JOINT WARFARE and Military Dependence on Space U.S

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JOINT WARFARE and Military Dependence on Space U.S. Air Force Computer generated composite map of Port-au-Prince using multispectral imagery Retaining the current international character of space will from LANDSAT (inset). remain critical to achieving national security goals. —National Security Strategy, July 1994

By JEFFREY L. CATON

After thirty-five years, space systems remain an integral part of national security. Desert Storm—which some regard as the first space war—represented the first widespread use of military space systems by common soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. It was also a harbinger of future military operations in which dependence on space-based force enhance- ment will continue to grow. This dependence by the Armed Forces on space systems reveals a vulnerability that an enemy with knowledge and expertise could exploit and con- centrates on an ignored threat: countries with little or no space capability. The exploitation of space dependency can greatly benefit an Major Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, is assigned to the Space Standardization and Evaluation Division, Cheyenne unsophisticated foe by dramatically Mountain Operations Center, U.S. Space Command. degrading our efficiency in combat.

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studies concentrated on satellite vul- Figure 1. Criteria for Evaluating Space System Vulnerability nerabilities, it is important to look at Ability to Influence vulnerabilities in joint surface forces Criteria U.S. Forces Enemy Forces (including air forces) that result from Types of Space Systems Force Structure Concentrate Attacks to dependence on space. The extent of our space dependency link is based on in Use Increase Specific three criteria: the types of space sys- Availability/Quality of Dependence tems vital to ongoing operations, the Alternate Means extent of their use among our forces, and an enemy’s ability to affect system Extent of Space System Force Structure Cannot Influence performance (see figure 1). Application Both the United States and its ad- Training versaries can influence the first criterion—the importance of a given space system to ongoing operations. We may Enemy Means to Affect Protection Attack Ground Systems affect it in our selection of force struc- System Performance ture which, in turn, dictates the avail- Countermeasures Electronic Warfare ability and quality of alternate means of performing system tasks. Since these ASAT Attacks alternate means may include assets from other countries, dependence on space systems extends to coalition operations. At least eight U.S. and coalition civilian satellites were called upon Dependence The dependence on a specific during Desert Storm to augment U.S. 5 Military space operations were ex- space system is linked not only to the systems. It can be expected that such tensive as early as 1963.1 Both the availability of alternate means of per- systems would be “fair game” for United States and the Soviet Union forming system tasks, but also to the enemy antisatellite (ASAT) efforts dur- 6 used space capabilities to observe effectiveness and efficiency of those ing wartime. 3 strategic weapon systems, and that means. Since space systems and their An enemy can influence these cri- helped provide for a stable nuclear de- alternate means can be affected by out- teria by conducting operations that in- terrence strategy. The use of space by crease dependence on a the military has not been limited to at least eight coalition civilian satellites given space system. This strategic nuclear applications but has may include physically covered the conflict spectrum. A sci- were called upon during Desert Storm destroying alternate ence adviser to President Reagan noted means of task perfor- that “even in a very limited war, we side forces, however, military depen- mance or simply concentrating their would have an absolutely critical de- dence on space—the so-called space de- efforts to increase U.S. use of satellites. pendence on space today.” 2 Indeed, pendency link—is dynamic in a combat The second criterion—scope of space systems have played a crucial environment; that is, subject to con- application—is influenced only by the role in a number of limited operations: stant change in its magnitude. United States. Once again, our force El Dorado Canyon (Libya, 1986), structure is the key player since it dic- Vulnerability Earnest Will (the Persian Gulf, 1988), tates the amount of surface-based and Just Cause (Panama, 1989), to The ultimate objective of military equipment that is acquired and the name a few. space operations is the effective em- level at which it is used. Space systems Probably the best known military ployment of space capabilities in are well ingrained in our forces, as il- use of space occurred during Desert support of land, sea, and air opera- lustrated by three applications from Shield/Desert Storm, when it greatly tions to gain and maintain a combat Desert Storm: communications, navi- enhanced coalition effectiveness. Space advantage throughout the operational gation, and intelligence. Over a thou- systems provided support for naviga- continuum and across the three levels sand single-channel, manportable tion, weather, missile defense, commu- of war. satellite radio units were issued at nications, reconnaissance and surveil- —Joint Pub 3–14, Space Operations small unit level. All told, satellites provided 85–90 percent of intratheater lance, and target acquisition. As we Two studies conducted by the face increasing global responsibilities and intertheater communications. Ford administration in 1976 concluded Also, thousands of global positioning with smaller forces, our ability to ac- that the United States was growing de- complish military missions will de- system (GPS) receivers were used by pendent on satellites for various func- coalition ships, planes, and ground pend ever more on such force-enhanc- tions, with little provision for satellite ing support from space. survival during wartime.4 While the

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troops to navigate in unfamiliar and Figure 2. High Altitude Nuclear Tests, 1958–62 featureless terrain. Finally, each service supported an ongoing initiative called Test Series/Date Test Name Warhead Yield Explosion Altitude Tactical Exploitation of National Capa- bilities (TENCAP), which allowed joint- HARDTACK force tactical units to receive and sort 21 Aug 58 Teak megaton range ~ 48 miles intelligence data directly from space.7 12 Aug 58 Orange megaton range ~ 27 miles The third criterion—enemy ability ARGUS to affect system performance—can be 27 Aug 58 Argus 1 1–2 kiloton 125–300 miles influenced by both ourselves and ad- 30 Aug 58 Argus 2 1–2 kiloton 125–300 miles versaries. The United States can affect 26 Sep 58 Argus 3 1–2 kiloton 125–300 miles the enemy’s ability to attack friendly space systems by using countermea- FISHBOWL sures for satellites.8 These protective 29 Jul 62 Starfish Prime 1.4 megaton 248 miles measures fall under the “space control” 20 Oct 62 Checkmate submegaton tens of miles mission area. The objective is defend- 26 Oct 62 Bluegill Tripleprime submegaton tens of miles ing friendly space assets and denying 21 Nov 62 Kingfish submegaton tens of miles an enemy use of his own. Currently, the popular view of space control em- Source. Defense Nuclear Agency. phasizes its role in the larger category of “information warfare.” As such, space control strategies are geared apply even to systems that have open particular interest was the “argus ef- more toward the protection and denial access, such as GPS. Simply put, if the fect,” named for the shell formed of satellite data than physical attacks enemy cannot use space or must use it around the earth by beta particles after on space system assets.9 at a disadvantage, he can only gain by a nuclear detonation. Trapped radia- An enemy might weigh the vul- knocking space systems out. tion from the test explosion with the nerability of a space system to deter- The equipment and tactics re- largest yield, Starfish Prime which had a mine if the U.S. space dependency link quired for attacks on ground systems 1.4 megaton warhead, inadvertently could be impacted. How can an enemy by conventional, special operations, damaged at least three satellites. take advantage of such vulnerabilities? and terrorist forces are readily available. The equipment for cer- ballistic missiles can optimize the Exploitation tain ground-based, air-based, and apogee for ASAT effectiveness [Satellites] would be so valuable to sea-based electromagnetic jam- the overall order of battle that any op- ming also is obtainable from ponent would have to take them into many countries, especially the former The overall ASAT system concept account in his overall battle plan and Soviet Union (FSU). Methods of attack was proven by the 10th Aerospace De- try to exploit any possible weakness.10 against the space segment include di- fense Squadron at Johnston Island in rect ascent and coorbital weapon sys- 1964–1975.14 Successful operation of Attacking our space systems could tems and directed energy beams that this unit required years of research and provide an enemy with excellent lever- can disrupt or destroy satellites.12 FSU testing. The many challenges for an age by degrading our combat efficiency has demonstrated several types of ASAT enemy to develop and operate such a and effectiveness. An enemy who is systems, and this technology may be- system can be divided into three areas: not dependent on space systems (civil come available to aggressor nations. tracking and targeting, delivery, and or military) can target ours with no warhead. fear of retaliation in kind. In such a Feasibility of Attack Tracking and targeting a satellite is case no space deterrence exists for the One method of electromagnetic often considered an expensive process United States. disruption is the high-altitude detona- that requires an immense infrastructure Enemies with no space capabili- tion of nuclear devices. Three series of and highly qualified technical person- ties can lease them. America may con- high-altitude nuclear tests conducted nel. However, the Kettering group, an duct diplomatic space control by en- by the United States between 1958 and informal network that monitors space couraging states not to provide space 1962 (see test summary in figure 2) activities, has proven that it can be support to foes. This occurred during demonstrated electromagnetic phe- done using common and inexpensive Operation Desert Shield when France, nomena that affected space operations: electronics with minimal training. For working in collaboration with the widespread ionization, electromagnetic example, in 1978 a 12-year-old student coalition, agreed not to sell SPOT mul- pulse (EMP), and artificial auroras.13 Of at Kettering Boys School, with the aid tispectral imagery data to Iraq.11 But of his physics teacher (a Kettering cutting off access to space data may group member), predicted within a 24- make the targeting of U.S. space assets hour range when the Cosmos 954 satel- more attractive to an enemy. This may lite would reenter the atmosphere. The

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group also was credited with discover- ing the then-secret Soviet launch facil- Titan IV with MILSTAR ity at Plesetsk in 1966 as well as track- communications ing Soviet spy satellites that were satellite. observing the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.15 In both cases the tracking was done without modern calculators and per- sonal computers. Today, an enemy can purchase commercial software packages to calculate orbital mechanics and can access the computer Internet to obtain U.S. Air Force the orbital parameters of satellites. Using this information, tracking and targeting a nuclear ASAT within its effective radius (usually measured in miles 16) is certainly feasible. Once a target is selected, a delivery vehicle must place the warhead in a given effect radius. Not including countries with established missile pro-

grams (namely, the United States, U.S. Air Force countries of the former Soviet Union, France, China, and Great Britain), there are at least 22 states with active ballistic missile programs.17 Ballistic missiles can be developed to optimize the apogee for ASAT effectiveness. Technological hurdles to the develop- ment of missile systems may be over- come with the help of FSU workers for hire: NPO Energomash, Russia’s lead- ing developer of liquid-fueled rocket U.S. Air Force engines, lost much of its experienced staff in September 1993.18 Hiring expertise could also help develop space hardware for the final guidance and control of warheads. But generating a satellite bus was another Employing space-based task accomplished by a group of ama- systems (from top), teur radio enthusiasts who designed, for missile warning, constructed, and operated six satellites. weather, communica-

Built mostly in their garages, the first tions, and navigation. U.S. Air Force orbiting satellite carrying amateur radio equipment (OSCAR 1) was launched in December 1961. The design and performance of the OSCAR series have improved over time, yet the majority of the work is still done by amateurs using their own resources. The final challenge to operating a nuclear ASAT is acquiring a warhead. Though difficult, developing or procur- ing nuclear weapons is feasible enough that our national security strategy lists their proliferation as a major concern. A recent Air Force study estimated that in 1993 as many as 10 countries were capable of producing nuclear weapons. U.S. Air Force

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This could increase to 25 by 2003.19 A separate probe by a government prolif- NORAD/SPACECOM eration study team estimated that Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center. eight third world countries would be added to the list by 2000.20 Effects Spending billions in space makes little sense if the assets are unusable in wartime.21 An attack on our space assets could impact every element of national power—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. During conflict, a priority of any commander is to prepare the battlespace 22 for combat operations—that is, to “stack the deck” to his advantage. An enemy has much to gain by exploiting the dependency

link between our terrestrial forces and (Carol Floyd)SPACECOM force-enhancing space systems. An as- sault on U.S. military space systems is plans an offensive with the high-alti- given areas on earth are heavily popu- a force multiplier for an enemy. tude nuclear environment in mind (for lated by satellites. This “bunching” If prepared, the Armed Forces example, EMP, atmospheric ioniza- could allow secondary satellite kills could probably operate in remote the- tion), it can opt to outfit troops with through debris fratricide. This could aters without the aid of space systems. low-tech equipment and procedures have a cascading effect as new colli- However, based on the increasing that would be unaffected by such an sions create more debris.25 The bottom strength of space dependency links, attack. Devices such as signal flags, line is that an enemy need not possess they would have problems operating compasses, and presurveyed attack space forces to be a space threat. under the immediate and unexpected routes could be turned into enemy The use of any nuclear device is loss of critical space support, which force enhancers that exploit GPS navi- likely to have significant political im- would give at least temporary advan- gation and satellite communication plications. While it may be acceptable tage to an enemy. That edge could in- links that are suddenly severed. An to direct such a device at inanimate ob- crease by synchronizing attacks on enemy could thus strengthen the syn- jects, the indiscriminate nature of ASAT space systems with assaults on terres- ergistic synchronization effects of his may not be acceptable to neutral coun- trial forces. While this may not enable terrestrial attack. tries whose space systems and related an enemy to triumph militarily, it may A nuclear ASAT can destroy or economic links may be impacted. But cause loss of life and materiel sufficient damage satellites in its kill radius. As a faced with an enemy who has a low re- to bring our withdrawal. consequence of the inadvertent satel- gard for world opinion (a Saddam Hus- Bang for the Buck lite damage caused by the Starfish sein or Mu’ammar Qadhafi), these fac- Prime nuclear test, it was obvious that tors may have little effect on enemy The most effective and least de- nuclear ASATs would have limited use- strategy. Given that reality, how can we fendable method of attack against fulness because of unavoidable collat- best prepare against such a threat? space systems is the high-altitude deto- eral damage they would inflict on nation of a nuclear device.23 Depend- other U.S. satellites.24 While such dam- Countermeasures ing on the yield of the warhead, a nu- age may concern us, it is of great bene- In considering countermeasures clear ASAT could attack multiple fit to a country which is not space de- against threats to space systems, the satellite systems with one detonation. pendent. Without penalties—indeed objective is to assess all elements of a Such an attack would have temporary with benefits—for collateral damage, system for vulnerabilities and provide and permanent effects on U.S. forces. an enemy can pursue indiscriminate survivability measures. Proliferation Depending on the design and operat- area targeting that allows less sophisti- and reconstitution measures can then ing radio frequency of the target, tem- cated targeting and delivery systems be added to ensure continuous capabil- porary effects could last minutes, for its ASAT. ity on all levels of conflict. hours, or days. These effects can be The permanent damage to satel- As microelectronics become more used to great advantage. If an enemy lites may introduce secondary damage sophisticated, they are more vulnerable mechanisms that would benefit an to radiation. The radiation level needed enemy. Even though space is vast, many of the useful orbits to support

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to produce instantaneous failure in cir- conducting operations which normally 12 Jelen, “Space System Vulnerabilities,” cuits today is two orders of magnitude include space dependency links. pp. 91–95. less than in the 1970s. Worse, domestic 13 Samuel Glastone and Philip J. Dolan, vendors who produce radiation-toler- The military use of space is a dou- editors, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, third ant semiconductors fell from twenty in ble-edged sword with strengths as well edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 45–48, 71–77, 461, 487, 1990 to four in 1995. DOD investment as vulnerabilities. Faced with growing 518–23; F.R. Gladeck et al., Operation Hard- in radiation-hardening technology also responsibilities and decreasing forces, tack I–1958, DNA report 6038F (Washing- dropped, from $50 million in 1989 to our ability to accomplish missions will ton: Defense Nuclear Agency, December 1, $20 million in 1995.26 depend more and more on force-en- 1982), pp. 257–73; C.B. Jones et al., Opera- hancing support from space. tion Argus 1958, DNA report 6039F (Wash- reconstitution through space launch The resulting vulnerability ington: Defense Nuclear Agency, April 30, may be affected by both the 1982), pp. 58–72. offers promise as a countermeasure United States and a potential 14 Curtis Peebles, Battle for Space (New enemy. Developing counter- York: Beaufort Books, 1983), pp. 85–94. 15 Equipment hardening and auton- measures to threats against our space Doug Stewart, “Satellite Sleuths,” Air and Space, vol. 5, no. 2 (June/July 1990), pp. 27–34. omy can reduce electromagnetic and systems may enable us to avoid a need- 16 Peebles, Battle for Space, pp. 88–91. The radiation interference from ASAT at- less loss of lives and equipment on the reported satellite killing radius for the 10th tacks. However, hardening counter- battlefield of the future. JFQ Aerospace Defense Squadron was five miles. measures would offer little protection During two CEL tests the ASAT simulated from blast and debris damage. Also, NOTES warhead passed within 0.89 and 2.019 nau- tical miles, both highly successful. the ability to maneuver may be of little 1 Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of 17 Thomas A. Torgerson, Global Power use since there would be only a few Space, U.S. Policy, 1945–1984 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Through Tactical Flexibility: Rapid Deployable minutes for ground operators to ob- Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 240. Space Units, Airpower Research Institute Re- serve the ASAT launch, assess intent, 2 Quoted in Paul B. Stares, Space and Na- search Report no. AU–ARI–93–6 (Maxwell Air determine its target, and command the tional Security (Washington: The Brookings Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994). target satellite to avoid the impact Institution, 1987), p. 46. 18 Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz and Boris Rybak, 3 Stares, Space and National Security, p. 47. area. But such maneuver capability “Engineers Flee Low-Paying CIS Jobs,” Avia- 4 Stares, The Militarization of Space, pp. may be useful for an untargeted satel- tion Week and Space Technology, vol. 139, no. 169–70. lite to avoid a fratricide threat resulting 13 (September 27, 1993), p. 53. 5 Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, from a successfully targeted satellite. 19 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force (AF/XOXI), “The First Space War: The Contribution of briefing entitled “Countering Weapons of The use of on-orbit spares (prolif- Satellites to the Gulf War,” RUSI Journal, vol. Mass Destruction Proliferation” (1993), p. 5. eration) confronts the enemy with 136, no. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 49. 20 Torgerson, Global Power, p. 16. more potential targets. However, since 6 Stares, The Militarization of Space, p. 21 Giffen, “Space System Survivability,” some of these spares may have to be in 248. Also see George F. Jelen, “Space System p. 100. orbits similar to the target satellites to Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures,” in 22 Battlespace is replacing battlefield in be effective, they may also be vulnera- National Interests and the Military Use of military lexicons and is taken to be the logi- Space, William J. Durch, editor (Cambridge, ble to fratricide. cal extension of battlefield into all dimen- Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984), p. 90. Reconstitution through space sions and media of operation. 7 David A. Fulghum, “Talon Lance Gives launch offers promise as a countermea- 23 Stares, Space and National Security, p. 77. Aircrews Timely Intelligence from Space,” sure. As one analyst observed, “reconsti- 24 Stares, The Militarization of Space, p. 108. Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 139, 25 Canavan, “Military Space,” p. 12. tuting essential space assets after hostili- no. 8 (August 23, 1993), p. 70. 26 R.C. Webb et al., “The Commercial ties begin may be the only method of 8 Robert B. Giffen, “Space System Sur- 27 and Military Satellite Survivability Crisis,” ensuring that critical systems survive.” vivability: Strategic Alternatives for the Defense Electronics, vol. 27, no. 8 (August While reconstitution would not be ef- 1990s,” in International Security Dimensions 1995), pp. 21–25. fective in preventing an enemy’s initial of Space, Uri Ra’anan and Robert L. Pfaltz- 27 Giffen, “Space System Survivability,” operations, it would allow for satellites graff, Jr., editors (Medford, Mass.: Archon p. 92. to be reintroduced into the battlespace, Books, 1984), pp. 87–92, discusses satellite possibly in support of U.S. counterof- countermeasures. 9 fensive operations. Robyn A. Chumley, “Supporting the Warfighter,” Airman, vol. 38, no. 11 (No- Finally, one of the best counter- vember 1994), p. 35. measures, training, is not directly re- 10 Gregory H. Canavan and Simon P. lated to space systems. Future joint Worden, “Military Space in the Next Cen- and coalition training should insert tury,” lecture to Air University Spacecast unexpected interruptions of space sys- 2020 Team, Air War College, Maxwell Air tems support. Our forces should iden- Force Base, Ala., 1993, p. 10. tify and practice alternate means of 11 Patricia Gilmartin, “Gulf War Rekin- dles U.S. Debate on Protecting Space Sys- tems Data,” Aviation Week and Space Technol- ogy, vol. 134, no. 17 (April 29, 1991), p. 55.

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