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JP 1, Joint Publication 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States 14 November 2000 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, serves as the capstone publication for all US joint doctrine. This revision represents the evolution in our warfighting guidance since the last edition — including sections on consideration for the use of force, interagency operations, and multinational operations. This publication also includes an expanded scope that bridges the gap among the national, strategic, and operational levels. JP 1 now ties joint doctrine to the national security strategy and national military strategy and describes the military’s role in the development of national policy and strategy. It provides the linkage between joint doctrine and the contribution of other government agencies and multinational endeavors. JP 1 sets forth the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This publication also addresses the importance of doctrine in the development of future concepts and capabilities, since joint doctrine provides the foundation for addressing the future. Most of all, JP 1 is about the employment of the Armed Forces as an instrument of national power, with the enduring theme — joint warfare is team warfare. The philosophy is reflected throughout this publication, from the mindset and attitudes described in joint values through the guidance on fundamentals of joint operations. It is the attitude of the team approach, established on the foundation of joint doctrine that is universally understood and practiced, that ensures the most effective employment of our Armed Forces. The knowledge and use of joint doctrine positions us for success in fighting the Nation’s wars — where winning is the only choice. To that end, commanders must understand, teach, and apply joint doctrine as they prepare and train the Nation’s Service men and women for joint force employment. Please ensure the widest distribution of this and the other supporting joint publications, promoting their use at every opportunity. HENRY H. SHELTON Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff PREFACE 1. Scope vulnerabilities that assure mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all Joint Publication 1 is the capstone joint forces will be equally represented in each doctrine publication. It guides the Armed operation. Joint force commanders may Forces of the United States in joint, choose the capabilities they need from the air, multinational, and interagency activities at all land, sea, space, and special operations forces levels across the range of military operations. at their disposal. 2. Purpose 3. Application The Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial This publication is written to assist roles, defending the United States against all members of the Armed Forces of the United adversaries and serving the Republic as a States to operate successfully together. The bulwark and the guarantors of its joint team is comprised of the members of independence. When called to action, they each Service, active and reserve, as well as support and defend national interests associated civilians in the supporting worldwide. The Armed Forces embody the governmental and private sector workforces. highest values and standards of American The guidance in this publication is broad and society and the profession of arms. They fulfill authoritative. It requires a leader’s judgment their roles, missions, and functions within the in application. This doctrine will be followed American system of civil-military relations. except when, in the judgment of the They serve under the civilian control of the commander, exceptional circumstances President who is the Commander in Chief. dictate otherwise. The nature of the challenges to the United The Services have the principal States and its interests in the contemporary responsibility to organize, train, equip, and security environment demand that the Armed sustain forces. These forces are employed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team under joint force commanders. Therefore, to in combat and noncombat operations. These assure that the Armed Forces achieve their operations often take place with forces of allies fullest potential, all American military leaders and coalition partners, and with US and must integrate the content of this publication foreign governmental and nongovernmental into their efforts to develop leaders and train nonmilitary agencies. The challenges are best forces for joint, multinational, and interagency met when the unified action of the Armed operations. Forces elicits the maximum effect from the unique but complementary capabilities of each Service skills form the very core of US Service and command, and from the synergy military capability. Joint warfare relies upon that results from their synchronized and Service traditions, cohesion, and expertise. integrated action. Successful joint operations are made possible by the capabilities developed and embodied Joint warfare is team warfare. in each Service, including Service “cultures,” Effectively integrated joint forces expose no heroes, and professional standards. The weak points or seams to an adversary, while Armed Forces of the United States continue they rapidly and efficiently find and engage to build on the tradition of joint victory in war those adversary weak points and that began with the Revolutionary War. i Preface The Armed Forces of the United States face doctrine. The principles apply to action unparalleled challenges to US interests around undertaken by the Armed Forces of the United the world, unlike nations whose military States to execute applicable national policies, forces can concentrate on a more limited range as well as the contemporary national security of operational environments. This means that and military strategies. joint forces must master multifaceted conditions in conducting successful unified Today, joint action is practiced and routine. action. The chapters that follow describe the The key to maintaining and enhancing joint principles for forming, training, and force effectiveness is the military leader’s employing joint teams in unified action at all diligence in studying, applying, teaching, and levels across the range of military operations. ultimately improving joint doctrine, which These broad principles that guide operations provides the foundation for joint warfare. are neither policy nor strategy — they are ii JP 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS • National Security — Developing Strategy and Policy ............................................... I-1 • The Political Context ................................................................................................ I-4 • Instruments of National Power .................................................................................. I-5 • The Role of Doctrine — “An Engine of Change” ...................................................... I-8 CHAPTER II THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1 • Threats to US Interests ............................................................................................. II-1 • Assessing the National Strategic Situation ................................................................ II-3 • Operations and Conflict Termination ........................................................................ II-5 CHAPTER III UNITED STATES MILITARY POWER • The Purpose of the Military .................................................................................... III-1 • National Military Objectives .................................................................................. III-1 • Core Military Competencies ................................................................................... III-2 • Joint Warfighting ................................................................................................... III-3 • Conclusion ............................................................................................................ III-17 CHAPTER IV THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER • Considerations for the Use of Military Force .......................................................... IV-1 • National Military Strategy ...................................................................................... IV-3 • Enduring Concepts ................................................................................................. IV-6 • Enduring Enablers .................................................................................................. IV-8 CHAPTER V FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS • Elements of Joint Operational Art ........................................................................... V-1 • The Campaign ......................................................................................................... V-4 • Unified Command and Theater Strategies ............................................................... V-6 • Unified Action ........................................................................................................ V-7 • Command Relationships ......................................................................................... V-7 iii Table of Contents CHAPTER VI FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERAGENCY
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