Before the atomic bombs brought an end to , US troops were set for massive amphibious landings in the Japanese home islands. The Invasion That

Didn’t Happen By John T. Correll Gen. Henry H. “Hap” Ar- nold, commander of the Army Air Forces, predicted that the bombing would be sufficient to prevail and “enable our in- Bettmann/Corbis photo fantrymen to walk ashore on Japan with their rifles slung.” Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, believed that encirclement, , and bombardment would eventu- ally compel the Japanese to surrender. Others, notably Gen. George C. Marshall, the influential Army Chief of Staff, were convinced an invasion would be necessary. In the summer of 1945, the pursued a mixed strategy: con- tinuation of the bombing and blockading, while preparing for an invasion. Japan had concentrated its strength for a decisive defense Emperor reviews Japanese troops in in June 1941. Only when Japan of the homeland. In June, Tokyo’s leaders suffered severe hardship did his enthusiasm for the war begin to wane. decided upon a fight to the finish, com- mitting themselves to extinction before surrender. As late as August, Japanese here was never any chance Japanese airpower was mostly troops by the tens of thousands were that Japan would win World aircraft, although there were thousands pouring into defensive positions on T War II in the Pacific. When of them and plenty of pilots ready to fly Kyushu and . Japan attacked the US at Pearl Harbor, on suicide missions. Nevertheless, Japan Old men, women, and children were it bit off more than it could chew. Ja- hung on with great tenacity. It still had trained with hand grenades, swords, and pan reached the limits of its territorial 4,965,000 regular army troops and more bamboo spears and were ready to strap expansion in the next few months, and, in the paramilitary reserves. explosives to their bodies and throw from then on, it was a steady The outcome of the war was sealed in themselves under advancing tanks. as Japanese forces were ousted from the 1944 when the United States obtained An invasion would almost certainly Solomons, New Guinea, the Marianas, air bases in the Marianas. From there, have happened had it not been for the the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. B-29 bombers could reach Tokyo and successful test of the atomic bomb in After Germany surrendered in May all important targets in Japan. Night after the New Mexico desert on July 16, an 1945, the full war effort was focused on night, the B-29s rained firebombs and event that gave the United States a new the Pacific. It was nominally an Allied high explosives on the wood and paper strategic option. effort, but almost all of the forces closing structures of Japan. On March 9, 1945, The overall invasion plan was code- in on Japan were American. The Japanese the bombers destroyed 16 square miles named . In April Navy was gutted. What remained of of Tokyo and killed 83,793 Japanese. 1945, the named 42 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2009 Gen. Douglas MacArthur commander in chief of US Army forces in the Pacific in addition to his previous authority as commander in the South Pacific. He would lead the final assault on Japan. The invasion plan called for a US force of 2.5 million. Instead of being demobilized and going home, soldiers and airmen in Europe would redeploy to the Pacific. Forces already in the Pacific would be joined by 15 Army divisions and 63 air groups from the European Theater. Operation Downfall consisted of two parts: Operation Olympic. This invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s main islands, was set for Nov. 1, 1945. It would be an amphibious landing a third larger than D-Day in Normandy. The expectation was that nine US divisions would be op- posed by three Japanese divisions. (In fact, Japan had 14 divisions on Kyushu.) Far East Air Forces would support the invasion with 10 fighter groups, six heavy bomb Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific, groups, four medium bomb groups, four wades ashore at the island of Leyte, Philippines. light bomb groups, three reconnaissance groups, and three night fighter squadrons. for shortfalls in military capability. The Japan won a big battle, strengthening its In addition, the B-29s would continue Ketsu-Go (“Decisive Operation”) defense bargaining position. their strategic bombardment. MacArthur plan for the homeland counted on civil- The prime minister was Kantaro Su- said the southern Kyushu landings would ians, including schoolchildren, taking zuki, a retired admiral, who sometimes be conducted “under cover of one of the part in the battle. sided with the council’s peace faction heaviest neutralization bombardments but aligned frequently with the military by naval and air forces ever carried out An Elusive Answer hardliners, who dominated meetings in the Pacific.” Some 17 million persons had died at and policy. Operation Coronet. This was the code the hands of the Japanese empire between Japan still held most of the territory it name for an invasion, in , 1931 and 1945, and more would be certain had captured in Asia and Indochina, and of Honshu, the largest of the Japanese to die during the final stand. hoped to keep some of it. Its remaining islands. Coronet would require 1,171,646 Japan had been controlled by the military strength was considerable. If US troops, including a landing force of military since the 1930s. In 1945, it could inflict painful casualties on the 575,000 soldiers and marines. It would be power was vested in the “Big Six,” the United States, Japan might be able to the largest invasion force ever assembled. Supreme Council for the Direction of the secure favorable terms, it thought. Operation Coronet would make use of War. Members were the prime minister, Today, a fierce argument still rages airfields on Kyushu captured during foreign minister, Army minister (also about what the casualty toll might have Operation Olympic. called War Minister), Navy minister, been if the Operation Downfall invasion As Japan’s desperation grew, the chief of naval general staff, and chief of had taken place. The answer is elusive. ferocity of its armed resistance intensi- the Army general staff. Army and Navy Wartime casualty estimates were based fied. The code of bushido—“the way ministers were drawn from the ranks of on inaccurate assumptions—usually of the warrior”—was deeply ingrained, serving officers. The dominant member low—about enemy strength. Postwar both in the armed forces and in the of the Big Six was the War Minister, analysis has been severely distorted by nation. Surrender was dishonorable. Gen. Korechika Anami. academicians and activists on the Ameri- Defeated soldiers preferred suicide to Emperor Hirohito, regarded as divine can left seeking to prove that neither an life in disgrace. Those who surrendered and revered as the embodiment of the invasion of Japan nor the atomic bomb were not deemed worthy of regard or Japanese state, was supposedly above was necessary to end the war. respect. On Kwajalein atoll, the fatality politics and government. In fact, he was After the war, President Truman said rate for the Japanese force was 98.4 interested in, and well-informed about, that Marshall told him at Potsdam (July percent. On Saipan, nearly 30,000—97 both of them. His enthusiasm for the war 1945) that the invasion would cost “at percent of the garrison—fought to the did not wane until the bombs and hardship a minimum one-quarter of a million ca- death. On Okinawa, more than 92,000 reached Japan. sualties, and might cost as [many] as a Japanese soldiers in a force of 115,000 On March 18, Hirohito toured the areas million, on the American side alone.” For were killed. of Tokyo firebombed March 9 and 10; he this, Truman was ridiculed. There is no Japan continued the fight with fanati- concluded that the war was lost and that independent evidence of what Marshall cal determination in the belief that the Japan should seek an end to it as soon as said at Potsdam. Truman may have been willingness of soldiers and sailors to possible. However, Hirohito agreed with embellishing it, but his numbers were not sacrifice their lives would compensate the strategy of waiting to negotiate until preposterous, as is often alleged. AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2009 43 48 days of combat in Europe, been working on a fission bomb. The were 63,360.) Big Six shrugged off the loss and held Neither comparison was apt. their position. The Japanese forces on Luzon When the second atomic bomb was

Bettmann/Corbis photo and Okinawa were a fraction of dropped on Nagasaki Aug. 9, the Navy the size of the force waiting in chief, Adm. , argued that the home islands. As Marshall the US could not have much radioactive and other military leaders were material left for more atomic bombs. about to learn, they had drastically The hardliners refused to consider sur- underestimated the strength of the rendering unless the Allies agreed that Japanese defenses on Kyushu and Japanese forces could disarm themselves, Honshu. that there would be no prosecution for US intelligence agencies had war crimes, and that there would be no long since broken Japan’s secret Allied occupation of Japan. codes. “” was the name given War Minister Anami said the military to intelligence from intercepted could commit 2,350,000 troops to con- diplomatic communications, and tinue the fight. In addition, commanders “” was intelligence from could call on four million civil servants Japanese Army and Navy mes- for military duty. sages. From these intercepts, it The declared war on Ja- was known that Japan intended pan Aug. 8, which put pressure on the Big to fight to the end. Six from a different direction. The Japa- On June 15, an intelligence es- nese had hoped, without sound reasons Gen. Korechika Anami, Japan’s War Minis- timate had reported six combat divi- or encouragement, that they could cut a ter, opposed the surrender but would not go against the Emperor. sions and two depot divisions, a total deal with the Soviets to counterbalance of about 350,000 men, on Kyushu. the Americans and permit the Japanese In fact, Joint Staff planners on two However, beginning in July, Ultra to keep some of their conquered territory. occasions worked up casualty estimates intercepts revealed a much larger force, On Aug. 10, the Foreign Ministry, and came out in the same range. In August with new divisions moving into place. acting on approval of the Emperor, sent 1944, using casualty rates from fighting Subsequent reports raised the esti- notice to the US and the Allies that Japan on Saipan as a basis, they said that “it mated number of troops, first to 534,000 could accept the demand for surrender if might cost us a half-million American and then to 625,000. That nearly doubled “prerogatives” of the Emperor were not lives and many times that number in the June estimate, but it was still too low. compromised. The United States replied wounded” to take the Japanese home In actuality, Japan had 14 combat divi- that the authority of the Emperor would islands. An April 1945 report project- sions with 900,000 troops on Kyushu, be subject to the Supreme Commander of ed casualties of 1,202,005—including concentrated in the southern part of Allied Powers. The hardliners dug in, and 314,619 killed and missing—in Opera- the island around the Olympic landing the peace faction fell into disarray. Vice tions Olympic and Coronet, and more beaches. The American force committed Adm. Takijiro Onishi, vice chief of the if either of the campaigns lasted more to Kyushu was 680,000, of which 380,000 naval general staff, declared: “If we are than 90 days. were combat troops. Japanese forces prepared to sacrifice 20 million Japanese MacArthur’s staff made several esti- were being pulled back into Honshu as lives in a special attack [kamikaze] effort, mates for Operation Olympic, one for well. Between January and July, military victory will be ours.” 125,000 casualties in the first 120 days strength in the home islands doubled, As the world watched and waited, Gen. and another for 105,000 casualties in the from 980,000 to 1,865,000. Carl A. Spaatz, commanding US Strategic first 90 days. Marshall sent MacArthur Air Forces in the Pacific, redirected the a strong hint about Truman’s concern The Bombs Fall B-29 force away from the firebombing of about casualties, whereupon MacArthur, Would the United States have pressed cities to precision attack of military tar- who wanted the invasion to go forward, ahead with Operation Downfall anyway? gets, especially transportation. Marshall backed away from the estimates, declar- If so, casualties would be much higher and his staff were studying an alternate ing them too high. than predicted. If not, Tokyo would have strategy, to use atomic bombs in direct At a critical White House meeting on won its bet that the United States would support of invasion. The United States June 18, Marshall gave his opinion that back down if the price in American lives expected to have at least seven bombs by casualties for the first 30 days on Kyushu could be made high enough. Oct. 31. They were told by Manhattan would not exceed the 31,000 sustained It did not come to the test. The casualty Project scientists that lethal radiological in a similar period of the battle for Lu- estimates were never updated to take the effects from an atomic bomb would reach zon in the Philippines. (Marshall took Ultra intercepts into account. On Aug. out 3,500 feet but that the ground would that number from an inaccurate report. 4, the war plans committee of the Joint be safe to walk on in an hour. Casualties for the first 30 days on Luzon Chiefs of Staff suggested reviewing the The impasse was broken by the Em- had been 37,900.) Others at the meeting plan in view of the Japanese buildup, but peror who decided to surrender and based their estimates on Okinawa, where by then the decision had been made to announce his decision to the Japanese US casualties were about 50,000. drop the atomic bomb. people in the form of an “Imperial Re- (To put these numbers in some per- The first atomic bomb fell on Hi- script” broadcast on the radio. spective, the losses for the Normandy roshima on Aug. 6. Japanese officials Army and Navy officers put up invasion, from D-Day through the first understood what it was; Japan had itself violent resistance. Some attempted to 44 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2009 destroy the recorded rescript before broadcast. The commander of the Imperial Guard, who would not go along with the plot, was assassinated by Army hotheads. They tried to find and kill Suzuki as well. They attempted to persuade Anami—who was opposed to the surrender but would not oppose the Emperor—to join in a coup. Had he done so, the surrender might have failed, but Anami committed suicide instead.

Enter the Revisionists The Emperor’s rescript was broad- cast at noon on Aug. 15, and the war was over. There was some criticism of the use of the atomic bomb in the immediate postwar period, but it was in the 1960s that the “revisionist” school of histo- rians emerged, aggressively critical of the United States and challenging the necessity and motive for using the atomic bomb. The central revisionist claim is that the atomic bombs were not necessary and that, even without them, the war soon would have been over. Japan was on the verge of surrender. The United States prolonged the war by insisting on unconditional surrender and dropped the atomic bombs mainly to impress and A mushroom cloud rises over the Japanese city of Nagasaki on Aug. 9, 1945, three intimidate the Russians. In any case, days after the first atomic bomb struck Hiroshima. the casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan were exaggerated. not nearly as authoritative a product as the bombing of Hiroshima created a The latest in the revisionist repertory the title sounds and its conclusions are situation which could be dramatized.” is Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, contrary to the overwhelming weight Japan was not ready to surrender and the (2005) by of evidence. prior to the dropping of the atomic Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, professor of his- It is reasonable to consider sev- bombs. Without them, the war would tory at University of California, Santa eral factors as contributing to the have gone on. Those who think other- Barbara. “Americans still cling to the surrender—bombing and blockade, wise seriously underestimate Japan’s myth that the atomic bombs dropped Soviet entry into war, the impending residual strength and determination. on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided invasion—but the Emperor’s decision Bombing and blockade would have the knockout punch,” Hasegawa said. was key. eventually ended the war at some point “The myth serves to justify Truman’s When Hirohito told his advisors but were not likely to have done so any- decision and ease the collective Ameri- that he intended to surrender, he gave time soon. The B-29 firebombing would can conscience.” three reasons: bombing and blockade, probably have resumed, and two nights A regular part of the revisionist inadequate provisions to resist invasion, of it on a par with March 9 would have litany is recitation of wartime opinions and the atomic bombs. He said on Aug. exceeded the death toll of both atomic of Army Air Forces leaders, including 14 that “a peaceful end to the war is bombs. Arnold and Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, who preferable to seeing Japan annihilated.” Operation Olympic would most likely thought the war could have been brought In the Imperial Rescript of Surren- have gone forward against a Japanese to an end by conventional bombing. der, he said, “The enemy has begun to force with 600,000 more troops than They ignore LeMay’s later assessment employ a new and most cruel bomb, the previously estimated on Kyushu—and that “the atomic bomb probably saved power of which to do damage is, indeed, that would have left the invasion of Hon- three million Japanese and perhaps a incalculable, taking the toll of many shu and Operation Coronet yet to come. million American casualties.” innocent lives.” Hirohito, at a meeting In the end, Japan would have been Revisionists like to cite the US Stra- with Mac­Arthur Sept. 27, 1945 said, defeated, but the price in lives on both tegic Bombing Survey of 1946, which “The peace party did not prevail until sides would have been terrible. n said the Japanese would probably have surrendered by Nov. 1, even if Russia John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a had not entered the war and even if no contributing editor. His most recent article, “Doolittle’s Raid,” appeared in the April invasion was planned. The survey is issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2009 45