”. The topics to be discussed during the conference are chosen during a preparatory meeting by the “Circle of Presidents” which comprises the Presidents of its member courts. For the tenth conference, which took place in Budapest in 1996, to pick just one example, the Circle of Presidents chose two topics: “Freedom of expression in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts with special regard to regulations on the electronic media” and “Sepa- ration of powers regarding the constitutional court's jurisdiction”. These examples illustrate the two areas from which topics are generally chosen, namely, the case-law on the application of individual constitutional rights on one hand and the discussion of structural issues on the other. The topic relating to freedom of expression was of a specific transnational interest, since media, in particular in their electronic version, naturally do not stop at national borders. In preparation of the meeting, the participating courts filled out questionnaires relating to the two chosen topics. Members of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, being the hosts, prepared two general reports which accumulated the information submitted by the members and served as a basis for the ensuing discussions. As such, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts does not have any coercive power – and it does not strive to obtain it. It can be characterised as a horizontal information network enabling constitutional judges to entertain personal contacts and to exchange know-how and experience. While these objectives might appear to be rather modest, the impact of the Conference should not be underestimated. Its deliberations allow a very open and intensive dialogue on fundamental issues of constitutional law and on methods of interpretation based on mutual respect and appreciation. The different legal and cultural backgrounds of the participating judges allow enlightening problems from a broad comparative perspective. The majority of the participants being active constitutional judges, the fruits of these discussions are very

4 Karl-Georg Zierlein, Entwicklung und Möglichkeiten einer Union: Die Konferenz der Europäi- schen Verfassungsgerichte, in: Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler, Berlin, New York 1987, p. 315 et s. (p. 341).

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likely to find their way into the case-law of their respective courts5. I do admit that it may be difficult to prove the effects of this “cross-fertilization” (Anne-Marie Slaughter), as many constitutional courts remain reluctant expressly to cite the case-law of their international counterparts. Nevertheless, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts actively promotes the development of a common “language” of European constitutional culture, or at least a grammar thereof, that is to say, its methods and standards.6

III. Human Rights Protection in the Council of Europe Framework Last but not least let me draw the attention to the human rights protection in the Council of Europe framework. The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights play an eminent role in safeguarding democratic values across Europe, as well as in setting an example even beyond the borders of its member states. The Enlarge- ment of the Council of Europe and the accession of the central and east European democracies have contributed to stability in the whole Europe. The right of individual application is the most distinctive feature of the control mechanism. The Court is the only international court to which any individual, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals have access for the purpose of enforcing their rights under the Convention. Beyond this individual supervision the Court has the constitutional mission to lay down common principles and standards relating to human rights and to determine the minimum level of protection which a state must observe. The exponential increase in the number of individual applications is now seriously threatening the survival of the machinery of the judicial protection of human rights. There is a fundamental conflict between the size of the population who have access to the Court and the Court’s responsibility as the final arbiter in human rights matters for so many different states. No other international court is confronted with a workload of such magni- tude while having at the same time such a demanding responsibility for setting the standards of conduct required to comply with the Convention. Because the system is in danger of collapsing the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe set up a Group of Wise Persons to consider the long-term effectiveness of the ECHR control mechanism. This Group recommends measures to remedy this situation, but did not follow the idea of giving the Court a discretionary power analogous to the certiorari procedure of the US Supreme Court, because this authority would be alien to the philosophy of the European human rights protection system. The right of individual application is a key component of the control mechanism of the Convention.7

5 Zierlein, op. cit., p. 335. 6 Lázló Sólyom, On the Co-operation of Constitutional Courts, General reports of the 10th Con- ference of the European Constitutional Courts, Budapest 1996, p. 4. 7 Report of the Group of Wise Persons, Strasbourg 2006, p. 15 ff.

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The Group proposed besides other measures the establishment of a new filtering mechanism. Here is not the place to give details to and to discuss the proposals. But in its entirety the Report is characterized by the variety of its proposals. The recommendations of the Report are addressed at many institutions, such as national courts, and at non-state entities, such as professional organisations, and last but not least at the civil society which plays a significant part in human rights protection, which is important to maintain and expand. The multitude and the variety of the addressees demonstrate the difficulty of an international institution as the European Court of Human Rights to establish a supporting network in a globalized world.

The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law

∗ By Javier A. Couso, Santiago de Chile

I. Introduction One of the most remarkable developments in the legal domain over the last few decades has been the increasing globalization of constitutional law, the legal subject most intimately linked to national identity. This trend is apparent not only in constitution-making, or in the use of foreign jurisprudence by constitutional and supreme courts but, I submit, in the emergence of what amounts to a kind of constitutional ius cogens. This body of global legal rules – which is intimately linked to international human rights law – has led to the increasing homogeneity of constitutional law around the world, because it is deemed mandatory by a similarly global network of constitutional scholars and rights activists. As international law scholars know well, ius cogens is a peremptory, unwritten norm thought to be so fundamental that it invalidates other rules.1 A typical example of ius cogens is the rule that slavery is unacceptable. This concept, which has evident links to natural law thinking (Janis argues that it is a ‘modern form of natural law’),2 gained legitimacy after World War II, as a reaction of the abuses of Nazism, and I think it represents the best way to conceptualize the type of human rights-based constitutional law that dominates current constitutional thought worldwide. As it happens in the domain of international law, the new constitutional ius cogens is regarded as peremptory by its supporters. Indeed, given the high moral status it is deemed to posses, those who adhere to it believe that national sovereignty should not be an obstacle to the domestic implementation of the basic human rights recognized in the rich body of instruments that have configurated the contours of international human rights law since the mid twentieth century.3 In what follows, I analyze the way in which this human rights-based constitutional ius cogens – which I take to be the most important vehicle for the globalization of constitutional law in our time – has penetrated Latin America’s constitutional law.

∗ Ph.D., M.A. Jurisprudence and Social Policy (Berkeley); Professor of Law, Universidad Diego Portales (Chile); Member of the International Committee of the Law and Society Association. E-mail: [email protected] 1 See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 1993, page 62. 2 Ibid, page 63. 3 See Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction,” in Thomas Risse / Stephen Ropp / Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, 1999, pages 1-38.

Couso, The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law 57

II. Law and constitutionalism in Latin American history Right after their independence – in the early nineteenth century – Latin American countries were fairly open to foreign legal influence, including in the domain of constitutional law. In fact, most of the new nation-states of the region look to a very different country (socially and culturally), the United States, for inspiration when designing their constitutional archi- tectures. This explains why all Latin American states adopted presidencialist regimes. The initial openness to foreign influence in constitutional law exhibited by Latin Ame- rican states would decline later, when constitutions came to play a crucial symbolic role in building the nation. This, in a region of the world in which (as opposed to Europe) the state preceded the nation. While constitutional law was becoming nationalized, the opposite happened in the domain of civil and criminal law, subjects which became open to foreign influence. An example of the receptiveness exhibited by Latin American countries to foreign legal ideas in civil law is the Civil Code that Andrés Bello drafted for Chile (1855), which borrowed from an array of codes from overseas, such as the Code Napoleon, the Prussian Code, the Sardinia Code and many others. The remarkable range of foreign legal sources from which Bello got inspiration was openly acknowledged in the preamble of his code.4 Another example of the denationalized status of civil law in Latin America was the wholesale adoption of Bello’s code by a number of countries in the region, such as Colom- bia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras and Nicaragua, after it had been adopted in Chile.5 As indicated above, Latin America’s openness to foreign law was not confined to the domain of civil law but it also reached criminal law. In this case, however, the foreign influence did not occur at the moment of codification but later on, through the hegemony achieved by German legal doctrine within Latin American legal academics and judges, which gradually led to the jurisprudential transformation of the region’s criminal law. How do we account for the fact that Latin American constitutional law became nationalized while that civil and criminal law were so receptive to foreign influences? I think this was because civil and criminal law were regarded in Latin America as more properly ‘legal’ subjects than constitutional law was, therefore as sites where a scientific legal discourse could be articulated, which in turn made them more liable to be penetrated by foreign scientific discourse (science has no nationality, as it were). Contrasting with this understanding of civil and criminal law, until fairly recently constitutional law was rarely considered ‘law’ in Latin America by legal practitioners and academics. It was instead a way of constituting the nation, but not something expected to be

4 See “Mensaje del Ejecutivo al Congreso proponiendo la aprobación del Código Civil,” in: Codigo Civil Edición Oficial, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1970, pages 5-19. 5 See Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, Los abogados de América Latina. Una introducción histórica, Bogotá, 2004, page 120.

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adjudicated by judges or theorized by legal academics. Given this context, it is not surprising that there was little space to create legal science around constitutional law, which in turn meant that it was less liable to be influenced by foreign legal ideas. In spite of the fact that constitutional law was not considered a proper legal subject there was quite a lot of constitutional drafting during that time. The reason behind this paradox is that every time there was a change in the political regime –due to the recurrence of military coups succeeded by the reestablishment of civilian rule—the new authorities felt compelled to enact a new constitution. This is what Brian Loveman had in mind when he wrote that behind all the constitution-writing which has characterized Latin America over the last two centuries there was very little constitutionalism, in the sense of an actual limitation of political authority and a culture of respect for individual rights.6

III. The transformation of Latin American constitutionalism Loveman’s assessment of the role of constitutions in Latin America represents a fairly accurate account of the situation until the 1970s. Indeed, up until then constitutions were largely irrelevant to the daily life of the people of the region, rarely controlling governmental abuses. But then something extraordinary happened: the emergence of what amounts to a true constitutional revolution in the region, a revolution in both the content and the uses of constitutional law which has elevated it to the top of the legal field. According to the new constitutional paradigm, constitutions involve not just rules but – more importantly – fundamental principles of public law drawn from international human rights law. Furthermore, the constitution is now understood to be an instrument that ought to be directly enforced by judges at both constitutional courts and the regular judiciary.7 In my view, the two most important factors contributing to the transformation of Latin American constitutional law into a real limit on political power and into a recognized legal subject (liable of being influenced by global academic discourse), were first, the way in which the wave of brutal military regimes that swept the region during the 1960s and 1970s was processed by Latin American society and, second, the understanding that international human rights law represents something like the constitutional ius cogens of our era, that is to say, a body of norms and principles above national sovereignty. These two factors opened the way to both the consolidation of constitutional law as the most important legal subject of out time as well as to the transformation of its content in order to satisfy its compliance with the demands of the standards of international human rights law. Going to the first of the aforementioned factors –that is, the growing awareness of the importance to limit power as a result of the tragic experience of the military dictatorships –,

6 See Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America, Pittsburgh Press, 1994. 7 See Alan Angell, Rachel Sieder and Line Schjolden (eds.), The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, London, 2005.

Couso, The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law 59

of course Latin America had had many episodes of horror in its past (starting with the genocidal Spanish treatment of indigenous peoples in the sixteenth century), but this time it processed it in a more fruitful way, thanks to the global awareness created by human rights discourse –which was itself made possible by the international human rights movement. Due to this new context, for the first time in the region’s history the horrors were processed in a way conducive to institutional change in the realm of constitutional law. In fact, we cannot understand current constitutional law thinking in Latin America without this background. With regard to the second element mentioned above, that is, the impact in Latin Ameri- can of what I have labeled constitutional ius cogens, it suffices to say that its penetration in the region has been so deep as to make it commonsensical in both the legal academy and in the judiciary. As Stone Sweet has argued in relation to the rise of constitutional justice in Europe,8 the new constitutional ius cogens encourages judges in Latin America to engage in what amounts to a type of natural law adjudication, in stark contrast with the traditional deference to legislated law so common in the region up until the 1970s. A fairly illustrative example of the way in which the constitutional ius cogens has penetrated the region is provided by a statement of a high official of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile, who, in the midst of the debate over the constitutionality of the treaty ratifying the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Chile, declared that since it had been considered constitutional in most countries of the world it should be so considered in Chile, without mentioning that the text of the latter’s constitution was different from that of the countries he was referring to! But textual elements were surely beside the point in the era of constitutional ius cogens. I have so far dealt with what I take to be the ‘macro factors’ contributing to the impact of the new constitutional paradigm in Latin America. I will now briefly deal with some ‘micro factors’ which have also contributed to the penetration of human rights-based constitutionalism in Latin America. The transformation of constitutional discourse in this region has been supported by a fairly active group of legal academics devoted to the cultivation of constitutional law and theory, a set of professionals who combine their intellectual interest in the area with the expectation of rising to the top of the state apparatus through their incorporation to membership in the courts in charge of constitutional adjudication.

8 Alec Stone-Sweet, commenting on the rise of what he labels ‘higher law constitutionalism’ in Europe had this to say: “In Germany, Italy, and Spain, constitutional texts proclaim human rights before they establish state institutions and before they distribute governmental functions. In consequence of this fact, rights are considered by legal scholars and many judges to possess a juridical existence that is prior to and independent of the state. Doctrine has it that rights are invested with a kind of ‘supraconstitutional’ normativity that makes (at least some of) them immune to change through constitutional revision (…) This is inherently a natural law position, although natural law is rarely explicitly invoked.” See Alec Stone-Sweet, Governing with Judges. Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford, 2000, page 95.

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Another element that has contributed to the hegemony of the new constitutional doctrine in Latin America has been the global network of constitutional scholars and judges who meet regularly to discuss about constitutional theory.9 The constitutional ius cogens I have identified above is the common denominator of those meetings, since judges and constitutional law scholars are reciprocally ignorant of the minutiae of each other’s constitutions, but share a basic understanding of the basic core of human rights-based constitutionalism. To finish this brief list of the elements encouraging the spread of the new constitutional ius cogens in Latin America it is important to mention the crucial role played by the Inter- American human rights system (which includes the Inter-American Human Rights Com- mission and Court). This body has been a focal point of articulation and dissemination of the new constitutional ius cogens in Latin America through its jurisprudence, which is widely commented regionally by a growing number of constitutional scholars who devoted themselves to analyze its rulings.

IV. Conclusion Over the last two decades or so, Latin American constitutional law has experienced a sea change, due to the adoption of a human rights-based constitutional ius cogens accompanied with a new conception of the role of high courts in a democracy. This new paradigm encourages courts to assertively adjudicate the constitution even against legislated law. This revolutionary change in constitutional theory has created quite a lot of excitement within those who work in the field in the region, as well as in many social groups who now see the courts as an important resource to advance their claims when they are disregarded by the political system. The high expectations placed in this new understanding of constitutional law should not, however, make us overlook the risks associated to this new paradigm, which are apparent from the record of the last two decades in the region, where assertive adjudication of human rights-based constitutionalism against legislated law has often led to the destruction of the independence of very courts which have used their power of judicial review of the constitutionality of law. At any rate, and in spite of the danger just noted, it is clear that as a result of the emergence of the new constitutional ius cogens I have described in this paper, constitutional law in Latin America has become more globalized than ever before.

9 The meetings of the International Association of Constitutional Law (IACL) represent the most important of such forums.

The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case

∗ By Manuel José Cepeda, Bogotà

1. Introduction The purpose of this note is that of describing the relevance of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) for constitutional adjudication, entrusted in Colombia to the Constitutional Court. In order to illustrate the scope of the internationalization of Constitutional Law in Colombia I shall sketch out some especially important judgments in light of the functions played by International Law in the resolution of the constitutional controversy. Needless to say I do not intend to present an exhaustive panorama. I have preferred to present the Constitutional Court’s doctrine highlighting its most significant aspects. In order to ensure the clarity of the message I want to convey, I shall emphasize its essential features, overlooking subtleties and notes on the evolution of Colombian Constitutional case-law which will surely be missed by those who know it in detail. For those who are not familiar with the Colombian case, the statements made in this paper may sound surprising. However, it is necessary to underscore that in spite of the news about violence that abound in the foreign mass media, there actually is another Colombia, predominantly urban, in which the Rule of Law prevails. In fact, it is important to emphasize that Colombia has a long, stable and uninterrupted tradition of judicial review, since 1886. The first decision striking down a congressional act was issued in July 1887. The Supreme Court of Justice was the constitutional judge at the time and fulfilled its judicial review functions for more than a century. In 1991, the constitutional adjudication functions held by the Supreme Court were given to a newly created Constitutional Court. Since its creation, the Constitutional Court has issued more than 13.500 judgments – on average, around 850 annual judgments per year - out of which roughly 25% are adopted in exercise of abstract judicial review of legislation, and the rest in exercise of concrete judicial review of the preservation of human rights in specific cases. Abstract control is mainly triggered by an actio popularis that was created in 1910. Concrete control is triggered by a strong, informal and very fast kind of amparo, a special writ for the protection of fundamental rights named acción de tutela created in 1991. Within these figures, approximately 23% of abstract review judgments have struck down the corresponding legal provision, whereas approximately 55% of concrete review judgments have protected the relevant fundamental rights.

∗ LL.M.(Harvard); former Ambassador of Colombia to UNESCO and Switzerland, since 2001 Member of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2005/6 President of the Court. E-mail: [email protected]

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2. The notion of “constitutionality block” IHRL and IHL have borne a significant impact upon constitutional adjudication. This comes as the consequence of an express decision made by the 1991 Constituent Assembly, in the sense of establishing articulation mechanisms between Constitutional Law and the International rules that are binding upon the Colombian State. Indeed, different articles of the 1991 Constitution make direct reference to IHRL and IHL, and these provisions have been interpreted broadly by the Constitutional Court. Thus, Article 9 states that the State’s foreign relations are based, inter alia, on the recognition of the principles of international law accepted by Colombia; Article 93 states that the international treaties that recognize human rights and forbid their limitation during states of emergency, duly ratified by Colombia, “prevail in the internal order”, and that “the rights and duties established in this Charter, shall be interpreted in accordance with the international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia”. Article 44 holds that children shall enjoy the rights expressly included in the international treaties ratified by Colombia. Moreover, Article 94 states that the enunciation of rights and guarantees made in the text of the Constitution shall not be understood as an exclusion or denial of other rights which are inherent to the human person and are not included therein, and Article 214 provides that during states of emergency, the rules of International Humanitarian Law must be complied with in every aspect. These constitutional provisions have often been invoked and applied by the Constitu- tional Court as sufficient grounds, in themselves, to incorporate the binding IHRL and IHL provisions into its legal reasoning. But in addition, the application of IHRL and IHL has been significantly reinforced by the jurisprudential notion of “constitutionality block”. Indeed, since the early stages of its case-law, the Constitutional Court has held that the constitutional judicial review of the legal provisions and situations subject to its scrutiny must be carried out not only making reference to the actual text of the Constitution as a parameter for review, but also to a set of norms and principles that have constitutional hierarchy, even though they are not expressly included in the constitutional text, or which at least have the nature of constitutionality parameters of necessary consideration, insofar as the Constitution itself grants them special force through the above-referred reception clauses included in articles 9, 93, 94, 44 and 214. These norms as principles are incorporated into the so-called “constitutionality block”, a French-inspired notion with rather specific traits in the Colombian legal system. By way of this figure, all of the provisions included in human rights treaties to which Colombia is a party, as well as the human rights provisions with a customary nature and, as a sub-chapter thereof, all the principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law, have become mandatory parameters for constitutional review in our country. This does not mean, however, that the Court carries out a “conventionality control” over the domestic legal provisions subject to its review; what it does is to carry out constitutional review, incorporating IHRL and IHL as necessary prem- ises of its reasoning, by mandate of the Constitution itself.

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 63

The constitutionality block includes international humanitarian norms of ius cogens. The Constitutional Court has on different occasions recognized the imperative character of these norms and their special force within the Colombian constitutional order. Thus the Court held that “the imperative character of humanitarian norms and their integration into the constitutionality block implies that the Colombian State must adapt the norms of lesser hierarchy within its internal legal system to the contents of international humanitarian law, in order to potentiate the material realization of those values.”1 More recently the Court pointed out that the essential principles of International Humani- tarian Law “have the clear rank of rules of ius cogens, given that the international community as a whole has recognized their peremptory and imperative nature, in the same way it has recognized [the peremptory nature] of basic provisions such as the prohibition of genocide, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of torture or the prohibition of apartheid.”2 It thereafter delved into the content of three of these basic principles –the principles of distinction, precaution and humanitarian treatment – plying them as necessary guidelines to determine whether the provisions of the criminal code under review were in accordance with the constitutionality block. The Court also clarified in this last judgment that “regardless of whether they are norms of ius cogens or not, all of the provisions of International Humanitarian Law – both substantial and procedural, both conventional and customary in origin or as general principles of law – are binding upon the Colom- bian State as part of the constitutionality block. They are, consequently, a parameter of necessary reference for the constitutional judge in carrying out abstract constitutional judicial review.” In interpreting the Constitutionality Block, the Court has followed a “harmonizing” approach. Thus, in applying IHRL and IHL as parameters for constitutional review, the Court has often had to refer to different applicable provisions with different degrees of protection. When harmonization cannot be reached in the case, the Court has opted for the most protective norm, based on the pro-dignity and pro-liberty interpretative principles.

3. The functions of IHRL and IHL in constitutional adjudication IHRL and IHL, from their position as constitutive elements of the Constitutionality Block, have played an important role in the Colombian constitutional order. This role becomes manifest in several material functions, of which I shall highlight eight in this paper in order to illustrate the impact of the internationalization of constitutional law.

1 Decision C-225 of 1995. 2 Decision C-291 of 2007.

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3.1 Definition of the scope of constitutional rights IHRL and IHL are sources of interpretation of the scope and limitations of constitutional rights. For example, the text of the American Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Inter-American jurisprudence, has been invoked in several judgments by the Con- stitutional Court in order to determine the scope of fundamental rights. One of this cases referred to victims’ rights.3 In the sphere of the rights of victims of crime, access to criminal justice had traditionally been construed as the possibility to report a crime and seek compensation for the damages sustained. Following the evolution of IHRL and IHL, the Constitutional Court held that access to justice comprises much more than that: the right to justice, the right to truth and the right to reparation in integrum, as pointed out by several international treaties, instruments and judicial decisions, in particular those adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Thus the Court held that “under International Law it has been considered insufficient for the effective protection of human rights, to grant the victims and affected parties solely compensation for damages, given that truth and justice are necessary in a society to prevent the situations that generated serious human rights violations, and also because the recognition of the intrinsic dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings, requires that the judicial resources designed by States be oriented towards a comprehensive reparation of victims and affected parties, which comprises an economic compensation, and access to justice to know the truth about the facts and to seek, through institutional channels, the fair punishment of the perpetrators”; and that “in International Law, as in comparative law and in our constitutional order, the rights of the victims and other persons affected by a criminal action enjoy a broad conception – not restricted exclusively to economic reparation – founded upon their rights to be treated with dignity, to participate in the decisions that affect them and to obtain effective judicial protection of the real enjoyment of their rights, inter alia, which requires authorities to guide their actions towards the comprehensive re-establishment of their rights whenever they have been violated by a crime. This is only possible if the victims and persons affected by a crime are secured, at the least, their rights to truth, justice and economic reparation of the damages sustained”. Hence victims, on the grounds of the different decisions adopted by the Court based upon IHRL and IHL, may now actively participate throughout the criminal process, in order to duly exercise their rights to justice, to truth and to reparation in integrum.

3 Judgment C-228 of 2002.

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 65

3.2 Identification of specific non-enumerated rights. A second function of IHRL and IHL is that of providing sound criteria for the identification of constitutional rights which are not expressly included within the actual text of the Con- stitution. This was the case, for example, of the right to personal security, which is not enunciated in the Constitution but was recognized and upheld by the Court in another well known judgment.4 In this case, the petitioners were the widow and orphaned infant child of a guerrilla who had deserted, and consequently been killed by his former partners in arms. The plaintiffs had requested protection by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, but it was refused, given that the widow’s life had not been directly threatened, nor had her son’s. The Court, however, held that the Ministry was bound to make an assessment of the real type of risks faced by persons in situations that threatened their personal security, before denying the request. The right to personal security, not enumerated in the Constitution, was recognized by the Court on the grounds, inter alia, of its specific incorporation and protection in human rights treaties duly ratified by Colombia, such as the American Convention on Human Rights, expressly invoked by the Court, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant instruments. In this sense, it should be emphasized that the Court not only made reference to these international treaties at the moment of identifying the very existence of the right to personal security, but also transcended the general interpretation which has usually been given to the content of this right by international jurisprudence and, on the grounds of other international human rights instruments and comparative constitutional law, held that it included additional elements that provided citizens with safeguards on a wholly new range of situations that threaten their security. The following explanation by the Court sums up this interpretative process: “the recognition and protection of the right to personal security are international obligations of the Colombian state, and therefore, this right is incorporated into our legal system by virtue of articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution. There are three international instruments binding for Colombia which include the right to personal security in their catalogue of fundamental guarantees: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (…), the American Convention on Human Rights (…) [and] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (…). The existence of international commitments for the State with regard to the right to personal security is, thus, clear; therefore, the scope of this right in the Colombian constitutional order must be precisely determined, in light of the aforementioned instruments. The Court notes, in the first place, that both the American Convention and the Interna- tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights include the right to personal security in

4 T-719 of 2003, the so called “personal security” case.

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the same article that refers to personal liberty, and that the corresponding rules enunci- ate aspects of due process, in particular the rules that must be observed to deprive a person of her liberty. The Chamber also notes that some international tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have interpreted the scope of a similar provision on “security” in Article 5 of the European Convention, mainly in the ambit of restrictions upon personal liberty (…). Does this mean that the Constitutional Court is bound to restrict the scope of the right to personal security to a right of defense from arbitrary state actions against liberty? The answer could only be negative. First, for a logical argument: even though the American Convention on Human Rights and the Interna- tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrine the right to security in the same article that regulates personal liberty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is equally binding, upholds it alongside life and liberty, without entering into specific regulations about the situation of persons deprived of their liberty (…). On the other hand, the security of certain special categories of persons or groups, in relation to other different types of risks –even those that come from private persons, not from the State-, has been recognized and specifically protected in other international instruments approved by Colombia; thus, in the Resolution on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1998, States were called upon to secure, in particular, that no person within their jurisdiction be deprived from her rights to life, liberty or security by reason of her religion or beliefs; and the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states, in article 5, that States Parties must eliminate all types of race- based discrimination so as to secure, inter alia, the right to personal security and State protection against violence or bodily injury (…)”. The relevance of IHRL and IHL for the adoption of this decision, coupled with reference to comparative law, is notorious. The Court thereafter ordered the security assessment required by the petitioner, and clarified that should the risk posed upon the plaintiff so require, authorities had to adopt the adequate protective measures.

3.3 Identification of special needs and basic standards of protection. The internally displaced population case (Decision T-025 of 2004)

Colombia has the second largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. The official measurement records near 2 million. An NGO and the Catholic Church report nearly 4 million in a country of 42 million inhabitants. By the end of 2003, over one thousand families composed of persons who had been internally displaced by the armed conflict considered that their fundamental rights were being disregarded by the State, even if guerrillas and paramilitary groups were mainly responsible for their displacement, because of the authorities’ omission in protecting them. The Constitutional Court, after gathering evidence on the situation of the roughly 3.5 million persons who had been internally displaced in Colombia since 1985, concluded that in

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 67

general, they were actually living under conditions that amounted to an “unconstitutional state of affairs”, partly because the basic standards of protection established in UN Guiding Principles (1998) concerning IDPs were permanently and massively being disregarded by several state agencies. Indeed, the Court made extensive recourse to the Guiding Principles, which are in part a specification of pre-existing IHRL and IHL obligations binding for the Colombian State – a point explicitly acknowledged by the Court when it stated that in the face of IDPs special needs the Guiding Principles “compile the provisions about internal displacement of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and –by analogy- International Refugee Law, and

contribute to the interpretation of the rules that form part of this protection system”. 5 Thereafter in this same judgment, the Court made reference to different specific Principles at the moment of determining the constitutional fundamental rights that were threatened or violated in situations of forced internal displacement, and the specific content acquired by those rights as a consequence of IDPS’ exposure to such situations, with the corresponding State obligations. The Court enumerated the following rights, citing the specific Guiding Principles that were relevant for the interpretation of their scope once forced displacement had taken place: life, freedom to choose one’s residence, free development of the personality, freedom of association and freedom of expression, family unity and family protection, health, personal integrity, personal security, freedom of circulation, work and choice of profession or occupation, food, education, dignified housing, peace, legal personality, equality the rights of specially protected categories of persons – such as children, women heads of household, persons with discapacities and elderly persons – and in general, economic, social and cultural rights. In addition, on the grounds of this enumeration and interpretation the Court concluded that, given the multiplicity of constitutional rights affected by forced internal displacement, displaced persons have an entitlement to urgent preferential State treatment. Immediately thereafter, the Court expressly held that “the scope of the measures that authorities are bound to adopt is determined in accordance [with] three basic parameters (…) as follows: (i) the principle of favorability in the interpretation of the provisions that protect the displaced population, (ii) the Guid- ing Principles on Forced Internal Displacement, and (iii) the principle of prevalence of substantial law in the context of a Social State grounded in the Rule of Law –Estado Social de Derecho- (…)”.6 Hence the Guiding Principles were held to be, not only key interpretative criteria to establish the scope of IDPs’ rights, but also guidelines in determining the scope of State authori-

5 Judgment T-025 of 2004. 6 See above Nr. 5

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ties’ duties and obligations in relation to IDPs, and as a consequence of the systematic and massive violation of their constitutional guarantees. In this same judgment, the Court went further still and identified a set of minimum fundamental rights of displaced persons which were to be satisfied under any circumstance by the authorities. The Court explained in section 9 of the judgment that, given the limited resources available to the Colombian State, it is materially impossible to satisfy the entire set of IDPs’ constitutional rights, which makes it necessary for the authorities to establish priority areas upon which they would focus their efforts so as to progressively advance in the guarantee of their effective enjoyment, and eventually fulfill the complete series of obligations that bind the authorities in this field; in the Court’s terms, “given the current dimension of the problem of displacement in Colombia, as well as the limited nature of the resources available to the State to comply with this goal, it must be accepted that at the moment of designing and implementing a given public policy for the protection of the displaced population, the competent authorities must carry out a balancing exercise, and establish priority areas in which timely and effective attention shall be provided to these persons. Therefore, it will not always be possible to satisfy, in a simultaneous manner and to the maximum possible level, the positive obligations imposed by all the constitutional rights of the entire displaced population, given the material restrictions at hand and the real dimensions of the evolution of the phenomenon of displacement”.7 Nevertheless, the Court specifically warned that “there exist certain minimum rights of the displaced population, which must be satisfied under all circumstances by the authorities, given that the dignified subsistence of the people in this situation depends on it.” These minimum rights, or minimum mandatory levels of satisfaction of the State’s obligations towards IDPs, which include duties with a positive content that bind the authorities to materially provide the necessary goods and services, were defined by the Court taking into account the relevant international provisions, in particular their codification in the Guiding Principles, as obligatory interpretative parameters. On these grounds, the Court imparted several complex enforcement orders to protect the rights of all IDPs -both civil and political rights, as well as social, economic and cultural rights-, it required the government to present periodic reports on how the state of unconstitutional affairs was being solved, and since then it has retained its competence to follow up the implementation of its orders.

7 See above Nr. 5.

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 69

3.4 Identification of minimum standards of protection A fourth function of IHRL and IHL is that of providing the grounds for determining the minimum levels of protection that must be fulfilled by the national legal system; the importance granted to IHRL and IHL in this sense has risen to a point where the Constitu- tional Court prefers IHRL or IHL over any domestic provisions or judicial doctrines with narrower or less favorable scopes of protection. Thus, for example, the Court examined an unconstitutionality claim presented against the provision of the Criminal Code that described the elements of the crime of forced disappearance.8 The lawsuit was specifically directed against the expression in this article by which forced disappearance would only be configured whenever the perpetrator belonged to an illegal armed group. The Court struck this segment down, considering that it was contrary to article 12 of the Constitution (which protects the right to personal integrity), as interpreted in light of the Inter-American jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court broadened the possible types of perpetrators of the crime of forced disappearance – an exceptional move, given that the general jurisprudential doctrine holds that it is for the Legislator to configure the scope of application of criminal law. In this case, the Court cited two cases decided in 1989 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights –the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases, in which a detailed description of the crime of forced disappearance was made, pointing out that it is a crime against humanity that violates many of the rights recognized in the Convention-, and it emphasized that in the Godínez Cruz case, the Inter-American Court had clarified that on principle, “every violation of the rights recognized by the Convention, carried out by an act of public power or of persons who act in exercise of the powers granted by their official positions, is attributable to the State”. Then the Constitutional Court cited the InterAmerican Convention on Forced Dissappear- ance of Persons, which also defines the crime including within its scope the acts committed by agents of the State, or by persons or groups of persons that act with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State. The Court concluded on these grounds that the Inter- American criteria “constitute the minimum standard of protection on the grounds of which States must design their legislation”. 9 In the light of these conclusions, the Court then proceeded to analyze the conformity of the legal provision under review with Colombia’s international obligations in this field –clari- fying that the relevant international legal provisions are incorporated into the Constitution- ality Block by mandate of Article 93 of the Constitution-, and it concluded that a complete

8 Judgment C-317 of 2002. 9 See above Nr. 5.

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reading of the norm reveals that public officers are not excluded as possible perpetrators of the crime of forced disappearance, which is “in accordance with the minimum level of protection established in international instruments that describe forced disappearance as a State crime”, and therefore is in accordance with the Constitutional provisions; the expression under review does disregard such international minimum, insofar as it excludes from the article’s scope of application the cases of forced disappearance committed by private persons who do not form part of any group, who form part of non-armed illegal groups, or of groups that do not normally operate outside the Law. For the Court, this was tantamount to a violation of article 12 of the Constitution, which “establishes a protection which is broader than that provided by the international instruments, according to which forced disappearance may only be committed by a State agent, a political organization or a private person with the former’s authorization, tolerance or acquiescence, from which it results that the constitutional guarantee is broader than the one provided by international legislation”. The Court pointed out that with this legal achievement, Colombia was placing itself in tune with the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s doctrine by which “States’ simple omission in preventing forced disappearance when it is committed by private persons, or in controlling the irregular armed groups that carry out such acts, implies that the relevant State has failed to comply with its obligation to prevent and punish those responsible for such acts, thereby deserving the corresponding sanctions”. Later the Court decided upon the constitutional complaint filed against the articles of the Criminal Code that described the crimes of genocide, torture and torture against persons protected by International Humanitarian Law.10 The plaintiff argued that the Legislator, in introducing a requirement by which the underlying acts of genocide or torture had to be “serious”, had restricted the level of protection granted to the victims of these crimes by the Constitution and the international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia. The Court upheld the expression “serious” in regards to the crime of genocide, but struck it down in relation to the qualification of the physical or moral damages that had to be sustained by the victims of torture. In order to reach that conclusion, the Court began by recalling that in Colombia, the favorability clause in the interpretation of human rights is applicable, given that it is contained in Article 4 of the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Colombia is a party; by virtue of this principle, the Court explained that “whenever the Colombian constitutional and legal provisions provide a higher scope of protection to the relevant fundamental right, they shall prevail over the text of interna-

10 Judgment C-148 of 2005.

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 71

tional treaties, in the same manner that in their interpretation, the least restrictive interpretation for the application of the affected fundamental right shall be preferred”. Then the Court, reiterating its prior doctrine on the constitutionality block, examined the definitions of the crimes of genocide and torture established in international treaties. Thereby it concluded, on the one hand, that the adjective “serious” formed part of all conventional descriptions of the crime of genocide included in treaties binding upon Colombia – in particular those contained in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951) and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court –, for which reason it declared the corresponding expression adjusted to the Constitution, holding that “both in these international texts and in Article 101 [of the Criminal Code] in which the expression under review is contained, reference is made to the serious nature of the damages that have to be inflicted upon the members of a group in order to constitute the crime of genocide”. On the other hand, after examining the diverse international definitions of torture, the Court noted that the American Convention on Human Rights, as opposed to other instruments, does not include the adjective “serious” within its definition of torture; consequently, in application of the pro homine interpretative principle –also developed by the Inter-Ameri- can Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence-, the Court concluded that the international definition which was decisive to review the constitutionality of the Colombian Criminal Code was the one provided by the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention and Pun- ishment of Torture, preferring this latter definition over those included in other international instruments, such as the UN Convention against Torture and the UN Declaration Against Torture. In the Court’s words, “in the present case and contrary to what was pointed out for the crime of genocide, there is a clear contradiction between the text of articles 173 and 178 of the [Colombian Criminal Code], which criminalize respectively the crimes of torture in protected person and torture, and the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention and Punish- ment of Torture, international instrument which, in accordance with Article 93 of the Constitution and the pro homine principle, is the one that must be taken into account in this case (…). Indeed, such international instrument, approved by Law 409 of 1997, not only excludes the expression “serious” in order to define what must be understood by torture…”

3.5 Identification of specific prohibitions that protect rights In order to fight terrorism, Congress approved, among other measures of the so called National Security Act, a provision by which civilians had the duty to collaborate with authorities in the fight against this crime. By virtue of this law, in zones of conflict, civilians’ obligations would be defined through executive orders. The Court struck down this

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act of Congress, holding that such a type of involvement of civilians in armed conflict ran contrary to the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, which forms part of IHL. Thus the Court derived from IHL a specific prohibition that protects rights.11 In its reasoning, the Court made different types of reference to IHRL and IHL. In the first place, it held that by virtue of the international obligations of the Colombian State, the principle of prevalence of the general interest could not be interpreted in such a way as to give preference to the interests of the majority and collective welfare when they clash with a person’s constitutional rights; and it grounded this conclusion, inter alia, on the obligations posed by IHRL: “the foregoing doctrine, far from being a conceptual novelty of this judgment, only systematizes this Court’s jurisprudence about the relation between peaceful coexistence, public order and constitutional rights, which is in turn based upon the very notion of human rights, as it has been developed by international human rights law. Indeed, in accordance with the international human rights instruments ratified by Colombia, such as the American Convention or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which form part of the constitutionality block (Art. 93 of the Constitu- tion), States have the duty not only to respect but also to secure the human rights of all the inhabitants of their territories. It is obvious that in furtherance of this duty to guarantee [human rights], the State is in the obligation of ensuring basic public order and peaceful coexistence conditions, because lacking them, persons would be poorly suited to truly enjoy their rights. Moreover, that State duty is so important that international instruments themselves authorize State authorities, under situations of special gravity, to declare a state of emergency and limit the force of certain human rights. Neverthe- less, the State duty to secure peace and order does not enable the authorities to forget their duty to respect and not violate human rights, and therefore all security policies are framed within strict respect for the limits imposed by human rights. This is clearly pointed out by the treaties that Colombia has ratified, which constitute a binding parameter for the interpretation of constitutional rights (Art. 93 of the Constitution).” The Court then proceeded to cite the relevant provisions of the ICCPR, the American Con- vention, and different holdings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that grounded such conclusion. Further ahead in the judgment, the Court clarified that in situations of armed conflict, the basic human rights guarantees had to be respected alongside with the provisions of International Humanitarian Law, by mandate of article 214 of the Constitution; and it pointed out that “humanitarian norms establish minimum limits for the protection of human rights in situations of armed conflict. This means that the basic principles of International Humanitarian Law (…) establish new limits for security and defense policies”.

11 National security law case (C- 251 of 2002).

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 73

In this order, the Court held that “if International Humanitarian Law applies in Colombia, it is obvious that security and defense strategies must respect the mandates of humanitarian law, such as the principles of proportionality and distinction, inter alia. And these mandates have concrete consequences. (…) Security and defense strategies can foresee a role for private individuals. …This means then that the aforementioned defense and security strategies may not impose such duties upon the civilian population, that they end up involving it in the armed conflict, because this would not only affect the principle of distinction derived from international humanitarian law, but it would also disregard the constitutional mandate by which the tasks of protecting sovereignty and public order correspond to the Armed Forces, and not to private persons”.

3.6 Criteria for reviewing decrees that declare states of constitutional emergency Before the 1991 Constitution was adopted, the decision to declare a state of constitutional emergency in order to reestablish public order -mainly the so-called “state of siege”-, was considered a political matter. Therefore, the motives invoked by the Presidential decree to declare such a state of emergency, were shielded from judicial review. After 1991, the Court has reviewed the motives invoked by the President in adopting this decision. This change of position was partly grounded upon two doctrines developed by the European Court of Human Rights and then also applied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, namely, the “margin of appreciation” and the “manifest error of appreciation” doctrines. Whenever the Court has found a manifest error in the appreciation of the gravity of the disturbances invoked in the motivation of the corresponding decree, it has declared the unconstitutionality of either part of the decree, or of the entire declaration of the state of emergency. As a consequence, Presidents now resort vary rarely to states of exception, marking a big transformation in the functioning of Colombian democratic institutions. Therefore, it may be held that a sixth function of IHRL and IHL is that of providing criteria to review the constitutionality of the declarations of states of emergency, as well as of the measures adopted in the course of their duration. In the last of those cases, the Court carried out the judicial review – in formal and substantial terms – of Decree 1837 of that same year, by which the President of the Repub- lic declared a “state of internal commotion” in the country in order to counter the terrorist actions of illegal armed groups.12 The varied topics examined by the Court included that of the limits established in the international instruments applicable to states of emergency. With regard to the American Convention, for example, the Court highlighted the following rules:

12 Decision C-802 of 2002.

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(i) the rule by which the restriction of those rights considered to be intangible during states of emergency is only justified “hen the requirements established in international instruments for declaring a state of emergency have been complied with”, namely, a serious threat for the survival of the Nation; (ii) the rule by which “the possibility of suspending rights and guarantees, established in the Convention and the Covenant, does not have an absolute meaning because it is solely restricted to the limitation of their full exercise” – a rule which was illustrated in its scope by reference to Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, on “Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations”. One other aspect of this judgment is noteworthy. The Court resorted to two notions developed by regional case-law, and even by European case-law, in the ambit of human rights, in order to limit the scope of judicial review over the exercise of discretionary powers, in this case, by the President of the Republic. The first notion is that of the “margin of appreciation”. The Court recognized that the Executive has a broad margin to appreciate, first, the gravity of the facts that give rise to a disruption of public order, and second, the sufficiency of the ordinary police means to address the causes of the disruption. Nonetheless, the Court warned that such a margin is not unlimited. The second notion is that of “manifest error of appreciation”, which sets a limit upon the aforementioned broad margin of appreciation, in such a way that the cause invoked to justify the declaration of a state of emergency will only be struck down as unconstitutional should the Court find a manifest error of appreciation. In addition, the Court made a clear difference between facts and the valuation of facts. Both of these notions, which are related to appreciation, are located in the sphere of evalu- ating facts. On the contrary, they are not pertinent when it comes to prove the existence of facts. For these reasons, the Court declared that it was unconstitutional to invoke, as one of the motives to declare a state of internal commotion, the following one: “the country with the highest rates of violence ever recorded”. For the Court, this fact had not been proven. It was a rhetorical statement, from which no arguments could be deduced to broaden the scope of action of exceptional powers during the state of internal commotion declared by the President.

3.7 A ground for the constitutional enforcement of social rights A seventh function is that IHRL constitutes one of the foundations of the enforceability of social rights in concrete cases. Thus, the Court has referred in many cases to the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, and especially the San Salvador Protocol, in order to substantiate the enforceability of social, economic or cultural rights in concrete cases, by way of the acción de tutela. For example the Court protected the rights of a blind woman in conditions of extreme poverty who had been separated from her daughter by the family welfare authorities, without having been given a chance to access rehabilitation programs or to prove her capacities

Cepeda, The Internationalization of Constitutional Law: A Note on the Colombian Case 75

as household provider.13 After a careful analysis of the facts of the case, grounded upon sound scientific assessments of the situation, the Court made reference to IHRL as the foremost interpretative criterion in determining the rights of persons with discapacities, such as the plaintiff. In this judgment the Court began by stating that international human rights law is a “complete, indispensable and obligatory guide for the protection of the rights of persons with discapacities”, and thereafter held that there are several international instruments “in which the community of nations has stated its express will to protect with special dutifulness the rights of persons with discapacity”, instruments which “must serve as an indispensable guiding criterion for the national authorities at all levels, in complying with their constitutional duties in the field of protection of the rights of persons with discapacities”. The Court then enumerated several international treaties and instruments which pose obligations for the Colombian State in this field, and also recalled its prior judgments on the applicability of IHRL to the interpretation of these rights, highlighting “the immense importance gained by Colombia’s international commitments in order to materialize the reinforced constitutional protection to which persons with discapacities are entitled”. It consequently stated that it would carefully follow –as it did- the guidelines provided by the “Uniform Rules on Equality of Opportunities for Persons with Discapacity”, approved by the UN General Assembly, and after a detailed assessment of the remedy to be granted, the Court ordered the creation of an inter-disciplinary professional team with representatives from different public entities from the national and district level, in order to undertake a rehabilitation process that could allow for the evaluation, within a reasonable term, of the blind woman’s real capacity to provide for her daughter and allow her to grow up in a safe and adequate environment.

3.8 National projection and enforcement of preventive measures adopted by the Inter- American Court of Human Rights

Finally, it is pertinent to point out a relatively recent development: the reception of Inter- American precautionary measures to protect persons at risk in urgent and serious cases. In such tutela decisions, the Constitutional Court has not only adopted the Inter-American legal doctrine, but also the specific orders imparted as remedies to render them effective. The leading case in this field was a judgment, in which the Court reviewed the accion de tutela filed by the relatives of a human rights advocate who had been the victim of forced disappearance, against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Inte- rior.14 The plaintiffs had requested the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to adopt the necessary measures to protect their fundamental right to life; and this body pres-

13 Decision T-397 of 2004. 14 T-558 of 2003.

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ently ordered the Colombian State to implement the measures required to protect the lives, integrity and dignity of the members of the family. Nonetheless, Colombian State agents irrupted a few days later into the family’s home, and they tortured one of its members. Even though the Inter-American commission had ordered the adoption of precautionary measures on two opportunities, the authorities had ignored such decisions. The Constitutional Court granted the tutela, and held that “the tutela judge may issue an order directed at the public authority so that the latter protects a fundamental right whose threat or violation justified the adoption of a precautionary measure by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”. This same line was followed by the Court later on.15 In this case –brought to the Court collectively, and not individually-, some members of the San José de Apartadó Peace Community had presented the acción de tutela against a National Army Brigade Com- mander, arguing that their rights to life, personal integrity, security and others were being placed at risk by the military authorities, who were involved in acts of violence and perse- cution aimed at tarnishing their reputation or eliminating them. Prior to the presentation of the tutela lawsuit, the plaintiffs had requested the protection of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which ordered the adoption of certain precautionary measures aimed at safeguarding their rights – measures that had not been executed by the national authorities. The tutela was granted. The Court clarified that it would issue “both the protective measures that correspond to the regional level, in accordance with the requirements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the orders that appertain to the tutela action brought to its decision”. In other words, through the channel of the acción de tutela, the Court not only ordered the adoption of the remedies required to preserve the fundamental rights invoked by the plaintiffs, but also imparted specific mandates to implement the precautionary measures which had been ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. From these holdings, one should also underscore the facts that (a) the Court appropri- ated itself of the precautionary measure to the point of transcribing its literal content; (b) the Court transformed non-compliance with an Inter-American precautionary measure into the legal grounds for possible contempt of court proceedings at the national level; and (c) the Court specified which were the National authorities in charge of securing compliance with the precautionary measure, raising their level to the Ministerial ambit.

4. Conclusion IHRL and IHL have borne a significant impact upon decisions concerning both the preservation and public order and the protection of rights in other contexts.

15 T-327 of 2004.

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Although the 1991 Colombian Constitution contains a very generous bill of rights, IHRL and IHL has been frequently incorporated in diverse types of settings, causing a very high material incidence upon the domestic legal system. Considerations that would initially have seemed to be closer to obiter dicta, have later come to be the clear foundations of the ratio decidendi of several recent judgments. In addition, Inter-American parameters have been decisive for the constitutional review of national legislation. On the other hand, IHRL and IHL have been incorporated in very sensitive ambits of constitutional review, and in relation to very controversial issues in the Colombian contexts. They have served to support the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court’s decisions. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that in several of the more polemic decisions not mentioned in this note, such as the euthanasia case 16 and the personal drug consumption case,17 IHRL and IHL did not play a significant function. Moreover, this reception process forms part of a broader dialogue with other Courts which are equally committed to the defense of human dignity, the construction of peace through the Law and the preservation of democracy’s foundations.

16 C- 239 of 1997. 17 C-221 of 1994.

BERICHTE / REPORTS

L’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en Partage l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF) – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service de l'État de droit

Par Anna Chadidscha Schuhmann, Gießen*

Nous voyons bien que le droit constitutionnel évolue. Il se trouve confronté à l'internationalisation du droit d’un côté, à l'intégration internationale avec ses nouvelles interdépen- dances de l’autre. Les juridictions constitutionnelles subissent donc un nécessaire ajuste- ment, voire reconfiguration1, rendu inévitable, mais en même temps possible par la mondialisation. Nous nous consacrons ici donc aux moyens auxquels nous pouvons recourir afin de l’accompagner et d’y faire face. En effet, les développements récents ont claire- ment indiqué la voie de coopération et d’interaction à divers niveaux. Dans cette perspective, l’Association des Cours Constitutionnelles ayant en partage l’Usage du Français (ACCPUF), s’est développée au sein de la francophonie. Créée en 1997 à l'initiative du Conseil constitutionnel français et soutenue par l'agence intergou- vernementale de la francophonie2 afin de renforcer les liens entre les membres de l'espace francophone, l'ACCPUF rassemble aujourd'hui plus de 40 Cours constitutionnelles et institutions équivalentes issues d'Afrique, d'Europe, d'Amérique et d'Asie.3

I. Raison d’être et objectifs L'Association a pour but de favoriser l'approfondissement de l'État de droit par un développement des relations entre les institutions qui, dans les pays ayant en partage l'usage du français, quelles que soient leurs appellations, ont dans leurs attributions, compétence pour régler en dernier ressort avec l'autorité de chose jugée, les litiges de conformité à la Constitution.4 Le rôle important de l’idée de la francophonie et de sa manifestation sous la

* Étudiante doctorante et collaboratrice scientifique à la chaire de droit constitutionnel et des sciences politiques, Justus-Liebig-Universität, Gießen, Allemagne. E-mail: chadidscha.schuhmann @recht.uni-giessen.de. 1 Cf., pour la justice africaine, Néji Baccouche, La justice comme nécessaire des libertés, in: Justice et démocratie, Limoges 2002, p. 323. 2 Pour plus à propos de celle-ci, voir www.francophonie.org. 3 Voir www.accpuf.org. 4 Article 3 des statuts du 9 avril 1997, modifiés.

Schuhmann, ACCPUF – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service de l'État de droit 79

forme de l’ACCPUF se montre à la diversité des niveaux de développement et d'intégration aux circuits d'échanges mondiaux des sociétés contemporaines. L’ACCPUF se consacre, au delà de l’hétérogénéité, à l’existence d’un socle commun sur lequel se sont bâties l’identité et les actions de l’Association. Lieu de rencontres et d'échanges d'idées et d'expériences, elle réunit ses membres hétéroclites5 autour des valeurs communes et le partage d’une langue. De cette façon, elle rassemble des juridictions constitutionnelles de tradition longue ainsi que celles qu’on n‘a vu qu’émerger à partir des années quatre-vingt dans le pays d’Afrique appartenant à l’espace francophone. La revendication du mécanisme de contrôle de constitutionnalité étant l’enjeu central dans la construction d’institutions démocratiques.6 Certes, les juges constitutionnels se voient aujourd’hui con- frontés aux contentieux comparables. Leurs missions, soit de veiller au respect de la consti- tutionnalité des lois, soit de rendre possible la tenue d’élections libres, fiables et transpa- rentes, sont des missions essentielles qui requièrent compétence et sagesse, mais aussi, nous en sommes conscients, du courage, tout particulièrement dans les pays en sortie de crise, et dans ceux où les fondements de la démocratie sont encore insuffisants.7 Comment les encourager? Quel rôle peuvent y jouer les associations de coopération, telles l’ACCPUF? On sait bien que l’indépendance des juges dans les textes ou discours est une étape importante mais cela ne saurait suffire pour mettre les juges à l’abri des pressions ou de l’autocensure.8 En fait, ce sont des difficultés techniques et politiques qui ont entravé la bonne marche d'une justice constitutionnelle dans les pays francophones d'Afrique noire.9 L’ACCPUF se consacre à préserver et à consolider les liens de collégialité et de solidarité existant entre ses membres, à nourrir ainsi des idéaux profonds, mettant la solidarité au service de l'État de droit. A cet effet, elle vise à développer, entre les institutions membres les échanges d'idées et d'expériences sur les questions qui leur sont soumises ou intéressent leur organisation et leur fonctionnement.

II. Fonctionnement et actualité L’Association est dirigée par une Assemblée générale, formée par les chefs de corps des institutions membres, qui se réunit tous les trois ans, administrée et gérée par son Bureau, qui comprend le président, trois vice-présidents et le trésorier, renouvelable à chaque

5 Cf. à titre illustratif la composition de son Bureau, ci-dessous note 10. 6 Ibrahima Diallo, À la recherche d’un modèle africain de Justice, Annuaire International de Justice Constitutionnelle 20 (2004), p.100. 7 S.E. Abdou Diouf, Secrétaire général de la Francophonie, Allocution prononcée à l'occasion du IVème Congrès de l’ACCPUF, p. 3, voir www.accpuf.org/images/pdf/publications/actes_des_ congres/c4/discours_sg-accpuf.pdf. 8 Serigne Diop, La justice du politique au Sénégal, in Afrique contemporaine, 156 (1990), p. 185. 9 Franck Moderne, L'évolution des juridictions constitutionnelles dans les Etats francophones et la République malgache, in: Les institutions constitutionnelles d'Afrique Francophone et la République malgache, 1979, p. 183 et suivantes.

80 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Assemblée générale. Sa composition reflète équitablement la composition géographique de l'Assemblée générale.10 Son Secrétariat général, qui comprend le secrétaire général et ses collaborateurs, assiste le président et le Bureau de l'Association dans leurs tâches respec- tives. Véritable point d'ancrage de l'association, le Secrétariat général de l'ACCPUF est permanent. Il a son siège à Paris, au Conseil constitutionnel français. Désignés par les pré- sidents des Cours, parmi leurs collaborateurs voire parmi les membres des Cours, les correspondants nationaux constituent le relais entre l'Association et ses membres. Un séminaire annuel autour d'un thème concret les réunit, comme récemment le 6ème séminaire des correspondants nationaux que s'est tenu à Strasbourg, au Conseil de l'Europe, les 28-29 et 30 novembre 2007 sur le thème de « communication et transparence au sein des Cours constitutionnelles » et la formation à la base de données de jurisprudence constitutionnelle (CODICES11). Depuis le Congrès fondateur de l’ACCPUF, des rencontres régulières ont été organi- sées avec le soutien de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. Ils favorisent le contact entre les membres des institutions et l'échange d'informations. Le Congrès théma- tique se tient à la même époque que l'Assemblée générale triennale de l'ACCPUF. Après avoir choisi d’axer les travaux du Congrès thématique en 1997 sur « le principe d’égalité », puis, en 2000, sur « l’accès au juge constitutionnel », en 2003 sur « la fraternité » et de consacrer le dernier VIème congrès aux « compétences des Cours Constitutionnelles et institutions équivalentes », le prochain congrès aura lieu en 2009. Entre deux Assemblées générales, l'Association peut se réunir en Conférence de chefs d'institution, sur proposition de son Bureau ou sur demande de la moitié des membres. La prochaine Conférence, va se dérouler les 8-13 juillet à Libreville (Gabon) et traiter le thème de la "proportionnalité dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle". Tous les actes de Congrès et des Conférences font l’objet d’une publication.

III. Action de coopération 1. En vue de la coopération juridique, l'ACCPUF s'attache à accroître et à publier les ressources de droit comparé disponibles en matière de droit constitutionnel francophone, afin d’encourager le juge qui doit trancher une question de droit nouvelle ou controversée et de lui permettre d'asseoir plus fortement sa jurisprudence en se référant, le cas échéant, à des solutions similaires prononcées par des Cours homologues. Sa publication vaste passe d’un bulletin général, regroupant textes et données sur les compétences et l'organisation des Cours membres, aux publications thématiques, synthèses

10 Lors de l'Assemblée générale triennale de 2006 a été élu comme suit: Présidence: Conseil constitutionnel du Burkina Faso; 1ère Vice-Présidence: Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin; 2ème Vice- Présidence: Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie; 3ème Vice-Présidence: Tribunal fédéral suisse; Trésorier: Cour constitutionnelle du Gabon; Membres de droit: Cour suprême du Canada, Conseil constitutionnel français. 11 Cf. ci-dessous.

Schuhmann, ACCPUF – Coopération des Cours et Francophonie au service de l'État de droit 81

des rencontres et des réponses aux questionnaires qui les ont accompagnées. Elles portent autant sur des principes, tels que le principe d'égalité ou l'accès au juge constitutionnel que sur des problèmes concrets, tel que la communication ou le rôle et le fonctionnement des Cours en période électorale. L’ensemble des publications est rendu accessible par le site Internet ACCPUF, crée en 1998, qui constitue une vitrine de l'activité des Cours constitutionnelles francophones. Outre l'intégralité des textes constitutionnels, organiques et régle- mentaires relatifs aux attributions et fonctionnement des institutions membres on y trouve toute l'actualité de l'Association et des Cours membres. En complémentarité avec la Com- mission de Venise, dont la base de données CODICES12 propose les textes et jurispru- dences constitutionnelles indexées des pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe, l'ACCPUF a développé sur son site Internet une base de données propre à l'espace géographique et culturel de la francophonie. Cette coopération a pour but de nouer des relations étroites avec l'espace européen afin que la solidarité et l'échange jurisprudentiel entre pays du Nord et pays du Sud se renforcent. Facilitant l'accès des juges aux décisions des ses homologues, cette base permet une meilleure diffusion de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle francophone et également de poursuivre le processus d’intégration de la jurisprudence des Cours constitutionnelles de l’ACCPUF 2. En outre, L'ACCPUF s'applique à développer des actions de coopération technique, répondant à la diversité des besoins de chaque Cour. La communication des Cours et le développement de méthodes de travail efficaces nécessitent des moyens adéquats. Cer- taines, toutefois, ne sont à ce jour pas correctement équipées, ni connectées au réseau Inter- net. Les actions de coopération technique visent ainsi à combler les déficits en ressources documentaires entre les institutions membre du Nord et du Sud francophone par la formation et l'équipement informatique des derniers. Toute l’importance est accordée à la mise en réseau des cours constitutionnelles par le développement d'un site Internet propre à chaque institution membre. Cette présentation ne peut pas prendre fin sans avoir souligné l’importance de l’ACCPUF pour la recherche de la justice constitutionnelle, notamment de ses membres du Sud. Qui s’intéresse par exemple à l’étude de l’organisation et du fonctionnement de ces institutions de type nouveaux en Afrique noire francophone ne va trouver que quelques publications à ce sujet13 et va sûrement recourir aux ressources offertes par l’ACCPUF. Réunies autour de valeurs communes et du partage du français, les Cours membres de l'ACCPUF sont résolues à renforcer les garanties juridictionnelles afin d’assurer un meilleur respect des droits fondamentaux dans leur pays.

12 Voir www.codices.coe.int. 13 Il n’y a que peu de temps que les chercheurs commencent enfin à s’intéresser à ce sujet, à titre d’exemples pour le Sénégal, voir Pape Mamour Sy, Le développement de la justice en Afrique noire francophone: les exemples du Bénin, du Gabon et du Sénégal, Thèse de doctorat (inédite), Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar 1998; Ibrahima Diallo, op. cit. note 6, p. 93; Mayacine Diagne, La mutation de la justice constitutionnelle en Afrique: L’exemple du Conseil Constitu- tionnel du Sénégal, Annuaire International de Justice Constitutionnelle 12 (1996), p. 99.

82 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

"La démocratie et l’État de droit sont le fruit d’une longue marche. Là ou ils existent, leur maintien exige une vigilance des tous les acteurs, car ils ne sont jamais définitivement garantis et sont toujours perfectibles. Là ou ils n’existent pas encore, encore ou pas suffisamment, leur conquête ou leur renforcement implique courage, présérvance et solidarité."14

14 S.E. Abdou Diouf, op. cit. note 7, p. 7.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN / BOOK REVIEWS

Jeffrey Goldsworthy (Ed.) Interpreting Constitutions. A Comparative Study Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 365 S.; pbk, £ 19,99 ISBN 978-0-19-922647-4.

Unter der Herausgeberschaft von Jeffrey Goldsworthy berichten sechs renommierte Verfas- sungsrechtler über die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation mit Blick auf die USA (Mark Tushnet), Kanada (Peter Hogg), Australien (der Herausgeber selbst), Deutschland (Donald Kommers), Indien (S.P. Sathe) sowie Südafrika (Heinz Klug). Den Band be- schließt ein zusammenfassender Essay des Herausgebers. Die jeweils rund 50 Seiten starken Länderberichte sind in sich selbst abgeschlossen und liefern eigenständige Abrisse zur Verfassungsgeschichte der jeweiligen Länder. Der Leser wird jeweils in das Verfassungs- recht der sechs behandelten Länder eingeführt; dabei liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf der historischen Entwicklung der Verfassungsordnung und den institutionellen Arrangements unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Stellung der Gerichts- bzw. Verfassungsgerichts- barkeit (jeweils Beschreibung der Richterwahl und des Gerichtssystems im übrigen). Be- deutung wird auch auf die sich im Laufe der Zeit verändernden Textgrundlagen, die jeweiligen Verfahren der Verfassungsänderung und dadurch möglicherweise ausgelöste Bindun- gen für die Verfassungsinterpretation gelegt. Schon allein dadurch erhält der interessierte Leser vorzügliche Überblicke über das Verfassungsrecht wichtiger, aber in der Verfas- sungsvergleichung oft nur in zweiter Reihe stehender Länder wie Indien, Kanada oder Australien. Deutlich wird der hierzulande gern übersehene evolutive Charakter des Verfas- sungsrechts. Umgekehrt mag für deutsche Leser der materielle Charakter der Verfassungs- ordnungen zu kurz kommen; der Schwerpunkt liegt bei einer institutionellen, gerichts- zentrierten Behandlung der Verfassungen. Die Auswahl gerade dieser sechs Länder scheint unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Ver- gleichbarkeit für die Verfassungsinterpretation etwas Zufälliges zu haben. Primär wird sie mit dem föderativen Staatsaufbau der Vergleichsländer gerechtfertigt, doch spielt die Gliedstaatlichkeit bei der Analyse der Verfassungsinterpretation eine nur marginale Rolle und erweist sich nicht als ein Kriterium, das spezifische Grundsätze der Verfassungsinter- pretation aufdeckt, die gerade der Gliedstaatlichkeit geschuldet sind (vielleicht mit Aus- nahme der Quebec-Frage). Man hat eher den Eindruck, als ob das Buch ein Beitrag zur momentan vor allem in Großbritannien geführten Debatte um die Einführung der Verfas- sungsgerichtsbarkeit sein soll. Jedenfalls eröffnet der Band britischen Diskursen einen Zugang zur Tradition und Vielfalt der Verfassungsinterpretationen gerade auch in der Rechtswelt des Commonwealth, das für Briten den nach wie vor wohl wichtigsten Refe- renzrahmen darstellt. Als einziges civil law country stellt die Bundesrepublik in diesem

84 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Kreis eine Ausnahme dar, was unter dem Gesichtspunkt verschiedener Interpretationsan- sätze auch immer wieder thematisiert wird. Auf die Beiträge kann hier nicht im Einzelnen eingegangen werden. Aus jeder Abhand- lung gewinnt man viele hoch interessante Einsichten, wie die (Verfassungs-)Gerichtsbarkeit mit strukturellen Problemen umgeht. So erklärt sich der Eklektizismus und Pragmatismus der US-amerikanischen Verfassungsinterpretation aus dem Umstand des außerordentlich schwierigen Amendment-Prozesses in den USA. Die kanadischen und australischen Gerichte hielten sich eher zurück bei aktivistischer Verfassungsinterpretation, wofür die britische Tradition der Parlamentssouveränität genauso verantwortlich sein mag wie das (langjährige) Fehlen eines Grundrechtskatalogs. Am kreativsten und phasenweise auch am selbstbewusstesten erscheint der indische Verfassungsgerichtshof. Trotz permanenter Ver- fassungsänderungen sei es ihm durch zahlreiche (im einzelnen im Band gut dokumentierte) Entscheidungen gelungen, die Verfassung mit Hilfe eines Maßstabs der „verfassungsrechtlichen Quintessenz“ zu stabilisieren; dieser Maßstab sei sogar auf das Verfahren der Ver- fassungsänderung angewendet worden. Demgegenüber bleibt das Bild für Südafrika noch undeutlich. Einzelnen Entscheidungen der letzten zehn Jahre wird man wohl noch keine symptomatische Bedeutung für die Verfassungsauslegung zusprechen dürfen. In diesem Vergleichskontext von Common Law-Rechtsordnungen wird dem Bundesverfassungsge- richt eine besonders textgebundene, legalistische oder normativistische (im Kontext auch zu lesen als unpolitische und schein-objektive) Interpretationsmethode attestiert, ohne dass sie eine hinreichend flexible Auslegung des Grundgesetzes verhindert hätte. Als deutsche Besonderheiten hervorgehoben werden die Bedeutung der wissenschaftlichen Literatur für die Verfassungsinterpretation, aus dem Rechtsstaat folgende strukturelle Aspekte und die objektiven, wertbezogenen Grundrechtslehren. Der den Band zusammenfassende Essay des Herausgebers versucht, die zahlreichen Einzelanalysen zu bündeln. Angesichts der unterschiedlichen Verfassungsrechtsordnungen (common law-Rechtskreis/civil law; Grundrechtskataloge ja oder nein; Häufigkeit der Verfassungsänderungen; jeweilige Stellung des Gerichts und der Verfahrensarten) kann das auf wenigen Seiten naturgemäß schwerlich gelingen. Goldsworthy fasst die Ergebnisse auf 20 Seiten zusammen und versucht, die dargestellten Unterschiede eher mit strukturellen als materiellen Kriterien zu erklären (Einfluss der juristischen Kultur und Sozialisation der Juristen, des Verfahrens der Richterernennung und ihrer politischen Homogenität, des Alters der Verfassungstexte und ihrer Änderbarkeit). Über spezifische Methoden der Ver- fassungsinterpretation im eigentlichen Sinne geht es dabei jedoch nicht. Diese versucht er mit Schablonen zu erfassen (positivism/normativism/originalism/non-originalism), die angesichts der differenzierten Einzelbeobachtungen in den Länderberichten nicht zu über- zeugen vermögen. Interessanter sind die punktuellen Vergleichbarkeiten jenseits der großen Erklärungsmuster, etwa die unterschiedliche Relevanz von Präjudizien, wann welche aus- ländischen Entscheidungen eine Rolle spielten und wie sich gerade unter den Common- wealth-Ländern Ansätze eines „constitutional dialogue“ bildeten. In ihm spielen Entschei- dungen des BVerfG aus sprachlichen Gründen so gut wie keine Rolle, während – erneut

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 85

wohl aus Gründen des englischen Empfängerhorizonts – britische Entscheidungen mit US- amerikanischen um die Vorbildhaftigkeit konkurrieren. In vergleichender Hinsicht ist das Buch, abgesehen von den informativen länderspezifi- schen und den punktuell vergleichenden Einsichten für deutsche Leser auch unter einem weiteren Aspekt interessant: Es betont die institutionelle Stellung der Verfassungsgerichte und ihre kompetentiellen Grenzen für die Verfassungsinterpretation. Es erläutert, wie Aus- legungsfragen in einen (verfassungs-)politischen Prozess eingegliedert sind, diesen reflek- tieren und anleiten, durch ihn andererseits aber auch wieder gebremst werden. Es schildert die Verfassungsinterpretation als einen sehr viel politischeren Vorgang, als wir das in Deutschland wahrzunehmen bereit sind. Der gliederungstechnische Fokus dürfte daher besonders die momentanen Interessen britischer Leser treffen und mag der Intention geschuldet sein, die Scheu vor einer entstehenden Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Großbritan- nien abzubauen. Man kann das Buch daher auch als Werbung lesen, sich mit der vorbildli- chen Entwicklung wichtiger Commonwealth-Länder zu beschäftigen. So wie einst England diesen Ländern sein Rechtssystem schenkte, so soll der Anstoß nun umgekehrt werden, und diesmal ist das Mutterland der Profiteur der verfassungsrechtlichen Errungenschaften. Inhaltlich finden die Berichte jedenfalls eine Gemeinsamkeit in der Betonung der ge- schichtlich wohlgeordneten, kontinuierlichen Entwicklung, im Nachweis national verhei- ßungsvoller Traditionen, der institutionell regelmäßig glücklichen Einbettung in das Ge- waltengefüge und der subkutanen These, dass die Parlamente durch die Verfassungsge- richte nicht rigide beschränkt wurden, sondern als Erstinterpreten respektiert und in einem dialogischen Sinne kontrolliert wurden. Das erklärt auch, warum materielle Maßstäbe der Verfassungsinterpretation hinter den institutionellen Aspekten doch deutlich zurücktreten. So bleibt etwa die Krise, die der U.S. Supreme Court vor dem Bürgerkrieg und zu Beginn des New Deal durch eine substantielle Verfassungsinterpretation erlebte, klein geredet. Auch tritt die Bedeutung, die materielle Abwägungsfragen für die Verfassungsauslegung spielen nur am Rande zu Tage. Der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz wird weder in seiner zentralen materiellen Bedeutung für die deutsche Grundrechtsinterpretation noch als ein sich international herausbildender Maßstab näher gewürdigt. Das Buch ist ein institutio- nelles Plädoyer für die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und beseitigt eventuell bestehende Ängste vor einer Richterherrschaft durch Verfassungsinterpretation. Unerfreulich ist die schlechte drucktechnische Qualität aus Oxford, jedenfalls der Paperback-Ausgabe, die sich schnell in Einzelseiten aufzulösen beginnt. Oliver Lepsius, Bayreuth

86 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Werner Meng / Ulrich Magnus / Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte / Thomas Cottier / Peter-Tobias Stoll / Astrid Epiney Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, Band 41 C. F. Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2005, 436 S., EUR 98,00, ISBN 3-8114-5351-3

I. Spätestens mit dem Zusammenbruch der kommunistischen Staatenwelt Osteuropas 1989/90 und den daraus resultierenden weit reichenden Transformationsprozessen hat sich das völkerrechtliche Koordinatensystem grundlegend verschoben. Die vormalige Bipolari- tät zwischen den Supermächten USA und UdSSR ist in der komplex vernetzten Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts einer unübersichtlichen Multipolarität gewichen. Das erschwert einerseits die Analyse der internationalen Beziehungen, die jenseits vertrauter Denkkategorien neuen Konfliktkonstellationen gerecht werden muss, erleichtert andererseits aber den analytischen Zugriff auf jene Verflechtungen und Antagonismen, die der Kalte Krieg allzu lange über- deckt hatte. Dazu gehören gewiss das Nord-Süd-Verhältnis und all die entwicklungspoliti- schen und entwicklungsvölkerrechtlichen Fragestellungen, die es immer neu aufwirft. Zu denken ist in diesem Kontext etwa an die Milleniumserklärung der UN-Generalversamm- lung, die G 8-Erklärung von Glenn Eagles (2005) oder jüngst den G 8-Gipfel in Heiligen- damm (2007). Auf ihrer 28. Zweijahrestagung in Freiburg (2003) hatte sich denn auch die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht des Themas angenommen und es Dank vorzüglicher Referate facettenreich entfaltet. Dass „Entwicklung“ in ihrer ganzen Bandbreite aus normativer Perspektive analysiert wird, mag zunächst überraschen, scheint es bei der Thematik vorderhand doch um tatsäch- lich Mögliches und politisch Gewolltes, nicht rechtlich Gesolltes zu gehen. Doch die Bilanz der Entwicklungspolitik während der letzten 40 Jahre fällt mehr als ernüchternd aus. „Die Schere zwischen Arm und Reich“, so M. Ruffert in einem Diskussionsbeitrag, „hat sich geöffnet, die Probleme haben sich perpetuiert.“ Von der Verrechtlichung der Entwick- lungspolitik wird daher ein Effizienzschub erwartet; rechtliche Ordnungsbildung soll leisten, wovon „nachhaltige Entwicklung“ abhängt („good governance“ „capacity building“, „nation“, „state“ and „constitution building“, demokratische Mindeststandards, rechtsstaatliche Mindestgarantien). Die Chancen und Grenzen rechtlicher Steuerungsfähigkeit auszu- loten, das Ordnungsbildungspotential des Rechts in einer Welt jenseits des Staates kritisch auszuschöpfen, ist somit das gemeinsame Leitmotiv, das die einzelnen Referate verklam- mert. Im Titel des Einleitungsbeitrages von M. Meng findet dieses Ansinnen denn auch programmatischen Ausdruck: „Völkerrecht als wirtschaftlicher Ordnungsfaktor und ent- wicklungspolitisches Steuerungsinstrument“. Für das IPR fragt U. Magnus nach „Anwend- barem Recht, Schutz und Freiheitsinteressen im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis“. Institutionell- rechtlich angelegt ist die Untersuchung von S. Schlemmer-Schulte zur „Rolle der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen im Nord-Süd-Konflikt“. Drei weitere Referate gelten Themen des besonderen Völkerrechts, die freilich zugleich als Referenz für allgemeine Grundsatz- fragenstellungen systembildend wirken: „Geistiges Eigentum, Handel und nachhaltige Ent-

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 87

wicklung. Erfahrungen und Perspektiven im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis“ (Th. Cottier), ferner „Das internationale Recht im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis. Der Technologietransfer“ (P.-T. Stoll), und schließlich „Umweltvölkerrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für Entwicklungsprojekte“ (A. Epiney). Auch wenn zentrale Menschenrechtsfragen von den einzelnen Referenten intensiv mitbehandelt werden, bleibt das Fehlen eines eigenständigen Vortrags zur menschenrecht- lichen Dimension der Entwicklung ein Defizit (so auch R. Hofmann). Das gilt erst recht, wenn der wiederholte Rekurs auf S. Huntingtons „Clash of Civilizations“ die Frage nach Universalität und kultureller Partikularität der Menschenrechte evoziert, wenn überdies das „Recht auf Entwicklung“ selbstverständlich thematisiert wird. Reizvoll wäre es gewiss auch gewesen, die „soziale Gerechtigkeit“ als möglichen (neuen) Topos des Völkerrechts grund- sätzlich zu behandeln, verbunden allerdings mit dem Risiko allzu abstrakter Theoriehöhe. Letztlich erweist sich die größere Praxisnähe bei der Themenwahl als kluger Kunstgriff, zumal Gerechtigkeitsbezüge oft implizit anklingen und Diskussionsanstöße liefern (so etwa Ch. Tietje mit Blick auf J. Rawls und die „Gerechtigkeit als Fairness“). II. Aus den inhaltsreichen, ein große Materialfülle verarbeitenden und durchweg „empi- riesensiblen“ Referaten können hier nur höchst selektiv einige Akzente herausgegriffen werden. Mit großem Recht betont Meng, anknüpfend etwa an die Grundlagenarbeiten von E.U. Petersmann, die konstitutionelle Funktion des internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts. Gerade aufgrund dieser konstitutionellen Dimension wirkt es als ordnungsbildender Faktor auf internationaler Ebene, legitimatorisch rückgebunden an den nationalen (Verfassungs-) Staat, diesen zugleich aber transzendierend. Indes darf nicht die Eigengesetzlichkeit der Ökonomie übersehen werden, die sich rechtlicher Steuerungskraft entzieht. Armut und Hunger in den Entwicklungsländern und die daraus resultierenden Gefahren von Krimina- lität, Terrorismus und ungesteuerter Migration lassen sich nicht – jedenfalls nicht aus- schließlich normativ – bewältigen. Und doch kann gerade das Recht einen Ordnungsrah- men bereithalten, der den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Akteuren nicht nur den notwendigen Gestaltungsspielraum eröffnet, sondern sie auch an ihre gestalterische Verantwortung erinnert, mitunter sogar zur gestalterischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit verpflichtet. Internationale Regelungsregimes können auch dort steuernd eingreifen, wo nationale versa- gen. Pointiert zugespitzt wagt Meng die Überlegung, „inwieweit das Völkerrecht eine ausgleichende Kontrollfunktion als Ersatz für die unzureichende interne demokratische Legitimation übernehmen kann“. Auch die entwicklungspolitische Verantwortung der Zivilgesellschaft (Stichwort „Global Compact") wird eingeblendet, die prozedurale Dimen- sion effektiver Streitbeilegungsmechanismen im Rahmen der WTO mitberücksichtigt. Es darf nicht übersehen werden, dass gerade eindrucksvoll-komplex elaborierte Prozess- mechanismen die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder mangels des nötigen „know how“ ausgrenzen. An den letzten Punkt kann Magnus anknüpfen, wenn er fragt, wie das IPR mit solchen Kapazitätsdefiziten umgehen sollte. Seine Kernthese lautet: Das IPR kann zum Interessen- ausgleich im Nord-Süd-Gefälle durchaus einen kollisionsrechtlichen Beitrag leisten. Es hat

88 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

bei der Bildung eines globalen Rechtssystems strukturelle Asymmetrien zu berücksichtigen, was nicht heißen muss, dass einer Anknüpfung an das Recht der weniger entwickelten Länder – nur weil es ihnen vertrauter ist – als generelle Regelung der Vorzug zu geben wäre. Die Anknüpfungsfrage stellt sich vielmehr in den konkreten Teilgebieten (Vertrags- recht, Arbeitsrecht, Deliktsrecht, Sachenrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht, Immaterialgüterrecht, Enteignungsrecht) gesondert. Das Steuerungsinstrument der sog. Eingriffsnormen bedarf sehr vorsichtiger Behandlung. So kann etwa ein Zahlungsmoratorium wegen des Staatsnot- standes eines hoch verschuldeten Staates – Argentinien mag ein gutes Beispiel geben – den kurzfristigen Interessen des Entwicklungslandes dienen, langfristig aber kontraproduktiv wirken, da es Investoren abschreckt und Zweifel an der Rechtssicherheit des Standorts aufkommen lässt. Schlemmer-Schulte vermag aus der Insider-Perspektive einer vormaligen Weltbank- Mitarbeiterin die Rolle der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen differenziert zu beleuchten. Ihr Referat geht, den aus der europäischen Verfassungslehre vertrauten Ansatz des „multi- level constitutionalism“ reflektierend, ebenendifferenziert vor. Die Rolle der internationalen Finanzinstitutionen auf der Ebene der Entwicklungsländer und deren Rolle auf globaler Ebene werden kontrastiert. Der internen, institutionellen Ebene entspricht nach außen eine kooperative Ebene, wenn die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen mit anderen Entwick- lungshilfe Leistenden zusammenarbeiten (bis hin zu sog. public-private-partnerships). Schlemmer-Schulte zufolge ist der Internationale Währungsfonds, weit über seine ur- sprünglich monetäre Zielsetzung hinaus, de facto zu einer Entwicklungshilfeorganisation geworden. Paralleles kann Geltung auch für die Weltbank beanspruchen. Höchst informativ werden schließlich der „Washington Consus“, rule-of-law- und good-governance-Pro- gramme vorgestellt. Aus der Fülle von für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit besonders signifikanten Berei- chen stellt Cottier den des Geistigen Eigentums vor. Die Auswahl ist gut begründet, da das Immaterialgüterrecht schon heute weitgehend internationalisiert ist. Mit dem TRIPS- Abkommen verbunden bleibt ein nachhaltiger Paradigmenwechsel: Statt einer kontinuierlichen, schrittweisen Fortentwicklung des Schutzniveaus findet sich nun eine weithin aus- differenzierte Rahmenordnung mit streng formalisierten Schutzstandards in materieller und in verfahrensrechtlicher Hinsicht. Ein solches Regime kann den Interessen der Entwick- lungsländer in hohem Maße zuwiderlaufen, gerade wenn im Bereich der Gesundheitspolitik der Urheberschutz die Herstellung preiswerter Alternativpräparate zur Aids-Prävention verhindert. Für Stoll ist der Technologietransfer ein rechtliches Konzept. Zu den auch für das Entwicklungsvölkerrecht zentralen Kernbereichen gehörte die Internationalisierung der Kernenergienutzung. Zahlreiche Überschneidungsfelder ergeben sich zwischen den Tech- nologietransfer und dem Umweltvölkerrecht. Vor allem aber verweist der Technologie- transfer auf die kooperative Dimension des Völkerrechts. Erforderlich wären Wettbewerbs- regelungen, um die Gefahr eines „Missbrauchs der Verfügung über Technologien und die damit verbundenen Rechte und Marktstellung zu verhindern“. Das Fehlen eines entsprechend effektiven Regelungsregimes gehört zu den großen Defiziten des Kooperationsvöl-

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 89

kerrechts. Dichter gewirkt sind die Regeln des Umweltvölkerrechts. Sie machen der Durchführung von Entwicklungsprojekten mitunter sehr konkrete Vorgaben. Epiney stellte die umweltvölkerrechtlichen Prinzipien und Verpflichtungen detailliert vor. Ein Schwer- punkt ihrer Ausführungen gilt den Konsultationspflichten, der Umweltverträglichkeitsprü- fung und möglichen Haftungsfolgen im Falle der Verletzung umweltrechtlicher Standards. Ein wichtiges Sonderproblem stellt die angemessene Nutzung gemeinsamer natürlicher Ressourcen dar. Die teilweise im Schrifttum angestellten Überlegungen, eine Koppelung von Finanzierungszusagen an die Erfüllung von Umweltstandards könne zu einer Verlet- zung des Interventionsverbotes führen, stoßen zu Recht auf Ablehnung. III. Wie lassen sich die vorgestellten Stränge nun bündeln, Umwelt- und Wirtschafts- völkerrecht, Technologietransfer und Finanzinstitutionen zusammenführen? Die gemeinsame menschenrechtliche Grundierung aller Teilthemen wurde schon eingangs betont, ihre jeweilige Gerechtigkeitsorientierung hervorgehoben. Alle Teilbereiche verbinden die For- derung nach einem materiellrechtlichen Ordnungsrahmen mit der nicht minder deutlichen Forderung nach effektiver prozedurale Ausgestaltung. Dazu können wirtschaftswissen- schaftliche Kontrollinstrumente wie „Monitoring“ und „Compliance“ (Cottier) ihren eigenen Beitrag leisten. Ein zentraler Grundsatz, der alle drei Themen ebenfalls wie in einem Brennspiegel zusammenführt, blieb bislang noch unerwähnt: der Grundsatz der „nachhaltigen Entwicklung“, des „sustainable development“. Da wissenschaftlich schon intensiv bearbeitet und monographisch aufbereitet1 lag es nahe, ihn nicht eigenständig zu einem Referatsthema zu machen. Dennoch finden hier die drei wesentlichen Komponenten des Entwicklungstopos zusammen: die umweltpolitische, die soziale und die wirtschaftliche Dimension. Th. Marauhn spricht von einem Drei-Säulen-Modell. Anders formuliert, könnte auch von einem integrativen Ansatz die Rede sein, den die Präambeln vieler völker- rechtlicher Verträge ohnehin schon zum Versprechen geben, nicht zuletzt auch die Präam- bel des WTO-Vertrages. Und auch das soziale Moment und das Ideal sozialer Gerechtigkeit sind im Völkerrecht vielfach präsent: in den völkerrechtlichen Texten, in Theorieentwürfen (etwa J Rawls), greifbar eher in Prinzipienstrukturen als in konkreten normativen Ver- pflichtungen, eher im soft law als im hard law. Die Frage nach der Letztbegründung der sozialen Gerechtigkeitsidee führt zurück auf die universelle Bedürfnisnatur des Menschen. Von diesen Bedürfnissen ausgehend, muss völkerrechtliche Theoriebildung realistisch bleiben, darf aber ein Stück weit Utopien wagen. Den innovativen Vorträgen, die vorlie- gender Band vereinigt, ist beides weithin gelungen. Markus Kotzur, Leipzig

1 Etwa G. Beaucamp, Das Konzept der zukunftsfähigen Entwicklung im Recht, 2002; A. Glaser, Demokratie und nachhaltige Entwicklung, 2006.

90 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Mathias Reimann / Reinhard Zimmermann (Hrsg.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, 1456 p., £ 125,00, ISBN 978-0-19-929606-4 (hbk); 2008, 1456 p., £ 39,95, ISBN 978-0-19-9535 45-3 (pbk)

Seit den 1990er Jahren hat sich die wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit der Rechtsverglei- chung verstärkt. Globalisierung und Europäisierung zeigen immer deutlicher die Notwen- digkeit, fremde Rechtsordungen vertiefter kennen zu lernen und das eigene Recht durch vergleichende Einordnung besser zu verstehen. Die bundesdeutsche Rechtswissenschaft hinkt hier freilich häufig hinterher. Anders als im angelsächsischen Sprachraum, aber auch anders als in Italien oder Frankreich, führt die Rechtsvergleichung hier oft noch ein Mauer- blümchendasein. Es ist daher nicht ohne Ironie, dass das hier zu besprechende prächtige Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law gerade von zwei deutschen Wissenschaftlern herausgegeben wird, von denen einer in den Vereinigten Staaten lehrt. Die Herausgeber Mathias Reimann (Ann Arbor) und Reinhard Zimmermann (Hamburg/Regensburg) ver- sammeln in diesem Band eine Fülle von Beiträgen, in denen die beachtliche Revitalisierung der weltweiten rechtsvergleichenden Forschung eindrucksvoll zum Ausdruck kommt. Das Handbuch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Der erste Teil versammelt Darstellungen zur Entwicklung der Rechtsvergleichung in verschiedenen europäischen und außereuropäi- schen Ländern (Frankreich, deutscher Sprachraum, Italien, Großbritannien, USA, Mittel- und Osteuropa, Ostasien, Lateinamerika). Dabei kommen spezifische nationale Traditionen – etwa die Rechtsvergleichung im Rahmen des Empire in Großbritannien – ebenso zum Ausdruck wie heutige Debatten – etwa die aktuelle Diskussion um die Beachtlichkeit aus- ländischer Gerichtsentscheidungen in der Rechtsprechung des US-amerikanischen Supreme Court. Im zweiten, umfangreichsten Teil werden die verschiedensten methodischen Zu- gänge zur Rechtsvergleichung in konzisen Essays vorgestellt, die von einer Bestandsauf- nahme zur „funktionalen Methode“ über die Analyse von Rezeptionsprozessen bis hin zum Verhältnis von Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsgeschichte reichen. Der dritte Teil behandelt schließlich den Stand der Rechtsvergleichung für einzelne Rechtsgebiete vom Vertrags- recht bis zum Strafrecht. Die Beiträge haben in der Regel einen Umfang von etwa dreißig Druckseiten. Sie sind jeweils gut lesbar und erfüllen vollauf den Zweck, den Leser über den Stand der Forschung zum jeweiligen Themenfeld zu orientieren; freilich dominieren in den Nachweisen englischsprachige Publikationen deutlich. Es ist nicht möglich, im Rahmen einer Rezension der beeindruckenden Fülle der hier vorliegenden Beiträge nachzugehen oder gerecht zu werden. Es seien daher im Folgenden einige Beiträge herausgegriffen, die sich mit Grundsatzfragen beschäftigen oder aus der Perspektive des Öffentlichen Rechts besonders interessant sind. Ingeborg Schwenzer be- richtet in einem dichten Artikel über die Entwicklung der deutschen bzw. deutschsprachi- gen Rechtsvergleichung seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (S. 69 ff.). Dabei wird erneut deutlich, einen wie tiefen Verlust für die Rechtsvergleichung die Vertreibung jüdischer Gelehrter wie Ernst Rabel in der NS-Zeit bedeutet hat. Schwenzer beleuchtet auch kritisch den idea-

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listischen Funktionalismus, wie ihn Konrad Zweigert im Nachkriegsdeutschland populari- sierte, und äußerst sich mit Recht skeptisch zu der verbreiteten These, die verstärkte Aus- landserfahrung heutiger Juristen fördere notwendigerweise auch die rechtsvergleichende Reflexion. Wenn man nur einmal im Vergleich den entsprechenden Bericht über Italien von Elisabetta Grande heranzieht, kann man sich des Eindrucks kaum erwehren, dass die Rechtsvergleichung anderenorts auch heute noch deutlich lebendiger ist als hierzulande. Naturgemäß wenden sich viele Beiträge den bis heute nicht ganz geklärten grundsätzli- chen Methodenfragen der Rechtsvergleichung zu. So sehr Einigkeit darüber besteht, dass Vergleichen die Herausarbeitung von Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschieden zwischen den verglichenen Gegenständen bedeutet, so wenig ist man sich doch darüber einig, wie Aus- wahl und Zuschnitt der Vergleichsobjekte erfolgen sollen, wie die entsprechenden tertia comparationis zu bestimmen sind und welche allgemeineren Regeln sich aus solchen Ver- gleichen entwickeln lassen. Dabei ist es von Vorteil, sich der entsprechenden Erfahrungen in anderen, methodisch reflektierteren Disziplinen wie der vergleichenden Linguistik und der vergleichenden Religions- und Geschichtswissenschaft zu versichern. Hier zeigt sich, dass die Rechtsvergleichung üblicherweise besondere Probleme in der methodenbewussten Erarbeitung des erforderlichen tertium comparationis hat. Juristen neigen dazu, die in der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung verbreiteten Allgemeinbegriffe als quasinaturrechtliche Katego- rien zu verwenden und damit auf eine von den jeweiligen Vergleichsrechtsordnungen in gleicher Weise entfernte neutrale Terminologie allzu rasch zu verzichten (hierzu Nils Jan- sen, "Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge". Damit wird verkannt, dass die Erarbeitung und Weiterentwicklung der zugrunde gelegten Allgemeinbegriffe einen der wichtigsten und schwierigsten Teile vergleichender Arbeit bildet. Ralf Michaels ("The Functional Method of Comparative Law") bietet in diesem Zusammenhang eine eingehende kritische Bestandsaufnahme zur so genannten „funktionalen Methode“ in der Tradition Zweigerts. Mittels des schillernden Begriffs der „Funktion“ hat diese Tradition der (Privat-) Rechtsvergleichung häufig eine gewissermaßen in der Natur der Sache liegende Gemein- samkeit der Sachprobleme angenommen und eine "praesumptio similitudinis" behauptet; von hier aus war es nur ein kleiner Schritt, der Rechtsvergleichung die Aufgabe zuzuwei- sen, „beste“ Lösungen herauszuarbeiten und Rechtsvereinheitlichung vorzubereiten. Michaels zeigt hingegen, dass der Funktionsbegriff im Rahmen der Vergleichung auch stärker epistemologisch begriffen werden kann und nicht notwendig eine problematische naturrechtliche Färbung aufweisen muss. So hebt er hervor, dass die konstruktive Zugrun- delegung einer gemeinsamen Funktion die genauere Herausarbeitung von Unterschieden möglicherweise überhaupt erst ermöglicht. Ein derartiger, methodisch reflektierter und bescheidener Funktionalismus vermiede das Umschlagen der Vergleichung in wissenschaftlich nicht gedeckte normative Aussagen über „beste Lösungen“, wie sie im Rahmen der traditionellen funktionalen Methode nicht selten waren. Heute wird insgesamt wieder stärker die Grundsatzdebatte geführt, ob die Rechtsver- gleichung sich mehr den Gemeinsamkeiten oder den Unterschieden zwischen den verglichenen Rechtsordnungen zuwenden soll. Während die privatrechtliche Fachtradition der

92 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Rechtsvergleichung nach wie vor eher auf die Herausarbeitung von Ähnlichkeiten setzt, hat sich seit längerem eine grundsätzliche Gegenposition herausgebildet, die die unhintergeh- bare Differenz zwischen den verschiedenen Rechtskulturen betont, insbesondere im Ver- hältnis von civil law und common law; ihr radikalster Vertreter ist heute der in Paris leh- rende Kanadier Pierre Legrand (in diese Richtung im vorliegenden Handbuch auch Roger Cotterell, "Comparative Law and Legal Culture"). Gerhard Dannemann versucht in dieser hitzigen Diskussion einen Mittelweg ("Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differ- ences?"). Dannemann zeigt, dass die Ähnlichkeitstheoretiker sich häufig auf politisch und kulturell weniger sensitive Bereiche des materiellen Privatrechts konzentrieren, während die Differenztheoretiker größeres Interesse an den kulturellen und mentalen Tiefenschich- ten der jeweiligen Rechtsordnung entwickeln. Die bloße Entgegensetzung von Identitäts- und Differenzannahmen sei daher nicht weiterführend und laufe weitgehend leer. Vielmehr komme es entscheidend darauf an, welche Ziele der Vergleich verfolge und welche Rechts- ordnungen miteinander verglichen würden. Dannemann gibt freilich zu, dass Ziele und Grundhaltungen des jeweiligen Rechtsvergleichers häufig korrelieren; wer Rechtsverein- heitlichung vorbereiten möchte, wird zu Ähnlichkeitsannahmen tendieren, wer die wechsel- seitigen Einflüsse zwischen Rechtsordnungen nach Möglichkeit begrenzen will, wird Diffe- renzannahmen vorziehen. Die Schwierigkeit des Vergleichs liegt nach Dannemann aber in jedem Fall gerade darin, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zugleich in den Blick zu nehmen. Wie zutreffend Dannemanns Annahme ist, dass gerade die Vergleichung eher technisch-ökonomischer Gebiete des Privatrechts Ähnlichkeitsannahmen nahe legt, zeigt in diesem Band e contrario der Beitrag von Harry D. Krause, der die Schwierigkeiten der Vergleichung im Bereich des Familienrechts analysiert ("Comparative Family Law"). Nur wenig thematisieren die Beiträge des Handbuchs im Rahmen der Grundsatzdiskussion über Ähnlichkeits- und Differenzannahmen freilich das Problem der verschiedenen (Anwen- dungs-)Kontexte von Rechtsvergleichung. Es bedeutet einen erheblichen Unterschied, ob etwa ein Gericht sich in den Urteilsgründen auf ausländische Gerichtsentscheidungen bezieht, Ministerialbürokratie und Parlament zur Vorbereitung von Reformen das Recht anderer Staaten aufbereiten lassen oder aber ein Wissenschaftler aus reinem Erkenntnis- interesse vergleicht. So liegt es etwa nahe, dass Rechtsvergleichung innerhalb von Integra- tionsverbünden wie der Europäischen Union häufig mit dem Ziel betrieben wird, Gemein- sames herauszufinden oder Vereinheitlichung vorzubereiten (dazu Reinhard Zimmermann, "Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law"). Ähnlichkeitsannahmen oder die Suche nach einem „common core“– wie sie in der privatrechtlichen Tradition der Rechtsvergleichung ohnehin meist überwogen haben –, sind hier bereits durch den Kontext nahe gelegt. Sie sind aber deshalb auch aus einer nicht von vornherein anwendungsorien- tierten wissenschaftlichen Perspektive um so problematischer. Die Intensität, mit der die Debatte zwischen Identitäts- und Differenztheoretikern heute ausgetragen wird, steht sicherlich in engem Zusammenhang mit der verstärkt empfundenen Globalisierung. Hora- tia Muir Watt ("Globalization and Comparative Law") stellt dar, dass die Globalisierung die Prämissen der traditionellen Rechtsvergleichung in vielfältiger Weise in Frage stellt.

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Die Vorstellung nationalstaatlich geschlossener Rechtssysteme – die immer schon recht fragwürdig war – wird nun endgültig brüchig; das gilt insbesondere für die in Kontinental- europa überlieferte Tradition der Gegenüberstellung eines (vermeintlich) statisch-geschlos- senen Zivilrechts und eines politisch-dynamischen Öffentlichen Rechts. Die Rechtsverglei- chung wird so stärker in die rechtspolitischen Auseinandersetzungen um die weltweite Weiterentwicklung des Rechts hineingezogen, in denen Muir Watt mit Pierre Legrand für einen auf Differenz setzenden Respekt vor „dem Anderen“ eintritt. Der dritte Teil des Buches, der sich einzelnen Rechtsgebieten zuwendet, ist hauptsäch- lich dem Privatrecht gewidmet. Auffälligerweise fehlt sogar eine Bilanz zum Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Rechtsvergleichung. Aus dem Bereich des Öffentlichen Rechts finden sich nur zwei Beiträge: Mark Tushnet widmet sich dem Verfassungsrecht ("Comparative Constitutional Law"), John S. Bell dem Verwaltungsrecht ("Comparative Administrative Law"). Beide sind bekannte Autoren, die schon in vielfältiger Weise zu diesen Fragen publiziert haben. Tushnets Analyse der Verfassungsrechtsvergleichung ist stark auf die Entwicklung der Diskussion in den USA konzentriert. Hier beobachtet er, dass eine stark auf die Rechtsprechung konzentrierte Rechtskultur sich erst spät für die Vergleichung öffnete. Neben der zunehmend bedeutsamen Rechtsprechung des deutschen Bundesverfas- sungsgerichts weist er eine Schlüsselrolle in diesem Prozess der Entwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa nach 1989 zu, die das heutige Feld des vergleichenden Verfassungsrechts über- haupt erst hervorgebracht habe. Er widmet sich dann verschiedenen Einzelproblemen, wobei die vergleichende Analyse der unterschiedlichen Formen einer Verfassungskontrolle durch Gerichte hervorsticht. Besonders lesenswert ist der Beitrag Bells zum Verwaltungs- recht. Dieses gilt traditionell als ein Gebiet, auf dem die Vergleichung besonderen Schwie- rigkeiten begegnet. Bell hebt aber mit Recht hervor, dass es bereits seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Gneist, Mohl) eine Tradition des verwaltungsrechtlichen Vergleichs gibt. Als Engländer hebt er den „interessanten“ Umstand hervor, dass das erste Buch über das englische Ver- waltungsrecht von einem Deutschen stammt.1 Als Besonderheit des Vergleichs im Verwal- tungsrecht gegenüber dem Privatrecht betont Bell, Universalitätsannahmen seien hier von vornherein fehl am Platze; es bedürfe vielmehr einer umfassenden Kontextualisierung im Rahmen der jeweiligen nationalen Institutionen. Deshalb sei die typische Form der Ver- gleichung auf diesem Gebiet auch häufig die monographische Behandlung eines anderen Verwaltungsrechtssystems, das der Vergleicher in ihm aus der eigenen Rechtsordnung vertrauten Begriffen analysiere. Die besten entsprechenden Arbeiten seien explizit verglei- chend in der Art der Fragen, die sie an das andere System richteten, und der Erklärungen, die sie für die jeweilige Entwicklung anböten. Vergleichende Arbeiten über mehr als ein anderes Verwaltungsrechtssystem blieben dagegen häufig unbefriedigend: Entweder fehle es dem jeweiligen Bearbeiter an der hinreichenden Vertrautheit mit den anderen Rechts- ordnungen, oder aber es komme zu einer Ansammlung von Länderberichten in einem Auto-

1 Otto Koellreutter, Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungsrechtsprechung im modernen England: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie, 1912.

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renkollektiv, wobei die Vergleichung weitgehend auf der Strecke bleibe. Anders als die ältere britische Tradition (Dicey) betont Bell mit Selbstverständlichkeit die Vergleichbar- keit zwischen kontinentalem und angelsächsischem Verwaltungsrecht. Dabei zeigt er, dass es im Verwaltungsrecht stärker als in anderen Bereichen der Vergleichung um die genaue Analyse der jeweiligen Institutionen geht, sei es in der Verwaltungsorganisation oder der gerichtlichen Kontrolle des Verwaltungshandelns. Die Vergleichung erbringt für ihn ihre besten Ergebnisse, wenn sie sich auf konkrete Einzelgebiete wie etwa die gerichtliche Kontrolle, Haftungsfragen oder die Kommunalverwaltung konzentriert. Bell hebt dabei am Beispiel der „rule of law“ hervor, wie unterschiedlich das Verständnis fundamentaler Be- griffe in verschiedenen verwaltungsrechtlichen Traditionen sein kann. Insgesamt liegt hier ein beeindruckendes Kompendium vor, das dem Leser den heuti- gen Stand der Rechtsvergleichung in den avanciertesten methodischen Diskussionen wie der Vielfalt einzelner Rechtsgebiete erschließt. Die Fülle der Literaturhinweise erlaubt es ihm auch, einzelne Fragen vertiefend zu verfolgen. Wer auf einem bestimmten Gebiet rechtsvergleichend arbeitet, wird durch das Handbuch in den Stand gesetzt, sich über methodische Grundsatzfragen und mögliche Parallelprobleme in anderen Bereichen rasch und zuverlässig zu informieren. Die durchgängig hohe Qualität der Beiträge macht dieses Oxford Handbook zum unentbehrlichen Begleiter für jeden, der sich ernsthaft mit Fragen der Rechtsvergleichung befassen möchte. Nietzsche hat das 19. Jahrhundert einmal das „Zeitalter der Vergleichung“ genannt. Wenn man dieses Handbuch als Indikator nimmt, dann wird wohl auch das 21. Jahrhundert so heißen dürfen, jedenfalls auf dem Gebiet des Rechts. Christoph Schönberger, Konstanz

Christoph Antons / Volkmar Gessner (Hrsg.) Globalisation and Resistance Law Reform in Asia since the Crisis Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, pbk 328 S., £ 22,00, ISBN 1-84113-681-6

In der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur zur Entwicklungspolitik gilt Asien oft als Muster- knabe. In anderen Regionen der (so genannten) Dritten Welt sind vielfach wirtschaftliche Stagnation und mitunter gar Rückschritt zu beobachten; die Schere zwischen reich und arm klafft immer weiter auseinander. Dagegen bilden Süd- und Ostasien die große Ausnahme. Allein hier findet man eine signifikante Zahl von Staaten, die den nachhaltigen wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg vom Entwicklungs- zum Schwellenland oder gar zur Industrienation ge- schafft haben. Dennoch ist in Europa und Nordamerika diese Region Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Untersuchung seltener als beispielsweise Osteuropa oder Südamerika. Auf diese Lücke zielen beiden Herausgeber Christoph Antons und Volkmar Gessner mit ihrem Band zu den rechtlichen Reformen in Asien seit der Krise. Die Beiträge gehen zurück auf einen Workshop des Internationalen Instituts für Rechtssoziologie im Frühjahr 2003 in

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Oñati. Sie beschäftigen sich mit der Rolle des Rechts bei der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung der Staaten vorwiegend in Ost- und Südostasien (social engineering through law). Der Band spannt einen weiten Bogen über verschiedene Rechtsgebiete. Der Schwer- punkt liegt auf dem Verfassungsrecht und der Herausbildung rechtsstaatlicher und demokratischer Strukturen. Es finden sich jedoch auch Beiträge zur Dezentralisierung der Ver- waltung und zum Wirtschaftsrecht. Die Untersuchungen stehen insbesondere unter dem Eindruck von zwei für die Region prägenden Ereignissen und Entwicklungen: zum einen der Asienkrise von 1997 und zum anderen der Rechtsentwicklung nach den Anschlägen auf die Twin Towers in New York am 11. September 2001. Die beiden Herausgeber führen zu Beginn in die Thematik ein. Sie geben einen kurzen und guten Überblick über den aktuellen Forschungsstand im Bereich Recht und Entwick- lung sowie der sozialwissenschaftlichen Asienstudien. Im Anschluss spannen sie einen einheitlichen Bogen über die unterschiedlichen Beiträge des Buches. Der Band ist in vier Teile gegliedert und in seinem Aufbau klassisch. Der erste Teil enthält vier theoretische Abhandlungen zur Rolle des Rechts bei der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, die den Rah- men für die in den folgenden drei Teilen abgedruckten Fallstudien bilden sollen. Die Bei- träge betrachten das Thema dabei aus einer soziologischen, einer anthropologischen, einer geschichtlichen und einer vergleichenden Perspektive. Teil 2 bietet konkrete Fallstudien zu Verfassungsrechtsreformen in Südostasien, Indien und China, Teil 3 widmet sich der De- zentralisierung der Verwaltung, und Teil 4 beschäftigt sich mit wirtschaftsrechtlichen Aspekten beschäftigt. Unter dem Titel "Legalisations and the Varieties of Capitalism" betrachtet Volkmar Gessner aus soziologischer Perspektive die Rolle des Rechts bei der Modernisierung. Ihre Bedeutung werde oft überschätzt. Westliche Institutionen, wie die Weltbank und verschiedene nationale Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen, versuchten, die Staaten Ost- und Südost- asiens bei der Etablierung rechtlicher Institutionen zu beraten. Dabei würde jedoch oft übersehen, dass sich westliche Modelle nicht ohne weiteres auf asiatische Gesellschaften übertragen ließen. Neben formalen gebe es in allen Staaten nämlich auch informale Institu- tionen. Um die tatsächliche Rechtspraxis verstehen zu können, müsse man daher die sozialen und historischen Hintergründe einer Gesellschaft kennen – je komplexer eine Gesell- schaft sei, desto weniger lasse sie sich allein durch formale Institutionen erklären. So spielten etwa in chinesischen Geschäftsbeziehungen gegenseitiges Vertrauen und soziale Bindungen eine große Rolle (guanxi). Bei seiner Diagnose unterscheidet Gessner mit Luh- mann zwischen normativen und kognitiven Erwartungen. Normative Erwartungen blieben erhalten, selbst wenn andere Akteure diese nicht erfüllten. Demgegenüber werden die kognitiven Erwartungen an das Verhalten anderer Akteure angepasst. Eine Gesellschaft brauche beide Elemente um gleichzeitig stabil und entwicklungsfähig zu sein. Gessner warnt davor, zu viel Wert auf formale Institutionen zu legen, da dann die Gefahr der Infle- xibilität und der Stagnation bei der Entwicklung bestehe.

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Franz und Keebet von Benda-Beckmann beschreiben in ihrem Kapitel über "Transna- tionalisation of Law, Globalisation and Legal Pluralism" die Pluralisierung des Rechts im Prozess der Globalisierung aus einer rechtsanthropologischen Perspektive. Recht werde nicht nur von unterschiedlichen Akteuren gesetzt, sondern wirke auch auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen. Auf der einen Seite sei ein Vereinheitlichungsprozess zu beobachten. Die Autoren unterscheiden – neben dem klassischen Völkerrecht – drei Formen globalen Rechts. Das transnationale Recht werde, wie die lex mercatoria, in bestimmten sektoriellen Netzwerken geschaffen und angewandt. Das transnationalisierte Recht bewirke eine Ver- einheitlichung nationaler Rechtssysteme zumindest in bestimmten Bereichen. Dazu gehör- ten Modellgesetze, aber auch Strukturanpassungsprogramme internationaler Institutionen, die auf eine Förderung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit oder eine Stärkung nationaler Institutionen gerichtet sind. Das globalisierte Recht schließlich ähnele dem transnationalisierten in seiner Wirkung, kenne jedoch keine Grenzen und umspanne den gesamten Globus. Auf der anderen Seite komme es jedoch auch zu einem Prozess der Differenzierung. Das Studium des nationalen Rechts allein sage oft wenig über die tatsächliche Rechtspraxis aus. Zum einen könne das Recht innerhalb eines Staates regional stark differenziert sein. So gebe es etwa in Indonesien teilweise nur Rahmengesetzgebung auf nationaler Ebene, die dann auf regiona- ler und lokaler Ebene ausgefüllt werde. Teilweise gebe es für bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bereiche auch eigenes Recht, so etwa im religiösen Bereich. Aufgrund dieser unterschiedlichen gegenläufigen Entwicklungen schlagen die Autoren vor, die gängige Unterscheidung zwischen Mikro- und Makrostudien aufzugeben. Christoph Antons verfolgt die Entwicklung des Rechts und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Ost- und Südostasien aus historischer Perspektive ("Law Reform in the Developmental States of East and Southeast Asia"). Während des kalten Krieges habe es in dieser Hinsicht kaum Bewegung in den südostasiatischen Staaten gegeben. Einige Staaten, wie etwa Indo- nesien, hätten an einer zu großen Pluralität von bereichsspezifischen oder regionalen Rechtssystemen gelitten; in anderen Staaten habe es entwicklungsorientierte Diktaturen gegeben mit dem Ziel, die Herausbildung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit zu verhindern. Mit dem Zusammenbruch des hohen wirtschaftlichen Wachstums während der Asienkrise hätten aber gerade diese Regime ihre Legitimität verloren, so dass bestimmte gesellschaftliche Gruppen erfolgreich auf die Einführung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Elemente drängen konnten. Zudem gebe es nach dem Ende des kalten Krieges eine größere Konkur- renz um Investoren auf dem Weltmarkt, da inzwischen auch ehemals kommunistische Staaten zu interessanten Zielen für westliche Investoren geworden seien. Nach dem 11. September bestehe zwar die Gefahr, dass, wie Antons meint, unter dem Druck der Bush- Administration einige Staaten zu Law-and-Order-Regierungen zurückkehrten, alles in allem sei aber die Zeit wohl nicht zurückzudrehen. John Ohnesorge ("Politics, Ideology and Legal System Reform in Notheast Asia") betrachtet den amerikanischen Einfluss auf die rechtlichen Reformen im Bereich des Ge- sellschafts- und Verwaltungsrechts, bezogen auf Nordostasien. Er stützt sich dabei auf Beispiele aus Japan, Südkorea und Taiwan. Die Reform-Agenden seien verwandt, da sie die

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Macht der Bürokratie einschränken sollten – zum einen zugunsten von mehr Wirt- schaftsfreiheit, zum anderen, um der Justiz mehr Einfluss zu verleihen. Er warnt jedoch vor einer Amerikanisierung der Rechtssysteme, da rechtliche Institutionen immer durch die lokale Praxis ausgestaltet werden und sie somit in einem anderen gesellschaftlichen Kon- text andere Effekte zeitigen könnten als beabsichtigt. Im letzten Teil seines Beitrags geht Ohnesorge auf zwei aktuelle Entwicklungen ein, die neoliberalen Tendenzen entgegenwir- ken könnten. Zum einen sorge die Enron-Krise in den USA für strengere Standards im Bereich des corporate governance. Um für amerikanischen Investoren interessant zu bleiben, werde diese Entwicklung in den nordostasiatischen Staaten wahrscheinlich nachvoll- zogen. Auch der 11. September habe zu verstärkten Kontroll- und Überwachungsmecha- nismen geführt. Gerade letzteres Beispiel zeige jedoch, dass eine Abkehr von einem extre- men Neoliberalismus nicht unbedingt positiv zu bewerten sein müsse. Der zweite Teil des Buches enthält Fallstudien zu verschiedenen Entwicklungen im Verfassungsrecht Thailands, Malaysias, Indiens und Chinas. Dabei werden vor allem die Demokratisierung dieser Staaten und die Herausbildung rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen in den Blick genommen. Andrew Harding vergleicht in seinem Beitrag die Entwicklung des Ver- fassungsrechts in Thailand und Malaysia, die sehr unterschiedlicher Natur sind. In Thailand kam es 1997 nach der Asienkrise zu einer umfangreichen verfassungsrechtlichen Reform, bei der durch ein ausgeklügeltes System von Checks and Balances versucht wurde, informale Netzwerke und Korruption weitgehend in Schach zu halten und ein demokratisches System zu etablieren. Der Militärputsch im September 2006 zeigt jedoch, dass dieser Weg trotz zwischenzeitlich positiver Aussichten bisher nur bescheidenen Erfolg hatte. Malaysia wählte einen anderen Weg, mit der Krise umzugehen. Der Staat, der seit 1981 von demsel- ben Ministerpräsidenten regiert wurde, verschloss sich politischen Reformen und stimmte gegen eine Intervention des IMF in der Asienkrise. Harding versucht mit diesen beiden unterschiedlichen Fallstudien aufzuzeigen, dass es nicht den einen asiatischen Weg gibt, sondern dieser viele Formen annehmen und auch in unterschiedliche Richtungen gehen kann. Die globalisierungsbedingte Konvergenz des Rechts vor allem im Bereich Wirtschaft gehe einher mit einer Divergenz in anderen Rechtsbereichen, insbesondere dem Verfas- sungsrecht. Oliver Mendelsohn beschäftigt sich in seinem Beitrag "Law, Terror and the Indian Legal Order" mit der Verfassungsentwicklung in Indien – der ältesten Demokratie des Kontinents. Er zeichnet dabei die aktuellen politischen Entwicklungen nach und versucht die Stabilität der indischen Demokratie zu bewerten. Vor allem zwei Entwicklungen bereiten ihm dabei Sorge. Während Indien während der Regierungszeit der Kongresspartei traditionell ein säkularer Staat war, habe sich diese Situation mit der Wahl der Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) zur Regierungspartei im Jahr 1998 radikal gewandelt. Die BJP habe sich einer Weltsicht verschrieben, in der die hinduistische Religion und Lebensweise die zentrale Rolle spielten, während vor allem den Muslimen, die mit 130 Millionen Gläubigen eine starke Minderheit bilden, nur eine marginale Rolle zukomme. Zum anderen habe die BJP mit ihrer Anti-Terror-Gesetzgebung nach dem 11. September 2001 autoritäre Tenden-

98 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

zen in die indische Politik eingeführt, die an 1960er und 1970er Jahren anknüpften, in denen demokratische Rechte häufig durch Ausnahmezustände außer Kraft gesetzt worden seien. Mit der überraschenden Wahl der Kongresspartei zur stärksten Regierungspartei im Jahr 2004 sei diesen Tendenzen zwar entgegengewirkt worden, doch sieht Mendelsohn die Gefahr noch nicht gebannt. Ein möglicher Hüter der Demokratie könnte das Verfassungs- gericht sein; es werde sich allein aber einem wachsenden Autoritarismus nicht entgegen- stellen können. Jianfu Chen ("Role/Rule of Law in China Reconsidered") untersucht die Entwicklung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit (rule of law) in der Volksrepublik China. Das Rechtssystem habe sich seit 1978 in hohem Tempo entwickelt; ein vollständiger Übergang vom Konzept rule by law zum Konzept rule of law sei jedoch noch nicht zu verzeichnen: Trotz aller offiziel- len rechtsstaatlichen Rhetorik gebe es noch beträchtliche Defizite, insbesondere beim Ge- setzgebungsverfahren sowie bei der Gesetzesbindung und der Kontrolle der Regierung. Chen hält die Ausbildung eines vollen rechtsstaatlichen Systems ohne Demokratisierung nicht für möglich. Daher sei in China durch die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklun- gen der letzten beiden Jahrzehnte zwar das Fundament für die Rechtsstaatlichkeit gelegt worden. Die Herausbildung einer rule of law vollziehe sich indes in einem langen und komplexen Prozess, der ohne eine politische Öffnung der kommunistischen Partei nicht zum Erfolg führen könne. Der dritte Teil des Buches befasst sich mit Reformen im Bereich der Verwaltung. Franz und Keebet von Benda-Beckmann beschreiben in ihrem Beitrag "Between Global Forces and Local Politics" die Dezentralisierung von Politik und Verwaltung in Indonesien. Insbe- sondere internationale Finanzorganisationen, wie IMF und Weltbank sowie ausländische Regierungsorganisationen wie GTZ oder USAID haben diesen Trend zur Dezentralisierung angestoßen. Indonesien hat dabei an traditionelle lokale Strukturen angeknüpft, so dass sich der Prozess in der Folge weitgehend verselbständigt hat. Die Reformen bestanden vor allem darin, die Verantwortung lokaler Gemeinschaften zu stärken durch Übertragung signifi- kanter Aufgaben. Die Autoren wagen eine erste Bewertung der Reformen: Positiv hätten die Reformen die streng hierarchischen Strukturen des indonesischen Zentralstaats abge- schwächt und das Interesse am ökonomischen Potential einzelner Städte gesteigert. Der Zuwachs an Verantwortung habe der Bevölkerung zu mehr politischer Partizipation ver- holfen. Allerdings hätten die Reformen auch Probleme sichtbar gemacht, die aus der Koor- dination unterschiedlicher rechtlicher und moralischer Ordnungen, der staatlichen, der lokalen und der religiösen, folgten. Die transnationalen Organisationen spielten in diesem Prozess keine gestaltende Rolle, sondern dienten allenfalls als Alliierte, um die Strategien lokaler Akteure zu legitimieren. Im letzten Teil des Buches beschäftigen sich Terence Haliday und Bruce Carruthers mit Strategien von Entwicklungsländern, sich gegen den Einfluss internationaler Finanz- institutionen auf das eigene Wirtschaftsrecht zur Wehr zu setzen. Unter dem Titel "Foiling the Financial Hegemons" beschreiben die Autoren Fallstudien zur Reform des Insolvenz- rechts in Indonesien, Südkorea und China. Der Einfluss internationaler Akteure sei dabei

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 99

unterschiedlich stark gewesen. Indonesien und Südkorea hätten Reformen als Gegenleis- tung für Kredite versprechen müssen. In China dagegen hätten Weltbank, IMF und auslän- dische Geberorganisationen, wie die GTZ nur beratenden Einfluss. Haliday und Carruthers beobachten dabei unterschiedliche Abwehrstrategien. Diese reichten von zeitlichen Verzö- gerungen und der bloß formalen Umsetzung ohne Änderung der Praxis bis hin zur Beru- fung auf kulturbedingte Ausnahmen, die Fragmentierung der Koalition der ausländischen Institutionen und dem Einbau von Ausnahmen und Fluchtwegen in die Reformgesetze. Die internationalen Akteure begegneten dabei einer Reihe von Problemen. Diese beträfen zum einen ihre eigene Ausstattung mit Zeit und Ressourcen. Gravierender sei allerdings eine andere Problematik: Von vielen westlichen Beratern und Wissenschaftlern werde oft über- sehen, dass rechtliche Institutionen nicht ohne weiteres in andere kulturelle Zusammen- hänge transplantiert werden könnten. Gerade ein Rechtsbereich wie das Insolvenzrecht mit seinen enormen distributiven Implikationen wirke sich oft sehr stark auf die gesamte Rechts- und Gesellschaftsordnung aus und könne daher in der Praxis Widerstände der lokalen Eliten hervorrufen. Mit "Globalization and Resistance" lenken die Herausgeber den Blick auf eine Region, in der gegenwärtig die größte wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Dynamik herrschen dürfte. Schon das macht es notwendig und dazu äußerst spannend, sich mit der Rechtsent- wicklung dort zu befassen. Die Beiträge bieten vielfach interessante Einblicke und eröffnen neue Perspektiven – auch oder sogar gerade für die, die keine vertiefte Kenntnis der Region haben. Der Rezensent vermisst allerdings eine engere Verbindung zwischen Theorie und Fallstudien. Auch wenn die beiden Herausgeber erkennbar bestrebt sind, den Band in den aktuellen Forschungskontext einzubetten, wäre ein größerer Bezug beider Bereiche aufein- ander wünschenswert gewesen. Sie werden nur durch das gemeinsame Oberthema ver- klammert, stehen aber ansonsten weitgehend beziehungslos nebeneinander. Immerhin sind die einzelnen Beiträge in so hohem Maße lesenswert, dass der Band ohne Einschränkungen zur Lektüre empfohlen werden kann. Niels Petersen, Bonn

Stefanie Agerer Das Recht des Koran Islamisches Strafrecht in der Gegenwart VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken 2006, 132 S., 49,00 EUR, ISBN: 3865504183

Die Geltung und Anwendung islamisch geprägten Strafrechts in der Gegenwart ist vor allem wegen seiner drakonischen Strafen an Leib und Leben, seiner die patriarchalischen Strukturen der islamischen Gesellschaften erhaltenden Ausrichtung sowie seiner offen- sichtlichen Unvereinbarkeit mit dem abendländisch gewachsenen Verständnis von Men- schenrechten und Rechtsstaatlichkeit ein öffentlich sehr emotional behandeltes Thema. Die

100 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Arbeit verfolgt das berechtigte Anliegen, angesichts der Islamisierung des modernen Straf- rechts seit den 70er Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts in mehreren islamischen Staaten, die Entwicklung, Umsetzung und Anwendung des islamisch geprägten Strafrechts in Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien nachzuzeichnen, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung der historischen Grundlagen hinsichtlich des geltenden Rechts und seiner praktischen Anwendung. Auch wenn die Arbeit ihrem Anspruch im Großen und Ganzen gerecht wird, so haftet ihr als wesentliches Manko an, wegen völlig unzureichender Auswertung der einschlägigen wissenschaftlichen Literatur nicht auf der Höhe des gegenwärtigen Forschungsstandes zu sein. Nach einer kurzen Einordnung des Themas in den Prozess der (Re-)Islamisierung des Rechts in den islamisch geprägten Staaten und der Skizzierung des Inhalts und der Vorge- hensweise der Arbeit widmet sich die Autorin in ihrem Hauptteil der „Scharia in Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien“. Die anfänglichen Ausführungen zu Grundlagen und Entstehung sowie Geschichte und Entwicklung der Scharia, die von der Systematik her besser in die Einlei- tung gehört hätten, weisen aufgrund unzureichender Berücksichtigung des aktuellen For- schungsstands einige in ihrer Plakativität zweifelhafte Wertungen (z. B. „unverfälschte Anwendung der Scharia“ unter dem Propheten, volle Geltung der Scharia im Osmanischen Reich), rechtliche Ungenauigkeiten (z. B. Zuordnung der Delikte zu den Rechtsansprüchen Gottes und der Menschen) und überholte historische Einschätzungen (z. B. die völlige Erstarrung der islamischen Rechtslehre) auf. Hinsichtlich Pakistan skizziert die Autorin die rechtliche Entwicklung bis und die Islamisierung unter Zia ul-Haq auf der Grundlage des vorhandenen Forschungsstandes, wobei jedoch der Strafjustiz nur unzureichend Beachtung geschenkt wird. Die sich anschließenden Ausführungen zur „Scharia im gegenwärtigen Strafrecht“ haben die geltenden Rechtsvorschriften des islamischen Strafrechts in Pakistan und ihre Anwendung in der Praxis zum Gegenstand. Es entspricht dem bisherigen Forschungsstand, dass das islamische Strafrecht zwar weitgehend eingeführt wurde, aber in der Praxis die Körperstrafen mit Ausnahme der Auspeitschung nicht zur Anwendung gekommen sind. Darüber hinaus zeigt die Autorin durch Auswertung auch des Internets neue Aspekte der Rechtsanwendung auf. Leider wird sie dabei wissenschaftlichen Anforderungen, geschweige denn rechtswissenschaftlichen Ansprüchen, nicht gerecht. Weder werden Fundstellen der Gesetze angegeben noch wird in hinreichendem Maße auf Normen der genannten Rechtsquellen zurückgegrif- fen. Oft wird nicht deutlich, inwieweit eine geschilderte Rechtslage entsprechend normiert ist oder auf richterlicher Rechtsfortbildung beruht (z. B. Schwangerschaft als Nachweis für illegitimen Geschlechtsverkehr, Beweislast der Frau, dass die Schwangerschaft aus einer Vergewaltigung resultiert). Der Autorin ist aber zugute zu halten, dass sie im Folgenden der Entwicklung in den Provinzen und der Bedeutung der Stammesgerichtsbarkeit die jeweils gebührende Aufmerksamkeit schenkt. Sie zeigt auf, mit welcher Laxheit die Zentralregie- rung der starken Islamisierung insbesondere in der North West Frontier Province begegnet und sie den Fortbestand einer eigentlich bereits abgeschafften, aber tatsächlich noch exis- tierenden Stammesgerichtsbarkeit duldet. Insgesamt sieht die Autorin die zunehmende

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 101

Islamisierung vor allem auf provinzstaatlicher Seite zu Recht mit Sorge, vor allem hat sich die Lage der Frauen wieder erheblich verschlechtert. Im Kapitel über die Entwicklung der Scharia in Saudi-Arabien gibt die Autorin überblicksmäßig den bisherigen Kenntnisstand über die Entstehung und Entwicklung des saudischen Staates in Verbindung mit der wahhabitischen Lehre wieder. Der Zusammen- führung der unterschiedlichen Rechtssysteme des Hedschas und des Nadschd, basierend auf osmanischem Recht, traditionellem islamischem Recht und Stammesrecht der Beduinen, kommt dabei besondere Bedeutung zu. Dementsprechend legt die Autorin auch Gewicht auf die Gerichtsorganisation. Das Kapitel über die institutionellen Grundlagen ist den Quellen des geltenden hanbalitischen Strafrechts und den Organen der Strafverfolgung gewidmet. Zu Recht geht die Autorin ausführlich auf das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen dem Königshaus und den Religionsgelehrten ein, die trotz der Kompetenzen des Herrschers zum Erlass von Verordnungen und zur Ernennung der Richter jedenfalls die Rechtspre- chung und Bildungsinstitutionen, wenn nicht auch die Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung, weitgehend beherrschen. Die folgende Darstellung der Justizorgane krankt vielfach an mangelnder juristischer Präzision sowie daran, dass die einschlägigen gerichtsverfassungs- rechtlichen Vorschriften nicht zitiert werden. Das gilt auch für die Religionspolizei, die die Autorin wegen ihrer weit reichenden Kompetenzen zur Züchtigung bei kleineren Vergehen gegen die wahhabitischen Verhaltensregeln zu Recht mit behandelt. Die sich anschließenden Ausführungen zur Rechtspraxis basieren weitgehend auf den Forschungsergebnissen von Vogel1 und berücksichtigen wichtige Sekundärliteratur nicht.2 Zur bereits bekannten Anwendung des materiellen islamischen Strafrechts in Saudi-Ara- bien – Auspeitschungen, Amputationen und Hinrichtungen sind gängige Strafen – erfährt man kaum etwas Neues. Zuweilen wird nicht hinreichend problematisiert, ob und inwieweit eine Strafbarkeit noch der koranischen Strafbarkeit unterfällt oder der Auffangkategorie der taczir-Strafbarkeit zuzuordnen ist (z.B. Blasphemie von Nichtmuslimen), deren rechtsstaatliche Problematik aber gesehen wird. Soweit einzelne Fälle zitiert werden, werfen diese zumeist mehr Fragen auf, als die zur Verfügung stehenden Informationen Antworten zu geben in der Lage sind. Interessanter sind hingegen die verfahrensrechtlichen Ausführun- gen zur Strafverfolgung, die eine Diskrepanz zwischen den gesetzlichen Verfahrenssiche- rungen und der Verfahrensweise in der Praxis erkennen lassen (z. B. Recht des Verhafteten auf Mitteilung des Haftgrundes und Information von Angehörigen, Öffentlichkeit der Gerichtsverhandlungen und schriftlichen Urteile, Recht auf anwaltliche Verteidigung). Leider sind aber die Ausführungen vermutlich aufgrund der schlechten Informationslage nur selektiv und oberflächlich; Normen des Criminal Procedure Code werden nur verein- zelt zitiert.

1 Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System. Studies of Saudi Arabia, Köln 2000. 2 B. Seifert, Strafrecht in Saudi-Arabien, ZStW 111 (1999), 235 ff.

102 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Die Studie endet mit einem Vergleich Pakistans mit Saudi-Arabien. Während Pakistan britisch-rechtlich beeinflusst bereits seit seiner Gründung über ein stark differenziertes Rechtssystem durchdrungen vom britischen Common Law verfügt, das dann unter General Zia ul-Haq von oben her durch Erlass von Rechtsvorschriften islamisch-rechtlicher Prove- nienz unter Fortgeltung der überkommenen Rechtskodices im Übrigen islamisiert wurde, ist das saudische Rechtssystem mit der Geltung des ungeschriebenen islamischen Rechts hanbalitischer Prägung durch den Siegeszug des Wahhabismus und der Vereinheitlichung der unterschiedlichen Rechtssysteme auf der arabischen Halbinsel entstanden. Beide Staa- ten unterscheiden sich vor allem in darin, dass in Saudi-Arabien die Anwendung der koranischen Strafen und der Widervergeltung zum Alltag gehört, während in Pakistan diese Strafen mit Ausnahme der Auspeitschung bisher nicht vollzogen wurden. Sind im Gottes- staat Saudi-Arabien die Sachwalter des islamischen Rechts insbesondere die Rechtsgelehr- ten, gegenüber denen der Staat eine eher mäßigende Rolle einnimmt, ist in Pakistan der Staat die islamisierende Kraft, der sich gewichtige Teile der Zivilgesellschaft nach wie vor widersetzen. Vor diesem Hintergrund sieht die Autorin für Pakistan zu Recht deutlich günstigere Rahmenbedingungen für eine positive Entwicklung als in Saudi-Arabien, für das eine Zivilgesellschaft erst im Entstehen begriffen ist. Peter Scholz, Berlin

Andrea Kramer Dezentralisierung in der Wasserversorgung in Peru, Bolivien und Ekuador Ein Beitrag zur rechtsvergleichenden Methodik in der rechtswissenschaftlichen Entwicklungsforschung Beihefte zu „Verfassung und Recht in Übersee“, Heft 21 Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006, 321 S., EUR 64,00, ISBN 978-3-8329-2124-8.

Die voranschreitende Verknappung lebenswichtiger Ressourcen – vorliegend: von Trink- bzw. Siedlungswasser – ist längst als dringende Herausforderung nicht nur der nationalen und internationalen Politik, sondern gerade auch für die juristische wie interdisziplinäre Forschung erkannt worden.1 Wenn man sich wie hier erstmals in Deutschland dieser The- matik mit exemplarischem Blick auf den südamerikanischen Kontinent annimmt, ist dies verdienstvoll. Schließlich ist Wasserknappheit hierzulande gleichsam ein Fremdwort und werden einschlägige Debatten eher unter sekundären wirtschafts-, gebühren- und umwelt- rechtlichen Aspekten (Stichworte: Liberalisierung, Privatisierung und Private public partnership; umweltgerechte Trinkwassergewinnung und Abwasserentsorgung), kaum aber

1 Siehe zuletzt etwa die Beiträge in: J. Fernández Ruíz / J. Santiago Sánchez (Hrsg.), Régimen jurí- dico del agua – Culturas y Sistemas Jurídicos Comparados, Mexiko (Univ. Nacional Autónoma de México), 2007.

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unter dem primären Gesichtspunkt einer quantitativ wie qualitativ angemessenen Allge- meinversorgung geführt. Die vorliegende, von Joachim Wolf am Bochumer Institut für Entwicklungsforschung und Entwicklungspolitik (IEE) betreute Bochumer Dissertation von Andrea Kramer schließt insofern eine bedeutsame Erkenntnislücke – und bewirkt zugleich weit mehr als dies: Anhand eines wichtigen Referenzgebiets des Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrechts leistet die Arbeit insbesondere einen Beitrag zur rechtswissenschaftlichen Methodik, konkret: zur Rechtsvergleichung im öffentlichen Recht, und vermittelt wertvolle Impulse für die inter- disziplinäre Entwicklungsforschung. Die Schrift beginnt mit einer Bestandsaufnahme zur mitunter desaströsen Lage der Siedlungswasserwirtschaft in Bolivien, Ekuador und Peru. In ländlichen Regionen dieser Länder überschreite der Deckungsgrad der öffentlichen Versorgung mit Trinkwasser kaum die 50 %-Marke. Zugleich sorgten voranschreitende Bau-, Agrar- und Industrieaktivitäten für erhebliche Wasserverschmutzungen und Grundwassersenkungen und scheitere die Problembewältigung insbesondere an unzureichenden Finanzressourcen. Allerdings stün- den, unterstützt auch durch internationale Entwicklungsprogramme, allenthalben umfassende Reformen des Wassersektors auf der politischen Agenda. Ihnen gehe es vor allem um die massive Förderung privatwirtschaftlicher Beteiligungen, um den Einsatz neuartiger Finanzierungsinstrumente und um eine spürbare Dezentralisierung der Verwaltungsverant- wortung. Damit einher gingen ein grundlegender Wandel der Rolle des Staates in der Ver- sorgungswirtschaft und damit auch des Staatsverständnisses. Vor der Detailanalyse der angedeuteten Veränderungen in den betrachteten Ländern wendet sich die Verfasserin zunächst der rechtsvergleichenden Methode zu. Betont wird deren Mehrwert bei der Begleitung rechtspolitischer Reformprozesse. Freilich liege hier der Teufel im Detail, wenn es, soll sich die Rechtsvergleichung nicht in bloßer Deskription oder aber bezugsloser Theoriendebatte erschöpfen, darum gehe, daraus praktisch verwert- bare Reformimpulse abzuleiten. Der (vorherrschende) „funktionale“ Ansatz der Rechtsver- gleichung wird deshalb kritisch-konstruktiv zurechtgerückt: Ihm könne es keineswegs um eine umfassende Prüfung der Wirksamkeit des jeweiligen nationalen Rechts bei der Prob- lembewältigung gehen, schon weil dazu umfangreichere Kontextanalysen u.a. rechtssozio- logischer Art erforderlich seien. Anempfohlen wird stattdessen eine methodische Reduk- tion, die an die Stelle einer Wirksamkeitsanalyse einen instrumentalen Ansatz verfolgt: Entscheidend seien die „Mittel und Wege zur Zielerreichung“ in den Blick zu nehmen und die jeweiligen nationalrechtlichen Lösungen mittels Plausibilitätserwägungen einer kritischen Beurteilung zu unterziehen. Abgerundet wird die Analyse durch Hinweise zur Da- tengewinnung beim Rechtsvergleich speziell von Entwicklungsländern. Wegen der dort nur schwer auffindbaren Rechtsnormen und kaum vorhandener Sekundärliteratur sei die Heranziehung empirischer Methoden, aber auch „grauer“ Literatur geboten – eine Kärrner- arbeit, von der die reichhaltigen Nachweise zu Interviews mit hochrangigen Gesprächspart- nern „vor Ort“ und zu Verlautbarungen internationaler Organisationen (UNO, Weltbank u.a.) beredtes Zeugnis ablegen.

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Unter stringenter Befolgung des methodischen Ansatzes wendet sich die Arbeit im Zweiten Teil der Einzelbetrachtung der Siedlungswasserversorgung in Peru, Bolivien und Ekuador zu. Die exemplarische Auswahl gerade dieser Länder wird einleuchtend mit Blick auf die dort zeitgleich verlaufenden Reform- und Dezentralisierugsprozesse in der Wasser- versorgung begründet. Die umfassend angelegten Länderberichte sind nach einem einheitlichen Untersuchungsschema übersichtlich strukturiert: Nach näheren Erläuterungen zur Entwicklung wie zu technischen, ökonomischen und administrativen Rahmenbedingungen der Wasserwirtschaft werden zunächst die einschlägigen Rechtsnormen sowie die auf dem Sektor tätigen maßgeblichen Akteure (getrennt nach wasserwirtschaftsrechtlicher Planung, der eigentlichen Leistungserbringung und der staatlichen Regulierung) präsentiert. Einen Prüfungsschwerpunkt bilden die unterschiedlichen Modalitäten der Leistungserbringung. Das Augenmerk der Verf.’in gilt vor allem den normativen Vorgaben zur Kooperation mit der Privatwirtschaft (etwa für Konzessions- und Betreibermodelle) wie auch für Public public partnership (z.B. in kommunalen Zweckverbänden), deren befriedigende Umset- zung in der Praxis häufig zu wünschen übrig lasse. Als ähnlich problematisch erweisen sich, mit Blick auf sich stets stellende Fragen etwa der Instandhaltungsverantwortung, die oftmals nur unzureichende Regelung der Eigentumsverhältnisse an den Versorgungsanla- gen. Nicht anders verhält es sich mit den unterschiedlichen Mechanismen zur Finanzierung der Wasserwirtschaft; zu besorgen seien hier eine unzureichende Ausgestaltung bzw. Kon- trolle der Gebührenbemessung und -erhebung mit daraus folgenden Haushaltsproblemen in den Gemeinden und deren Abhängigkeit von staatlichen, oftmals unzureichend koordinier- ten Transferleistungen und Fonds-Lösungen. Abgerundet werden die Länderberichte durch ausführliche Hinweise zur rechtlichen Sicherung der Trinkwasserqualität wie auch zu vorhandenen Verbraucherrechten sowie zur Wassernutzung und zum Gewässerschutz. Gewünscht hätte man sich freilich, auch angesichts aktueller Unsicherheiten hinsichtlich der öffentlichen Daseinsvorsorge in Deutschland, noch weiterführende Hinweise zur rechtsdogmatischen Positionierung der Wasserversorgung als eines traditionellen Servicio Público zwischen „Staat“ und „Markt“ in den untersuchten Ländern. Schließlich weisen diesbezügliche Untersuchungen in anderen lateinamerikanischen Staaten, auch wegen ihrer kritischen Distanz gegenüber dem früher maßgeblichen Vorbild wie der französischen Service Public-Doktrin, ein beachtliches Niveau auf.2 Angesichts der detailreichen Bestandsaufnahme zum Instrumentenmix in den untersuchten Staaten wendet sich der Leser mit Interesse der eigentlichen rechtsvergleichenden Analyse im Dritten Kapitel zu. Es bildet zugleich das Kernstück der Schrift, indem es die zuvor entwickelten theoretischen Anforderungen an die vergleichende Methode im öffent- lichen Recht mit den Feststellungen zur rechtsnormativen wie rechtspraktischen Lage der Wasserwirtschaft in Bolivien, Peru und Ekuador schlüssig zusammenführt: Aufgrund des

2 Grundlegend zum argentinischen Recht der Versorgungswirtschaft insbes. J. Salomoni, Teoría general de los servicios públicos, Buenos Aires 1999; speziell zur Entwicklung des chilenischen Wasserwirtschaftsrechts: A. Vergara Blanco, Derecho de aguas, 2 Bde., Santiago de Chile 1998.

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zuvor entwickelten Vergleichsmaßstabs (tertium comparationis) – des wasserwirtschaftlichen Zielkanons aus effizienter Allgemeinversorgung, hinreichender finanzieller Ressour- cen zur Behebung von Versorgungsmängeln sowie verbraucher- und umweltschutzbezoge- ner Belange – erfolgt zunächst eine kritische Gesamtschau der einzelstaatlichen Reforman- sätze. Leiterkenntnisse bilden hier die Hinweise auf erhebliche Unzulänglichkeiten schon bei der allgemeinen wie sektorbezogenen Gesetzgebung und sodann bei der rechtspraktischen Umsetzung des vielfach inkohärent und nicht selten fehlerhaft oder widersprüchlich gesetzten Rechts. Kritisch mag man darin auf den ersten Blick nicht mehr als „Binsenweis- heiten“ zur Lage des Rechts und der Versorgungswirtschaft in Entwicklungsländern erbli- cken. Der Vorzug der Schrift besteht freilich darin, dass konkrete rechtsnormative wie rechtspraktische Hemmnisse und Defizite bei der Verfolgung der wasserwirtschaftlichen Ziele in der Gegenüberstellung der Wasserrechtsregime gleich dreier Staaten präzise erar- beitet werden. Wiederholt zur Sprache kommen insbesondere gravierende Unzulänglich- keiten bei der kompetenz- und verfahrensrechtlichen Flankierung gesetzlicher Dezentrali- sierungs-, Privatisierungs-, Finanzierungs- sowie Umwelt- und Verbraucherschutzvorga- ben. Im Übrigen lässt es die Autorin bei diesen Feststellungen nicht bewenden, sondern spürt in einem zweiten Unterabschnitt gerade auch den Ursachen für die beachtlichen Diskrepanzen zwischen wasserwirtschaftspolitischem Anspruch und der rechtstechnischen Wirklichkeit nach. Aufgelistet sehen sich drängende Probleme einerseits im Rechtset- zungsprozess (Stichworte: Missachtung der Normenhierarchie und Wechselwirkung mit anderen Normen; Verstöße gegen Grundsätze der Normenklarheit und selbst der Logik; mangelhafte Transparenz von Rechtsänderungen) und sodann im Zuge der Rechtsanwen- dung; bemängelt werden in letztgenannter Hinsicht insbesondere fehlende Ausführungsvor- schriften sowie Personal- bzw. Schulungsressourcen, aber auch korrupte Strukturen auf administrativer wie judikativer Ebene und schließlich eine insgesamt mangelnde soziale Akzeptanz des Rechts in Lateinamerika. Insgesamt also eine gewiss schonungslose Analyse. Nur sie macht indes deutlich, wie nachhaltige Verbesserungen der Wasserwirtschaft oder auch anderer Regelungssektoren in Entwicklungsländern zu erreichen sind – und welchen praktischen Nutzen insoweit die Rechtsvergleichung zu leisten vermag: Zentral gehe es darum, vorhandene Reformen her- auszustellen bzw. neue Reformansätze zu entwickeln, mit denen die Qualität sowohl der Rechtsetzung bzw. der rechtsetzenden Institutionen wie auch die Effizienz des Normen- vollzugs zu steigern sind. Umgekehrt müssten Reformanstrengungen zur nachhaltigen Lösung der Weltwasserkrise solange Stückwerk bleiben, wie nicht die tiefer liegenden Mängel in der allgemeinen Rechtskultur der Einzelstaaten behoben werden. Die daraus abzuleitenden und durchaus verallgemeinerungsfähigen Forderungen an die rechtswissen- schaftliche Forschung wie an die Beratungstätigkeit in den Entwicklungsländern liegen dann auf der Hand: Die Rechtswissenschaft (zumal in Deutschland) sei in Richtung einer eigentlichen, d.h. ganzheitlichen „Entwicklungsforschung“ fortzuentwickeln, während die

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Rechtsberatung von Entwicklungsländern zwingend auch auf Verbesserungen in der Recht- setzung und Rechtsanwendung zu richten seien. Für notwendige weitere Untersuchungen zum öffentlichen (Wirtschafts-) Recht in Lateinamerika, aber auch in anderen Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern, ist die durchweg ansprechend geschriebene Arbeit von Andrea Kramer gewiss maßstabbildend. Ange- sichts der sichtbar gemachten Bezüge zur politikwissenschaftlichen und rechtssoziologi- schen Forschung (nebst Verwertung einschlägigen englischsprachigen Schrifttums vor allem im methodenkritischen Teil) dürfte in ihr ferner ein wertvoller Beitrag zur interdis- ziplinären wie internationalen Governance-Forschung zu sehen sein. Auch aus diesem Grund wurde die Schrift mit dem Wissenschaftspreis der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Lateinamerikaforschung 2006 ausgezeichnet – aus Sicht der deutschen Lateinamerikafor- schung handelt es sich allemal um einen großen Wurf. Johann-Christian Pielow, Bochum

Simon Chesterman / Chia Lehnardt (Eds.) From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies Oxford University Press, 2007, 308 S.,£ 60.00, ISBN 978-0-19-922848-5

Wenn private Militärfirmen hierzulande auch erst seit kurzem im Fokus des breiteren öffentlichen Interesses stehen, hat sich das Phänomen der Ausgliederung militärischer Aufgaben an transnational operierende Konzerne bereits in den Neunziger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts herausgebildet, und der Markt boomt spätestens seit Beginn des jüngsten Irak-Krieges. Der von Simon Chesterman und Chia Lehnardt herausgegebene Band, der im Rahmen eines Forschungsprojekts am Institute for International Law and Justice der New York University School of Law entstanden ist, bietet einen reichhaltigen Einblick in die verschiedenen Facetten wissenschaftlicher Auseinandersetzung mit den Aktivitäten privater Militärfirmen. Die Autorinnen und Autoren stammen größtenteils aus verschiedenen Uni- versitäten und Forschungseinrichtungen, aber auch der Verband britischer Militärfirmen (BAPSC, s.u. Kapitel 13) ist vertreten. In vier Teilen – Bedenken, Herausforderungen, Normen, Märkte – wird das historisch neue (bzw. wiederbelebte) Phänomen der Privatisierung legitimer Gewaltausübung aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven beleuchtet. Hierbei wird grundsätzliche Kritik unter rechtlichen und moralischen Gesichtspunkten ebenso geäußert wie generelle Akzeptanz der Übertragung militärischer Aufgaben an private Unternehmen. Bei aller Mannigfaltigkeit der vertretenen Standpunkte besteht unter den Autoren Einigkeit jedenfalls darüber, dass der neu entstandene Wirtschaftszweig bestehen bleiben wird und eine Regulierung in höherem Maße als bisher von Nöten ist. Den ersten Teil (Concerns) eröffnet das Kapitel „Morality and regulation“ von Sarah Percy, die zwei grundsätzliche Einwände gegen die Aktivitäten privater Militärfirmen

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 107

untersucht. Der erste bezieht sich auf die Motivation der Mitarbeiter (und – wenn auch deutlich weniger – Mitarbeiterinnen) dieser Unternehmen, die sich mit dem Vorwurf kon- frontiert sehen, aus rein finanziellen Interessen Menschen umzubringen; der zweite beklagt die Gefährdung demokratischer Kontrolle von Gewaltanwendung bei deren Übertragung auf Private. Percy legt dar, dass die Kritik zwar teilweise relativiert und auch zwischen verschiedenen Konstellationen des Einsatzes privater Militärfirmen differenziert werden muss, gewisse prinzipielle Bedenken aber bestehen bleiben. Auch zur Steigerung der öffentlichen Akzeptanz müssten diese bei der Regulierung bedacht werden, z.B. wäre eine klare Verbindung zwischen den Unternehmen und ihrem jeweiligen Sitzstaat wünschens- wert. Letztlich dienten moralische Einwände auch zur ständigen Hinterfragung staatlicher oder privatisierter Gewaltanwendung. Kevin A. O´Brien befasst sich im zweiten Kapitel („What should and what should not be regulated?“) mit der Typologie privater Militärfirmen. Nach Abgrenzung von sog. Söld- nern und weiteren verwandten Phänomenen wird eine Unterteilung anhand der verschiedenen Tätigkeitsfelder privater Militärfirmen vorgenommen, wobei – anders als bei P. W. Singers ansonsten ähnlicher „tip of the spear“-Typologie1 – nicht ein Unternehmen als Ganzes betrachtet werden soll, sondern jeweils die unterschiedlichen Aktivitäten Gegens- tand der Regulierung sind. Während im engeren Sinne militärische Operationen (wie z.B. die Teilnahme an oder die Unterstützung von Kampfhandlungen, nachrichtendienstliche Tätigkeiten sowie Friedenssicherung) streng reguliert und überwacht werden sowie jeweils einer einzelfallspezifischen ministeriellen Lizenz bedürfen sollen, könnten die weiteren Kategorien weniger entscheidender und gefährlicher Unterstützung und Sicherheitsge- währleistung (military-support operations, defensive security operations, non-lethal security operations) durch allgemeine Lizenzen reguliert werden. O´Brien entwickelt hierzu ein differenziertes System und stellt die notwendigen Schritte für dessen Realisierung dar, kann dabei aber die im ersten Kapitel erhobenen Bedenken, insbesondere hinsichtlich der feh- lenden parlamentarischen Kontrolle, nicht ausräumen. Mit der Einflussnahme privater Militärfirmen auf die staatliche Außen- und Sicher- heitspolitik beschäftigt sich das dritte Kapitel, „Regulating the role of private military companies in shaping security and politics“ von Anna Leander. Wegen zahlreicher Unter- schiede zwischen öffentlichen Militärs und privaten Militärfirmen hält sie die bisherigen institutionellen Mechanismen politischer Einflussnahme auf das Militär für ungeeignet zur Regulierung der Einflussnahme Privater. Ein soziologischer Ansatz hierzu, der eine Kom- patibilität der in der demokratischen Gesellschaft und unter privaten Militärfirmen vorhandenen Vorstellungen hinsichtlich dieser Einflussnahme anstreben würde, könnte sich deswegen disfunktional auswirken, weil eine Dominanz der Normen privater Sicherheits- experten aufgrund der Dynamik des Marktes wahrscheinlicher sei. Auch wenn Leander

1 P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca/London, 2003, S. 91 ff. unterscheidet Military Provider Firms, Military Consultant Firms und Military Support Firms anhand der Nähe ihrer Tätigkeiten zum Kampfgeschehen.

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diesbezüglich keinen konkreten Vorschlag zur Regulierung macht, eröffnet ihr interdiszi- plinärer Ansatz eine weitere Dimension der Auseinandersetzung mit der Rolle privater Militärfirmen im nationalen und internationalen Machtgefüge, die bei Regulierungsversu- chen zu berücksichtigen ist. Im zweiten Teil des Buches (Challenges) werden Beispiele verschiedener Einsatzge- biete privater Militärfirmen untersucht und jeweils damit verbundene Probleme aufgezeigt. Angela McIntyre und Taya Weiss setzen sich im vierten Kapitel („Weak governments in search of strength: Africa´s experience of mercenaries and private military companies“) mit der Rolle privater Militärfirmen in schwachen Staaten auseinander, insbesondere am Bei- spiel der Einsätze der südafrikanischen Firma Executive Outcomes in Angola (1993-1995) und Sierra Leone (1995-1997). Diese verdeutlichen den – zumindest kurzfristigen – Nutzen privater Militärfirmen bei der Wiederherstellung der Hoheitsgewalt legitimer Regierungen (so auch der ehemalige Finanzminister Sierra Leones, James O. C. Jonah, in seinem Vor- wort zum hier besprochenen Band), während die zugrunde liegenden Geschäftsverbindun- gen zu Rohstofffirmen bedenklich sind. Gerade der Einsatz transnationaler Unternehmen zum Schutz von Rohstoffvorkommen kann das Verhältnis des Staates zu seiner Bevölke- rung in politischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht stören und die innere Sicherheit gefährden. McIntyre und Weiss stellen zusammenfassend fest, dass die Regulierung privater Militär- firmen in schwachen Staaten andere und größere Probleme mit sich bringt als in stabilen Demokratien, was letztere in ihren Regelungsansätzen berücksichtigen müssen. Gegenstand der Untersuchung in David Isenbergs Kapitel „A government in search of cover: Private military companies in Iraq“ sind die Probleme, die der massive Einsatz privater Militärfirmen im Irak offenbart. Dass die weitgehende Privatisierung militärischer Aufgaben grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, wird in den Vereinigten Staaten kaum angezweifelt, vielmehr geht es um die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Die Kontrolle über und die Verantwortlichkeit für private Militärfirmen sind bisher nur lückenhaft durchsetzbar, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Rules of Engagement liegt eine dichtere Regelung gerade auch im Interesse der Unternehmen. Von staatlicher Seite hält Isenberg sowohl erhöhten Personal- einsatz zur Kontrolle als auch konsequentere Verfolgung und Sanktionierung von Verstö- ßen für notwendig. Diese Maßnahmen würden durch die damit intendierte steigende Glaubwürdigkeit auch der Wirtschaft zugute kommen. Im sechsten Kapitel, „Transitional states in search of support: Private military companies and security sector reform“ von Elke Krahmann, steht der Einsatz privater Militärfir- men bei der Reform des Sicherheitssektors im Vordergrund. Diese beinhaltet die (Wieder-) Herstellung effektiver Sicherheit unter demokratischer Kontrolle und erlangt Bedeutung vor allem in Entwicklungsländern und in postautoritären und Post-Konflikt-Staaten, wobei private Militärfirmen – diese Konstellationen werden unterschieden – sowohl von den betroffenen Staaten selber als auch von dritten Geberstaaten beauftragt werden. Probleme sieht Krahmann weniger im jeweiligen Verhalten der Unternehmen als in ihrer Natur als private Akteure im eigentlich öffentlichen Sektor. Hierunter könnte sowohl die Effektivität ihres Einsatzes leiden als auch die wichtigen internationalen Beziehungen zwischen staatli-

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 109

chen Armeen, weswegen Regulierung zwar teilweise Verbesserungen herbeiführen kann, der Einsatz staatlicher Armeen aber langfristig vorzuziehen wäre. Den dritten Teil (Norms) eröffnet Louise Doswald-Beck mit dem siebten Kapitel „Pri- vate military companies under international humanitarian law“. Sie legt diesen viel beach- teten Komplex sehr anschaulich dar durch präzise Untersuchung der verschiedenen Nor- men des humanitären Völkerrechts und der ihnen jeweils zugrunde liegenden Konstellatio- nen. Während die Merkmale der Söldnerdefinition des Art. 47 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls zu den Genfer Abkommen (ZP I) durch Beschäftigte privater Militärfirmen selten erfüllt bzw. nachzuweisen sind, ist deren Kombattantenstatus im Sinne des Art. 43 ZP I umstritten und stark vom Einzelfall abhängig. Daneben besteht die Möglichkeit, nach Art. 4 A Nr. 4 Genfer Abkommen III als Begleiter der Streitkräfte Kriegsgefangenenstatus zu erhalten, dies freilich nur in internationalen und nicht in internen Konflikten. Der Schutz der Mitar- beiter privater Militärfirmen vor Angriffen hängt maßgeblich von ihrer direkten Teilnahme an Feindseligkeiten ab, einem weiteren außerordentlich umstrittenen Merkmal. Für die wiederum anders geregelten nicht-internationalen Konflikte hält Doswald-Beck aufgrund des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes Angriffe dann für rechtswidrig, wenn eine Gefangennahme ebenso möglich wäre. Abschließend untersucht sie die Staatenverantwort- lichkeit im Rahmen des humanitären Völkerrechts, insbesondere für die Unterrichtung der eingesetzten Personen, sowie die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit bei Kriegsverbrechen der Beteiligten. Letztere beinhaltet neben Beweisschwierigkeiten und fehlendem Durchset- zungswillen der Staaten zusätzliche Probleme hinsichtlich der möglichen Befehlsgewalt öffentlicher Militärs. Zur Klärung des Status der Angehörigen privater Militärfirmen unter humanitärem Völkerrecht könnte vor allem deren Eingliederung in die Streitkräfte beitra- gen. Mitherausgeberin Chia Lehnardt untersucht im achten Kapitel „Private military companies and state responsibility“ die Staatenverantwortlichkeit für das Handeln privater Mili- tärfirmen, wobei sich das Völkerrecht trotz seiner Staatenzentriertheit flexibel zeigt im Hinblick auf diese neuen Akteure. Die Zurechnung privaten Handelns ist zum einen mög- lich bei der Ausübung hoheitlicher Gewalt, deren Abgrenzung aber – bis auf einige Kern- funktionen staatlichen Handelns wie die Beteiligung an Kampfhandlungen – Schwierig- keiten bereitet. Zum anderen ist die Zurechnung aufgrund faktischer Verbindungen zum Staat möglich, wobei die vom Internationalen Gerichtshof geforderte effektive Kontrolle hierfür eine hohe Hürde darstellt. Lehnardt stellt fest, dass dieses Kriterium weniger streng gehandhabt werden könnte, wenn der beauftragende Staat – anders als in den vom Interna- tionalen Gerichtshof entschiedenen Fällen – gleichzeitig die Kontrolle über das Gebiet ausübt, in dem der Einsatz stattfindet. Eine dritte, weniger entwickelte Zurechnungsmög- lichkeit, die gerade bei Verneinung der notwendigen Kontrolle Bedeutung erlangt, bietet die Verletzung der gebotenen Sorgfalt (due diligence) durch einen Staat – in Betracht kommen hier neben dem beauftragenden auch der Einsatz- und der Sitzstaat. Insgesamt findet im System der Staatenverantwortlichkeit die Beteiligung privater Militärfirmen an der Entscheidung über die Gewaltausübung keine Berücksichtigung, was aber auch Aus-

110 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

druck der Erkenntnis ist, dass die Staaten die ihnen zugeteilte Verantwortung für die Be- grenzung der Gewaltausübung selber wahrnehmen müssen. Mit den Möglichkeiten innerstaatlicher Lizenzierung privater Militärfirmen am Beispiel der USA und Südafrikas befasst sich Marina Caparinis Kapitel „Domestic regulation: Licensing regimes for the export of military goods and services“. Beide Staaten sind sehr darauf bedacht, dass die nationale Sicherheitspolitik nicht untergraben wird; in den USA akzeptiert man die Übertragung militärischer Aufgaben auf private Militärfirmen generell eher als in Südafrika. Beide Lizenzierungssysteme, die jeweils auf der Kriegswaffenexport- kontrolle aufbauen, weisen jedoch erhebliche Lücken auf sowohl in der Dichte der Regulie- rung als auch hinsichtlich der parlamentarischen Kontrolle und der Durchsetzbarkeit. Wäh- rend in den USA aufgrund der besonderen Privatisierungsfreundlichkeit die Kooperation mit den Unternehmen im Vordergrund steht, sind in Südafrika jüngst Gesetzesänderungen verabschiedet worden2, die den regulierten Bereich ausweiten und Ausdruck eines weiterhin eher antagonistischen Verhältnisses zwischen Staat und Militärfirmen sind. Für eine effektive Regulierung hält Caparini unabhängig von den Gegebenheiten in dem jeweiligen Staat vor allem erhöhte Transparenz, eine stärkere Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft und die Aus- weitung der bisher minimalen parlamentarischen Kontrolle für erforderlich. Im Fokus des vierten Teils des Buches (Markets) stehen der internationale Markt privater Militärdienstleistungen sowie seine Regulierung und zukünftige Entwicklung. Deborah Avant untersucht im zehnten Kapitel „The emerging market for private military services and the problems of regulation“ die mit der Privatisierung von Gewaltausübung verbundenen Möglichkeiten und Herausforderungen und sieht vor allem die diffuse Kontrolle über privatisierte Gewaltausübung als problematisch an. Die unterschiedlichen, oft nur kurzfris- tig angelegten Interessen der verschiedenen Akteure sowie die fehlende Kooperation und Überwachung sorgen für eine Entwicklung des Marktes allein anhand wirtschaftlicher Gesichtspunkte. So hält Avant die Normentstehung auf dem Markt durch prägendes Ver- halten der Auftraggeber für viel unwahrscheinlicher als durch Selbstregulierung der zur Professionalisierung tendierenden Unternehmen. Mit den Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme auf private Militärfirmen beschäftigt sich James Cockayne anhand der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie im elften Kapitel „Make or buy? Principal-agent theory and the regulation of private military companies“. Durch Untersuchung der verschiedenen Konstellationen des Einsatzes privater Militärfirmen im Hinblick auf das jeweilige Verhältnis zwischen Prinzipal und Agent werden verschiedene Regulierungsmöglichkeiten dargelegt. Probleme bereiten Schlupflöcher in den bisherigen Regelungen, das häufige Vorhandensein mehrerer Prinzipale sowie die Möglichkeit der Umkehr des Prinzipal-Agent-Verhältnisses, vor allem bei der Bereitstel- lung und Bedienung von Waffensystemen durch private Unternehmen. Hinsichtlich der

2 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act (No. 27 of 2006), GG 30477/2007-11-16 – Inkrafttreten wird noch bekannt gemacht, vgl. http://www.lawlibrary.co.za/notice/updates/2007/issue_37.htm (08.01. 2008).

Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 111

Regulierung setzt Cockayne große Hoffnung auf die private Rechtsdurchsetzung durch Geschädigte im Einzelfall, verbunden mit internationaler Harmonisierung und Kooperation. Insgesamt könnte der Einsatz privater Militärfirmen in bestimmten Konstellationen die rechtsstaatliche Begrenzung der Gewaltausübung gefährden, aber auch eine Steigerung der sozialen Verantwortung der Unternehmen schiene möglich, so dass neben der Gewaltaus- übung auch deren Überwachung teilweise privatisiert wäre. Im zwölften Kapitel („Contract as a tool for regulating private military companies“) untersucht Laura A. Dickinson den Einsatz von Verträgen als Mittel der Regulierung. Sie beschäftigt sich hierfür mit verschiedenen Einwänden gegen die Effektivität von Verträgen und legt – meist unter Bezugnahme auf das Beispiel des Einsatzes privater Vernehmungs- personen im Militärgefängnis Abu Ghraib – dar, dass dies für derzeitige Verträge zwar zutrifft, es durch effizientere Verträge aber möglich wäre, öffentlich-rechtliche und völker- rechtliche Normen in den privaten Sektor zu transportieren, wie es bei der Privatisierung auf rein nationaler Ebene bereits üblich ist. Der Vertrag sei deswegen das wirksamste Instrument, weil er stets an den jeweiligen Einzelfall angepasst werden könne. Bei der Überwachung könnten vor allem internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen eine bedeu- tende Rolle spielen. Andrew Bearpark und Sabrina Schulz von der British Association of Private Security Companies legen im dreizehnten Kapitel („The future of the market“) Optionen für die zukünftige Entwicklung und Regulierung privater Militärfirmen dar. Während staatliche Maßnahmen auf internationaler und nationaler Ebene langfristig notwendig seien, sei zunächst eine Selbstregulierung innerhalb der Wirtschaft zu erwarten, die wiederum zu entsprechenden Gesetzen führen könne. Zur auch von Seiten der Unternehmen gewünsch- ten Regulierung sei ein Zusammenwirken der verschiedenen Akteure erforderlich. In ihrem abschließenden Fazit stellen die Herausgeber Simon Chesterman und Chia Lehnardt fest, die tatsächliche Entwicklung privater Militärfirmen sei der wissenschaftlichen Aufarbeitung und theoretischen Einbettung voraus. Es fänden sich aber dennoch anwendbare Regeln, die nur zu einem einheitlichen regulativen Rahmen zusammengefügt werden müssten. Probleme bereiteten derzeit vor allem die mangelnde Transparenz, strukturelle Schwierigkeiten bei der Sanktionierung individuellen Handelns und fehlende Durchsetzungsmechanismen für die vorhandenen Normen. Für die künftige Entwicklung schlagen die Herausgeber vor, Vergleiche mit privaten Militärfirmen weniger bei den oft genannten Söldnern zu suchen, sondern stattdessen bei transnationalen Rohstofffirmen, und eine direkte Bindung an Menschenrechte herbeizuführen. Von der erwarteten Konsolidie- rung der Wirtschaft nach Beendigung des Irak-Konflikts erhoffen sie sich eine durch erhöhten Konkurrenzdruck veranlasste Professionalisierung, wenn auch weder Regulierung noch der Markt alle Bedenken gegen die Privatisierung militärischer Gewalt beseitigen könnten. Ohne ein ausbalanciertes Rechtsregime aber, so das plastische Schlusswort, würde der Markt weiterhin nur durch „Bankrott und Tod“ reguliert. Der Band zeigt deutlich das durch die Herausgeber im Fazit angesprochene „Patch- work“ verschiedener vorhandener Regelungen und bei zukünftigen Regelungen zu beach-

112 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

tender Aspekte. Die Vielfalt der Ansätze bringt es mit sich, dass sich in den einzelnen Kapiteln einige Überschneidungen und Widersprüche finden, sei es hinsichtlich der tat- sächlichen Gegebenheiten oder ihrer typologischen oder rechtlichen Einordnung. Diese – geringfügigen – Unstimmigkeiten sind aber im diskursiven Ansatz des Werkes angelegt und mindern in keiner Weise den großen Wert des Bandes als Zusammenstellung beachtlicher Erkenntnisse über das in dieser Intensität selten2 untersuchte Phänomen privater Militärfir- men. Die Schwierigkeit wird darin bestehen, diese Erkenntnisse zu einem kohärenten Regulierungsregime zusammenzufügen, wobei staatliche und nichtstaatliche sowie nationale und internationale Akteure gleichermaßen gefordert sind. Gleichzeitig wirft der Band weitergehende Fragen auf hinsichtlich der Verteilung und Kontrolle legitimer Gewaltaus- übung in einem Völkerrechtssystem mit immer mehr und immer wichtigeren privaten Akteuren. Positiv zu erwähnen sind schließlich die ausführliche Bibliographie, das detaillierte Sachverzeichnis sowie der eindrucksvolle Einband des Buches mit einem Ausschnitt aus Picassos „Guernica“. Daniel Heck, Berlin

2 Umfassend auch Thomas Jäger / Gerhard Kümmel (Eds.), Private Military and Security Compa- nies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, Wiesbaden 2007.

113

BIBLIOGRAPHIE / BIBLIOGRAPHY

Die nachfolgende Literaturauswahl ist erstellt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Informations- zentrum des Leibniz-Instituts für Globale und Regionale Studien – GIGA – (bis 2005: Deutsches Übersee-Institut – DÜI) Hamburg.*

The following selected bibliography has been compiled in cooperation with the information centre of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies – GIGA – (former German Over- seas Institute – DÜI) Hamburg.**

RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG ALLGEMEIN / LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL

Bliss, Frank / Merten, Peter / Schmidt, Bettina (Hrsg.), Die Evaluierungspraxis deutscher Entwick- lungsorganisationen. Ziele – Umsetzung – Herausforderungen, 2007, 224 S., ISBN 978-3-88156- 786-2. Brunkhorst, Hauke / Voigt, Rüdiger (Hrsg.), Rechts-Staat. Staat, internationale Gemeinschaft und Völkerrecht bei Hans Kelsen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2008, 400 S. (Staatsver- ständnisse, Bd. 16), ISBN 978-3-8329-2977-0. Eberhard, Harald / Lachmayer, Konrad / Ribarov, Gregor / Thallinger, Gerhard (eds.), Perspectives and Limits of Democracy. Proceedings of the 3rd Vienna Workshop on International Constitu- tional Law. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2008, 170 S., (Schriften zum Internatio- nalen und Vergleichenden Öffentlichen Recht, Band 4), ISBN 978-3-8329-3341-8. Heun, Werner / Starck, Christian (Hrsg.), Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Rechtsvergleich. Drittes deutsch-taiwanesisches Kolloquium vom 02.- 03. Oktober 2006 an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 2008, 246 S. (Studien und Materialien zur Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, Bd. 102) ISBN 978-3-8329-3082-0. Hufen, Friedhelm (Hrsg.) Verfassungen - Zwischen Recht und Politik. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag für Hans-Peter Schneider. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 2008, 596 S., ISBN 978-3- 8329-2946-6. Kreide, Regina, Globale Politik und Menschenrechte. Macht und Ohnmacht eines politischen Instru- ments, Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2008 (Campus Forschg, Bd. 929), 264 S., ISBN 978-3- 59338-597-6.

* Diese Bibliographie dient ausschließlich der Information. Die angegebenen Titel können von VRÜ und GIGA nicht geliefert werden. ** This Bibliography serves information purposes only. Neither VRÜ nor GIGA can supply any of the titles listed.

114 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Tenscher, Jens / Viehrig, Henrike (Hrsg.), Politische Kommunikation in internationalen Beziehungen. Studien zur politischen Kommunikation Bd. 2, 2007, 240 S., ISBN 978-3-8258-0279-0. Thränhardt, Dietrich (Hrsg.), Entwicklung und Migration, Jahrbuch Migration - Yearbook Migration 2006/2007. Studien zu Migration und Minderheiten Bd. 14, 2008, 256 S., ISBN 978-3-8258- 9724-6. World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, by World Bank, 384 p. October 2007, ISBN: 0-8213-6807-9.

AFRIKA / AFRICA

Aivo, Frédéric Joël, Le président de la république en Afrique noire francophone: genèse, mutations et avenir de la fonction.- Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007, 643 S. -ISBN 978-2-296-02398-7. At the coalface: gender and local government in Southern Africa / ed. by Colleen Lowe Morna u.a. with a foreword by Winnie Byanyima. Gender Links.- Johannesburg, 2007, 316 S. -ISBN 978-0- 620-38248-9. Becher, Anika, Parteienverbote in Afrika: mehr Schein als Sein?.- Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institut für Afrika-Studien, 2007, 8 S. Bogaards, Matthijs, Measuring democracy through election outcomes: a critique with the African data, in: Comparative Political Studies (Thousand Oaks/Cal.). 40 (October 2007) 10, S. 1211- 1237. Böhler, Katja, Die Landfrage in Simbabwe: eine zeitgeschichtlich-juristische Untersuchung.- Köln: Köppe, 2006, XXIII, 295 S. -ISBN 978-3-89645-621-2. Boone, Catherine, Property and constitutional order: land tenure reform and the future of the African state, in: African Affairs (Oxford). 106 (October 2007) 425, S. 557-586. Breton, Jean-Marie, Le statut et la perception de juge de l'administration dans les Etats d'Afrique Noire francophone, in: Recht in Afrika (Köln). 10 (2007) 1, S. 1-30. Brown, Stephen / Kaiser, Paul J., Democratisations in Africa: attempts, hindrances and prospects, in: Third World Quarterly (Egham). 28 (2007) 6, S. 1131-1149. Cammack, Diana, The logic of African neopatrimonialism: what role for donors?, in: Development Policy Review (Oxford). 25 (September 2007) 5, S. 599-614. Clark, John F., National conferences and democratization in francophone Africa, aus: Multiparty democracy and political change: constraints to democratization in Africa / ed. by John Mukum Mbaku u.a. - Trenton/N.J. u.a.: Africa World Press, 2006, S. 97-122. -ISBN 1-8401-4379-7. Erdmann, Gero, The cleavage model, ethnicity and voter alignment in Africa: conceptual and methodological problems revisited.- Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2007, 32 S. Fall, Ismaïla Madior, Evolution constitutionnelle du Sénégal: de la veille de l'indépendance aux élections de 2007.- Dakar: Centre de Recherche, d'Etude et de Documentation sur les Institutions et les Législations Africaines, 2007, 181 S.

Bibliographie / Bibliography 115

Fombad, Charles Manga, The Swaziland constitution of 2005: can absolutism be reconciled with modern constitutionalism?, in: South African Journal on Human Rights (Lansdowne). 23 (2007) 1, S. 93-115. Hirschler, Kurt, Tanzania in transition: violent conflicts as a result of political and economic reform, aus: Umbrüche im afrikanischen Gesellschaften und ihre Bewältigung / Ludwig Gerhardt u.a. - Berlin u.a.: Lit, 2006. - (Afrikanische Studien ; Bd.22), S. 259-276. -ISBN 3-8258-7518-0. Hopwood, Graham, Guide to Namibian politics: including A-Z of political personalities.- Windhoek: Namibia Institute for Democracy, 2007, 336 S. -ISBN 978-99916-840-1-7. Hulterström, Karolina / Kamete, Amin Y. / Melber, Henning, Political opposition in African countries: the cases of Kenya, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.- Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007, 85 S. -ISBN 978-91-7106-587-2. Ikome, Francis Nguendi, Good coups and bad coups: the limits of the African Union's injunction on unconstitutional changes of power in Africa.- Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007, 55 S. -ISBN 978-1-92021-601-6. Isike, Christopher / Ojakorotu, Victor / Uzodike, Nwabufo, The internationalisation of the Niger Delta crisis: a function of the globalisation of human rights, in: Africa Insight (Pretoria). 37 (April 2007) 1, S. 19-43. Joireman, Sandra Fullerton, Enforcing new property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Ugandan constitution and the 1998 Land Act, in: Comparative Politics (New York/N.Y.). 39 (July 2007) 4, S. 463-480. Kirschke, Linda, Semipresidentialism and the perils of power-sharing in neopatrimonial states, in: Comparative Political Studies (Thousand Oaks/Cal.). 40 (November 2007) 11, S. 1372-1394. Larmer, Miles / Fraser, Alastair, Of cabbages and king cobra: populist politics and Zambia's 2006 election, in: African Affairs (Oxford). 106 (October 2007) 425, S. 611-637. Law and justice in a multicultural society: the case of Mozambique / ed. by Boaventura de Sousa Santos u.a. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa u.a. .- Dakar: CODESRIA, 2006, XIV, 251 S. -ISBN 2-86978-191-1. Mashike, Lephophotho, "Blacks can win everything, but the army": the transformation of the South African military between 1994 and 2004, in: Journal of Southern African Studies (Basingstoke). 33 (September 2007) 3, S. 601-618. Mbaye, Keba, Propos d'un juge.- Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines du Sénégal, 2006, 253 S. - ISBN 2-7236-1620-7. Mlambo, Norman, The politics of bitterness: understanding the Zimbabwean crisis 1980-2005, in: African Renaissance (London). 3 (2006) 2, S. 54-73. Moore, David, "When I am a century old": why Robert Mugabe won't go, aus: Legacies of power: leadership change and former presidents in African politics / ed. by Roger Southall u.a. . Nordiska Afrikainstitutet ; Human Sciences Research Council - Uppsala: NAI u.a., 2006, S. 120-150. - ISBN 91-7106-558-X. Msekwa, Pius, Reflections on the first decade of multi-party politics in Tanzania.- Dar es Salaam u.a. : Hanns Seidel Foundation, 2006, XIV, 334 S. -ISBN 9987-9092-1-3.

116 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 41 (2008)

Muzondidya, James, Jambanja : ideological ambuguities in the politics of land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe, in: Journal of Southern African Studies (Basingstoke). 33 (June 2007) 2, S. 325- 341. Ould Hamady, H. O. B., L'evolution des institutions politiques mauritaniennes: bilan et perspectives au lendemain de la réforme constitutionelle du 25 juin 2006, in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Stuttgart). 67 (2007) 3, S. 907-947. Posner, Daniel N., Regime change and ethnic cleavages in Africa, in: Comparative Political Studies (Thousand Oaks/Cal.). 40 (November 2007) 11, S. 1302-1327. Rakner, Lise / Svasand, Lars / Khembo, Nixon S., Fissions and fusions, foes and friends: party system restructuring in Malawi in the 2004 general elections, in: Comparative Political Studies (Thou- sand Oaks/Cal.). 40 (September 2007) 9, S. 1112-1137. Robinson, Mark / Friedman, Steven, Civil society, democratization, and foreign aid: civic engagement and public policy in South Africa and Uganda, in: Democratization (Abingdon). 14 (August 2007) 4, S. 643-668. Salih, M. A. Mohamed, African liberation movement governments and democracy, in: Democratiza- tion (Abingdon). 14 (August 2007) 4, S. 669-685. Sanni, Amidu, The Shari'ah conundrum in Nigeria and the Zamfra model: the role of nigerian muslim youth in the historical context, in: Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (London). 27 (April 2007) 1, S. 117-132. Shivji, Issa G., Let the people speak: Tanzania down the road to neo-liberalism.- Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2006, X, 303 S. -ISBN 2-86978-183-0. Smith, Lahra, Voting for an ethnic identity: procedural and institutional responses to ethnic conflict in Ethiopia, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge). 45 (December 2007) 4, S. 565- 594. Ten years of democratic South Africa: transition accomplished? / by Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti u.a. [eds.]. Institut français d'Afrique du Sud.- Johannesburg, 2006, 215 S. Tetzlaff, Rainer, Stufen und Etappen politischer Herrschaft 1960-2006, aus: Afrika - ein verlorener Kontinent? / Mir A. Ferdowsi [Hrsg.]. Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit . - 2. aktual. Aufl. - München. 2008, S. 35-81. Vinnai, Volker, Demokratieförderung in Afrika: die Zusammenarbeit der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung mit politischen Parteien und Befreiungsbewegungen in Afrika.- Berlin: Lit, 2007, II, 96 S. -ISBN 978- 3-8258-0199-1.

ASIEN / ASIA

Brownlee, Jason, Authoritarianism in an age of democratization.- Cambridge u.a.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007, XIII, 264 S. -ISBN 978-0-521-68966-3. Buehler, Michael, Local elite reconfiguration in post-new order Indonesia: the 2005 election of district government heads in South Sulawesi, in: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs (Sydney). 41 (2007) 1, S. 119-147.

Bibliographie / Bibliography 117

Case, William, Democracy's quality and breakdown: new lessons from Thailand, in: Democratization (Abingdon). 14 (August 2007) 4, S. 622-642. Chen Jie / Lu Chunlong / Yang Yiyin, Popular support for grassroots self-government in urban China: findings from a Beijing survey, in: Modern China (Newbury Park/Cal.). 33 (October 2007) 4, S. 505-528. Cheng, Joseph Y. S., The pro-democracy movement: a lost decade?, in: China Perspectives (Hong Kong). (2007) 2/70, Special feature: Hongkong ten years later, S. 14-27. Choi Heungsuk, Networked and polycentric governance in South Korea: the case of dam politics after devolution, in: Asian Journal of Political Science (Singapore). 15 (August 2007) 2, S. 174-194. Clarke, Donald C., Editor's introduction: the Chinese legal system since 1995, in: The China Quar- terly (London). (September 2007) 191, Special issue on China's legal system : new developments, new challenges, S. 555-566. Clarke, Donald C., Legislating for a market economy in China, in: The China Quarterly (London). (September 2007) 191, Special issue on China's legal system : new developments, new challenges, S. 567-589. Darimont, Barbara, Die Verabschiedung des Arbeitsvertragsgesetzes vor dem Hintergrund moderner Sklavenhaltung in der VR China, in: China aktuell (Hamburg). 36 (2007) 5, Special issue: Hu Jintao's second term - challenges facing the party-state, S. 96-114. Davis, Michael C., Constituting democracy in Hong Kong: ten years on, in: China Perspectives (Hong Kong). (2007) 2/70, Special feature: Hongkong ten years later, S. 28-33. A decade of "one country, two systems" actualization / Ming K. Chan u.a., in: The Journal of Contem- porary China (Abingdon). 52 (August 2007) 16, S. 337-441. Economic returns to communist party membership: evidence from urban Chinese twins / Hongbin Li u.a., in: The Economic Journal (Oxford). 117 (October 2007) 523, S. 1504-1520. Feinerman, James V., New hope for corporate governance in China?, in: The China Quarterly (Lon- don). (September 2007) 191, Special issue on China's legal system : new developments, new challenges, S. 590-619. Foley, James A., Fail-safe: North Korea's stability paradox, in: Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon). 19 (October 2007) 10, S. 30-37. Geping, Rao / Wang Zhenmin, Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" experience under the basic law: two perspectives from chinese legal scholars, in: The Journal of Contemporary China (Abingdon). 52 (August 2007) 16, S. 341-358. Ghosh, Dhruva Nath, Governance and accountability: essays on the Indian financial and corporate sectors.- New Dehli: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007, X, 257 S. -ISBN 978-0-19-568931-0. Gilson, Julie, Building peace or following the leader?: Japan's peace consolidation diplomacy, in: Pacific Affairs (Vancouver). 80 (Spring 2007) 1, S. 27-48. Hafeez, Mahwish, Political struggle of the untouchables and the rise of Bahujan Samaj Party, in: Strategic Studies (Islamabad). 27 (Autumn 2007) 3, S. 30-49. Hale, Sarah, The significance of justiciability: legal rights, development, and the human right to water in the Philippines, in: The SAIS Review of International Affairs (Baltimore/Md.). 27 (Summer- Fall 2007) 2, S. 139-150.

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Ho, Peter, Embedded activism and political change in a semiauthoritarian context, in: China Informa- tion (Leiden). 21 (July 2007) 2, S. 187-209. Karki, Mrigendra Bahadur, Social networking and the recruitment process among activists in Nepal, in: Contributions to Nepalese Studies (Kirtipur). 33 (January 2006) 1, S. 33-72. Kazmin, Amy, A setback for Thai democracy: the rise, rule and overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra, in: Asian Affairs (London). 38 (July 2007) 2, S. 211-224. Krumbein, Frédéric, Die Auswirkungen der westlichen Menschenrechtspolitik auf die Menschen- rechtslage in China, in: China aktuell (Hamburg). 36 (2007) 5, Special issue: Hu Jintao's second term-challenges facing the party-state, S. 115-136. Kulessa, Manfred, Königlich verordnete Demokratie: Bhutans neuer Verfassungsalltag nimmt Gestalt an, in: Der Überblick (Hamburg). 43 (September 2007) 3, S. 126-131. Lee Hyun-chool, The ideological disposition of Koreans, in: Journal of Contemporary Asia (Abing- don). 37 (November 2007) 4, S. 472-494. Lee Sangmook, Democratic transition and the consolidation of democracy in South Korea, in: Taiwan Journal of Democracy (Taipei). 3 (July 2007) 1, S. 99-125. Levy, Katja, Der Schutz geistigen Eigentums in der VR China: Status quo und Grenzen, in: China aktuell (Hamburg). 36 (2007) 3, S. 29-60. Liebman, Benjamin L., China's courts: restricted reform, in: The China Quarterly (London). (Sept. 2007) 191, Special issue on China's legal system : new developments, new challenges, S. 620-643. Lo, Sonny Shiu-hing, One formula, two experiences: political divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since retrocession, in: The Journal of Contemporary China (Abingdon). 52 (August 2007) 16, S. 359-387. Lynch, Daniel C., Envisioning China's political future: elite responses to democracy as a global constitutive norm, in: International Studies Quarterly (Malden/Mass.). 51 (September 2007) 3, S. 701-722. Maaz, Oliver, The Chinese property rights law: an overview, in: Business Forum China (Shanghai). (2007) 3, S. 39-41. Macintyre, Martha, Informed consent and mining projects: a view from Papua New Guinea, in: Pacific Affairs (Vancouver). 80 (Spring 2007) 1, S. 49-66. Nomura, Ko, Democratisation and environmental non-governmental organisations in Indonesia, in: Journal of Contemporary Asia (Abingdon). 37 (November 2007) 4, S. 495-517. Potter, Pitman B., China and the international legal system: challenges of participation, in: The China Quarterly (London). (September 2007) 191, Special issue on China's legal system : new developments, new challenges, S. 699-719. Radical Islam and international terrorism: Indian democracy as a moderating factor / ed. by Dipankar Banerjee u.a. Contr.: Priyashree Andley u.a. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.- New Delhi, 2007, XVIII, 110 S. Rawnsley, Gary D., The media and democracy in China and Taiwan, in: Taiwan Journal of Democ- racy (Taipei). 3 (July 2007) 1, S. 63-78.

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NAHER UND MITTLERER OSTEN / NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

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LATEINAMERIKA / LATIN AMERICA

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>>Verfassung und Recht in Übersee << ist eine Vierteljahresschrift für Fragen der Verfassungs- und Rechtsentwicklung der Staaten Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas. In ihr werden ebenfalls die internationalen, insbesondere regionalen Beziehungen dieser Staaten behandelt. Die Zeitschrift lädt alle, die an der Entwicklung dieser Kontinente interessiert sind, besonders die Wissenschaftler aus diesen Regionen, ein, sich an der Diskussion zu beteiligen. >>Verfassung und Recht in Übersee << is a Quarterly concerned with the various aspects of constitutional and legal development in the Asian, African and Latin American countries. It also deals with the international and particularly the regional relations of these countries. Everyone interested in the development of these continents, particularly scholars from these regions, are invited to take part in the discussion. >>Verfassung und Recht in Übersee << est une revue trimestrielle consacrée aux questions de l’évolution constitutionnelle et juridique des pays d’Asie, d’Afrique et d’Amérique Latine. Dans cette revue on étudiera également les rapports internationaux, surtout les rapports régionaux, de ces Etats. La revue invite tous ceux qui s’intéressent au développement de ces continents, notamment les spécialistes des régions en question, à participer à la discussion. >>Verfassung und Recht in Übersee << es una revista trimestral consagrada al estudio de cuestiones sobre el desarrollo constitucional y jurídico en Asia, Africa y Latinoamérica, dedicando asimismo su atención a las relaciones internacionales y, especialmente, regionales de cada área. La revista invita a todos los que se interesen por cuestiones relativas al desarrollo en estos continentes, y en especial a los investigadores de cada área, a participar en las discu- siones. Guidelines for submitting papers Manuscripts (German, English, French, Spanisch) may be submitted in printout or – preferably – via E-mail attachment and under the condition that they have not been published elsewhere in any form. An abstract, not exceeding 200 words, should be added as well as some details about the author. We regret that no remuneration can be offered for publication. Contributions must be saved in a simple format, i.e. without automatic hyphenation, with a consistent font, and NO activated hyperlinks or other macros.The length of an article should not exceed 20 pages using 12 pt Times New Roman, line space 1,5. Please refrain from using bold type or underlining in the text, italics only sparingly. Footnotes (font 10 pt Times New Roman, line space single) should use tab after standard auto number and keep to the following scheme, including typeface as indicated: (a) books: author’s surname/forename, title, place, year of publication, page number; (b) journals: author’s surname/forename, title, name of journal volume (year), page number; do not cite the publishing company. c) book reviews: should contain a head-line citing author(s)/editor(s), full title of book (in bold font), publishing company, place and year of publication, page numbers, price and ISBN- number. Titles of works cited in languages using non-Latin script should be given in an established transliteration, and a translation of the title should follow in […].

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