Joint Force Quarterly Has Been Portant Work to Do to Create a Truly Integrated the Journal of the Joint Warfighter

Home , Joint warfare, Operation Downfall, USS Jarrett

0119 C1PG 11/18/98 8:13 AM Page 1 JOINT FORCEJFQ QUARTERLY

The Nature of Jointness Summer98 Doctrine and Education Innovation and Warfighting

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL 0219 C2 11/17/98 4:06 PM Page C2

...to spread the word about our team, to provide for a free give-and-take of ideas among a wide range of people from every corner of the military. —Colin L. Powell on the purpose of JFQ in the inaugural issue (Summer 1993)

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AWord fromthe Chairman

f the many changes I have witnessed Americans in the Armed Forces. Likewise, those during my career, the most significant who will follow us will rely on our dedication and in terms of warfighting has been the hard work to prepare them for the future. Develop- Oincreased ability of the Armed Forces ing the best force for the Nation requires rigorous to work together. There is no doubt that there has analysis about important choices concerning new been tremendous progress in synchronizing oper- equipment, organizations, training, and doctrine. ations on land, at sea, and in air and space. How- Critical thinking about joint warfare takes ever, despite strides in organizing, training, and place in different quarters of the military, but for equipping for joint operations, there is still im- the past five years Joint Force Quarterly has been portant work to do to create a truly integrated the journal of the joint warfighter. JFQ provides joint force. an open forum where ideas and concepts about Efforts toward jointness are essential given the joint warfare can be proposed, debated, and re- challenges of the future. Although the United fined. As General Colin Powell noted in the inau- States will probably not face a hostile superpower gural issue, the purpose of the journal is “to in the near term, the world will remain a danger- spread the word about our team, to provide for a ous place. The nation-state, along with armies, free give-and-take of ideas among a wide range of people from every corner of the military.” It has done precisely that, furnishing an arena for de- for the past five years Joint Force Quarterly has bate among officers from every service and of all been the journal of the joint warfighter grades, as well as civilian defense analysts from this country and abroad. Collectively, the articles which have ap- navies, and air forces as we know them today, will peared in JFQ over the last five years have pre- remain for a long time, and the Armed Forces must sented a profusion of original ideas. Some pieces be ready to defeat any foe equipped with conven- have shaped operational concepts while others tional military capabilities. At the same time, these have explored the impact of change on doctrine, forces will certainly face adversaries who will chal- organization, and technology. lenge America’s interests asymmetrically, using This issue offers a look back at the best of state-of-the-art technology and, perhaps more JFQ. The opening section discusses the nature of frightening, weapons of mass destruction. jointness itself. No nation has had more experi- Meeting these challenges depends on making ence in conducting joint operations than the the right preparations now. In very real and tangi- United States. Yet since the first extensive test of ble ways, the successes of our joint force were joint operations during World War II, we have made possible by the past efforts of thousands of (continued on page 4)

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■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman ■ by Henry H. Shelton 45 The Chairman as ■ Principal Military Adviser: An Interview 5 The Nature of Jointness with Colin L. Powell JFQ (issue 13/Autumn 1996) 6 Jointness and the Impact of the War by David A. Armstrong ■ (issue 8/Summer 1995) 53 Doctrine and Education 8 What Exactly Is Jointness? by Lawrence B. Wilkerson 54 Joint Doctrine: The Way (issue 16/Summer 1997) Ahead by Joseph J. Redden (issue 14/Winter 1996–97) 11 Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team 57 Lessons Unlearned: by Dennis J. Reimer and Somalia and Joint Doctrine Ronald R. Fogleman by C. Kenneth Allard (issue 11/Spring 1996) (issue 9/Autumn 1995)

19 Living Jointness 63 The Fifth Service Looks by William A. Owens at Doctrine by John S. Clay (issue 3/Winter 1993–94) (issue 14/Winter 1996–97)

28 The Limits of Jointness 69 Emergence of the Joint by Seth Cropsey Officer by Howard D. Graves and (issue 1/Summer 1993) Don M. Snider (issue 13/Autumn 1996) 37 The New Joint Warfare by Frederick R. Strain (issue 2/Autumn 1993)

PHOTO CREDITS

The collage on the cover incorporates photographs from eight previous issues that feature (clockwise from top right) amphibious assault vehicles in Kuwait (U.S. Marine Corps/Michael J. Anglin), issue 10 (Winter 95–96); C–17 over Fort Sumter (U.S. Air Force/ Dave McLeod), issue 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95); USS Dwight D. Eisenhower transitting Suez Canal during Desert Shield (U.S. Navy/Frank A. Marquart), issue 1 (Summer 93); marines emplacing 74 sensor during Advance Warfighting Experiment (U.S. Marine Military Education for the Corps/Christopher S. Cline), issue 15 (Spring 97); F–117 refueling New Age by Ervin J. Rokke (U.S. Air Force/Val Gempis), issue 11 (Spring 96); USS Kentucky (issue 9/Autumn 1995) (U.S. Navy/F.E. Zip Zimmerman), issue 12 (Summer 96); Apache (McDonnell Douglas), issue 9 (Autumn 95); and (centered) soldiers of 325th Airborne outside Tuzla Air Base (U.S. Army/Larry Lane), issue 13 (Autumn 96). The front inside cover shows flight deck crew rigging barricade (U.S. Navy/Nathan Curtis), navigators plotting course (U.S. Air Force/Paul Caron), Ranger pa- ■ trolling in Haiti (U.S. Army/Greg Scott), and marines disembarking at Guantanamo Bay (U.S. Air Force/Vince Jones). The photo at right features joint officers (U.S. Navy/Jeffrey 80 Keeping the Strategic Flame Viano). The back inside cover captures F–16C at air base in Jordan (U.S. Air Force/Paul R. Caron). The back cover features members of 10th Mountain Division at CENTRAZBAT ’98 by Carl H. Builder (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Lemuel Casillas); Marine F/A–18Cs aboard USS Enterprise, (issue 14/Winter 1996–97) COMPTUEX ’98 (U.S. Navy/Timothy S. Smith), USS Jarrett in Persian Gulf during Southern Watch (U.S. Navy/Daniel J. Quinajon), and C–130 at Pope Air Force Base (4th Combat Cam- era Squadron/Melissa M. Mondares).

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SUMMER 1998 / NUMBER 19

■ ■ 89 Innovation and Warfighting 130 Index of Contributors, Issues 1–18 (1993–98) 90 Revolutions in Military Affairs by James R. FitzSimonds and 142 JFQ—Seen from Afar Jan M. van Tol (issue 4/Spring 1994)

98 RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy by Colin S. Gray (issue 17/Winter 1997–98)

103 Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs by Williamson Murray This special fifth anniversary issue of Joint Force (issue 16/Summer 1997) Quarterly presents a selection of articles previously published in the journal. Since the appearance of the 112 An Ecstasy of Fumbling: inaugural issue in Summer 1993, over 350 authors Doctrine and Innovation have contributed a wide range of feature articles, essays, and reviews (see index, pp. 130–141). The con- by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. tributions reprinted herein thus represent only a (issue 10/Winter 1995–96) small fraction of a diverse, growing body of periodi- cal literature dedicated to fostering joint culture 119 War in the Information Age within the Armed Forces. No attempt has been made to update or otherwise amend the articles in this by Thomas G. Mahnken issue. Similarly, the biographical details accompany- (issue 10/Winter 1995–96) ing them reflect the rank or position of the authors at the time the articles were originally published. All 124 Time: The New Dimension contributions are reproduced with original pagina- in War by Ajay Singh tion and issue markings at the bottom corner of each folio. However, a ring folio 8 has been added at the (issue 10/Winter 1995–96) ᭺ bottom center which corresponds to the page numbers in the table of contents. JFQ

Joint Force Quarterly Hans Binnendijk Robert A. Silano Director Director of Publications Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor

Martin J. Peters, Jr. William A. Rawley Calvin B. Kelley Production Coordinator U.S. Government Printing Office Copy Editor Art Director

JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 144 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 August 1998

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Joint Force Quarterly ■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN

GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher struggled with the notion of jointness. What is it? What are its limitations? More importantly, will ADVISORY COMMITTEE the concept of jointness change in the future? Ar- LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ National Defense University ticles found under the heading of “The Nature of Chairman Jointness” tackle these questions head on. BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman Doctrine and professional education underpin every dimension of jointness. They are the VADM Dennis C. Blair, USN ■ The Joint Staff mechanisms for conveying new ideas to our Brig Gen Franklin J. Blaisdell, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College warfighters and are essential for translating our

A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College vision of future joint warfighting into reality. The section entitled “Doctrine and Education” ad- Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College dresses how joint doctrine and joint education Brig Gen Jerry M. Drennan, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College should be revised to handle the diverse and daunting challenges of the 21st century. Maj Gen Richard L. Engel, USAF ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces One of the formidable tasks ahead is coping Maj Gen Timothy A. Kinnan, USAF ■ Air War College with technological change. How we employ tech- Col David M. Lumsden, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College nological breakthroughs can be as critical as developing the technology in the first place. In- RADM Thomas F. Marfiak, USN ■ National War College deed, history is filled with examples of militaries Brig Gen Ralph Pasini, USAF ■ The Joint Staff that did not make the most of the technology

MG Robert H. Scales, USA ■ U.S. Army War College they possessed because they held onto outmoded organizational concepts. This problem is the RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College focus of articles in the section entitled “Innova- BG John R. Wood, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College tion and Warfighting.” Two further contributions are reprinted in this issue. “The Chairman as Principal Military EDITORIAL BOARD Advisor,” an interview with General Powell, offers Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University unique insight into the development of jointness Chairman in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. And in Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University “Keeping the Strategic Flame,” the late Carl Builder examines the American approach to war Col J. Lee Blank, USAF ■ National War College in search of enduring ideas for victory. Col Paul Balash III, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College The articles in this edition were not selected Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University because they present “approved solutions.” In- stead they offer excellent examples of well-writ- COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy ten and insightful arguments that inspire critical Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University thinking about the profession of arms. I am en-

Col Robert J. Garner, USMC ■ Armed Forces Staff College couraged by the spirited dialogue displayed in these pieces. This is the type of debate we need to Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces help us gain a better understanding of joint capa- CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN ■ Naval War College bilities for today and tomorrow. I look forward to many more years of thought-provoking articles in Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College the pages of JFQ. Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation

William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College HENRY H. SHELTON Chairman John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago of the Joint Chiefs of Staff LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute

Lt Col Robert C. Owen, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College

James H. Toner ■ Air War College

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University

COL Douglas L. Tystad, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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The Nature U.S. Navy (David Blencoe) of Jointness

ointness is at its strongest in the face of an In his article “Living Jointness,” he writes that enemy, and its foundations were laid dur- the service components should be enablers when- ing World War II. David Armstrong makes ever possible. That is, they “ought to operate con- Jthis argument in “Jointness and the Impact tinually with the purpose of aiding and facilitat- of the War.” In “What Exactly Is Jointness?” ing operations of the other service components Lawrence Wilkerson then picks up where Arm- that will be involved in conflict.” strong leaves off. Jointness is forged the same way Jointness has bounds, as Seth Cropsey re- as the bonds of combat—“in the cauldron of minds us in “The Limits of Jointness.” It must shared dangers, decisions, and death.” It is also strike a careful balance, particularly in peacetime. built on proficiency in one’s own service capabili- On the one hand, it must emphasize a concerted ties. Without such an appreciation there can be operational effort. On the other, it must not sup- no trust and understanding. press debate over such fundamental issues as the How understanding is developed in joint op- composition and character of future forces. erations is at the heart of “Joint Warfare and the In the final article, Frederick Strain goes where Army-Air Force Team,” by Dennis Reimer and few have gone before in his article “The New Joint Ronald Fogleman. These service chiefs address co- Warfare.” He examines what joint warfare will operation in what has historically been the most mean in the future. As he observes, “The ability to contentious aspect of joint warfare, air-ground conduct simultaneous operations across the depth, operations. They work through many of the diffi- breadth, and height of the combat area compels cult issues that have arisen in combat. professionals to change their perspective.” JFQ William Owens examines how interservice cooperation might be viewed to the benefit of all.

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JFQ FORUM

Jointness

The Battle for Fox Green Beach by Dwight C. Shepler. U.S. Navy and the Impact of the War By DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

s General Colin L. Powell noted Dwight D. Eisenhower was, however, to two years ago in introducing the maintain U.S. forces as “a separate and dis- inaugural issue of JFQ, the experi- tinct component of the combined forces.” A ence of World War II provided a With a task that called for Army leadership, foundation for jointness. Operations during the prospect of American participation in the war clearly and repeatedly demonstrated coalition operations led to early agreement the advantages of jointness and the penalties by the War and Navy Departments to estab- for failing to achieve it. At war’s end, the Joint lish a joint command in Europe.2 Chiefs of Staff supported jointness in princi- Jointness was strongest in face of the ple.1 The progress of jointness was slow, how- enemy or when necessitated by coalition op- ever. A review of JCS action in creating a post- erations. But even in war, it fell prey to interwar system of unified commands suggests service rivalries and other concerns. In the that the wartime experience left an ambigu- Pacific, the lack of strong allied forces dimin- ous legacy for the development of jointness. ished coalition pressures to achieve unified Unified command of U.S. forces in Eu- command. Coupled with the special prob- rope began with the establishment in June lems posed by the presence of General Dou- 1942 of the European Theater of Operations, glas MacArthur, Army and Navy reluctance U.S. Army (ETOUSA), a joint command in to trust their forces to the command of offi- which an Army officer exercised planning cers of another service led to separate theater and operational control of assigned naval commands. The Army promoted unity of forces. Directed to cooperate with the British, ETOUSA commander Major General

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Armstrong

command by forces or functions while the Approved by the President on December Navy advocated achieving it geographically. 14, 1946, the “Outline Command Plan” was While joint operations were routine in the the first unified command plan, a basic doc- Pacific, command of the entire theater had ument of the joint system. Publication of not been unified at the war’s end.3 the plan did not, however, resolve the issue Dissatisfied by the separate command of of the organization of unified commands. Army and Navy forces in the Pacific, the The debate over organizing by geographic Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral area versus forces and functions was to sur- Chester W. Nimitz, called in 1946 for creat- face repeatedly in the joint arena during the ing a single command for the entire decades of the Cold War.5 Pacific less Japan, China, Korea, As the Chairman observes in this issue, and the coastal areas of Central the lessons of World War II are boundless. In and South America. Based on the medley of original contributions that Oahu and supported by a joint make up this JFQ Forum, various aspects of staff, the commander would that conflict are presented as tribute to the sol- “exercise unity of command” diers, sailors, marines, and airmen who fought of all U.S. forces in the theater. as a team to lay the foundations of joint and The Army and Army Air Forces combined warfare. JFQ countered the Nimitz initiative with a proposal to organize com- NOTES mand based on the assignment of 1 See, for example, statements by Ernest J. King and forces. The heart of the problem lay in estab- Henry H. Arnold on the inside back cover of Joint Pub lishing an organization that centralized con- 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991). trol of forces without impinging on what the 2 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Plan- services considered basic prerogatives in the ning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, United States Army command of their respective forces.4 in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili- With joint planners split along service tary History, U.S. Army, 1953), pp. 196–97. Subsequent lines, JCS deferred action for almost six developments are covered in Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, United States months. Finally, the Army Chief of Staff, Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of General of the Army Eisenhower, revived the Military History, U.S. Army, 1959), pp. 102–05, 270–74. issue with a paper outlining command 3 Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two arrangements worldwide. That proposal was Years, United States Army in World War II (Washington: greeted by one from the Navy, and subse- Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1962), pp. 361–63; Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the quent staff deliberations were complicated Sun (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. xiii–xv, when the question of control over strategic 540–43; Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943–1944, pp. air forces was raised by General Carl A. 525–26, 536; Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Spaatz, the Commander of Army Air Forces. Chiefs of Staff in World War II, The War Against Japan In December, having seen nine staff papers (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 93–96, 476–79, 563–66, 586–95. on unified command in less than three 4 James F. Schnabel et al., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and months, General Eisenhower sought a com- National Policy, 1945–1947 (Washington: Historical Divi- promise. Admiral Nimitz was similarly in- sion, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), pp. 171–77. clined. Including provisions that dealt with 5 Ibid., pp. 177–86. The original commands were the problems posed by the requirements of Far Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean, and European. JCS also recognized the East Command under General of the Army Strategic Air Command (SAC), an Army Air Forces com- MacArthur and of strategic air forces, the mand made up of units normally based in the United plan that emerged established a worldwide States and under a commander responsible to JCS. SAC system for the unified command of U.S. was the first example of what later were known as speci- forces under JCS control. fied commands. Control of the Bonin and the Marianas Islands was split with MacArthur controlling forces and local facilities, but having no responsibility for military or civil government or naval administration and logistics. The Cold War debate over unified and specified commands will be treated in The History of the Unified Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.), Command Plan, 1946–1993 (Washington: Office of the is Director for Joint History in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Of- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member fice, February 1995). of the JFQ Advisory Committee.

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■ What Exactly Is out of joint Jointness? By LAWRENCE B. WILKERSON

Jointness is not seamless. It will have as many seams as the fallibility of human nature and technology impose. Indeed, to regard seamlessness as an achievable attribute of military operations is arrogant and dangerous. It is the sort of attitude that commits assets to the wrong purpose, gets people killed needlessly, loses wars, and devastates peace operations. he last thirteen of my thirty-plus years When it is achieved jointness is not greater as a military officer have been spent in than the sum of its parts—it is at best the sum of joint duty assignments. For six years I its parts. In fact the sum is most often reduced by Thave actually taught the essentials of that inevitable human element which does not jointness at the intermediate and senior levels of understand or trust and therefore functions im- professional military education (PME), an experi- perfectly if at all, and the mechanical parts that ence which has provided many opportunities to seem to achieve a 60 percent success rate on a discuss the nature of jointness with students. What good day. And there will always be such factors, has come out of those human and mechanical, to contend with. jointness is not greater than the discussions is that joint- Jointness is not created by doctrine, joint or ness is understanding otherwise. It is brought about by people, good sum of its parts—it is at best broadly what your fellow and bad. Like most things in life, it is created the sum of its parts soldiers, sailors, airmen, more successfully by a higher proportion of good and marines bring to the people well trained in their service capabilities battle and trusting them and how to employ them. Words printed on to do it right and well—and their feeling the same paper, no matter how attractive, are largely mean- way about you. All frills and lobbying aside, the ingless in the greater scheme of things. Common essence of jointness is understanding and trust. tactics, techniques, and procedures are vital to As General Colin Powell stated in the first training. Just as critical to success in battle are edition of Joint Pub 1, “joint warfare is team people who while operating in accordance with warfare.” But what about seamlessness, synergy, their training can do exceptional things. Such acts, joint doctrine, interoperability, and all the other both large and small, are what bring order to con- buzzwords? Let’s examine some of the more fusion and win conflicts. One of the strangest prevalent ones. paradoxes of human behavior is that people ac- customed to studied routine must be capable of Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA, is deputy quick and decisive departure from that mind set director of the Marine Corps War College.

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W ilkerson

to be repeatedly successful. Order must tend to chaos—indeed, teeter next to it with an exquisite sense of balance—in order to intuitively adapt, triumph, and endure. Jointness is not produced by the ability of systems to share information, ammunition, fuel, or a host of other things, though this capacity— interoperability—is a vital technical aspect of deep- ening trust. Faith in a buddy’s ability to help in a pinch is difficult to muster if one cannot even communicate. Of all the misunderstood and mis- defined components of jointness, interoperability is the most important. It is the technical side of trust. Without it trust evaporates quickly in the

heat of combat. out of joint True jointness is not imparted by fiat. It is created the same way as the bonds of combat: in the cauldron of shared dangers, decisions, and death. Henry V did not stroll around the camp- fires on the eve of Agincourt to instill doctrine in the hearts and minds of his men. “A little touch of Harry in the night” was far more complex than any directive or written instruction. It was also far more integral to the stunning victory gained by the English over the French on the following day. How does one teach jointness? Specifically, how do war and staff colleges—for the latter institutions are where jointness as described above truly fits into our PME system—best develop understanding and trust in students?

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) For an answer I reviewed the seminars that my former students consistently rated hen a team takes to the field, highest. They turned out to be the sessions individual specialists come to- in which the students had to use their own expertise to sort out a complex politi- gether to achieve a team win. cal-military problem, then give an appreci- W All players try to do their very ation of it as well as the solution. In some best because every other player, the team, and cases they had to execute that solution. the home town are counting on them to win. This ranged from contemporary case stud- So it is when the Armed Forces of the United ies of Urgent Fury (Grenada), Earnest Will (reflagged Kuwaiti tankers), Eagle Claw States go to war. We must win every time. Every (Iranian hostage rescue), UNISOM II (So- soldier must take the battlefield believing his or malia) to full-fledged crisis wargames that her unit is the best in the world. Every pilot must lasted several days, the most successful of take off believing there is no one better in the which dealt with the complex deployment sky. Every sailor standing watch must believe of U.S. forces to the West Bank to provide there is no better ship at sea. Every marine must humanitarian relief following massive refugee flows into that sector. All sessions hit the beach believing that there are no better were highly rated in each pedagogical cat- infantrymen in the world. But they all must also egory including learning jointness. believe that they are part of a team, a joint As I read and re-read the student cri- team, that fights together to win. This is our his- tiques, the connection became apparent: tory, this is our tradition, this is our future. that short of the cauldron of combat, the seminar can be as searing and instructive —Colin L. Powell, “Message from the Chairman,” in its own way, given the right context. in Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (November 11, 1991)

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■ WHAT EXACTLY IS JOINTNESS?

That was a demanding situation confronted by a the finest, most efficient staff in the Armed team possessing diverse service capabilities in Forces—perhaps in the world. As the classic Greek which every member was well trained. An obser- dramatists warned, however, such excellence can vation by a former Commander in Chief Pacific, contain the seeds of its own destruction. Admiral William J. Crowe, drives this point The criticism offered here is not related to the home. In 1985, before becoming the Chairman, inordinate and largely American fear of the he remarked: “I want people for my staff who are dreaded general staff. Most people who harbor thoroughly proficient in their own service’s capa- such concerns today do not understand the very bilities. Everything else will follow.” Proficiency concept they protest. My argument is more closely in one’s own service capabilities is the sine qua related to what Douglas Southall Freeman called non of jointness. Without it “the odds.” In short, there are only so many truly proficiency in one’s own there can be no trust or un- excellent people in any enterprise and to concen- service capabilities is derstanding. The “every- trate them at a single point in an organization thing else will follow” de- may well create an imbalance of skill which en-

out of joint the sine qua non of jointness pends first on the individual dangers the health of the entire organization. The and second on the fre- efficiency and quality of the Joint Staff have to an quency and quality of his exposure to combat extent been achieved at the expense of service and the seminar room, the latter being all that is staffs and—while few admit it—to the great con- available in peacetime. sternation of the civilian staff serving the Secre- Trust and understanding are derived from tary of Defense who, by the very nature of their service competence. That is the only foundation appointed status, cannot match the energy and on which genuine jointness can be built. level of expertise of the Joint Staff. Threaten that and you threaten jointness. That is The Secretary’s effort to create a schoolhouse why the increasing power of the Joint Staff is so for civilians under the Defense Leadership and troublesome—not now or over the next year but Management Program is aimed in part at redress- for the future. Thus far that growing power has ing this situation. The lead paragraph of the di- not impinged upon the flourishing of separate rective issued on the program in April 1997 re- service cultures or the healthy competitiveness veals much: “This directive...establishes a which they naturally engender, but given its cur- DOD-wide framework for developing future civil- rent direction it will. ian leaders with a DOD-wide capability in an en- Even in apparently insignificant areas signs vironment that nurtures a shared understanding of the increasing power of the Joint Staff and the and sense of mission among civilian employees potential for abuse can be found. The proposed and military personnel.” introduction of PME learning objectives for force The growing power of the Joint Staff at the protection and risk management is a case in expense of service staffs may be nothing to point. The Joint Staff maintained that military worry about. The primary concern is that with education policy should be changed to reflect the declining quality of service staffs, the nur- specific PME learning objectives for these subject turing of service competence, which is the foun- areas; others held that such a sudden change dation of jointness, will fall off. Therefore, keep- contradicts good education policy. These oppo- ing a wary eye to that possibility might be wise. nents argue there is a more satisfactory way of Power corrupts, and absolute power—but you know evolving an area of educational focus, namely how the old aphorism goes. the subject area of emphasis method. Quality JFQ education is best served by gradual change that is carefully evaluated rather than by rapid-fire, knee-jerk change that often is rooted in political expediency (which is the atmosphere that influences decisions by the Joint Staff). In this instance the education community won the argument; however, the trend seems to be moving in the other direction. The momentum is on the side of the Joint Staff. This is not necessarily bad. After all, one objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to improve the Joint Staff—something that has been done remarkably well. Indeed, the Joint Staff is

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Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team Northrop Grumman Corporation Northrop JSTARS aircraft and light ground station modules. By DENNIS J. REIMER and RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

The Army and Air Force are natural partners in the conduct of combat operations on and over land. Since day-to-day operations are intertwined, particularly in areas of service support, we often take this partnership for granted. It was forged during World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and most recently in the Gulf War. The most important teamwork occurs on the battlefield, where our combined capabilities produce a synergistic increase in joint combat power that provides a decisive advantage over an adversary. The Army-Air Force team is robust and forward looking, unequalled among the armed forces of the world. We intend to strengthen that part-

General Dennis J. Reimer, USA, and General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, nership as we work together in are the chiefs of staff of their respective services. the future.

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Cooperation does not imply that we have Chartered by the deputy chiefs of staff for opera- identical views on every issue, nor that we should tions and plans of both services, the group took be combined. Each service optimizes its unique on the job of identifying and resolving these is- strengths. National security depends upon dis- sues. Building on a heritage of teamwork and mu- tinct warfighting capabilities on land, at sea, and tual respect, Army and Air Force officers have de- in the air. Moreover, each service brings separate voted months to clarifying matters of common core capabilities—the missions they perform interest and finding useful solutions. This has led best—to the joint table. One lifetime is barely suf- to shared understandings, increased trust, and ficient to master every skill needed to fight and pragmatic agreements. Numerous organizations, lead in one medium of war. Learning to fight including Air Combat Command, U.S. Army jointly in three is a tough business—leveraging Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), unique capabilities, specialties, and individual 1st Battlefield Control Element (BCE) at Fort competencies to the warfighting advantage of all. Bragg, and 9th and 12th Air Forces, have helped Such efforts are especially important in a re- the group. After a mid-year review revealed there source constrained environment. Together we can were more areas of agreement than disagreement selectively apply advances between our two services, the working group refo- in technology to compen- cused on air and missile defense and on joint relations between the Army sate for the redundancies control measures. and Air Force became strained that we have lost through The first issue centers on controlling air and the force drawdown. This missile defense assets not directly assigned to as each tried to incorporate process of leveraging one corps commanders and on theater missile defense lessons learned in the Gulf another’s strengths builds (TMD) attack operations in the area of operations on current doctrinal foun- (AO) of land component commanders (LCCs). dations to evolve a more Since CINCs often employ echelon-above-corps mature, complementary perspective of joint oper- (EAC) air and missile defense assets as theater as- ations. The savings will be measurable in both sets, the Air Force held that such units should be lives and resources, and ultimately by mission put under the operational control (OPCON) of success. joint forces air component commanders The Persian Gulf War provided a glimpse of (JFACCs). As stipulated in joint doctrine, JFACCs the dramatic changes in warfare and results of are normally area air defense commanders rapid evolutions in technology. It also demon- (AADCs) and will usually control all theater air strated the tremendous power which the Army and missile active defense efforts. Likewise, the and Air Force could generate by working together Air Force saw TMD attack operations—actions to and with the naval services and coalition part- locate and destroy hostile missile launchers and ners. After an intense air offensive disabled Iraq’s their associated command, control, and support- key capacities and reduced its warfighting capa- ing infrastructure regardless of their location—as bility, the ground offensive, supported by maxi- counterair efforts under JFACC purview. The mum tempo air operations, demonstrated the ef- Army viewed TMD attack operations inside the fectiveness of teamwork in defeating an adversary land AO as an integral part of the LCC scheme of and minimizing American casualties. maneuver and supporting counterfire operations. Both of our services gained important in- The group also examined joint control mea- sights into 21st century military operations from sures because of the apparent friction over which the Gulf War; however, there are divergent inter- component commanders should plan and control pretations of that brief conflict. Relations be- deep operations beyond fire support coordination tween the Army and Air Force became strained as lines (FSCLs). The Air Force considered JFACCs as each tried to incorporate and capitalize on best suited to coordinate operations beyond lessons learned in the Gulf. We recognized doctri- FSCLs, while the Army thought LCCs should plan nal disparities and quickly began an effort of co- and synchronize fires in the entire land AO. operative review to ensure our preeminence as When the working group could not completely the world’s finest air-land team. resolve TMD or joint control measures, we agreed to address them in a four-star review at the Army- Developing Understanding Air Force Warfighter Talks in December 1995, the Since the Gulf War, in what has become an results of which are described below. annual event, senior leaders of our respective services have met to discuss lessons learned as well Joint Doctrine as opportunities for improving joint operations. Service concerns arise when areas of responsi- At the Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks in 1994 bility potentially overlap, creating questions over we set up a working group to tackle tough issues. control of combat assets. But on a fluid, dynamic battlefield joint force commanders (JFCs) cannot

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Some Key Responsibilities.

JFACC is supported commander for • Overall air interdiction • Counterair operations • Theater airborne reconnaissance, surveillance, ted C Suppor and target acquisition JFAC • Strategic attack when air provides bulk of capability

JFLCC Su pp o r te Land AO d JF g ACC Supportin Amphibious JF LC ing Objective Area C Support

Within their respective AOs, land/naval commanders Naval AO • Are designated supported commanders and are responsible for synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction • Designate target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations • Do not typically have responsibility for the entire joint AOR

Each component has area and functional responsibilities as well as custody of the people and resources under its command. These responsibilities may intersect when components work together. Thus we must allow flexibility for responsibilities to shift during various phases of a campaign and act to minimize mutual interference and maximize mutual support. What may be optimum for one component can come at the expense of others—by decreasing combat power or increasing risk. Joint doctrine is an excellent starting point for assisting LCCs and air component commanders (ACCs) in efforts to resolve any overlaps. Together we must learn to tailor air-land solutions to circumstances, missions, risks, and opportunities at hand. Commanders normally seek to conduct oper- throp Grumman Corporation throp

Nor ations to gain maximum advantage at minimum Interior of JSTARS risk to their forces. For example, ground com- aircraft. manders stress counterfire and maneuver opera- permit disagreements on issues such as targeting tions while air commanders stress strategic attack, and missile defense to remain unresolved. Regard- counterair, and interdiction; yet all seek to attack less of how complementary our views on joint op- deep targets and enemy air defenses to provide erations might be, specific responsibilities produce maximum flexibility for their forces. Such opera- legitimate differences among component com- tions are not always mutually supportive, espe- manders. We must minimize the differences and cially when resources are scarce. move toward greater understanding of one another’s strengths and limitations.

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Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera- both agencies must understand the intent of tions, published in September 1993, offers direc- commanders as well as provide timely, informed tion for every element of a joint force. It instructs decisions. JFCs, as senior commanders, to provide guidance As partners in the air-land team, mutual un- and set priorities. Moreover, it establishes the lati- derstanding of command relationships must be tude required to optimize and fine-tune arrange- strong and clear. Just as Generals George S. Patton ments between land and air forces under various and O.P. Weyland, the respective commanders of circumstances. This III Army and 19th TAC in World War II, recognized 2 as partners in the air-land team, publication serves as a the need for a strong C relationship between land common baseline for and air components, we are committed to smooth, we are committed to smooth, understanding both in seamless operations throughout the theater. seamless operations throughout and among services, and also within our Areas of Concern the theater warfighting arrange- Using the efforts of the working group as a ment, the unified com- point of departure, the senior leadership of our mand structure. No component should develop services prepared five agenda items for discussion doctrine that directly contradicts this validated last December: the role of the Joint Targeting Co- baseline. ordination Board (JTCB), joint control measures, Joint doctrine ascribes authority and respon- command and control arrangements for air and sibility to JFCs and provides a framework for con- missile defense, offensive counter-air and TMD ducting joint operations and designating the attack operations, and dual hatting of JFCs. Many roles of supporting and supported commanders. of these issues overlap and some may never be re- Both services recognize that LCCs are normally solved. But when possible, candor will pave the supported commanders in assigned AO bound- way for greater understanding. In addition, we aries and ACCs are normally supported comman- covered tangential areas that impact our overall ders for theater air operations. Joint doctrine pro- relations on the battlefield. Further advances in vides flexibility to allow JFCs maximum latitude connectivity, coordination, and perception of sis- to devise the best solution for a mission. If con- ter service doctrine will decrease differences and flicting priorities arise, JFCs will determine the increase mutual trust. precedence of priorities. However, a solid basis of Joint Targeting Coordination Board. The JTCB trust between component commanders will go a concept has been controversial since the Gulf long way towards alleviating potential problems. War. The Air Force held that the board would hin- der operations, while the Army contended that it Key to Success was necessary to establish targeting priorities. Coordination among components is critical Joint Pub 3-0 codifies JTCB without going into on the battlefield. One of the best methods for great detail. JFCs typically create JTCBs and de- ensuring proper coordination of operations is fine their roles. The services accept the vision of sound command and control (C2). Modern war- JTCB, but we agree it must be focused at a macro fare requires us to increasingly share real-time, level. JTCB as a planning support function assists common views of the battlefield. We must under- components in following the intent of JFCs in ex- stand overlapping as well as occasionally inter- ecuting operations by preparing targeting guid- secting needs of component commanders, recon- ance, refining joint target lists, and reviewing tar- ciling their different views with improved risk get information. The board must maintain a management techniques. The commanders have campaign-level perspective and should not be in- optimum tools in their staffs and headquarters to volved at levels best left to the component com- conduct detailed planning and execute missions. manders, such as selecting specific targets and Moreover, they liaise with other components to aimpoints or developing attack packages. facilitate both the flow of information and timely Joint Control Measures. The heart of this doc- decisions. Senior liaison elements are important trinal discussion concerns operations beyond in sharing the broad concerns of component FSCLs but within the land force AO. Since both commanders. commanders seek to maximize results in this area BCE is a critical Army element attached to consistent with their intent to shape the battle- the senior command and control agency within space, it represents the greatest overlap of land the Air Force, the Air Operations Center (AOC). and air objectives. The land component’s capabil- Similarly, the Air Force provides Tactical Air Con- ity to exploit deep attacks before an enemy can trol Party (TACP) representatives at key Army headquarters. BCE and TACP should be fully staffed with highly trained personnel to support component commanders. Senior members of

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F–16 Falcons during Roving Sands ’95. Combat Camera Imagery (Andy Combat Camera Imagery Dunaway) Combat Camera Imagery (Jim Steele)Combat Camera Imagery

Patriot battery during Roving Sands ’94. adjust to them will vary with depth, terrain, resis- and more advanced tactics, techniques, and proce- tance, and resources. Air component capabilities dures (TTP) will also improve mutual support be- will vary less with distance, but since air forces tween the land and air components. operate beyond FSCLs on a normal, continual Whenever we discuss targeting the placement basis, ACCs must also manage risks to their of FSCL inevitably comes up. Joint doctrine grants forces. Coordination and deconfliction are essen- LCCs authority to place this line anywhere within tial to reducing duplication, conserving resources, their AO. To maximize the effectiveness of both maximizing results, and managing risks in this land and air forces, LCCs should coordinate the area. Managing risks requires careful design and placement of this line with ACCs to ensure maxi- tuning of control measures and authority to min- mum coverage of all enemy targets with available imize restrictions on all forces and maximize assets. It is incumbent on each component com- combat power. JFCs will normally establish for- mander to establish a level of mutual trust with ward AO boundaries and adjust as necessary to the other commanders to make this relationship balance the needs of LCCs to rapidly maneuver work. ACCs must provide LCCs making FSCL de- with the needs of ACCs to rapidly mass and em- cisions with relevant facts that will help them, but ploy airpower with minimal constraints. must trust LCCs to place FSCLs in the best loca- Between FSCL and AO forward boundaries, tion to support the objectives of JFCs. LCCs are supported commanders and must coor- Air and Missile Defense. Coordination of fires dinate operations with ACCs when possible. LCCs naturally leads to this next area of concern. This should judiciously use control measures such as issue centers on the degree of control the area air FSCLs to facilitate attack operations. ACCs should defense commander should have over EAC air de- coordinate attacks inside the land AO to comple- fense assets. The Air Force holds that JFACCs— ment support of both the needs of LCCs and the who are normally designated as AADCs—are sup- overall theater campaign plans of JFCs. Improved ported commanders for overall theater air and friendly and enemy situational awareness, rapid information sharing, expertise in BCE and TACP,

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missile defense and should exercise OPCON over doctrine provides JFCs with the flexibility to de- air defense units unassociated with a corps. The velop the necessary C2 arrangements based on the Army is reluctant to release such control over its situation in theater. organic EAC air defense assets. Dual Hatting. Political and operational pres- While no one disputes the right of each unit sures on JFCs were the crux of the dual-hatting to self defense, we must balance that right with issue. Because dual hatting a corps commander as the need for close coordination of fires against a division commander or a numbered air force enemy threats beyond FSCLs to prevent fratricide. commander as a wing commander would be ir- Since JFACCs will be operating forces in this area regular, the Air Force contended that a dual-hat- for counterair, interdiction, strategic attack, and ted JFC or CINC would also be irregular, resulting surveillance and reconnaissance, coordination in a possible loss of focus on theater or compo- and deconfliction are cru- nent details. During our discussions, senior Army cial. Both services agree leaders acknowledged that this could occur, but political and operational that while corps comman- the likelihood is low. Dual hatting must be han- pressures on JFCs were the ders will retain OPCON dled on a case-by-case basis. CINCs must deter- crux of the dual-hatting issue over their organic air de- mine, subject to the approval by the Secretary of fense units, AADCs as sup- Defense, whether to simultaneously retain com- ported commanders will es- mand of an entire operation as JFC and a compo- tablish rules of engagement and assign air defense nent—land, maritime, or air—or to designate an- missions for EAC assets. LCCs must communicate other senior leader as component commander. their desires but trust AADCs to make the correct This is in line with joint doctrine. Situation-spe- decisions. cific political or operational considerations will The Army and Air Force have made great influence JFC decisions to retain leadership of a strides in target identification, attack cueing, and specific functional component in addition to the responsiveness since the Gulf War, and more im- overall JFC role. provements are on the horizon. The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction emphasizes the Looking to the Future need to share information, tailor countermissile In addition to those issues discussed at the dispositions and response postures, and work to- Warfighter Talks, there are many areas in which gether to create the greatest possible risk to interservice cooperation has made great strides. enemy missiles. LCCs must communicate their While the Army-Air Force working group offers needs to JFACCs/AADCs in developing air and an avenue to pursue such developments, other missile defense plans. This close coordination is organizations including TRADOC and ACC, Army essential to ensure timely and correct decisions. fire support elements, and various Air Force wings TMD Attack Operations. Closely tied to air and numbered air forces are constantly striving to and missile defense are TMD attack operations. enhance Army-Air Force team operations. While the Air Force believes TMD is part of the To improve TTP, the services have been de- counterair effort requiring theater-wide integra- veloping a multiservice targeting TTP under the tion, the Army holds that these operations are Air, Land, Sea Application Center (ALSA). Com- broader in scope and considers existing fire sup- mon TTP will allow component commanders to port as the most responsive for attacking enemy know how other components operate. Common missiles in an LCC’s AO. Regardless of opinions, procedures, as well as improved C4I, will help en- common sense dictates that between FSCL and sure proper prioritization, deconfliction, and at- the AO forward boundary, LCCs and ACCs must tack of targets. coordinate TMD attack operations to maximize There has also been an extensive effort to effects and minimize fratricide. There will be improve connectivity in combat identification times when an airborne asset provides a more and tracking. Tests conducted by the All Service timely response to pop-up targets than a corps Combat Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET) commander’s assets. At other times a corps may in Gulfport, Mississippi, in September 1995 iden- have the appropriate weapon. The Air Force is tified specific areas which needed attention. We considering increasing the amount of “on-call” must develop both the hardware and processes to assets available for TMD attack operations. With pass real-time combat identification data among improved connectivity, coordination and ap- elements of all services to reduce the possibilities proval will become easier. Until that time, current of air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air fratricide. Although the work of ASCIET has just begun, its contributions will receive careful attention because we stand to gain much from its successes in the area of combat risk management. The Army and Air Force plan to incorporate

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ASCIET into the next Roving Sands and Blue Flag the century, through interservice initiatives and air-land combat exercises. systems like JSTARS, our commanders should Integration of this information with evolving enjoy increased interoperability and a more com- capabilities such as the joint surveillance and tar- plete view of the battlefield. Both technological get attack radar system (JSTARS) and unmanned enhancements and sound joint doctrine are es- autonomous vehicles will provide commanders sential in strengthening ties between our services. with improved battlefield information. Real-time But great technology and good doctrine alone are imagery is a step towards the information domi- insufficient. Without trust and mutual under- nance that we are striving for. standing, an enemy could exploit our weaknesses We are making significant progress in in- and possibly defeat us. creasing connectivity between Army and Air Trust is based on insight and familiarity, Force planning and fire control elements. These knowing who will do the right thing in the initiatives have the potential to greatly increase proper way. A soldier’s expectation of airpower the ability to share and deconflict data on emerg- must be based on the realization that airmen ing targets in real time. Ongoing work to link the have theater-wide perspectives and responsibili- Air Force contingency theater automated plan- ties. An airman must appreciate the vital role of ning system (CTAPS) and Army advanced field ar- airpower in land combat and understand that air tillery tactical data system (AFATDS) will ensure flown in support of LCCs must complement the our forces put the right weapon on the right tar- plans of LCCs. The Army and Air Force depend get at the right time, increasing effective fire- upon and leverage the capabilities of one another power while reducing waste and delay. Connec- to be decisive in battle. Our separate strengths, as tivity between air and missile defenses (such as well as differences, will ensure that we remain an the Army TMD Force Projection Tactical Opera- air-land team without equal. In fact, no other tions Center and the Air Force combat integration military will even come close. JFQ capability) also helps to rapidly deconflict air and surface targets. This is increasingly important as weapons and threats change and a commander’s reaction time decreases.

The Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks, as well as working group and interservice efforts, are each small steps towards greater understanding between our services. Improving connectivity, strengthening command relationships, and developing trust are key elements in ensuring the Army and Air Force remain the premier air-land team. We have witnessed numerous advancements over the past year that increase a commander’s awareness of the battlefield. By the turn of

Destroyed Iraqi fighter. DOD

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General of the Army Omar Nelson Bradley (1893–1981) Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Clark, Missouri; graduated from Military Academy (1915). Assigned to 14th Infantry and duty in the West (1915–19). ROTC duty, Minnesota and South Dakota (1919–20); instructor, West Point (1920–24). Advanced course, Infantry School (1925). Served with 19th and 27th Infantry, Hawaii (1925–27); in charge of National Guard and Reserve affairs for Hawaiian Islands (1927–28). Attended Command and General Staff School (1929) and Army War College (1934). Instructor, Infantry School (1929–33) and West Point (1934–38). Chief, operations branch (G–1), War Department (1938–40); assistant secretary, General Staff (1940–41). Commandant, Infantry School, and established infantry OCS (1941–42). Comman- der, 82d and 28th Infantry Divisions (1942–43). Personal representative of commander, North African Theater of Operations (1943). Commander, II Corps in North Africa and Sicily (1943), and First Army and 12th Army Group in invasion and final European campaigns (1944–45). Adminis- trator of veterans affairs (1945–47). Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1948–49); responded to National Security Act of 1947 with Army reorganization leading to appointment of vice chief and two deputy chiefs of staff, consolidated technical services under a director of logistics, and finance and management under a comptroller. Served as first Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1949–53), and first Chairman, NATO Military Staff Committee (1949–50); promoted to General of the Army (1950). Died in New York City.

[In 1949] Congress enacted several laws modifying the 1947 National Security Portrait of General Act, designed to intensify unification. One [law]...established the formal post Bradley by Clarence of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would serve a two-year term Lamont MacNelly.

(and be eligible for reappointment to a second term in time of peace) but who Courtesy of the U.S. Army Art Collection would not have a formal “vote” in the JCS. Probably on Ike’s recommendation, [Secretary of Defense] Johnson then turned to me, even though I had told Ike earlier in the year I did not want the job. I now changed my mind. I agreed to serve in the job one term—two years. The main reason for my change of heart was my deep concern about the state of the military establishment. Owing to the cancellation of the supercarrier, there was a vicious mutiny afoot in the Navy...[which] could conceivably tear apart the Department of Defense, possibly tempting the Kremlin to capitalize on our military disarray. A firm but fair JCS Chairman, assisted by a neutral Army general (my replacement as Army Chief of Staff), might be the moderating force that could prevent a crippling brawl. On August 12, Louis Johnson and I went to the White House, where President Truman announced my nomination as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Senate approved the nomination at once, and at 0900 on August 16, in a modest ceremony at Johnson’s office, I was sworn in. The reaction to my appointment generally was positive. I was still blessed with a “favorable press.” However, to the Navy I was still an enemy. With the JCS now officially enlarged to four men...the Navy felt that even though I had no official vote, its voice would be further weakened.

—From A General’s Life by Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair

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USS Iowa firing LIVING 16–inch guns. JOINTNESS U.S. Navy (Jeff Elliott) by WILLIAM A. OWENS

U.S. Navy Summary There are two competing views of jointness in vogue. One is specialization which argues that the services should stick to the roles for which they were established. The other is synergism which holds that military capabilities of various services should be blended in response to a given crisis or contingency. In the former view the capabilities preexist while in the latter they must be cobbled together on an ad hoc basis. Neither view has gained ascendancy thus far, but the Armed Forces must define the practical meaning of joint operations and then adopt it as second nature. The Navy and Marine Corps should embrace synergism because it enshrines enabling, a concept advanced in “. . . From the Sea.” If tested synergism is the most compelling view since it draws on common ground which the services have developed through joint exercises, operations, and war games.

oint operations are taken almost as a Competing Views given in Pentagon pronouncements Beneath these common understandings, and it is virtually impossible to find however, there are at least two competing Janyone who professes to be against views of how different force components them. The unanimity with which they are should be used to increase combat effective- endorsed, however, is not supported by an ness. One view argues in favor of using the in-depth, well-articulated grasp of what joint best qualified force component for a given operations are or how to conduct them. mission which implies that overall combat There are some areas of agreement. By defini- effectiveness can be best enhanced by fit- tion, joint operations involve more than one ting forces to missions for which they are service component, and most professional of- specialized. Let’s call this view the special- ficers would argue, I think, that the funda- ization argument. The other claims that mental reason for having joint operations is higher combat effectiveness is made possi- to increase overall combat effectiveness. ble by combining forces in such a way that

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LIVING JOINTNESS

higher outputs result than could be specialization is to clearly differentiate com- achieved by simply adding the outputs of bat responsibilities along force specialty lines different forces. Let’s call this the synergism and break out missions by service compo- argument. These views don’t really repre- nents while that of synergism is almost the sent two sides of the same jointness coin, opposite, at least with respect to mission as- and accepting one or the other ultimately signments. Specialization takes advantage of leads to differing operational behavior and inherent efficiencies in the integrated tradi- force structures. tions, doctrines, discipline, and procedures Discussions of joint operations often of a single service; synergism blends particu- refer to a toolbox analogy which entails an lar service strengths on a mission basis to admonition to consider all the forces avail- provide higher combat output than either able to a joint commander as if they were any single service or the sum of individual the contents of a toolbox. In this analogy a service contributions could produce. joint force commander can pull the forces Each view leads down a separate path of needed to do the job from the toolbox, re- logic and to a different practical understand- gardless of whether ing of joint operations. Specialization, for ex- the tools bear the ample, ultimately argues in favor of a com- markings of the mand and control system that keeps the Army, Navy, Marine responsibilities and operations of various ser- Corps, or Air Force. vice components distinct and separate. Inter- An advocate of action among service components, according what I called the to this view, should be concerned with main- specialization view taining distinctions and keeping lines of re- of joint operations sponsibility from overlapping, for opera- would say that the tional clarity will keep components from toolbox analogy is getting in each other’s way and allow them exactly right and ex- to carry out their particular specialty with U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division plain that a joint greatest effectiveness. There is synergism also convoy during Desert commander turns to the box and chooses the in this approach, for if each service compo- Storm. right tool for the job. For instance, if required nent meets the demands of its particular mis- to plan and conduct a strategic bombard- sion, the result will be an effective, smoothly ment campaign, the joint commander would conducted war or operation. That is, if Air assign the missions to the force component Force, Navy, and Army components focus on that knows the most about strategic bom- air, sea, and ground campaigns respectively, bardment campaigns—perhaps to the Air the overall operation will benefit. Air Force Force. An advocate of what I termed syner- resources will not be diluted by allocating gism would also say the toolbox analogy was sorties to support Army ground operations, exactly right. But he would explain that a Navy resources will not be stretched between joint commander would put together the providing gunfire support to the ground right tool out of various force components. campaign and destroying an opponent’s Then if a job required strategic bombardment naval forces, and Army resources will not be the air assets available from all services diverted to protect Navy or Air Force bases. Is would be combined in the most productive this an exaggerated extension of the inherent way by a joint commander. logic of this view? Yes. But it is essentially the The operational implications of these logic that girds spirited defenses which each two views, I suggest, vary greatly so far as service makes in justifying its own aircraft, the use of force is concerned. The essence of communications, and logistics systems. The logical extension of synergism gen- erates similar problems of unreasonableness. Admiral William A. Owens, USN, has been nomi- When pushed to the extreme, for example, it nated to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of not only erodes individual service traditions, Staff. He has most recently served as Deputy doctrines, and procedures, but ultimately Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare argues in favor of unification and differenti- Requirements and Assessments. Previously he commanded the Sixth Fleet and NATO Naval ating among forces strictly in terms of func- Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe. tional capabilities. However rational such a

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F–117 Stealth Fighter. and in defining where the right balance really lies between specialization and synergism. In short, we must step beyond the idea of joint exercises toward operating jointly on a continual basis. This goal challenges both the current joint command structure and the peacetime activities of all services other than participation in joint exercises. It challenges the existing joint command structure because it argues for creating standing joint Lockheed (Schulzinger and Lombard) commands (as opposed to joint task forces) at the tacti- conclusion might be, of course, going too far cal level, the level of command most often could undercut recruiting, training, and engaged in actual war fighting—that is at preparing men and women who make up the corps, numbered fleet, and numbered air force as suggested by the Canadian experi- force level. Currently joint commands do ence with unification. not extend to this level. While joint task I have exaggerated both arguments to force commands do, they are almost always point out the differences between them. In formed for specific operations. What I am the real world the contrast is not as dra- suggesting here, however, is what might be matic, and as Operation Desert Storm called standing joint force commands at the demonstrated the use of force regional three-star level, maintaining direct we must step beyond the in an actual conflict is likely operational command over units of each ser- idea of joint exercises to involve aspects of special- vice that normally would only be part of an ization and synergism. But it identifiable joint command in a particular toward operating jointly is important to note that two operation or crisis. potentially divergent views of on a continual basis An Interim Understanding joint operations underlie the The practical meaning of jointness is de- discussion. Neither has as yet rived essentially from promoting joint exer- prevailed, though both have legitimate cises and joint operations, and will emerge claims on our understanding of jointness. as operational forces work out the myriad as- This leads me to make two suggestions. pects of what joint operations entail. The Practical Meaning military does not, however, have the luxury My first suggestion is to promote day-to- of not thinking about what joint operations day activities by the forces of all services should be until all the details are worked which will work out a practical balance be- out. We in the Navy, in particular, are in tween the two views of jointness. The Armed need of a non-rhetorical definition of what Forces, in large measure due to the active in- joint operations imply, because we have terest of General Colin Powell in developing committed ourselves to them both in the an in-depth understanding of joint opera- way we expect to use naval forces and in the tions, has come a long way in this regard designing, structuring, and sizing of naval over the last several years. There are more forces for the future. We have stated for- joint exercises being conducted today than at mally in documents such as “...From the any other time since the end of World War II. Sea” that the primary role of naval forces is It’s hard to argue, however, that there to “enable joint operations in littoral areas,” will ever be too many. More importantly, I and we have informed Congress and the think we have to go further in trying to work out the practical meaning of jointness

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American people that we will build a Navy planners are wrestling with as the Army de- that is better able to do this. velops its expeditionary force concept and To return to the distinction between the that for the Air Force deals with something two notions of jointness, the Navy ought to long near and dear to air power theorists— line up behind synergism because this view strategic bombardment. is far more compatible with the concept of Building Ground Power enabling. Recognizing changes in the world, and Enabling Joint Operations particularly the likelihood of fighting where Some have argued that enabling is there are no prior overseas deployments, the something temporal in character, referring Army has been developing an understanding primarily to the ability of forward deployed of expeditionary warfare. This is not the naval forces to be the first on the scene in a place to discuss the emerging concept in any crisis; and if the crisis cannot be contained, detail,1 but one key aspect is the need for a to secure beach heads and prepare for the ar- sequential, rapid build-up of power in the re- rival of ground and ground-based air power. gion in which conflicts will occur. Briefly, Once accomplished, according to this argu- the Army’s answer to the problem of fielding ment, naval forces fight alongside the other overwhelming, combined arms force rapidly forces and—after the objectives of the opera- in a potentially hostile environment focuses tion are achieved and the ground and on deploying units in a logical sequence; ground-based air power withdraw—cover those arriving early would be charged with the post-conflict period. I think this is an and capable of both preparing for the arrival important part of what the Navy of larger, heavier units logistically and pro- the Air Force and ought to mean by enabling. tecting their arrival. Thus, the Army nor- But there is more to it. I believe mally plans for the early deployment of Army also ought to the concept of enabling ought to ex- units that can protect themselves and pro- add this concept of tend throughout these stages, and vide air and ballistic missile defenses. enabling to their that naval forces ought to operate The sequential approach to the buildup continually with the purpose of aid- of power has long been a central tenant of operations ing and facilitating operations of the the Army view of expeditionary warfare, and other service components that will the Army has long recognized the inherent be involved in conflict. We ought to operate tension between building its strength se- naturally in such a way that we help the quentially and in a defensible manner, and Army do what armies must do, and assist the doing this rapidly. It takes time for units that Air Force in doing what it must do. This does arrive initially to get in place, and the rate at not posit a subordinate or unique role for which following units can arrive and take up naval forces. The Air Force and Army also their places is a function of available lift and ought to add this concept of enabling to reception capabilities. Airlift, the fastest way their operations. And it does not mean the to deliver forces, will always be constrained Navy can or should abandon its classical by the capacity to provide all the things ev- conflict focus on control of the seas, even if eryone wants in the theater of operations the seas are most likely to be the littorals of early. And such constraints delay the rate of the world for the foreseeable future. But, for building ground power. the Navy, it means coming to appreciate the The Navy’s role in assisting the build-up priorities of conflict and peacetime opera- of Army power has traditionally been re- tions from the perspectives of the other ser- flected in terms of how fast weapons and vices and acting accordingly. materiel can be delivered to the intended de- To illustrate this point, I would like to barkation points by sea. But there are other suggest how naval forces could enable some ways in which the Navy can cooperate to in- basic concerns of the Army and Air Force, re- crease the rate of building up Army strength spectively, in littoral warfare. My example abroad. One is to provide or to cooperate in for the Army is taken from what military establishing air defense and ballistic missile defense screens that are a key early step in the Army build-up sequence. Another is to hold up the advance of enemy land forces

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Guided missile destroyer USS Kidd.

EP–E3 Orion (center) and EA–3B Skywarriors from Fleet Air. U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call)

U.S. Navy

by focused surveillance, intelligence, and against it as the first step of a deployment, fires from tactical aircraft, naval guns, and airlifting a land-based system would eat up sea-based missiles, including Tomahawk lift capabilities precisely when competing land attack missiles and seaborne versions of transport demands would be highest. the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The sea-based system could ease compe- The agility of sea-based systems allows tition for airlift in one of two ways: by pro- them to be deployed in such a way as to providing a defensive umbrella to allow later in- vide for the air and ballistic missile defense of troduction of a land-based system or by any coastal area. Operationally, this can mean obviating the very need to deploy a land extending a defense umbrella over systems based system at all. like the Patriot or Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), by protecting areas where Cooperative Engagement and land-based air and ballistic missile defense Forward Passes systems are established. In a regional conflict But a more synergistic approach would in which there is a premium on the rapid be to deploy the fire control radar of the land build-up of land-based forces, sea-based the- based system and link them with the Aegis ater defenses could be of particular benefit. missiles off shore. The demanding airlift re- This is because of the airlift required to trans- quirements to establish a land-based ballistic port a land-based defense system. Getting a missile defense system are generated largely THAAD battery in position to protect against by what it takes to transport the missile and missile attacks eats up airlift. And since a re- missile support components of systems like gional commander faced with a possible mis- THAAD. Accordingly, transporting only the sile attack would want to establish a defense

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radar initially would ease that can result from melding this argument the demands on airlift to advanced military technology is an exam- greatly when competi- ple of decisive force, as opposed to over- tion for it would be high. whelming force, since it attains war goals The basic idea would be quickly without annihilating enemy forces. to deploy an air and bal- The potential success of strategic bomb- listic missile defense sys- ing campaigns and validity of the theory tem that could use land- supporting them are contentious, largely be- based radars to detect, cause many consider them an argument for track, and control mis- shifting resources to the Air Force. While I siles from the sea for the believe such concerns are unwarranted, this intercept. is not the occasion to debate them. It is im- Cuing and commu- portant, however, to note three fundamental U.S. Navy (Franklin P. Call) F–16As taking off for nications to support this points about strategic bombardment cam- Iraqi targets. forward pass concept are technically feasible. paigns. First, whether called strategic bom- They would allow land-based acquisition bardment campaigns or not, interest in and fire control radar, perhaps located at the bringing force to bear in the manner of extremities of the land coverage provided strategic bombing is a key and integral part from the sea-based defense system (which is of the U.S. approach to conflict. Second, and a function primarily of the range of fire con- because of this, the issue facing naval forces trol line-of-sight radar aboard the Aegis is not whether strategic bombing theory is ship), to identify the “basket” into which totally correct but the sea-based interceptors would be fired, rather how best to the issue facing and then to assume control of those missiles contribute to success- and direct destruction of incoming ballistic ful strategic bombard- naval forces is missiles or aircraft. In effect, this cooperative ment campaigns. how best to arrangement would extend the range at Third, the answer to contribute to suc- which the sea-based missile launching plat- this question revolves form could destroy ballistic missiles while around how the ser- cessful strategic easing the early demands on airlift, thus al- vices operate together bombardment lowing a more rapid introduction of other in conducting cam- campaigns land and land-based air forces. paigns. Successful strategic bombing Enabling Strategic Bombing campaigns will be the product of joint oper- The concept of strategic bombardment ations—they will not be the purview of a grew out of the search for ways to avoid the single service. bloody horror of ground force attrition war- Moreover, what does it mean to say that fare. In its modern form, it is an intellectu- naval forces ought to enable a strategic ally compelling, well-articulated expression bombing campaign, and in particular what of the difference between decisive and over- should their relationship be with the Air whelming force. That is, one of the argu- Force? The answer in part lies in the keys to a ments running through the growing body of successful strategic bombing campaign. Two literature about strategic bombardment the- of the most important are accurate, timely ory is that it is possible to defeat an oppo- intelligence on an opponent’s operational nent by focusing air power on the com- scheme as well as the key command and con- mand, control, and logistics links between trol nodes and links through which an opera- enemy leaders and their forces. Near simul- tional scheme can be implemented, and a ju- taneous, relatively quick, and sustained de- dicious, efficient use of all the military assets struction of such links, the argument goes, that can attack those potential targets. leads to the disintegration and paralysis of Accurate, timely, and complete intelli- an opponent’s operations. And precision gence is the essential precondition of a suc- guided munitions, coupled with rapid, com- cessful strategic bombardment campaign, for prehensive, systematic, and accurate target if the wrong targets are struck and the nodes acquisition and battle damage assessment make this possible.2 The bombing campaign

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that are truly critical to an opponent’s military operations are missed, then the tremendous potential leverage of precision guided munitions is nullified. As one Air Force man- ual states: “Air power is targeting, and targeting is intelligence.” Many targets that become key to strategic bombing are discernible long before an opponent embarks on aggression. They are embedded in the national infrastructure, and many of them— roads, bridges, and communications towers relied upon to conduct military operations— U.S. Navy (Chad Vann) are truly fixed targets. They don’t change or move during the bombing campaign. But ef- Stealthy B–2 bombers and F–117 attack fective targeting depends on knowing which aircraft are effective, deadly, and efficient as- potential targets are important and where sets. Their stealth enables them to be used in nodes critical to an opponent are when oper- areas where an opponent has heavy anti-air- ations begin. That’s harder. Knowledge de- craft defenses and, since they are highly sur- pends profoundly on surveillance and intelli- vivable, the aircraft and their pilots can be gence generated before a conflict, and on the employed again and again. With precision capacity, once hostilities start, to keep track guided munitions, they can destroy virtually of both efforts to destroy vital nodes and an any target in a single sortie. But their effec- opponent’s efforts to overcome or circum- tiveness is even greater when they are em- vent our bombardment. ployed with diversionary attacks by aircraft No single service can do this alone. The which can be provided by naval forces, when problem is too complex and demanding. It air defenses are suppressed by manned or un- can be done jointly, however, by all force manned assets such as naval attack or elec- components working together to collect, pro- tronic warfare aircraft and cruise missiles, cess, analyze, and disseminate the necessary when provided with real-time target updat- information. And the contribution of naval ing from naval manned and unmanned air- forces will be essential, for they are the most craft, and when it is necessary to rescue pi- likely to be on the scene providing surveil- lots which in some cases may only be lance and intelligence before, during, and possible by using naval forces in the theater. after strategic bombing campaigns. They can The efficient use of attack assets also do this with a broad range of platforms avail- means that the strategic bombing campaign able to them, from submarines which gather should not be limited by the vagaries of information covertly, to surface platforms weather or by the fact that daylight erodes which gather the entire spectrum of signals the stealth characteristics of aircraft like the intelligence, to aircraft (manned and un- B–2 or F–117. That is, the success of a strate- manned), and to personnel on the ground. gic bombing campaign depends on severing And, tied into the nets through which other many links in an opponent’s command and sources of information flow, they can provide control system more or less simultaneously, on-scene intelligence and assessments which and keeping them severed for an extended are key to effective targeting. period. This simply cannot be done by at- Judicious and efficient use of attack as- tacking only at night and, given that the sets is another necessary component of suc- leverage offered by stealth is greatest at cessful strategic bombardment. Efficiency night, it means other aircraft must conduct stems in part from good targeting—picking the campaign during the day. Against heav- the key targets and destroying them when it ily defended targets the most effective will have the greatest effect. But this also in- weapon in daylight is likely to be the sea- volves getting the destructive output needed based Tomahawk land attack missile. from each of the attack assets committed to Finally, efficient use of attack assets in the campaign. And that is a function of close some cases means that they should not be coordination with supporting and participat- ing forces.

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diverted to air defense missions and that they increase the efficiency by which the Na- their overall efficiency depends on the air tion uses military power. The outstanding defense security. In the aftermath of Desert question is what jointness means in a practi- Storm there was considerable debate over cal sense which can be resolved only though the extent to which naval aviation con- experience—by experimentation, doctrinal tributed to the success of the strategic bom- development, and military exercises. But we bardment campaign against Iraq. A great should not kid ourselves. While the trends deal of the discussion was narrow-minded are favorable, we have a way to go before we because it focused on how many precision can claim to have made the transition from guided munitions were used by Air Force rhetoric to reality insofar as jointness is con- and Navy aircraft respectively, along with cerned. To complete this important transi- similar bean counts which missed the bigger tion we will have to keep pushing, for mak- picture. One reason Air Force tactical fighters ing joint operations second nature to the were so effective in bombing missions, for Armed Forces means continued innovation, instance, was because the Navy controlled probable organizational changes, and a deep the air space over the Gulf. If this had not sense that operating jointly is the way things been the case the Air Force would have had ought to be. JFQ to divert aircraft from striking targets to air defense missions. This is the kind of syner- NOTES gism that often gets overlooked. It is, how- 1 The Army provides ample references. See, for exam- ever, a prime example of how naval aircraft ple, Gordon R. Sullivan, “Moving into the 21st Century: enabled Air Force aircraft to contribute to America’s Army and Modernization,” Military Review, the air campaign in the Persian Gulf War. vol. 73, no. 7 (July 1993), and “Projecting Strategic Land The key to success in strategic bombard- Combat Power,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer ment campaigns is the effective use of preci- 1993). 2 sion guided munitions, which depends in See Buster C. Glossen, “The Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” Aipower Journal, the first instance on coordinated, focused vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993). surveillance and intelligence. And that is best achieved by blending capabilities from all service components with the special perspective of national space-based as- the outstanding sets. It means practical, operational links between Air Force assets like question is what Rivet Joint RC–135s that provide jointness means in electronic surveillance and recon- a practical sense naissance with similar platforms provided by naval forces like the EP–3s and ES–3s. Together, these assets can provide a better electronic map of an opponent and his forces than either can do separately. It also means tying together the tactical assets of two force components. Air Force and Navy manned and unmanned vehicles can provide a far better, more comprehensive picture of the campaign than either one operating on its own. This means coordinated planning which brings people together in the same way they do for joint war games, seminars, and day-to-day operations by second nature. Which brings me back to the central point. The question of whether joint operations are desirable has been resolved for some time. Everyone agrees that they are here to stay and should stay fundamentally because

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27 Summer 1998 / JFQ 27 0819 Cropsey Pgs 11/17/98 6:32 PM Page 28

roles and missions. And history, both ancient and modern, testifies of a nearly universal agreement that true jointness demands seamlessly linked operations between dif- The Limits ferent military capabilities. If politicians and senior officers did not use the motley definitions in this strange pail to support of Jointness different policies, the task of defining jointness could safely be left to theoreticians. By SETH CROPSEY Since, however, jointness has attained in the defense arena the buzzword status that jus- tice, equality, and of late empowerment enjoy in the domestic debate, it is important to be as clear as possible about what jointness is and what it is not. Failure to do so is likely ooperation like apple to lead to an erosion of the distinctive abili- pie is rarely if ever ties of the military disciplines from whose questioned as a desir- differences—ironically—the rationale for able thing. Unfortu- jointness originally springs. nately, while everyone The difficulty of defining jointness was knows whatC an apple pie is, fixing a military apparent in the debate over the Goldwater- definition of cooperation is much harder. Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza- The easy response is jointness, but trying to tion Act of 1986. Both opponents and sup- define this quality produces surprisingly var- porters of the legislation appealed to this ied answers. By implication, legislation al- elusive term to justify their arguments. The ready written defines jointness as a diminu- former claimed that because of the increased tion of the power of the individual services. powers granted to the Chairman, future Presi- In a more positive vein the Chairman of the dents would lose the joint perspective pro- Joint Chiefs, General Powell, sees jointness vided by the expertise of other service chiefs. as teamwork and cooperation. Congressional The legislation’s proponents responded that ideas as expressed by the Chairman of the an increase in the Chairman’s power was Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator needed to provide the jointness that was Nunn, find jointness in the elimination of redundant weapon systems or overlapping

Summary Jointness defies consistent definition. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and students of operational art all view jointness differently. What will be the result of divergent, often opposing concepts of jointness? Goldwater-Nichols mandated jointness by structural reforms; General Powell sees jointness as interservice teamwork; Senator Nunn hopes jointness will be a mechanism for eliminating what he considers to be redundant roles and missions. History has shown that unified forces triumph while poorly organized ones perish. Nevertheless, General Schwarzkopf— who is lionized as an operational commander—waged joint warfare with great success, though he served in few joint assignments during his career. The summons to the services to fight as a team will be ignored by commanders at their own peril, and a joint culture may ensure that as the defense budget is slashed the services are diminished proportionately. But jointness must not eliminate the debate on the purposes and utility of the individual services that must now be conducted in the post-containment era.

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missing due to the disproportionate influence claims, and sought to raise the Chairman and of the individual services and their chiefs. the Joint Staff so that they could settle disputes and unite the efforts of the unruly ser- Change the Organization vices. So successful was the legislation that Goldwater-Nichols does contain a defi- General Powell, the first Chairman to serve nition of jointness, if only by negation. The his entire tour under the new law, has been legislation suggests what jointness does not able to give jointness a new meaning. mean by identifying interservice rivalry as Powell has defined jointness in more the obstacle to it. Accordingly, the act aims positive terms than the 1986 legislation. His at reducing the power of the services by view is that cooperation means teamwork. changing military education to emphasize Given the increasingly dismal prospects for interservice cooperation, diminishing the defense funding and demands on the Armed control exercised by each service over ca- Forces in a disorderly world, his definition reers, and increasing exposure of officers to a also makes political sense. central staff. The 1986 landmark legislation In the private sector scarcity encourages never offered a positive model of how a thrift, drives prices up, and then usually more joint military would think or perform. seeks out other avenues to satisfy demand. But it did draft very firm guidelines altering In the Government—especially the mili- service college curricula, insisted on speci- tary—dwindling budgets have traditionally fied qualifications for career advancement, stimulated a free-for-all between and among and laid the foundation for shifting effective the services that rewards the bureaucratically responsibility for acquisition of major adept and ends only when resources once weapons systems to the Office of the Secre- again start to flow. The bitter fight over roles tary of Defense. and missions following World War II is the So comprehensive was the congressional most notorious example in American mili- understanding of jointness that the reorga- tary history. Demobilization and postwar nization directly touched military officers budget reductions were the dry tinder; Presi- and senior civilian officials. The legislation dent Truman’s decision to pick that moment drained power from the service secretaries to fundamentally rearrange the services was and gave new, broad authority to the Office the flame that set the pile burning. of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), specifi- Colin Powell has turned out to be more cally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac- skillful at politics than Harry Truman. Con- quisition. Consistent with the 30-year effort templating the defense cuts at the beginning to gather authority within OSD—which does of his tenure in 1989, Powell has consis- not embrace the private sector’s current ef- tently sought to create an atmosphere of co- forts to decentralize—the legislation’s au- operation among the services that fends off thors doubted the ability of the services to divisive issues of basic structural change or manage major programs and preferred in- reordering priorities. A measure of the stead to consolidate control over a $300 bil- stature that the Chairman’s political skills lion budget at the center. have earned is a willingness to disagree with Goldwater-Nichols applied the same ap- both Senator Nunn and President Clinton. proach to the military chain of command. Senator Nunn asked basic questions in Congress regarded the services as quarrelsome July 1992 about the structure of the Armed siblings with single, infinite appetites. It de- Forces, such as whether naval aviation and spaired at arbitrating endless contradictory the Marine Corps were still required. He wondered if a single service should be placed in charge of all electronic warfare aircraft, Seth Cropsey is director of the Asia Studies Center at and whether the responsibility for defending the Heritage Foundation. He has served as Principal troops and installations should be consoli- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special dated under the Air Force. Echoing these dif- Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. ficult queries, but taking them a major step

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toward execution, President Clinton in Au- writers could have reached much further gust 1992 told the World Affairs Council in back into history. Los Angeles that: In 425 B.C., the seventh year of their fa- In 1948, then Secretary of Defense James Forre- mous contest, the Athenians and Spartans stal convened a meeting of the military service chiefs fought over the protected harbor of Pylos on in Key West to allocate responsibilities among the the west coast of the Peloponnesian penin- four services. It failed. As President, I will order the sula. The Athenian command concentrated Pentagon to convene a similar meeting to hammer out its efforts on the Spartan garrison which held a new understanding about consolidating and coordi- out on Sphacteria, the island that guards the nating military missions in the 1990s and beyond. western approaches to Pylos. Throughout an In a draft assessment of the future of the operation that lasted over ten weeks the Armed Forces, noted in the press on the last Athenian navy worked smoothly with heavy day of 1992, Powell saw no reason for and light infantry, the former enforcing a sweeping changes. “Yes, we can be said to blockade that hampered resupply of the Spar- have four air forces,” said the Chairman’s re- tan detachment, the latter frontally harassing port, “but each is different, playing a unique the besieged defenders. Eventually hunger and complementary role.” helped break the Spartans’ will to resist and allowed the Athenians to surprise their Change the Spirit enemy in his fortified positions. The image of the military as a powerful Two centuries later, the struggle between organism composed of mutually dependent Rome and Carthage for power in the and cooperative groupings of cell structures Mediterranean spilled over into Spain. As has characterized General Powell’s tenure as Scipio, the joint commander, directed a Chairman. Joint Warfare of bombardment and infantry assault against the U.S. Armed Forces (Joint the need for combined the walled city of New Carthage (today’s Pub 1), which was pub- Cartagena), his naval component comman- operations and harmony lished in November 1991, is der Admiral Caius Laelius launched a simul- the clearest picture of this between the different taneous amphibious attack on the city’s sea- image. Technology, it says, fighting disciplines has ward side. Diverted by these synchronized has made the services in- shocks, the defenders neglected their third been understood—if not creasingly interdependent. flank which lay exposed to a shallow lake Teamwork, trust, and coop- always practiced—since through which a Roman detachment waded eration among the services antiquity and entered New Carthage. After defeating are needed now more than the besieged Carthaginians, Scipio offered a ever to succeed in war. And crown to the man who had first breached as balance is required in the kinds of forces the walls. When both a marine and a centu- fielded, “there is no place for rivalry” among rion of the fourth legion claimed the honor, members of the joint team. Scipio acted with great respect for what we The idea of jointness in Joint Pub 1 is would today call jointness. He awarded two politically attractive because it helps sup- prizes and declared that both warriors had press dissension among the services at a time mounted the wall at the same moment. when straitened budgets are most likely to The need for combined operations and cause such quarrels. Moreover, the need for harmony between the different fighting dis- teamwork between the different military disciplines has been understood—if not always ciplines rests on unassailable operational practiced—since antiquity. But Joint Pub 1 ground. Joint Pub 1 singles out examples in takes this proven operational idea another American history from riverine warfare step by arguing that the teamwork needed along the Mississippi in the Civil War to in battle is just as necessary throughout the Douglas MacArthur’s amphibious attack on military’s other work, using the same lan- the enemy’s rear at Inchon in 1950. But the guage of exhortation to encourage equal harmony throughout the whole military.

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issues arise? Should officers use teamwork and cooperation as a guide, adjusting their opinions to avoid clashes with other experts from different services? This question is particularly relevant to still another current definition of jointness, the one noted above that has been proposed by Senator Nunn and endorsed by President Clinton. In their view the Key West agreements on service roles and missions that Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the chiefs reached in March 1948 have failed to pre-

DOD photo vent wasteful duplications of effort. As can- Senator Nunn during didate Clinton said in his Los Angeles World a visit to the Persian Affairs Council speech: Gulf. Because “the arena of our potential opera- I agree with Senator Sam Nunn that it is time to tions is the entire planet,” the Armed Forces take a fresh look at the basic organization of our require “the ability to project and sustain Armed Forces. We have four separate air forces—one the entire range (emphasis added) of military each for the Marines, Army, Navy, and Air Force. power over vast distances.” 1 There is “no Both the Army and Marines have light infantry divi- place for rivalry that seeks to undercut or sions. The Navy and Air Force have separately devel- denigrate fellow members of the joint oped, but similar, fighter aircraft and tactical mis- team.” 2 And, “the nature of modern warfare siles....While respecting each service’s unique puts a premium on cooperation with each capabilities, we can reduce redundancies, save billions other to compete with the enemy.” 3 of dollars, and get better teamwork. For actual combat, Joint Pub 1’s call to Change the Missions pull together is clear and cannot be dis- Far more radical than either Goldwater- puted. However, in drawing up a concept of Nichols or the Chairman’s calls to join operations to prepare for combat or in draft- hands in battle and out, the Clinton-Nunn ing the doctrine that determines what forces vision sees teamwork as the by-product of ef- will be called upon, or in choosing which ficiency. Rationalizing the missions of the weapons to build or what national military Armed Forces so that no two services per- strategy to follow, the admonition to cooper- form the same job will save money first and ate runs into problems. Reasonable men demand cooperation second. Of the several can—and do—differ about weapons systems, approaches toward establishing a more uni- the appropriateness of certain missions, and fied military, the ideas supporting this one the contributions of the individual services are weakest. Not because Nunn’s proposal to to the Nation’s security. combine such staff functions as the medical, According to Joint Pub 1, “Individual chaplain, and legal corps are baseless. And professional growth, reinforced by military not because his questions about the need for education and varied service and joint assign- separate air and infantry capabilities in his ments, leads to a refined capability to com- Senate speech of July 2, 1992 are unworthy. mand joint forces in peace and war.” 4 But the Nunn’s argument fails to observe its own document does not claim that this combina- standards. Quoting a former Chairman, Admi- tion of education and experience will answer ral William Crowe, Nunn rightly faults the thorny military questions, the ones that pre- customary manner in which America has re- dictably draw bureaucratic blood and leave duced its forces at “the end of a period of mili- trails of nettles from the Pentagon to Capitol tary crisis and the start of an era of relative Hill. What does Joint Pub 1 expect when such peace.” Proceeding backwards, the United States has cut defense first, says Senator Nunn,

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and asked second how “to shape a new force fication for cutting defense that may or may in light of the changed circumstances.” not suit the disorderly world and American However, instead of trying to peer into interests. It does not start out by taking de- the years ahead or explain the lessons that liberate aim at these vexing problems. But should have been learned from the struggle whatever the merits of his proposal, it does against the Soviets, Nunn looks to the past. expand the definitions of jointness. For him, the most important challenge in These definitions share a common, sus- America’s change of circumstances is “to picious view of the services and are differen- provide a fighting force...that is not bound tiated by their political content. Goldwater- by the constraints of the roles and missions Nichols is the least political. Knowing the outlined in 1948.” military’s responsiveness to hierarchy and Nunn, of course, is referring to the com- promotion, it seeks harmony through orga- promise by which the Office of the Secretary nizational changes that tinker with power of Defense and the Joint Chiefs were estab- and incentives. The legislation has other ef- lished while maintaining a separate Marine fects, but it had no other end. Corps and naval aviation arm. This compro- General Powell’s emphasis on opera- mise was a political response to an idea de- tional teamwork stands unmovably on the veloped by Secretary of War Henry Stimson firm ground of experience. It is harder to say and Army Chief of Staff General George what the positive effect of his call to repro- Marshall. Deputy Chief of Staff General duce this cooperation at the staff level Joseph McNarney presented the proposal to means except in broad terms of encouraging the House Select Committee on Post-War respect for the views of officers from differ- Military Policy in 1944. Its original justifica- ent services. But Powell’s more distant—and tion had been the lack of sufficient coordi- political—goal is to dampen the rivalry nation between the Army and Navy during among the services that could still be an in- the war, especially just before the Japanese strument of wanton dismemberment in the attack on Pearl Harbor. hands of legislators bent on extracting fur- But interservice co- ther peace dividends from the military. the undesirability of ordination is not Nunn’s Most political are Nunn’s questions on absolute jointness— first goal; he nowhere duplication and redundancy. Wrapped in re- complete absorption of all claims the lack of it as a flections on the changed circumstances of problem. The Nunn- our time and casting back to the political the services into a single Clinton proposal identi- tussles of the late 1940s, the queries by the organization—should be fies the benefit of mov- Chairman of the Senate Armed Services plain since there is no ing beyond the 1948 Committee are linked by the political goal of agreements in terms of reducing defense costs, which accounts for serious proposal to go potential savings. Look- campaigner Clinton’s support. that far ing at air power Nunn The Passion for Purple says, “We spend tens of There is a serious problem with this billions of dollars every year operating tacti- growing chorus of calls for jointness. The cal aircraft squadrons in each of the four ser- sense of purpose and morale, and thus ulti- vices.” Noting that the Navy wants to spend mately the effectiveness of the services, is from $55 billion to $75 billion on a new ver- threatened by a calculus of their diminishing sion of the F–18 while the Air Force plans to identities. The undesirability of absolute replace its F–16 fleet, Nunn asks whether the jointness—complete absorption of all the services could save money by cooperating services into a single organization—should together in the development of a common be plain since there is no serious proposal to multirole fighter. go that far. Somewhere is a view of the ser- These questions are rooted in the desire vices as too big and complicated to be led to save costs, not in changed circumstances. Nunn in the end offers merely another justi-

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easily from the center, and of their skills as early in their careers, the genius of such too diverse to be mixed without weakening other great officers as Ulysses S. Grant re- the final compound. vealed itself later. Is the system’s rational re- Unfortunately, albeit unintentionally, sponse to Goldwater-Nichols denying the this is where we are headed. Ideas have been Nation the talents of late bloomers? Or will legislated, those representing the current the military ultimately find a way to move thinking of the leaders of the Department of officers through joint duty assignments by Defense, and those still in the planning unintentionally hamstringing the Joint Staff stages, are not like a series of proposals on na- and the CINCs with a host of joint billets? tional health from which Neither alternative beckons. For the mo- one must be chosen. In- ment, however, one direction is clear. The stead, these and other current Chairman, General Powell, has used proposals will have a cu- the powers of his office which were enlarged mulative effect. by Goldwater-Nichols, as well as his own ex- The increased time ceptional political talents, to cultivate a that officers spend in staff spirit of cooperation among the services. positions as a result of Balanced reductions in forces reinforced by Goldwater-Nichols as well an inclusive approach to service assets in as the rising quality of of- combat and cushioned by such educational ficers who are assigned to efforts as this journal have been the order of joint billets has improved the day. the strength of personnel But again, the call to jointness has some on combined staffs. Of discordant notes. The need for teamwork this there is no doubt. But when combined operations are required is at what price? When the incontestable. However, do joint assign- system as retooled by ments and education, the powerful message Goldwater-Nichols proof documents such as Joint Pub 1, or even duces its first Chairman the Goldwater-Nichols Act itself promote DOD photo by R.D. Ward General Powell and set of Joint Chiefs, such teamwork where it matters: in combat? appearing before the will they know as much about the capabilities Perhaps. But the evidence is scanty. House Armed Services of their services as those who preceded them? Joint Pub 1 paints General Schwarz- Committee. Will the opinions they give under the most kopf’s victory over Iraq as a jewel in the demanding circumstances to a President who joint crown. It quotes repeatedly and at has no military experience be as operationally length from all his component commanders informed as the advice of a general officer on the virtues of harmony. But Schwarzkopf, such as Norman Schwarzkopf who, until he by his own account, is a straightforward, became a CINC, had only served one tour on old-fashioned Army man with little toler- a joint staff? 5 ance for staff life, and no warm feelings for And what dislocations are being caused joint duty. He speaks of his decision to ac- by the legislatively induced requirement for cept an assignment in the Army Secretariat the Armed Forces to push a large pool of as ticket punching.6 And, the “happiest day” qualified officers through the relatively nar- of Schwarzkopf’s tour on the staff of U.S. Pa- row channel of joint duty billets? Personnel cific Command occurred when he was or- detailers already talk in private both about dered to Germany as assistant division com- the demoralization junior officers sense at mander of the 8th Mechanized Infantry.7 The not earning joint qualifications soon Central Command commander did not trust enough, and the growing pressure to exclude the Joint Staff much either. Referring to from joint assignments any officer who is slides from a briefing on Operation Desert not rated first or second among several peers Storm which President Bush received in in yearly evaluations. Although men like Washington, Schwarzkopf told his chief of George Marshall distinguished themselves

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staff, “I want them presented by you person- a court martial. The matter was quickly really, not some officer from the Joint Staff.” 8 solved and the operation proceeded. Nowhere in his popular autobiography Joint tours, revised educational curric- does Schwarzkopf mention Goldwater- ula, exhortations to cooperate, and leg- Nichols or the 1986 law’s supposed multipli- islation did not help—or hurt—General cation of the CINC’s Schwarzkopf in the execution of his joint power which others have duties. When he was called on for advice, he joint tours, revised touted as key to the suc- gave his best which was very good indeed educational curricula, cess of U.S. arms in the because it was based on many years of work Gulf War. Although he perfecting his skill. And when he required exhortations to cooperate, had anxious moments assistance and cooperation of officers from and legislation did not when Washington’s re- other services, he knew how to get it. help—or hurt—General quests for information The balance in the system which pro- made him fear that the duced Schwarzkopf and such other success- Schwarzkopf in the execu- policymakers did not ful unified commanders as General Max tion of his joint duties wholly grasp the true Thurman, who led the U.S. Southern Com- picture, Schwarzkopf at- mand during the invasion of Panama in tributes his success in 1989, was as difficult to achieve as it is easy part to the freedom he was given to operate to upset. In this equilibrium, the need for according to his best judgment and Powell’s competitive ideas at the center where deci- ability to run political interference. sions are made about the size, shape, pur- Schwarzkopf’s appreciation of jointness pose, and mixture of forces serves as equi- lacks the diversity of approaches and harmony of poise to the demand for harmonious action effort tone that characterizes Joint Pub 1, but in battle. the vacuum is filled by practical and effective Such efforts as the increasing emphasis action. When his order to move VII Corps on jointness tip the scales in the direction of into position in control of Safwan airfield was concerted operational effort. However, by ef- not obeyed, the CINC tells his Army compo- fectively putting a damper on conflicting nent commander that unless the original or- ideas, they also suppress debate over such ders are executed, he will give the job to the fundamental issues as the composition and Marines. This threat helps speed action. character of future forces. Backed by a force- It fits neatly into the operational appreci- ful Chairman, Joint Pub 1’s insistence on ation of jointness that Schwarzkopf gained in common perspectives, teamwork, and coopera- 1983 as Army advisor to Vice Admiral Joe tion delivers a strong warning against argu- Metcalf who led the invasion of Grenada. As ments, for example, that support asymmetri- Schwarzkopf tells it, when Metcalf required cal reductions in U.S. forces in response to expertise on ground operations—as he did in world events. Admonitions that “there is no planning the opposed movement of Army place for rivalry” on the joint team, that the and Marine units across the island to free military should “exploit the diversity of ap- American medical students—Metcalf asked proaches that a joint force provides,” help Schwarzkopf to write the orders. establish a standard of political correctness However, when it subsequently became in the Armed Forces that chokes off consid- clear that a helicopter assault to release the eration of ideas which, while troublesome to students at Grand Anse would be quicker the interests of an individual service or a and less costly, Metcalf gave the order. particular weapons system, might be impor- Schwarzkopf explained the plan to the Ma- tant to the Nation. rine colonel whose helicopters were to carry The problem is not jointness but rather Army troops in the hostage rescue. When what is meant by jointness. Unified effort in the colonel balked, Schwarzkopf noted that the field has real meaning, and there is no the order came from Metcalf and threatened serious argument against this. But outside the realms of the unified commanders, the

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notion becomes unclear or encourages intel- time of falling defense budgets. But the hier- lectual torpor. archy’s forceful message not to squabble also The medical profession’s contemporary helps muffle consideration of such ideas as experience offers clear parallels and a con- the unequal division of budget cuts based on structive direction. Like officers, physicians national requirements or a national security must devote a growing portion of their time strategy that may not rely on balanced to mastering the technical demands of their forces. Unfortunately, such questions are art. Technological advancements in diagnos- precisely the ones to be examined. Insofar as tic and surgical instruments as well as the the pressure for jointness keeps these issues doubling of medical knowledge roughly every at bay, the Nation is deprived of a debate it four years is forcing doctors to concentrate on should conduct. smaller and smaller parts of the human In Federalist 10 James Madison, urging anatomy. The body, however, is a whole, and adoption of the Constitution, reflects on the a pathology of the optic nerve, for example, proposed Union’s ability to control the dan- might be apparent to neurosurgeons where gerous effects of political faction. “The ophthalmologists would overlook it. The cure causes of faction cannot be removed...re- is to balance specific with general knowledge. lief is only to be sought in controlling the ef- In military terms, the solution to the want of fects.” Heading off controversy in the Armed a common perspective is not to exhort offi- Forces over basic questions on the future cers and enlisted personnel to get one, but to could eventually remove the causes of dis- provide one that is based on ideas rooted in agreements among the services by helping experience. to strip them of their pugnacity. This would In other words, one must study history not serve America well either. It would be to understand the causes of military success better to seek jointness off the battlefield in and failure. By noting joint and combined the renewed effort to understand the valu- operations throughout the text, Joint Pub 1 able lessons of warfare through the experi- does acknowledge this need. But its histori- ences of those who have succeeded and cal lessons all teach jointness. And depen- failed at it. JFQ dence on ratios of students from different services to determine whether a service col- NOTES lege course qualifies as joint in the wake of 1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Goldwater-Nichols is an obvious example of Armed Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: National De- the triumph of process over substance. Mili- fense University Press, 1991), p. 2. 2 Ibid., p. 4. tary history is richer and more complicated. 3 Ibid., p. 15. It shows that organizations as well as great 4 Ibid., p. 32. captains can make the difference between 5 Schwarzkopf quotes the reaction of his command- victory and disaster. It teaches the value of ing officer, Major General Richard Cavazos, to the news thinking through tactical and strategic prob- Schwarzkopf had been ordered to the Pacific Command when he was a one-star general: “Whoever made that lems beforehand. It demonstrates the advan- decision is a dumb bastard.” H. Norman Schwarzkopf in tage of being able to swiftly change ideas, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), plans, and operations in the face of the p. 214. unanticipated. 6 Ibid., p. 191. Jointness is not an end in itself. Nor can 7 Ibid., p. 221. 8 Ibid., p. 360. anyone prove that it is. Jointness is a minimal requirement for most of the imaginable situations in which this Nation would use force in the future. Apart from combat, it is a rhetorical whip that maintains a politically useful discipline among the services in a

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Joint Force Quarterly Essay Contest on INNOVATIONMilitary To stimulate innovative thinking on how the Armed Forces can remain on the cutting edge of warfare in the 21st century, Joint Force Quarterly is pleased to announce the 1998–99 “Essay Contest on Military Innovation” sponsored by the National Defense University Foundation, Inc. The contest solicits contributions on exploiting technological advances in warfighting as well as on the development of new operational concepts and organizational structures. Essays may be based on either historical analyses of military breakthroughs or contemporary trends in the conduct of war.

Contest Prizes 4. Entries must be submitted with (a) a letter indi- Winners will be awarded prizes of $2,500 and cating the essay is a contest entry together with $1,500 for the two best essays. In addition, a the author’s name, social security account number prize of $1,000 will be presented for the best essay (or passport number in the case of non-U.S. en- submitted by an officer in the rank of major/ trants), mailing address, daytime telephone num- lieutenant commander or below (or equivalent ber, and FAX number (if available); (b) a cover grades), regardless of nationality. sheet containing the contestant’s full name and essay title; (c) a summary of the essay which is no Contest Rules more than 100 words; and (d) a biographical 1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians sketch of the author. Neither the names of authors (from the public or the private sector) and of any nor any personal references to the identity of the nationality. Essays written by individual authors contributors should appear in the body of the es- or groups of authors are eligible. says (including running heads or other distinguishing markings such as office symbols). 2. Entries must be original in nature and not previously published (nor under consideration for 5. Entries should be mailed to: Essay Contest, publication elsewhere). Essays derived from work ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62), carried out at intermediate and senior colleges Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. (staff and war colleges), universities, and other 20319–5066. educational institutions are eligible. 6. All entries must be postmarked no later than 3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words in length June 30, 1999 to be considered eligible. and must be submitted typewritten, double- 7. Joint Force Quarterly will hold first right to spaced, and in triplicate (no electronically trans- publish all entries. The prize-winning as well as mitted contributions will be accepted). They other essays submitted in the contest may appear should include a wordcount at the end. Documen- in future issues of the journal. JFQ tation may follow any standard form of citation, but endnotes rather than footnotes are preferred.

36 JFQ / Summer 1998 36 0919 Strain Pgs 11/17/98 6:42 PM Page 37

A 25-mile radius radar used to alert surface- to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns. New

Joint U.S. Air Force (Scott Stewart) The WarfareBy FREDERICK R. STRAIN

uccessfully developing effective mili- completed puzzle, one that took decades to tary capabilities is not unlike solving solve but that now fits together as tightly as Rubik’s Cube. If individual service as- the classic paradigm of a cube. What actually Ssets and strengths are represented by occurred was that the puzzle was overtaken the squares of a cube, then solving the puzzle by technological breakthroughs and the rush F–117A stealth aircraft involves long periods of adjusting military ca- of world events. The result is the advent of on the flight line at Langley Air Force pabilities to reach the optimum configura- the kind of turmoil that disrupts the estab- Base, Virginia. tion. In the wake of the Gulf War many be- lished order and presents the military profes- U.S. Air Force lieve that the Armed Forces resemble a sional with yet another puzzle to solve.

Summary The Gulf War not only marked a watershed in modern joint and combined operations, but also ushered in another, new type of warfare that is influenced by the course of emerging technology and the pace of world events. Like changes that have followed the development of new weapons throughout military history, doctrine and strategy are undergoing a revolution in the wake of the greatly enhanced stealth, precision, and lethality of fielded systems. As a result, commanders can anticipate that operations will almost always be joint, that distinctions between the strategic and tactical levels will blur, that new centers of gravity will emerge, and that the combat area will be more complex and difficult to delineate. These changes require redefining campaigns and campaign phasing, interdiction, maneuver, close air support, and other time-honored terms.

37 Autumn 1993 / JFQ 17 JOINT WARFARE

There have been other occasions in mili- and be supported by sea or air insertion and retary history when one puzzle was sup- covery of mission personnel. planted by another, particularly as the result The first postulate of the new warfare is of technological developments.1 The intro- that the services fight and operate jointly. duction of the machine gun, tank, airplane, Even lesser contingencies in the future will submarine, atomic bomb, and ICBM all almost always involve materiel, C4I, or trans- caused the Armed Forces to readjust their port from more than one service. Military doctrine to meet fresh challenges. More re- professionals must learn to appreciate cent innovations brought about stealth, pre- emerging service capabilities and organize, cision, lethality, and surveillance systems train, and equip to optimize the employ- that portend other revolutionary changes in ment of decisive joint force. military capabilities. The United States decided to actively Strategy and Tactics pursue particular technologies over the last Distinctions between the strategic and twenty-five years to provide the Armed the tactical levels of war are no longer clear. Forces with distinct military advantages. Nowhere is this lack of clarity more pro- Even though the services worked to bring nounced than in designating weapon sys- about this dramatic shift in the puzzle, tems. Long-range bombers destroy ground many appear surprised by the outcome. This forces along the forward line of troops as situation highlights the need to develop new short-range fighters attack and destroy oil re- doctrines and strategies that fully recognize fineries. Army helicopters hit strategic air de- and support the spectacular changes that fense control centers as Navy cruise missiles have occurred. The services must dedicate designed for fighting nuclear wars disable themselves to solving the puzzle. We must electrical grids with specialized payloads. also determine if the puzzle is still a cube or Those who remain prone to “old think” fail whether it has taken on another form better to recognize how technology now enables suited to the new environment. What are all combat systems and elements to become the changes in the paradigm? strategic or tactical depending on their intended objective. Future Operations Will Be Joint The distinction between strategic and Military history is replete with accounts tactical targets is also undergoing change. of campaigns and battles involving partici- Influenced by waning doctrine associated pation by only one service. In the new with the Single Integrated Operational Plan paradigm it is difficult to envision any point (SIOP) and Cold War, military planners have on the conflict spectrum where a single ser- lost track of the fact that the distinction re- vice would be committed alone. In the new lates to a target’s impact on the CINC’s ob- joint warfare it is very likely that jective rather than to the nature of the target ▼ naval armadas will do battle on the high itself. Thus communication nets, fielded seas together with long-range bombers armed forces, oil refineries, and vehicles have a with Harpoon missiles strategic or tactical implication depending ▼ operations against enemy land forces will on the desired outcome. involve sea-launched or air-launched, stand-off specialized anti-armor munitions as well as more New Centers of Gravity conventional artillery The principle of attacking key centers of ▼ air battles will involve theater ballistic gravity (COGs) to quickly achieve an objec- missile defense systems launched by land forces tive is as old as war itself and is taught at or from off the decks of specialized naval vessels each level of Professional Military Education. as well as the commitment of aircraft Unfortunately, traditional COGs may have ▼ even relatively small, covert special opera- little impact on the outcome of future con- tions will involve space-based communications flicts. Global economic and informational interdependencies, for example, suggest new Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Strain, USAF, serves in the centers of gravity that strategists must con- Strategic Planning Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of sider. These COGs require the military to de- Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters, Department of velop and exploit new ways to attack key the Air Force. A master navigator, his operational assign- points. Destroying or interdicting an en- ments have been in B–52 and B–1 bombers.

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Strain

emy’s economic infrastructure by computer fact of life. Modern war- intrusion may be just as valid as an ap- fare demands grasping proach to warfare by the year 2000 as strate- massive theater-scale op- gic bombing is today. erations on a minute-by- minute basis. The possi- Redefining the Combat Edge bility of a potential Technology remains the major driving adversary launching bal-

force behind the changing limits of the com- U.S. Navy listic missiles compresses bat area. When soldiers lined up abreast and the decision cycle even A Marine Corps F–18 maneuvered with spears and shields in fighter firing a further and dramatically sweeping formations to flank an opponent, Sidewinder missile. emphasizes the point. commanders needed only to primarily con- Aside from the characteristics of new sider the breadth of battle. With the advent weapon systems, two additional factors influ- of artillery, the depth of the battle area (even ence the criticality of time in the new on the seas) became an important considera- paradigm. The growing sensitivity of the tion in the development of doctrine, strat- American public to combat losses suggests egy, and tactics. Fewer than twenty years that civilian leaders will tend to measure fu- after the first flight of the Wright brothers, ture acceptable levels of U.S. casualties in the battle area had a significant, expanded dozens rather than thousands of lives. The Gulf vertical dimension. Most professionals rec- War set a standard in this regard that could be ognize current technology is once again dra- difficult to meet in future conflicts unless cer- matically expanding the range of these tain technological advantages are pursued. In boundaries. The breadth, depth, and height order to minimize casualties, the Armed of the battle area now encompasses the en- Forces must deliver the full range of combat tire globe and extends well into space. The power quickly and decisively. Moreover, pro- requirement for global situational awareness longed conflicts make it far more difficult to is more critical than ever before. maintain political-military coalitions which The new paradigm points to revolution- are becoming increasingly important and ary change in the way we think about the complex in the new environment. battle area. Time—the fourth dimension— may become the paramount factor in mod- The New Battle Area ern combat. Prior to the new warfare mili- The ability to conduct simultaneous op- tary leaders measured time (in combat erations across the depth, breadth, and terms) by weeks, months, or even years of height of the combat area compels military operations. The luxury of professionals to change their perspective. the need to identify, target, having the time to think, The traditional reliance on finely drawn and attack in near real-time plan, and react stemmed lines on charts must be challenged in order from the limitations on to fully realize the potential of emerging is now a fact of life physical movement of combat systems. Among the questions that combat forces. It took must be asked are: time for soldiers to march, vessels to transit, ▼ Will future naval commanders responsi- and aircraft to deploy, as well as for com- ble for destroyers with cruise missiles capable of manders to gather and assess intelligence. striking ground targets a thousand miles away Ballistic missiles, jet aircraft, hovercraft, understand the new battle area? Will the missiles and turbocharged light vehicles are charac- recognize Forward Support Control Lines (FSCLs) teristic of the new environment. As empha- drawn on a chart or the significant maneuver by sized in Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces friendly forces that has occurred since launch? If (Joint Pub 1), “Crises may unfold rapidly, not, how can combat power at the disposal of and critical engagements may occur with lit- commanders be effectively advocated and integrated into useful operations? tle time to prepare.” The commander can no ▼ Will Army company commanders in longer afford the luxury of thinking in terms charge of new fire systems with ranges of 200 km of days, weeks, or months to phase cam- fully understand the integration of weapon sys- paigns or move forces. The need to identify, tems into strategic targeting plans? If not, how target, and attack in near real-time is now a can commanders begin to think about improving doctrine, strategy, and tactics?

39 Autumn 1993 / JFQ 19 Joint Combat Camera Center Refueling M–1 Abrams tank during Operation Desert Shield.

Joint Combat Camera Center Marines unloading a Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC–22) in Somalia. New capabilities may not be able to op- masses of enemy troops in bloody combat, erate within the confines of old doctrinal battling their way to the enemy’s capital in patterns if there is a true desire to optimize order to eventually convince their leaders utility and exploit synergy. Joint Force Com- that further resistance is futile. manders (JFCs) will need new ways in the fu- The new paradigm suggests that simul- ture to undelineate the battlefield and more taneity or what some theorists call simulta- effectively integrate and control service ca- neous or parallel warfare (as opposed to se- pabilities. Creative doctrines and strategies rial warfare) is key to future operations. Old- must emerge, and the vision of commanders style serial warfare is illustrated by the way must begin to be expanded at all levels. air forces struck targets during World War II when commanders massed hundreds of Old Definitions/New Paradigm bombers and dropped thousands of bombs Part of the inability of the services to against a single important target. The next fully participate in creative discussions about day they did the same thing against a sec- the new joint warfare is the inability to ond target; and on the third day yet another break with definitions belonging to the old target was hit. It did not take long before the model. Hidebound ideas that link certain enemy realized that on the following day a terminology, weaponry, and/or services in- fourth target would be struck. By the tenth hibit desperately needed innovation. day the first target was repaired and opera- Campaigns and campaign phasing. Histor- tional again. Serial warfare on land, at sea, ically the term campaign meant a series of and in the air was necessary to achieve the military operations directed by a comman- mass needed to destroy a particular target. der in chief to achieve specific objectives. The Gulf War demonstrated it is now The campaign is composed of phases that possible to simultaneously strike hundreds match particular elements of combat power of key targets through the careful integration against sub-objectives. Each phase estab- of land, sea, and air capabilities. The result is lishes the requisite environment or condi- the strategic, operational, and tactical paral- tions for the next operation. Developing ysis of an enemy in a brief period of time: campaign plans designed to “peel the that ability to bring down the hammer in onion” layer by layer to get to the center of one gigantic crushing blow is the new joint gravity is old thinking. That syndrome often warfare. In this respect using the term cam- crops up in doctrinal debates and is rooted paign to denote carefully sequenced activities in the mistaken notion that war continues to resemble giant Napoleonic battles of yore. It envisions masses of Americans fighting

20 JFQ / Autumn 1993 40 0919 Strain Pgs 11/17/98 6:42 PM Page 41 U.S. Navy (Kit Masterson)

Combat information center aboard the aircraft carrier USS Constellation.

over a prolonged period of time may no interdiction.2 If it is now becoming possible longer be valid. The advent of parallel war- to achieve operational paralysis quickly, fare dramatically reduces the time required then interdiction could conceivably become to achieve objectives. The net result is that the JFC’s primary strategy. future JFCs can pursue multiple objectives si- There is also a danger in believing that multaneously. For all practical purposes tran- interdiction is more effective if segmented or sitions between campaign phases may occur divided into geographic regions or areas of so quickly that one might consider each responsibility.3 Interdiction must occur campaign as consisting of only a single quickly and decisively across the depth, phase. If so, are there still traditional cam- breadth, and height paigns or should a new term be coined and of the modern battle interdiction must added to the military lexicon? area to fully exploit occur quickly and Interdiction. Impeding, hindering, or iso- its synergistic effect. lating by firepower (typically using short- This means control- decisively across range aviation or submarines) is the tradi- ling interdiction at the battle area tional form of interdiction. This old command levels redefinition, however, is no longer sufficient sponsible for theater- for the new joint warfare and changing bat- wide activities. Allowing control of interdic- tle environment. Service capabilities now tion activities to reside at a lower echelon of provide for interdiction by computer, elec- command—or excluding certain capabilities tronic warfare, electromagnetic pulse, psy- because of service-unique positions—will chological operations, and a host of other likely result in missed opportunities and the emerging means of denial. misuse of integrated land, sea, air, space, and Furthermore, planners have historically special operations forces. viewed interdiction as a function that sup- Maneuver. A principle of war generally ports the CINC. But consider the emerging associated with mass movement, maneuver paradigm: could not technology provide in- may become less important in the new bat- terdiction capabilities so complete and ef- tle area. First, being able to see the entire fective (read operationally paralyzing) that an battle area (using JSTARS, AWACS, and opponent recognizes the futility of continu- emerging space systems) provides JFCs with ing? That was hardly the case in World War opportunities to optimize movement. Com- II, Korea, or even Vietnam. The high vol- manders will move smaller and smaller ele- ume of munitions required to strike individ- ments of very lethal systems to counter ual targets—due to weapon inaccuracy— could not support effective, wide-scale

41 Autumn 1993 / JFQ 21 JOINT WARFARE

larger, less capable enemy forces. This will Fire Support Control Lines (FSCLs). As avoid wasted movement of excess force and mentioned previously, the notion of two di- thereby negate the need for increasingly mensional lines on charts as absolute delin- complex logistical support. The intricate eators of responsibility has to be revised. Tra- challenge of keeping fuel flowing to speed- ditional means of command and control ing heavy vehicles for the ground assault cannot keep abreast with the rapid pace of during Operation Desert Storm, for example, operations in the new joint warfare. As at- portends the problems traditional weapon tention focuses on the development and em- systems have in the new battle area. ployment of smaller, lighter, faster, but more Second, events in the modern battle area lethal weapon systems, JFCs must conceive could happen so quickly there will be scant new methods of deconflicting ground, time to react, let alone to plan and execute naval, and air forces. Since the only com- mass maneuver. The battle area of the future mon point of reference available to all types will be the domain of of forces is time (provided by synchronized no single weapon or force lighter, faster, more lethal space satellites), the new boundaries, per- land, sea, and air vehicles. haps drawn in time, will serve as the divid- reaches its full potential The expanded nature of ing lines of the future. Centralized com- unless employed with com- the combat area almost mand and control of targeting under the plementary capabilities precludes moving tradi- Joint Force Air Component Commander tional systems far enough (JFACC) is only the first step in a process and quickly enough to that must exploit new technologies. Eventu- keep pace with the tempo of widely-dis- ally communication and computer systems persed geographic operations. A major chal- should automatically deconflict combined lenge to future JFCs is the ability to provide fires and optimize target-attack sequences by real-time command and control for small, sending signals across the battle area that in- combined elements of extremely lethal forces hibit or enable weapon systems based upon moving throughout the battle area at break- real-time feedback. neck speed. The famous left hook during Close Air Support. Another term of art Desert Storm (involving almost 50,000 vehi- that requires revision as technology changes cles) may have been the last major large-scale the battle area is Close Air Support (CAS) maneuver of its kind. which traditionally meant aircraft attacking Finally, developing long-range ground enemy ground forces in close proximity to and naval fires and exploiting air-launched friendly troops. The support involved both stand-off weapons could diminish the need preplanned and immediate requirements, to maneuver for close-in engagements as yet recently the focus tends to be almost ex- enemy ground, naval, and air forces are de- clusively on the immediate. An aircraft has stroyed at greater and greater distances. As- even been designed exclusively to perform suming strong defensive positions—as more this mission. With the development of im- advanced semi-autonomous weapons sys- proved guidance and fire control systems, tems begin to dot the battle area—could be support to forces engaged close-in can be ac- the most advantageous tactic of the future. complished just as easily with new forms of Maneuver in the new joint warfare fo- artillery, both air- and surface-launched cuses on maneuvering technological stand-off weapons that disperse cluster and strengths against an adversary’s weaknesses anti-armor munitions, and emerging non- to minimize casualties and shorten the con- lethal technologies. flict. The speed, precision, and increased Once again each of the services can con- lethality of emerging weapons will allow tribute to these requirements in the new bat- commanders the opportunity to concentrate tle area. The true key to success in future on maneuvering smaller and smaller forces: joint warfare is to provide forces with suffi- single ships instead of armadas, companies cient indigenous lethality so that immediate in place of battalions, and one stealth air ve- CAS is rarely needed. The generic term used hicle instead of dozens of traditional aircraft. for such support should be simply close support which more accurately reflects the changing nature of weapon systems that

22 JFQ / Autumn 1993 42 0919 Strain Pgs 11/17/98 6:42 PM Page 43

Strain

conceivably could deliver munitions or Conflict has achieved truly global propor- other payloads from land, sea, or air. tions. It is difficult to envision any scenario These are just a few of the terms and affecting only the United States. Because of definitions that must be recast in light of the American troop withdrawals from around new joint warfare. They also reveal some of the world, conflicts will be fought at greater the basic elements of this warfare. distances than in the past. This fact requires close cooperation with allied and friendly na- Fundamentals of the New Warfare tions for the use of sovereign airspace, transit The first basic element of the new war- of waterways, and benefit of temporary bas- fare is the axiom that the whole is greater ing facilities. Practically all military scenarios than the sum of its parts. While technology envision political support of allies and other can provide unprecedented military capabili- international partners. Greater participation ties, no single weapon or force reaches its by coalitions in conflicts and operations can full potential unless employed with comple- be expected. This puts greater emphasis on mentary capabilities. The military profes- the expanding role of combined training and sional should recognize the increasing syner- exercises. Not only must joint doctrine be ca- gism of modern forces. In particular, Joint pable of accommodating new technology Force Commanders (JFCs) must be cognizant and exploiting service capabilities, but it of individual service capabilities and en- must be intelligible to both allies and coali- abling characteristics needed to carefully or- tion partners. Absent from the current debate chestrate quick, decisive actions. The ability are serious questions about improving com- to orchestrate force capabilities to achieve de- bined operations. How would Thai forces use sired results is the key to success. It does not U.S. space assets during coalition action? matter if a symphony conductor once How would U.S. forces exploit future Japa- played the flute; the only allegiance is to the nese assets? These are important issues for strength and power of the synergism. the new joint warfare. Complementary operations are necessary Post-conflict operations in the new joint for any future success. JFCs must form the warfare environment are almost as impor- team so that the appropriate players are in tant as combat itself. Protecting refugees, the line-up and ensure the game plan suits fostering fledgling regimes, providing hu- the operation. In the new paradigm, it is im- manitarian assistance, and enforcing peace portant that JFCs select the key force required accords are all necessary to ensure stability to spearhead efforts. That force is the mili- in today’s world. tary capability with the greatest potential impact on events. This con- The Challenge for Commanders claiming service-unique cept goes well beyond desig- Effective command and control of the doctrinal exemptions is nating a particular service as most capable military force in history is a the key force. In the new daunting task. Not only must JFCs com- counterproductive to the warfare special forces or psy- pletely understand the synergetic effect of new joint warfare chological operations may an increasing range of service capabilities, have as much impact on the but designated commanders must be en- outcome as traditional combat elements. abling forces themselves. JFCs must have au- The key force requires full and unequivocal thority to direct all available assets at their support from all force elements. The force disposal and the ability to create cohesive designated by JFCs may vary in each new teams. Any attempt to undermine or dilute scenario. the principle of unity of command by claim- Another element of new doctrinal devel- ing service-unique doctrinal exemptions is opment is organizing to win. Relationships counterproductive to the new joint warfare. that exist only in crises have proven to be Future battle within the new paradigm less and less effective over time. Command is more than a team effort. Most team mem- relationships of the past cannot be relied on bers tend to come together and put aside to continue to work in the future. It is neces- their individual differences only for the big sary to pioneer new command structures for game, then they part company and revive peacetime as well as periods of crisis. personal animosities. Resulting friction on the sidelines eventually manifests itself on

43 Autumn 1993 / JFQ 23 JOINT WARFARE

the field, thereby denigrating the entire target as part of an effort to achieve strategic team’s effectiveness. The challenge is to de- paralysis may severely affect the ability of an velop a force that respects the strengths of enemy to recover economically in the post- all its components and appreciates the judg- war period (which could have significant po- ment of its JFC. litical implications). The delegation of authority is one of the Expanded intelligence gathering and cornerstones of modern warfare. While it analysis are critical to an economy of effort. may seem at odds with the principle of unity Disabling attacks on targets, identified of command, it really is an indication of the through careful nodal analysis, can enhance level of trust and confidence that JFCs place operations by strategically and operationally in the ability of their subordinate comman- paralyzing an enemy. With fewer resources ders to accomplish objectives. JFCs must be able to strike hard and fast at The selection of the key force for a partic- the correct targets, with little waste of effort. ular operation gets increasingly difficult, but Advance analyses of key political, economic, it is nonetheless important. Decisions regard- military, and infrastructure targets are criti- ing the key force will affect many factors in cal to reacting quickly and decisively. Fur- the new environment. It thermore, the rapid pace of modern joint determines reaction time, operations requires the targeting cycle to how much and what type have near real-time capability, with the of force to unleash, the added requirement that target data be dis- degree of lethality to seminated in a form common to all forces. apply, how fast an adver- Success in the new joint warfare requires sary can be defeated, the each team member to recognize significant kind of targets to attack, shifts in technology, appreciate the syner- and the level of casualties gism of capabilities, and develop innovative that can be sustained. doctrine and strategy to take advantage of More importantly, when these conditions. Undoubtedly there will be

U.S. Army (Samuel D. Henry) JFCs select the principal challenges that confront JFCs in the new Hawk missile system combat capability they joint warfare. But force integration is not an on an XM501 E–3 determine which force will receive the prior- issue to take up on the eve of battle. It must loader transporter. ity allocation of resources. be realized prior to a crisis by developing and The command relationships evolving adopting common joint doctrine, and also from designation of the key force have come by appreciating the effort involved in once to be known as the supported and the support- again solving the puzzle of Rubick’s Cube. JFQ ing forces. The new joint warfare recognizes that these designations are not indicators of NOTES popularity. No negative connotations attach 1 See Anthony H. Cordesman, Compensating for to being designated a supporting force in Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means Through Tech- given operations. The supported commander nology (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1992). must be generally able to direct the key force 2 In World War II it took 9,070 bombs dropped by an enabled by the complementary capabilities armada of B–17s to ensure a 90 percent probability of of other components. Such command rela- kill (PK) against a single 60-foot by 100-foot building. tionships vary from one scenario to another, By the time of the Vietnam conflict, 176 bombs were re- and even within particular operations. quired. Today it takes only one precision guided bomb to achieve the same PK. (Data courtesy of the Strategic Targeting in the new paradigm also de- Planning Division, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.) serves a fresh look. Traditional methods of 3 For a discussion of the historical lessons learned, selecting and attacking targets may not be see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, editors, effective in the emerging technological envi- The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume 2, Europe: ronment. The requirement to identify, tar- Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 28 ff. get, and destroy mobile missile launchers in Operation Desert Storm suggests the kind of challenge that JFCs will face in the future. Moreover, the significance of a given target vis-á-vis the objective must be better understood. For example, destroying an industrial

24 JFQ / Autumn 1993 44 1019 Powell Pgs 11/17/98 6:55 PM Page 45

An Interview with COLIN L. POWELL The White House The President, Secretary, and Chairman on THE CHAIRMAN February 11, 1991. as Principal Military Adviser

JFQ What is your appraisal of the over- the President, Secretary of Defense, and all impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act? other members of the National Security Council with good, clear, crisp, com- POWELL I believe the implementa- prehensive military advice and recom- tion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has mendations. And they wanted to satisfied the intent of its author—Con- change a system whereby a commit- gress—which under article I, section 8 tee—the Joint Chiefs—tended, they of the Constitution has the power to felt, to offer the least common denomi- make regulations for the Armed Forces. nator advice. Congress achieved this by Congress wanted to make sure that making the Chairman the principal the Joint Chiefs of Staff were providing military adviser—charged to furnish direct military advice—but did not remove the responsibility of the other th General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret.), served as 12 Chairman chiefs to provide it as well. During my of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was the founding publisher tenure as Chairman, I gave my civilian of Joint Force Quarterly.

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■ JFQ FORUM

Moscow Summit, May 1988. The White House as national security adviser I watched

the Cold War starting to end between the Secretary and the chiefs, especially the Chairman. The Secretary is free to obtain advice from whomever he chooses, to include his own civilian policy staff. He is obliged to receive the leaders my own professional advice, Joint Staff has been improved so dra- advice of his military leaders; but he fully informed by the advice and coun- matically that it is now, in my judg- does not have to accept it if he finds he sel I received from my JCS colleagues. ment, the premier military staff in the can get better advice elsewhere or if he When one or more of the chiefs dis- world. You can see a similar effect in doesn’t find it responsive to his needs. agreed, I made sure the Secretary and the staffs of the combatant comman- My experience with Secretary Dick the President were aware of any differ- ders. Just as important, jointness, or Cheney for almost four years was that he ences. This is what Congress intended. teamwork as I prefer to call it, has fully understood his authority over the Goldwater-Nichols also clarified become imbedded in the culture of the entire Department of Defense. He used the lines of command and communi- Armed Forces. me and the chiefs skillfully to get the cation between the President and Sec- military advice he needed. He also skill- retary and the combatant comman- JFQ How has the Chairman’s more fully used his policy staff to get it from ders. CINCs are subordinate to the influential role affected the balance of another perspective. He was then able to Secretary—he is their boss, not the civilian and military authority? blend the two perspectives. I made sure Chairman or the Joint Chiefs. The act POWELL You have to remember that Secretary Cheney saw the Joint Staff authorized the Secretary to use the that Goldwater-Nichols was intended as his staff as well as mine. Chairman as his channel of communi- to strengthen civilian control over the The frequent claim that the Secre- cations to the combatant commanders. military by clarifying and reaffirming tary’s civilian authority and influence The act was also intended to the role of the Secretary and his rela- were reduced by Goldwater-Nichols is improve the professionalism of the tionship with the Joint Chiefs and simply nonsense. Mr. Cheney demon- officer corps in conducting joint opera- combatant commanders. strated on more than one occasion that tions. It has certainly done that. The But to answer the question fully, he was up to the task of controlling the you have to look beyond the legisla- military. Obviously, he found the advice tion. The key is the relationship we provided useful and relevant. To

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Powell

The White House Situation Room.

The White House

suggest that somehow the Secretary is JFQ Why has this new role of the critics. In my four years as Chairman, at the mercy of the Chairman and the Chairman drawn such fire from critics? I worked with five different sets of other chiefs is wrong. The suggestion POWELL Some critics suggest that chiefs. I believe they felt they were does a disservice not to the Chairman the Chairmen, especially me, did some- fully included in the formulation of or the other chiefs but to the Secretary. thing wrong in implementing the act advice. In fact the Chairman relieved The Secretary was very much in charge. in the manner intended by Congress. I them of a lot of housekeeping issues And because he usually found the mili- tried to take the act to its fullest limit. If and permitted them to spend more tary advice he received useful and acted I understand my obligation, I was sup- time and energy on organizing, equip- upon it, I believe the Joint Chiefs of posed to faithfully discharge the law. ping, and training their forces, which Staff became a more influential body Many critics didn’t like the law in is their principal role. than it had been. To improve, to the the first place. They fought it before it Congress and the American people Secretary’s satisfaction, the quality of was passed and are still fighting it. have had ample opportunity over the the military advice he received was These critics sometimes forget that past ten years to see how the Armed what Goldwater-Nichols was all about. Congress enacted Goldwater-Nichols Forces are working and they are The proof of the pudding is the because they were deeply dissatisfied pleased. Goldwater-Nichols has been a string of successful military operations with the system of old that the critics success notwithstanding its critics. we have seen in recent years, from long for. I am sure there was frustra- Panama through Desert Storm through tion among service staffs because the JFQ What is the nature of the relation- Bosnia. The problems encountered in Chairman could move forward on his ship between the Secretary of Defense and Grenada or Desert One, which gave own. The opportunities for logrolling Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols? such impetus to Congress to reform and frustrating progress for parochial POWELL The Chairman was given the process, have been largely over- interests were severely curtailed. We no no authority under the act. He was come. We are not perfect, but the per- longer had to “vote” on issues to deter- given a role—to serve as the principal formance of the Armed Forces in joint mine what advice the chiefs were military adviser. He commands noth- operations has improved significantly going to provide to the Secretary. ing. What the Chairman ultimately and Goldwater-Nichols deserves a great Interestingly, the chiefs seemed to possesses is influence, not authority, deal of the credit. have less of a problem with the role of the Chairman than their staffs and the

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■ JFQ FORUM

and only that influence which the Sec- JFQ Why under your leadership did the I knew my approach was controversial retary gives him. It cannot be taken Joint Chiefs often meet informally? and kept waiting to see if I had to from the Secretary—he must give it to POWELL When former Chairman adjust it. But I never had a single chief the Chairman. The Secretary does that General Dave Jones and Army Chief of say, “We need to hold more formal when he believes the Chairman is Staff General Shy Meyer began the meetings.” someone who can get the best military debate that eventually led to Goldwa- I might add that the secure direct advice available out of the system, ter-Nichols, one of Shy Meyer’s ideas hotline telephone and intercom sys- someone in whom he has confidence was to have two groups of four stars— tems we installed among the chiefs and trust. That’s ultimately what the service chiefs and another council and with the combatant commanders makes the whole system work. It is a of four stars detached from their ser- permitted an even more informal system designed by Goldwater-Nichols vice responsibilities—to serve as the means of consulting. We were con- but one executed by human beings real Joint Chiefs. I didn’t think that stantly in touch and generally spoke who have confidence in each other. was the way to go. But the idea had with one voice once agreement was And at the top of that DOD pyra- merit because it is hard for any service reached on a given issue. mid is the Secretary of Defense. There’s chief who has to fight for his service’s no doubt in my mind—at least in the interest to put that interest aside easily JFQ What impact did the Goldwater- case of the two Secretaries I worked for, in discharging his role as a member of Nichols Act have on the conduct of mili- Dick Cheney and Les Aspin—that they the Joint Chiefs. This is particularly tary operations? were in charge. the case in well-attended formal meet- POWELL The invasion and libera- ings where the chiefs arrive with for- tion of Panama in December 1989 was JFQ How did your experiences in senior mal service-prepared positions to the first full test of Goldwater-Nichols positions in Washington help you as the defend and with their institutions in a combat situation, although there first officer to serve his entire tour as watching. was a partial test under Admiral Crowe Chairman under Goldwater-Nichols? So I used a combination of formal during operations against the Iranian POWELL I came to the job with a and informal meetings. We had lots of navy in the Persian Gulf in 1988. You rather unique background. I had been formal “tank” meetings as a group and might even say that Panama was some- national security adviser, deputy often with the Secretary of Defense in thing of a shakedown cruise for what national security adviser, and military attendance. But to use Shy Meyer’s we would be doing in Desert Shield assistant to three deputy secretaries idea, I had many, many more informal and Desert Storm a year later. and one Secretary of Defense, which meetings, just the six of us sitting General Max Thurman, CINC- gave me a window on the workings of around a table in my office without SOUTH, and one of the greatest sol- the entire Joint Staff and the Chair- aides, staff, or notetakers. This was not diers I’ve ever known, created a joint man’s relationship to the Secretary great for history, but it was a superb task force to design the contingency prior to the enactment of Goldwater- way of getting the unvarnished, plan. The plan was reviewed in Wash- Nichols. As national security adviser I gloves-off, no-holds-barred personal ington but not second-guessed by the also watched the Cold War starting to views of the chiefs. They never shrank Joint Staff and Joint Chiefs. It had end. I had also commanded all opera- from defending their service views, but been briefed to the Secretary. When tional Army forces in the United States it was easier for them to get beyond soldiers of the Panamanian Defense and knew what was happening in the those views when we were no longer a Force killed an American Marine offi- field. As CINC, Forces Command, I was spectator sport. It was also easier to cer, we were ready and able to move a force provider to the overseas com- protect the privacy of our delibera- quickly. I assembled the chiefs, we batant commands. That gave me great tions. We occasionally had a donny- reviewed the situation and plan, and insight into their regional warfighting brook but almost always came to provided our recommendation to plans and needs. agreement on the advice that I took intervene. Dick Cheney agreed and we That experience was also enhanced forward to the Secretary. On occasion, made that recommendation to the by the fact that I had both personal and the Secretary would join us at the little President after thoroughly briefing professional relationships with the round table in my office. I am sure the him on the plan. On the night of the senior members of President Bush’s service staffs were often unhappy operation and in the days that fol- national security team. I was national because they didn’t have their chiefs lowed, General Thurman was given security adviser when he was Vice Presi- loaded with positions and wouldn’t maximum flexibility to use the forces dent and I lived next door to him for always get a complete readout. we provided him. He reported directly two years in the Reagan White House. It was a technique I found useful. to the Secretary through me. Secretary During that same period Congressman Other Chairmen might choose to do it Cheney knew every aspect of the plan Dick Cheney was the minority whip differently. I wouldn’t be surprised if intimately but did not insert himself and Jim Baker was Secretary of Treasury. we met more times formally and infor- into every tactical decision. I dealt So these established relationships gave mally than any previous sets of chiefs. with Thurman, and the Secretary me the entree that I needed to fully watched and listened and kept the implement Goldwater-Nichols. President fully informed. When we

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Powell

jointness means nothing more than teamwork

Remnants of retreating

Iraqi forces. DOD

needed additional political guidance, Forces. The trick is always to put the an operation and it did it very well. We the Secretary rapidly got it from the right stars together on a team to accom- had to break a lot of bureaucratic bowls President. There were glitches, of plish the team mission without arguing to create ACOM. We knew that it would course. There always are. But the about who gets the game ball. have to evolve over time and that evo- model was set: we had clear political lution is still going on. guidance, there was a solid and well- JFQ How has the ACOM role as joint We used the old Atlantic Com- integrated plan, the CINC was in force integrator progressed in your view? mand as the base for ACOM because charge, and there was appropriate POWELL It took us three years of with the end of the need to defend the oversight from the Joint Chiefs and debate to create the ACOM concept. We sea lanes against the Soviet navy, National Command Authorities. It was recognized that with our drawdowns Atlantic Command was a headquarters the model we used, scaled-up, for around the world there would be a with the capacity to accept a new mis- Desert Shield and Desert Storm and it greater need to have jointly trained sion. Its location in Norfolk placed it is the model that is still in use and forces immediately available to deploy near TRADOC, Langley, the Armed working very well. overseas to be used by theater comman- Forces Staff College, the Pentagon, ders. Theater commanders trained their Quantico, and other installations that JFQ How would you assess the level of forces jointly, but we weren’t doing that have a role in training, doctrine, con- jointness during Desert Storm? well enough back in CONUS. Each ser- tingency planning, and education. At POWELL I would assess it as excel- vice trained its own forces, with only the time, we also left it with mission lent. It wasn’t perfect. We identified large, annual showcase exercises to responsibility for the Caribbean so it improvements we had to make such as train a joint force. We had to make would be a real warfighting headquar- enhancing the integration of the air joint training the rule and ACOM was ters and not just a think tank. It also assets available to a CINC. We worked created, in my mind, for that purpose. retained NATO responsibilities. very hard after Desert Storm to improve It was a force trainer and provider. In ACOM finally came into being the our joint doctrine. Jointness means Haiti, it also demonstrated it could run week I retired. It was my last act going nothing more than teamwork. We have out the door. Others will have to make lots of star players within our Armed

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■ JFQ FORUM Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library In the field.

the definitive judgment of how well it no longer linked in the sense that they Both the strategy and the Base is doing now. were part of a worldwide Soviet threat, Force levels were severely criticized they could be looked at separately. We then and now. But they gave us some- JFQ How were a new national military needed sufficient forces to fight each of thing to plan on and to present to strategy and the Base Force concept devel- them. It was unlikely they would break Congress, the American people, our oped? out at the same time. But we didn’t want allies, our potential enemies, and our POWELL During the first year of our force structure to be so thin that if troops as a vision for the future during the Bush administration, it was clear we were executing one an adversary a time of historic transformation. It that the Cold War was coming to an could take advantage of our weakness served that purpose exceptionally well end. We were really going to lose our and start trouble in the other. The sim- and gave us the basis to downsize our “best enemy.” For four decades we had ple sizing formula was to be able to fight forces in an orderly way. We were a strategy, force structure, infrastruc- two major regional contingencies nearly determined not to be pulled apart for ture, research and development, and simultaneously. We wanted the second want of a rational strategy. investment policy that rested on the aggressor to know that we had enough Some critics now say that strategy need to be ready to fight World War force to deal with him even though it and force structure have outlived their III. If that was going away, then what could take a little time to get there. usefulness. I don’t think so. The strat- should we be ready for? The Base Force was designed to egy won’t last forty years as did the Obviously, we had vital interests in execute the new strategy. The term Cold War strategy of “containment.” the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. We “base” was used to denote that we felt But until North Korea follows the still needed our nuclear deterrent, and it was a floor below which we should Soviet Empire into political oblivion we still had force presence responsibili- not go given the world situation we and/or the Persian Gulf becomes a ties around the world. And there would saw when this was all being designed region of democracy and stability, we still be the need to fight the conflict that in 1990. There was quite a bureaucratic must still be able to respond to two no one predicted or planned for. The battle over what that base should be MRCs. The Base Force and its succes- two most demanding contingencies for each service, and it took some time sor, the somewhat smaller Bottom-Up were the Persian Gulf and Northeast to get everyone on board. Review force, have also ensured that Asia. We considered these major we had the forces needed to deal with regional contingencies. Since they were all the contingencies that have come

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With the fleet aboard USS Wisconsin. U.S. Navy (Scott Allen)

we have lots of star players within our Armed Forces

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■ JFQ FORUM

along in recent years. Lots of alterna- were some disagreements. In particu- JFQ How were you able to recruit tal- tive ideas are floating around, but I lar, General Al Gray, Marine Corps ented senior officers to the Joint Staff? haven’t seen one yet that does the job commandant, argued strongly that the POWELL Goldwater-Nichols helped better. planned strength level for the Marine enormously. Since joint duty credit The roles and missions debate was Corps was set too low, even though was now needed for advancement, we seen as another way of rationalizing the Secretary of the Navy supported became a sought-after staff. The Joint and downsizing the force. I conducted that level. Secretary Cheney knew of Staff was seen as a prime assignment. I a roles and missions study as required the disagreement and made a decision. also believe that it became a more by Congress and pretty much validated But I was not constrained in providing exciting place to work. Panama, the the existing roles and missions for our my recommendation while I tried to Persian Gulf, new strategy, and the services. Some members of Congress achieve total consensus or put it to the Base Force all served to make the Joint didn’t like the results because they “yeas” or “nays.” And by the way, Sec- Staff more attractive as a cutting-edge weren’t revolutionary enough and retary Aspin subsequently raised the operation. The service chiefs were very forthcoming in nominating their most able officers. We also changed the rota- tional process for senior staff assignments. It was no longer the “Army’s turn” to get the J-3 position, etc. Or worse, to have to fill a position they didn’t want to fill! Now the best person gets the job. The law required me to maintain service balance and I was able to do that without a service rota- tion scheme. I was also able to get legislation from Congress that gave us billets for the three-star jobs on the Joint Staff. So now, when I asked the chiefs to nominate for one of those jobs, they didn’t also have to give up one of their three-star billets. This made the jobs even more attractive and spurred competition.

JFQ Finally, how well have the new

Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library joint officer personnel policies worked? POWELL From my perspective as especially because they didn’t point planned strength level of the Marines Chairman, they worked very well. the way to even greater reductions and during the Bottom-Up Review. More officers than ever before are savings. Congress established a roles Much credit for the strategy and being trained in team warfare. More and missions commission which after force structure we came up with has to officers than ever have team warfare a year’s worth of work came basically go to the Secretary’s civilian policy experience. This is good for the Nation to the same conclusion I had, although staff. Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and good for the Armed Forces. they presented some recommenda- and his staff did their own analysis as I know that the policies have been tions for changes in process. they developed the Defense Guidance. very difficult for the services to man- Dick Cheney had a civilian policy age, but they have paid off. JFQ JFQ To what extent did Goldwater- check on what I, the chiefs, and the Nichols empower the development of this Joint Staff were proposing. We all got This interview was conducted on new strategy and the Base Force? along well. It was a healthy relationship June 24, 1996 in Alexandria, Virginia. POWELL It gave me more freedom which served the Secretary’s needs. and flexibility to come up with ideas We were also able to simplify the and move them through the system joint planning process. We cut through because I was able to speak in my own a lot of the paper encrustation which right and not wait for a vote of the had been the hallmark of the old JCS Joint Chiefs. As it worked out, all the system. chiefs agreed with the strategy and the overall force structure, although there

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Doctrine U.S. Air Force and Education

hanging times mean changing doctrine. Service Looks at Doctrine.” Whereas, in the past, This is the test the Armed Forces face there were no doctrinal publications that described today. “Joint Vision 2010 remains just an the unique contributions of the Coast Guard, C idea,” Joseph Redden cautions in “Joint today that service has a system of doctrine to meet Doctrine: The Way Ahead.” It must be defined new operational and technological demands. and translated into doctrine. He outlines how Such changes impact on education and both doctrine and training can address this joint training. “The next logical steps in the evolution warfighting necessity on the eve of a new century. of joint professional military education will pre- If doctrine must respond to technological sent serious challenges,” according to Howard change, it must also respond to challenges in the Graves and Don Snider in “Emergence of the operating environment. That case is advanced by Joint Officer.” It must retain the right balance Kenneth Allard in “Lessons Unlearned: Somalia between service and joint or combined opera- and Joint Doctrine.” Muddling through is no tions. Moreover, education must contribute to longer an acceptable alternative. We must link the moral-ethical development of officers. what is advocated in joint doctrine to what actu- Our war colleges must be the harbingers of ally happens on the ground. This entails forging a change, according to Ervin Rokke in “Military closer relationship among three basic processes: Education for the New Age.” The information age how operations are planned, how lessons are requires that senior-level professional military drawn from them, and how those lessons are education institutions equip future leaders to applied to the formulation of joint doctrine. function in a world where rapid change is the Changing doctrine means rethinking the norm. We must teach a successor generation of process by which it is developed. One imaginative warfighters how to deal with the unexpected. JFQ approach is detailed by John Clay in “The Fifth

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■ Joint Doctrine: TheWay Ahead

By JOSEPH J. REDDEN EDITOR’S Note Significant progress has been made in developing joint doctrine publications. assage of the Goldwater- The process has been shortened from four years to 23 months. Both capstone Nichols Act was viewed by and keystone pubs have undergone major revision. The Joint Electronic Library some critics as “forced joint- has been expanded and made available over the World Wide Web. However, Pness.” But the decade since contentious issues remain in certain areas which must be resolved at service its enactment in 1986 has seen us suc- chief or CINC level. Moreover, the best hope for continued progress in joint cessfully engage a major regional warfighting lies in training and Joint Vision 2010. Yet questions have been threat with coalition allies, conduct posed about this vision—some still outstanding—with unabashed critics alleg- operations around the world previ- ing that JV 2010 amounts to nothing more than a string of bumper stickers. ously regarded as uncharacteristic for conventional military units, start to foster jointness as second nature in the officers and NCOs of every service, and take interdependence to the point charge. In the haste to get joint doc- As a result, the process of develop- where the Navy will provide key elec- trine to the field, the initial publica- ing doctrinal pubs was reduced from tronic warfare support for all services. tions were little more than reworked 48 to 23 months, in large part due to This has been enabled by developing a service doctrine between purple covers. writing groups. While the lead agent firm doctrinal foundation, a require- They were created out of need, but approach to joint doctrine has not ments-based training system, and the many were redundant or should have changed, agents are encouraged to emergence of a joint vision as a bridge been published as tactics, techniques, host writing groups comprised of rep- to the future. and procedures (TTP). As Chairman, resentatives of the services, CINCs, and The joint doctrine development General Powell started a concerted ef- joint staff directorates to draft a docu- process is often maligned as slow and fort to make doctrine more joint and ment that is as purple as possible, re- unresponsive to user needs. Unfortu- more accessible to users. He also ducing coordination time. The new nately, there is some validity to that sought to improve the horizontal and publication format has been widely ac- vertical consistency of joint publica- cepted, and the extensive use of pho- tions. General Shalikashvili continued tos has opened new vistas for readers. these initiatives and has mandated To ensure that pubs get into the hands Lieutenant General Joseph J. Redden, that the publications should be more of users quickly distribution is made to USAF, is commander of Air University readable and distributed more quickly. the field and fleet based on lists devel- and previously served as commander oped by the services and CINCs. of the Joint Warfighting Center.

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Redden

Capstone pubs (1 and 0-2) and The Chairman transformed joint staffs to coordinate, synchronize, and keystone pubs (2-0, 3-0, 4-0, et al.) have training policy into a requirements integrate field forces. Potential JTF undergone major revision. Some 84 of based program in 1989. Combatant commanders are being educated, the projected 104 joint pubs were commanders were directed to articu- trained, and exercised to develop inte- slated for completion by the end of late joint training requirements in grated land/sea/air operations that 1996. The Joint Electronic Library has joint mission essential task lists apply “the right force, at the right been expanded and is available on the (JMETLs). This effort takes time and place, at the right time.” Quite clearly, World Wide Web, allowing greater ac- people. Those who have made the in- well trained joint staffs are as critical to cess to joint doctrine, selected service vestment are seeing the benefits; those operations as well trained forces pro- doctrine pubs, terminology, and futures who have not continue to question the vided by the services. Evolving training databases. Another significant step in validity of the system. Stating mission technology will continue to support the process has been inclusion of the requirements in terms of the capability specific service requirements. The flexi- Coast Guard as a full participant. to accomplish specific tasks under rele- bility it provides will also support train- vant conditions to meet defined stan- ing for a range of potential operations Seamless Training dards provides a clear training that will face CINCs in the future. We While progress has been made in roadmap. The vehicle to execute that have made great progress in doctrine many areas, there are some con- is the joint training system (JTS). and training systems and technology to tentious issues that have lingered for One result of the Chairman’s joint support them. However we still must years which must be resolved. Two ex- training review in 1992 was the need determine what joint capabilities will amples are Joint Pub 3-01, Countering for a formal joint training system be needed for the 21st century. Air and Missile Threats, and Joint Pub 3- which was created in 1993–95, with a 09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. Both transition plan calling for full imple- A New Window have gone through numerous drafts mentation by 1998. JTS is comprised of In 1984 the chiefs of staff of the and working groups without major four phases: establishing training re- Army and Air Force issued a memo en- progress. Deployed forces will always quirements based on JMETL, develop- titled “U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Joint find a way to make things work, but ing joint training plans to meet re- Force Development Process.” This vi- parochial interests in the system have quirements, executing supporting sionary document offered a framework precluded the development of joint events (from academic instruction to for moving toward true jointness—not doctrinal guidance. Without resolving joint exercises), and assessing the effec- a popular concept prior to Goldwater- these issues at service chief and CINC tiveness of events to meet these re- Nichols. Also known as the “Wickham- level, advances in joint training and quirements. JTS and JMETL are flexible Gabriel 31 Initiatives,” it presented a the evolution of Joint Vision 2010 may enough to accommodate CINC specific clear vision of the future but never re- offer the best avenues for progress. requirements while supporting the alized its potential because of opposi- Our disposition of forces has commonality essential to effective tion from within the services and proven costly, not least to OPTEMPO. joint operations. DOD. Ten years after the passage of the We must ensure the readiness of forces Our recent exercise experience has Goldwater-Nichols Act, we have JV while supporting regional engagement emphasized the need to be proactive 2010, which provides a new window of strategies identified as vital by combat- with our friends and allies to meet re- opportunity. ant commanders. Progress has been quirements of multinational opera- JV 2010 contains concepts for con- made with the development of the tions. We must mature together rather ducting warfare in the future. Because joint training system and the emer- of the emphasis placed on this gence of U.S. Atlantic Command as if JV 2010 remains just an idea, document by our military lead- joint force integrator, but there are ership, it has attracted a wide challenges to ensuring a seamless joint it may well die a slow death readership and attention. Many training environment. from misuse and ambiguity now espouse its ideas and nearly Prior to 1989 joint exercises were every document published in event-driven. Planning conferences the last few months has been were often opened with questions to than pursuing divergent courses that linked to it. A commonly asked ques- determine what the components may seriously degrade future coalition tion about the vision is how it will help wanted to do, who was available to operations. We have seen increased in- achieve full spectrum dominance play, and what resources could be com- terest in joint training technologies within the battlespace of the future, mitted to the exercise. Success was and methods by our friends and allies. across the entire range of operations. based more on the number of person- There has been a shift from traditional And how will progress be measured and nel involved than on meeting jointly- large scale field exercises that focused how will quality control be exercised agreed training goals. The line between on the tactical level to exercises focused over various interpretations of the vi- command post and field training exer- on the ability of joint or multinational sion’s concepts? cises was blurred if not indistinguish- If JV 2010 remains just an idea, it able, and deployed forces were regu- may well go the way of many other larly used as training aids for staffs. “good ideas” and die a slow death

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■ JFQ FORUM

from misuse and ambiguity. That is will determine the utility of their ideas, predict future warfare with total accu- why when JV 2010 appeared an imple- make recommendations to the service racy. Moreover, the concepts of CFJO mentation process was initiated by the operations deputies, and forward ap- were evaluated during a series of senior Joint Staff. This effort has also been proved ideas to the appropriate agen- level seminars at JWFC in autumn evolving at the Joint Warfighting Cen- cies or systems for action. Responses 1996. Continued refinement will occur ter (JWFC). It has four distinct phases: could include action by the Joint Staff throughout the life cycle of the vision on issues such as joint doctrine or by ■ publishing the vision and articulat- as new ideas and insights emerge. ing it as strategic guidance the deputy operations deputies/opera- ■ further refining and defining the Adjusting Course tions deputies/Joint Requirements concepts The most frequent question about Oversight Council on ideas which will ■ assessing the progress being made in the vision is how one will know if we involve changes in equipment or orga- achieving the vision have achieved the capabilities to im- nizations. This entire process will be ■ integrating lessons from the assess- under the oversight of the Joint ment phase into DOD systems to institute JV 2010 has great promise for Chiefs. Once an idea is determined change. to have utility by the appropriate The initial phase of publishing instituting changes needed for oversight group, the integration the vision and articulating it as strate- warfighting in the 21st century process will begin. Integration will gic guidance was highly effective. One utilize the existing acquisition, indicator of that success is the fre- budgeting, doctrine, and planning quent use of the vision in both joint plement it in the battlespace of the 21st systems. The desired output of the im- and service literature issued by the de- century. Phases three and four respond plementation process is the ability to fense establishment. While this phase to this question. Phase three, assess- achieve full spectrum dominance on is vital in establishing operational ment, is a process that will both mea- the future battlefield (the accompany- concepts for the 21st century and lay- sure movement towards the vision and ing figures depict this process). ing a basis for the assessment phase, it enable us to adjust our course. This as- is also dangerous if left to stand alone. sessment will involve the services, Because JV 2010 is more than a JV 2010 unfortunately has been re- CINCs, Joint Staff, and all members of concept, it has great promise for devel- duced to a bumper sticker in some the Armed Forces. A small staff at JWFC oping unity of effort and instituting quarters. It is an idea that everyone has primary coordination responsibility changes needed for warfighting in the appears to support but that few really for the assessment effort. They will pro- 21st century. This process involves all understand. It was this requirement to vide a common joint assessment DOD components, does not promote define the vision’s concepts that led to methodology, strategy, and measures of parochial interests, maintains the vital- the second phase, conceptualization. merit for use by the joint community in ity of each service, strives for joint and Concept definition has been un- the evaluation of concepts, technology, unified action, and allows for course derway at JWFC for many months. It operational art, procedures, and future corrections under the program de- has involved a group of senior active capabilities required to achieve JV 2010. scribed above. and retired officers from all four ser- Determining what to assess and devel- JV 2010 is more than rhetoric. It is vices with a wide breadth of experi- oping and conducting the exercises, the tool that will help us achieve what ence. Its goal is to develop a document seminars, and events to serve as the test was envisioned by the Goldwater- which will put meat to the bones of bed for assessments will involve the en- Nichols Act. It will allow DOD to de- the original vision document. The first tire joint community. JWFC will facili- velop the right force for the next cen- draft of this publication, The Concept tate the process; the services, CINCs, tury while involving the entire defense for Future Joint Operations (CFJO), was Joint Staff, and others will be the ex- establishment in the process. Coupled completed in August 1996 with copies ecutors of the assessments. with progress in joint doctrine and disseminated to the CINCs, services, One example of this process is the training, it will enable us to meet the and Joint Staff the next month. In ad- effort by the Command, Control, challenges of an uncertain world. JFQ dition to the JWFC personnel involved Communications, and Computer Di- in developing the document, the draft rectorate (J-6), Joint Staff, to develop a underwent extensive revisions in late series of exercises to determine the 1996 and early 1997 by working what and how of information superior- groups which involved all services, ity. Working with that directorate and representatives of the CINCs, and the affected joint activities, JWFC will col- Joint Staff. The preliminary coordinat- lect lessons from these exercises for se- ing draft CFJO was published in March nior level review. The lessons will then 1997. This document must never be be presented to a general/flag officer viewed as the “gospel” for future oper- working group at the Pentagon which ations. It was designed as a living, breathing concept. Obviously a small group such as the one at JWFC cannot

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Mogadishu.

Lessons Unlearned: Navy ( Mitchell) Terry U.S. Somalia and Joint Doctrine

By C.KENNETH ALLARD forces were beset by deficiencies in command, namely, the United Nations, joint operations which persist ten years U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols and U.S. Special Operations Command. s the Armed Forces prepare Act.1 The larger lesson of the book on As arduous as it was for CENTCOM to for new peacekeeping as- which this article is based, Somalia Op- exercise operational control over vari- signments, the lessons erations: Lessons Learned, is that we ous coequal units in a theater that was learned from operations in must forge closer links among three 9,000 miles from headquarters, the A processes: the way we plan operations, arrangements reflected the need to Somalia continue to have cutting-edge relevance. Some of those lessons were the way we draw lessons from those keep U.S. forces far removed from the clearly learned and applied in Haiti, operations, and the way we apply the reality or appearance of direct U.N. while others dominate planning for lessons in formulating joint doctrine. command. They also confirmed the rel- any Bosnian deployment. These spe- evance of standing doctrine and a les- cific insights are important for current Old Lessons, New Realities son that should be added to Murphy’s and future operations, but our experi- Unified command is one of the laws of armed combat: “If it takes more ence in Somalia also highlighted the oldest problems in joint operations, but than ten seconds to explain the com- enduring problem of effectively inte- there is widespread agreement that the mand arrangements, they probably grating joint operations. Despite the concepts of unity, simplicity, and oper- won’t work.” difficulties of working with the United ational control underpin any com- Another chronic problem was Nations and coalition partners in a mand structure. However, during U.N. joint task force (JTF) organization. new, demanding class of missions, U.S. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II Even though JTFs have represented a there were three de facto chains of balance between continuity of command and the integration of additional capabilities for more than fifty Colonel C. Kenneth Allard, USA, is a senior fellow in the years, striking that balance in Somalia Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National was a surprisingly random process. The Defense University and author of Command, Control and humanitarian assistance survey team the Common Defense. sent to coordinate the initial airlift had

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barely arrived before being redesig- its own logistical tail and competed for seas, inadequate port intelligence, and nated as the JTF for complex and dan- lane space on a narrow information delayed deployment of transportation gerous operations that lasted six highway—primarily the commercial specialists, three Army pre-positioned months. Built around the nucleus of a INMARSAT satellite at a cost of six dol- ships spent weeks shuttling between Marine headquarters, the JTF that con- lars per minute. East African ports. Two eventually re- trolled United Task Force (UNITAF) Another constant in joint opera- turned to Diego Garcia without un- gave way after a difficult transition to tions is the planning process, espe- loading their cargoes, a disturbing the hastily formed UNOSOM II staff. cially as it influences force deployment shortcoming in an environment which The officers forming this staff had and lift. While the joint operations was austere but not the scene of com- been individually recruited from Army planning and execution system bat operations. units worldwide and only a third of (JOPES) forms the basis of that process, While Somalia certainly illustrated them had arrived in-country by the moving and sustaining the forces sent the persistence of old problems, it also time their mission was launched. to Somalia revived the friction be- demonstrated the continuing impor- When a JTF was added to UNOSOM II tween the discipline needed to run the tance of mission analysis in adapting in the wake of the firefight in which system and the flexibility demanded existing capabilities to new circum- by warfighters. A great effort was stances. Several of those innovations communications is the critical required to reconcile bookkeeping may serve as precedents for the future: methods for tracking Army units Rules of engagement. Though com- link in operations with the airlift deployment data mon to every operation, ROE are espe- to move them. Even so, tele- cially important if the objective is to 18 Americans died, the 10th Mountain phone calls, faxes, and repeated visual limit the level of violence. Somalia had Division provided the nucleus with checks were necessary to insure that the virtue of keeping ROE simple, di- less than two weeks from initial notifi- the “ramp reality” agreed with airlift rect, and unclassified so that they were cation to in-country hand-off and few requirements in the automated data as well understood by the local people organic capabilities for conducting base. Similar problems afflicted sealift. as by the peacekeepers. joint or multinational operations. Through a sad combination of rough These difficulties were overcome through dedication, hard work, and professionalism of those sent to do a tough job. But the worrisome fact is NOW IN ITS SECOND PRINTING that, during the period of UNOSOM II alone, U.S. forces also engaged in a dozen other major operations that required forming JTFs—from enforcing a Somalia Operations: no-fly zone over Iraq to providing flood relief at home in the Midwest. Lessons Learned Communications is the critical by Kenneth Allard link in operations. While no Grenada- style interoperability fiascoes arose in Somalia, there were some similarities. ...there should be no mistaking the For example, the same series of Army fact that the greatest obstacles to unity and Marine tactical radios had compat- of command during UNOSOM II were ibility problems because of differing modernization and upgrade cycles. For imposed by the United States on itself. the few weeks Navy ships were off- Especially at the end of the operation, shore, the Army hospital in Mogadishu these command arrangements had could not talk to them nor were Army effectively created a condition that medical evacuation helicopter pilots cleared to land on them. Another allowed no one to set clear, problem was the stovepiping of differ- unambiguous priorities.... ent data systems. At the height of American involvement in a country that lacked even a functioning telephone system, at least ten different Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995. data systems were in use. Most were 113 pp. $4.25 built on single service requirements [ISBN 0–16–045577–4] but handled a host of common func- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents tions: intelligence, personnel, logistics, and even finance. Each system brought [GPO stock no. 008–020–01352–8]

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Allard

MEDCAP in Somalia. Air Force (James Mossman)Air Force U.S. Air Force (James Mossman)Air Force U.S.

Disarmament. During UNITAF, best indicate mission success or failure. For that reason and also to look at peacekeepers confiscated only weapons Many indicators in peace operations the full scope of the operation, the So- seen as a threat to the force, for exam- will differ from those in more conven- malia archive was reduced to a hard- ple, crew-served weapons and arms tional scenarios. But all must answer copy printout comprising some 200 caches. Disarming Somali clans, how- two critical questions: What is the mis- separate reports totalling nearly 400 ever, was a nation-building objective of sion and how will we know when we pages. The individual reports became UNOSOM II. The ensuing hostilities have accomplished it? more revealing as the relationships suggest that employing forces to dis- among them were tracked across all arm a populace is to commit those JULLS But Not Gems three phases of the Somalia operation: forces to a de facto combat mission as The book, Somalia Operations: the early airlift and humanitarian assis- active belligerents. Lessons Learned, was principally based tance, the U.S.-led coalition of UNITAF, Civil-Military Operations Center. Es- on those operational reports compiled and the de facto combat of UNOSOM tablished early in UNITAF, this center through the joint universal lessons II that took place under U.N. control. was one of the most significant inno- learned system (JULLS). This system Although this unusual approach vations of the operation. An out- has been a fixture since the mid-1980s to the JULLS system of micro-analysis growth of the standard military ap- when it was created in response to re- yielded some important macro-level proach to the liaison function, it peated General Accounting Office criti- insights, the Somalia archive also high- became an invaluable way of coordi- cism of the lack of an automated sys- lighted some fundamental problems in nating information and activities be- tem to evaluate joint training the way we collect and analyze our op- tween the JTF, multinational contin- exercises. Administered by the Joint erational lessons: gents, and 49 different international Staff (J-7), JULLS reports are solicited ■ The JULLS system is built around in- agencies operating in Somalia. from individual participants in joint dividual reports that are primarily used to Mission Creep. Although much has operations as well as from major head- identify and solve specific problems. Be- been written on mission creep in So- quarters and service components. Re- cause it is difficult to determine the linkage malia, it is clear that the major ports are reviewed by unified com- of these problems to larger issues solely changes in mission and direction came mands as well as the Joint Staff, through keyword searches, JULLS reports from the national command authori- usually to document remedial actions. can be a “science of single events” unless ties. The object lesson for the future is Because it is a combination of service they are related to other evidence (as actually occurred during this project). that military leaders have a critical re- and joint reports linked by keywords, ■ Individual JULLS reports range from sponsibility to select milestones that JULLS has a well-deserved reputation the trivial to the profound; but because as a user-unfriendly system. they lack specific context information or other corroborating data, it is often hard to

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judge their validity. Worse, normal person- joint doctrine is validated. Such link- about what now passes for joint doc- nel turbulence and lengthy processing age is essential to subjecting new ideas trine is that it was compiled by dili- times often make it impossible to track on joint warfare to operational testing gently polling the usual sources—the down those who originally submitted them. and rigorous analysis. The process sug- services and other affected parties. That ■ There is always tension between the gested here is a more systematic practice would not pose a dilemma if candor needed for improvement and the approach to field testing ideas on joint- the results were simply taken as tenta- perceived or actual potential for embarrass- ment caused by putting oneself on report. ness through exercises, training, readi- tive ideas about what works and then There is similar tension between the need ness, and combat itself (see figure 1). subjected to field testing. But as matters Refining ideas through the stand, the only consistent tests are the the solution is to link what we say to operation of organized feed- least common denominators: brokered back loops is what will yield solutions and bureaucratic interests. what we actually do a body of joint doctrine val- This military equivalent of politi- idated by systematic opera- cal correctness contrasts sharply with tional testing. Although it is uncertain the more forthright approach the for thoughtful review of JULLS reports as if this process might lead to an overar- Army adopted a decade ago, with com- they work their way through the system ching joint paradigm as a complement pulsory after action reviews at every and the temptation to eliminate or water down those which show commands or ser- to the American way of war, develop- level of training and operations plan- vices in an favorable light. Reports on the ing an integrated body of doctrine vali- ning. While neither perfect nor pain- de facto combat phase of UNOSOM II, for dated by field experience is a basic goal less, the process promoted candid self- instance, were delayed for months in the in itself.2 improvement that eventually was case of one command as such tensions were Current practice could not be far- imbedded in service culture. It also presumably thrashed out. ther from this ideal. There are 103 titles tied operations planning to lessons These problems suggest that the in the hierarchy of joint pubs, a stag- learned in a period of vigorous doctri- JULLS system is a throwback to an era gering number considering that com- nal experimentation—much of it aided in joint operations when fault finding piling joint doctrine did not really by computer simulation and sophisti- was studiously avoided to preserve in- begin until after Goldwater-Nichols. cated technology. That precedent un- terservice comity. Because of institu- Eye-numbing page counts further com- derlines what the services do best: pro- tional reluctance to trace operational pound the problem: a new publication vide laboratories to develop the basic effects back to first causes, the system on noncombatant evacuation proce- elements of combat power. Joint insti- acts as an endlessly repetitive lessons dures is more than 200 pages. While no tutions must now provide an essential unlearned exercise that usually resolves human could possibly read such a vast counterpoint by searching for new only marginal issues. As one jaded vet- array, few would ever want to, since the ways to combine those elements—with eran put it: “I could take any operation writing is notoriously verbose and next-generation simulations playing we’re starting next week and write the stilted. Yet the most precarious aspect the role in larger combinations that first 30 JULLS today.” they now exercise in training individual warriors. As one observer recently Doctrinal Changes and Constants The Evolution of Joint Doctrine and Strategy A system that concentrates on after-the-fact fixes that never seem to recur in just the same way is singularly ineffective in dealing with a constantly Single Events Combined Arms Synergy at changing international environment. Individualized Actions Global or Regional Levels The volatility of this environment creates incentives for the Armed Forces to lessons learned master the most persistent obstacles to in combat the integration of joint capabilities. TASK: Most effective joint operations, How else do we deal with chaos and use of land, sea, and ideas about validated joint joint strategic what works exercises, and doctrine paradigm adaptive adversaries than by eliminat- aerospace power training ing those difficulties which we can and should control? lessons learned in training The solution is to link what we Levels of combined synergy say to what we actually do. Specifi- • National Security Strategy • National Military Strategy cally, it means a closer alignment of • Combined/Coalition • Joint functions that often proceed indepen- • Service dently: the way joint operations are • Individual Branch/Arm planned and evaluated, and the way Source: C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 261.

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Allard

noted, “It is hypothetical wars, not real leap of faith to conceive of future enemy. As crises from Somalia to Bosnia al- ones, that will shape doctrine in the cyber-systems serving as trusted associ- ready indicate, adversaries can offset mili- years to come.”3 ates to those hard-pressed humans tary inferiority with innovative tactics that All the more reason, then, to use who function as operations planners. take advantage of errors on our part. the analytical rigor of modelling and The person in this future loop, how- ■ Somalia reveals that many institutional mistakes are corrected (when the chips ever, would be able to draw on really are down) only through extraordinary muddling through is no longer an his own professional experience efforts by junior officers, NCOs, and most of as well as artificial intelligence to all by individual soldiers, sailors, marines, acceptable alternative reconcile unique mission re- and airmen. Our senior leaders, however, quirements with joint doctrinal have a special obligation to limit the need simulation to tackle head on the dis- principles and even the most recent for such heroic efforts and sacrifices. turbing tendency in joint operations to operational insights. In that way, cur- Senator Strom Thurmond recently keep making the same mistakes. rent operations could be linked far defined stupidity as doing the same Among other things, this means not more effectively to our best ideas about thing over and over while expecting putting the cart before the horse. what works and what does not. different results. We should by now re- Rather than being inflated with addi- But future possibilities and persis- alize the basis of the historical problem tional volumes of indigestible prose, tent problems evoke a familiar argu- in joint doctrine as well as the futility the current collection of joint doctrine ment: this is just the normal cost of of expecting different results from the needs to be screened for those funda- doing business and is more than offset same muddled processes. Those with mental organizing principles which by a genius for muddling through, es- responsibility for the further develop- ought to guide the integrated employ- pecially when the chips are down. But ment of this uniquely American joint ment of joint combat power, including like many familiar arguments, this one culture might well consider what must criteria to decide when operations has outlived its usefulness. There are be done to set these things right. JFQ should be joint and when they can be four related reasons why muddling handled by a single service. Those con- through is no longer an acceptable al- NOTES cepts should be tried and tested ternative: 1 through joint exercises conceived with This article draws on the author’s ■ The international security environ- recently published book entitled Somalia such specific purposes in mind. A ment will be marked by continuous discon- Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington: JULLS process truly worthy of the tinuities for the foreseeable future. It is a National Defense University Press, 1995). name could play a vital role in sup- basic requirement that forces operating in 2 C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, porting this process, much as Army this environment not only limit their vul- and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale after-action reviews contributed to the nerabilities but also act more quickly and University Press, 1990), pp. 260–62. refinement of AirLand Battle doctrine. effectively than an adversary. In a chaotic 3 “The Softwar Revolution,” The Econo- A new body of field-tested joint doc- environment, we must first eliminate self- mist, vol. 335, no. 7918 (June 10, 1995), induced disorder. trine would also validate the artificial p. 10. ■ One of the most important environ- dividing lines in the current hierarchy mental discontinuities is technology. of joint doctrine by distinguishing Whether change is seen as an ongoing mili- bedrock principles from the mass of tary-technical revolution, a future revolu- tactics, techniques, and procedures tion in military affairs, or a much larger rev- that are part of the operational infra- olution in the security arena, it will structure but are far more transient. profoundly affect the integration of joint That distinction alone would be a capabilities. Given the pace and scope of worthwhile contribution to educating this revolution, failing to test assumptions future joint warfighters, a well-under- about jointness is extremely dangerous. Ba- sically, high tech means tighter teamwork. stood baseline being fundamental to But often it takes a tragic mistake (such as the virtuoso improvisations that will the shoot down of the Blackhawks over be expected of them in years to come. northern Iraq in 1994) to highlight the in- adequacies of old thinking and outmoded Shaping the Future assumptions. The ultimate expression of such a ■ Because this new security environ- revised approach to joint doctrine ment presents difficulties for policymakers, might not necessarily be contained in the military is being asked to do more with another series of publications even if less. With declining force levels and bud- the writing and methodology were im- gets, there is less margin for error in what we do or how we do it. Persistent errors be- proved. The next generation of expert come vulnerabilities to be exploited by an computer systems can significantly aid joint planning, provided that we first clarify our assumptions about linking thoughts to actions. It does not take a

61 Autumn 1995 / JFQ 109 1219 Allard Pgs 11/17/98 7:27 PM Page 62

ARTICLE TITLE OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Nathan Farragut Twining, USAF (1897–1982) Chief of Staff of the Air Force Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Monroe, Wisconsin. Graduated from U.S. Military Academy (1918). Attended Infantry School and served as company commander, 29th Infantry (1919–22). Instructor, Air Corps Primary Flying School (1924–30). Pilot and squadron commander (1930–35). Attended Air Corps Tactical School and Command and General Staff School (1935–37). Air Corps technical supervisor (1937–40). Technical Inspection Section, Office Chief of Air Corps, and assistant executive officer to Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force (1940–42). Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces, South Pacific. Commanded 13th Air Force; 15th Air Force, Mediterranean Theater; and 20th Air Force (1942–45). Commanding General, Air Materiel Command (1945–47). Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command (1947–50). Vice Chief of Staff (1950–53) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (1953–57). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1957–60). Worked for development of aircraft, missiles, and weapons. Advocated Eisenhower’s policy of extensive but not exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons. Term as Chairman marked by crises in Lebanon and on Quemoy and Matsu. Played leading role in DOD Reorganization Act of 1958. Died at Lackland Air Force Base.

In 1948 the Nation’s first Secretary of Defense, James D.

Forrestal, ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a sabbatical at Courtesy of USAF Art Collection Key West, Florida, for an intellectual reassessment of roles and Portrait of General missions of the Armed Forces. He hoped for a solution to the increasingly ugly internal strug- Nathan F. Twining by gle for resources. Unfortunately, no such solution came from the meeting. When reduced to Robert Brackman. the actual meaning of the many words of the document, the mission of the Army was only re- stated to be the defeat of enemy ground forces; the Navy’s was to be control of the seas; and the Air Force was charged with securing and controlling the air. These missions and their service assignments were, of course, precisely the same prior to Key West. This redefinition of the roles and missions apparently failed to consider, or to strike at, the real core of interservice rivalry. It would seem, from agreements reached, that some fears had been expressed that one service might cannibalize another. But I don’t believe that any responsible military chief of service ever actually entertained such an intention except, perhaps, as a “paper exercise.” The complexities of modern war would absolutely prohibit a one-service or two-service system.

— From Neither Liberty Nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy by Nathan F. Twining

106 JFQ / Spring 1994 62 1319 Clay Pgs 11/17/98 8:35 PM Page 63

Patrol boat Nunivak off Haiti for Uphold Democracy.

The Fifth Service (ValU.S. Air Force Gempis) Looks at Doctrine By JOHN S. CLAY

EDITOR’S Note he Coast Guard, having no doctrine command, char- For the Coast Guard, establishing a doctrine system is a momentous project. tered a field commanders’ The thoroughgoing review of doctrine currently being conducted by the fifth concept of doctrine team in service justifies serious consideration by every service. Under this examination T 1994. Directed by operational flag offi- the Coast Guard regards doctrine development as a process that standardizes cers, the team presented its findings to how it thinks about and does its job, how it acquires dynamic feedback, and the commandant the following year. how it articulates its image as an institution. In this, the Coast Guard sees doc- Common areas identified by the team trine as a unifying vision. It must link its strategy and daily operations and fa- as needing improvement were distilled cilitate development of acquisition requirements. This highly rational effort is into seven themes: unity of vision, efficiency, external links, training links, thrusting our fifth service toward the desired systematic end-state. focus, unity of effort, and empowerment. These themes emerged as doctrine drivers. The team reported the need for a doctrine system and recom- Captain John S. Clay, USCG, is chief of the Office of Defense mended that one be established. But Operations at Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, and has twice commanded Coast Guard cutters.

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C–130s on flight line at Barbers Point, Hawaii. U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard

looking for common ground. Opera- tors must carry a library of manuals with them on patrol. In addition, as the field commanders’ report warned, ...there is no established mechanism to cycle the valuable knowledge accrued through operational experience and experimentation back to academia and training centers....operational experience and experimentation tend to remain within local circles as opposed to becoming updates in the service as a whole, sub-optimizing operational procedures and preventing unity of effort.

The Current State Organizational and system im- Port security for USS Iwo Jima during provements occur only after failure. Desert Shield. Lessons learned by one unit are not ap-

DOD plied by others. How would the commanding officer of USCGC Juniper (the latest 225-foot buoytender) prepare for no publication describes the unique current guidance is poorly or- a catastrophe such as the downing of ganized. There is no standard TWA flight 800? Does he know the un- contribution of the Coast Guard approach to developing guid- derlying priority of people, environ- ance throughout the service or ment, and property? Where does he because findings by other teams (train- across programs. Manuals are dated, seek guidance during that critical pe- ing and streamlining) were pending at and information and advice that logi- riod between stimulus and response to the time, and the form of the Coast cally should be included in them are incidents? The answers are not readily Guard was thus unclear, the doctrine often written into instructions to cir- available. There is no collection of doc- team recommended that a focus group cumvent a cumbersome review umentation that fully explains what be appointed to develop and analyze process. Moreover, guidance is neither our daily business is, how we do it, or specific options and costs of imple- linked to higher level strategy nor con- how everything fits into an integrated menting such a system. The following nected to critical programs. Areas such system. There is no publication for in- article represents a status report on ef- as search and rescue, law enforcement, ternal or external consumption that forts by the doctrine focus group that marine safety, and alien migration in- describes the unique contribution of was chartered by the commandant cidents are not treated in comparable the Coast Guard to the public. under the Directorate for Reserve and ways. We have developed specific sets The inability to link daily business Training. of guidance for each mission without to a strategic vision also further com- An inventory of Coast Guard pub- plicates the process of generating re- lications and directives reveals that its quirements for system acquisitions. We

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Clay

face the formidable task of developing having the unique non-redundant ca- not advance scrapping current guid- a deep-water mission area analysis pabilities that it brings to national mil- ance but rather seek to better organize from scratch. The result is a series of itary strategy included in both joint and understand it. Simply stated, we directives, publications, and indexes and naval doctrine publications. In- are not trying to grow another bureau- that meets program needs but fails to deed, the Chairman has acknowledged cratic arm but to connect the dots. capture the linkages and common fea- the important role of the Coast Guard Doctrine can mean different tures inherent in many of these on his team by including the Coast things to different people. First one processes. This leads to problems in Guard seal on the covers of all joint must understand what it is not. Doc- both efficiency and effectiveness. doctrine publications. In addition, the trine is not a collection of weighty Does this mean we cannot do our commandants of the Coast Guard and tomes designed to sit prominently on a jobs or that we anticipate operational sagging shelf. Nor is it a decree, pro- failure? Not at all. But the current a good doctrine system will claimed but never updated. It is a body decremental budget environment and increase intellectual capital of fundamental principles that guide the reduction of 4,000 personnel is a service actions in support of national cause for concern. Increasingly we en- objectives. A doctrine system captures counter overlap among our programs Marine Corps along with the Chief of the best knowledge available about in operational events such as the Naval Operations will sign version 1.0 how to do things yet still accommo- North Cape spill, escort of the Cuban- of the universal naval tasks list in date judgment, innovation, and American flotilla, and defense opera- which all three sea services incorporate change. A good doctrine system will tions in Haiti. their military operational and tactical increase intellectual capital. The three How did we get into this position? essential tasks under one cover. levels shown in figure 1 illustrate such As the Coast Guard assumed more and a system: level I, strategic; level II, more missions, guidance was written Desired State multi-unit or force; and level III, indi- from a narrow, programmatic view- Our vision is a system that facili- vidual unit. point. Time and exigency forced pro- tates the effective management of in- Keystones are functionally derived gram managers to develop highly fo- tellectual capital and improves the or- from the capstone. The Coast Guard is cused, specific guidance that gave little ganization’s speed of learning. We currently in the process of writing its thought to a service strategic plan. must replace the current stovepipe sys- capstone together with the Center for While the guidance was often good, it tem with an outcome-based process of Naval Analyses. Keystones define the failed to step outside the program’s policy and procedures that integrates way we function across other services view and explain the larger impact high level strategy documents and low and other Federal, state, and local or- daily actions have on the Coast Guard level unit TTP. Some parts of this sys- ganizations. Level I, national, contains as a whole. tem are already in place, having strategic direction. Capstone and key- The long-term planning and bud- proven their worth in several national stone documents translate national geting process appears to drift among and international crises. The focus is policy and budgetary guidance of gov- three main strategies: activities-based, on developing a doctrine system to ernment agencies into applicable resource based, and outcome-based. forge the horizontal and vertical links strategic direction for our service. That Activities-based, long-term planning that will join these “islands of guid- direction identifies strategic policy focuses on missions that provide the ance” into a coherent system. We do above the Coast Guard and provides a most money in our budget. Concen- trating counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean is a good example. Re- source-based program managers com- Figure 1. The Doctrine System

pete for available funds for hardware. • Nation Integrating:

Those who promise the greatest sav- (Cross Roles, Missions, and Programs) ings may get the most money. Out- The Only Glossy Publications Joint, Combined, Interagency, Capstone come-based, long-range planning uti- (Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, and Service Teamwork Focused Logistics, and Full-Dimensional and lizes risk assessments to formulate Protection) I Keystones strategic planning. Outcomes are • Theater Operations Intergrating: achieved when unit level tactics, tech- Multi-Unit Doctrine Operational Doctrine Teamwork niques, and procedures (TTP) are Multi-Media CD–ROM linked to our strategic plan. This is the (Synchronization of Multi-Unit most effective way to ensure long-term Relational Data Base multiple units in Management System II Tactics and Techniques (MTT) resource support. time and space) In recent years the Coast Guard, • Unit Level Integrating: recognizing its historical ties to the de- Relational Data Base Unit Level Tactics, Techniques, and Unit

fense establishment, has exploited Management System Procedures Teamwork TTP joint and naval doctrine activities by (TTP) III

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broad interpretation of how the service HH–60J Jayhawk should implement it. The guiding dropping litter basket. principle of level I is joint, combined, and interagency teamwork to achieve national objectives. Level II is the operational tier of doctrine where multi-unit tactics and techniques (MTT) are defined. It deals with specific movements and synchronized coordination of multiple units in time and space. At present, the closest examples of this level of guidance are portions of the search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and marine safety manuals. The guiding principle of level II is intra-service teamwork to achieve service essential task objectives. When the level of detail focuses on unit actions and tasks instead of multi-unit employment, a break is made to level III. As we transition from operational doctrine and multi-unit U.S. Coast Guard tactics and techniques (level II) to single-unit TTP, we no longer must operate with other units. Commanding of- Figure 2. Real-Time Feedback Loops ficers are empowered and responsible for carrying out these TTP as they see Training centers of excellence (COEs) Units have ability to update fit, but consistent with service regula- have ability to update master on-line locally held TTP data base tions and directives, safety considera- MTT and TTP data base management management system during tions, and assigned missions. Guidance systems Capstone post-briefs and ceases to be doctrine at level III. The Keystones principle here is unit empowerment and intra-unit teamwork to achieve Operational Doctrine unit essential task objectives. Master MTT DBMS Operational However, a doctrine system does Teamwork (OT) not exist until another active ingredi- Pre-Course Pre-Brief ent is added, the near real-time feed- Unit TTP Master TTP DBMS back loops seen in figure 2. The current Lectures/Tasks "Best-in-Service" Operations/Exercises migration by the Coast Guard to a standard, Windows-NT based operating Post-Course Post-Brief Auto-Capture system, the availability of software ap- Training Lessons Unit Learned Unit plications, and pressing need for infor- Auto-Transmit Lessons Learned Lessons Master Learned Lessons Unit Lessons Learned Data Base mation sharing make this an ideal time Learned for such an initiative. We envision a Data Base Unit Empowerment Coast Guard doctrine system in which COE Empowerment after-action reports and doctrine/TTP lessons learned are captured during hot washups and automatically forwarded without operator intervention into an The Benefits rescues and for helping the boating information system that permits the ef- A doctrine system is intended to public through an extensive safety proficient review and updating of doctrine achieve four objectives. First, it will gram. That image changed dramati- and “best-in-service” MTT and TTP standardize how we think about and cally when our law enforcement pro- data bases. Under such a system, do things as an institution. Since the gram was greatly expanded and we lessons from Somalia, for example, ex- 1980s the Coast Guard has undergone earned the moniker “Smokies of the tend beyond the participants. Cutters three transformations in its image. Sea.” By the early 1990s our image be- share tactics and techniques in execut- Early in that decade we were good came softer and environmentally more ing a mission and strategic planners guys. We were known for search and responsive because of our role in sev- have access to a feedback mechanism eral highly publicized environmental based on real data. crises. Two things are worth noting

32 JFQ / Winter 1996–97 66 1319 Clay Pgs 11/17/98 8:36 PM Page 67

Removing suspected drugs from freighter in Miami. U.S. Coast Guard (Steve Sapp) U.S. Coast Guard

about these images of the Coast Guard. Lastly, this system will enable us vertical linkages for guidance. It con- First, the transformations did occur as an institution to clearly articulate siders the unit people on-scene as key and, second, they just happened. A the qualities, values, and principles elements of the strategic process by doctrine system provides a forum for that define the Coast Guard. empowering them to own TTP and au- managing such changes. Implementation begins with de- tomatically capturing their changes for Second, the doctrine system will veloping capstone and keystone doc- consideration in future updates to TTP, standardize a methodology for doing trine, then integrates all operational MTT, and higher level guidance. the business of the Coast Finally, such a doctrine system is Guard. Without a direct the doctrine system will standardize a necessary in order to obtain the infor- link between the strategic mation superiority described in Joint and tactical, operators re- methodology for doing business Vision 2010. spond to crises based on Since the commandant’s doctrine whatever ad hoc knowledge and proce- guidance to strategic level and finishes focus group has not completed its dures are available in their immediate by fielding an on-line database to auto- work, it is premature to speculate on environment. matically capture lessons learned. It options and potential costs; but as this Third, it will provide a dynamic ensures the identification, capture, and article goes to press the results will feedback system that allows us to cap- availability of the best-in-service prac- likely have been briefed to both the ture the best methods and continu- tices. It empowers multi-unit opera- chief of staff and the commandant of ously improve, better manage our in- tional commanders to download best- the Coast Guard. The bottom line is tellectual capital, and increase the in-service MTT and improve it as their that the doctrine focus group con- speed of learning within the Coast own MTT, unit commanders to down- firmed the findings of the earlier work Guard. Today we represent one of the load best-in-service TTP and improve it by the field commanders’ concept of most highly educated and trained ser- as their own TTP, and training centers doctrine team, added value, and will vices in American history. Countless to automatically capture the deltas be- recommend a doctrine system for the operations are performed flawlessly tween best-in-service and modified Coast Guard. If approved by the com- every day. Given that, what does doc- MTT/TTP and own the process of up- mandant, this effort will be expanded trine add? In a word, efficiency. Feed- dating and training to best-in-service to include other critical constituencies back loops are designed to capture new MTT/TTP. within the Coast Guard and focus on a experience and innovations which fur- The ultimate value of the system detailed implementation plan with nish best-in-service data bases and an will be to create unity of purpose. It cost estimates. JFQ operational level doctrine library that does this by directly linking strategic links essential local tasks with strate- guidance to practical, day-to-day oper- gic, long-term objectives. ations. It integrates prevention and response processes regardless of the mission and establishes horizontal and

67 Winter 1996–97 / JFQ 33 1319 Clay Pgs 11/17/98 8:36 PM Page 68

Look for Joint Force Quarterly on the JFQ Joint Doctrine Web Site

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/index.html

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm

For more information about the Joint Doctrine Web Site, contact the Joint Doctrine Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7), at (703) 614–6469 / DSN 224–6469.

68 JFQ / Summer 1998 68 1419 Graves/Snider Pgs 11/17/98 8:41 PM Page 69 U.S. Navy (Jeffrey Viano) Emergence of the Joint Officer

By HOWARD D. GRAVES and DON M. SNIDER

Both the form and substance of professional military education (PME) have been subjected to basic and revolutionary reforms in recent years. The farsighted Goldwater-Nichols Act, though hotly debated and strongly resisted at the time of its passage, mandated and catalyzed this change. Initially the law had little appeal to the military departments. Today each service accepts, indeed embraces, these reforms because their contribution to the effectiveness of joint warfare outweighs the new burdens which they have admittedly placed on the services.1

PME reforms were the result of Recalling that the military is de- two profound and complementary fined, as well as delimited, by its exper- thrusts found in title IV of Goldwater- tise in military science and that this ex- Nichols that dealt with officer person- pertise is an intrinsic part of the nel policy. The first, which addressed self-concept of the officer corps and its form or process, created joint specialty relationship to the state, it is easy to see officers (JSOs) and imposed criteria for the prescient mutual significance of their selection, education, utilization, these two new thrusts in PME. To- Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, and promotion. The second, one of gether, they have produced joint offi- USA (Ret.), served as superintendent substance, revamped the content of cers of a kind rarely before found in our of the U.S. Military Academy where military science as it applies to the ed- military institutions and culture. Some Don M. Snider is currently the Olin ucation of JSOs through its focus on professor of national security studies. emerging joint doctrine.

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may disagree with this characterization been neither joint educational programs Institutional Costs by pointing out that Goldwater- nor required standards The services have adapted to the ■ mandated promotion policy objec- Nichols only defined new duty posi- new realities of Goldwater-Nichols, but tives for officers in joint duty assignments, tions and educational requirements. not without costs. The requirement to But they misunderstand the revolution- objectives directing that as a group these officers should be promoted at a rate compa- assign promising officers to joint bil- ary nature of what has occurred in the rable to officers serving on service staffs in lets who otherwise would receive posi- joint arena over the last ten years—the the military departments tions which their service deemed im- clear emergence of a new culture ■ required newly promoted flag and portant to its own missions has among the leaders of the Armed Forces. general officers to attend the Capstone complicated personnel management. This new culture is truly joint. It is course, which is designed specifically to pre- The increased quality of officers serv- evidenced in the experiences of officers pare them to work with all the services ing in joint assignments resulted in a who have been educated and served in ■ designated a PME focal point in the corresponding decline in the overall vice director, Operational Plans and Inter- joint billets, many during operations in quality of service headquarters and op- Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, operability (J-7), Joint Staff, who is dual- hatted as the deputy director, Joint Staff, for erational staffs, a cost more quickly Haiti, and Bosnia.2 The reforms intro- military education and oversees the Military recognized by some services than oth- duced under Goldwater-Nichols are not Education Division (J-7). ers. Further complications have arisen the sole cause of this emerging joint over the time officers spend outside Moreover, a program for joint ed- culture, but they were vital in facilitat- their services for joint PME and in ucation has evolved into a PME frame- ing the learning experience through joint duty assignments, which in work which relates five educational which it is being nurtured. many cases now approaches 20 percent levels to career phases (namely, pre- Joint culture continues to emerge. of professional careers. commissioning, primary, intermediate, Its ultimate impact on the individual The third cost has been an unre- senior, and general/flag officer), each services is not yet fully known, nor is lenting increase in the number of joint with its own mandated learning areas the ethos it advocates. One outcome billets, more than 10 percent over the and objectives.3 appears certain: the next logical steps last six years alone, a period in which in the evolution of joint PME will pre- the services markedly reduced their sent serious challenges. As we face the next logical steps in the strength in officers. Lastly, inflexibility them, it is vital—especially for younger evolution of joint PME will in managing JSO assignments and in- officers—to recall that the Armed creased turbulence because of the re- Forces successfully adapted to new represent serious challenges quirement to attend phase II of the alities under title IV of the Goldwater- program for joint education (PJE) dur- Nichols Act. ing twelve weeks in residence at the These provisions, with others too Armed Forces Staff College constitute Influences on PME numerous to detail here, linked assign- ongoing costs to the services. ments, education, and promotion po- The principal changes brought Notwithstanding their expense, tential to joint duty. The law had re- about in joint PME under Goldwater- these reforms have been so fruitful markable effects on service policies Nichols include actions that: that on balance the result has been the relating to professional development. ■ established the Chairman as princi- emergence of a new joint culture. The services had to adjust traditions, pal adviser to the President and Secretary of America’s evolving approach to war- particularly the convention that officers Defense on all military issues including fare, which is increasingly joint in all did not serve outside their service nor PME (previously the domain of the corpo- respects, has been supported, even led their tight-knit career specialty lest they rate JCS) and facilitated, by officers profession- ■ defined “joint matters” for educa- fall behind their contemporaries who ally educated and employed under tional and other purposes as relating to the remained in the service’s mainstream. Goldwater-Nichols. integrated employment of land, sea, and air To effect change in the services, Ultimately, the benefit of PME re- forces in the areas of national military strat- Goldwater-Nichols needed to define forms must be measured against the egy, strategic and contingency planning, the nature of joint officer development performance of the Armed Forces in and command and control of combat oper- and create institutional incentives suf- ations under unified command, whereas be- defending and furthering national in- ficient to promote its ultimate legiti- fore they were not clearly defined and tradi- terests. In this case the record is clear: macy.4 As indicated, it did this initially tionally included only joint planning better officers, better prepared for joint by linking assignments, education, and ■ created a JSO career track to im- force employments, with markedly later promotion potential. In subse- prove the quality and performance of offi- better results in integrating service ca- cers assigned to joint duty; mandated that quent years, the effectiveness of joint pabilities on the battlefields and in re- critical positions identified in joint organi- combat operations has been even more gional conflicts. zations be filled only with JSOs contingent powerful in persuading officers that With so much successful adapta- upon their completion of joint PME joint duty is both personally fulfilling tion over the past decade, is joint PME ■ mandated maintaining “rigorous and career enhancing. standards” at joint PME institutions for ed- now established for the decades ahead? ucating JSOs, where previously there had

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Graves and Snider

If not, what issues should occupy those significance of those inter- responsible for preparing officers for ests. Thus these missions joint duty? Two broad sets of ongoing must be conducted swiftly changes in the security environment and efficiently, with even create challenges for designers of joint a higher premium on pre- PME. The first relates to future missions conflict integration of ser- of the Armed Forces—those purposes vice capabilities and joint for which the Nation will employ the training readiness. Fur- military in the next millennium. The thermore, they are likely second centers on the response of to have limited objectives Western democracies, including the and be of short duration, United States, to a new security envi- creating the aura of con- ronment and its implications for civil- stabulary missions.7 military relations. The tensions within these evolving missions al- Future Missions ready are, and will con- With respect to missions of the fu- tinue to be, quite real for ture, it would appear that within the officers. Will core compe- residual, state-centric international sys- tencies and self-concepts Medics carrying tem, conflicts among major powers will be focused on the role of Signal Company, Combat Camera (Brian Combat Camera Gavin)Signal Company, wounded Haitian. 5 th

be the exception. But nonstate actors the warrior or on that of 55 have increasingly created capabilities the constable and peace- which endanger U.S. and allied inter- keeper? Most OOTW mis- ests in widely separated regions. sions have also called for decentralized set of ongoing changes that will influ- Threats exist along two vastly different mission execution. This dispersion re- ence joint PME—the nature of the re- segments of the conflict spectrum: at quires greater political-military sophis- sponses by democratic governments, the low end with operations other than tication in younger officers, to include including the United States, to changes war (OOTW), and at the high end—be- direct contact with the media, non-gov- in security imperatives. yond conventional war as seen in re- ernmental organizations, and foreign gions like the Persian Gulf—through governments, as well as coping with A New Environment the proliferation of weapons of mass the inherent ambiguities and complexi- Democratic responses can be ag- destruction (WMD), some potentially ties of such international operations. gregated into four areas, each diverging to nonstate actors. Recent sharply from the patterns of the past OOTW missions which five decades, and with some quite im- have involved joint forces— will core competencies be focused on portant differences between America in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, the role of the warrior or on that of and its allies. First, the resources being Bosnia, Liberia—contrast allocated to national security have been sharply with the focus of the constable and peacekeeper sharply reduced and will remain so the Cold War era and the re- until a new threat to our vital interests gional conflict in the Gulf that immedi- Such missions also require officers of emerges for which elected governments ately followed it. But in fact they have exemplary character since the ambigui- can extract the necessary resources been the normal missions of the Armed ties and complexities of international from internally oriented publics.8 Cou- Forces save for the historical anomaly operations often have a moral-ethical pled with the requirement for political of the Cold War.6 character, and joint commanders must legitimacy in the use of military force, The need to be prepared for vastly work with foreign officers whose cul- as observed in the Gulf War and Bosnia, contrasting missions—from OOTW to ture and institutions reflect a different this means that Western democracies regional war with WMD or a return to value orientation. will fight future conflicts with political- major power competitions—poses sig- Since the Nation will always military coalitions.9 nificant challenges for joint PME. First, rightly expect that its Armed Forces be Secondly, unlike the Cold War era since OOTW missions do not usually prepared across the full spectrum of of long-standing coalitions, the future involve our vital interests (with the ex- potential conflict, the success of future norm will consist of ad hoc and condi- ception of international terrorism), the adaptations of joint PME may well de- tional commitments by democratic polity will expect them to be achieved pend on how this dilemma is resolved. governments, again as seen in the Gulf without casualties and other costs The challenge will consist of further War and recent OOTW missions. The which are not commensurate with the developing competencies for new, lim- implications for joint PME are clear. ited missions while enhancing joint For every joint concept, doctrine, or warfighting—a daunting task given the course, the United States must develop likelihood of continuing resource constraints. This brings us to the second

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missions for which they are relatively least suited, consuming even greater The Desirability of Joint Duty—1982 shares of declining resources. This is more true of the most critical asset for oint assignments are seldom sought by officers. A joint position removes them from the environment change: the focus of senior military for which they have been trained, in which they have established relationships and reputations, and in leaders.12 Thus, unless resourced and Jwhich they seek advancement. It places them instead in a wholly new environment involving unfamiliar procedures and issues for which most of them have little or no formal training. Their fitness reports nurtured by them, PME may regress (which affect their careers and prospects for advancement) are often entrusted to officers of other services from the notable strides made under with little in common by way of professional background. Goldwater-Nichols.13 Adding to these concerns is the perception that much of the work on the Joint Staff is unproductive, and that too much effort is wasted on tedious negotiation of issues until they have been debased and re- Overarching Challenges duced to the “lowest common level of assent.” Regardless of which future un- The general perception among officers is that a joint assignment is one to be avoided. In fact, within folds, those responsible for PME will one service it is flatly believed to be the “kiss of death” as far as a continued military career is concerned. In face two transcending and thus key contrast, service assignments are widely perceived as offering much greater possibilities for concrete ac- challenges. The first is retaining the complishments and career enhancement. As a result, many fine officers opt for service assignments rather right balance between service and than risk a joint-duty assignment. Yet joint positions have the potential for making major contributions to the defense effort, and offer challenging work to the finest officers. joint/combined PME. The second and more important is maximizing the —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Study Group, contribution of joint PME to the The Organization and Functions of the JCS (1982) moral-ethical development of officers. At the “point of the spear” in joint warfighting are service capabilities that enable the Armed Forces to conduct parallel combined capabilities in con- well as influencing officer attitudes and land, sea, and air operations in succes- cert with its allies. Those responsible perceptions toward fundamental shifts sive and successful battles. Developing for joint PME should urgently consider in military doctrine and organization.11 and educating officers in the integrated the profound implications of the rapid But the success of such investments in employment of these capabilities, joint internationalization of U.S. military in- human capital is problematic at best or combined, should not serve to di- stitutions and processes. given the political clout of congres- minish core service capabilities. PME The third response is the evolving sional-industrial interests that favor should not become too joint. If it does, specialization in U.S. military capabili- spending on defense hardware and soft- the profession of arms could be criti- ties vis-à-vis those of our allies. Basically, ware. Thus, only at senior levels where cized for “majoring in minors.” Calls Washington has indicated its intention the civilian and military leadership for substantial amounts of joint educa- to maintain a high-tech competitive ad- make these trade offs can the specific tion down to the precommissioning vantage—in pursuit of a revolution in challenge from a potential RMA to joint level, among other initiatives, could military affairs (RMA)—whereas other PME be met. rapidly lead to that point. By contrast, nations, with the possible exception of In the fourth area of response, our service culture and interservice compe- France and Japan, have eschewed such a allies have significantly reshaped their tition, especially on the tactical level, role. Unfortunately, any intention to force structures, in some cases even are constructive aspects of maintaining adapt and reshape the Armed Forces making changes in reserves and con- an effective defense establishment.14 through an RMA is unresourced as yet. scription, although America has done Of course such competition at Further, developments to date indicate little. The most notable examples are higher levels has occasionally gotten an asymmetric application of RMA ca- Britain and France, who have exten- out of bounds, such as when con- pabilities across the conflict spectrum, sively reduced and reorganized their strained resources inflame it, and per- with few benefits for OOTW, currently militaries. France even announced the haps could once again. On the other the most frequent grounds for employ- end of obligatory national service. hand, officer education is not the most ing joint capabilities. Collectively, the implications of effective method to deal with per- Since joint PME operates at the in- these responses for PME—at service, ceived excesses in interservice rivalry. tersection of intellectual development joint, and combined levels—are omi- Effective civilian leadership, which can and operational art, adapting to an RMA nous. Just as role specialization, a po- easily channel such competition to requires the formation of officers who tential RMA, and sharp declines in re- constructive adaptations and innova- are analytic, pragmatic, innovative, and sources are making adaptation, tions, is a more appropriate corrective. broadly educated.10 History teaches that innovation, and reshaping more criti- Civilian leadership cannot, how- effective PME—though insufficient by cal to military institutions—processes ever, effectively address the second itself—has proven to be necessary for historically facilitated by PME—the challenge. The moral-ethical dimen- military innovation, experimentation, Armed Forces are heavily engaged in sion of military service, vital in educat- and adaptation. This resulted primarily ing officers, is inherently part of the when PME provided the dual benefits of “contract” that the Armed Forces have training in new factual knowledge as maintained with the Nation. Were the

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military to abrogate that pledge, as re- An overriding need exists to 4 That such institutional change is pos- cent actions by a few officers have imbue joint PME with an ethos which sible, even predictable, is well documented. demonstrated, it would cease to be a is suited to the emerging culture. The For example, see Deborah Avant, Political In- profession. It would become unattrac- moral-ethical development of leaders, stitutions and Military Change: Lessons from tive to those who might wish to serve their education in character, occurs the Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1994). and unsupported by those it is dedi- much more in the field and fleet than 5 Among many works on this subject, cated to protect. Furthermore, and in academic settings. But knowledge of see Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation aside from this contract, officers have ethics and values, which can be con- of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), always had to act with integrity and veyed through joint PME, is a necessary and Donald M. Snow, The Shape of the component of this Future, 2d edition (New York: M.E. Sharpe officer education is not the most effective development. PME Publishers, 1995). curricula are already 6 Samuel P. Huntington, “Nontradi- method to deal with perceived excesses overflowing with tional Roles for the Military,” in Noncombat- ant Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post Cold- in interservice rivalry good joint subject matter. That is exactly War Era (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp. 3–12. the point. For the 7 For early insights on such roles, see trustworthiness. Such attributes will re- moral-ethical development of joint of- Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier main a functional requisite to mission ficers, the military risks supplanting the (New York: The Free Press, 1960), particu- accomplishment in a profession that essential with the good. Desiring to re- larly chapter 20. unleashes violence as a team, with each main a profession, those responsible for 8 See Don M. Snider et al., “The Coming member subject to unlimited liability. the future of joint PME should not set- Defense Train-Wreck...and What to Do As noted, OOTW test such trust- tle for so little. About It,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19, worthiness early in an officer’s career. no. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 87–127. 9 Therefore at a time when individual In 1986, Congress transformed See International Institute of Strategic character is becoming less central to the the officer corps over harsh opposition Studies, “The Problem of Combat Reluctance,” in Strategic Survey, 1995–1996 (London: Oxford society which professional officers from the Pentagon. Not discounting University Press, 1996), pp. 48–57. serve, it remains of unrelenting impor- the remarkable progress of the last 10 For amplification of this point, see tance to them regardless of grade or as- decade, new difficulties have emerged Steven H. Kenney, “Professional Military signment. To meet that need, all ser- for joint education. Senior military Education and the Emerging Revolution in vices are making serious efforts to leaders should not forget the lessons of Military Affairs,” an unpublished paper pre- develop and maintain leader character. the past. The challenge now is to re- sented at a symposium on the same subject But such efforts are not coordinated and shape PME—balancing the Nation’s in- convened at the National Defense Univer- appear to be implemented unevenly. vestment in its future military leaders sity on May 22–23, 1995. 11 Improvements in moral-ethical de- and their character against invest- See Military Innovation in the Interwar velopment are needed. Recent cases of ments in technology and forces—with- Period, edited by Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett (New York: Cambridge Uni- untrustworthiness include adultery and out relying on Congress. JFQ versity Press, 1996). fraternization on the part of senior offi- 12 The critical role of military leaders in NOTES cers, failure to hold officers accountable peacetime innovation is well documented. for friendly fire incidents which cost 1 The authors are indebted to the deputy See Stephen P. Rosen, Preparing for the Next lives, personal use of government air- chiefs of staff for personnel of all the ser- War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, craft, and more intrusive “zero defect” vices for providing candid comments which 1991), particularly chapters 3 and 9. command climates which severely test assisted in the preparation of this article. 13 General Shalikashvili is attempting to principled performance at every level. 2 Here we subscribe to the definition of do this but has noted a lack of progress in Thus, if a joint culture is emerging, it is organizational culture advanced by Edgar critical areas: “...despite the importance equally clear that its ethos at the joint H. Schein, “Culture is what a group learns we have attached to simulations, nobody over a period of time as that group solves its has yet developed a single, fully-tested, reli- level is largely unarticulated and has problems of survival in an external environ- able, joint warfighting model.” See “A Word yet to be successfully inculcated. Unfor- ment and its problems of internal integra- from the Chairman,” Joint Force Quarterly, tunately, neither the new instruction tion.” See “Organizational Culture,” Ameri- no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 1994–95), p. 7. issued by the Chairman on PME (CJCSI can Psychologist, vol. 45, no. 2 (February 14 Don M. Snider, “The U.S. Military in 1800.1, March 1, 1996), nor Joint Vision 1990), pp. 109, 111. Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old 2010 even broaches the question of 3 Not all the reforms summarized were Notions of Interservice Rivalry,” Airpower character development for future mili- mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Of Journal, vol. 10, no. 3 (Fall 1996). tary leaders. In addition, this ethos is particular importance was the legislation undergirded only through discrete, un- passed in 1989 as a result of the efforts of a coordinated, and less than effective ef- House panel chaired by Representative Ike Skelton. See U.S. Congress, House, Commit- forts by the services to strengthen indi- tee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on vidual character and commitment to Military Education, report. no. 4, 100th Cong., institutional values. 1st sess., 1989.

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Fires of Kuwait.

Military Education for the New Age

B–17s over England.

U.S. Navy (S. Gozzo)

U.S. Air Force Collection, National Air and Space Museum

By ERVIN J. ROKKE PME institutions and the policy community as well. Adapting to this change is the basic challenge confronting the war colleges today. uring his transition from Princeton Uni- The issue is straightforward: either the war versity to the White House, Woodrow colleges become agents for change within the in- Wilson is alleged to have said that acad- dividual services and joint arena or they become emic politics are the worst kind because anachronisms. Whatever the nature of academic D politics, the downside is irrelevancy at best and the stakes are so low. As any dean with curricu- lum revision experience will attest, Wilson had a demise at worst. Five major factors contribute to point. Squaring curricula with student needs at this phenomenon. the expense of faculty interests is a complex task. The stakes clearly have changed, however, at Factors for Change least in the context of professional military edu- International Politics. Historians and political cation (PME) at the war colleges. Not only has the scientists hold that the international system post-Cold War era placed new substantive and changes when new answers emerge to three fun- pedagogical requirements on military educators, damental questions: Who are the major players? but new demands on the relationship between

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What can they do to one another? What do they Curricula are replete with cases of how such ad- wish to do to one another? The unexpected end vances were treated by institutions and individu- of the Cold War was only the latest watershed in als wedded to more traditional approaches.1 Re- the world order. One classic example is the cently, however, breakthroughs related to warfare French Revolution which spawned a new player have occurred with greater frequency, more sub- (democratic France), a new capability (a citizen stantial impact on quality versus quantity trade- army), and new intentions (liberty, equality, and offs, and increased organizational implications. fraternity). Similar transitions occurred with the A former director of the Defense Intelligence Congress of Vienna (1815), German unification Agency, Lieutenant General James Clapper, has (1870), Treaty of Versailles (1919), and agree- raised an excellent case of the accelerating impact ments following World War II. of technology on quality-quantity tradeoffs.2 Dur- From the perspective of war college curric- ing World War II some 9,000 bombs dropped by ula, it is useful to examine the ongoing post-Cold more than 1,500 B–17 bomber sorties were re- War transition against the backdrop of past quired to destroy a 6,000 square foot target. In changes. In each instance the Vietnam the destruction of a similar target took perhaps no single factor has results were not readily appar- only 176 bombs delivered by 88 F–4 fighter sor- ent. The answers to questions ties. During the Gulf War, one bomb carried by as much potential as the concerning players, capabili- an F–117 fighter-bomber did the job. This is not information explosion ties, and intentions are no to imply that a single 2,000 pound bomb can more likely to surface quickly today destroy every 6,000 square foot target. Ad- or clearly today than in previ- vances in guidance system technology, however, ous realignments of the international system. As- have made a qualitative improvement in weapon sessments made in the democratic atmosphere of effectiveness. Technological advances by ground Paris circa 1789 did not foresee an autocratic and naval forces also resulted in impressive Napoleon on the horizon. Similarly, most inter- warfighting efficiencies during Desert Storm. nationalist projections made at Versailles follow- Equally important for PME are the organiza- ing World War I failed to predict a global depres- tional, structural, and budgetary implications of sion or a resurgent Germany. accelerated technological breakthroughs. The The first requirement then for the curricula price of improved technology is high, particularly at war colleges is to ensure that students do not if applied to such systems as the stealthy F–117 presume to know who their future opponents or aircraft. Indeed, given the tradeoff between a new coalition partners will be. This appreciation for item of equipment representing a breakthrough uncertainty is the beginning of wisdom in the in sophistication as opposed to just a better, sim- post-Cold War era. But underscoring uncertainty pler item, some defense experts argue for the lat- is not the same thing as saying that everything is ter.3 Whatever the ambiguity of quality versus up for grabs. On the contrary, it means that the quantity tradeoffs, however, the organizational war colleges must delve into what is known but is impact of increasingly expensive high tech items frequently neglected in the defense establish- is clear. As the cost and operational complexity of ment. For example, students must understand systems increase substantially, the organizational more than their predecessors about economics, response is centralization. In the case of the evo- technologies, and diverse cultures to make sound lution from photographic reconnaissance aircraft judgments. This perspective brings into question to satellites the focal point of operations and con- several major tenets of defense policy which were trol moves from the battlefield to Washington. prevalent in a bipolar world. Although it offers Information. Perhaps no single factor has as few clear-cut policy prescriptions, it is essential to much potential as the information explosion for appreciating the security implications of a world changing the way in which military organiza- order in flux. tions function, both during peace and in war. The Technology. Advances in technology are widespread adoption of information technologies hardly new phenomena. Stirrups, gunpowder, the in the latter part of this century has set the stage steam engine, radio, stealth, and other innova- for a social transformation of historic magnitude tions dramatically changed the nature of warfare. by making unprecedented amounts of information instantaneously available in easy-to-use forms at ever-diminishing cost. The emerging information highway, which extends from earth to geosynchronous orbit, will certainly alter society, Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF, is to say nothing of conflict. Worldwide 24-hour president of the National Defense University and connectivity and sensors and hardware needed to formerly served as assistant chief of staff for support information processing are already in intelligence at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. place. So are stand-off weapons that can be

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launched from almost anywhere and strike tar- them, the services have made major improve- gets with accuracy measured in fractions of yards. ments in collaboration and interoperability. Joint- To date the best thinking on innovative ap- ness is in. Outstanding professionals are now plications for information age technologies has assigned to positions on joint staffs, and a succes- been done by the staff of the Office of Net Assess- sion of JTF exercises and deployments has proven ment under Andrew Marshall at the Pentagon. that the Armed Forces are capable of functioning They have recast functional areas associated with within multi-service command structures. Even traditional service expertise into precision strike, service monopolies on developing requirements dominating maneuver, space warfare, and infor- have been redressed by the Joint Requirements mation warfare. Moreover, they suggest that the Oversight Council (JROC) overseen by the Vice potential for a revolution in military affairs Chairman. (RMA) exists in a zone where these new warfare As the services become more familiar with areas intersect and offer a new construct that joint responsibilities and work more effectively to- demonstrates the military potential afforded by gether, we also are finding that the likelihood of information. The Vice Chairman, Admiral the United States fighting alone is becoming re- William Owens, with similar logic, has advanced mote. Experiences such as the Gulf War, former a vision of a 200 square nautical mile battlefield Yugoslavia, and other recent crises suggest that al- box about which virtually everything is known liances and well-greased multinational command on a near real-time basis chains are insufficient if not outmoded. Ad hoc al- and within which all tar- liances and coalitions are the norm, and the gets can be hit using stand- United Nations is increasingly involved in hu- off weapons.4 manitarian and peace operations. Not surprisingly, de- Coordinating strategy and tactics to include bates about whether RMA rules of engagement as well as the distribution of notions are fact or fiction intelligence to coalition partners with both vary- provide grist for the mill in ing capacities for information and differing levels many PME seminars. But of security access are tasks that war college gradu- information age issues go ates face. The problem becomes more complex as far beyond procedures for tensions arise between the centralizing tendencies waging war to the heart of of jointness and the decentralizing, multiple military organization. chain of command biases of coalition warfare. Cheap microchips and Ecology. Perhaps less known but significant breakthroughs in commu- in their impact on security are environmental nications have made huge phenomena. While this area has received little at- amounts of information tention in PME, it is drawing increasing emphasis available and created pres- worldwide. It embraces climate change, ozone de- sure for decentralization pletion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and air and flat organizational and water pollution. Recent examples include the structures. Bluntly stated, 1989 conflict between Senegal and Mauritania vertical organizational which was sparked by a scarcity of water and structures long associated arable land, and the mass migration from Rwanda with the military, along which became a crisis of epic proportions because y Lane) with the centralization re- of the lack of potable water. In short, ecological Larr sulting in part from high developments could well affect the circumstances tech and costly equipment, under which the Armed Forces are used as well as U.S. Army ( U.S. Army are not optimal for the in- how they are used. Clearly this new challenge is “Digital” soldier. formation age. When tank, relevant to PME—although it has gone largely ship, and aircraft operators unaddressed. can directly receive much of the information they And so it is that various factors, from interna- need to fight, at least some higher headquarters tional politics and ecology through technology will become extraneous. and information, are moving doctrine, organiza- Jointness/Coalition Warfare. Consistent with tion, and operations in new and often conflicting the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the increasingly directions. As General Wayne Downing, Com- prominent combatant CINCs have responsibility mander in Chief of U.S. Special Operations Com- for command and control in warfare. To support mand, told students attending the School of Infor- mation Warfare and Strategy, “In the information age, the very nature of war is changing.” 5

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Rokke

Inter-vehicle information system. y Lane) Larr U.S. Army ( U.S. Army

Imperatives for PME world where rapid change is the norm. To do so, The central task of war colleges is to prepare however, professional military education needs to students to succeed across a broad spectrum of adapt in three ways. First, we must strengthen the national security challenges. The impact of these capability to affect the full spectrum of national institutions is in large part a function of how well security policies by embracing added roles for their graduates perform. We are in the business of PME. Second, we must revise curricula and sup- equipping leaders to deal with the security envi- plement the substance of what we teach. Finally, ronment of the 21st century. The unpredictable we must update pedagogical concepts, ap- nature of the ongoing process of change makes proaches, and technologies. this more akin to a floating Like most institutions of higher learning, craps game than an exact sci- war colleges can become ivory towers divorced war colleges must equip ence. Nevertheless, it is a game from the world which they serve. If they are to leaders to function in a in which we all must play. As help align military culture with the technologi- the Chairman, General John cal, environmental, and geopolitical revolutions, world where rapid change Shalikashvili, observed, “The they must be fully in tune with national security is the norm unexpected has become the processes which stimulate and implement routine; we need people who change. This goes beyond policy formulation and are comfortable in an uncertain includes technology insertion, doctrine develop- world.”6 In this game, the role of war colleges is ment, planning and budgeting, and training. to make the odds better for graduates. And those How can PME institutions do this? First, they odds can be shortened by doing everything possi- should be “present at creation” to ensure an envi- ble to convey an understanding of the emerging ronment that encourages new thought and re- security environment as well as teaching students wards rather than punishes innovation. Similarly, to recognize and deal with the unexpected. This they must follow organizational processes for is the PME challenge. change. War gaming, policy-relevant research, and Managing change is what national security is faculty participation in ad hoc commissions are all about. War colleges must equip leaders to as- classic examples. Each war college has a research sume this critical responsibility. We must give institute to connect its parent institution with the graduates the tools to function comfortably in a activities of the national security community.

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Secondly, PME institutions have a responsi- Indeed, because of the complexity of joint bility to expose ideas, new as well as old, to the and combined operations, curricula must deal critical light of academe. Wargames and simula- with the doctrine and capabilities of multiple nation exercises work well. So do informal, off the tions and services. Moreover, blurred boundaries record discussions between students and visiting among military, diplomatic, economic, and psy- lecturers from the policy arena. Each senior PME chological tools require unprecedented sensitivity institution enjoys special relationships with indi- for what policy types call the interagency process. viduals sympathetic to the military and who liter- In sum, developing PME curricula—like our secu- ally try out new ideas on faculty and students. rity environment itself—is of necessity an exercise More of these exchanges are needed with policy- in risk limitation. There simply is not the time to makers and leaders who are not instinctively cover all contingencies. The most one can do is sympathetic to military culture. prepare for dealing with uncertainty. Finally, PME institutions have a duty to be The classic approach to this dilemma is a bal- harbingers of change. Classes and seminars are ance among academic disciplines, the interests common ways for disseminating innovative ideas. and backgrounds of students, and the demands of So are professional journals. Less developed, but theory and practice. Like a classic liberal educa- with greater potential, are options associated with tion, war college curricula must cover a range of the information highway. Without a home page academic disciplines that include basic and engi- and a routine means for distributing the best of neering sciences as well as humanities and the so- faculty and student research, a war college is sim- cial sciences. ply not doing its job in the information age. In What then is different about curricular re- brief, PME can and must play a central role as an quirements today? For a start, the balance of PME agent in altering that greatest barrier to meaning- has shifted with the advent of the revolution in ful change—our traditional culture. information technology. While military strategists in past revolutions, such as that brought on Adapting Curricula by nuclear weapons, tended to be civilian In the classroom, as in headquarters or war thinkers with humanities and social science back- zones, the basis for innovation lies in critical grounds, the current revolutionary force puts a thinking about capabilities, concepts, and organi- higher premium on basic and engineering sci- zations relevant to current and future needs. As in ences. Historical perspective and an appreciation the past, military innovators in the information of bureaucratic politics remain vital, but an ade- age must develop an appreciation for what exists quate intellectual framework in the information as well as analytic skills for critiquing the status age requires some understanding of the ones and quo. It is not a choice between notions of mod- zeroes being passed around in such incredible ern warfare and more abstract theories of coer- quantities. In short, the center of mass at the war cion. Unfortunately, for already tight curricula colleges must move toward more technical acade- and busy students, it is a combination of both. mic disciplines.

Educational and Research Initiatives

U.S. national security will be increasingly af- of the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of broad range of information warfare electives to fected by the ability to adapt doctrine, organiza- Defense for Command, Control, Communica- all students at both colleges. Finally, on a third tional concepts, and operations to fully exploit tions, and Intelligence, ACTIS serves as a center tier, students will be able to select an intense information technologies. Toward this end, the of excellence for information warfare within elective program in information studies to be- National Defense University (NDU) has estab- DOD. This enhances the educational as well as come the information specialists of the future. lished a teaching, research, and outreach activ- the research mission of NDU by contributing to ACTIS is the DOD executive agent for re- ity to focus on the development of a vision for knowledge in a rapidly evolving field, offering search on command and control and informa- national security in the information age. The courses on information warfare, and disseminat- tion warfare and also designs and manages an Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, ing material on information warfare. extensive research and analysis program. In ad- and Information Strategies (ACTIS), an element NDU is currently developing a three-tier dition, it provides outreach activities, including of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, educational program for the School of Informa- short programs of instruction, workshops, sym- merges efforts of the School of Information tion Warfare and Strategy. On the first tier infor- posia, and on-line services, and will dissemi- Warfare and Strategy and the former Center for mation concepts will be introduced and inte- nate information warfare concepts, research, Advanced Command Concepts and Technology. grated into the core curricula of the National War and course material. JFQ Working under guidance issued by the Director College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. On the second the school will offer a

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How We Teach To conclude, there is a current revolution in War colleges justifiably take pride in teach- PME that parallels the RMA. In both cases, core ing techniques, which traditionally have included functions and procedures are undergoing funda- seminar-style classroom interaction as well as lec- mental changes. In both cases, we are seeing dis- tures by faculty and visitors, many of whom are parate rates of progress among the constituent involved in the policy arena. Excellent student to parts. And in both cases, we are facing difficult re- teacher ratios, as well as diverse student bodies, source tradeoffs between traditional approaches facilitate the high quality of seminar discussions. on the one hand and information age alternatives Though student diversity across the services and on the other. defense-related civilian career fields is most bal- PME institutions must assume the role anced at the National Defense University, service played by first class research universities. We have war colleges also ensure student representation a duty to mobilize our institutions to expand from the other services and civilian agencies. knowledge through research, educate practition- Regardless of quality, however, it is increas- ers, and serve as catalysts for change through out- ingly probable that teaching techniques need to reach. The war colleges must provide the intellec- be supplemented to cover a rapidly changing se- tual capital for changing the existing paradigm. curity environment and the increased informa- The stakes are high in the revolutions in mil- tion age sophistication of incoming students. The itary affairs and professional military education. notion that a ten-month experi- Significant obstacles and inertia must be over- ence at a war college is suffi- come. The RMA has the potential to alter priori- a major challenge for war cient for students who may ties among service capabilities. Similarly, the revolution in PME—challenging curricula and colleges lies in developing serve for a further ten years has always been questionable. Most teaching methods—has the potential to trans- follow-on education certainly the accelerating pace form war colleges into innovative centers that of change today makes it impor- spawn and foster new concepts of warfare. In the tant that we begin to provide follow-on educa- final analysis, both revolutions demand changes tional opportunities for PME graduates. in culture. Since PME shapes and promotes ser- Technology for distance learning is available vice and joint cultures, it would be difficult if not and the cost of personal computers is falling. Mil- impossible for the RMA to succeed without a cor- itary personnel take lap-top computers on tempo- responding revolution in war college curricula. rary duty to communicate with offices, homes, This places a major burden on those of us in- and educational institutions offering degree pro- volved in PME and requires that we move ahead grams over the information highway. Beginning with the revolution. JFQ last year, students at several PME institutions were issued lap-tops. The Air Force Command NOTES and Staff College, in particular, has made substan- 1 A classic example is found in Edward L. Katzen- tial progress in offering virtual seminars to stu- bach, Jr., “Tradition and Technological Change,” in dents on a worldwide basis. Both the Army and American Defense Policy, 5th edition, John F. Reichart and Air Force have begun providing lap-tops with Steven R. Sturm, editors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins modems to general officers. The Army has also University Press, 1982), pp. 638–51; also see Stephen P. funded a leadership development program at the Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). Industrial College of the Armed Forces which will 2 James R. Clapper, presentation at the National War be implemented using lap-top computers. College, February 9, 1995. A major challenge for war colleges lies in de- 3 See Jack N. Merritt and Pierre M. Sprey, “Negative veloping the substance of follow-on education Marginal Returns in Weapons Acquisition,” in American programs for transmission via the information Defense, 3rd edition, Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, highway. Simply transmitting research products is editors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, an initial but insufficient step. Faculty members 1973). whose dialogue with students has been limited to 4 William A. Owens, speech to the Retired Officers the classroom must develop and conduct virtual Association, Des Moines, Iowa, July 1, 1995. 5 seminars using distance learning. In fact, since Wayne A. Downing, presentation at the School of Information Warfare and Strategy, National Defense faculty resources are unlikely to expand, new University, August 16, 1995. course development might involve curtailing 6 John M. Shalikashvili, presentation at the National some existing courses. Before the next century, Defense University, August 18, 1995. PME graduates need the option of communicat- ing with war colleges on national security issues.

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Keeping the Strategic Flame By CARL H. BUILDER U.S. Air Force Historical Center U.S. Air Force B–17s on daylight raid over Germany.

trategic thinking by the American mili- What happened? We cannot blame the tary appears to have gone into hiding. demise of the Soviet Union since the strategic Planning on the tactical and operational flame began to dim during the 1960s, a quarter levels flourishes, but the strategic level is century before most people believe the Cold War S ended. It cannot be a decline in the defense bud- largely discussed in historical terms rather than as current art. Three decades ago, strategic thought get, for we spend about the same amount in real burnt bright in the sanctuary of the national se- terms today as at the height of strategic thinking curity temple. And for three decades prior to in 1955.1 Some may blame the Vietnam War that—back to the 1930s—strategic theorizing when the military every bit as much as our civil- dominated military debates in this country. ian leadership seemed to lose its strategic com- pass. But the cause may lie deeper in military institutions. And even if it should be found, that may not motivate a revival of strategic thinking, for few lament its absence today. Carl H. Builder is a senior staff member with the RAND Corporation and author of The Icarus Syndrome, an analysis of airpower theory in the evolution of the Air Force.

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I would like to pursue three sets of questions These distinctions beg for some comparison about this paucity of strategic thinking: with the term operational, which lies between ■ What is strategic thinking? How can it be distin- strategic and tactical. By contrast with the other guished from other kinds of military thought? two, the operational enterprise has as its objective ■ What happened to strategic thinking? What providing the means—getting the right things in caused its flame to wax and now wane? the right amount to the right place at the right ■ Why should we mourn the absence of strategic time. This operational quality of the American thinking today? What will it take to rekindle the flame? military has long been the envy of the world. Re- I will argue that the strategic flame must be peatedly during this century it has moved large rekindled and kept alive. It has gone out twice be- land, naval, and air forces, set them up, and made fore in this century to the Nation’s detriment. them fully functional halfway around the globe. It required more than logistics or support. It The Strategic Idea meant knowing which units to send where and The familiar terms strategic and tactical— when in order to create complex military forces which act as bookends on either side of the term that could fight as well as defend and support operational—have accumulated lots of baggage in themselves—precisely as they were organized, this century, and some of it must be jettisoned at trained, and equipped to do—from the first to the the outset. The best way to do that is to start over. last forces sent. General Glenn Kent, the legendary Air Force ana- If the operational thinking of our military is lyst, sometimes admonished those who were secure and without peer, and if tactical thinking about to brief him that they has come to the fore, strategic thought has been Joint Vision 2010 is a current could define terms in any all but abandoned. The difficulty lies in seeing way they wished, but he the strategic side of national security increasingly illustration of thinking tactically would hold them strictly to as the province of politicians and diplomats while their definitions. To avoid the operational and tactical sides belong to the confusion, he urged briefers to use simple dictio- military, free from civilian meddling (for some ev- nary definitions. For the terms strategic and tacti- idence of this development, consider the exam- cal, the ordinary dictionary definitions are close ples outlined in figure 2). enough and strip away some of the baggage that The current demand by the military for well- encumbers them in military usage. But to defined objectives is eloquent evidence of how far sharpen the differences, a distinction should be our thinking has drifted toward the tactical do- made between strategic and tactical as separate main. The insistence on operationally planning kinds of endeavors (see figure 1). Note that these based on enemy capabilities, while tactically pru- differences between strategic and tactical do not dent, is the antithesis of strategic thinking, which refer to types of weapons (nuclear or conven- should concentrate on enemy vulnerabilities. Al- tional), their range (intercontinental or theater), though defeating enemy forces may sometimes or the ways in which military power is applied be necessary to achieve our objectives, it is not al- (force, logistical, or surveillance). ways the Nation’s or the military’s best option. Joint Vision 2010 is a current illustration of thinking tactically. It is largely about engaging an enemy with joint forces in the future—without Figure 1. Redefining Two Familiar Terms evident purpose beyond fighting and winning.2 It Term Strategic Tactical could instead have been about the different ways military power, through joint capabilities, might Objective Going to the heart of the matter Dealing with the matter at hand be brought to bear on the future spectrum of na- Going for the jugular Playing the hand dealt tional interests. The military planning posture that came out of the Bottom-Up Review at the Focus on Ends Means start of the first Clinton administration is a con- Nature Transformatory Engaging temporary example of operational thinking. It explained (or argued) what kinds of forces in what Style Game-changing Game-playing amounts are needed where and when for two In the game of chess Check and mate moves Opening and castling moves nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. It is difficult to find current instances of strategic In Vietnam Why we went there: What we ended up doing: 3 Stopping the fall of south- Trying to defeat an opposing thinking from within the American military. east Asian dominoes military force The strategic flame is a metaphor for the grand idea that military power can sometimes be brought to bear most effectively and efficiently when it is applied directly toward a nation’s highest purposes without first defeating defending

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The strategic thinking made actionable by Figure 2. Examples of Strategic and Tactical Thinking planes and then missiles was controversial from Strategic Tactical the outset. It first appealed mostly to aviation- minded people such as Smuts, Douhet, Tren- What are our national interests What is the military objective? chard, and Mitchell; but aviators such as Chen- and objectives? nault and Moffett were skeptical of expansive What are an enemy’s What are an enemy’s claims by air strategists. World War II demon- vulnerabilities? military capabilities? strated these arguments in the European and Pa- What will it take to achieve What will it take to defeat cific theaters. national objectives? an enemy’s military? The Idea in Practice How can we most quickly go How should we best engage Over Europe in the 1940s, British and Ameri- to the heart of the issue? an enemy’s military? can airmen played out strategic bombardment theories with results that ranged from failure at worst to ambiguity at best. “Bomber” Harris and “Hap” Arnold structured forces and mounted bombing campaigns around their respective ideas enemy forces. It is an enduring idea latent in the that the aircraft would always get through and age-old precept of seizing the enemy capital, but the industrial base of the enemy war machine one which was often frustrated by the interposi- could be destroyed by precision daylight bom- tion of defending forces. So long as military bardment from self-defended bomber formations. forces were confined to the surface of the earth Those ideas proved disastrous to aviators who and limited in mobility, as was the case prior to tested them over Germany. Their bomber forces the 20th century, strategic thinking was mostly were too small to overwhelm enemy defenses; positional—the occupation of capitals, straits, and they found themselves in an age-old battle ports, etc. Seizing or occupying such critical with the defenders, precisely the clash the strate- points was a strategic objective, but access could gic theorists had promised they could avoid. be denied or delayed by defending enemy forces The British took up bombing at night to that typically had to be defeated before any ob- evade the worst of the defenses; and the Ameri- jectives were achieved. Thus, winning a war be- cans found themselves in a fighter-plane battle came the sine qua non for pursuing strategic aims. for control of daylight skies over Germany as Little wonder that combat was seen as a noble Chennault had warned. It had become a war of contest among professional warriors over a prize, attrition even in the air. By the time the United which was a disarmed or vulnerable opponent fi- States built up its fighter and bomber forces nally opened to the strategic designs of the win- enough to overwhelm German air defenses, the ning state, which is pure Clausewitz. forces were diverted to support tactical objectives The technological achievement of flight for the impending invasion of Europe.4 Thus the through the air and then in space provided the theory of strategic bombardment remained either first plausible opportunity to test the existing bar- incompletely tested (to airmen) or discredited (to riers to strategic objectives. Strategic thinking be- the critics). came militarily actionable: national objectives In the Pacific, a strategic campaign was car- could be achieved directly, without first defeating ried out on land, under the sea, and in the air. Be- enemy forces. Airmen were the earliest to see, cause of the “Europe first” policy adopted by Roo- elaborate, and promote this idea. What made air- sevelt and Churchill, the Pacific war had to be planes distinctive from surface forces was that ac- fought with an economy of force, not by attri- cess to strategic objectives could be sudden—a tion. On the surface, MacArthur and Nimitz pur- matter of hours or minutes with little or no warn- sued island-hopping campaigns to seize only ing—from any direction and to any place. As bases needed to close on the strategic objective of with surface forces, the interposition of defenses Japan. They did not attempt to defeat the enemy was still conceivable but not as certain. The en masse or to push back its entire perimeter. agility and rapidly increasing speed of aircraft Under the sea, American submarines closed the made the kinematics of defenses appear much waters around Japan to shipping5 instead of less advantageous. The advent of ballistic missiles scouring open seas for enemy naval forces.6 In the and space technologies in mid-century made de- air, both MacArthur and Nimitz used their air fenses against strategic actions even more remote. forces tactically to support strategic island-hopping campaigns that led to air bases within practical striking range of Japan. It was Curtis LeMay who then used such bases to strategically launch aircraft over Japan.

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In Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere pursuit of strategic objectives, while technically and militarily feasible, was deemed too risky in its potential impact on other foes and domestic support. Even as strategic thinking defined the broader and more vital framework of the Cold War, it seemed useless for militaries mired in conflicts where the strategic options were arrogated to their civilian leaders. In retrospect, however, strategic thinking did reappear periodically, sometimes in stunning forms—and not just in framing and sustaining the nuclear standoff at the nexus of the Cold War. While it may have been conceived as a tactical alternative at the time, the Berlin airlift of 1948 was a strategic masterpiece. It not only fulfilled its tactical objective of feeding and fueling the populace of Berlin (that is, dealing with the matter at hand); it transformed the game on the strategic level. The Soviets blockaded land routes to Berlin, believing that the West would have to choose be-

DOD tween initiating hostilities (perhaps precipitating Loading equipment for World War III) or abandoning Berlin. Supplying Desert Shield. Berlin by air was inconceivable to the Soviets After learning that the theory behind the debased on their own limited experience with airlift velopment of the B–29 wasn’t workable, LeMay and the failed German effort at Stalingrad. What completely subverted available means to pursue no one on either side seemed to recognize then strategic ends. Since the combination of daylight or now is that an airlift would turn the tables and bombing from self-defended formations at high oblige the Soviets to initiate hostilities. That was altitude using high-explosive bombs could not check. When the sufficiency and sustainability of gain the desired effect, he stripped the defensive the airlift became apparent, it was checkmate. armament from B–29s and flew them at night Thereafter, if the blockade was to be continued without formations and at medium altitude to the West could only gain international admira- maximize their loads of tion at the expense of the Soviets. the strategic idea appeared finally incendiaries. Whatever The Cold War yielded another transforma- the legality or morality of tory strategic action in the Cuban missile crisis. to have come of age in the 1950s such bombing, LeMay On the strategic (game defining) level, the strug- was clearly on the way to gle for world opinion focused on who was telling burning down every major Japanese city when the truth about missiles in Cuba. The United the atom bomb punctuated his campaign with an States asserted their presence and the Soviet exclamation point. Union denied it. Both sides had predisposed sup- The Strategic Bombing Survey,7 conducted porters in the absence of contrary evidence. The following World War II to validate or refute aerial reconnaissance of Cuba, clearly revealing a strategic bombardment theories, did not resolve build-up of Soviet missiles and facilities, trans- the dispute, although the atom bomb now formed the debate. In a dramatic moment, Adlai seemed to make the argument academic. It was Stevenson, the U.S. representative to the United obvious that even a few bombers armed with Nations, posted the reconnaissance photographs these atomic weapons could be enormously de- for all the world to see and declared that he was structive; and defenses able to deny all the planes prepared to wait until hell froze over for the So- access to their targets seemed all but impossible. viet explanation of the evidence. The aerial re- The advent of the ballistic missile, with access connaissance and public release of the photos times measured in minutes rather than hours, (unprecedented at the time) was a strategic ac- simply compounded the problem of defense tion—the pursuit of the Nation’s highest pur- against strategic actions. The strategic idea ap- poses without first defeating enemy forces. peared finally to have come of age in the 1950s. Note that both the Berlin airlift and the But the strategic stalemate of the Cold War Cuban reconnaissance utterly transformed the was bypassed in a series of conflicts in which strategic objectives were tempered by larger political considerations than fighting or winning wars.

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East-West games being played at the time; yet clear. Hence we default to a tactical use of force: strategic objectives were accomplished not by beating up the opposition. The strategic problem force but with military capabilities that normally is the Iraqi leadership, not its people nor its mili- support fighting forces. These cases are stunning tary; and separating these elements for the strate- proof that the strategic use of military power does gic application of military power is not easy. Air- not always take the form of military force. In- power is thus applied to tactical ends, to taking deed, cases of strategic action during the Cold down air defenses in preparation for what—other War which involved the use of force are much tactical applications of airpower? This is evidence more ambiguous in their effectiveness. They in- that the strategic flame has dimmed. clude coercive and punitive raids on Hanoi and Curiously, the American response to the Libya—the first to bring the North Vietnamese to Bosnian conflict may have demonstrated more by the negotiating table and the second to punish way of strategic thinking. Dropping supplies was Kadafi for presumed connections with terrorism. the direct pursuit of one of our highest interests The pertinence and impact of both actions are at the time—heading off winter starvation within still argued today. the Muslim enclaves—without seeking to engage opposing forces. While the air embargo over When the Flame Is Low Bosnia appears to have been no more effective With the end of the Cold War and the politi- than efforts over Iraq, Operation Deliberate Force cal constraints imposed by the risks of nuclear may have been a direct factor in ending the fight- confrontation, one might have expected a renais- ing and bringing the Serbs to the bargaining sance in strategic thinking in the American mili- table. Moreover, it appears that the strikes in De- tary. It hasn’t happened. Both the Persian Gulf liberate Force were not directed so much at mili- War and Bosnian conflict have been approached tary forces as at intimidating their leaders. We mostly in operational and tactical terms. In the may have to wait for history to clarify the strate- Gulf, only the first rapid deployments into the gic thinking involved in the run-up to the Day- theater as part of Desert Shield prior to October ton accords. 1990 were unambigu- Such examples and the definition of the ously strategic, at least as strategic idea might suggest deliberate exclusion of military power can sometimes be defined here. Protecting fighting or surface forces. Not so. Throughout the brought to bear when it is applied oil fields south of Kuwait Cold War, fighting forces—whether land, sea, or was our first and highest air, nuclear or conventional, whose presence and without first defeating defending interest; and that was ac- readiness served to deter conflict—were key to the enemy forces complished by force de- grand idea that military power can sometimes be ployments, not engaging brought to bear most effectively and efficiently and defeating enemy when it is applied directly to the highest national forces. Subsequent interests—ejecting the Iraqis interests without first defeating defending enemy from Kuwait and ending the threat to the re- forces. That grand idea does not exclude applying gion—were largely approached operationally and military power directly against opposing forces if tactically: Iraq’s air defenses were temporarily their defeat or destruction advances national in- neutralized and its air force shattered. Coalition terests. There are circumstances when that could ground forces were built up until they were capa- conceivably be an end in itself, without further ac- ble of frontal assaults on Iraqi armies that had tion, such as eliminating enemy capabilities for been weakened by aerial attacks. Even the Scud employing weapons of mass destruction. But the missile threat was dealt with tactically—offen- cases are few. Eliminating the Iraqi Republican sively in Scud hunts and defensively by Patriot Guards as a power base for Saddam Hussein might missiles—to keep Israel out and the coalition to- have been strategic in intent, but their power gether, both of which were means, not ends. rested in their loyalty to him more than their Thus the Gulf War was not dominated by arms. Thus their defeat on the battlefield may not strategic actions; it was mostly a demonstration of have been a sufficient means to that end. operational and tactical virtuosity—precisely the Israel seems to have appreciated the strategic sort of opportunity our military has increasingly use of military means for its highest interests in sought from civilian leaders since Vietnam. More- the 1976 Entebbe raid and the 1981 strike on the over, subsequent actions in the Gulf have been nuclear reactor near Baghdad. These probes were mostly tactical: punitive strikes against an intelli- not about defeating enemy forces or winning a gence facility and air defense installations. Two air war; both were direct applications of military embargoes have not stopped Iraq from either force toward national ends—recovering hostages using helicopters or abusing its own minorities.8 and thwarting hostile nuclear developments. The strategic ends to which our military power might be applied over Iraq today are not so

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Nevertheless, the strategic role of fighting and the exile of upstart Army aviators to dusty forces began to shift when nuclear weapons and posts in Kansas or fetid jungle camps in Panama global access became feasible in the mid-20th cen- or the Philippines to atone for their radical ideas. tury. This time, the seminal strategic thinking It briefly went out again when America demobi- seemed to spring from civilians rather than the lized after World War II and before the onset of military. Bernard Brodie was thinking strategically the Cold War. On both occasions we had to fifty years ago when he observed what nuclear scramble to rekindle it and rebuild new institu- weapons implied: “Thus far the chief purpose of tions from scratch. And, to our peril, we very our military establishment has been to win wars. nearly missed rebuilding in time. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert Although our experience in rekindling the them. It can have almost no other useful pur- strategic flame is limited, a pattern is evident. It pose.”9 At about that time, George Kennan sug- starts with a seminal strategic idea—how military gested that our interests would best be served by power might be more effectively and efficiently “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant con- applied to pursuing national interests without tainment of Russian expansive tendencies [until] necessarily engaging defending enemy forces. the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet That idea is then translated into strategic doc- power.”10 These ideas on deterrence and contain- trine—rules or principles about the best way mili- ment remained pivotal to our thinking about na- tary power can be forged to pursue strategic ob- tional security throughout the forty-year Cold jectives. The doctrine then becomes the objective War. Of course they would be modified and elab- specifications for developing military capabilities orated over time and in light of new develop- and drives the acquisition of new systems. This ments, both political and technical. Containment pattern could be recognized when the strategic was embellished with massive retaliation, flexible flame was relighted at the Air Corps Tactical response, and détente. Deterrence was defined by School in the 1930s and in the Strategic Air Com- criteria of assured destruction, extended to cover mand (SAC) in the 1950s. allies, and eventually mocked as mad. Concepts As war clouds gathered over Europe in the for massive civil defense and missile defense pro- 1930s, airmen at the Tactical School at Maxwell grams disturbed, but could not displace, deter- Field began to entertain the idea of economic tar- rence as the strategic core of national security. geting. It was a strategic idea in the sense defined Vestiges of that core are still found in operational here. It presumed that an enemy might be de- thinking, in explaining the purpose of military feated by destroying critical economic activities— forces—to deter enemies and, if that fails, to fight factories, industries, resources—supporting its war and win. machine. But these airmen did not know how to With the end of the Cold War and recession execute that idea at first. They had to study na- of an immediate nuclear threat to our survival, tional economies to identify economic targets; tactical thinkers may have anticipated that the and they had to determine how to damage or de- military could get back to its real job—winning stroy such targets. Their answer was precision aer- wars. Alas, as Martin van Creveld suggests, the ial bombardment. But they went further doctri- relevance of traditional state-on-state warfare is nally. To be precise they needed a better declining in a world where proliferating nuclear bombsight; and to see targets they had to bomb technology is an inevitable consequence of global by daylight. To gain access to targets without first trade: defeating defending enemy forces, they would Slowly, unevenly but inexorably, nuclear proliferation need long-range bombers that could survive by is causing interstate war and the kind of armed forces flying at high altitude in self-defended forma- by which it is waged to disappear. The future belongs tions. That doctrine drove development of the to wars fought by, and against, organizations that are Norden bombsight and the acquisition of the not states....Unless some yet to be designed system B–17 Flying Fortress. Establishment of the semi- enables states to reliably defend themselves against independent Army Air Forces followed as these nuclear weapons...the writing for large-scale, inter- capabilities emerged. state war, as well as the armed forces by which it is Strategic thinking came first, before the capa- waged, is on the wall.11 bilities were in hand. Doctrine, development, acquisition, and institution-building followed logi- When the Flame Dies cally. It can be argued that the strategic thinking The strategic flame can go out. It flickered at the Air Corps Tactical School was not sound, twice in the past—both before and after World that the theory of economic targeting was beyond War II. It died with Billy Mitchell’s court martial the means chosen by at least another decade—it would take a breakthrough in the destructiveness of weapons. But the validity of their theory is not the test for the existence of strategic thinking. No

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Berlin airlift, 1948.

Norden bombsight. U.S. Air Force

one would suggest aban- the development of a series of bombers and bal- doning operational or tacti- listic missiles, tested their crews, and argued for cal thinking if it sometimes requisite force levels. The institution that evolved proved wrong or reached became the military centerpiece of the Cold War; beyond available technol- and its effects are still evident in military plan- ogy. Airmen in that day ning and culture today. SAC wasn’t conceived to were thinking strategically defeat an enemy air force; it was designed to ful- and thus laid the founda- fill the Nation’s highest security objective ditions for American security rectly—to deter a nuclear attack by the visible policies for the next half threat of unacceptable damage through a well-co- throp Grumman throp

Nor century. ordinated retaliatory strike. Nor was the fleet bal- The very same pattern listic missile program conceived to defeat an was repeated in the emer- enemy navy;12 it was specifically designed to ful- gence of SAC some two decades later. As the out- fill that same objective directly, but with an as- lines of the Cold War began to take shape in the suredly survivable force—one which denied the late 1940s, America’s nuclear posture was in disar- enemy any plausible counterforce option. As with ray: Neither the weaponry strategic bombardment theories of the 1930s, de- seminal strategic thinking came nor means of delivery had terrence theories of the 1950s may seem naive or been maintained beyond re- simplistic today, but they were determinants of from civilians like George search and experimentation. the path that led to the present; and they arose Kennan and Bernard Brodie This time, the seminal from strategic thinking. strategic thinking came from civilians like George Why Has the Flame Dimmed? Kennan and Bernard Brodie in the concepts of From the beginning—when the strategic containment and deterrence. The military prob- flame burned most brightly during the first half of lem was how to implement the concept of deter- the Cold War—some worried that a traditional test rence. The solution was to make the threat of nu- of military weapons between armies and navies clear retaliation to an attack on the United States could force our hand—that we could be self-de- so evident, quick, certain, and massive that any terred from being the first to use our nuclear strike rational enemy would be dissuaded from making forces even as we suffered a traditional defeat. The such a mistake. But again it was strategic doctrine Korean war lent credence to that argument. that drove developments, acquisition, and insti- Hence we built up other arms—conventional tutions. Central to SAC was the doctrine of a sin- or tactical to differentiate them from nuclear or gle integrated operational plan, the scheme to strategic—and thus started a destructive division constantly maintain trained, tested, ready nuclear in our minds and institutions that still haunts us. forces to execute a massive, coordinated nuclear Tactical weapons grew until they dwarfed their attack upon the Soviet Union. That plan drove strategic counterparts; they even acquired nuclear weapons and found a niche in nuclear war plans. At great cost, they provided the United States and

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its allies with an uneasy degree of security in ground. So the strategic flame has dimmed. If it is Western Europe and Korea. A warfighting role again extinguished by larger vested interests or was even found for these conventional forces in neglect we may find ourselves struggling against Southeast Asia until we learned to our chagrin time to rekindle it once more. that they became hostages that could be extracted only after we resorted once again to Relighting the Flame strategic strikes against enemy will, values, and What must be done to rekindle the strategic resources. flame? Reduced resources pose difficulties, but Nevertheless, the strategic flame was much they are not the problem. The flame can be kept reduced by our attention to conventional arms, burning with even a fraction of today’s defense not by funding so much as interests. The military budget. But it can’t endure without devotion and has once again built up large vested interests in spirit. It is easy to have both when institutional traditional weaponry—intended to defeat their fortunes are soaring and assets abound. Keeping opposite number in kind, to fight and win wars— faith in ideas rather than things is difficult when to the neglect of other capabilities (such as special institutions and resources are focused on things. operations forces) that might be more directly As in the case of those strategic pioneers at mid- and adroitly applied to the Nation’s highest or ul- century, strategic thinkers within the military timate objectives. today may get greater support from the public, In order to retain and modernize traditional from outside the defense establishment. That is arms, our military institutions have contributed altogether fitting, for keepers of the strategic flame serve the Nation even more than they do the institutions to which they belong. The strategic idea can’t always be applied successfully, as history has shown. Sometimes the available technical means are not up to the demands. And sometimes the ends are not apparent. Unfortunately for those devoted to things rather than ideas, new strategic means cannot be defined apart from evolving strategic ends. That was part of the trap into which we fell some fifty years ago by dividing forces along strategic and tactical (nuclear and conventional) lines. It is not that we lack the ability to define strategic means once the strategic ends have been defined; we neglect to spend the effort up front to define and pursue the strategic ends. It is the keepers of the vin Lynchard)

Mar strategic flame who must find strategic ends for applications of military power, for no others will assume that responsibility. It took hard work and

U.S. Air Force ( U.S. Air Force acrimonious debate to define the ends for the F–117 precision strategic applications of military forces twice be- bombing. fore—and it will again. to the reduction of the strategic flame. Once How do we attend to strategic ends before again, as occurred earlier in this century, the mili- the demand arises? In the same manner that we tary—including the aviators—has become mostly did in the past. No one directed the Air Corps Tac- rooted in the idea that weapons should be con- tical School to think about economic targeting. ceived to defeat their opposite numbers in a No one told LeMay that the means for deterrence major regional conflict—with armies confronting was to be found in a comprehensive nuclear war armies and air forces opposing air forces. The plan. Thinking about strategic ends—and means Navy, with no other significant maritime power to achieve them before a threat presented itself— to defeat, has oriented itself on projecting power rekindled the strategic flame and set it to burning over the land from the sea. But this concept re- brightly, at least back in those days. mains mostly operational in nature—about the Thinking about these ends seems daunting. kinds of units needed to provide presence and Determinants of the future are in flux on many project power.13 levels—national interests, resources, threats, and For the most part, however, the mid-20th cen- technology. During the Cold War those issues at tury strategic idea that a military can be used for something more pertinent than defeating its counterpart has been pushed into the back-

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least seemed relatively constant; and we became NOTES good at hedging against uncertainties with rapidly changing technology. But it is no longer possible 1 In 1955, when the United States was urgently to depend on abundant resources or precisely preparing for imminent thermonuclear war with the So- know who or where an enemy will be or what will viet Union, the defense budget was $242.8 billion in 1995 dollars. In 1995 the amount was $271.6 billion. be required of our military to directly serve the Na- From The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal tion. Contemplating strategic ends across this Year 1996, historical tables, reported in The National Re- spectrum can boggle the mind; but it need not if view, vol. 47, no. 24 (December 1995), p. 21. we think strategically instead of tactically. 2 For a reprise of JV 2010, see Joint Force Quarterly, The strategic applications of military power no. 12 (Summer 1996), pp. 34–50. are about choosing the ways, places, and times to 3 Even the missile defense debate seems to reflect this get at the heart of the mat- point. Only the political discussion addresses strategic ter. The initiative lies with us concerns, whilst military concerns are mostly tactical. the burden of strategic thinkers 4 when we think strategically. Not only were bombers diverted to tactical mili- is to explore beforehand what The burden of strategic tary objectives, the invasion itself had the tactical objective of destroying the enemy. Eisenhower’s invasion thinkers is to explore before- may be worth doing and why order (written by himself) was to enter Europe and do hand what may be worth just that. At the same time, other leaders advanced doing and why. Not only in strategic objectives such as seizing Berlin (Stalin and war, but when friends are isolated—Berlin in Patton) and blocking Soviet occupation of Eastern Eu- 1948 and Bosnia in the early 1990s. Not just for rope (Churchill) by invading through the Balkans. war, but when we need to punish—Libya in 1986 5 Submarines were aided in that strategic objective or Bosnia in 1995. Not just to destroy, but when by aerial mining, including a number of sorties flown help is needed—the aftermath of Hurricane An- by B–29 bombers then massing in the western Pacific. 6 drew and Provide Comfort. Not just to strike, but The Japanese used submarines mostly for the tacti- to know what is going on—over Cuba in 1962 cal objective of sinking American naval vessels in open ocean areas of the western Pacific. and Rwanda in 1996. 7 See David MacIsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Future strategic challenges may include Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Sur- asymmetrical conflicts (as the first world convey (New York: Garland Publishing, 1976). fronts threats in the second and third), terrorism 8 In fact, the only confirmed effect so far has been with no definable state roots, and ethnic, reli- the shooting down of two American Blackhawk heli- gious, and separatist movements. They may in- copters. volve a proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- 9 Bernard Brodie, editor, The Absolute Weapon (New tion beyond state controls. The world may see York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), p. 76, as repeated by its au- uncontrollable migrations and contraband as bor- thor in War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), ders between nation-states erode. And all this may fn. 2, p. 377. 10 George F. Kennan writing as “X” in “The Sources have to be addressed as traditional nation-state of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4 (July sovereignties and resources decline. Preparing for 1947), pp. 575, 582. war, though still necessary, will be insufficient. 11 Martin van Creveld, “Air Power 2025,” in New Era The strategic idea is arguably the most im- Security (RAAF Air Power Studies Centre, June 1996). portant military concept of this century as well as 12 Indeed, the Navy sometimes argued that the fleet the next. It is a much bigger idea than the one ballistic missile program served the Nation more than that dominates our military institutions today— itself and thus should not come out of the Navy budget. warriors being able to defeat other warriors of like See Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military kind. It is serving the Nation—more directly, ef- Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hop- fectively, and efficiently—not just testing new kins University Press, 1989), pp. 199–200. 13 Department of the Navy, Forward...from the Sea arms one against the other. History tells us that (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1994). strategic thinking requires courage and perseverance: courage because it demands departures from mainstream thinking and perseverance because it takes time for institutional mainstreams to move and join the “discovered” innovative courses of thought. JFQ

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nnovation is the enabler of the future. In a Doctrine and Innovation.” He looks at the Ger- seminal article entitled “Revolutions in Mili- man effort to integrate the technology of gases tary Affairs,” James FitzSimonds and Jan van during World War I. More importantly, he shows ITol examine how innovation can lead to a how it cost dearly in the short and long term. As revolution. They outline criteria for winning the he states, we “should not hesitate to apply the innovation battle and advocate fostering a mili- lessons in current situations.” tary culture that promotes thinking in an uncon- Many innovative concepts currently being strained fashion about future warfighting. discussed were framed by Thomas Mahnken in Colin Gray then examines the strategic im- “War in the Information Age,” which won first plications of such revolutions in “RMAs and the prize in the JFQ RMA Essay Contest in 1995. He Dimensions of Strategy.” He argues that RMAs addresses the need to integrate a myriad of sys- can change the conduct and character of warfare tems: sensors, shooters, and command and con- but are not an antidote for strategic ills. The di- trol. This will result in shock warfare—actions mensions of strategy are eternal and ubiquitous. that foreclose enemy options—and establishes While historians have largely ignored RMAs, the need to target information nodes. Ultimately, Williamson Murray accepts the challenge in an information advantage will be decisive. “Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs.” Finally, today’s RMA will have an impact on He suggests ways to conceptualize RMAs of the things temporal. It will compress the decision- past and interpret the implications of history for making cycle and require that operations be the future. planned and executed faster than before. Ajay Kenneth McKenzie appeals to history to il- Singh explores the implications of this phenome- lustrate the difficulty of harnessing technology to non in “Time: The New Dimension in War.” JFQ military purposes in “An Ecstasy of Fumbling:

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REVOLUTIONS U.S. Navy (Daniel G. Lavois) in Military Affairs By JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS and JAN M. VAN TOL

n the early morning hours of the 15th of Blitzkrieg has been termed a revolution May, 1940, Prime Minister Churchill re- in military affairs or RMA—a fundamental ceived an urgent telephone call from French change in the nature of warfare that the Premier Reynaud. “We are beaten,” Rey- Wehrmacht used to inflict a rapid, stunning I defeat on a qualitatively comparable, numer- naud said in distressed English, “we have lost the battle.” It had only been five days since the ically superior force. Many factors con- German army launched a broad offensive into tributed to the Allied collapse, but the France and the Low Countries. “Surely it can’t essence of the German victory was the inno- have happened so soon,” Churchill replied, in- vative operational exploitation of systems credulous at the rapidity of the defeat.1 Six common to both sides: the tank, airplane, weeks later, France formally surrendered. and radio. Speed, surprise, and deception,

Summary Technological change may revolutionize warfare in the next century. Nations which can exploit emerging technologies through innovative operational doctrine and organizational adaptation may achieve significant gains in relative military effectiveness. In the past, America has had sufficient time to adapt in the midst of war to military revolutions that developed in peacetime. However the proliferation of technology may no longer afford the luxury of observing developments from the sidelines. The role of the military in developing concepts to exploit emerging technologies will be crucial in order to stay ahead of competitors. Junior officers in particular must be encouraged to think about the implications of the emerging revolution in military affairs.

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combined with superior tactical and opera- her sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in the En- tional performance, gave the Germans a de- glish navy apart from these two that it would not be gree of relative operational superiority to madness to trust to an engagement with that little which the Allies failed to adapt in time. [American] Monitor. 2 While nations have always pursued inno- —The Times (London), 1862 vation to increase military effectiveness rela- It is difficult to precisely and consis- tive to potential adversaries, accelerating tently define the term revolution in military technological change, coupled with associ- affairs, though it is generally clear ex post ated operational and organizational changes, facto when something of a revolutionary na- has altered the character of war more pro- ture has occurred. An example of an RMA foundly in the last two centuries than ever might be the universal change across warfare before. The railroad, telegraph, steam-pow- driven, for instance, by the development of ered ironclad, and rifle caused dramatic in- the airplane or atomic bomb. Another sort creases in military effectiveness between the might be the conversion from wooden sail- Napoleonic wars and the American Civil War. ing ships to steam-powered armored hulls in Similar changes accompanied the introduc- the latter half of the 19th century. Still an- tion of the machine gun, airplane, and sub- other might be a consequence of major so- marine prior to World War I. By the outbreak cial or political upheaval, such as the French of World War II the internal combustion en- levee en masse which dramatically altered the gine, improved aircraft, radio, and radar made scale of land warfare. One feature common possible revolutionary leaps in long-range, to each, and perhaps the essence of an RMA, highly mobile operations such as Blitzkrieg is not the rapidity of the change in military and carrier air strikes. The development of effectiveness relative to opponents, but nuclear weapons at the end of World War II rather the magnitude of the change com- and their subsequent mating with ballistic pared with preexisting military capabilities. missiles marked perhaps the most profound Technological advances are usually a req- revolution in military affairs to date. uisite for an RMA, but technology alone is The stunning victory of the Armed Forces not enough to achieve leaps in relative mili- in the Gulf has stimulated increasing discus- tary effectiveness. As illustrated by Blitzkrieg, sion of the possible emergence of a new RMA, profound change only takes place when new which will again lead to major changes in the concepts of operations incorporating new nature of conventional warfare. Such a revo- technologies are developed. Often this will lution may be driven by the rapidly develop- require or result in new military organiza- ing technologies of information processing tions which reflect the new conditions. and stealthy, long-range precision strike. History suggests three common precon- The following discussion has two pur- ditions to the full realization of an RMA: poses. The first is to present the question of an ▼ Technological Development—Since the In- emerging revolution in military affairs and sug- dustrial Revolution there has been a stream of new gest why it may be significant. The second— technologies which intentionally or otherwise and perhaps more important—is to encourage have had military applications. For example, devel- the readers of Joint Force Quarterly, particularly opment of a powerful, reliable internal combus- junior officers, to think and write about the ex- tion engine made possible the self-propelled vehi- plosive technological advances of our day and cle and airplane. Mere invention, of course, is not their implications for the way militaries will be enough; the new technologies must also be developed into practical military systems (or systems of organized and operate in the future. systems as technologies become ever more com- What Are RMAs? plex). While the tank was introduced at Cambrai Whereas we had available for immediate pur- in 1917, it was years before it was reliable and ro- poses one hundred and forty-nine first-class warships, bust enough to spearhead rapid ground advances. we have now two, these two being the Warrior and ▼ Doctrinal (or Operational) Innovation—To fully exploit the potential of new systems, operational concepts incorporating and integrating the new technologies must be developed into coher- Commander James R. FitzSimonds, USN, and ent doctrines. Military organizations must also Commander Jan M. van Tol, USN, are assigned to train to use and interactively improve them. After the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the the tank’s introduction into combat, it took more Secretary of Defense.

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Experimental stealth U.S. Navy (George F. Champagne) ship Sea Shadow in San Francisco Bay. decades of doctrinal experimentation and devel- Perhaps counter- prolonged peace opment to produce Blitzkrieg. intuitively, revolu- provides the time ▼ Organizational adaptation—The most pro- tionary changes do found changes require significant bureaucratic ac- not generally occur and resources for ceptance and institutional change. The success of during war. The fact experimentation Blitzkrieg required not only the technology of the of change may be tank and a coherent doctrine of armored warfare, but also substantial organizational and even cul- most dramatically manifested in combat, but tural changes which were reflected in the new historically the most profound RMAs are combined arms operations centered on the Ger- peacetime phenomena (the atomic bomb man Panzer division. may be the exception that proves the rule). For example, the transition from wooden It is the synergistic effect of these three sailing ships to steam-powered armored hulls preconditions that leads to an RMA. Indeed in the last century was one of the more dra- it is the increasing recognition of the impor- matic revolutions in military history, yet tance of the doctrinal and organizational el- there were no major wars at sea in this period ements that has led to the term revolution in which underlined that fundamental change. military affairs gaining currency over expres- Militaries are driven to innovate during sions such as military-technical revolution peacetime by the need to make more efficient which implied that technology was the pre- use of shrinking resources, by reacting to dominant factor. major changes in the security environment, or by recognizing the possible implications of

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technologies was engendering a new revolution in military affairs.” 3 They were particularly interested in the “incorporation of information sciences into the military sphere” M1A1 Abrams in Saudi and in the idea of a “reconnaissance-strike Arabia. complex.” 4 The events of the Gulf War convinced them of the validity of their hypothesis.5 Desert Storm indeed suggests that a new RMA is emerging.6 It may have provided a glimpse of a major transition to a different type of warfare heavily based on information processing and stealthy long-range precision strike weapons. What are some of the possible implications of this transition? Information processing has always been part of warfare. In the future, however, it U.S. Army may be central to the outcome of battles and engagements. If so, establishing information dominance over one’s adversary will become a major focus of the operational art. Infor- mation warfare is still an ill-defined term. However, it might encompass a range of concepts, including but not limited to: ▼ comprehensive intelligence regarding an enemy’s military, political, economic, and cultural “targets” while denying the same to him ▼ disruption/manipulation of enemy C3I DOD systems and defense of one’s own F–117 Stealth fighters. ▼ space-based information usage and denial ▼ sensor-to-shooter data fusion ▼ flexible information/intelligence data bases ▼ use of simulations to support operational decisionmaking. To the extent these notions have opera- new inventions or techniques for their art. tional validity, they may also drive signifi- Prolonged peace provides the time and re- cant organizational changes.7 sources for experimentation. Equally impor- Stealthy long-range precision strike may tant, this is the period of least risk if wrong become the dominant operational approach. choices are made. Consequently, long periods By reducing the strike timeline from target without major wars have generally resulted in sensor-to-shooter by orders of magnitude the greatest changes. while increasing the effectiveness of weapons Full exploitation of emerging technolo- in terms of range, target discrimination, and gies can span decades. The lengthy develop- lethality, such systems conceivably could pro- ment of Blitzkrieg was noted earlier. Simi- vide conventional forces the ability to rapidly larly, it took time to move from Kitty Hawk destroy an opponent’s critical military targets to strategic bombers and carrier task forces. at minimal cost and with little collateral dam- The commercial analog is instructive; for in- age. Some proponents even believe this ap- stance, it took business years to fully exploit proach extends to the destruction of an the telephone’s potential or, more recently, enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. exponential increases in computing power. There may well be other technologies, Is Another RMA Emerging? employed operationally in ways as yet un- In the early 1980s the Soviets noted that foreseen, that emerge to dominate future “the emergence of advanced non-nuclear wars and preparations for them. Use of advanced simulations may greatly reduce cost and increase the speed of various military

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REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS U.S. Navy (Jon Guzman) USS Monsoon, a new class of coastal patrol ship, off the San Clemente Islands.

technical improvement, doctrinal development, and organizational adaptation. Could the modern systems such as stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and smart weapons, the Joint Combat Camera Center concepts of operations Navy F/A–18C. that employed them, activities. Commercial technologies such as and the military organizations of the Gulf microelectronics, telecommunications sys- War be the “1918” equivalents in the context tems, space systems, nanotechnologies, ro- of a future “1940” war? botics, and biogenetics, whose potential is Why Do RMAs Matter? only starting to be explored and which will RMAs matter principally for two rea- be widely available, may also have enor- sons. First, being second best may lead to mous implications for mili- catastrophic loss in future wars. Since the there is a substantial cost tary effectiveness. Moreover, only objective benchmark for determining these technologies and their for failure to recognize the relative effectiveness of forces (that is, operational employment may revolutionary changes success in combat) is unavailable in long pe- radically affect the whole riods of peace, there is great potential for in warfare gamut of military affairs, asymmetries in combat effectiveness be- from combat operations and tween militaries, observable only when the training to logistics and deployment prac- next war has occurred. For example, the tices to optimizing the responsiveness and British and French experimented with tanks flexibility of the industrial base. and aircraft in the interwar period, but their In thinking about the proposition of an effectiveness was disastrously inferior to that emerging RMA, it may be instructive to com- of the Wehrmacht. However, few observers pare the present with the interwar years. By would have guessed at this reality in 1939. 1918, systems like planes, tanks, and radios Obviously, there is a substantial cost for fail- were considered state of the art and repre- ure to recognize revolutionary changes in sented quantum leaps over 1914. Yet the warfare before an opponent does. combat power represented by these same sys- Secondly, as equipment life cycles, espe- tems in 1940 was orders of magnitude greater cially for platforms, steadily grow to encom- than in 1918. The promise they held in 1918 pass decades (B–52s were designed in the only became decisive after two decades of late 1940’s, carriers last 40-plus years), many of the principal weapons systems of 2025 will likely be designed and built in the next

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few years. Since militaries are stuck with information distribution networks, and navi- force structures they choose for long periods gation systems. Future revolutions will occur (though designs allowing for frequent sys- much more rapidly, offering far less time for tem modifications ameliorate this to some adaptation to new methods of warfare. The extent), it is more crucial than ever to think growing imperative in the business world for now, in peacetime, about the impact of pos- rapid response to changing conditions in sibly revolutionary changes in the nature of order to survive in an intensely competitive war and about what will matter in winning environment is surely instructive for military wars in twenty or thirty years. Paradoxically, affairs. Corporations repeatedly have to make however, this may be more difficult even as major changes in strategy to accommodate it becomes more important. the full implications of technologies which Today, with the United States arguably have already existed many years. the only superpower for the foreseeable fu- In the military context, as with the tank, ture, one might ask why this issue is espe- aircraft, radio, and other systems in 1918, the cially pressing. Replicating the U.S. force key technologies are out there and available structure is clearly beyond the reach of all but for many nations to exploit. This places a a few other nations, even in the long term. premium on remaining at the forefront in This may not, however, be relevant. Even the identification and implementation of the small- to medium-sized powers may be able developments which will maintain, if not in- to exploit specific technologies for significant crease, relative military effectiveness well military leverage in certain areas. Fifty years into the next century. Doing so can only ago the Japanese fielded a highly capable mil- come from encouragement of innovative itary, technically advanced in selected as- thinking about the relevant questions. pects, which was more than a match for Innovative Thinking American forces during the early years of the Stationed at Camp Meade, Maryland just after Pacific war. Yet Japan’s economy on the eve of World War I, Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton World War II was maybe 15 percent the size both began articles for military journals describing of this Nation’s. A more serious possibility is their experiments utilizing new doctrine for the em- the emergence of a major competitor or coali- ployment of tanks. “Then I was called before the tion to seriously challenge the United States. Chief of Infantry,” Eisenhower later recalled. “I was Such a military peer might employ the same told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous critical technologies which will serve as the and that henceforth I would keep them to myself. Par- basis of our Armed Forces and thus pose a di- ticularly, I was not to publish anything incompatible rect threat to American vital interests. with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be 8 The current rate of change suggests that hauled before a court-martial.” state of the art in any technological context Today’s breathtaking technological will be an extremely short-lived phe- achievements notwithstanding, developing nomenon, particularly with respect to the the concepts of operations that incorporate technologies that were key to the success of new technologies and organizations to per- Desert Storm: space systems, telecommunica- mit effective exploitation of new capabilities tions systems, computer architectures, global is even more critical than acquisition of the technologies themselves. Indeed, the most compelling lesson from the 1920s and GENERAL HEINZ GUDERIAN 1930s is that some militaries were much bet- (1888-1954) ter than others at developing and imple- Between 1914 and 1918 [Guderian] served mainly with menting successful concepts and also mak- the staff on the Western Front. In 1922 his task was to ing the organizational changes to fully help develop the mechanization of the German army: by exploit new technologies. 1929 he had become convinced that tanks in all-arms, Innovation is not necessarily or even armoured (Panzer) divisions would in the future domi- primarily a function of budget. Many of the nate land warfare. With Hitler’s support, but obstructed by traditionalists, he promoted the creation of the interwar innovations came at a time of low German armoured forces which spearheaded the budgets and small forces. Blitzkrieg was de- invasion of Poland in 1939. veloped while Germany was tightly re- — From The Penguin Encyclopedia of Modern Warfare stricted by the Versailles Treaty. American by Kenneth Macksey and William Woodhouse carrier naval aviation developed under a

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strict arms control regime in a fiscally con- The other critical requirement is the strained environment. The amphibious doc- ability and willingness of relatively junior trine of the Marine Corps—which J.F.C. officers who are now out in the field and Fuller characterized as probably “the most fleet to think about the future. As younger far reaching tactical innovation of the people more recently out of school, they are war”—originates in the conceptual work of likely to be in closer touch with new and Major Earl H. Ellis in 1920 under the vision- emerging technologies which have potential ary tutelage of the Marine Commandant, military application. As operators, they are Major General John A. Lejeune. aware of the operational and organizational Why some innovations succeed and problems that they must deal with daily and others fail, and why some militaries inno- hence are prime clients for possible solu- vate rapidly while others languish, are mat- tions. Finally, they will also be the senior ters for debate.9 History provides no clear leaders who must win the wars twenty to guidance on overcoming institutional resis- thirty years from now. tance to change and no final explanations of Unfortunately, these same officers have the relative roles of civilians, military maver- published little to date in professional jour- icks, or visionaries. However, in one form or nals on the idea of an RMA, nor have RMAs another, the military role in implementing been a focus of study at the service col- innovative ideas is crucial. As one observer leges.11 There may be several reasons for this. noted, “many important wartime technical Arguably the present force drawdowns put innovations such as the tank, proximity such a premium on preserving what exists fuse, and microwave radar, and organiza- that discussion of concepts which might tional innovations such as new doctrines for threaten current programs is effectively sti- submarine warfare and strategic targeting fled. Then organizations that have had re- functions for American bombers, were pur- cent success, as has the U.S. Armed Forces, sued at the initiative of military officers or probably feel less impetus for institutional with their vigorous support.” 10 change than if they had been less successful. What may be key to “winning the inno- And lastly, countries have historically not vation battle” is a professional military cli- had good records of military innovation in mate which fosters thinking in uncon- periods such as the present when they can- strained fashion about future war. This is in not envision a well-defined military problem part a function of having leaders on the as the focus of planning and acquisition. order of a LeJeune who will encourage inno- The failure of military officers to think vation and—subject to reality checks—actu- about potentially crucial ideas such as an ally test and implement innovative ideas to emerging RMA can carry with it the seeds of Patriot missile maintain a preeminent military position. defeat, not least because the absence of a sig- system. nificant military contribution to the discussion of future wars will result in the subject being restricted to academics and think tanks. Although the latter have important ideas to bring to the table, inherently they can neither be as intimately familiar with military problems as professional officers nor as effective in implementing innovation from within the services. Journals such as JFQ should play an important role in giving exposure to new ideas. Military officers, especially junior ones, should contribute views on emerging RMAs, or at least evaluate the implications of the stunning changes occurring today. As a starting point, the authors suggest the following broad questions: ▼ How will the emerging RMA change the nature of warfare in the next several decades? Joint Combat Camera Center

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FitzSimonds and van Tol

NOTES BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM (“BILLY”) MITCHELL (1879–1936) 1 Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: ...by September 1918 [Mitchell] was commander of a Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 2. 2 Franco-American air force of 1,500 machines. He used the Quoted in John Taylor Wood, “The First Fight of force in mass (sometimes with formations of 200 aircraft) in Iron-Clads,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New the Saint-Mihiel battle and the Meuse Argonne offensive. By York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), p. 692. 3 then he was a fervent champion of airpower, proposing the Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Image of Future parachuting of airborne infantry behind the German lines in War: Through the Prism of the Gulf War,” Comparative 1919, and of strategic bombing by independent air forces on Strategies, vol. 10, no. 4 (October–December 1991), p. 393. 4 the British model. Ibid., p. 398. 5 — From The Penguin Encyclopedia of Modern Warfare Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Military and the by Kenneth Macksey and William Woodhouse New Air War in the Persian Gulf,” Airpower Journal, vol. 5., no. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 64. 6 The emerging nature of RMAs is the subject of an unpublished manuscript by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., ▼ What military applications do burgeoning entitled “The Military Revolution.” commercial technological developments have? 7 A cogent proposal for consolidating information ▼ What implications do new technologies management recently appeared in these pages: see Martin have for concepts of operations? For the way the C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett, “Do We Need an Informa- military is organized? tion Corps?”, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), ▼ How might potential adversaries exploit pp. 88–97. the military revolution to America’s detriment? 8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to ▼ What should the U.S. strategy be for deal- Friends (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 173. 9 ing with future military competitors? Should such See for example Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: a strategy aim at inhibiting those competitors? Cornell University Press, 1991); Barry Posen, The Sources These questions are just a starting point. of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between Indeed, figuring out what the right questions the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and James S. Corum, The Roots of the Blitzkrieg: are is a challenge in itself. But assuredly, offi- Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, cers must think beyond the issues of force Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1992). drawdowns and the Five-Year Defense Plan. 10 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 255. As Paul Bracken has pointed out, “We should 11 Antulio J. Echevarria and John M. Shaw, “The New be looking beyond the military we are plan- Military Revolution: Post-Industrial Change,” Parameters, vol. 22, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93), pp. 1–10, and John W. ning to have at the end of our current force Bodnar, “The Military Technical Revolution: From Hard- restructuring—we should be planning now ware to Information,” Naval War College Review, vol. 46, for the ‘military after next.’” 12 JFQ no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 7–21, appear to be the only articles on RMAs in professional military journals in 1993. 12 Paul Bracken, “The Military After Next,” The Wash- ington Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 157–74.

The Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON Revolutions in Military Affairs

announces an annual essay contest cosponsored by the Office of the Secretary of JFQ Defense (Net Assessment) and the National Defense University Foundation to encourage innovative thinking on Revolutions in Military Affairs and how the Armed Forces can best prepare to remain dominant as the nature of warfare changes. All essays will be considered for publication in JFQ. The contest will be open to military officers and civilians from this country as well as abroad. Cash prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 will be awarded to the three top entrants. In addition, a prize of $500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer candidate or officer in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (and equivalent grades). All winners will also receive a selection of books dealing with innovation. Look for entry rules and other details in the next issue of JFQ (Summer 94).

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■ RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy By COLIN S. GRAY

Guadalcanal, December 1942.

U.S. Army (Robert L. Reeve) On the offensive in Kuwait. U.S. Marine Corps

trategy and war are holistic enterprises. fixed, but their details often change. The gram- U.S. strategic culture is wont to function mar of strategy can altar radically, even to the taking one thing at a time on its own point where one can argue that a revolution in Smerits. Monochronic defense perfor- military affairs (RMA) has occurred. Presently I mance leads to a focus on only one or two di- identify 17 working dimensions of strategy: mensions of what is almost always a more com- ethics; society; geography; politics; people; cul- plex challenge. Strategy has a variety of ture; theory; command (political and military); dimensions, each of which matters though differ- economics and logistics; organization (including ently from one historical case to another. Each defense policy and force planning); military has the potential to undo a strategic venture. The preparation (administration, research and devel- generic dimensions of strategy are ubiquitous and opment, procurement, recruitment, training, and numbers or mass); operations; technology; information and intelligence; adversary; friction, Colin S. Gray is the director of the Centre for Security Studies at the chance, and uncertainty; and time. Some (like University of Hull; his books include The Leverage of Sea Power: technology or command) figure more promi- The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War. nently than others, but none can be taken for

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granted. Having so many interdependent dimen- ■ Dimensions of strategy and war are generically sions means that advantages derived from im- as eternal and ubiquitous as their details, and like de- proving one are seriously limited. tails of their interconnections change from one context to another. The nature and structure of strategy are ef- Two Schools fectively immortal.5 ■ But the character and conduct of war (or to mis- Cultural anthropologists note that America quote Clausewitz, who wrote of its “grammar”), the is a preponderantly monochronic culture, which grammar of strategy, how strategy is achieved by tactics,6 means that it considers challenges one at a time, must change—possibly radically—along with political, in isolation, pragmatically.1 As a result national social, economic, and technological conditions. strategy in the United States reflects this one- ■ Although the nature and structure of strategy thing-at-a-time, each-on-its-merits approach. De- and war remain constant, changes in the character and fense intellectuals have a way of validating the conduct of war can arguably be described as revolutions Watergate investigatory tactic of “following the in military affairs. The term revolution, however, does money.” The trail of dollars for studies leads from risk devaluing those variables that change more slowly. one “big idea” to another—monochronically. Al- ■ It follows that we know a great deal about strategy and war; and, ipso facto, we know quite a lot about though there is essential unity, indeed a poly- what we do not and cannot comprehend. chronicity, to strategic experience, defense issues rapidly fall into and out of fashion. There has While this argument is profoundly conserva- been controversy over détente, nuclear strategy, tive, it allows for the certainty of change. Early in ICBM basing, SDI and the 20th century the rapid pace of technical and the historical school argued more SDI, competitive thus tactical developments in Britain provoked strategies, and so forth. bitter debate in the Royal Navy between “mater- that strategy and war are 7 The tide of issues comes in ial” and “historical” schools of thought. Advo- unchanging in their essentials regularly with new or new- cates of the former asserted that great—even not sounding ideas, and then so great—technical change meant that the entire inexorably it goes out. Today it is RMA and infor- subject of war, at all levels and in all dimensions, mation warfare. To point out the fluctuating na- was effectively changed or revolutionized. The ture of these issues is not to dismiss them; but it rival historical school argued that strategy and war is to admit that only historical perspective can re- are as unchanging in their essentials as technol- veal just how useful they are.2 ogy and tactics are permanently in flux. The terms Herman Kahn was a defense intellectual of this debate in the 1900s between materialists whose primary instinct was to put things together like Admiral Jackie Fisher and historical thinkers rather than disassemble them for monochronic, like Admiral Reginald Custance still persist to this piece-by-piece analysis.3 One cannot emulate his day with evolving levels of detail. To the material genius, but one can follow his methodology. This school the world may be made over whenever a article presents strategy and war holistically with new technology comes along. emphasis on the totality of the subject no matter how formidable it may appear. Indeed, the more a Everything Matters strategic phenomenon is examined, the more Michael Howard provided the most direct complex it seems. Readers may have noticed that stimulus to thought on the dimensions of strat- the more professional historians scrutinize mili- egy by identifying the logistical, operational, so- tary experience, the more RMAs appear. It is not cial, and technological.8 Writing within the con- unlike probing the universe with more powerful text of an active debate about SALT II and telescopes. When additional historians join in the nuclear strategy, Howard was concerned that the debate, they are apt to attest to the plausible exis- United States appeared to be focusing unduly on tence of one or more RMAs in their century no the technological at the expense of the social matter what their periods of expertise may be.4 and operational. A hard core of interconnected ideas forms When considering strategy vis-à-vis the de- the thread of this argument, specifically: bate over RMA and information warfare, I prefer to use no fewer than the 17 dimensions already ■ Strategy and war have many dimensions (while mentioned. These work with, on, and around 17 is my preference, the list is open). each other simultaneously. Anyone who argues ■ Every dimension matters though interaction among them varies from case to case. that strategy really has only one or two dimen- ■ All dimensions of strategy matter so much that sions will oppose this approach. One should be a severe national or coalition disadvantage in any one reluctant to rank-order the dimensions of strat- can have a lethal strategic effect overall. egy; hence the order in which they are cited above is largely random. By analogy, the model range for auto makers typically emphasizes engine type and size as leading edge or dominant

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Briefing Secretary Cohen, Bosnia. DOD (HeleneDOD C. Stikkel)

for each vehicle in its range. Nonetheless, cars significance about strategy has been included cannot operate without drive trains, electrical sys- somewhere among them. A country or coalition tems (including batteries), or tires. Furthermore, need not be outstanding or even excellent in all there are restrictions on what improvements to dimensions of strategy. Wars can be won—which automotive dimensions can achieve unless bal- is to say, enough strategic effect can be gener- ancing refinements are made in others. Twin tur- ated—despite unsound plans, uninspired politi- bos are nice to have, but not without better cal leaders, undistinguished generalship, bad brakes and tires and—returning to the question of luck, or inconvenient geography. Three points strategy—a better driver. require prompt registration. First, each dimen- An excellent military may, even with faulty sion is a player. It is part of national strategy—in political guidance, fight the wrong war well. Con- every conflict, in every historical era. versely, a wretched force may fight the right war Second, some substitution is feasible among, badly. The primary point is the stupefyingly obvi- between, and even within the dimensions of strat- ous one that everything matters. The secondary egy.10 It is rare for a nation to be equally compe- point is that even wonderful improvements in tent on land, at sea, in the air, and in space (or cy- military effectiveness—as might be delivered by berspace). Or, in the case of Germany’s Östheer (its U.S. forces multiplied by the so-called “system of army in the East), the quality and quantity of one systems” 9—are likely to disappoint if political side’s technology may be degraded during the leadership is poor. After all, Germany was second course of war, but some useful compensation may to none in fighting during two world wars, but it be found in the realm of motivation (fighting was awesomely incompetent in waging war. spirit, morale, and ideology). Or information on an enemy may be in short supply, but some mix Beyond Geography of luck, better logistics, superior organization, and There is no correct answer to the question: higher morale may enable a nation to survive un- How many dimensions are there to strategy? The pleasant surprises. Yet specific circumstances al- exact numbers or labels of the dimensions do ways differ. Because of inadequate operational in- not matter, but it is important that everything of formation, Anglo-French forces were taken by surprise in both World War I and II, recovering from their ignorance in 1914 but not in 1940.

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Third, there is, or should be, a level of com- this point clearly when he referred to the trinity petitive performance in each dimension which, if of passion, uncertainty, and reason, which are as- one falls below it, has the inexorable consequence sociated primarily with the people, the army and of adversely deciding the conflict. You lose. its commanders, and the government respec- The argument advanced is that a whole range tively.14 Unfortunately, there is little analysis in of strategic dimensions influences conflict, not On War about the vital subject of the difficulties just those either preferred or designated. Which that can and do arise when policy and military among them does not matter? It has been debated instruments are not both excellent and operating whether geography mat- in harmony. no general theory of strategy ters much in the age of cy- There is no need to belabor the blindingly 11 can truly be proof against folly berspace. If cyberspace obvious point that the dimensions of strategy are rules, and cyberpower is interdependent. However, it may be worth offer- or bad luck on a heroic scale everywhere and nowhere ing the caveat that to every robust-looking theory (placelessly “beyond geog- there is apt to be the odd exception. One should raphy”), perhaps we are witnessing a radical de- recall that Clausewitz, unlike Jomini, declined to parture from previous strategic experience. Yet offer a cookbook of rules for strategy.15 Hence the perhaps there are grounds for skepticism. argument here has a Clausewitzian rather than a The argument that the holistic nature of Jominian message. No general theory of strategy strategy and war can be ignored only at one’s or architecture of understanding can truly be peril is considered by one analyst who advises proof against folly or bad luck on a heroic scale. that “Human limitations, informational uncer- Although it is true that each dimension of strat- tainties, and nonlinearity are not pesky difficul- egy is important and poor performance in any ties better technology and engineering can elimi- one could decide the ultimate outcome of a con- nate, but built-in or structural features of the flict, and that no degree of superiority in any one violent interaction between opposing groups we or two can deliver victory if performance else- call war.” 12 To take just one of these features, the where is too low, an exception is always possible limits in the human (and command) dimension in practice. Military genius (or folly) on a heroic of strategy can easily restrict or offset any gains of scale writes or rewrites the principles of strategy. a technological edge. (And the human dimension Again, the nature, purpose, and structure of plays at every level of conflict from tactics to strategy are eternal and ubiquitous. Any war, in statecraft.) any period, between any adversaries (like or un- If one accepts the promise of immaculate like), can be understood with reference to these performance by technology-rich, information-led particular dimensions. What must vary, how- warriors, what can one assume about U.S. com- ever—sometimes quite radically—is the detail of petitiveness in other dimensions of strategy? Is it the complex interplay among and within them. reasonable to anticipate excellence in political But when advocates of the historical school claim leadership, enthusiasm on the part of the public, that strategy is strategy and war is war regardless and superiority in making, executing, and moni- of the time, place, adversaries, and technology, toring the means of strategic performance?13 this is what is meant. Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, and Liddell Hart were right in stating that the na- Cookbook Strategy ture of strategy and war does not, indeed cannot Whether or not one thinks appropriately change. The components and structure of the about an RMA or implements one competently in subject remain constant—only the details change. all its requisite aspects (technology, weaponiza- Each dimension of strategy considered above tion, doctrine, training, organization, acquisition played a part in the Peloponnesian War, the of critical mass of numbers) may have little actual Punic Wars, and the Crusades. bearing on future U.S. strategic performance. This The complexity of war and the diversity of is because the friction that degrades national per- the instruments of strategy with which we wage formance most insistently may well lie between it have increased over the past century. Technol- the government and the Armed Forces, or be- ogy, tactics, doctrine, and organization have been tween the government and society. This is not a adjusting to experience and in anticipation of the rebuke of military modernization or hostility to- advantages to be gained or the disadvantages to ward the concept of RMA, nor by implication a be avoided. Novel though each additional envi- critique of information warfare in its several ronment for war certainly is, however, we find guises. Instead, it is simply an argument that that as we have proceeded to fight in the air, to countries conduct conflict, wage wars, and make consider combat in and for space and in cyber- and execute strategy as a whole. Clausewitz made space—as well as on land and at sea—the same rules govern strategic performance everywhere. Whether or not forces specialized for combat in

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various geographies (or perhaps anti-geography 4 For example, see Clifford J. Rogers, ed., The Mili- in cyberspace) can win wars by independent ac- tary Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transfor- tion, each must follow the guiding rule of classi- mation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, cal strategy. That rule mandates securing military 1995). 5 control in each geography as a prerequisite for This argument is a central theme in Colin S. Gray, Understanding Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford Univer- strategic exploitation. The same logic applies for sity Press, forthcoming). land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. If sea, air, or 6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans- cyberspace forces are to exercise their roles as lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: team players, each must first succeed in its dis- Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605. tinctive environment. To understand why one 7 Battlelines for debate were drawn most clearly in must be ready to fight at sea is to grasp why one Reginald Custance, “Introduction” to “Barfleur,” Naval must be ready to fight in the air, in space, or in Policy: A Plea for the Study of War (Edinburgh: William cyberspace. The logic of strategy and war is the Blackwood and Sons, 1907), pp. vii–ix. 8 same.16 If an environment is militarily important, Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of we must be ready to fight for the right to use it. Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 5 (Summer 1979), pp. 975–86. 9 James R. Blaker, Understanding the Revolution in Mil- Overall, we know almost everything that we itary Affairs: A Guide to America’s 21st Century Defense, need to know, and probably all we can know, Defense Working Paper 3 (Washington: Progressive Pol- about the future of strategy and war. Indeed, if icy Institute, January 1997). one is willing to engage in reductionism, it can 10 See Andrew G.B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doc- be claimed that Thucydides recorded almost trines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art (London: everything worth considering about the causes of Macmillan, 1996), chapter 2. war and the political need for strategy by empha- 11 See both Colin S. Gray, “The Continued Primacy sizing just three impulses: fear, honor, and inter- of Geography” (and “A Rejoinder”), and Martin Libicki, “The Emerging Primacy of Information,” Orbis, vol. 40, est.17 It is not obvious that modern scholarship no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 247–59, 261–76. on the motives for empire or the causes of war 12 Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future has produced conclusions superior to that trini- War, McNair Paper 52 (Washington: National Defense 18 tarian hypothesis. University Press, October 1996), p. 122. What is not known about the future of strat- 13 On strategy as process, see Williamson Murray egy and war is almost all of detail, significant and and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in insignificant. Many pundits have a weakness for Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bern- invoking the phrase “the foreseeable future.” But stein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and the future has not happened and cannot be fore- War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), seen in detail. Under political guidance that is cer- chapter 1. 14 tain to be unsatisfactory, likely to contain contra- Clausewitz, On War, p. 89. 15 Contrast Clausewitz, On War, p. 141, with Antoine dictions, and almost bound to bear the stamp of Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Novato, Calif.: Pre- some unsound assumptions, defense planners are sidio, 1992), pp. 16–17, 70, 114. Michael I. Handel, Mas- obliged to decide what is a good enough defense ters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 2d ed. (London: establishment when one cannot know precisely Frank Cass, 1996), offers a comparative treatment. whether, when, where, or for what ends war will 16 This proposition pervades Edward N. Luttwak, be waged. But if it is any consolation, at least they Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: know what strategy and war are made of—the 17 Harvard University Press, 1987). dimensions—and should be rendered immune by 17 Robert B. Strassler, ed., The Landmark Thucydides: A education, including the education provided by Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War (New York: experience, to persuasion by unsound theories of Free Press, 1996), p. 43. 18 See Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the miracle cures for strategic ills. JFQ Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), which is influenced by Thucydides; and Hidemi Sug- NOTES anami, On the Causes of War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (Garden City, N.Y.: 1996). Doubleday, 1976). 2 See the discussion in Colin S. Gray, The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment, Oc- casional Paper 28 (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Joint Services Command and Staff College, 1997). 3 Kahn’s instinct for synthesis is represented in On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965).

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Thinking About Revolutions in

Military Affairs (JamesCombat Camera Squadron D. Mossman) st 1 By WILLIAMSON MURRAY

he term revolution in military affairs This article suggests how one might think (RMA) is a buzzword inside the Beltway about RMAs of the past and the implications of and among academics interested in de- the historical record for the future. The views re- fense affairs. As Dennis Schowalter flect the influence, comments, and thoughts of T 1 noted at a recent conference, “RMA has replaced colleagues in the historical profession. TQM [total quality management] as the acronym First, historians have done relatively little of choice” among members of the Armed Forces. work on RMAs. Michael Roberts introduced the One suspects that much of this enthusiasm, idea of a single military revolution in his inau- which rests upon only the slightest knowledge of gural lecture at Queens University Belfast in 1955. the historical record, may distort as much as it Thereafter until 1991, interest in the military rev- helps in thinking about military change and in- olution was focused on the 16th and 17th cen- novation. Yet one must also admit that military turies; early modern historians argued among events of late suggest major changes in technol- themselves about whether there was such a revo- ogy and weapons with substantial implications lution and, if so, when it occurred and what form for conducting war in the next century. it took. That debate continues. Since the mid-18th century, however, military historians have concentrated on other issues such as innovation, ef- Williamson Murray, professor emeritus at The Ohio State University, fectiveness, adaptation, organizational behavior, is the Charles A. Lindbergh Visiting Professor of Aerospace History or—the bread and butter of the profession—battle at the National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution.

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the strategy of Edward III to Blitzkrieg operations Figure 1. Possible RMAs in the light of what we call revolutions in military affairs. The crucial point is that the historical 14th century record is not yet in; and until there is detailed re- —longbow: cultural search on the subject most commentaries may be 15th century distortive. At a recent conference, I listed possible —gunpowder: technological, financial RMAs along with the driving forces behind them. 16th century Although not inclusive, it suggests the complexi- —fortifications: architectural, financial ties and ambiguities found in the historical record 17th century (see figure 1). —Dutch-Swedish tactical reforms: tactical, organizational, cultural The list suggests a number of points. First, given the enthusiasm for describing the coming —French military reforms: tactical, organizational, administrative RMA as technological, the historical record sug- 17th –18th centuries gests that technological change represents a rela- —naval warfare: administrative, social, financial, technological tively small part of the equation.2 Moreover, mili- 18th century tary history over the last eighty years offers many —British financial revolution: financial, organizational, conceptual cases in which forces with inferior technology have won conflicts. The record further suggests —French Revolution: ideological, social that the crucial element in most RMAs is concep- th th 18 –19 centuries tual in nature. In the breakthrough on the Meuse, —industrial revolution: financial, technological, organizational, cultural for example, the German advantage was a com- 19th century bined arms doctrine resting on a thorough and —American Civil War: ideological, technological, administrative, operational realistic appraisal of the last war. Their opponents late 19th century had not developed such a doctrine.3 —naval war: technological, administrative, cultural In fact there is only one example on the list of possible RMAs that is entirely technological: 19th –20th centuries nuclear weapons. But even here there is some am- —medical: technological, organizational biguity since the impact of nuclear weapons has 20th century been almost entirely political except for their first —World War I: combined arms: tactical, conceptual, technological, scientific use against the Japanese. Outside of great power —Blitzkrieg: tactical, operational, conceptual, organizational competition, nuclear weapons have not changed —carrier war: conceptual, technological, operational the nature of warfare. What the historical record implies, therefore, is that technology has played —strategic air war: technological, conceptual, tactical, scientific only one part in these revolutions, and frequently —submarine war: technological, scientific, tactical a relatively insignificant part. —amphibious war: conceptual, tactical, operational Secondly, the record suggests that historians and others using the concept should rethink RMA —intelligence: conceptual, political, ideological terminology. Even the idea of a series of revolu- —nuclear weapons: technological tions distorts history and misses a number of —people’s war: ideological, political, conceptual complex and ambiguous interactions. The current reading of the evidence indicates a linear series of discrete revolutions that are readily discernable and therefore easily managed.

histories. Modern historians quite simply have Military Revolutions not been very interested in military revolutions. Evidence, however, points in another direc- In a sparsely attended session at the March tion.4 There appear to be two distinct historical 1991 meeting of the Society of Military History, phenomena involved in radical innovation and Clifford Rogers suggested that there was not one change. The first can be called military revolu- military revolution but a series that reached from tions. These were by far the more important, for the middle ages to the present day. He said they they fundamentally changed the nature of war- may have begun as early as the 14th century and fare in the West. There appear to have been four continued with increasing frequency as one (two occurring at the same time): creation of the neared this century. Not surprisingly there has modern, effective nation-state based on organized been a rush to examine virtually everything from and disciplined military power in the 17th century; the French Revolution and the industrial revolution beginning at the same time during the period 1789–1815; and World War I, 1914–18. We might compare them in geological terms to earth-

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catastrophe of the Thirty Years War which devas- tated Germany and the sack of Antwerp where unpaid Spanish soldiers mutinied, thus under- mining Spanish policy in the Netherlands. The action of the Spanish soldiery reflected both their disobedience and the inability of the state to compensate them. The 17th century revolution created military organizations that in Machi- avelli’s conception not only imposed the laws but responded to them in civil as well as military terms. As the Swedish Articles of War in the early 17th century made clear, soldiers would dig when they were told to dig—a conception that had not always marked the performance of warriors in the Middle Ages. In the macro sense, the Euro- pean military organizations that emerged in the 17th century were more effective on both the battlefield and in the conduct of civil affairs because Naval Historical Center they were responsive to the orders of the state Battery Sherman, bureaucracy. Once the state was able to collect Vicksburg. taxes it could pay soldiers on a regular basis; in quakes. They brought with them such systemic turn, it demanded that soldiers maintain disci- changes in the political, social, and cultural are- pline on the battlefield and in garrison. We take nas as to be largely uncontrollable, unpredictable, for granted the discipline and responsiveness of and above all unforeseeable. Therefore those who Western military institutions and their imitators expect the “information revolution” to bring rad- (such as the Japanese and Indians); but the his- ical social and cultural changes—if they are cor- tory of South America and much of the Third rect—will find that the direction, consequences, World over the past forty years suggests that this and implications of such a revolution will be political relationship is not always a given. largely unpredictable for both society and mili- The French Revolution established the tary organizations. norms for the mobilization of economic, scien- Such “military revolutions” recast the na- tific, and popular resources. It interjected ideol- ture of society and the state as well as of military ogy and nationalism into the equation of war in organizations. By so doing they altered the ca- the West, and the ferocity of that combination pacity of states to project military power and al- goes a long way toward explaining the 25 years lowed the military to kill people and break of war that followed (the French Revolutionary things ever more effectively. and Napoleonic Wars) as well as the thirty-year “military revolutions” do not Moreover, these revolutions German war of 1914–45. Faced with foreign in- do not replace but rather vasion brought on by their own ill-considered replace but rather overlay overlay each other. Conse- policies, the political leaders of 1789 declared a each other quently, all the new technol- leveé en masse, which placed citizens and their ogy in the world will not goods at the disposal of the state for the dura- help an Iraqi army fight co- tion. The result was that the French tripled their herently on the modern battlefield because Iraqi army in less than a year and, although they re- society has not gone through the creation of a mained less effective in battle than their oppo- modern state, and the government lacks the ca- nents on a unit to unit basis, they could accept pacity to infuse its citizens with the fervor of the casualties and fight on a scale like no other 18th French Revolution. On the other hand, a Viet- century military formation. As Clausewitz noted: namese communist movement, which combined Suddenly war again became the business of the the revolutionary enthusiasm and fervor of the people—a people of thirty millions, all of whom con- French Revolution in a xenophobic culture, de- sidered themselves to be citizens....The people be- feated two great Western powers. came a participant in war; instead of governments These four military revolutions raise a num- and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation th ber of points. The 17 century revolution laid was thrown into the balance. The resources and ef- the basis for the modern state. Until that point, forts now available for use surpassed all conventional armies and navies were under only the loosest limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which control of central governments. Their employers war could be waged, and consequently the opponents more often than not failed to pay the troops who of France faced the utmost peril.5 in turn looted and pillaged. The result was the

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win against superior Russian numbers. But neither side was willing to seriously mobilize national passions, manpower, and resources. It was left to the opposing sides during the Civil War in the United States, South as well as North, to combine the “benefits” of technology (the railroad, steamboat, rifled musket and artillery, and telegraph) with the French Revo- lution’s mobilization of the populace and national wealth. The result was a terrible killing war of four years which owed its duration to a combination of the three “military revolutions” that had occurred up to that time: the strength of the nation-state, its ability to mobilize society, and the enormous resources and new weapons of the industrial revolution. In many ways World War I reaf- firmed the lethal combination of these revolutions. But in its own way that conflict was a profoundly revolution-

U.S. Army Military History Institute History U.S. Army Military ary event that fundamentally shattered The American front, the Western equilibrium with im- November 18, 1918. mense political, economic, and social It was not until adversaries were willing to consequences. The political consequences of the fight on the same terms, namely the national war itself, one could argue, did not end until the mobilization of resources and manpower, that autumn of 1989. But of all military revolutions, France was finally brought to heel. But its revolu- World War I should be regarded as the most revo- tionary example would be replicated by combat- lutionary in military terms. It involved creating ants in the American Civil War and later in the combined arms, exploitation tactics, strategic fierce killing contests of the two world wars in bombing, unrestricted submarine warfare, carrier this century. As suggested above, the French Rev- operations, and even amphibious war. Admittedly, olution would find an echo in far off Indochina in some aspects the weapons, technology, and tac- in the wars waged against the French and later tical concepts provided only a glimpse into the fu- the Americans. ture, but the glimpse was there nevertheless. Per- Concurrent with the French Revolution, the haps the best way to illustrate this point is to first stages of the industrial revolution were al- suggest that a British or German battalion com- ready underway in Britain. That upheaval mander from the battlefields of summer 1918 changed the entire economic underpinning of would have understood the underlying concepts British society and placed unimagined wealth in of the battlefields of 1940, 1944, and even 1991. A the hands of political leaders. The industrial rev- battalion commander of 1914, however, would olution did not provide the military with techno- not have had the slightest clue as to what was oc- logical improvements that helped its soldiers on curring in 1918: that was how far military affairs the battlefield; if anything the British army travelled in the course of four years. fought in a retrogressive fashion compared to the French. But while the revolution had little influ- RMAs ence on the battlefields of the Napoleonic wars, What then are military professionals to make it provided British governments with enormous of these great revolutions that have rocked the his- financial resources to cobble together and sup- tory of the West and the world since the 17th cen- port the military coalitions that eventually de- tury? Probably not much. At best, if they are able feated Napoleon. to recognize such events, they can hold on and The industrial revolution first influenced the adapt to trying and difficult times. History does battlefield during the Crimean War, when the rifled musket, telegraph, and steamship combined to allow Britain and France to deploy forces and

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suggest smaller phenomena that might best be Figure 2. Military Revolutions and RMAs termed RMAs. In these cases there is profound evidence that the right military institution and culture can gain a significant advantage. Preshock RMAs: longbow, Edward Ill’s strategy, If military revolutions are compared with gunpowder, fortress architecture earthquakes, we can think of RMAs as pre- and Military Revolution: 17th century creation of the aftershocks. During the process of developing modern state RMAs military organizations must come to grips Direct- and Aftershocks: Dutch and Swedish tactical with fundamental changes in the political, social, reforms, French tactical and organizational reforms, and military landscape; they innovate and adapt naval revolution, Britain’s financial revolution to—in some cases foreshadow—revolutionary changes. RMAs involve putting together the com- Preshock RMAs: French military reforms (post Seven plex pieces of tactical, societal, political, organiza- Years’ War) tional, or even technological changes in new con- Military Revolutions: French and industrial revolutions ceptual approaches to war. The formula is rarely Direct- and Aftershocks: national economic and politi- apparent at the time, and even historians with ac- cal mobilization, Napoleonic way of war, financial cess to the documentary evidence find it hard to and economic power based on industrialized reconstruct the full concept. The results on the power, technological revolution of war (railroads, battlefield, however, make it chillingly clear which rifles, and steamboats) military organization has done better at innovat- Preshock RMAs: Fisher Revolution (1905–14) ing and adapting. Before proceeding we might want to look at where possi- Military Revolution: World War I RMAs take considerable time ble RMAs fit with the larger Direct- and Aftershocks: combined arms, Blitzkrieg, phenomena of military revo- strategic bombing, carrier warfare, unrestricted to develop even in wartime lutions (see figure 2). submarine warfare, amphibious warfare, intelli- There are several histor- gence, information warfare (1940–45), stealth ically interesting aspects of RMAs. First, most take considerable time to develop even in wartime; and peacetime RMAs even in the 20th century have taken decades. One can argue over the accuracy of applying the term revolutionary to con- tions that grappled with systemic and intractable cepts and capabilities that take such a long time problems in an atmosphere of fear, confusion, and to emerge. There is also the matter of perspective. ambiguity, it was not until the 1980s that histori- To the French and British what happened on the ans began to unravel what actually took place on Meuse in summer 1940 and afterwards undoubt- the battlefield between 1914 and 1918. edly appeared revolutionary. To the Germans the If the problems of adapting to wartime con- doctrine and capabilities that destroyed the Allies ditions are difficult, those involved in peacetime in the battle of France would have appeared revo- innovation are a nightmare. Michael Howard has lutionary. Moreover, what is clear today was not compared the military in peacetime to a surgeon apparent to those who fought then. For example, preparing for a series of operations at an un- many German officers in May 1940 would have known time and place under unidentified condi- attributed their success to the fanaticism that tions without the benefit of having previously Nazi ideology had infused into the fighting spirits worked on live patients.6 Rather, he must rely en- of their troops. And there would have been some tirely on what he has read and on incomplete legitimacy to that view, given German persever- and inaccurate models. Similarly, military organi- ance in crossing the Meuse despite casualty fig- zations are called on to function in the most try- ures in lead companies that reached upwards of ing circumstances, which simply cannot be repli- 70 percent. cated in peace. And they frequently have limited Originating an RMA in wartime is difficult resources to prepare and train. Yet the record, as enough. The combined arms revolution during demonstrated by the German campaign against World War I, which saw development of accurate Western Europe in 1940, suggests that some mili- indirect artillery fire with decentralized infantry taries have done better than others. The results of tactics that relied on fire, maneuver, and exploita- that were equivalent to what most would agree tion, emerged from the slaughter on the Western represents an RMA. Front in 1917 after three long years of learning. Here history contributes to thinking about And the details of that revolution were not en- what kinds of military institutions and cultures the tirely clear when the war was over, as the fate of the British and French in the interwar years un- derscores. In fairness to the World War I institu-

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worked by Generals Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck in 1932 shortly before they took over direction of the army as commander in chief and chief of staff respectively, reflected actual conditions on the battlefield of 1918. Germany then built on that experience in a coherent, careful, and evolutionary fashion. There was nothing revolutionary about German armored tactics; they fit within a larger conceptual framework of combined arms that rested on exploitation, decentralized decisionmaking, and fire and maneuver—that is, the battlefield of 1918. This process of rigorously examining the past carried over into the German evaluation of current exercises and training. The French army took no such approach. The examination of the recent past was used to justify current doctri-

U.S. Navy nal trends. In other words, they knew Omaha Beach, the answer before they started looking. June 6, 1944. The British case was even more de- United States needs to prepare for the next RMA. pressing. It was not until 1932 that the chief of Historians tend to argue that military organiza- the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Lord tions are focused on the last war and thus have George Francis Milne, saw fit to establish a com- substantial problems with the next conflict; for ex- mittee to study lessons of the previous war. Ad- ample, the traditional image of a revolutionary mittedly the committee was given wide latitude: German army jumping into the future with its it would examine World War I and determine if Blitzkrieg tactics while the British and French, still its lessons were being adequately addressed in locked in World War I, failed miserably. manuals and training. Unfortunately its report Nothing is farther from the truth. Almost was submitted to the next chief, Field Marshal immediately after World War I, the Reichsheer, Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, and the under its first chief of staff and second comman- whole effort was deep-sixed since its critical re- der, General Hans von Seeckt, organized no fewer view of army performance in 1914–18 might than 57 committees to study what really hap- have made that service look bad. If the British did pened on the battlefield of 1918 in excruciating not get the revolution in armored and mecha- detail. He charged those examiners to produce: nized warfare right, critics like J.F.C. Fuller and short, concise studies on the newly gained experiences Basil Liddell Hart were further off the mark. In of the war and consider the following points: What fact, much of British failure on the battlefields of situations arose in the war that had not been consid- 1941–42 in North Africa was due to slavish read- ered before? How effective were our prewar views in ing of Fuller’s argument that armor operated best dealing with the above situations? What new guide- on its own. Yet there is another point regarding lines have been developed from the use of new RMA in land warfare during the early 1940s. weaponry in the war? Which new problems put for- Starkly put, recent research has stressed that the ward by the war have not yet found a solution?7 French army did a miserable job in training its soldiers to face the great test in 1940. Had its The crucial point is, as Seeckt’s last question units on the Meuse followed doctrine there is a emphasizes, that the Germans used a thorough good chance that the German infantry crossings review of recent military events as a point of de- on May 13 would have failed. parture for thinking about future war. If various military organizations misused or Moreover, the spirit of this examination de- misinterpreted history in the interwar period, pended on an attitude that Ludendorff expressed others completely rejected its relevance to the in his memoirs about visits to the front: “[Staffs] problems of the day. The Royal Air Force repudi- knew I wanted to hear their real views and have a ated history entirely and its leaders argued that clear idea of the true situation, not a favorable re- technology had rendered the past irrelevant. port made to order.”8 The result was that German doctrine, first crystallized in 1923 and then re-

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aircraft suffered unacceptable losses. Second, finding and hitting targets under anything other than perfect daylight conditions posed intractable challenges. As one naval officer noted of es- capades during World War I night operations, ...experience has shown that it is quite easy for five squadrons to set out to bomb a particular target and for only one of those five ever to reach the objectives; while the other four, in the honest belief that they have done so, have bombed four different villages which bore little if any resemblance to the one they desired to attack.9 Such lessons disappeared from the organizational memory of the Royal Air Force. The result of the unwillingness to learn from the past was that the British went into the war with almost a religious belief in the survivability of bombers and that finding and destroying targets, if a problem at all, would not be difficult to solve. Such belief in the irrelevance of the past became unwillingness to learn from the present. There were plenty of warnings in terms of exercises that suggested that the Royal Air Force was going to have a hard if not impossible time identifying and hitting targets at night or in bad weather. In turn, the confidence that bombers would always get through led British senior officers to go so far as to suggest that long-range escort fighters were technologically infeasible. They made this argument early in World War II with no technological or scientific evidence to support it. What occurred was a process by which their mental jump into the future without reference to the past caused them to minimize technological possibilities because those possibilities did not fit into their preconceived notion of the future. American airmen did not fare much better. At least Billy Mitchell, despite the stridency of his arguments, recognized the underlying lesson of the DOD air war in World War I: air superiority was required Airborne ambulance, Vietnam. before airpower could be effectively employed. But Rather than study air operations in World War I, by the early 1930s, airmen at the Air Corps Tactical one could leap into the future to base doctrine, School had discarded such realism and blithely ar- force structure, and employment concepts en- gued that great formations of self defending tirely on theoretical conceptions of what war bombers could fly deep into an enemy nation should look like. Such an approach had a crucial without the protection of long-range escort fight- and detrimental impact on the British strategic ers and only sustain acceptable casualties. The pro- bombing campaign during much of World War II. clivity to disregard the past as well as the present— One can argue that the lessons of World War I that is, a general disregard for an evidentiary-based were not entirely clear with respect to strategic approach to the preparation of military forces— bombing and its effects on an enemy nation. Two carried over to the war in the case of both forces. things were clear, however, from the aerial com- And they continued to execute their operational bat of 1914–18. and tactical frameworks well into 1943 despite un- First, such air operations required air superi- equivocal evidence of problems in their assump- ority. Absent that, bombers and reconnaissance tions and thus the results. In the end, the combined bomber offensive played a crucial role in World War II, and we should consider its achievements when arguing that strategic bombing was

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an RMA. The cost in aircraft and crews, however, Finally, although technology is important it suggests an unacceptable price that was largely the is only a tool. If we connect it to a clear under- result of too many airmen accepting assumptions standing of the past and present, we can perhaps that past as well as present evidence suggested push our current capabilities into the future in an were substantially flawed. intelligent fashion and thus be on the leading The point is not to belittle the airmen of the edge of the next RMA. If we jettison history by interwar period. In fact this century is replete haphazardly leaping into an uncertain future, we with military organizations that preferred to im- may endure the same consequences as the airmen pose their peculiar models of war on conditions of World War II. In 1942 America had almost un- they confronted rather than learn from the past. limited resources and the will to “pay almost any To some extent all or- price and to bear any burden.” Those conditions all organizations will get certain ganizations will get may well not obtain in the future. JFQ certain things wrong things wrong about the next war about the next war; it NOTES has been the persis- 1 The author acknowledges the participation of Cliff tence of many military organizations to hold Rogers, Geoffrey Parker, John Lynn, Macgregor Knox, their course despite evidence to the contrary that Dennis Schowalter, Holger Herwig, Jonathan Bailey, and is inexcusable. The two most obvious cases are Allan R. Millett at the RMA conference which was held the British army during World War I and the at Quantico, Virginia, in April 1996. American military in Vietnam. 2 See among others the introduction by William A. Owens to Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning How should we adjust to the next RMA? Edge, edited by Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki First, no revolution has ever involved a leap into (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995), the future without a lifeline to past military con- pp. 3–17. 3 For the development of German armor doctrine, cepts and capabilities—particularly the recent see Williamson Murray, “Innovation in Armored War, “ past. We should not think that back to the future in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, edited by suggests anything other than a stab in the dark. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Those military organizations that have created Cambridge University Press, 1996). successful RMAs have tied development of the 4 The following line of argument owes much to the revolutions to a realistic understanding of the historians who met at Quantico in April 1996, in partic- past. That attention to lessons learned has gener- ular Clifford Rogers and Holger Herwig. ally been carried over into an evidentiary-based 5 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated analysis of current exercises and capabilities in by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: peacetime as well as in war. This is not to say that Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 592. 6 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military organizations that have failed to use such an ap- History,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, proach have failed to adapt to the conditions of a vol. 107, no. 625 (February 1962) pp. 4–10. new RMA. The British army during World War I 7 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von and the combined bomber offensive suggest that, Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, Kans.: Uni- given enough blood and treasure, even the most versity Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 37. obdurate military organization will eventually 8 Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story, Au- learn, but that hardly suggests a path we should gust 1914–November 1918, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and wish to retrace. Brothers, 1919), p. 24. Secondly, we must not believe that new con- 9 Quoted by Group Captain R.A. Mason in “The cepts or capabilities will negate the fundamental British Dimension,” Airpower and Warfare, edited by Al- fred F. Hurley and Robert C. Erhard (Washington: Gov- nature of war. Friction together with fog, ambigu- ernment Printing Office, 1979), p. 32. ity, chance, and uncertainty will dominate future battlefields as it has in the past. History certainly stresses that lesson, and for those who debunk history it is worth noting that various sciences— evolutionary biology, quantum physics, and most current mathematical research—emphasize that Clausewitz’s basic understanding of how the world works was correct. Friction will not disappear in the next century; it is a fact of life.

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

Admiral Arthur William Radford, U.S. Navy (1896–1973) Commander in Chief, Pacific Command Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Chicago, Illinois. Graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy (1916). Served on board the battleship USS South Carolina (1916). Completed flight training (1921). Assigned to the fleet, at naval air stations, and in the Bureau of Aeronautics. Appointed chief of aviation training (1941). Commanded carrier division eleven in the Pacific (1943). Served at the Navy Department (1944). Commanded carrier division six (1944). Became the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (1948) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific/High Commissioner, Trust Territory of Pacific Islands (1949). Appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1953). In- volved in the so-called “revolt of the admirals”; as Chairman supported President Eisenhower’s “new look” policy and also dealt with the Formosa and Suez crises. Retired in 1957 and remained active in national security affairs, often being called upon for advice by the White House. Died at Bethesda Naval Medical Center.

On arrival in Washington, I wasted no time in reporting to... Secretary [of the Navy Forrestal]. He said something like this: “Radford, I have become increasingly concerned with the situation in regard to the merger fight or unification of the services....I have, therefore, had you ordered back to take charge of the Navy’s efforts to insure, if at all possible, that legislation on this subject, which is sure to be passed in the U.S. Navy not-too-distant future, is satisfactory from our standpoint. My personal position is that an improved and unified defense organization is needed. The President wants one quickly, and the Army is pushing for speedy action with his complete backing. You are to set up an office, under me, and go to work as soon as you can.” By 1946 I had a broad knowledge of the problems of the services. In my new job I tried to establish and define my own position. I concluded that: • There was no doubt that the services could not return to the earlier status quo, two separate and independent Departments of War and Navy. • Any new organization must attempt to coordinate military with national planning in political and economic fields. • A “joint chiefs of staff” organization, similar to the one that had worked so well under President Roosevelt in World War II, must become a statutory body.

—From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford

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Gas! Gas! Quick, boys! An ecstasy of fumbling Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time But someone still was yelling out and stumbling And floundering like a man in fire or lime —Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum Est

U.S. Army Military History Institute

cautious, and self-regu- An Ecstasy lating. To effectively link doctrine and technology one must combine the dynamism of scientific of Fumbling: inquiry and the caution of military culture (see Doctrine and Innovation figure 1). This is not a condemnation of the By KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR. military mind. Soldiers are innately cautious because the stakes in their profession are high. The outcome of war is critical he information explosion is about to field complex systems that to national survival. Success or failure beginning to influence that will deluge users under mountains of is measured in human lives. most conservative of institu- trivial data attached to easily thwarted Operational doctrine and organiza- T tions, the Armed Forces. strike technologies. What we can be tions must be flexible enough to em- Professional journals from Parameters sure of is that we are on the verge of brace new capabilities that arise from to Proceedings are awash with articles an explosion in ideas as well as sys- research and applications far removed on RMA and military technical revolu- tems that promises to change the way from military requirements. Taking tion (MTR).1 Depending on their tech- war is fought. In fact, RMA is nothing practical battlefield advantage of new nological or ideological bent, these ar- more than the military application of ideas is the responsibility of doctrine. ticles either hail new developments as ideas from a global revolution in tech- To do this, the military culture must be a shining path to the future or nology brought about by advanced prepared to leap forward with technol- gloomily decry the shortcomings, both computerization techniques. ogy and establish meaningful para- real and perceived, of emerging con- digms for practical soldiers from tech- cepts and hardware. Thus it is difficult Two Cultures nological starting points that may to tell if we are entering an era in Technological innovation is un- appear unreachable at first. At the same which perfect knowledge—that is, in- ruly, spasmodic, and to a certain extent time, the culture must be discerning formation dominance—will be coupled uncontrollable—the opposite of devel- enough to reject irrelevant or unneces- to perfect strike capabilities or if we are oping force structure and doctrine sary capabilities. This is a tall order for which tends to be highly predictable, cautious minds forced to deal with explosive opportunities, but the alternative is disaster. An inability to accommodate ideas or, more likely, a tendency Major Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, is executive officer to misapply concepts will be paid for in st th d of the 1 Battalion, 6 Marines, 2 Marine Division, and opportunities lost in combat. previously was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

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M C Kenzie

The interaction between emerging Figure 1. The Scientific and Military Worlds technologies (together with the weapons and capabilities that ensue) Scientific Culture Military Culture and doctrine—the way land, sea, and air Driven by discovery; non-hierarchical Driven by knowledge; hierarchical forces fight—will be the fundamental dynamic in determining whether new Embraces the unknown Avoids the unknown ideas are digested and used properly. In Externally directed Internally directed short the question is whether we can Long term orientation Short term orientation translate technological concepts into Outcomes are secondary Outcomes are paramount battlefield advantage.2 That is a crucial step, because technological advances, regardless of their inherent brilliance, must be harnessed to a coherent model systems and technologies that we have approach. Doctrine changed as the to be employed for decisive advantage. not requested and that have not been technology arrived. Many other exam- New technologies must be integrated validated by any concept-based de- ples come to mind. Royal Navy battle- with tactical organization, techniques, mand, which is uncomfortable and in- cruisers during World War I were de- and procedures. This is easy to under- evitable. Increasingly, the origin of a signed and built for a high-speed stand but difficult to accomplish. It re- capability will become less important. scouting role, yet they were eventually quires managed, directed interaction of The only criterion will be its advantage forced to lie in the line of battle, scientific and industrial methods with a in battle. largely because they looked like battle- military culture that must deal with the New ideas and technologies intro- ships—which had disastrous results at realities of the battlefield. These two duce potentialities, Jutland. The process of melding tech- some self-generated, nologies and doctrine is difficult be- translating potential into functional others externally cre- cause both are “moving targets.” purpose dictates the pace of ated. Cumulatively, When new technology only mod- they shape the expecta- ifies an existing paradigm for the con- organizational and doctrinal integration tions for the new idea. duct of war, it can be readily subsumed What is this thing sup- and digested. It may also be misap- posed to do? How can we measure its plied. The disastrous fielding by the worlds may be far apart, but they can success? Some expectations, such as French of the Mitrailleuse in 1870 is an eventually be merged. Avoiding an “ec- the Manhattan Project, are obvious, example (this early machine gun was stasy of fumbling” over integration can others less so. Translating potential employed as an indirect fire weapon provide the margin of victory over an into functional purpose, articulating and kept so secret that its users were opponent who is struggling with the an end state, can destroy a project be- unfamiliar with its capabilities). Con- same problems. fore it reaches fruition, regardless of versely, some technologies establish Chicken or Egg? technical feasibility. Expectations can entirely new paradigms—the tank, air- be set too high or low. Either extreme plane, and radar, for example (though Requirements may be driven from is counterproductive. The ability to de- it should be remembered that the tank the bottom up based on combat imper- termine a reasonable and attainable was initially misused as a pillbox, the atives, or from the top down based on end state for new technology dictates airplane as a horse that flew, and radar a concept for employment. Ideally, re- the pace of organizational and doctri- as a pair of binoculars). The creation of quirements are identified, then di- nal integration. This can be difficult, revolutionary new paradigms like rected technological advances provide because relationships of this nature are these is relatively rare. Most new tech- capabilities to answer the need. This neither linear nor static. Instead, the nologies only modify existing meth- almost never happens—and in an era interactions are dynamic—expecta- ods, although even incremental modi- of exploding ideas, requirements are tions change as technologies mature. fications eventually may greatly vastly outpaced by burgeoning techni- At the same time, existing doctrine change an operational paradigm. cal capabilities. This means that many and organizational patterns are not ideas emerge from a growing external frozen. They, too, are responding to ex- Germany and Chemical Warfare base, offering exponential advances internal stimuli. The German attempt to integrate creasingly dislocated from a conserva- The development of the XB–70 as the technology of gases in World War I tive internal approach to require- a high-altitude supersonic penetrating is a telling case of the difficulties in ments. In some cases this means that bomber in the late 1950s is a case in harnessing technology to military pur- the requirements system is being point. Despite technical feasibility that poses. No clear requirement generated wrung inside out. We are examining was demonstrated, the improvement the capabilities inherent in gas; instead the relevance and utility of advanced in Soviet air defenses forced a shift in Air Force strategic bombing doctrine, away from high altitude to a low-level

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chemical assets emerged almost with- great maneuver battles on the Western Ypres out regard to requirements. Gas war- Front at the beginning of World War I In the winter of 1914 the Ger- fare began as a technological initiative had not been decisive. Out of broken mans experimented with gas in two of the German chemical industry. It is plans came the establishment of static small-scale attacks, but it did not affect the story of the translation of an ex- positions which yielded slowly but in- enemy troops. In October 1914, at perimental concept into integrated evitably to trench warfare. This re- Neuve Chapelle in France, tear gas (di- doctrinal and organizational accep- flected a strategic stalemate that char- aniside chlorosulphate) was delivered tance. The final adoption was ulti- acterized the conflict until 1918. by primitive artillery projectiles.3 In mately expressed in approved tactics, Strategic mobility, made possible by January 1915, at Bomilov in Russia, ar- techniques, and procedures, all part of railroads and theater logistics, enabled tillery-delivered xylil bromide was a coherent doctrine for employment. both sides to shift reserves to prevent used, but an attack designed to take The cost of achieving this integration local successes from becoming break- advantage of the presumed effect of was time—time lost that could never throughs. At the same time, on the tac- gas was a costly failure. Extreme cold be recovered. tical level, fire dominated the battle- weather dissipated the effects of the German experience with offensive field. The limited offensive tactical gas. Problems were encountered in chemical warfare is particularly rele- mobility of foot-mobile infantry, horse- matching gas projectiles with high ex- vant today because it clearly illustrates drawn artillery, and primitive battle- plosive shells.4 Despite these setbacks the difficulty of integrating developing field logistics systems could not over- German scientists and soldiers re- technology and existing doctrine. In come the defensive supremacy of fire. mained interested in gas. Certainly the many ways, it parallels the broad yet It was virtually impossible to generate Allied newspaper articles claiming new second-order technology of informa- opportunities for operational maneuver and ominous French gases were a spur tion management as related to the bat- beyond the depth of enemy trenches to German chemical enthusiasts. tlefield. Unlike the tank or airplane, gas before the latter could redeploy suffi- Fritz Haber of the Kaiser Wilhelm was not developed as an independent cient forces to reestablish his defenses. Institute for Physical Chemistry in weapon. It did not alter the paradigm The Germans endeavored to break Berlin observed these failures and of- of ground combat in World War I. In- this static front on both the strategic fered an alternative gas and delivery stead its effects were distributively felt and tactical levels. The strategic re- means. He proposed using chlorine, a and essentially supportive. By 1918 course included the ill-fated 1916 Ver- lethally toxic gas to be delivered by these effects were evident across all as- dun offensive, an attempt to bleed the cloud. Large quantities of commercial pects of German tactical doctrine, but French army to death that inexorably chlorine were readily available. Gas as an enabling force rather than a cen- bled both armies white. After this, the cylinders would be transported to the terpiece. This makes the study of these correlation of forces drove the Germans trenches and opened. Favorable winds German attempts to integrate gas use- to the strategic defensive. Thus, they would move the cloud over no man’s

French 340mm (13.9 inch) gun.

ful in examining new technologies developed a doctrine of elastic defense land to Allied trenches. With enough today that must be linked to doctrine in depth, designed to minimize Allied cylinders, a lethal concentration could and organizational architecture not artillery superiority. In 1917 victory be achieved. Because the gas dispersed only directly, but more often indirectly. over the Russians allowed them once rapidly, an exploiting infantry attack again to shift their forces westward would not be slowed. Expectations Strategic Framework where they could attempt to achieve a were relatively low. Scientists saw gas Like most wartime marriages of decision before the weight of American as simply a casualty producer. Concur- technology and tactics, German gas arms could be brought to bear. rently, it might reduce the demand for warfare was driven by military neces- high explosive projectiles. For German sity. By late 1914 it was clear that the war planners, a shortage of helium

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(HE) was a real possibility. No opera- turned down requisitions for supple- and while one can criticize the Ger- tional requirement had been set forth mentary artillery ammunition.5 mans for wasting an opportunity in an for gas. Once started, late in the afternoon insignificant localized operation, this General Erich von Falkenhayn, of April 22, 1915, things went better is hindsight. All the Germans expected chief of staff and de facto supreme than even the most sanguine gas en- of gas was that it would produce casu- commander, took Haber up on his thusiast could have hoped. The brunt alties. Gas had been effective against offer. He decided to employ gas on the of the attack was borne by Algerian unprepared forces, but such surprise Western Front as part of a limited at- troops who broke and ran. A gap of could be achieved only once. The suc- tack at Ypres that did not heighten ex- some four miles appeared in Allied cess of Ypres was not exploited, so thus pectations for using gas. Ypres would lines. Thirty minutes after the gas dis- it was irrelevant and meaningless. The test gas as an offensive weapon and charge, German troops advanced four shock effect of the new technology was cover redeployment to the eastern the- not matched by tactics for a ater, where the main effort for 1915 gas seemed to slow the advance of fleeting opportunity. Even if was planned. The failure of earlier the Fourth Army had been chemical experiments was duly noted. the attackers almost as much as the better prepared to continue There was no attempt to consider ex- fire of the defenders the attack, given the limita- actly how gas might change the tacti- tions of artillery mobility and cal balance of power. logistics, it is difficult to be- Duke Albrecht’s Fourth Army had and a half miles until encountering a lieve that it could have been translated emplaced over 5,700 large and small rag-tag cordon of Canadians. The as- into an operational success. chlorine cylinders. Two infantry corps saulting infantry, tired and perhaps Chemical warfare was primitive were prepared to follow the cloud this having lost their edge in the month- and unable to produce the ideal gas for would generate, overrunning the Al- long wait for proper winds, could not maneuver support, one of high toxic- lied positions. But a complication break the line. There were no German ity but not persistent. Such develop- arose. The prevailing winds were from reserves to throw in, so the momen- ments (nerve agents) rested in the fu- west to east, which was bad both in tary gap disappeared. ture. The gas used by the Germans, the long and short term for German Subsequent gas attacks over the particularly when limited to cloud at- gas cloud operations. The Fourth Army next 48 hours were unfruitful, al- tacks, could produce casualties but waited over a month before the though they caused over 5,900 Allied were too blunt to shape the battlefield weather was adequate. To planners, the casualties, a ratio of over two Allied decisively. Their net effect was simply Western Front had become a support- soldiers to each German.6 In the con- to add more friction to a situation that ing action. Falkenhayn’s attention had text of most engagements, this was a was already frightful enough. Gas was swung east to Galicia. Thus, on April heartening statistic for the Germans. a two-edged sword that worked against attackers as well as defenders, and it was not lethal enough to be used as an independent bludgeon. Without maneuver, it could not produce enough attrition to alter the balance of power. The basic problem, which would haunt the Germans for three years, was the relation of gas to maneuver.

Failure to Integrate Over the next two years, the Ger- mans used various gases and delivery systems against the Russians and Ital- ians and on the Western Front. Results were generally favorable but not deci- U.S. Army Military History Institute History U.S. Army Military sive. One problem with gas attacks was 10, 1915, Falkenhayn made it clear to Interestingly, the gas seemed to slow the lack of reliable means for assessing General Ilse, chief of staff of Fourth the advance and depress the ardor of results which plagued the Germans Army, that it was “more important to the attackers, who feared its unknown throughout the war. Professor Haber launch the gas cloud as soon as possi- effects almost as much as the fire of was placed in charge of the German ble than it was to obtain a deep pene- the defenders.7 There were positive chemical warfare effort. Eventually, he tration.” As if to emphasize his point, technical and tactical aspects of Ypres. served as the link among science, indus- Falkenhayn refused the Fourth Army The ratio of casualties was favorable, try, and the high command. It was not request for an additional division to and a gap opened in the French lines. exploit possible success and also Unfortunately, there was no plan for taking advantage of the penetration,

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Meuse-Argonne, 1918.

an altogether successful linkage. The chemical weapons into persistent and simply added to the coefficient of fric- military distrusted scientists to some de- nonpersistent agents. The recognition tion on a battlefield already over- gree, but a reasonable amount of coop- of this duality started the interpreta- whelmed with obstacles to maneuver eration was achieved by Haber. The Ger- tion of chemical warfare technology and casualty-producing systems. Be- mans consciously decided to make their and conventional artillery tactics. cause it proved difficult to link gas to effort self-contained “on account of the With this came a heightened set of ex- maneuver, by late 1915 chemical oper- special nature of the work, the need for pectations for chemical weapons. They ations had become dislocated from of- secrecy, and the desirability of avoiding could perhaps do more than create fensive maneuver. any delay with a weapon that was de- deadly friction and fear in friend and The goal of German chemical at- veloping so rapidly.” 8 The industrial foe alike. This blunt, deadly weapon tacks had nothing to do with attempts production of gases and delivery sys- could be sharpened. at a breakthrough. Instead they sought tems was generally adequate. Over time, With this technical interpenetra- simple attrition. The nadir of this of- the problem became less one of scien- tion, artillerymen began to apportion fensive chemical employment was typ- tific research and industrial manufac- chemical targets in two categories. Tar- ified at Verdun in 1916 where massive ture than tactical application. The gases gets attacked by infantry received non- amounts of diphosgene were fired on could be produced; but what were they persistent agents, and those attacked French artillery positions in barrage supposed to do? by fire only, suppressed, or denied, re- operations which were not linked to The introduction of phosgene, a ceived persistent agents. This split was, ground maneuver to take advantage of more potent agent, was accompanied and remains today, a pillar of offensive success.10 Despite the development of a by improved artillery and projectiles as chemical warfare doctrine.9 For the technical architecture for targeting, a the principle delivery technique for Germans it began—but only began—to broad doctrine and a vision for opera- German chemical weapons. Artillery provide the structure for a coherent ap- tional integration were lacking. From added depth to gas, making it less replication of chemical weapons. Despite 1915 to autumn 1917, the German liant upon weather. Diphosgene (green these technical advances, it was clear chemical warfare effort, regardless of cross) gave German gunners a potent, that offensive chemical warfare alone how relatively advanced it was, would in-depth offensive chemical capability. would not break the tactical stalemate be without a framework for employ- By mid-1915 German offensive chemi- in the West. The opportunity proffered ment. This diffusion of purpose pre- cal thought began to embrace a con- at Ypres, combining German surprise vented gas from being used in an inte- cept which has become basic to chemi- and Allied unpreparedness, defied grated combined arms effort. cal warfare: the division of offensive replication. In fact, if the machine gun was the essence of infantry, then gas remained the essence of attrition. It

Figure 2. German Chemical Warfare Development, 1914–18

Time Illustrative Battles Expectations Effects Doctrine

1914–15 Bomilov, Nueve Chapel, Ypres none mixed none 1915–17 Verdun low indecisive, attritive technical only, not linked to maneuver 1917 Riga, Caporetto moderate successful, attritive informal technical and operational; linked to maneuver 1918 Michael high very successful formal technical and operational; linked to maneuver

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as lungs. In the German Michael offensive of 1918, mustard agent was fired as a barrier to deny the flanks of attacking formations and against targets that were not to be assaulted by infantry. Nonpersistent agents such as chlorine and diphosgene were fired against targets to be carried by the Ger- man infantry. It was a sophisticated approach: lachrymatory gases, or throat irritants, were mixed with other

U.S. Army Military History Institute History U.S. Army Military gases to force defending infantry to remove their masks, thus rendering them vulnerable to lethal agents. As Changing Expectations The Attack in Position Warfare. This doc- the 1918 offensives ground themselves out and reached an end, the Germans A doctrinal development reflect- ument set out the German approach to discovered the utility of mustard agent ing organizational and tactical changes breaking the tactical stalemate of as a defensive weapon. It proved a brought gas to the fore as a tool to trench warfare. It reflected the lessons highly effective barrier break the tactical deadlock: the intro- weapon and ultimately duction of infiltration tactics. These the technological advantage afforded by was more successful in tactics put a premium on short, high- industry was not matched in doctrine or the defense than in the intensity hurricane artillery barrages attack. Had the war re- that gas projectiles could enhance. In organizational concepts mained mobile, mus- October 1917, artillery-delivered chlo- tard agent—available to rine and phosgene were fired against both sides by 1918—might have served Italian positions on the Isonzo River at of Riga, Caporetto, and Cambrai. Gas to slow the tempo of the fight yet Caporetto, coupled with an attack led was a key element, both because of its again by denying vast areas to maneu- by infantry trained in infiltration tac- “disruptive characteristics” and be- ver forces.15 tics. The Italians were unprepared for cause it gave artillery greater effectiveness over shorter times.13 For rapid sup- both the gas and Stosstrupen and were The Lessons routed.11 It was one of the most compression, gas was far more economical. The hinge of history turned at plete successes for gas in the war and Excellent suppression, particularly Ypres, but the Germans were unpre- served as a model for subsequent at- against enemy artillery, could be ob- pared. The technological advantage af- tacks in the West. This action, coupled tained with far fewer gas than conven- forded by industry was not matched in with similar success at Riga in Septem- tional HE shells. doctrine or organizational concepts. ber 1917, were harbingers of an in- In infiltration tactics, speed of at- Ironically, initial German conservatism creasing role for gas in German offen- tack was critical, and artillery-delivered toward gas was sparked by earlier sive thinking.12 Another was the gas heightened the shock and force of small-scale failures.16 It would not be German counterattack at Cambrai. In indirect fire without requiring the long until late 1917 that offensive chemical November 1917 a short artillery prepa- preparatory fires typical of both British warfare again played a significant com- ration preceded the infantry infiltra- and French tactics at this period. To- bat role. For the Germans, systematic tion-style attack. A large percentage of ward that end, by the close of the war success with offensive chemical war- the shells were chemical, which disori- the basic load of German artillery units 14 fare finally occurred when it was used ented the British defenders as much as was 50 percent gas shells. In certain in a totally integrated operational con- caused injury. The use of gas in such operations the ratio of gas to conven- cept, when the strengths of gas war- cases was aimed at suppression, not de- tional rounds fired was three to one. fare—suddenness, shock, and variable struction, and greatly reduced the time Driven by a slowly awakening doc- persistencies—were linked to a broad, required for the German artillery to trine, technological advances were thorough tactical scheme: infiltration achieve effect on target. being integrated into organizational tactics. This interpenetration of tech- The Germans developed a vision practice and tactics. The expectations nology and doctrine yielded a coher- for effective, coherent offensive chemi- were shifting, with chemical warfare ent framework for employment. Gas cal doctrine in early 1918, when infor- techniques being integrated into a was the junior partner in 1918, one of mal procedures of the previous two larger tactical calculus. the key supporting tools for infiltra- years were superseded by a compre- An important development was tion tactics; a means, not an end. In hensive work released by the high technological, the widespread adop- this case, the shifting paradigm of in- command on January 1, 1918 entitled tion of mustard gas, or yellow cross. Mustard was lethally toxic and persis- fantry and artillery combat for the Ger- tent; it could kill up to 72 hours after mans absorbed the capabilities pro- exposure and acted against skin as well vided by gas and gave them useful

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expression. Before the linkage of gas to a coherent plan for employment. Suc- 11 Patrick T. Stackpole, “German Tactics infiltration tactics, chemical warfare cess will largely be a function of how in the Michael Offensive, March 1918” (MA was a clumsy, balky killer; after the quickly we mesh them operationally. thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, linkage it became a lethal accomplice. As we enter the next century, the Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1993), pp. 35–41. 12 As shown in the accompanying Armed Forces must accommodate sig- Ibid., pp. 28–34. 13 T.T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: figure, German offensive chemical war- nificant changes in alliance structures The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine dur- fare ultimately helped to break the tac- and political direction, and soldiers, ing the First World War (Fort Leavenworth, tical deadlock on the Western Front, sailors, marines, and airmen must con- Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General but the long gap between first use in sider how best to cope with new Staff College, 1981), p. 41. 1915 and coherent employment in weapons and technologies. Not every 14 Stackpole, German Tactics, pp. 49–53. 1918 blunted its contributions. Despite decision about these weapons and 15 Stockholm International Peace Re- the best of intentions, the Germans technologies—and, importantly, how search Institute, The Problem of Chemical and were unable to rise above the lure of we think about them—will have an Biological Warfare: Vol. 1, The Rise of CB simple, direct attrition and to effec- immediate tactical effect, but as the Weapons (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1971), p. 140; tively link chemical warfare to maneu- Germans learned in World War I, an Heller, Chemical Warfare, pp. 24, 27. 16 McWilliams and Steel, Gas, p. 214. ver until 1918. By then it was too late. “ecstasy of fumbling” about how to integrate a new idea can cost dearly in The German experience offers im- both the short and long runs. Thus we portant lessons. The inability to fully should think critically about how ideas exploit offensive chemical capabilities have been integrated into military or- was linked to the dynamic nature of ganizations in the past and should not war. New weapons may have enor- hesitate to apply the lessons to current mous shock value but also operate situations. JFQ under a principle of rapidly diminishing returns. We must plan for their ini- NOTES tial use with maximum effect. If capa- 1 Andrew F. Krepinevich, in “Cavalry to bilities are either misunderstood or Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolu- unappreciated, they will be misused— tions,” The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall or, as with gas, underused. The chance 1994), p. 30, defines MTR as “what occurs for decisive action can disappear be- when the application of new technologies cause the opposition will compensate, into a significant number of military sys- often at a fraction of the original cost. tems combines with innovative operational Weapons and technologies which concepts and organizational adaptation in a are becoming available today, particu- way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict.” larly those related to information man- 2 Michael T. Mazarr et al., The Military agement, represent only part of a larger Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework global revolution in technology. On (Washington: Center for Strategic and Inter- the operational level, we must exploit national Studies, 1993), p. 18. fleeting advantages that even imma- 3 Charles E. Heller, Chemical Warfare in ture, incomplete technologies offer. World War I: The American Experience, 1917– This involves recognizing that new 1918 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat ideas may well bring new vulnerabili- Studies Institute, 1984), p. 6. 4 ties. Time is a key consideration in Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention: Sci- using new technology, for action de- entific Development, 1914–1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1988), pp. 95–96. ferred may be success denied. At the 5 J.L. McWilliams and R.J. Steel, Gas! same time, the casual, unconsidered The Battle for Ypres, 1915 (St. Catherines, use of immature technology, while lo- Ont.: Vanwell Publishing Co., 1985), p. 26. cally successful, may prevent a subse- See also Basil Liddell Hart, A History of the quent coordinated application of its ul- World War, 1914–1918 (Boston: Little, timate strategic significance. But there Brown and Co., 1935), p. 248. is no formula for success. Each oppor- 6 Heller, Chemical Warfare, p. 31. tunity must be weighed against the po- 7 Liddell Hart, History, p. 248. 8 tential cost. Our goal must be to reduce Hartcup, War of Invention, p. 105. 9 the period of fumbling, the time in Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare (Ur- bana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 23; which we try to mesh capabilities with Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Weaponry (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 26–27. 10 Ibid.; Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Storm- troop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 67–68.

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The strategic force commander sat in a dimly-lit subter- NORAD/SPACECOM ranean command center, waiting for the battle to start. Each Command Center, Cheyenne Mountain. of his component commanders was settled in front of a lu- minescent screen which displayed aspects of an ongoing situation half a world away. Green icons marked positions of enemy command and control nodes as electronic lightning flickered across the displays revealing traffic over networks. The war had begun three weeks ago when the President U.S. Air Force (CarolU.S. Air Force Floyd) approved the infiltration of enemy information networks. Since then information warfare teams had worked hard to compromise enemy command and control systems. They saw themselves as commandos of the information age who moved unnoticed through information networks, searching out and mapping the sinews that bound the enemy together. Some they would destroy; others they would leave alone. Thousands of miles away, the first strike began exactly at midnight. Fingers of light arced into the dark sky off the enemy coast as semi-submersible arsenal ships launched wave after wave of ballistic missiles. High overhead stealthy aircraft released their deadly payloads, cruise missiles armed with electromagnetic-pulse warheads designed to short-circuit electronic systems. Nearby, a wing of penetrating aircraft carrying precision-guided munitions peeled away and began bombing runs. In space above them, a constellation of small satellites began to de-orbit payloads of heavy-metal rods capable of destroying the hardest targets known to man. The commander watched the attack take shape from his underground sanctuary. A network of satellites and unmanned air vehicles began to provide the command center with battle damage assessment data as the attack was still underway. The objective of the strike had been to blind the enemy by dismembering his command and control system, and initial reports showed that it had been largely successful. A red stain spread across the situational displays indicating that the initial waves of ordnance had ripped holes in enemy command and control networks. But other nodes remained functional. Here and there other green lights started to flicker, indicating the presence of previously unknown nodes only now coming to life in the wake of the first attack. The automated battle manager had already evaluated the initial results of the attack and was formulating the next strike. A list of weapon-target pairings appeared on a screen in front of the commander. He deleted several targets, withholding them for later, then sent the list forward to his component commanders for execution. He looked over at his theater force commander, seated at another screen across the room. Only time War would tell whether his men would be needed in the Information Age to bring this conflict to a close. By THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

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ver the next few decades, The most far-reaching effect of the infrastructure. Some see the informa- the growth of microprocess- information revolution is the ability to tion revolution as the dawning of a ing and information tech- integrate a myriad of systems into what new, bloodless age of conflict domi- nology will create a revolu- the Vice Chairman, Admiral William nated by “netwar” and nonlethal tech- O 2 4 tion in military affairs (RMA) that Owens, calls a “system of systems.” nologies. More modestly, it is likely to transforms the tools, conduct, and The network’s sensors could sweep the expand the options available to deci- eventually the nature of war.1 The battlefield in search of an enemy, with sionmakers for waging lethal war. emergence of long-range precision data processing systems fusing sensor strike and information warfare may inputs into a single coherent picture The Dawn of Shock Warfare usher in an era of conflict based on and disseminating it to units world- The increasing range and accuracy paralysis and shock rather than attri- wide. Individual weapon systems could of weapons will enable us to mass ex- tion. While no panacea, concepts and use this information to “bid” on tar- tremely lethal fires at will. Rather than organizations for waging war in the in- gets, much as traders bid on stocks, closing on an enemy, we may be able formation age may offer us decisive ad- with an automated battle manager de- to engage and destroy it at long range. vantages over a range of regional ene- termining optimum weapon-target Moreover, the advent of information mies as well as leverage against a peer combinations. Data from space-based warfare may allow us to disrupt those competitor, should one emerge. sensors might, for example, be used to networks that allow an enemy to act in The development of systems target aircraft dropping precision- a coordinated manner. In combina- which collect, process, evaluate, and guided munitions, while special operation, long-range precision strike and distribute information is already chang- tions forces deep behind enemy lines information warfare capabilities may ing the way we plan and conduct mili- might be called on to identify targets provide the means to focus our tary operations. Advances in sensor for long-range ballistic or cruise missile strengths against enemy weaknesses strikes. During and and thus crush its will to resist. The re- the most far-reaching effect is the ability after strikes networked sult is likely to be a new paradigm of sensors would gather, warfare, based not on attrition but on to integrate a myriad of systems evaluate, and dissemi- the ability to paralyze and shock. A nate battle damage as- fundamental tenet of attrition warfare technology and data processing will sessment (BDA) much more rapidly is that victory can be achieved through allow us to gather and interpret an ex- than has heretofore been possible.3 the progressive destruction of an traordinary amount of information The effectiveness of long-range enemy. In the end, it is the threat of about our forces, those of prospective precision strike systems will be decided further punishment that causes surren- enemies, and the battlefield itself. Sen- by a game of hide-and-seek played by der. Shock warfare, by contrast, com- sors operating across the electromag- our sensors and enemy targets. If ad- pels an enemy to follow the course netic spectrum will locate targets as in- vances in stealth, deception, and mo- that we desire by foreclosing options formation processors fuse data from bility outpace the ability of sensors to which we deem undesirable. disparate sensors into a single coherent acquire targets, then long-range preci- A campaign combining strategic picture. They will enable us to under- sion strike systems will be ineffective. information attack and long-range pre- stand where force can be decisive as If, on the other hand, information fu- cision strike could afford us substantial well as offer greater control over its use. sion renders the battlefield transpar- leverage against a future enemy. The Robust command, control, and com- ent, long-range precision strikes will be initial phase would seek to disorient or munications (C3) systems will help dis- lethal. Where we end up on this con- paralyze an enemy by disrupting its seminate the resulting information in tinuum will shape the character of war decision cycle. This may, in turn, un- seconds, while stealthy precision strike in the information age. dermine its confidence by creating un- systems will attack an enemy discrimi- As the ability to gather, fuse, and certainty about controlling the course nately at long range. Advanced guid- disseminate information becomes and outcome of a conflict. It may also ance technology, including data from more central to military affairs, infor- increase our capacity to surprise an global positioning system (GPS) naviga- mation networks may themselves be- enemy. Strikes on hostile command tion satellites, will let us strike targets come critical targets. Thus information and control systems, for example, with an accuracy of feet from standoff warfare, by which a state denies or ma- could hamper enemy ability to employ distances. As a result, we may be able to nipulates the intelligence available to forces effectively by interfering with destroy virtually any enemy target that an enemy, may permeate all levels of the leadership’s ability to collect, can be identified. conflict, from sophisticated tactical process, and disseminate information.5 electronic warfare to strategic attacks Should the initial operation prove against civil and military information insufficient to break enemy will, we might destroy its capability to resist by Ensign Thomas G. Mahnken, USNR, is assigned to the Office massive, coordinated strikes on a range 6 of Naval Intelligence and is currently a national security of key target networks. Leverage could fellow in the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at accrue from the ability both to achieve Harvard University. greater battlespace awareness than an

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enemy and to exploit that advantage by operating faster than an enemy can Mobile communications react. terminal. The effectiveness of such a strategy will depend in part on our ability to collect, assess, disseminate, and exploit information. There is, within reasonable bounds, a relationship between our level of battlespace awareness and the effectiveness of our forces. At a relatively low level of awareness, for example, we may be able to identify discrete targets but unable to understand their relationship. As awareness increases, we may understand how targets form systems and identify key nodes within each system. That may allow us to employ our forces more efficiently.7

One way to increase U.S. Army the effectiveness of our forces in war will be to develop a sophisticated understanding of potential enemies in peace. Intelligence to support information warfare and long-range precision strike will, however, be a major challenge.8 We will like a chess match between grand mas- need not only to identify ters, each maneuvering while waiting individual targets with pre- for the other to make a mistake. By cision but to understand contrast, decisive outcomes are likely to how they fit into networks. Global positioning result from situations where one side In addition, we must under- system. enjoys a marked information advan- stand which nodes and net- tage, as the United States did during works are vulnerabilities.9 the Battle of Midway and the Gulf War. Highly centralized target U.S. Army A future war may thus begin with systems such as national an information suppression operation leadership may be vulnerable to a rela- studies of an enemy’s society and cul- aimed at reducing our enemy’s battle- tively small number of well-placed ture to determine the most effective field awareness while we protect our strikes. By contrast, highly distributed ways to shatter its will and in-depth own. Achieving information domi- systems such as cellular communica- analyses of its target networks to iden- nance against a peer competitor with tion networks might be much more re- tify vulnerabilities. distributed and redundant sensor and sistant to disruption. Furthermore, we communication net- must understand the effect of our decisive outcomes are likely where one works is likely to be strikes upon an enemy’s capacity and difficult. Gaining an will to wage war. This will require not side has a marked information advantage information advan- only the ability to view an enemy as a tage will depend on coherent system, but insight into its The shape of future warfare will how well we can identify and destroy values and strategic culture. One way largely depend on achieving an infor- the key nodes of an enemy’s informa- to improve our understanding of po- mation advantage. One can imagine a tion infrastructure. The level of success tential enemies might be to constitute situation in which neither side pos- required of such an operation will, multidisciplinary teams of analysts sesses a high battlespace awareness. In however, depend on our overall objec- with expertise in intelligence, informa- such circumstances, neither would be tives. It may be unnecessary, for exam- tion systems, targeting, and weapons able to conduct decisive operations. ple, to sever all links from enemy lead- effects. Such teams could conduct both Such a battle might resemble a duel be- ership to its forces. It may be sufficient tween blind swordsmen. A conflict in to disrupt the timing and coherence of which both sides enjoy a high level of its military operations for a period. battlespace awareness might look more

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The information suppression op- systems will depend on the character forces to defeat any remaining pockets eration could include attacks on com- of an enemy and our overall objec- of resistance in detail. At a minimum, mand and control networks, civil tives. The scope and duration of the it might disorient an enemy, reducing telecommunications, and even mili- operation will depend on an enemy’s its ability to oppose the insertion of tary and civilian leaders. Long-range sophistication and retaliatory capabil- theater forces. ballistic missiles with high-explosive ity as well as our ability to identify and The combination of weapons of and earth-penetrating warheads, for swiftly strike its target systems. Against mass destruction and long-range preci- example, could be used against leader- a relatively unsophisticated enemy sion weapons will make the future bat- ship targets, including hardened facili- with a limited infrastructure such an tlefield extremely lethal. To credibly ties, while cruise missiles armed with operation may be relatively straightfor- project power abroad, we must develop electromagnetic-pulse warheads dis- organizations that fight effectively rupted information networks. Some the ability to disrupt enemy in such an environment. This may targets may be fixed and others mo- include the means to insert and bile. Coordinating such an operation information networks may deter extract forces rapidly. Once in- would include deciding which net- aggression serted in a theater, ground forces works should be infiltrated and ex- may have to disperse, reduce their ploited and which ones destroyed. ward; against a peer competitor it signature, and move rapidly.14 They However extensive prewar prepa- could involve the integrated use of may, in fact, come to resemble the Pen- rations, we are unlikely to ever enjoy tens of thousands of precision-guided tomic division, designed to operate on perfect information about an enemy.10 munitions over hours or days. In any the nuclear battlefield.15 In the words of Jomini: event, our capacity to inflict shock will From Theory to Practice [While it] is unquestionably of the highest im- depend on an ability to strike vital tar- portance to gain [perfect] information, so it is a get systems in parallel over a short pe- No single concept of warfare can thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impos- riod.12 In essence this was the ap- address the entire spectrum of conflicts sibility; and this is one of the chief causes of proach of air planners prior to the Gulf we may face. The type of campaign de- the great difference between the theory and the War: rather than rolling back Iraqi air scribed above, for example, will have practice of war.11 defenses before attacking strategic tar- limited utility at the low end of the We may fail to identify key nodes in get systems, networks were bombed warfare spectrum, though intelligence, an enemy’s infrastructure or be unable from the outset of the war.13 surveillance, and reconnaissance capa- to destroy those we attack. Nor will an Strategic air and missile defenses bilities may be useful in such contin- enemy stand by passively as it is pum- are a prerequisite to strikes against gencies. The combination of long- meled. Rather, it will attempt to repair vital assets. Without them, an enemy range precision strike and information individual targets, reestablish old net- could credibly threaten retaliation warfare may instead provide our deci- works, and build entirely new ones. against U.S. forces and allies for strikes sionmakers with expanded options to Success will ultimately depend on de- upon its homeland. Defenses could deter and wage war against regional stroying enemy information networks protect friendly forces and reduce an powers or a peer competitor. The faster than they are rebuilt. Conduct- enemy’s confidence in achieving its demonstrated ability to disrupt enemy ing rapid battle damage assessment objectives by long-range strikes. More- information networks, for example, and formulating and launching follow- over, the combination of long-range may deter aggression. Threats against on strikes before an enemy reacts may precision strike and strategic defense command and control systems could therefore be a key source of leverage. may convince an enemy that continu- render an enemy unable to direct its An information suppression oper- ing to employ offensive systems is fu- forces should war occur, while destruc- ation could shatter an enemy’s will to tile. An enemy may instead decide to tion of the civil telecommunications fight and force it to sue for peace. If so, retain its forces for postwar bargaining. system could disrupt its economy. we may achieve Sun Tzu’s ideal of vic- A strategic campaign of the sort Moreover, in authoritarian states tory without combat. Even should an outlined above could prove insuffi- which rely upon repression for politi- information suppression operation fail cient to force an enemy to capitulate cal control, such strikes could lead to to bring victory, we may hamper an in and of itself. In such a case, we may civil unrest. The acquisition of long- enemy’s capability to anticipate and need to deploy ground forces to defeat range precision strike and information react to our actions by disrupting its an enemy in the field. Long-range pre- warfare may also provide options for means of collecting and processing in- cision strikes may acquire a role as a non-nuclear extended deterrence of ag- formation. Moreover, we may reduce precursor to theater power projection gression against our friends and allies. its capacity to transmit timely and co- operations, just as naval gunfire has While the emerging RMA is unlikely to herent orders, thereby limiting its abil- preceded amphibious landings. Such provide a risk-free option for waging ity to coordinate its forces. an operation could dismember an strategic warfare against a nuclear- Having suppressed enemy infor- enemy’s ability to command and con- armed enemy, at least without robust mation-gathering, we could attack ca- trol its forces, allowing our theater pabilities that are vital to military operations. The selection of target

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strategic air and missile defenses, long- The President might, for example, pre- 5 In some ways, the Gulf War repre- range precision strike and information clude the Armed Forces from infiltrat- sented the first attempt to implement such warfare could accomplish some of ing an enemy’s networks for fear that a strategy. Coalition air campaign planners those missions heretofore reserved for discovery of such activities could pro- hoped to strike at Iraq’s central nervous sys- nuclear weapons. voke a conflict. Or it might preclude in- tem by attacking the leadership, telecommunications, and electric power systems to We cannot, however, expect po- formation warfare attacks on networks paralyze the regime in Baghdad. See tential enemies to sit idly by as we carrying both civilian and military data Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf amass the means to dismember them. for fear of collateral damage. War Air Power Survey, volume I, Planning and They may take any number of steps to The emerging military revolution Command and Control (Washington: Gov- reduce our ability to bring long-range will not eliminate Clauzewitzian fric- ernment Printing Office, 1993), pp. 109–11. precision strike and information war- tion. Nor will it usher in a new age of 6 A similar strategy was favored by an- fare assets to bear upon them. Perhaps bloodless conflict. It may, however, cient Chinese generals who viewed opera- the best way to deter us from employ- offer us leverage against a range of ene- tions as the interaction of ordinary force ing shock warfare would be to acquire mies in peace, crisis, and war. Long (cheng) and extraordinary or unconven- nuclear weapons. An enemy may also range precision strike and information tional force (ch’i). The former fixed and made an enemy vulnerable to unconven- use camouflage, concealment, and de- warfare capabilities may deter a poten- tional force, a flanking maneuver that dis- ception to reduce our ability to iden- tial enemy and offer coercive leverage rupted enemy strategy and forced capitula- tify and target key nodes in its infra- to resolve crises and conflicts in our tion. See the discussion in Sun Tzu, The Art structure. Or it could move them favor. Should we fail to exploit the of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith underground. Over time, an enemy emerging RMA, however, we may well (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), might even attempt to eliminate all find ourselves at the mercy of another pp. 42–43. key nodes. Centralized switched tele- power who has mastered it. JFQ 7 Conversely, lacking reconnaissance, phone networks could be replaced by surveillance, and data processing, an enemy distributed cellular networks, and na- NOTES may be able to make up for a relatively low tional power distribution could be re- level of information by employing its forces 1 See, for example, A.J. Bacevich, “Pre- en masse. placed by local networks. An enemy serving the Well-Bred Horse,” The National 8 See Edward A. Smith, Jr., “Putting It could also use information warfare Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 43–49; Mary Through the Right Window,” U.S. Naval In- techniques to disrupt our command C. FitzGerald, “The Russian Image of Future stitute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 6 (June and control networks. War,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 13, no. 2 1995), pp. 38–40. Nor may we be free to conduct (April–June 1994), pp. 167–80; James R. 9 See John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as long-range precision strikes and infor- FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, “Revolu- a System,” Airpower Journal, vol. 9, no. 1 mation warfare based on military effec- tions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quar- (Spring 1995), pp. 40–55. tiveness criteria alone. In the future as terly, no. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 24–31; An- 10 Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Beyond drew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Keeping Pace with today, the use of force will be limited Luddites and Magicians: Examining the the Military-Technological Revolution,” Is- by political considerations. We may, for MTR,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer sues in Science and Technology, vol. 10, no. 4 1995), pp. 17–19. example, be constrained from striking (Summer 1994), pp. 23–29; and Andrew F. 11 Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans- an enemy homeland, especially if it Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The lated by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill possesses the means to threaten us with Patterns of Military Revolutions,” The Na- (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), weapons of mass destruction. Future tional Interest , no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 30–42. p. 245. wars could come to resemble not the 2 William A. Owens, “The Emerging Sys- 12 For a cogent critique, see Richard Gulf War, where our Armed Forces were tem of Systems,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- Szafranski, “Parallel War: Promise and Prob- free to strike virtually any military tar- ings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May 1995), pp. 35–39. lems,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 3 get they wanted, but the Korean War, Implementing such a concept puts a 121, no. 8 (August 1995), pp. 57–61. premium on the ability to gather, correlate, 13 where concern over potential Chinese Keaney, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol- interpret, and transmit information much and Soviet responses restricted our ac- ume I, chapter 1. more rapidly than previously possible. This 14 Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, tions and created a sanctuary from then poses daunting challenges to data fu- Land Warfare in the 21st Century (Carlisle Bar- which enemy forces operated with im- sion, high-data-rate communications, and racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. punity. Or our dependence on space inexpensive precision munitions. See James Army War College, 1993), pp. 12–25. systems for navigation, communica- R. FitzSimonds, “The Coming Military Rev- 15 See, for example, A.J. Bacevich, The tion, and intelligence collection may olution: Opportunities and Risks,” Parame- Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea translate into a reluctance to launch at- ters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995), p. 34. and Vietnam (Washington: National Defense 4 tacks against an enemy’s space systems See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, University Press, 1986), chapters 3 and 5. for fear of retaliation. The use of infor- “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strat- egy, vol. 12, no. 2 (April–June 1993), pp. mation warfare may likewise be re- 144–46; and Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War stricted, especially during peacetime. and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Little, Brown and Com- pany, 1993).

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The New Dimension in War

By AJAY SINGH Success and failure in war—as in most human endeavors—rests on the ability or failure to create and exploit asymmetries in capabilities and action. These asymmetries result from a process of technological revolution and evolution, based on microrevolu- tions, and generalship that exploits them in time and space. Methods of warfighting undergo changes through microrevolu- tions that are usually driven by innovations such as the stirrup, crossbow, gunpowder, steamship, wireless, et al. A revolution in military affairs (RMA) occurs when there are essential changes in the nature of war requiring a reassessment of the way we plan and conduct warfare. This revolution displays a shift in the center of gravity of military activity. The common denominator is a growth in either mobility or firepower, or both, that increases the premium on time and space. Throughout history time and space have been played against each other to gain advantage in battle. With the passing of the years, time has gradually been compressed Squadron Leader Ajay Singh, Indian Air Force, is a fighter while space has expanded. pilot assigned to Air Headquarters in New Delhi.

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The pace of war has changed little IDA Cycle in “T time” over the centuries, and therefore warriors did not really experience the compression of time. With the advent of airpower, warfare expanded into a Action? third dimension, and the process of creating asymmetry was lifted to a new Action dimension. Airpower thus constituted an RMA, the impact of which started to be felt with the end of World War I. Today we are at the threshold of new Information technologies which promise to enlarge We They the battlefield even more and shrink the time available for decisionmaking and action to critical levels. Their net Decision effect—whether long-range weapons or information warfare technologies—will be to tighten the decision loop until Decision an asymmetry created in time proves to be decisive. This new revolution can Note: The continuous line in the figure represents “T time” which is the time to complete the cycle. For an therefore be termed the advent of the enemy, the time to complete the cycle is “T plus time” which leads to a time differential that causes a lag fourth dimension—time. in its response with resulting adverse asymmetry.

Two-Dimensional Warfare For centuries war was confined to The Industrial Revolution height- two dimensions, breadth and depth. Third Dimension ened the pace as well as intensity of Combat at sea and on land remained The advent of airpower extended combat, which led to greater lethality limited to these two dimensions even warfare into the third dimension, mak- and to the industrialization of war. The as the area of battle expanded. Subsur- ing it possible to target a nation—and tank, introduced in World War I, in- face warfare at sea did not alter the its will—directly and thus conquer ter- cluded elements of enhanced mobility basic dimension, although it did ex- ritory without destroying enemy and firepower in a single vehicle, al- pand conflict in space. Advances in forces. That began with the aerial bom- though its real significance was not rec- military technology primarily con- bardment from Austrian balloons dur- ognized until World War II when com- tributed to increased mobility and fire- ing the siege of Venice in 1849 which bat became even more violent. power in terms of depth and breadth. led to calls for a permanent ban “on Armored warfare, however, was con- Many technological advances led to an the discharge of any kind of projectile impact on the methodology of or explosive from balloons or by simi- warfighting and thus can be called mi- airpower extended warfare lar means” at the Hague in 1899.2 While the ban was not adopted, de- crorevolutions. Their effect enhanced into the third dimension, speed and lethality in battle, though struction from the air clearly heralded the results were spread over time, per- making it possible to target a fundamental change in military af- haps centuries. a nation directly fairs. Ten years before the flight of the One early microrevolution was Wright brothers, J.D. Fullerton of the the expansion of the battlefield by cav- British army’s Royal Engineers spoke of fined to the dimensions of breadth and alry. With enhanced mobility, forces a “revolution in the art of war” where depth, and continued to require the could engage at longer ranges more “the chief work will be done in the air, forces of one nation to defeat those of quickly. This was the way in which and the arrival of the aerial fleet over another to impose its will. Though Mongol cavalry swept across Asia. An- the enemy’s capital will probably con- many developments had taken place 3 other microrevolution was the stirrup, clude the campaign.” Other strategists over the centuries, warfare remained giving horsemen enhanced firepower such as Douhet and Mitchell elabo- tied physically to the surface (either on on the move.1 The English longbow rated on the concept later, but they land or at sea), and was hence two-di- 4 and 10th century crossbow also caused were more prophets than strategists. mensional. It was the acceleration of changes in tactics. Gunpowder in the Although forerunners of the third technological changes beginning in the 15th century further increased fire- dimension recognized the impact air- 20th century that led to a major revolu- power, while the grooved rifle which power would have on war, technology tion in the nature of warfighting. was fielded during the Civil War in- did not mature in the earlier decades creased accuracy and further expanded to a level where it had a revolutionary the battlefield, although within exist- effect. It was a case where doctrine ran ing limits of time and space. ahead of technology, giving rise to

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misgivings and skepticism. Much of the problem in understanding air- AWACS. power even today is due to the fact that landpower and seapower doctrine is based on centuries of experience while airpower is only a hundred years old. But if our understanding of airpower has been clouded for these reasons, Fullerton’s vision of the third dimension as a revolution in warfare has been amply vindicated over the last century.5 Airpower had developed suffi- ciently by World War I that it could be employed in combat. Between wars, it matured enough to contribute substantially in World War II, and warfare in the surface medium (including subsur- face) could not keep pace with changes in the third dimension. The maturing of technology in World War II facili-

tated use of doctrine envisioned in ear- U.S. Air Force lier years. One classic example of the revolutionary impact of airpower was of the electromagnetic spectrum and a was not that airpower failed as some the Blitzkrieg concept, where dive move toward more accurate aerial claim; it was an ill-defined threat com- bombers leading panzer thrusts rapidly weapons profoundly affected warfight- bined with unclear political objectives destabilized and disrupted defenses ing. Though the electromagnetic spec- that fettered the third dimension. Air- into defeat.6 The Battle of Britain trum was significant during World War power remained critical as seen in the changed the course of the war itself, II, its exploitation matured in Vietnam defense of Khe Sanh or in Linebacker II. resulting in the cancellation of Ger- when precision guided munitions Around the same time, the Arab- man plans for the invasion of England. (PGMs) made an operational appear- Israeli war proved that airpower had The ability of airpower to target surface ance. The maturing of electronic war- the potential to decide the outcome of forces from the third dimension was fare is a microrevolution in military af- surface war. In the 1982 Bekaa Valley an influence on the surface battle, es- fairs and a subset of the third operations, Israel used the third dimen- pecially in the North African cam- dimension since it is primarily con- sion in a decisive manner.11 This was paign.7 Besides its offensive employ- ducted through, for, and against activi- repeated by the U.S.-led coalition in ment for destruction, the third ties in the third dimension.9 While the Persian Gulf War, albeit on a larger dimension airlifted troops and mater- PGMs provide greater accuracy and scale. This was also perhaps the first iel, thus enhancing the mobility of sur- timeliness, they must be backed war when information was employed face forces by air transport or airborne through reconnaissance, surveillance, extensively to create conditions con- operations. Creating major asymme- and target acquisition (RSTA) technolo- ducive to victory. Satellites provided tries in time and space by exploiting gies to be effective. Increased military real-time information to operational the third dimension literally lifted tra- use of space has led to a scenario of commanders. U.S. Space Command as- ditional two-dimensional warfare to space-based weapons and defenses. A sets were critical for cuing Patriot bat- nonlinear dimensions. The struggle to move toward continuous asymmetry teries. Time was of importance in such control the third dimension itself be- above the earth was evident in the SDI missions and all efforts were made to came a major military aim.8 Strategic technology of the Reagan era.10 obtain real-time information, whether bombing may not have achieved the The last hundred years of warfare for targeting Scud launchers or battle- expected objectives, but the atomic in the third dimension has clearly field targets. This war was the first bombing of Hiroshima finally estab- shown that airpower (including space) where real-time information was a real- lished what the prophets had forecast. has fulfilled its promise of being a true ity, and the results indicated that the The intensity of the revolution revolution. It is dominant in combat; time had come for it to play a crucial continued into the nuclear age, with and while it may not achieve victory role in combat. While the coalition significant advances in levels of tech- alone, airpower is nevertheless essential benefitted from compressed time-cy- nology. The most obvious fallout in to winning a war. Even in Vietnam it cles, Iraqi time-cycles had distended to the post-war era was a total shift in the such a degree that they became totally currency of power to the third dimen- irrelevant. This war was for all practical sion through nuclear weapons that purposes a combination of the potency were air deliverable. The increased use

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of the third dimension and the use of Although time has always been a task is the sum of the time required to sophisticated technology to shrink the factor in war, technology has never complete each of the subcycles and the time for decision-action synergy. To been at a stage where it could play an overall cycle itself. that extent, this war was the overlap in independent and dominant role in Some tasks may call for complet- which signs of another RMA could be shaping conflicts. The slow pace of war ing a number of cycles before the ac- seen—the advent of the fourth dimen- when it was confined to two dimen- tion reaches finality. The time dimension of war. sions also meant that the human decision will then be that much more sionmaking loop was never pushed to dilated compared to single-cycle tasks. Fourth Dimension its time limits by the demands of bat- The IDA cycles required for a particular The nature of the battlefield is un- tle management. It was not that time task, such as neutralizing a target sys- dergoing transformation. Fully auto- did not play a key role; rather, the ad- tem, depend on the nature of that sys- mated warfare may be technologically vantage offered by timely information tem—the vulnerability and recuper- feasible in the next twenty years.12 Air- was often overshadowed by the rela- ability of subsystems, and the accuracy power has provided a dynamic plat- tively large time required to act on it. and effectiveness of one’s own decision form for change. Its early signs were Notwithstanding this, time has always and action components of the IDA apparent in the Bekaa Valley where been crucial to surprise.13 cycle. The probability of a single-cycle nonlinearity from technological ad- task is very low, considering that some vances helped to destroy Syrian forces Reorienting the IDA Cycle cycle overrun would be needed for a at the front and to stop the Syrian 3d With the inherent mobility and reasonable degree of assurance of task Armored Division in its tracks before it firepower of airpower, the expansion achievement. But the objective clearly reached the battle. The doctrine was of war to the third dimension largely must be the reduction of the number incorporated in the AirLand Battle changed the factor of time. The dimen- of cycles required for a particular task, concept, which spoke of an extended sion of time began to be recognized as as close to unity as possible, along with battlefield where airpower would en- more important, and conscious efforts compression of each cycle (time), since gage follow-on forces and enemy tar- were made to reduce the time required the total term taken would be the sum to gather information, of all cycles. disseminate it, make a de- One method of achieving this time promises to envelop the other cision, and follow it up would be identifying the weak links in dimensions of war as a force multiplier by action. In the 20th cen- the IDA cycle, then incorporating ap- tury, rapid technological propriate solutions to strengthen the advancement has reduced cycle, or in other words reducing the gets in depth. During the Gulf War the the span needed to know, decide, and subcycle or cycle time. The solution se- indications were much clearer that fu- act with the result that time has been lected could, depending on the prob- ture conflict would involve extensive shrinking, while space (the extent of lem area, be based on improving pro- use of technology to conduct the bat- the battlefield) has been expanding. cedures or technological modifications tle at extended ranges and compressed This may lead to a state of seamless or innovations. The rule of the chain time. With further advances in tech- space, where borders become even less applies here—that is, the strength of nology, the battlefield can be expected relevant in the conduct of war, and the cycle in terms of time will often be to expand even more. Hitting targets time assumes the form of boundaries. only as strong as the weakest link of at long range with precision RSTA This border of time will be the decisive the cycle (again in terms of time). De- technologies is critical and translates factor of war and will call for orienting lays in one segment, therefore, may into the accuracy and time sensitivity the information-decision-action (IDA) well be the deciding factor. Conversely, of information. While accuracy is a cycle in terms of time. degradation of hostile IDA cycle, based matter of acquisition and guidance The IDA cycle is a basic element of on identifying weak or vulnerable posi- sensor technologies, time on the ex- the dimension of time in military af- tions of the cycle and attacking it at a panded battlefield needs greater atten- fairs and represents a set of activities re- faster pace than it can recuperate, tion. Technologies of the future may quired in all of them. The size of the could prove decisive in one’s favor. For provide highly accurate information loop is a demonstration of the time example, targeting Saddam’s command which satisfies needs on all levels of taken to achieve a specific task. The and control functions led to an asym- war, although if it is not timely it faster this cycle is completed, the metry where his IDA cycle was totally could be worthless. The result will be a greater the compression of time. The degraded in the early hours of the war, new dimension—time—which prom- aim, when operating in this dimension, and he was incapable of responding in ises to envelop the other dimensions is to shorten the cycle as much as pos- a meaningful time-frame, though of war as a force multiplier and coun- sible and thereby retain the advantage other components of military power terforce divider. of time over an enemy. It is important were available. Another example is to understand that each component of planning airfield denial missions by the cycle has its own subcycles and, ac- designing their frequency to stay cordingly, the time needed for a given within an enemy’s airfield rehabilita- tion ability in terms of time. A striking

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case of time versus time is the frequency-hopping technique used by M–1 Abrams. radars as an electronic counter-coun- termeasure in a race in the fourth dimension, against the effects of hostile electronic countermeasures. Of the advances underway, the most significant are in the information segment of the cycle. In fact, this segment is technologically more dependent than the others, and thus the payoffs are likely to be much greater. This has been recognized by many experts, some of whom have called information a new revolution in war. While the role of information in the time dimension deserves special attention, it must be recalled that information is merely a means to an end, not an end in itself. It must be seen as part of the overall IDA cycle, although a critical component of the fourth dimension. Information warfare involves using information to one’s advantage and also U.S. Army denying its benefits to an enemy. Under close scrutiny, therefore, infor- Targeting Time Cycles even if the means exist. Tightening the mation entails degrading, delaying, Had Saddam Hussein thought in cycle beyond reasonable human con- and disrupting information to confuse the fourth dimension, he might have trol was no doubt a major factor that an enemy and increase response time. realized that the only chance that Iraq led to the intermediate nuclear force The greatest change in the information had of success was the disruption of treaty since vulnerabilities on both campaign over the years has been the the coalition build-up during Desert sides increased inversely to the tight- expansion of the quantum of informa- Shield, which offered a window of vul- ening of the cycle dictated by the mis- tion which can be made available and nerability as the allies mobilized. The siles. The first step in defending the contraction of processing time (a point was not whether Iraq could have against the missile threat thus lies in microrevolution in itself). defeated the coalition in battle, but the fourth dimension as any anti-mis- The speed and volume of informa- recognition that the war would have sile defense system designer must rec- tion, although an asset in the fourth followed a different course if the ognize. SDI did this by developing dimension, can create vulnerabilities. fourth dimension had been exploited. technologies that promised to reduce Even with reduced processing time, The coalition did control and exploit it the time needed for early warning and there is a possibility of information to a certain extent, as seen in the inter- boost-phase/mid-course interception. overload, creating congestion and deception of Scud missiles, which would The Soviet objections to SDI also re- lays in using information. Thus there otherwise have been extremely diffi- sulted from the implicit adverse asym- will be an inescapable need for the in- cult. It is worth noting that after the metry of the relative IDA cycle. formation to be time-sensitive. The war the Pentagon initiated programs As airpower demanded airpower amount of data processed will be such as the Joint Precision Strike to counter it, so will the new dimen- greater than the processing power of Demonstration Task Force (JPSDTF) to sion of time require its war to be the information system and, therefore, reduce sensor-to-shooter timelines. fought in the fourth dimension. Just as information technology application in The goals of JPSDTF include reducing air superiority was a prerequisite to combat has become more susceptible timelines, now measured in hours, to successful warfare in the third dimen- to the time factor. And since it is actu- two minutes.14 This is a clear recogni- sion, freedom of action and control of ally a subset of the IDA cycle, it is cor- tion of the impact of the fourth di- the fourth dimension will become nec- rect to term the advances in informa- mension in warfighting. In fact, the essary to operate on future battlefields. tion technology as incremental to the question of ballistic missiles being a This will lead to the targeting of time criticality of the time dimension, has- destabilizing factor is essentially linked cycles to degrade an enemy cycle, tening the advent of the fourth dimen- to the fourth dimension, as these mis- while safeguarding one’s own from sion as a true RMA. siles, especially short range ones, do enemy interference. The objective of not give the IDA cycle of the defender causing an asymmetry in this dimen- adequate time to mount a response sion will demand thought and action to create a time differential where the

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IDA cycle for an objective on any level In the future a number of coun- NOTES of war starts and finishes before the re- tries are likely to reduce their IDA cy- sponse time or enemy IDA cycle. If one cles, enabling them to fight in the 1 R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, completes the cycle in “T time,” forc- fourth dimension. It is hard to see a se- The Encyclopedia of Military History (London: ing an enemy to complete its cycle in rious challenge to the United States on McDonald, 1970), p. 137. 2 Jasjit Singh, “Evolution of Politico-Mili- “T-plus time,” one creates a time differ- the global level for the next quarter tary Doctrines,” in Jasjit Singh and Vatroslav ential. In other words, to conduct time century. Only Japan has the requisite Vekaric, editors, Non-Provocative Defence technological strength. But (New Delhi: Lancer Press, 1990), pp. 17–18. the side that controls time will be in intent is another matter al- 3 David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Cen- together. Although Russia tral Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter a superior position to conduct war in now lags in fourth dimen- Paret, editor, Makers of Modern Strategy: From all dimensions sion technology compared Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: to the United States and Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 627. 4 Japan, it can be expected to Giulio Douhet, The Command of the warfare one must stay within the catch up. At the regional level, how- Air, translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942), pp. 11–16. enemy IDA cycle, thus gaining control ever, the key question that U.S. forces 5 Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial of the fourth dimension. Only with will confront is whether they have suf- Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 1994). control of time can one exploit this di- ficient power in place to counter a bel- 6 Harold Faber, Luftwaffe: An Analysis by mension and subsequently fight in ligerent able to exploit the fourth di- Former Luftwaffe Generals (London: Sidgwick other dimensions. If control of time is mension. If not, they may be and Jackson, 1979), p. 165. lost it is likely to pass on to the other threatened by the dynamics of the IDA 7 J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War, side, and the side which loses the race cycle before reinforcements can be de- 1939–1945: A Strategical and Tactical History for control of the fourth dimension ployed. Between other states, the con- (New Delhi: The English Book Store, 1969), will find itself continuously sliding flict would be shaped by the relative pp. 220–59. 8 down in its time cycles. Recovery may capabilities of sides in the fourth di- Jasjit Singh, Air Power in Modern War- fare (New Delhi: Lancer International, be made difficult by a domino effect mension and how these are exploited. 1985), pp. 1–33. influencing current and future cycles. Of all emerging technologies, the 9 Some regard electronic warfare as The side that controls time will be in a most significant impact on the fourth the fourth dimension; Ibid., pp. 122–37. superior position to conduct war in all dimension may be the trans-atmos- 10 Simon P. Warden, SDI and the Alterna- dimensions. pheric vehicle (TAV). This technology tives (Washington: National Defense Uni- Centuries of conflict have proven will make it possible to rapidly launch versity Press, 1991), pp. 159–60. that offensive action provides the small satellites to provide cover of an 11 Eliezer “Cheetah” Cohen, Israel’s Best greatest control in any dimension of area in the event of the regular sensors Defence, translated by Jonathan Cordis warfare, and time is no exception. In being incapacitated through antisatel- (New York: Orion Books, 1993), p. 468. 12 fact, considering the potentially desta- lite warfare, which is expected to in- Frank Barnaby, The Automated Battle- field (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986), bilizing nature of time warfare, the crease as reliance on the sensors grows p. 141. fourth dimension favors the offensive to cut down the IDA cycle. TAV can 13 Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the more than any other dimension. Tradi- also be employed in an antisatellite Swift: Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare tional military organizational struc- role since it will provide a highly accu- (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, tures may require redefinition to suit rate, flexible, and low-IDA cycle option 1985), pp. 182–84. demands of war in the new dimension with on-board directed and kinetic en- 14 John Boatman, “Army Plans Two- to pass the litmus test of a small IDA ergy weapons. Thus the impact of the Minute Warning,” Jane’s Defence Weekly cycle. Plans must ensure that nodal fourth dimension is likely to increase (June 17, 1995), p. 27. 15 points, vulnerable to enemy interfer- exponentially based on the capability Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Anatol ence, are kept to a bare minimum. of TAV which, flying at a speed of Rapoport, editor (London: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 164–67. Hardening organizational structures Mach 30, will be able to target a point against interference should be done on the surface of the earth from its This article was submitted as an entry in the using physical and software solutions ground station in thirty minutes. It 1995 RMA Essay Contest. to provide counterforce dividers. At will therefore become virtually impos- the same time, the ability to create fric- sible to think without operating in the tion must exist to degrade enemy IDA dimension of time when planning and cycles.15 Integrating technologies—arti- conducting war. JFQ ficial intelligence, JTIDS, JSTARS, AWACS, et al.—is fundamental to the reorientation of military structure.

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Bennett, Drew A. Coalition Rules of Engagement, Cumulative Index (1993–98) no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 124–25; ISSUES 1–18: CONTRIBUTORS Defending Inlandia: A Flawed Deployment Doctrine, no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 130–34 Benson, Sumner Adolph, Robert B., Jr. Ballard, John R. Shaping Arms Export Policy, no. 6 Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t JMETL: The Key to Joint (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 84–91 Go Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), Proficiency, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 48–53 pp. 95–98; Joint Task Forces: A Bib- Bernstein, Alvin H. liography, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter From Desert One to Desert Storm, A’Hearn, Francis W. 94–95), pp. 121–26 no. 1 (Summer 93), p. 6; The QDR The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing Process—An Alternative View, the Acquisition Reform Debate, Balza, Martin Antonio no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 20–26; no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 34–38 Changing Argentine Military Cul- Thucydides and the Teaching of ture, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 64–66 Ahrari, M.E. Strategy: A Review Essay, no. 14 Riding the Toffler Wave: A Book Barlow, Jason B. (Winter 96–97), pp. 126–27 Review, no. 15 (Spring 97), Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific, Bingham, Price T. pp. 141–43 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 76–81 On Machine Guns and Precision Allard, C. Kenneth Barnett, Roger W. Engagement, no. 16 (Summer 97), Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Grasping 2010 with Naval Forces, pp. 88–90 Joint Doctrine, no. 9 (Autumn 95), no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), Binnendijk, Hans pp. 105–09 pp. 25–31 Asia-Pacific Challenges, no. 7 Anderson, Ewan W. Barry, Charles L. (Spring 95), pp. 6–7; Assessing U.S. Putting Geography Back into the Creating a European Security and Strategic Priorities, no. 6 (Autumn/ Military Canon: A Review Essay, Defense Identity, no. 15 (Spring 97), Winter 94–95), pp. 10–17; The Case no. 18 (Spring 98), pp. 138–40 pp. 62–69; NATO’s Bold New for Forward Deployment, no. 8 Concept—CJTF, no. 5 (Summer 94), (Summer 95), p. 7; Challenges in a Anderson, Gary W. pp. 46–54 Time of Transition, no. 4 (Spring Leaving the Technocratic Tunnel, 94), p. 6; Focus on the Middle East, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 69–75 Behling, Thomas G. no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 5–6; NATO, Satellite Reconnaissance of the Fu- Andre, David J. European Security, and Beyond, ture, no. 18 (Spring 98), pp. 23–30 The Art of War—Past, Present, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 55–56; Future: A Review Essay, no. 9 Belknap, Maggie Rethinking European Security, (Autumn 95), pp. 124–28; National The Force-on-Force Model: An no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 6–7; The Se- Culture and Warfare—Whither De- Anachronism in the Information curity of the Americas, no. 11 cisive Force: A Book Essay, no. 13 Age, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 116–19 (Spring 96), pp. 36–39; A Strategic (Autumn 96), pp. 104–08; Reflection Assessment for the 21st Century, Bender, Trevor J. on We Were Soldiers Once...and no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 67–68; A Primer on Naval Theater Air De- Young: A Review Essay, no. 3 (Win- Tuning the Instruments of fense, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 22–28 ter 93–94), pp. 119–22 National Power, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 82–88 Ankersen, C.P. A Little Bit Joint—Component Blaker, James R. Commands: Seams, Not Synergy, Overseeing Cross-Service Trade no. 18 (Spring 98), pp. 116–22 Offs, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 37–40 Armstrong, David A. Blasko, Dennis J. Jointness and the Impact of the Evaluating Chinese Military Pro- War, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 36–37 curement from Russia, no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 91–96 Bacevich, A.J. Civilian Control: A Useful Fiction? Boorda, Jeremy M. no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Leading the Revolution in C4I, pp. 76–79 no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 14–17

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Bourne, Christopher M. Casper, Lawrence E. Clemins, Archie R. Unintended Consequences of the Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Secu- Information Superiority in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, no. 18 rity Strategy for the Next Century, Pacific Fleet, no. 17 (Autumn/ (Spring 98), pp. 99–108 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89 Winter 97–98), pp. 67–70 Boutelle, Steven W. Castka, Bruce Coats, Dan AFATDS: The Fire Support Window The National Support Element in Joint Experimentation—Unlocking to the 21st Century, no. 11 (Spring Hungary, no. 16 (Summer 97), the Promise of the Future, no. 17 96), pp. 16–21 pp. 48–49 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 13–19 Caton, Jeffrey L. Cogdell, Matthew W. Joint Warfare and Military Depen- Medical Dimensions of Joint Hu- dence on Space, no. 10 (Winter manitarian Relief Operations, 95–96), pp. 48–53 no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 90–97 Cerjan, Paul G. Coglianese, Christopher Service Identities and Joint Cul- Operation Weserübung and the ture, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Origins of Joint Warfare, no. 1 pp. 36–37 (Summer 93), pp. 100–11 Chiarelli, Peter W. Cohen, Eliot A. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, no. 2 A War That Was Not Left to the (Autumn 93), pp. 71–81 Generals, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 46–49 Chilcoat, Richard A. Army Prepositioning Afloat, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 51–57; Strategic Brady, Pamela J. Leadership and the “Fourth” Army Joint Endeavor—The Role of Civil War College, no. 12 (Summer 96), Affairs, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 74–80 pp. 45–47 Christman, Daniel W. Brandt, Linda S. NATO’s Military Future, no. 11 The Sisyphus Paradox: Framing (Spring 96), pp. 76–81 the Acquisition Reform Debate, Clapper, James R., Jr. no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 34–38 Challenging Joint Military Intelli- Budura, Vic gence, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 92–99 Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting Clark, Paul C., Jr. into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), D-Day Veracruz, 1847—A Grand pp. 71–76 Design, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), Builder, Carl H. pp. 102–15 Cohen, William S. Keeping the Strategic Flame, no. 14 Clawson, Patrick L. Report of the Quadrennial Defense (Winter 96–97), pp. 76–84; Roles Assessing U.S. Strategic Priorities, Review, no. 16 (Summer 97), and Missions: Back to the Future, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 8–14 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 32–37 pp. 10–17; Middle Eastern Military Cole, Bernard D. Bullock, Harold E. Dynamics: A Book Review, no. 13 Struggle for the Marianas, no. 7 Training the Pacific Warriors, (Autumn 96), pp. 111–12; A Prince (Spring 95), pp. 86–93 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 16–21 of a Tale: A Book Review, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 131–32; Tuning Cole, Ronald H. Canby, Steven L. the Instruments of National Managing the Schwarzkopf Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unin- Power, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), Account—Atkinson as Crusader: tended Consequences, no. 6 pp. 82–88 A Book Review, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 68–75 pp. 123–27 Clay, John S. Carr, Nevin P., Jr. The Fifth Service Looks at A Primer on Naval Theater Air De- Doctrine, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Every article listed in fense, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 22–28 pp. 29–33 this index can be found Carvalho, Luiz Paulo Macedo on the web. A Brazilian Strategic Outlook, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 59–63 jfq_pubs/index.htm

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Collins, John M. Davis, Jacquelyn K. Dryden, George M. Going to Tchepone: OPLAN The Looming Alliance Debate over The C–17 Transport—Joint Before El Paso, no. 17 (Autumn/Winter Nuclear Weapons, no. 15 (Spring Its Time, no. 12 (Summer 96), 97–98), pp. 118–29; More Than 97), pp. 80–86 pp. 67–73 Deeds of Derring-Do: A Book Re- Dietrich, Steve E. Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. view, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 128–29; Falaise, The Highway of Death, Joint Vision 2010: A Red Team Where Are Special Operations and Mogadishu: A Book Review, Assessment, no. 17 (Autumn/Winter Forces? no. 2 (Autumn 93), no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 117–20 97–98), pp. 47–49 pp. 7–16 Dworken, Jonathan T. Cope, John A. Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief The Security of the Americas, Operations, no. 8 (Summer 95), no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 36–39 pp. 14–20 Cossa, Ralph A. Echevarria, Antulio J., II Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue on Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality: Two Tracks, no. 7 (Spring 95), A Revolution in Military Theory, pp. 32–36 no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 29–36; War, Courter, Jim Politics, and RMA—The Legacy of The QDR Process—An Alternative Clausewitz, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), View, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 76–80 pp. 20–26 Edmondson, Charles M. Crigler, T. Frank Writing Joint Doctrine, no. 7 The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma, (Spring 95), pp. 109–10 no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 64–70 Einaudi, Luigi R. Cronin, Audrey Kurth DiFronzo, Vincent P. Security and Democracy in the Re- From Strategists to Strategy: A Unity of Command—Countering gion, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 67–72 Book Review, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Aircraft and Missile Threats, no. 11 Eisenhour, John Howard pp. 129–31 (Spring 96), pp. 29–35 Leveraging Human Interaction for Cronin, Patrick M. Dixon, Anne M. Joint Training, no. 16 (Summer 97), Asia-Pacific Challenges, no. 7 The Whats and Whys of Coali- pp. 109–14 (Spring 95), pp. 6–7; Japan’s Emer- tions, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Emmett, Peter C. gent Security Policy, no. 7 (Spring pp. 26–28 Software Warfare: The Militariza- 95), pp. 20–22; The Pacific Century tion of Logic, no. 5 (Summer 94), and Future Causes of War: A Book Donley, Michael B. pp. 84–90 Review, no. 12 (Summer 96), Building a New Defense Consen- pp. 115–16; Rethinking Asian sus, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Estes, Howell M., III Alliances: A Review Essay, no. 2 pp. 18–27; Problems of Defense Or- Space and Joint Space Doctrine, (Autumn 93), pp. 119–23 ganization and Management, no. 8 no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 60–63 (Summer 95), pp. 86–94; Prospects Cropsey, Seth for the Military Departments, Everett, Michael W. The Limits of Jointness, no. 1 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 58–62 JLASS: Educating Future Leaders in (Summer 93), pp. 72–79 Strategic and Operational Art, Doughty, Robert A. no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 29–33 Cusick, John J. Reforming Joint Doctrine, no. 1 In Search of Focused Logistics, (Summer 93), pp. 40–47 Farmen, William N. no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 125–27 Wanted: A NATO Logistics Head- Downing, Wayne A. quarters, no. 18 (Spring 98), Dallaire, R.A. Joint Special Operations in Peace pp. 62–66 UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, and War, no. 8 (Summer 95), no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 66–71 pp. 22–27 Ferriter, Edward C. Which Way Joint Doctrine? no. 8 Daugherty, Leo J., III Drago, Steven R. (Summer 95), pp. 118–19 Supplying War: Interservice and Joint Doctrine and Post-Cold War Interallied Cooperation in China- Military Intervention, no. 14 Filak, Ronald Burma-India, no. 12 (Summer 96), (Winter 96–97), pp. 106–10 AFATDS: The Fire Support Window pp. 95–105 to the 21st Century, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 16–21

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FitzSimonds, James R. Goodale, Richard W., Jr. Gumahad, Arsenio T., II Revolutions in Military Affairs, Planning for War: A System, no. 5 The Profession of Arms in the no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 24–31 (Summer 94), pp. 106–10 Information Age, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 14–20 Flores, Susan J. Gordon, John, IV JTFs: Some Practical Implications, Joint Power Projection: Operation Gutmanis, Ivars no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 111–13 Torch, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 60–69 Whatever Happened to Defense Industrial Preparedness? no. 16 Fogleman, Ronald R. Gottlieb, Aryea (Summer 97), pp. 27–33 The Air Force and Joint Vision Beyond the Range of Military 2010, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Operations, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 24–28; Global Presence, no. 7 pp. 99–104 (Spring 95), pp. 94–99; Joint War- Grange, David L. fare and the Army-Air Force Team, Forgotten Mission: Military no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 9–15; Reengi- Support to the Nation, no. 15 neering Defense Transportation, (Spring 97), pp. 108–15 no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 75–79; Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, Graves, Howard D. no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 75–79 Emergence of the Joint Officer, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 53–57 Foster, Gregory D. Research, Writing, and the Mind of Gray, Colin S. the Strategist, no. 11 (Spring 96), The Limits of Seapower: Joint War- pp. 111–15 fare and Unity of Conflict, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 52–61; Fredericks, Brian E. On Strategic Performance, no. 10 Information Warfare at the Cross- (Winter 95–96), pp. 30–36; RMAs roads, no. 16 (Summer 97), and the Dimensions of Strategy, pp. 97–103 Habiger, Eugene E. no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), Strategic Forces for Deterrence, Freedman, Lawrence pp. 50–54 no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 64–69 Britain, NATO, and Europe, no. 5 Gregory, William H. (Summer 94), pp. 8–17 Hallion, Richard P. Squaring the Pentagon: A Book Re- Airpower and the Changing Freeman, Chas. W., Jr. view, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 131–33 Nature of Warfare, no. 17 The Middle East: Challenges Born (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 39–46 of Success, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 40–45 Halter, Irving L. Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Secu- Garner, David P. rity Strategy for the Next Century, Logistics in Wargaming: An Initial no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89 Report, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 97–101 Hammond, Grant T. Desert Storm Warnings: A Book Genschel, Dietrich Review, no. 8 (Summer 95), Russia and a Changing Europe, pp. 129–31; Paradoxes of War, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 24–27, 30–35 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 7–16 Giangreco, D.M. Hanauer, Larry Operation Downfall: The Devil EUCOM and Sub-Saharan Africa, Was in the Details, no. 9 (Autumn no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 103–07 95), pp. 86–94 Handberg, Robert Gill, Bates Searching for Policy Coherence: Modernization of the People’s Gropman, Alan L. The DOD Space Architect as an Ex- Liberation Army: A Book Review, Australia and the Gulf War: A periment, no. 16 (Summer 97), no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), Book Review, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 91–96 pp. 137–39 pp. 123–25; The Military Cost of Harrington, Peter Discrimination: A Review Essay, Goldberg, Joseph E. Soldier Art of World War II, no. 8 no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 123–25 The Military in Israeli Society: (Summer 95), pp. 68–69 A Book Review, no. 9 (Autumn 95), p. 132

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Haseman, John B. Hitchen, Ralph M. Hyde, James C. Garuda XII: Indonesian Peacekeep- Cutting Defense—Method Instead JLASS: Educating Future Leaders in ing in Cambodia, no. 12 (Summer of Madness, no. 5 (Summer 94), Strategic and Operational Art, 96), pp. 89–94 pp. 91–94 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 29–33 Hash, Charles H. Hitt, Franklin D., Jr. Jeremiah, David E. Changing the Mindset—Army An- Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t What’s Ahead for the Armed titerrorism Force Protection, no. 17 Go Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), Forces? no. 1 (Summer 93), (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 110–17 pp. 48–53 pp. 25–35 Haven, John S., II Hoar, Joseph P. Johnson, Dana J. War Termination and Joint Plan- A CINC’s Perspective, no. 2 Unity of Control: Joint Air Opera- ning, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 95–101 (Autumn 93), pp. 56–63 tions in the Gulf, no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 88–99 Hochevar, Albert R. Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of Johnson, Jay L. War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 The Navy in 2010: A Joint Vision, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 17–19 Hoffman, F.G. A New Paradigm for the Army: A Johnson, Rodney L. Review Essay, no. 16 (Summer 97), Forgotten Mission: Military Sup- pp. 119–20; Joint Vision 2010— port to the Nation, no. 15 (Spring A Marine Perspective, no. 17 97), pp. 108–15 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 32–38 Johnson, W. Spencer Holder, Leonard D., Jr. Under Four Ensigns: A Book Re- Prospects for Military Education, view, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 125–27 no. 18 (Spring 98), pp. 81–90 Johnson-Freese, Joan Holland, Edward E. Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting Joint Combat Search and Rescue— into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), Operational Necessity or After- pp. 71–76; Searching for Policy Co- Hazlett, James A. thought? no. 18 (Spring 98), herence: The DOD Space Architect Do We Need an Information pp. 44–51 as an Experiment, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 91–96; Joint Vision 2010: Corps? no. 2 (Autumn 93), Hone, Thomas C. America’s Military—Preparing pp. 88–97 Professionalizing Command, for Tomorrow, no. 12 (Summer 96), Education, and Doctrine, no. 18 Henderson, David S. pp. 34–49 Army Prepositioning Afloat, no. 4 (Spring 98), pp. 91–98 Jones, David C. (Spring 94), pp. 51–57 Hooker, Richard D., Jr. Past Organizational Problems, America’s Two Armies, no. 6 Herrly, Peter F. no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 23–29 Southern Italy: Strategic Confu- (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 38–46; sion, Operational Frustration, Operation Weserübung and the Jones, Jeffrey B. no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 70–75 Origins of Joint Warfare, no. 1 PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC, (Summer 93), pp. 100–11 no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 28–33 Herwig, Hogler H. The Prussian Model and Military Hopkins, Donna L. Joseph, Robert G. Planning Today, no. 18 (Spring 98), Joint Reserve Forces: An Evolution The Impact of NBC Proliferation pp. 67–75 in Military Affairs, no. 18 (Spring on Doctrine and Operations, 98), pp. 123–29 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 74–80; Hillen, John Regional Implications of NBC Pro- Huntington, Samuel P. After SFOR—Planning a European- liferation, no. 9 (Autumn 95), New Contingencies, Old Roles, led Force, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 64–69 pp. 75–79 no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 38–43 Joulwan, George A. Hurley, Marcus Hines, Scott M. Doctrine for Combined Opera- JFACC—Taking the Next Step, Standing Down a Joint Task Force, tions, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 60–65 no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 46–49; The New SHAPE of the pp. 111–13 Hutzler, Patricia Insley Atlantic Alliance, no. 15 (Spring Logistics in Wargaming: An Initial 97), pp. 57–61 Report, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 97–101

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Kang, Choi Kojac, Jeff S. LaPlante, John B. South Korea’s Defense Posture, Campaigning under the U.N. Logistics in Wargaming: An Initial no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 26–31 Banner: A Book Review, no. 12 Report, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), (Summer 96), p. 114 pp. 97–101 Kass, Ilana National Power and the Intera- Kraska, James C. Larson, Charles R. gency Process, no. 8 (Summer 95), Counterdrug Operations in the Cooperative Engagement, no. 2 pp. 8–13 U.S. Pacific Command, no. 17 (Autumn 93), pp. 82–87 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 81–85 Katz, Douglas J. Lasswell, James A. Unity of Control: Joint Air Opera- Krause, Michael D. Presence—Do We Stay or Do We tions in the Gulf—Part Two, no. 5 Getting to Know Jomini: A Book Go? no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 83–85 (Summer 94), pp. 59–63 Review, no. 7 (Spring 95), Lawrence, K. Scott pp. 126–28 Joint C2 Through Unity of Com- Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. mand, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter America’s Long Road to Vietnam: 94–95), pp. 107–10 A Book Review, no. 17 (Autumn/ Leahy, Peter Winter 97–98), pp. 140–42; Assess- ANZUS: A View from the Trenches, ing the Bottom-Up Review, no. 3 no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), (Winter 93-94), pp. 22–24 pp. 86–90 Kross, Walter Lewis, William H. The Joint Force Commander and The Growing Reach of Radical Global Mobility, no. 18 (Spring 98), Islam, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 46–49; pp. 57–61; Single Port Manage- United Nations Peacekeeping: ment, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. Ends versus Means, no. 1 (Summer 53–59 93), pp. 48–57; War and Peace in the New World Order: A Book Review, no. 16 (Summer 97), p. 123

Keaney, Thomas A. Libicki, Martin C. A Jubilee for Airmen: A Book Do We Need an Information Review, no. 11 (Spring 96), p. 134; Corps? no. 2 (Autumn 93), Surveying Gulf War Airpower, pp. 88–97 no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 25–36 Link, Charles D. st Kelley, Jay W. 21 Century Armed Forces—Joint Brilliant Warriors, no. 11 (Spring Vision 2010, no. 13 (Autumn 96), 96), pp. 104–10 pp. 69–73 Kelso, Frank B., II Linn, Thomas C. The Wave of the Future, no. 1 The Cutting Edge of Unified (Summer 93), pp. 13–16 Actions, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 34–39; Joint Operations: The Kievit, James Krulak, Charles C. Marine Perspective, no. 10 (Winter Learning from Rwanda, no. 7 Doctrine for Joint Force 95–96), pp. 16–18; Once and Future (Spring 95), pp. 105–08 Integration, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Marines, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 47–51 Kim, Ted pp. 20–23 Logistics: The Way Ahead, no. 4 Kuehl, Daniel T. Locher, James R., III (Spring 94), pp. 38–44 Roles, Missions, and Functions: Taking Stock of Goldwater- Nichols, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Kitchen, Bruce R. Terms of Debate, no. 5 (Summer pp. 10–16 Meteorological and Oceanographic 94), pp. 103–05 Conditions, no. 18 (Spring 98), Kupiszewski, Robert B. Lord, Carnes pp. 38–43 Joint Education for the 21st Cen- To Wage a War of Words: A Book Review, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Kohn, Richard H. tury, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 72–76; pp. 109–10 An Officer Corps for the Next Cen- Joint Education: Where Do We Go tury, no. 18 (Spring 98), pp. 76–80 from Here? no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 63–70

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Lorenz, F.M. Marr, Phebe Mears, Gary H. War Criminals—Testing the Limits Gulf Security and Iraq’s Uncertain Logistics: The Way Ahead, no. 4 of Military Force, no. 16 (Summer Future, no. 9 (Autumn 95), (Spring 94), pp. 38–44 97), pp. 59–65 pp. 50–54 Mendel, William W. Lovelace, Douglas C., Jr. Marshall, Andrew W. New Forces for Engagement Policy, Joint Doctrine Development: Over- The 1995 RMA Contest: A Post- no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 25–29 coming a Legacy, no. 14 (Winter script, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), p. 81 Messervy-Whiting, Graham 96–97), pp. 94–100 Mata, Jose F. WEU Operational Development, Loy, James M. Defense of the Hemisphere: An no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 70–74 Shaping America’s Joint Maritime Historical Postscript, no. 11 (Spring Metcalf, Marvin G. Forces: The Coast Guard in the 96), pp. 73–75 Acoustics on the 21st Century 21st Century, no. 18 (Spring 98), Mathews, Michael P. Battlefield, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 9–16 PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC, pp. 44–47 Luers, Michael no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 28–33 Metz, Steven Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Learning from Rwanda, no. 7 Controversies, no. 5 (Summer 94), (Spring 95), pp. 105–08 pp. 111–13 Miller, Charles E. Lwin, Michael R. Roles, Missions, and Functions: General Tzu’s Army: OPFOR of the Terms of Debate, no. 5 (Summer Future, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 44–49 94), pp. 103–05 Macdonald, Anne F. Miller, Paul David Coalition Rules of Engagement, A New Mission for Atlantic Com- no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 124–25 mand, no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 80–87 Macke, Richard C. Millett, Allan R. A Commander in Chief Looks at A Reader’s Guide to the Korean East Asia, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 8–15 War: A Review Essay, no. 7 (Spring Magee, Roderick R., II 95), pp. 119–26 Strategic Leadership and the Moentmann, James E. “Fourth” Army War College, no. 12 Joint Combat Search and Rescue— (Summer 96), pp. 74–80 McCaffrey, Barry R. Operational Necessity or After- Mahnken, Thomas G. A Former CINC Looks at Latin thought? no. 18 (Spring 98), War in the Information Age, no. 10 America, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 44–51 (Winter 95–96), pp. 39–43 pp. 44–47, 50–51; Human Rights and the Commander, no. 9 Montaperto, Ronald N. Maiorano, Alan G. (Autumn 95), pp. 10–13 The PLA: In Search of a Strategic A Primer on Naval Theater Air De- Focus, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 16–17 fense, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 22–28 McCarroll, Kevin F. Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs, Moore, George M. Mallard, Philippe H. no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 50–53 Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting France’s European Priority, no. 5 into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), (Summer 94), pp. 18–23 McDowell, Dennis pp. 71–76 Theater Missile Defense: A Joint Marchio, James D. Enterprise, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Morgan, Clarence Todd Days of Future Past: Joint Intelli- pp. 80–87 Atlantic Command’s Joint Train- gence in World War II, no. 11 ing Program, no. 8 (Summer 95), (Spring 96), pp. 116–23 McGruther, Kenneth pp. 120–23 Satellite Reconnaissance for the Mariner, Rosemary Bryant Future, no. 18 (Spring 98), pp. 23–30 Morningstar, James K. A Soldier Is a Soldier, no. 3 Technologies, Doctrine, and (Winter 93–94), pp. 54–61 McKenzie, Kenneth F., Jr. Organization for RMA, no. 15 An Ecstasy of Fumbling: Doctrine (Spring 97), pp. 37–43 Marks, Edward and Innovation, no. 10 (Winter Leveraging Human Interaction for 95–96), pp. 62–68 Moseley, Edward H. Joint Training, no. 16 (Summer 97), D-Day Veracruz, 1847—A Grand pp. 109–14 McPeak, Merrill A. Design, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), Ideas Count, no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 102–15 pp. 22–24

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Muckerman, Joseph E., II Oakley, Robert B. Parker, Jay M. ‘L’ Is for Logistics: A Book Review, Developing a Strategy for Change and the Operational Com- no. 16 (Summer 97), p. 121 Troubled States, no. 12 (Summer mander, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), 96), pp. 81–88; An Envoy’s Perspec- pp. 89–96 Mundy, Carl E., Jr. tive, no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 44–55; Complementary Capabilities Passarelli, Ralph W. A Mogadishu Duet [Part One]: from the Sea, no. 1 (Summer 93), Unified Endeavor ‘95 and Model- A Book Review, no. 10 (Winter 95– pp. 17–21; Thunder and Lightning: ing Effective Training, no. 12 96), pp. 125–26; The New Living Joint Littoral Warfare, no. 4 (Summer 96), pp. 11–15 Room War: A Book Review, no. 17 (Spring 94), pp. 45–50 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 142–43 Peay, J.H. Binford, III Murdock, Clark A. Correlating Medical Forces Okonogi, Masao Mission-Pull and Long-Range Plan- Forward, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Assessing the U.S.-North Korea ning, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 70–75; The Five Pillars of Peace Agreement, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 28–35 in the Central Region, no. 9 pp. 23–25 (Autumn 95), pp. 32–35, 38–39 Murray, Williamson Olynyk, Stephen D. The Great War and the Birth of Pendley, William T. Ukraine as a Post-Cold War Armored Warfare: A Book Review, America and the Asia-Pacific Re- Military Power, no. 15 (Spring 97), no. 16 (Summer 97), p. 122; Innova- gion, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 37–42 pp. 87–94 tion: Past and Future, no. 12 (Sum- Perla, Peter P. mer 96), pp. 51–60; The Meaning of O’Neill, William G. Future Directions for Wargaming, World War II, no. 8 (Summer 95), Moral Obligation Versus “Beeper no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 77–83 pp. 50–57; Prospects for Military Ethics”: A Review Essay, no. 11 Education, no. 18 (Spring 98), (Spring 96), pp. 130–33 Perry, Charles M. pp. 81–90; Thinking About Revolu- The Looming Alliance Debate over tions in Military Affairs, no. 16 Nuclear Weapons, no. 15 (Spring (Summer 97), pp. 69–76; Why 97), pp. 80–86 Training Counts: A Book Review, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), p. 128 Perry, William J. Good Bridges Make Good Neigh- National Defense Panel bors, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 40–43 National Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Petrie, John N. Transformation, no. 16 (Summer Dealing with Anarchy, no. 4 97), pp. 15–19 (Spring 94), pp. 17–23; Much More Than “From the Sea”: A Book Re- Neimeyer, C.P. view, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 120–23 Marines as an Endangered Species: A Book Review, no. 5 (Summer 94), Pfluke, Lillian A. pp. 121–22; Once and Future Southern Italy: Strategic Confu- Marines, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter sion, Operational Frustration, no. 4 94–95), pp. 47–51 (Spring 94), pp. 70–75 Nelson, Michael A. Owens, Mackubin Thomas Pierce, Terry C. Unity of Control: Joint Air Opera- Civilian Control: A National Cri- Leaving the Technocratic Tunnel, tions in the Gulf—Part Two, no. 5 sis? no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 69–75 (Summer 94), pp. 59–63 pp. 80–83; Vietnam as Military Pipp, Donald C. History: A Review Essay, no. 3 In Search of Focused Logistics, Nesselrode, Mark C. (Winter 93–94), pp. 112–18 The Joint Staff: Completing the no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 125–27 Metamorphosis, no. 8 (Summer 95), Owens, William A. Pitts, W. Darren pp. 114–17 The American Revolution in Mili- Guantanamo Diary-Operation tary Affairs, no. 10 (Winter 95–96), Nicula, Gail Sea Signal, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 37–38; JROC: Harnessing the pp. 114–20 Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography, Revolution in Military Affairs, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 55–57; Liv- Poole, Walter R. pp. 121–26 ing Jointness, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Chiefs from Across the Estuary: Nunn, Sam pp. 7–14; Overseeing Cross-Service A Book Review, no. 2 (Autumn 93), Future Trends in Defense Organiza- Trade Offs, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 123–25 tion, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 63–66 pp. 37–40

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Poulin, B. Raach, George T. Rollins, George A. UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, National Power and the Intera- Improving Force Closures, no. 10 no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 66–71 gency Process, no. 8 (Summer 95), (Winter 95–96), pp. 119–20 pp. 8–13 Powell, Colin L. Rosen, Stephen Peter The Chairman as Principal Mili- Randolph, Leonard M., Jr. Service Redundancy: Waste or Hid- tary Adviser: An Interview, no. 13 Medical Dimensions of Joint Hu- den Capability? no. 1 (Summer 93), (Autumn 96), pp. 29–36; A Word manitarian Relief Operations, pp. 36–39 from the Chairman, no. 1 (Summer no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 90–97 Rostow, Eugene V. 93), pp. 4–5; A Word from the Redden, Joseph J. Is U.N. Peacekeeping a Growth Chairman, no. 2 (Autumn 93), Joint Doctrine: The Way Ahead, Industry? no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 4–5 no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 10–12 pp. 100–05 Powers, Earl W. Reichart, John F. Ryan, Donald E., Jr. Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Secu- Adversarial Use of Chemical and Implications of Information–Based rity Strategy for the Next Century, Biological Weapons, no. 18 (Spring Warfare, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89 98), pp. 130–33 94–95), pp. 114–16 Price, David E. Reimer, Dennis J. Santarelli, Eugene D. Leadership: Some Thoughts on the Dominant Maneuver and Precision Air Component Support to Military Circa 2025, no. 13 Engagement, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Joint Exercises, no. 17 (Autumn/ (Autumn 96), pp. 97–99 pp. 13–16; Joint Warfare and the Winter 97–98), pp. 71–75 Price, George W. Army-Air Force Team, no. 11 Sapolsky, Harvey M. The Impact of Nationalism on (Spring 96), pp. 9–15; Leaping Interservice Competition: The Joint Force Planning, no. 10 Ahead to the 21st Century, no. 17 Solution, Not the Problem, no. 15 (Winter 95–96), pp. 20–24 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 20–24 (Spring 97), pp. 50–54 Rinaldo, Richard J. Sawyer, David A. Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do The Joint Doctrine Development Real Soldiers Do MOOTW? no. 14 System, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), (Winter 96–97), pp. 111–16 pp. 36–39 RisCassi, Robert W. Schafer, John M. Principles for Coalition Warfare, Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 58–71 War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 Robards, James A. Scheina, Robert L. Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of Argentine Jointness and the Mal- War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 vinas, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 95–101 Robb, Charles S. Schmitt, Gary J. Examining Alternative UCP Struc- American Primacy and the tures, no. 14 (Winter 96–97), Defense Spending Crisis, no. 18 pp. 85–93 (Spring 98), pp. 52–56 Roberts, Mark J. Schneider, James J. Prueher, Joseph W. Hardening Overseas Presence: Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, Rethinking the Joint Doctrine Force Protection, no. 14 (Winter and the Promise of Information Hierarchy, no 14 (Winter 96–97), 96–97), pp. 117–20; Iran and the Warfare, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 42–45; Shaping Our Future in “Great Satan”, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 21–28 the Asia-Pacific, no. 17 (Autumn/ pp. 55–57 Winter 97–98), pp. 55–61; Warfight- Schwamb, Frank E. Rokke, Ervin J. ing CINCs in a New Era, no. 13 Unified Endeavor ‘95 and Model- Military Education for the New (Autumn 96), pp. 48–52 ing Effective Training, no. 12 Age, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 18–23 Pudas, Terry J. (Summer 96), pp. 11–15 Rokosz, Ronald F. Preparing Future Coalition Com- Selva, Paul J. Changing the Mindset—Army An- manders, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Secu- titerrorism Force Protection, no. 17 pp. 40–46 rity Strategy for the Next Century, (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 110–17 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89

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Sennewald, Robert W. Shwedo, Kevin A. Penetrating the Hermit Kingdom: War Termination and Joint Plan- A Book Review, no. 17 ning, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 95–101 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 139–40 Sifers, Steve C. Sewall, John O.B. JMETL: The Key to Joint Implications for U.N. Peacekeep- Proficiency, no. 9 (Autumn 95), ing, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 29–33; pp. 95–98 United Nations Peacekeeping: Ends Simon, Jeffrey versus Means, no. 1 (Summer 93), Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing pp. 48–57 the East, no. 5 (Summer 94), Shalikashvili, John M. pp. 36–45 Farewell Message, no. 17 (Autumn/ Singh, Ajay Winter 97–98), pp. 1, 4–5; A Word Time: The New Dimension in War, from the Chairman, no. 3 (Winter no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 56–61 93–94), pp. 4–5; A Word from Spector, Ronald H. the Chairman, no. 4 (Spring 94), Skelton, Ike The Generation of 1945, no. 8 pp. 4–5; A Word from the Chair- Intelligence Support of Military (Summer 95), pp. 58–61 man, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 4–5; Operations, no. 18 (Spring 98), A Word from the Chairman, no. 6 pp. 17–22; Taking Stock of the New Stanton, James P. (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 4–8; Joint Era, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Europe, Forward Presence, and the A Word from the Chairman, no. 7 pp. 15–21 Future, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), (Spring 95), pp. 4–5; A Word from pp. 47–53 the Chairman, no. 8 (Summer 95), Starns, John F. pp. 4–6; A Word from the Chair- Whatever Happened to Defense man, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 1, 4; Industrial Preparedness? no. 16 A Word from the Chairman, no. 10 (Summer 97), pp. 27–33 (Winter 95–96), pp. 1, 4–7; A Word from the Chairman, no. 11 (Spring Stavridis, James 96), pp. 1, 4–5; A Word from the The Second Revolution, no. 15 Chairman, no. 12 (Summer 96), (Spring 97), pp. 8–13 pp. 1, 4–5; A Word from the Chair- Steele, William M. man, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 1, Joint Education: Where Do We Go 4–7; A Word from the Chairman, From Here? no. 3 (Winter 93–94), no. 14 (Winter 96–97), pp. 1, 4–6; pp. 63–70; Preparing the Army A Word from the Chairman, no. 15 in the Pacific for the 21st Century, (Spring 97), pp. 1, 4–7; A Word from no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), the Chairman, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 62–66 pp. 1, 4–5 Steffens, Thomas W. Sheehan, John J. Smith, Arthur M. Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Secu- Next Steps in Joint Force Integra- Joint Medical Support: Are We rity Strategy for the Next Century, tion, no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 41–47; Asleep at the Switch? no. 8 no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89 U.S. Atlantic Command and (Summer 95), pp. 102–09 Unified Endeavor ‘95, no. 10 Stevenson, Jonathan Snider, Don M. (Winter 95–96), pp. 11–15 Mogadishu Duet [Part Two]: Emergence of the Joint Officer, A Book Review, no. 10 (Winter Sheehan, Michael A. no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 53–57 95–96), pp. 127–28 ...to the Shores of Turtle Bay: Snyder, Jed C. A Book Review, no. 18 (Spring 98), Stiles, Charles W. Turkey’s Role in the Greater p. 141 Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Middle East, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), Shelton, Henry H. pp. 58–63 pp. 48–53 Coming of Age: Theater Special Operations Commands, no. 14 Soofer, Robert M. (Winter 96–97), pp. 50–52; A Word Joint Theater Missile Defense Strat- Every article listed in from the New Chairman, no. 17 egy, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 70–74 this index can be found (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 6–8; Soucy, Robert R., II on the web. A Word from the Chairman, no. 18 War Termination and Joint Plan- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/ (Spring 98), pp. 1, 4–6 ning, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 95–101 jfq_pubs/index.htm

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Stocker, Jeremy R. Sullivan, Gordon R. Todd, David F. Canadian “Jointery”, no. 10 Projecting Strategic Land Combat Cutting Defense—Method Instead (Winter 95–96), pp. 116–18; Joint- Power, no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 8–12 of Madness, no. 5 (Summer 94), ness in Defence of the Realm: A pp. 91–94 Summers, Harry G., Jr. Review Essay, no. 15 ( Spring 97), Leaner, Meaner (and Dejected?) Toner, James H. pp. 137–39 Soldiers: A Book Review, no. 18 Leadership, Community, and Story, Ann E. (Spring 98), p. 142; Revisiting the Virtue, no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 98–103 Beyond the Range of Military Gulf War: A Review Essay, Trainor, Bernard E. Operations, no. 9 (Autumn 95), no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 118–22 Jointness, Service Culture, and the pp. 99–104 Szafranski, Richard Gulf War, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Strain, Frederick R. When Waves Collide: Future pp. 71–74 The New Joint Warfare, no. 2 Conflict, no. 7 (Spring 95), Tritten, James J. (Autumn 93), pp. 17–24 pp. 77–84 Developing Naval Doctrine... Strebeck, John Tata, Anthony J. From the Sea, no. 9 (Autumn 95), Organizing National Level Imagery A Fight for Lodgement: Future pp. 110–13; Setting the Record and Mapping, no. 18 (Spring 98), Joint Contingency Operations, Straight: A Book Review, no. 10 pp. 31–37 no. 11 (Spring 96), pp. 82–89 (Winter 95–96), pp. 129–32 Tertrais, Bruno Tuozzolo, John J. France’s European Priority, no. 5 The Challenge of Civil-Military (Summer 94), pp. 18–23 Operations, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 54–58 van Tol, Jan M. Military Innovation and Carrier Aviation—An Analysis, no. 17 (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 97–109; Military Innovation and Carrier Aviation—The Relevant History, no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 77–87; Revolutions in Military Affairs, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 24–31 Viccellio, Henry, Jr. The Joint Challenge to Interservice Strickland, Frank B., Jr. Training, no. 7 (Spring 95), It’s Not About Mousetraps—Mea- pp. 43–47 suring the Value of Knowledge for Operators, no. 13 (Autumn 96), Vitale, Michael C. Thomas, William C. pp. 90–96 Jointness by Design, Not Accident, Operation Kingpin—Success or no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 24–30 Stucky, Scott W. Failure? no. 15 (Spring 97), Joint Operations in the Civil War, pp. 120–24 Vittori, Jay M. no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Making the Case for Multinational Tiersky, Ronald pp. 92–105 Military Doctrine, no. 18 (Spring French Military Reform and NATO 98), pp. 109–15 Sullivan, Brian R. Restructuring, no. 15 (Spring 97), Are We Really Ready for an RMA? pp. 95–104 Vlahos, Michael A Book Review, no. 12 (Summer 96), By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye Know Tilelli, John H., Jr. pp. 112–13; Joint in Spite of Them- Us, no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 108–10 Ulchi-Focus Lens ‘97: Putting selves: A Book Review, no. 7 (Spring JV 2010 into Practice, no. 17 Waldron, Arthur 95), pp. 129–31; Mediterranean (Autumn/Winter 97–98), pp. 76–80 China’s Military Classics: A Review Warfare in 3D: A Book Review, Essay, no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 114–17 no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 122–25; Tillson, John C.F. On the Other Side of the Interwar Building a Joint Training Readi- Walker, Jack Years: A Book Review, no. 1 ness Reporting System, no. 12 Leveraging Technology for Joint (Summer 93), pp. 125–27; Russia’s (Summer 96), pp. 22–28; Improving Training, no. 16 (Summer 97), Military Past: A Book Review, no. 2 the Management of Reserve Forces, pp. 104–08 (Autumn 93), pp. 125–27 no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 39–43

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Walker, Nancy J. Whetstone, Shawn C. Woodruff, William EUCOM and Sub-Saharan Africa, Of Arms and Men: A Book Review, The Battle for Anzio, no. 8 no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 103–07 no. 10 (Winter 95–96), pp. 128–29; (Summer 95), pp. 62–67 Joint Training for MOOTW: A Ware, Lewis Yakeley, Jay B., III Book Review, no. 15 (Spring 97), Warriors of the 13th Generation, Training the Pacific Warriors, p. 141 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 8–10 no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 16–21 White, John P. Yost, David S. Defense Organization Today, The Future of U.S. Overseas Pres- no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 18–22 ence, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 70–82 Whitlow, J.L. JFACC: Who’s in Charge? no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 64–70 Widnall, Sheila E. Global Presence, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 94–99 Wilkerson, Lawrence B. What Exactly Is Jointness? no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 66–68 Willis, T. LaMar Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Secu- Webb, Willard J. rity Strategy for the Next Century, The Single Manager for Air in no. 13 (Autumn 96), pp. 81–89 Vietnam, no. 3 (Winter 93–94), Willmott, H.P. pp. 88–98 Grave of a Dozen Schemes, no. 4 Yost, Mark Weidner, Glenn R. (Spring 94), pp. 82–91; Guadal- Where Are the Arleigh Burkes Operation Safe Border: The canal: The Naval Campaign, no. 2 Today? no. 11 (Spring 96), Ecuador-Peru Crisis, no. 11 (Spring (Autumn 93), pp. 98–106; Operation pp. 125–27 96), pp. 52–58 Downfall: A Book Review, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), p. 127 Young, Thomas-Durell Weigley, Russell F. Joint Doctrine Development: Fighting with Allies: The Debate Wilson, Thomas R. Overcoming a Legacy, no. 14 Fifty Years On, no. 8 (Summer 95), Joint Intelligence and Uphold (Winter 96–97), pp. 94–100; “Top pp. 38–45 Democracy, no. 7 (Spring 95), Down” Planning and Joint Doc- pp. 54–59 trine: The Australian Experience, Welch, William G. no. 12 (Summer 96), pp. 61–66; The Everyman’s Joint Library: Winnefeld, James A. A Trans-Atlantic Mid-Life Crisis: A Review Essay, no. 14 (Winter Unity of Control: Joint Air Opera- A Book Review, no. 18 (Spring 98), 96–97), pp. 128–30 tions in the Gulf, no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 88–99 p. 143 Wells, Gordon M. Young-Koo, Cha Deep Operations, Command and Winner, Andrew C. South Korea’s Defense Posture, Control, and Joint Doctrine: Time The Looming Alliance Debate over no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 26–31 for a Change? no. 14 (Winter Nuclear Weapons, no. 15 (Spring 96–97), pp. 101–05 97), pp. 80–86 Zackrison, James L. Of Cabals and Complots: A Book Westenhoff, Charles M. Wolfowitz, Paul D. Review, no. 11 (Spring 96), Why We Need an Air Force, no. 6 Managing the Schwarzkopf pp. 135–36 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 62–67 Account—Atkinson as Crusader: A Book Review, no. 3 (Winter Zepka, James M. Wettering, Frederick L. 93–94), pp. 123–24 Deep Strike: The Evolving Face of Dealing with Anarchy, no. 4 (Spring War, no. 9 (Autumn 95), pp. 80–85 94), pp. 17–23 Wolver, Gary A. Joint Combat Search and Rescue— Zoufal, Donald R. Wheelock, Kevin R. Operational Necessity or After- Transition of the Sarajevo Suburbs, Review Criteria for the Logistic thought? no. 18 (Spring 98), no. 16 (Summer 97), pp. 50–53 Plan, no. 15 (Spring 97), pp. 128–33 pp. 44–51

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The following appraisal of Joint Force Quarterly appeared in volume 86, number 1 (January 1998) of Naval Review, a professional military journal published in the United Kingdom. It was written by Lieutenant Comman- der J.R. Stocker, Royal Navy Reserve, who has contributed to past issues of JFQ.

he newest, and one of the better, Amer- ican military professional journals is Joint Force Quarterly. First published in T 1993, it is still not widely known on this side of the Atlantic but deserves to be. The National Defense University (NDU) is the alma mater of “jointness” in the United States, and these days every am- bitious officer needs to get his “joint ticket” punched if he is to rise beyond commander/lieutenant colonel. JFQ’s glossy format with lots of good pictures belies its serious purpose and content. Despite being officially sanctioned and funded, with a regular foreword by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it contains a wealth of authoritative, original, and questioning articles, overwhelmingly but not exclusively from serving U.S. officers. JFQ exists “to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development.” By and large, it suc- ceeds in its objectives and is invariably a good read. There is always something to attract the attention of a diverse readership, though one should be wary of the occasional piece of single- service advocacy masquerading as “jointness.” (No surprise there.) Predictably, joint doctrine features prominently in most issues. The joint empire in the United States extends much more widely and

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deeply than in the United Kingdom, though in- the beach and reduce their “footprint” ashore by terservice rivalries are as great, and in some im- exploiting superior maneuverability. portant respects U.S. forces on the ground are no An annual RMA essay contest produces a more truly integrated than those of their allies. wide selection of forward-looking pieces ranging Indeed, one often detects an underlying feeling from philosophical views on the future of armed (somewhat justified) on the part of the Navy-Ma- conflict, such as “Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality,” rine Corps “team” that they’ve always been joint to the very specific, such as “Acoustics on the 21st in all warfare environments, and what’s the big Century Battlefield.” fuss about? The United States has not one or two Historical pieces regularly appear, especially joint doctrine publications, but more than a hun- on World War II, and often purport to draw dred, including JTTP 4-02.2, Patient Movement; lessons from the past that can be applied in the JTTP 3-55.1, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; JTTP 1-06, future—always a contentious undertaking. The Financial Management, as well as more significant Middle East, ballistic missile defense, training and books on joint intelligence, amphibious opera- simulation, military operations other than war, tions, information warfare, air defense, and so on. and European defense have been other recent At the higher levels of joint doctrine in the themes. Many articles are very U.S.-specific, but a United States is clearly an evolving process, and a larger number have a much wider appeal and recent article specifically identified doctrine as provide good material for anyone interested in still not a part of naval culture. the current and future state of armed conflict and A recurring theme in JFQ is the American military operations. revolution in military affairs. The RMA debate is To understand what the American defense es- making an appearance in the United Kingdom, tablishment is doing and thinking, look no fur- but its true home is in the United States. Ameri- ther. To get real insights into “the higher aspects” cans have always had a more technologically-fo- of the military profession, again you will be hard cused military and strategic culture, and the in- pressed to find a better source. It can be depressing formation warfare concept is but the latest to see how much original, well-argued, and embodiment of that. In the future it will be thoughtful work is produced by U.S. officers, in “cyber-war,” in which computers do not just aid somewhat stark contrast to the continuing anti-in- conventional weapons to do their job more effec- tellectual culture that still permeates our own tively but become weapons in their own right, armed forces. One should note, however, how disabling vital parts of a modern state’s infrastruc- much of JFQ’s content does originate from com- ture “on the net”—a form of warfare that the manders, their staffs, and teaching establishments. United States is probably more vulnerable to than Much as Proceedings gets a regular airing in most. The extent to which the application of new the Naval Review, it is planned to review JFQ’s technologies is fundamentally altering the nature content in the future on an annual basis. of warfare is hotly debated, but the U.S. military is deeply committed to the hypothesis that “information superiority” will enable them to assert and maintain “battlespace dominance,” employing precision stand-off systems that minimize casualties and collateral damage. Some of the more skeptical views on this come from the Marine Corps, whose concept of “Operational Maneu- ver ...from the Sea” seeks nonetheless to bypass

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■ A NOTE TO READERS AND CONTRIBUTORS

DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of service channels. Individuals and organizations interested in receiving the the Armed Forces as well as from both defense analysts and academic journal on a regular basis should make their requirements known through specialists from this country and abroad, including foreign military officers command channels. Any corrections in shipping instructions for service and civilians. There is no required length for contributions, but manuscripts distribution should be directed to the appropriate activity listed below. of 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters, commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of ■ ARMY—Contact the installation publications control officer (citing Misc. Publication 71–1) or write: U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, supporting material (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with ATTN: Customer Service, 1655 Woodson Street, St. Louis, Missouri manuscripts; do not send originals. Unsolicited book reviews are generally 63114–6181, or call (314) 263–7305 / DSN 693–7305 (extension 286); or not accepted for publication. order via Starpubs or the Internet [http://www.usappc.hoffman.army.mil]. All submissions to JFQ must be accompanied by a covering letter which states that the manuscript has not been previously published and is not being ■ NAVY—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, submitted simultaneously to any other publication. In addition, the letter must Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be sent by Fax to (215) 697–5914 include the author’s full name (including military grade, service/component, (include SNDL, UIC, and full address). and assignment if applicable), a complete postal address (with Zip code), and a work telephone number. Submissions which do not comply with these ■ MARINE CORPS—For one-time distribution of an individual issue write to Marine Corps Logistics Base (Code 876), 814 Radford Boulevard, Albany, conditions may not be considered for publication. Neither facsimile nor e-mail Georgia 31704–1128; request by Fax at (912) 439–5839 / DSN 567–5839. manuscripts will be accepted as formal submissions. To be placed on standard distribution contact Headquarters, U.S. Marine All unsolicited manuscripts are reviewed, a process which may take Corps (Code ARDE), Federal Building No. 2 (Room 1302), Navy Annex, two to three months. To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manu- Washington, D.C. 20380; request by Fax at (703) 614–2951 / DSN 224–2951. script together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) ■ AIR FORCE—Submit AF Form 764A with short title “JFQN (indicate issue number)” to the base publications distribution office to establish unit in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the requirement through the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern manuscript, but endnotes rather than footnotes should always be used. Both Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896. the manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. ■ COAST GUARD—Contact Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, ATTN: Defense Operations Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations 20593–0001. and conform to the journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally returned to authors for review. In addition to service channels, bulk distribution is made directly to Unless evidence of prior clearance is provided, all manuscripts selected defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, service colleges, and for publication which are contributed by members of the U.S. Armed Forces other activities. Changes in shipping instructions should be communicated or employees of the Federal Government are forwarded to the Office of the to the Editor (see schedule below). Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to undergo security review. No honorarium or other form of payment is authorized for the publication of SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Govern- articles submitted by servicemembers or U.S. Government employees. ment Printing Office. To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript on the order and mail with a check for $17.00 ($21.25 foreign) or provide a version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superinten- WordPerfect is preferred (disks will not be returned unless requested). dent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15250–7954, Information on the submission of contributions is available by contacting or Fax the order to: (202) 512–2233. (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220, Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219, or Individual copies may be purchased through GPO bookstores nation- writing to the Editor, Joint Force Quarterly, ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ, 300 Fifth wide for $8.00 each. Avenue (Bldg. 62), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–5066. JFQ

DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE A total of 35,000 copies of Joint Force Quarterly is distributed worldwide. Of this number, more than 18,500 copies are sent directly to the five services for break down and delivery to subordinate commands, units, bases, etc. Bulk shipments also are made to the following organizations:

copies copies copies Office of the Secretary of Defense 400 U.S. Atlantic Command 150 PME Institutions Joint Staff and Joint Activities 700 U.S. Southern Command 150 U.S. Army War College 600 Services U.S. Central Command 275 U.S. Army Command and General Army 4,000 U.S. Strategic Command 275 Staff College (including the School Navy 6,500 U.S. Space Command 150 of Advanced Military Studies) 1,525 Marine Corps 1,500 U.S. Special Operations Command 150 Naval War College (both resident and Air Force 6,500 U.S. Transportation Command 100 nonresident programs) 1,750 Coast Guard 125 Defense Agencies Naval Postgraduate School 300 Unified Commands Defense Information Systems Agency 125 Marine Corps War College and Marine U.S. European Command 275 Defense Intelligence Agency 150 Corps Command and Staff College 400 U.S. Pacific Command 275 Defense Logistics Agency 150 Air War College 450 U.S. Forces Korea 75 Defense Mapping Agency 25 Air Command and Staff College U.S. Forces Japan 50 Defense Nuclear Agency 25 (including the School of Advanced Alaska Command 25 National Security Agency 25 Airpower Studies) 900

In addition to the above, approximately 3,500 copies of JFQ are distributed to general/flag rank officers and members of Congress; service doctrine centers; U.S. and foreign military attachés; and selected educational institutions, journals, and libraries in this country and abroad.

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Cover 3 0119 C4PGS 11/18/98 8:42 AM Page 1

JOI JFQ

coming next...

from flexible presence to deep battle

plus JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY lessons from Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, the case for joint evaluation reports, airpower at the Kassarine Pass, and more in the Autumn 98 issue of JFQ

JFQ 19 1998 / NUMBER SUMMER JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY The Nature

Published for the Doctrine an Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies Innovation National Defense University Washington, D.C.

Cov 4 Score covers 1 & 4 no greater than 3/16” from the b