Cover1 JFQ9 10/1/96 9:13 AM Page 1 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLYJFQ The Greater

New Age Military

Operation Downfall

Jointness Defined

Somalia: Lessons Unlearned Autumn95

Theater Missile Defense

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL JFQ Cov2 10/1/96 9:18 AM Page C2

C2 JFQ / Autumn 1995 JFQ Prelm Pgs 10/1/96 9:23 AM Page 1 JFQ

AWord from the Chairman

t has been said that the deserts of the Middle East are where hopes and dreams go to wither and die. It is a warning worth recalling. Enough skeletons of fallen empires and forgotten Icities lie buried in the sands to confirm the wisdom of that caution. In our own day we have seen hopes and dreams lan- guish there, which demonstrates anew that the warning has not lost its gravity. Just six years ago this was the most bricks, one volatile canvas painted over another. dangerous place on . It was here that the Then, suddenly, the background on one of the faced the canvasses was washed away. greatest odds of going to war This permitted two historic brushstrokes that with the . A have been applied since then. One was the Per- clash of interests and a sian . For the first time in forty-five years chronically unstable politi- the West fought alongside Arab states against a cal culture made the chance common enemy. More amazing, that very enemy of miscalculation frighten- was an Arab nation. At once two great taboos ing. As well, the conflicts were lifted. Moderate Arabs learned that America that have erupted during is a trustworthy and valuable ally and vice versa. every decade since ’s And our European partners, wary of venturing founding—including one into this region as U.S. allies ever since the Suez occasion that took us to the crisis of 1956, finally set the past aside. brink of nuclear confronta- The second brushstroke was applied when tion—seemed destined to Yitzak Rabin and Yassar Arafat stood with their continue far into the future. hands clasped on the White House lawn. For the All that has changed. region’s future, their handshake that day carried The end of the was an impact comparable to the fall of the Berlin one reason for the differ- Wall. Indeed, the Arab-Israeli confrontation tor- ence, although that event tured and mangled the region in ways that the was not the cause of regional had never inflicted on . problems. Far from it. But It would be tempting to suggest that all is DOD ( Helene Stikkel) neither did it heal any rifts. now well. But, of course, it is not. Twice since the Instead, bipolar competition War our forces have returned to worked its way between the cracks of shifting ha- deter Saddam Hussein from again lashing out at treds, alliances, and ambitions that grew from a tempestuous past. It was mortar between the (continued on page 4)

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■ CONTENTS

1 A Word from the Chairman ■ OUT OF JOINT by John M. Shalikashvili 24 Jointness by Design, 5 Focus on the Middle East Not Accident by Hans Binnendijk by Michael C. Vitale

■ JFQ FORUM ■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET 31 The Greater Middle East 7 Letters to the Editor 32 Five Pillars of Peace in the ■ Central Region 10 Human Rights and by J.H. Binford Peay III the Commander by Barry R. McCaffrey 40 The Middle East: Challenges JFQ Born of Success by Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.

46 The Growing Reach of Radical Islam by William H. Lewis

50 Gulf Security and ’s 14 Leading the Revolution Uncertain Future in C4I by Phebe Marr by Jeremy M. Boorda 55 and the “Great Satan” by Mark J. 18 Military Education for the New Age 58 ’s Role in the Greater by Ervin J. Rokke Middle East by Jed C. Snyder

64 Regional Implications of PHOTO CREDITS NBC Proliferation The cover features Apache helicopter (McDonnell Douglas); the insets (from top) include Kuwaiti honor guard (U.S. Air by G. Joseph Force/Dave McLeod), transmitting photographs via satellite phone system (U.S. Air Force/Randy S. Mallard), Coast Guard ■ barge picking up troops on Saipan (U.S. Coast Guard), marines raiding Somali market (U.S. Navy/Terry C. Mitchell), 70 Joint Theater Missile and USS Cape St. George firing surface-to-air missile (U.S. Navy/Johnny Wilson). Defense Strategy The front inside cover displays (clockwise, from top left) Bradley fighting vehicle (U.S. Air Force/Tracy Hall); landing by Robert W. Soofer craft returning to USS Ashland (U.S. Navy/Alexander C. Hicks); USS Arthur W. Radford being replenished by USS Tempest off Haiti (U.S. Navy/Gregory S. Cinelli); marines providing cover in 75 Theater Ballistic Missile (U.S. Navy/Terry C. Mitchell); and F–16 supporting NATO airstrikes in Bosnia (U.S. Defense Air Force/Debbie Hernandez). The table of contents includes photographs (from top left) of soldiers securing by Ronald R. Fogleman building in Haiti (Combat Camera Imagery/Val Gempis), Patriot missile batteries (DOD), and F–16, FA/18, and A–10 flying over Northern Italy (Combat Camera Imagery/Jamie Bowman). 80 Deep Strike: The Evolving The back inside cover captures Coast Guard patrol boat Adak with USS Face of War Wisconsin off Sandy Hook (U.S. Coast Guard/Robin Rossler). The back cover reproduces a work of art from the Mexican War entitled Hill by Albert R. Hochevar, James A. Robards, Omatuzzo by James Walker (U.S. Army Center of Military History). John M. Schafer, and James M. Zepka

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AUTUMN 95 / NUMBER 9

114 A Guantanamo Diary— Operation Signal by W. Darren Pitts

■ OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN 121 Lemuel Cornick Shepherd, Jr.

■ THE JOINT WORLD 122 Lessons Learned, Exercises, Education, History, and Periodical Literature

86 : ■ OFF THE SHELF The Devil Was in the Details 124 The Art of War—Past, Present, by D.M. Giangreco Future: A Review Essay by David J. Andre 95 JMETL: The Key to Joint Proficiency 128 More Than Deeds of by John R. Ballard and Steve C. Sifers Derring-Do: A Book Review by John M. Collins 99 Beyond the Range of Military Operations 129 From Strategists to Strategy: by Ann E. Story and Aryea Gottlieb A Book Review by Audrey Kurth Cronin 105 Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine 131 A Prince of a Tale: by C. Kenneth Allard A Book Review by Patrick L. Clawson 110 Developing Naval Doctrine ...From the Sea 132 The Military in Israeli Society: by James J. Tritten JFQA Book Review by Joseph E. Goldberg

Joint Force Quarterly

Hans Binnendijk JFQ is published for the Chairman of the The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Editor-in-Chief by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and top- Patrick M. Cronin fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 9 for de- employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations tails). Please direct all editorial communications to: Executive Editor forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, Editor Robert A. Silano contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the Joint Force Quarterly Editor unified commands, and joint force development. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ Martin J. Peters, Jr. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Production Coordinator not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense Telephone: (202) 475–1013 / DSN 335–1013 Calvin B. Kelley or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012 Senior Copy Editor portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Internet: [email protected] Justin Burkhart without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- This publication has been approved by the Secretary of Editorial Intern (Summer 1995) ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- rial is quoted from or based on its contents. Defense. The Typography and Design of the U.S. Government Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction. ISSN 1070–0692 November 1995

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■ A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN Joint Force Quarterly

(continued from page 1) GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA Publisher his neighbors. For nearly four years we have pa- trolled northern Iraq to prevent the slaughter of ADVISORY COMMITTEE the Kurds. Tehran’s still resonate with Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF ■ National Defense University sermons by angry mullahs who spew hatred Chairman against America and exhort their followers to ex- port a revolution of dubious benefit that has im- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman poverished and Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF ■ The Joint Staff

isolated Iran. It Col John W. Brooks, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College was adherents of hopes and dreams this faith who Brig Gen Roger E. Carleton, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College now have a better planted a bomb in MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA ■ U.S. Army War College the World Trade A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College chance of surviving Center. With re- in the Middle East gard to the Middle Col K.A. Conry, USMC ■ Marine Command and Staff College East peace process, MG John S. Cowings, USA ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces

while it has come Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College far there is still a ■ long road ahead and, absent American power, it is Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF The Joint Staff unlikely that it will remain on the right path. RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN ■ National War College

Yet compared to a few years ago, hopes and BG David H. Ohle, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College dreams now have a better chance of surviving in ■ the greater Middle East. We have a vital stake in Maj Gen D. Bruce Smith, USAF Air War College those hopes and dreams. We depend on the oil RADM James R. Stark, USN ■ Naval War College that lies beneath the sands. Without it, America as well as the international economy would suf- EDITORIAL BOARD fer. We also have strong and invaluable regional allies, from freedom loving and courageous Hans Binnendijk ■ National Defense University Chairman to wise and noble Egyptians without whom peace would still be an empty dream. In- Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University

deed, one great benefit of the last few years has COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College been the growth of American-Arab friendship Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University made possible by vast changes in the region’s strategic environment. COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy

The articles on the greater Middle East which Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University appear in this issue of JFQ explore some of the Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces challenges that remain. With the end of the Cold War, American power has become interlaced with Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF ■ Naval War College the future of the region as never before. U.S. lead- William T. Hodson ■ Information Resources Management College ership, vision, and strength are important to meet- Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College ing larger challenges and obstacles. As we survey the opportunities before us, we should remember Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation that only a short time ago the threat of Armaged- William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College don loomed in this area. We now have a chance to CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN ■ National War College make sure that this threat never arises again. Col Charles H. Mead, USAF ■ Armed Forces Staff College

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago Chairman Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College of the Joint Chiefs of Staff LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute

James H. Toner ■ Air War College

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University

LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) ■ RKK, Limited

COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA ■ Marine Corps War College

COL Terry J. Young, USA ■ U.S. Army War College

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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■

systems that can strike U.S. forces abroad. Should Islamic, anti-Western regimes take power, or Iran FOCUS ON THE and Iraq have a free hand, U.S. interests would suffer a serious setback. These factors have altered the region’s geo- graphic parameters. The narrow Cold War per- spective which viewed the Middle East as limited Middle East to the and the Persian Gulf is obsolete. The emerging concept of a “greater” Middle East By HANS BINNENDIJK encompasses the between Turkey in the north and the Horn of in the south, and between to the west and to the east, and recognizes the strategic impact of events in areas adjacent to the traditional boundaries of vents in the first half of this decade have the Middle East. Some even include Central significantly strengthened America’s as part of the region. strategic hand in the Middle East, but sev- Despite positive developments and danger- Eeral long-term trends threaten to under- ous prospects, core U.S. strategic interests in the mine this progress and once again make the re- area remain essentially what they were during the gion dangerous to Western interests. The type Cold War. Protecting access to Persian Gulf oil, and extent of future U.S. military engagement in maintaining peace between Israel and its neigh- the greater Middle East could be determined by bors, and limiting radical political movements re- the direction of these trends. It is for this reason main vital U.S. interests. What changed signifi- that we focus on the region in the JFQ Forum in cantly is the political context of these challenges. this issue of the journal. While a considerable consensus remains between The collapse of the Soviet Union and the American and regional views regarding security withering of its bilateral security ties abroad have threats, the shift towards domestic priorities by severely reduced Moscow’s ability to affect re- key governments could begin to undermine this gional events and have modified the orientation consensus. of countries such as and . Without The United States protects its vital interests this competition the United States emerged as the in the Gulf with a diplomatic policy of dual con- principal external actor in the region. This advan- tainment, backed up by the U.S. Central Com- tage was reinforced by the outcome of the Persian mand. This policy, which labels both Iran and Gulf War in 1991 and our continuing effort in de- Iraq as hostile to Western interests, has thus far fense of the (GCC) effectively isolated the region’s most immediate states. Washington invested its diplomatic advan- security threats. There are recent indications that tages wisely and helped broker peace agreements the regime of Saddam Hussein is under intense between Israel and the Liberation Orga- pressure. But dual is a unilateral nization and between Israel and . Peace ef- initiative with only limited support from Europe forts continue with Syria. The American role has and Japan. Should sanctions against Iraq be seldom been as dominant. eased by the , or should Russia But there is heightened concern in the Mid- supply Iran with fissile material, the dual con- dle East over a combination of internal eco- tainment policy could break down and our Gulf nomic, social, and political problems which allies would be increasingly threatened. Dual eclipse traditional security concerns. As these containment also does not address the potential problems have grown, radical groups have used for instability that exists among the states of the religion as a political weapon to destabilize pro- Gulf Cooperation Council. The U.S. military Western states and to spread terror not only to presence which provides them with external pro- Cairo and Algiers but to Paris and New York. At tection would be of little avail against internal the same time, states in the region continue to upheaval. pursue weapons of mass destruction to offset In the event that it must again respond to a conventional military weakness, with delivery challenge from Iraq or another renegade nation, CENTCOM has taken significant steps with the cooperation of GCC states to bolster its theater military posture and to reduce its long lead-time for transporting equipment and weapons to the Hans Binnendijk is director of the Institute for region. As Vigilant Warrior illustrated in October National Strategic Studies and editor-in-chief 1994, our ability to mobilize expeditionary forces of JFQ.

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■ MIDDLE EAST

and deploy them has improved rapidly and dra- Islam as the vehicle with which to contest gov- matically. Nevertheless, with U.S. force reductions ernment policies and gain control of governing in Europe and elsewhere, a repeat of the massive institutions. While some connections and com- Desert Storm buildup would significantly strain mon interests exist among these radical groups, the U.S. force structure. In addition, the contin- they do not constitute a monolithic movement. ued military enforcement of the Iraqi cease fire Nor are they representative of Islam. The United through Operations Southern Watch and Provide States and its Western allies can work with the Comfort II constantly stress our forces. To reduce great majority of Moslems, who do not support a this tension and enhance the durability of these radical anti-Western agenda. In any case, it would missions, more efficient means to accomplish be both fallacious and counterproductive for these tasks may need to be devised. America or its treaty partners to develop policies The second vital American interest in the re- which could be perceived as anti-Islamic. gion—maintaining the Arab-Israeli peace—is also Given rising economic, social, and political protected by both diplomacy and military en- difficulties confronting friendly governments in gagement. The successes in the Middle East peace the Middle East there is little the United States process will probably be an important diplomatic can do militarily to ameliorate the present situa- legacy of the Clinton administration. But the tion. We must continue to support friendly gov- process is not complete and existing successes are ernments who are in direct conflict with extrem- under attack. The recent assassination of Israeli ists while urging them to deal with underlying Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by an Israeli ex- economic, social, and political issues. We must tremist robs the peace process of its most impor- recognize the potential costs to our long-term se- tant leader. We can only hope that the outrage it curity interests if the extremists succeed, and we has engendered throughout the world will stimu- must also begin to develop contingency plans. late rather than retard the peace process. Much For example, we might well be called on by may now depend upon whether the position of France to help evacuate people should extremists moderates within Israel can be strengthened and take over in . We could also find ourselves whether Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is willing caught in the middle of internal unrest in to compromise over the Golan. or the Gulf. In the Middle East peace process it is success These challenges are all addressed in greater that brings U.S. military engagement. The United detail by authors of the articles in JFQ Forum. States continues to deploy two battalions as peace They take a broad, long-term view of the emerg- monitors in the Sinai. Peace between Israel and ing threats that Western governments as well as Syria will probably mean deployment of addi- joint force commanders and planners may have tional peacekeepers to the . Despite to face in the region. JFQ criticism of such a deployment, American peace- keepers on the Golan would likely be quite se- cure. If a deployment is required, the United States will have an opportunity to consolidate the Sinai and Golan operations and provide a more cost effective monitoring force. While there are prospects for success in U.S. Persian Gulf policy and the peace process, the most alarming development in the greater Middle East is the growth of Islamic extremism in Algeria, , Egypt, and elsewhere. In its most extreme form resurgent Islam is an ideological, xenopho- bic, populist movement that seeks to overthrow moderate regimes, endorses anti-Western strate- gies, and advocates the supremacy of Islamic par- ties. Extremists represent a special challenge to governments by threatening their legitimacy on religious as well as political grounds. While militant Moslems may have strong re- ligious beliefs, many deliberately use Islam to fur- ther political agendas. With the failures of Marx- ism and pan-Arab ideologies, many radicals view

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

The coupling of Yost’s two assumptions leads Basing an analysis on a theory which we do Letters... to a means-ends gap that undermines America’s not have the resources or will to support saps the credibility overseas. Resources are finite, and it is pertinence of the argument. Nobody is suggesting OVERSEAS PRESENCE not unpatriotic to say so. We must abandon the par- that we turn our backs on the rest of the world. It is a To the Editor—In an article that appeared in adigm that every crisis is a zero sum game. U.S. se- matter of intellectual approach, and defense analysts the Summer 1995 issue of JFQ, David Yost stated curity requires taking a selective look at military re- must free themselves from Cold War cliches. In the that to address the question of U.S. overseas pres- sponses and preserving our assets for crises that past we could not afford to question if we should be ence, we must go back to first principles. Yost’s merit attention because they threaten national inter- there. But today the question has to be asked, even if principles turn out to be pillars of liberal interna- ests. Engagement and leadership are means to an it is continually rejected by some on its own merits. tionalist theory. Peace is indivisible and threats to end, not ends in themselves, and when taken in —John Hillen the world order are everywhere threats to our secu- Yost’s context as policy guidance they could lead to Defense Policy Analyst rity. In other words, occasional alligators of discon- squandering valuable resources in places such as The Heritage Foundation tent, extremism, and aggression can be best de- Somalia and Bosnia. In an age of shrinking budgets feated by draining the swamp. and crippling debt, we can take important stands on JOINT PSYOP security issues without becoming the one and only But a potent argument can be made that his —An error introduced into the world policeman. To the Editor principles vanished with the Cold War. After all, it is published version of my article on “PSYOP and the To his credit, Yost does not pretend, as others astonishing to learn that the demise of the Soviet Warfighting CINC” in your last issue (JFQ, Summer do, that the myriad threats of a fragmenting, multi- Union as a clear and present danger has apparently 1995) requires clarification. Command and control polar world actually threaten America in the same changed nothing vis-à-vis national security. In one of for psychological operations (PSYOP) forces differs way as the Soviets did. Instead, his most compelling the most unthreatening periods in our Nation’s his- from that for other special operations forces (SOF). rationale for engagement lies in supervising our al- tory we are being encouraged to wage a costly and The broad range and tactical levels, with the require- lies who apparently cannot be trusted with nuclear expansive crusade through a strategy of engagement. ment to be fully integrated with interagency activities weapons or the strategic capabilities of force projec- Yost’s first principles rest on two assumptions (both overt and covert), as well as with conventional tion. So we maintain the arsenal of democracy to of the Cold War that are questionable today. The first forces, command and control warfare operations, keep our major trading partners out of the security is that resources are unlimited and provide infinite and information warfare, mandate that PSYOP com- business—which enables them to profit enormously means to shape international security. This takes lit- mand and control structures and relationships be from our neurotic largesse—while we struggle on in tle account of the debt crisis, a falling share of world separate and distinct from those of other SOF. While the superpower role. As Ronald Steel has written, GNP, and rich democratic, free-market states across PSYOP fully supports the activities of other SOF, its “They concentrate on productivity, market penetra- Europe and Asia. The second is that our allies and primary emphasis is to bolster the theater CINC’s tion, wealth, and innovation: the kind of power that clients will acquiesce in our actions overseas. After overall campaign and conventional forces. Thus its matters most in today’s world. In this competition we all, who wouldn’t want to follow our lead? Exception- focus is broader than just the activities of JFSOCC are—with our chronic deficits, weak currency, mas- alism is key to Wilsonian internationalism, but as or JSOTF, and its C2 must allow for direct access to sive borrowing, and immense debt—a very strange Abba Eban observed: “The truth is that nobody out- JFCs and full integration at all levels. kind of superpower.” side of America has ever taken the theory of Ameri- A theater SOC or JFSOCC does not normally Can we only be secure by ensuring, at great can exceptionalism very seriously.” exercise command and control over PSYOP forces cost, that the rest of the world is secure first? Per- The arrogance of liberal internationalism does other than those specifically attached to JSOTF to haps, as some suggest, this is an overreaction to not start at the water’s edge; it also applies to Ameri- support other operations. Rather, day-to-day peace- having responded late for two world wars in this cans in an attempt to factor them out of the foreign time responsibility for PSYOP planning and supervi- century. Internationalism holds that there will be policy equation. Yost rightly points out that polls re- sion rests with J-3s, assisted by J-3 PSYOP officers other wars unless America remains “at the center of veal a mood of prudence and caution that reflects and forward liaison teams from the active component international security management efforts.” This dire in-your-face troubles at home and lack of a tan- PSYOP group. In a crisis, contingency, or war, CINCs smacks of self-fulfilling prophesy and, more cyni- gible threat abroad. Like a committed international- will form Joint Force PSYOP Component Commands cally, of a rationale for an establishment grown rich ist, however, he brushes aside these things by refus- (JFPOCCs) as functional component commands on global gendarmerie. ing to factor constraints into his prescription for (similar to ground, naval, air, and special operations The underlying question suggested by Yost’s engagement. Leading the world may ennoble foreign component commands) to plan, coordinate, and exe- first principles is whether the end of the Cold War policy elites, but those who must bear the cost of cute theater PSYOP. CINCs designate the senior engendered new first principles. These might dictate that still have to deal with the more mundane prob- PSYOP commander as JFPOCC commander who that peace is divisible, that wars can and always will lems of domestic renewal. Given the propensity of will form a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) to exe- occur, and that many will not threaten our interests. U.S. foreign policy adventures to lose public support cute PSYOP. Some forces may be assigned or at- They would need to be addressed, but not always by and collapse at the first sign of double-digit casual- tached to component commands (GCC or SOCC) as a significant military campaign. New principles ties, the tolerance of the Nation should command the mission dictates, but JPOTF retains overall would maintain that conflicts are best solved from greater attention from policy elites instead of getting responsibility for executing PSYOP in theater. short shrift as parochial or irrelevant. Public willing- the inside-out: at local or regional levels. Such solu- —COL Jeffrey B. Jones, USA ness to make sacrifices is an accurate barometer of tions are sustainable, and achieving them would Joint Staff (J-38) the varying importance of U.S. interests. allow the Nation to keep its powder dry for conflicts that really threaten the global balance of power and vital interests.

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■ FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

A JOINT NCO? the enlisted force arose, he could help senior advi- creature of the Cold War, which is over now. As out- sors at unified commands find common solutions. lined by McPeak, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps To the Editor—Military training and leadership depend heavily on non-commissioned officers. Yet This would be valuable for every command. In ad would continue present missions, even though he the Chairman, unlike service chiefs and most CINCs, hoc organizations such as JTFs he could establish envisioned mission expansions for each service. The lacks the counsel of a senior NCO. This seems odd an acceptable set of standards. Navy could assume long-range bombing, which he since senior NCOs perform three distinct functions to Since nearly 80 percent of the Armed Forces suggested is the only true remaining Air Force mis- support the chain of command. First, they assist in are enlisted, it seems fitting that they have one of sion. The Navy has the power to control the air over decisionmaking and enforcing standards during exe- their own at the top of the joint team. and coastal areas and consequently can strike cution. Goldwater-Nichols served as the impetus for —SGM William P. Traeger, USA anywhere. All three main branches of the operational thinking about what it means to fight jointly. Partic- Senior Enlisted Advisor Navy have long-range strike potential already. ipation by NCOs in joint decisions and execution Joint Special Operations Forces Submarines clearly possess that potential as should be consistent up and down the chain. Sec- Institute the Navy’s strategic arm. This most viable leg of the ond, NCOs direct and monitor training that, while not nuclear triad continues to deploy submarine- usually joint at the individual and small unit levels, HUBRIS...FROM launched nuclear missiles. Strategic Command is definitely affects joint exercises. Their experience THE SEA already headed by a naval officer. It would be a rela- tively small step to turn it over to the Navy. Further- could enhance efforts by CJCS to develop meaning- To the Editor—When General Merrill McPeak, ful and challenging training. Third, they enhance more, because strategic (nuclear) forces have a former Air Force Chief of Staff, stated that his ser- much smaller profile than in the Cold War, perhaps communication by explaining policy to enlisted men vice was willing to give up major missions to the and women and gleaning feedback on morale, wel- it is time to do away with B–1Bs and B–52s and Army and naval air arms except for long-range and their outdated strategic strike capability. The ratio- fare, quality of life, and training. This function is no , he basically admitted that the Na- less important from a joint perspective. nale for a nuclear triad has passed away as should tion does not need an Air Force. Then why not sim- the triad itself. All long-range strategic bombing A senior NCO seems appropriate given the ply expand the other services to assume the mis- Chairman’s role as communicator. Title 10 lists four sions of the Air Force? After all, the Air Force was a CJCS functions performed for CINCs: confer with and obtain information on requirements, evaluate and integrate such information, advise and make recommendations on the requirements of combatant RMA Essay Contest commands, and communicate those requirements to other DOD elements. WINNERS National military strategy cites five force The winners of the first annual Joint Force Quarterly Essay Contest on building foundations including quality people and the Revolution in Military Affairs sponsored by states that retaining good people involves not only the National Defense University Foundation, Inc., are as follows: matters of pay and benefits, but ensuring that “our operating tempo and planned deployments are kept FIRST PRIZE within reasonable bounds.” These words speak to the heart of what NCOs do: they enlighten the lead- “War in the Information Age” ership by paying attention. Indeed, paying attention by ENSIGN THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, USNR means to listen, question, monitor, reassure, ensure (the NCO way of enforcing), and report back to the SECOND PRIZE boss. These communications basics are key to the success of joint exercises and operations. “Acoustic Technology on the Twenty-First Century Soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen should Battlefield” be able to look to the NCO chain and see that it con- by LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARVIN G. METCALF, ARNG tinues to the top of the Armed Forces. They should know that CJCS gets advice and counsel from one of THIRD PRIZE their own. Enlisted personnel should hear the latest joint policies and decisions from an NCO. These are “Joint Warfare and the Ultimate High Ground: more matters of substance than symbolism; they are Implications of U.S. Military Dependence on Space” real elements of both joint and service culture, by MAJOR JEFFREY L. CATON, USAF considerations that the military must address for mission success. A senior enlisted advisor to the Chairman Prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 will be presented to the first, second, and third could uniquely benefit the entire enlisted force by re- place winners, respectively. An additional prize of $500 will be awarded to the first ducing friction at the seams of joint training and op- place winner, ENS Mahnken, for submitting the best essay by a contestant in the erations. Unlike his opposite numbers in the ser- rank of major/lieutenant commander or below. Winners also will receive a selection vices, he would only focus on issues relevant to of books on various aspects of military affairs and innovation. The prize winning jointness. When an interservice conflict that affected essays and other contributions on the revolution in military affairs will appear in the next issue of the journal (Winter 1995–96). JFQ

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET ■

should belong to the most secure of the strategic forces, the Navy submarine service. A Note to Readers and Contributors Tomahawk cruise missiles give surface ves- sels a long-range strike capability. They proved their DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed to the field and fleet through service channels. Military worth in Desert Storm and since. The Navy currently personnel and organizations interested in receiving the journal on a regular basis should make has plans for more Tomahawk capable ships and their requirements known through appropriate service, unified command, or agency channels. more capable missiles. This offers the ability, with- Corrections in shipping instructions for service distribution should be directed to the appropriate out allies, to strike anywhere within a thousand activity listed below. miles of any coast, that is, in every politically impor- tant region of the world. ■ ARMY—Contact the installation Publications Control Officer or write to the U.S. Army Most important to long-range and strategic Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 bombing is naval air. Navy and Marine aircraft did (reference Misc. Publication 71–1). the same job as Air Force planes during Desert ■ NAVY—Contact the Navy Inventory Control Point, Customer Service List Maintenance Storm. One problem—a lack of coordination in (Code 3343.09), 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111–5098; requests may be long-range strike war—can be solved if the Air sent by FAX to: (215) 697–5914 (include SNDL, UIC, and full address). Force is phased out and the Navy is given all long- ■ MARINE CORPS—Contact the Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, Warehouse 1221, range bombing missions. But not only is the Navy Section 5, Albany, Georgia 31704. able to fill much of the long-range and strategic ■ AIR FORCE—Contact the base Publishing Distribution Office to establish requirement at bombing mission; for fifty years it has been built the Air Force Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 around the strength of airpower projection, so much (indicate issue number requested which should be proceeded by the prefix “N–#”). so that today 48 percent of naval officers are flyers. ■ COAST GUARD—Contact U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: Defense Operations Eliminating the Air Force would simplify the Division, 2100 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593–0001. military establishment and cut the size of the de- In addition, bulk distribution is made to defense agencies, the Joint Staff, unified commands, fense budget. Instead of three military departments service colleges, and other activities. Changes in these shipments should be communicated to the there would be two. The redundancy of the Air Editor at the address below. Force—in transport, nuclear weapons, tactical air, long-range strike, et al.—could be scraped while SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available by subscription from the Government Printing Office (see that small portion of its capabilities that is not a du- the order blank in this issue). To order for one year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) on the order plication could be given to the Army and Navy. and mail with a check for $21.00 ($26.25 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account The Navy is built around airpower projection. number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, The recurring strategic question “where are the carri- Pennsylvania 15220–7954, or FAX the order to: (202) 512–2233. Individual copies may be ers?” which has been asked by virtually all post-war purchased at GPO bookstores for $7.50 each. Presidents recognizes this fact. Since the Navy has become the Nation’s on-call air arm, why not elimi- CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes submissions from members of the Armed Forces as well as nate the Air Force and give part of its sole remaining from defense analysts and academic specialists from both this country and abroad, including mission to the Navy? foreign military officers and civilians. There is no required length for articles, but contributions of —LT S. Pratt Hokanson, USN 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropriate. Other submissions, however, to include letters to the History Department editor, items of commentary, and brief essays are invited. Reproductions of supporting material U.S. Naval Academy (such as maps and photos) should be submitted with manuscripts; do not send originals. Manuscripts are reviewed by the Editorial Board, a process which takes two to three months. To facilitate review, provide three copies of the manuscript together with a 150-word summary. Place personal or biographical data on a separate sheet of paper and do not identify the author (or authors) in the body of the text. Follow any accepted style guide in preparing the manuscript, but CORRIGENDA endnotes rather than footnotes should be used. Bibliographies should not be included. Both the manuscript and endnotes should be typed in double-space with one-inch margins. In the article entitled “Atlantic Com- JFQ reserves the right to edit contributions to meet space limitations and conform to the mand’s Joint Training Program” by Clarence Todd Morgan which appeared journal’s style and format. Proofs of articles accepted for publication are not normally sent to in issue 8 (Summer 1995), the following authors for review. particulars shown here in italics stand as If possible submit the manuscript on a disk together with the typescript version. While 3.5- corrections: (1) all combatant CINCs and 5.25-inch disks in various formats can be processed, WordPerfect is preferred (disks will be have full authority and responsibility returned if requested). Further information on the submission of contributions is available by calling under Title 10, U.S.C., chapter 6, section 164, to conduct joint training; (2) the De- (202) 475–1013 / DSN 335–1013, FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012, or writing: fense Planning Guidance (DPG) provides Editor detailed training guidance to CINCs; and (3) J-71 coordinates JTP scheduling, moni- Joint Force Quarterly tors participation of ACOM forces in CJCS- ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ directed NATO and bilateral exercises, and Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 JFQ documents and reports or corrects defi- ciencies in exercises and operations. JFQ

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HUMAN RIGHTS U.S. Marine Corps (Timothy E. LeMaster) AND THE Commander By BARRY R. McCAFFREY

he Armed Forces must respect human Indeed, there is general agreement that our rights, not only on legal and ethical peoples have fundamental rights—rights that do grounds, but also for practical reasons. not accrue from political or other forms of power T Consequently, U.S. Southern Command but that spring from the nature of man. seeks to imbue an awareness of the paramount importance of respecting and protecting human Human Rights and Democracy rights among U.S. military units and service President Bill Clinton, whose values reflect members deploying to Central and South Amer- absolute respect for the individual, offered his ica under its aegis. view on human rights before the U.N. General Those rights which every soldier, sailor, ma- Assembly in September 1993: rine, and airman must respect are affirmed in Democracy is rooted in compromise, not con- common law, the declaration of the U.N. General quest. It rewards tolerance, not hatred. Democracies Assembly of 1948, and the Charter of the Organi- rarely wage war on one another. They make reliable zation of American States. Indeed, the govern- partners in trade, in diplomacy, and in the steward- ments of all states in the —north, cen- ship of our global environment. And democracies, tral, and south—have proclaimed their support of with the rule of law and respect for political, religious, the following principles: and cultural minorities, are more responsive to their ■ Each individual has fundamental rights without own people and to the protection of human rights. distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex. ■ The state shall respect the rights of the individ- President Clinton’s message was that “This is ual and the principles of universal morality. our motivation, this is what we stand for.” ■ Social justice and social security are the bases for Democracies, because of the consensual nature of lasting peace. politics and civil society, respect the fundamental rights of individuals. As Assistant Secretary of

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McCaffrey

State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs The most notorious recent incident occurred John Shattuck said in August 1993: at My Lai during the . We have learned Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law much from that tragedy. Studying it was painful, are not the same. But they are complementary and but the Peers’ report and the other investigative mutually reinforcing. Fundamental rights are best works that analyzed its root causes have enabled us guaranteed by basic institutions of democracy: a free to better protect and promote human rights. press; an independent judiciary; a vibrant civil soci- Winning , Losing the Peace ety; freely contested, transparent, and meaningful elections. Democracy—the rule of, by, and for the peo- Two opposites from American history fur- ple—is only possible in a political and social order nish insights into establishing a proper command that fully respects the rights of each and every man, climate. General William Tecumseh Sherman woman, and child in society. Governments that do observed: not respect the rule of law are by definition lawless. We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a The most useful point here is that there is a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich linkage between human rights—this principle of and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their the rule of law—and the fundamental values of organized armies. democracy. If the...[civilians in the South] raise a howl Sun Tzu, in discussing what laws mean to against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that commanders, said in The Art of War, “Laws are war is war, and not popularity seeking. If they want regulations and institutions. Those peace, they and their relatives must stop the war. a commander’s actions who excel in war first cultivate their In contrast, General Robert E. Lee said: own humanity and justice and reflect his values No greater disgrace can befall the army and maintain their laws and institu- through it our whole people than the perpetration of tion.” He stated further, “The com- barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defense- mander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincer- less. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetra- ity, benevolence, courage, and strictness.” tors and all connected with them, but are subversive In one form or another the works of every of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and de- significant military thinker express these ideas of structive of the ends of our movement. Sun Tzu. A commander’s actions reflect his val- ues. Although articulated in different terms, We can learn much from the conduct of there seems to be universal recognition that mili- Sherman and Lee during the Civil War. There tary forces and their leaders must adhere to a may not be a better contrast in treating noncom- higher moral code. batants in American military history than that posed by these two commanders. There is no Facing the Past doubt that Sherman waged total war on the One problem with which commanders must South ruthlessly, much as the Germans did in deal is the legacy of past actions. Each military in- Russia during World War II. Of course, he also stitution has its own history. Some of it is painful won. But was his approach, making the “old and and none of it will go away. A people, state, or young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, army that cannot face the past cannot learn from as well as their organized armies” the most effec- it and may repeat it. Inevitably, the past blocks tive course of action? progress until it is confronted. That is just what Nearly 130 years later, Lee is still revered as a our Armed Forces have tried to do. man of integrity and principle. But he lost. Why Our most useful insights into human rights then do his lessons have value for us today? Win- come from our history of human rights abuses. ning a war is a reasonably easy proposition al- Many occurred in the small wars we fought on though it involves energy, courage, violence, and the frontier during the 19th century against In- skill. Winning the peace is far more difficult. dian tribes. Some tragedies are more modern. The Sherman’s barbarity fueled a century of bit- truth is that there have been incidents of human terness in the South, some of which endures to rights violations in every war in which we have this day. Lee, on the other hand, espoused values fought. After all, we are dealing with imperfect that were not and are not a military weakness. people and their leaders. Those values are a source of constant strength since they preclude an army dissipating its strength on wanton acts of destruction and do not create a requirement to defend gains because General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, is commander of enduring hostility from a civilian populace. in chief, U.S. Southern Command, and formerly These are values that we can appreciate by exam- served as director of strategic plans and policy ining our past. (J-5), Joint Staff.

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■ HUMAN RIGHTS

A Commander’s Liability One thing that my division command There are two basic standards to which every sergeant major and I would not tolerate in the commander must adhere, the Medina and the Ya- months which led up to the Gulf War was label- mashita standards. The former applies when a ing Iraqis as less than human. We believed that commander orders a crime committed or knows tolerating such attitudes increased the chances that a crime is about to be committed, has power that Iraqi soldiers would be treated inhumanely. to prevent it, and fails to exercise that power; the We also know that high friendly casualties latter occurs when a commander should have lead to frustration, particularly when combined known about a war crime and did nothing to stop with gruesome injuries. Losses inflicted by an in- it. (Yamashita assumes that a crime is part of a visible enemy are especially difficult for an army widespread pattern of abuse over a prolonged pe- trained to fight conventional forces. In such cir- riod. In such a scenario, a commander is pre- cumstances, typical of internal wars, we know sumed to have knowledge of a crime or to have that the temptation increases for soldiers to seek abandoned his command.) retribution on enemy civilians. Strong leadership The Medina standard resulted from the fail- then becomes more important. ure by an American captain to prevent the mur- Commanders must be on the lookout for der of some 300 Vietnamese civilians at My Lai. It these indicators. They must ensure that leaders at is one to which we now hold our military leaders. squad, company, and battalion levels can recog- If a captain, colonel, or general knows of a nize and deal with them before an incident occurs. human rights violation or a war crime and fails to This must be done through effective human rights take action, he will be held criminally liable. The training to preclude a breakdown in leadership. Yamashita standard is named for the Japanese Avoiding Abuses general who was tried and convicted following World War II for atrocities committed by troops How do operational commanders go about under his command avoiding human rights abuses? The answer to in the . that question gives rise to both some obvious and units with poor leadership will The court concluded not so obvious considerations. th have problems with human rights that he failed to con- We had a great debate in the 24 Infantry trol the forces serving Division before the war against Iraq broke out. under him, particu- Our lawyers tried to persuade me that I could not larly in Manila, and allowed them to ravage the state in an annex to the division order a directive civilian population. General Yamashita was exe- that whoever committed a war crime would be ar- cuted for his role in those actions of brutality. rested and sent back out of Iraq to . But the sense that the command sergeants major, The Cause of Abuse colonels, and I had to uphold was that if a soldier The Armed Forces have come to learn that mistreated prisoners or civilians—he would not institutional problems contribute to human be given the honor of continuing to fight. We rights abuses. If one sees the following traits, the would send him to the rear disgraced and in likelihood of human rights abuse increases: handcuffs. I am convinced that as professionals we have to make clear that there is no acceptable ■ poor leadership level of violence against civilians. There should ■ poorly trained or ill-disciplined troops be zero tolerance when it comes to abusing ■ unclear orders or missions ■ tendency to dehumanize the enemy human rights. That must be the standard for ■ high frustration level among troops everyone. ■ poor understanding of the complexities of un- A great challenge for those of us who serve in conventional war uniform is addressing human rights training with- ■ high casualties out suggesting that respect for an enemy, its sol- We have learned that the most common fac- diers, and civilians detracts from the central objec- tors in human rights abuse are poor leadership tive of winning the war. How can leaders explain and poorly trained or ill-disciplined troops. Units that such respect actually contributes to military with poor leadership will have problems with effectiveness? How do they instruct without being human rights. Troops behave in combat as they paternalistic? Commanders must sort this out do in training. If poorly trained and ill disci- since they have to engage their sergeants and cap- plined they cannot fight effectively. We saw that tains and themselves about this challenge. in the Iraqi army prior to Desert Storm and also The initial rules of engagement for my divi- under fire. We also know that such forces do not sion were published as a 12-page document. respect the rights of noncombatants, prisoners of war, or private property.

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McCaffrey

They were impossible to understand unless you Honorable Conduct Pays were a field grade officer with a law degree, desk, Anyone who commands forces in combat lamp, and time to think. They had little value for knows that respect for the dignity of the people sergeants, tank company commanders, or being protected as well as the dignity of soldiers brigade operations officers; so we explained that pays off. Actions such as those perpetrated by rules of engage- German SS units in Ukraine during World War ment (ROE) are respect for dignity and attention to II—slaughtering, raping, and plundering—turn not tools for the the people against the invader. And the same is human rights benefit operational lawyer but rather true in internal stability operations and uncon- the commander. commanders ventional warfare. Adherence to the Geneva Con- They had to be vention, respect for dignity, and attention to expressed in a human rights benefit operational commanders. way that was helpful to a 25-year-old captain or Which position is preferable, that of a Nazi a 20-year-old private. So we put them on cards, commander facing the enmity of a nation or that made them simple, and did not state the obvi- of an allied commander in the Gulf War facing an ous. The obvious is the Ten Commandments. army that would rather quit than fight and Less obvious is not tampering with places of wor- whose soldiers eagerly seek safety in surrender? ship or not firing on built-up areas without per- Operational commanders can control to a certain mission from your battalion commander. extent which position their forces adopt. If they ROE must be written for easy use by soldiers instill a code of conduct and a sense of discipline and their combat leaders; but they must never in subordinate leaders and units, their troops will put our forces at risk. We cannot place our troops have respect for all with whom they deal. Then in danger without providing adequate means of we will not have abusive forces. protection. José San Martín observed that “[a] nation It is not always understood that soldiers treat does not arm its soldiers for them to commit the civilians and prisoners as they are treated them- indecency of abusing said advantage by offending selves. So if we show our own soldiers dignity and the citizens who sustain them through their sacri- some sense of compassion under the rule of law, fices.” The military spends very little time fight- they are more likely to act similarly toward the ing. Instead, most of its energy goes toward civilian population. preparing for war. In peacetime the military inter- The opening days of combat in a conflict are acts continuously with civilians in recruiting new the most difficult. Young men and women do not soldiers, living alongside local communities, pur- know exactly what constitutes appropriate con- chasing goods and services, and participating in duct. They wait for professionals to show them the national debate about what constitutes through example. That in turn is how the troops proper force structure, roles, and missions. will act. Our fellow citizens support the military In Vietnam there were normally 70 to 130 when they hold us in high esteem. They form men in my company. We believed that eventually their opinions when their sons and daughters— every one of us would be killed or wounded. It the Nation’s soldiers, sailors, marines, and air- was rare to serve a month as a lieutenant or six men—go home and tell families and friends how months as a soldier without becoming a casualty. well they are treated in the military. Their opin- In such an environment of enormous violence ions are also influenced when they come in con- and danger I had another concern as an infantry tact with a soldier traveling on leave, pass a con- commander. I knew that there were a few soldiers voy on the road, or visit an installation. Finally, in my company who were like caged animals they form opinions when they see the military in awaiting release. But the vast majority, because of action in a conflict or peaceful mission. the influence of family, school, church, and the Consequently, our every action in peace or Constitution, were incapable of committing war affects the prestige of our institution. We human rights abuses. Only the potential crimi- must always protect our honor. A single incident nals were waiting for a chance to strike. So the such as My Lai will cause long-term damage to challenge is how to treat a unit honorably while the Armed Forces. JFQ guarding against criminals who are inside every military in the world. Our most important re- This article is adapted from an address presented at the sponsibility is to not allow any criminals into our U.S. Army School of the Americas on August 10, 1994. officer corps.

Autumn 1995 / JFQ 13 Boorda Pgs 10/1/96 9:32 AM Page 14

Combat information center aboard USS Kitty Hawk. U.S. Navy (Gallagher) Leading the Revolution in C4I

By JEREMY M. BOORDA

he information revolution is a harbinger and Air Force units continue to return to the of notable changes in the objective and United States. conduct of war. One important aspect of The Navy and Marines will, correspondingly, this revolution is information warfare—a play prominent roles in information warfare. For- T ward presence requires that the naval services ag- potent command, control, communications, com- puter, and intelligence (C4I) capability with a pro- gressively approach information warfare as an en- found influence on the way naval forces deter and gaged and enabling force. Unlike other services, if necessary fight wars. To discuss warfare in the the Navy must imbed information warfare in the information age, it is vital to appreciate how the fleet and be able to conduct information warfare Navy collects, disseminates, and uses information. from the time those forces leave CONUS to the Our approach is unique because it emphasizes for- end of an extended deployment. ward presence. Simply put, one will not grasp our The Revolution in Military Affairs C4I vision unless the importance of naval forces being forward positioned is understood. We are in a revolution of no less impor- tance than the advent of steam propulsion, car- Forward Presence rier aviation, or nuclear submarines. The so- For two hundred years the Navy and Ma- called revolution in military affairs has moved rine Corps have provided forces to leverage information and the need for information domi- events overseas. The National Command Au- nance to center stage in thinking about warfare. thorities and warfighting CINCs require naval Development of advanced information and forces that are forward, ready to respond to or communications technologies will continue. deter crisis, and able to transition to war. More- Successful implementation of these innovations over, while all the services have a role in forward requires their integration into force structure presence, I am convinced that naval forces are and operational concepts. going to be relatively more significant as Army Thus the way we organize and use technology is critical. The organizational aspects may actually be more important than the technical. The Navy will be a full partner in the revolution to leverage Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, USN, is chief of naval its investment in technology, attack vulnerabilities operations and previously served as commander in enemy systems, and protect its own. in chief, Allied Forces, .

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Boorda

In information warfare we are not really Information based warfare permits forces to talking about something new. We must recognize fully exploit weapons technology to escalate the that success on past battlefields has come from speed of battle. Denying an enemy’s ability to innovative ways of considering and combining communicate, going after command and control new technologies, and not solely from the tech- nets, and shutting down sensors will provide an nological advances themselves. History is replete upper hand on the battlefield. Also, information with examples of outnumbered forces which based warfare will afford the United States the were victorious because they controlled vital in- operational flexibility to allocate forces and fires formation. Often both sides had similar tech- in real time and to defeat an enemy at the mo- nologies, but one gained an advantage by their ment of our choosing. On the battlefield of the innovative use. future, we will be unable to attain decisive vic- For instance, the Navy applied information tory without a comprehensive global command warfare to thwart the Japanese at Midway. So and control system. The foundation is a robust what is really new or revolutionary? It is the at- C4I architecture. tempt to institutionalize—as others have done be- fore—the use of information for tactical advan- Copernicus tage. Using the Midway example, it was not Recognizing information as a weapon the information warfare that made the difference; it Navy issued the Copernicus architecture in 1990. was information and pure luck—without the ben- This is an initiative to make C4I systems respon- efit of an overarching strategy. sive to the warfighter, field them quickly, capital- Today we realize the value of systematically ize on advances in technology, and shape doc- using information to influence operations and trine to reflect changes. The Copernicus the fact that we have crossed the threshold into architecture is the structure of how C4I works. It the information age. When the most critical en- represents satellites which pass data, computers abler for naval expeditionary forces may be infor- which process information, and warfighters who mation, our tactics flow from information pro- need information to make tactical decisions. It cessing. We can only should be noted that it is not a system but an ar- gain the advantage chitecture. In other words, one cannot go out and the challenge is institutionalizing over an enemy by purchase or touch Copernicus. information warfare innovation being the first to effec- This architecture represents a blueprint for tively use offensive capturing technological change. It is a bold C4I and defensive infor- paradigm shift toward a unified design and pro- mation tactics as part of our warfighting arsenal; curement strategy specifically focused on the so the challenge is institutionalizing information joint warfighter. Its designers recognized that warfare innovation and capitalizing on the op- stovepipe acquisition strategies do not work; en- portunities available today. gineers are too removed from users. Instead, the goal is to combine strategies and technologies to Enabling Force create a consistent situational awareness where The Navy and Marines have always provided information integration is seamless and warfight- combat credible forces, forward. Thus our infor- ers are able to access information on demand. mation warfare weapons, command and control From the outset Copernicus was not in- systems, and the associated expertise must be em- tended to be a formal acquisition program be- bedded in the force, ready to execute information cause there was no comprehensive DOD program. warfare. Forward deployed naval forces need an The intent was to serve as the definitive architec- in-place global C4I structure. For example, we ture and unifying strategy for multi-service joint have an embedded JFACC capability that gives us C4I programs. The Navy tactical command sys- a structure for building joint C4I capability in the- tem-afloat (NTCS–A) is a case in point. This dy- ater. Moreover, because our posture forward al- namic system is part of the joint maritime com- lows the Navy to be in position as crises develop, mand system (JMCS). It is installed on more than information warfare will give us the ability to in- 200 ships, replaces a variety of less capable sys- fluence enemy decisions, prepare the battlespace tems, and integrates information in one display. before hostilities, and dictate the battle on our terms. Information based warfare, using advanced Jointness command and control with its associated high as- The Armed Forces made a significant step to- surance connectivity, allows integration of battle- ward a truly joint C4I structure in 1992 when the field information that in turn will increase effects Joint Staff followed the Navy’s lead and issued from offensive firepower and maneuver of our dispersed units.

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■ REVOLUTION IN C4I

“C4I for the Warrior.” This concept, based on Congress, identified Challenge Athena as one of Copernicus, envisioned a joint C4I architecture the most innovative and successful imagery dis- that provided timely sensor-to-shooter informa- semination efforts. Demonstrations utilize open tion direct to the warfighter. Then the Army pub- architecture and commercial standards to provide lished “Enterprise Strategy” in 1993 and the Air joint and allied interoperability. Force issued “Horizon” in 1994. Significant por- By using the fleet as a C4I laboratory, opera- tions of those documents reflect the Copernicus tors gain valuable experience with equipment as effort. This architecture is more than a snapshot system designers respond to customers. After a of the current C4I demonstration period, the advanced technology

4 structure; it is a dy- becomes a fielded operational system with C I systems must be built under a namic and evolving trained operators to run it. The Copernicus archi- JCS unified strategy program which is flex- tecture, while not in final form, is fielded and op- ible enough to adapt erational. It is a robust and dynamic system that to rapid technological provides global C4I in support of the national change. This year the Navy will release an up- military strategy. It is part of the joint vision. dated plan that will redefine Copernicus as it evolved, discuss acquisition strategies, and chart Exercises and Doctrine the course for the future. The emphasis for all of C4I assets are featured in a joint warfare in- these initiatives will remain constant as Coperni- teroperability demonstration, Kernel Blitz ’95, cus evolves to meet the goal of joint C4I for the which spans two and a . It inte- warrior. grates an amphibious ready group; a geo-trans- The Navy is the de facto C4I joint architect formed mine countermeasures force; a simulated and its joint maritime command information sys- carrier battle group; Air Force B–52s, B–1s, and tem (JMCIS) is the backbone of the global com- F–117s, and AWACS aircraft; and Army medevac mand and control system (GCCS). The vast expe- units, with modeling and simulation to offer real- rience of the Navy and Marine Corps in digitizing istic joint training in a synthetic theater of war in the battlespace over the past thirty years is a a European environment. model for building a comprehensive common Navy C4I, within the context of information tactical picture at sea and over land. warfare, cannot succeed without the doctrine to support it. To achieve this, space and electronic Vision warfare specialists work closely with the Naval To realize this vision, C4I systems must be Doctrine Command to provide an operating built under a JCS unified strategy. Copernicus framework and guidance for forward deployed provides this focus for the Navy and Marines. Our forces. Information warfare is treated in Naval approach demands implementation of state-of- Doctrine Publication (NDP) 3, Naval Operations, and C4I in NDP 6, Command and Control. This comprehensive analytical approach to informa- tion warfare which combines strategy, tactics, and doctrine fully prepares the Navy/Marine Corps team for the 21st century. It makes the Navy the logical choice to lead the development of joint ar- chitecture for information and C4I systems. Challenges Implementing information warfare will be a major requirement in the near future. There are two specific problems to be tackled. First, the cost of developing software is rising exponentially even as the cost of hardware remains fairly con- stant. Secondly, technology is moving faster than

U.S. Navy (Gallagher) it can be integrated into the fleet. As a result tech- Combat information nology may become obsolete by the time a sys- center aboard the-art technology with highly trained operators. tem is fielded. It is time for the Navy to basically USS Kitty Hawk. This is achieved by fielding advanced technology change its information system acquisition ap- demonstrations like Challenge Athena hard- proach. One way is modeling and simulation to ware—which offers high volume data communi- test product development and to speed up the cations afloat—to meet fleet CINC requirements. time required to field a new system. In fact, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Finally, for the Navy to maintain the lead on for Intelligence and Security, in testimony to the information superhighway, it must have a

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Boorda

USS Carl Vinson in Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy (Michaels)

strong foothold in space, to the extent that space space system support is integral to strategy, doc- is a medium for exploitation by the warfighter, trine, and tactics. not a mission or the fourth dimension of the bat- We have crossed a threshold and must adapt tlefield. Space offers access to real time coverage to fight and win wars in the information age. It is and connectivity. The Navy time to be proactive and to keep naval forces has integrated space systems ahead of the information bow wave. Toward that for the Navy to maintain the in every facet of its opera- end, I established the Naval Information Warfare lead it must have a strong tions to improve communi- Activity, Fleet Information Warfare Center, and cations, navigation, surveil- Modeling and Simulation Office. Moreover, the foothold in space lance, and environmental Navy issued a military satellite communications support. We have made im- strategy and defense information infrastructure pressive gains in space despite the fact that the master plan. Also, I organized a tiger team under Navy receives only 4 percent of the budget and 2 the Chief of Naval Education and Training to get percent of the personnel allocated to military information warfare incorporated into every level space operations. of fleet and individual training. It is clear that in- This has been done through innovation, formation has become a major factor in warfare agility, and competition for ideas. The Navy has and will grow in importance. Join us in redefin- succeeded in space through initiatives such as the ing how wars are fought and won. JFQ ultrahigh-frequency follow-on satellite program, a model for streamlining acquisition strategies This article is adapted from an address presented to the through fixed-priced multi-year contracts, and Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association in Washington, D.C., on March 23, 1995. taking advantage of commercially competitive launch capabilities. With the widely dispersed, mobile, and dynamic nature of naval warfare,

Autumn 1995 / JFQ 17 JFQ Rokke Pgs 10/1/96 9:34 AM Page 18

Fires of .

Military Education for the New Age

B–17s over England.

U.S. Navy (S. Gozzo)

U.S. Air Force Collection, National Air and Space Museum

By ERVIN J. ROKKE PME institutions and the policy community as well. Adapting to this change is the basic chal- lenge confronting the war colleges today. uring his transition from Princeton Uni- The issue is straightforward: either the war versity to the White House, Woodrow colleges become agents for change within the in- Wilson is alleged to have said that acad- dividual services and joint arena or they become Demic politics are the worst kind because anachronisms. Whatever the nature of academic the stakes are so low. As any dean with curricu- politics, the downside is irrelevancy at best and lum revision experience will attest, Wilson had a demise at worst. Five major factors contribute to point. Squaring curricula with student needs at this phenomenon. the expense of faculty interests is a complex task. The stakes clearly have changed, however, at Factors for Change least in the context of professional military edu- International Politics. Historians and political cation (PME) at the war colleges. Not only has the scientists hold that the international system post-Cold War era placed new substantive and changes when new answers emerge to three fun- pedagogical requirements on military educators, damental questions: Who are the major players? but new demands on the relationship between

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What can they do to one another? What do they Curricula are replete with cases of how such ad- wish to do to one another? The unexpected end vances were treated by institutions and individu- of the Cold War was only the latest watershed in als wedded to more traditional approaches.1 Re- the world order. One classic example is the cently, however, breakthroughs related to warfare French Revolution which spawned a new player have occurred with greater frequency, more sub- (democratic France), a new capability (a citizen stantial impact on quality versus quantity trade- army), and new intentions (liberty, equality, and offs, and increased organizational implications. fraternity). Similar transitions occurred with the A former director of the Defense Intelligence Congress of Vienna (1815), German unification Agency, Lieutenant General James Clapper, has (1870), Treaty of Versailles (1919), and agree- raised an excellent case of the accelerating impact ments following World War II. of technology on quality-quantity tradeoffs.2 Dur- From the perspective of war college curric- ing World War II some 9,000 bombs dropped by ula, it is useful to examine the ongoing post-Cold more than 1,500 B–17 bomber were re- War transition against the backdrop of past quired to destroy a 6,000 square foot target. In changes. In each instance the Vietnam the destruction of a similar target took perhaps no single factor has results were not readily appar- only 176 bombs delivered by 88 F–4 fighter sor- ent. The answers to questions ties. During the Gulf War, one bomb carried by as much potential as the concerning players, capabili- an F–117 fighter-bomber did the job. This is not information explosion ties, and intentions are no to imply that a single 2,000 pound bomb can more likely to surface quickly today destroy every 6,000 square foot target. Ad- or clearly today than in previ- vances in guidance system technology, however, ous realignments of the international system. As- have made a qualitative improvement in weapon sessments made in the democratic atmosphere of effectiveness. Technological advances by ground Paris circa 1789 did not foresee an autocratic and naval forces also resulted in impressive Napoleon on the horizon. Similarly, most in- warfighting efficiencies during Desert Storm. ternationalist projections made at Versailles fol- Equally important for PME are the organiza- lowing World War I failed to predict a global de- tional, structural, and budgetary implications of pression or a resurgent Germany. accelerated technological breakthroughs. The The first requirement then for the curricula price of improved technology is high, particularly at war colleges is to ensure that students do not if applied to such systems as the stealthy F–117 presume to know who their future opponents or aircraft. Indeed, given the tradeoff between a new coalition partners will be. This appreciation for item of equipment representing a breakthrough uncertainty is the beginning of wisdom in the in sophistication as opposed to just a better, sim- post-Cold War era. But underscoring uncertainty pler item, some defense experts argue for the lat- is not the same thing as saying that everything is ter.3 Whatever the ambiguity of quality versus up for grabs. On the contrary, it means that the quantity tradeoffs, however, the organizational war colleges must delve into what is known but is impact of increasingly expensive high tech items frequently neglected in the defense establish- is clear. As the cost and operational complexity of ment. For example, students must understand systems increase substantially, the organizational more than their predecessors about economics, response is centralization. In the case of the evo- technologies, and diverse cultures to make sound lution from photographic reconnaissance aircraft judgments. This perspective brings into question to satellites the focal point of operations and con- several major tenets of defense policy which were trol moves from the battlefield to Washington. prevalent in a bipolar world. Although it offers Information. Perhaps no single factor has as few clear-cut policy prescriptions, it is essential to much potential as the information explosion for appreciating the security implications of a world changing the way in which military organiza- order in flux. tions function, both during peace and in war. The Technology. Advances in technology are widespread adoption of information technologies hardly new phenomena. Stirrups, gunpowder, the in the latter part of this century has set the stage steam engine, radio, stealth, and other innova- for a social transformation of historic magnitude tions dramatically changed the nature of warfare. by making unprecedented amounts of informa- tion instantaneously available in easy-to-use forms at ever-diminishing cost. The emerging in- formation highway, which extends from earth to geosynchronous orbit, will certainly alter society, Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF, is to say nothing of conflict. Worldwide 24-hour president of the National Defense University and connectivity and sensors and hardware needed to formerly served as assistant chief of staff for support information processing are already in intelligence at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. place. So are stand-off weapons that can be

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launched from almost anywhere and strike tar- them, the services have made major improve- gets with accuracy measured in fractions of yards. ments in collaboration and interoperability. Joint- To date the best thinking on innovative ap- ness is in. Outstanding professionals are now plications for information age technologies has assigned to positions on joint staffs, and a succes- been done by the staff of the Office of Net Assess- sion of JTF exercises and deployments has proven ment under Andrew Marshall at the Pentagon. that the Armed Forces are capable of functioning They have recast functional areas associated with within multi-service command structures. Even traditional service expertise into precision strike, service monopolies on developing requirements dominating maneuver, space warfare, and infor- have been redressed by the Joint Requirements mation warfare. Moreover, they suggest that the Oversight Council (JROC) overseen by the Vice potential for a revolution in military affairs Chairman. (RMA) exists in a zone where these new warfare As the services become more familiar with areas intersect and offer a new construct that joint responsibilities and work more effectively to- demonstrates the military potential afforded by gether, we also are finding that the likelihood of information. The Vice Chairman, Admiral the United States fighting alone is becoming re- William Owens, with similar logic, has advanced mote. Experiences such as the Gulf War, former a vision of a 200 square nautical mile battlefield Yugoslavia, and other recent crises suggest that al- box about which virtually everything is known liances and well-greased multinational command on a near real-time basis chains are insufficient if not outmoded. Ad hoc al- and within which all tar- liances and coalitions are the norm, and the gets can be hit using stand- United Nations is increasingly involved in hu- off weapons.4 manitarian and peace operations. Not surprisingly, de- Coordinating strategy and tactics to include bates about whether RMA rules of engagement as well as the distribution of notions are fact or fiction intelligence to coalition partners with both vary- provide grist for the mill in ing capacities for information and differing levels many PME seminars. But of security access are tasks that war college gradu- information age issues go ates face. The problem becomes more complex as far beyond procedures for tensions arise between the centralizing tendencies waging war to the heart of of jointness and the decentralizing, multiple military organization. chain of command biases of coalition warfare. Cheap microchips and Ecology. Perhaps less known but significant breakthroughs in commu- in their impact on security are environmental nications have made huge phenomena. While this area has received little at- amounts of information tention in PME, it is drawing increasing emphasis available and created pres- worldwide. It embraces climate change, ozone de- sure for decentralization pletion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and air and flat organizational and water pollution. Recent examples include the structures. Bluntly stated, 1989 conflict between Senegal and vertical organizational which was sparked by a scarcity of water and structures long associated arable land, and the mass migration from Rwanda with the military, along which became a crisis of epic proportions because with the centralization re- of the lack of potable water. In short, ecological sulting in part from high developments could well affect the circumstances tech and costly equipment, under which the Armed Forces are used as well as U.S. Army (Larry Lane) are not optimal for the in- how they are used. Clearly this new challenge is “Digital” soldier. formation age. When tank, relevant to PME—although it has gone largely ship, and aircraft operators unaddressed. can directly receive much of the information they And so it is that various factors, from interna- need to fight, at least some higher headquarters tional politics and ecology through technology will become extraneous. and information, are moving doctrine, organiza- Jointness/Coalition Warfare. Consistent with tion, and operations in new and often conflicting the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the increasingly directions. As General Wayne Downing, Com- prominent combatant CINCs have responsibility mander in Chief of U.S. Special Operations Com- for command and control in warfare. To support mand, told students attending the School of Infor- mation Warfare and Strategy, “In the information age, the very nature of war is changing.” 5

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Inter-vehicle information system. U.S. Army (Larry Lane)

Imperatives for PME world where rapid change is the norm. To do so, The central task of war colleges is to prepare however, professional military education needs to students to succeed across a broad spectrum of adapt in three ways. First, we must strengthen the national security challenges. The impact of these capability to affect the full spectrum of national institutions is in large part a function of how well security policies by embracing added roles for their graduates perform. We are in the business of PME. Second, we must revise curricula and sup- equipping leaders to deal with the security envi- plement the substance of what we teach. Finally, ronment of the 21st century. The unpredictable we must update pedagogical concepts, ap- nature of the ongoing process of change makes proaches, and technologies. this more akin to a floating Like most institutions of higher learning, craps game than an exact sci- war colleges can become ivory towers divorced war colleges must equip ence. Nevertheless, it is a game from the world which they serve. If they are to leaders to function in a in which we all must play. As help align military culture with the technologi- the Chairman, General John cal, environmental, and geopolitical revolutions, world where rapid change Shalikashvili, observed, “The they must be fully in tune with national security is the norm unexpected has become the processes which stimulate and implement routine; we need people who change. This goes beyond policy formulation and are comfortable in an uncertain includes technology insertion, doctrine develop- world.”6 In this game, the role of war colleges is ment, planning and budgeting, and training. to make the odds better for graduates. And those How can PME institutions do this? First, they odds can be shortened by doing everything possi- should be “present at creation” to ensure an envi- ble to convey an understanding of the emerging ronment that encourages new thought and re- security environment as well as teaching students wards rather than punishes innovation. Similarly, to recognize and deal with the unexpected. This they must follow organizational processes for is the PME challenge. change. War gaming, policy-relevant research, and Managing change is what national security is faculty participation in ad hoc commissions are all about. War colleges must equip leaders to as- classic examples. Each war college has a research sume this critical responsibility. We must give institute to connect its parent institution with the graduates the tools to function comfortably in a activities of the national security community.

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Secondly, PME institutions have a responsi- Indeed, because of the complexity of joint bility to expose ideas, new as well as old, to the and combined operations, curricula must deal critical light of academe. Wargames and simula- with the doctrine and capabilities of multiple na- tion exercises work well. So do informal, off the tions and services. Moreover, blurred boundaries record discussions between students and visiting among military, diplomatic, economic, and psy- lecturers from the policy arena. Each senior PME chological tools require unprecedented sensitivity institution enjoys special relationships with indi- for what policy types call the interagency process. viduals sympathetic to the military and who liter- In sum, developing PME curricula—like our secu- ally try out new ideas on faculty and students. rity environment itself—is of necessity an exercise More of these exchanges are needed with policy- in risk limitation. There simply is not the time to makers and leaders who are not instinctively cover all contingencies. The most one can do is sympathetic to military culture. prepare for dealing with uncertainty. Finally, PME institutions have a duty to be The classic approach to this dilemma is a bal- harbingers of change. Classes and seminars are ance among academic disciplines, the interests common ways for disseminating innovative ideas. and backgrounds of students, and the demands of So are professional journals. Less developed, but theory and practice. Like a classic liberal educa- with greater potential, are options associated with tion, war college curricula must cover a range of the information highway. Without a home page academic disciplines that include basic and engi- and a routine means for distributing the best of neering sciences as well as humanities and the so- faculty and student research, a war college is sim- cial sciences. ply not doing its job in the information age. In What then is different about curricular re- brief, PME can and must play a central role as an quirements today? For a start, the balance of PME agent in altering that greatest barrier to meaning- has shifted with the advent of the revolution in ful change—our traditional culture. information technology. While military strate- gists in past revolutions, such as that brought on Adapting Curricula by nuclear weapons, tended to be civilian In the classroom, as in headquarters or war thinkers with humanities and social science back- zones, the basis for innovation lies in critical grounds, the current revolutionary force puts a thinking about capabilities, concepts, and organi- higher premium on basic and engineering sci- zations relevant to current and future needs. As in ences. Historical perspective and an appreciation the past, military innovators in the information of bureaucratic politics remain vital, but an ade- age must develop an appreciation for what exists quate intellectual framework in the information as well as analytic skills for critiquing the status age requires some understanding of the ones and quo. It is not a choice between notions of mod- zeroes being passed around in such incredible ern warfare and more abstract theories of coer- quantities. In short, the center of mass at the war cion. Unfortunately, for already tight curricula colleges must move toward more technical acade- and busy students, it is a combination of both. mic disciplines.

Educational and Research Initiatives

U.S. national security will be increasingly af- of the Joint Staff and the Assistant Secretary of broad range of information warfare electives to fected by the ability to adapt doctrine, organiza- Defense for Command, Control, Communica- all students at both colleges. Finally, on a third tional concepts, and operations to fully exploit tions, and Intelligence, ACTIS serves as a center tier, students will be able to select an intense information technologies. Toward this end, the of excellence for information warfare within elective program in information studies to be- National Defense University (NDU) has estab- DOD. This enhances the educational as well as come the information specialists of the future. lished a teaching, research, and outreach activ- the research mission of NDU by contributing to ACTIS is the DOD executive agent for re- ity to focus on the development of a vision for knowledge in a rapidly evolving field, offering search on command and control and informa- national security in the information age. The courses on information warfare, and disseminat- tion warfare and also designs and manages an Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, ing material on information warfare. extensive research and analysis program. In ad- and Information Strategies (ACTIS), an element NDU is currently developing a three-tier dition, it provides outreach activities, including of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, educational program for the School of Informa- short programs of instruction, workshops, sym- merges efforts of the School of Information tion Warfare and Strategy. On the first tier infor- posia, and on-line services, and will dissemi- Warfare and Strategy and the former Center for mation concepts will be introduced and inte- nate information warfare concepts, research, Advanced Command Concepts and Technology. grated into the core curricula of the National War and course material. JFQ Working under guidance issued by the Director College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. On the second the school will offer a

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Rokke

How We Teach To conclude, there is a current revolution in War colleges justifiably take pride in teach- PME that parallels the RMA. In both cases, core ing techniques, which traditionally have included functions and procedures are undergoing funda- seminar-style classroom interaction as well as lec- mental changes. In both cases, we are seeing dis- tures by faculty and visitors, many of whom are parate rates of progress among the constituent involved in the policy arena. Excellent student to parts. And in both cases, we are facing difficult re- teacher ratios, as well as diverse student bodies, source tradeoffs between traditional approaches facilitate the high quality of seminar discussions. on the one hand and information age alternatives Though student diversity across the services and on the other. defense-related civilian career fields is most bal- PME institutions must assume the role anced at the National Defense University, service played by first class research universities. We have war colleges also ensure student representation a duty to mobilize our institutions to expand from the other services and civilian agencies. knowledge through research, educate practition- Regardless of quality, however, it is increas- ers, and serve as catalysts for change through out- ingly probable that teaching techniques need to reach. The war colleges must provide the intellec- be supplemented to cover a rapidly changing se- tual capital for changing the existing paradigm. curity environment and the increased informa- The stakes are high in the revolutions in mil- tion age sophistication of incoming students. The itary affairs and professional military education. notion that a ten-month experi- Significant obstacles and inertia must be over- ence at a war college is suffi- come. The RMA has the potential to alter priori- a major challenge for war cient for students who may ties among service capabilities. Similarly, the rev- olution in PME—challenging curricula and colleges lies in developing serve for a further ten years has always been questionable. Most teaching methods—has the potential to trans- follow-on education certainly the accelerating pace form war colleges into innovative centers that of change today makes it impor- spawn and foster new concepts of warfare. In the tant that we begin to provide follow-on educa- final analysis, both revolutions demand changes tional opportunities for PME graduates. in culture. Since PME shapes and promotes ser- Technology for distance learning is available vice and joint cultures, it would be difficult if not and the cost of personal computers is falling. Mil- impossible for the RMA to succeed without a cor- itary personnel take lap-top computers on tempo- responding revolution in war college curricula. rary duty to communicate with offices, homes, This places a major burden on those of us in- and educational institutions offering degree pro- volved in PME and requires that we move ahead grams over the information highway. Beginning with the revolution. JFQ last year, students at several PME institutions were issued lap-tops. The Air Force Command NOTES and Staff College, in particular, has made substan- 1 A classic example is found in Edward L. Katzen- tial progress in offering virtual seminars to stu- bach, Jr., “Tradition and Technological Change,” in dents on a worldwide basis. Both the Army and American Defense Policy, 5th edition, John F. Reichart and Air Force have begun providing lap-tops with Steven R. Sturm, editors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins modems to general officers. The Army has also University Press, 1982), pp. 638–51; also see Stephen P. funded a leadership development program at the Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). Industrial College of the Armed Forces which will 2 James R. Clapper, presentation at the National War be implemented using lap-top computers. College, February 9, 1995. A major challenge for war colleges lies in de- 3 See Jack N. Merritt and Pierre M. Sprey, “Negative veloping the substance of follow-on education Marginal Returns in Weapons Acquisition,” in American programs for transmission via the information Defense, 3rd edition, Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, highway. Simply transmitting research products is editors (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, an initial but insufficient step. Faculty members 1973). whose dialogue with students has been limited to 4 William A. Owens, speech to the Retired Officers the classroom must develop and conduct virtual Association, Des Moines, Iowa, July 1, 1995. 5 seminars using distance learning. In fact, since Wayne A. Downing, presentation at the School of Information Warfare and Strategy, National Defense faculty resources are unlikely to expand, new University, August 16, 1995. course development might involve curtailing 6 John M. Shalikashvili, presentation at the National some existing courses. Before the next century, Defense University, August 18, 1995. PME graduates need the option of communicat- ing with war colleges on national security issues.

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Jointness by Design, NO By MICHAEL

Soldiers on flight deck of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower.

U.S. Navy ( Martin Maddock) U.S. Air Force (NydiaU.S. Air Force Ainsworth)

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ince the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 it has become politically incor- rect to question jointness as the preeminent Sway for the military to do business as a whole. Jointness has also become a panacea for Congress and others in reprioritizing declining de- fense budgets. As a result, civilian officials and mili- tary leaders are accelerating this already fast-moving concept. NOT ACCIDENT By MICHAEL C. VITALE

Even though jointness was the rai- needed to efficiently manage its evolu- Chairman, has stated that experimental son d’être for Goldwater-Nichols, it has tion. This can be done by defining approaches are the only practical never been defined systematically or jointness precisely, framing the con- means of determining how to improve developed conceptually, as Seth cept of jointness holistically, and de- jointness. Unfortunately this has led Cropsey noted in “Out of Joint” in the vising a process to assess its evolution the Joint Staff, combatant commands, inaugural issue of JFQ. It has been in- analytically. This would lead to joint- and services to derive coordinated joint voked to universally justify any and all ness by design, not accident. processes (in doctrine, training, re- of the intents identified in that legisla- quirements, et al.) that are stovepiped tion which has created a perception The Problem —isolated from one another instead of within the military that its overall - Overall, Goldwater-Nichols has thoroughly integrated. While many ject was to make jointness an end in it- enhanced the warfighting capabilities factors affect jointness, these processes self. While the conduct of recent oper- of the Armed Forces. Practically speak- have the greatest impact, and their in- ations shows major improvements, ing, it has bounded the concept of efficient design suboptimizes the jointness within course of jointness. Not surprisingly, the Chairman has said that he is unimpressed the context of after eight years of nonintegrated joint operations, processes, the Chairman has said that with the level of joint warfighting particularly in he is unimpressed with the level of terms of combat. joint warfighting, particularly in terms jointness still lacks the theoretical un- Therefore the purpose of jointness as it of doctrine, training, requirements, and derpinning to resolve all the explicit evolves should be directed toward en- readiness.1 intents of Goldwater-Nichols. hancing the effectiveness of operations. One way to explain the problems Jointness is not an end in itself, The lack of a theoretical founda- these poorly integrated processes cause but it is more than a buzz word. Since tion, however, has resulted in a trial for jointness is by using a football the goal of jointness is to enhance and error approach for addressing prob- analogy. Some parts of the game of military operations, a process is lems across the range of joint issues. jointness have been well defined while Admiral William Owens, the Vice others have not. The following items have been established since 1986. First, the players (services) have signed mul- Commander Michael C. Vitale, USN, is the prospective tiyear contracts to play on one team commanding officer of USS John S. McCain. He served on the (meaning no free agency), though Joint Staff before attending the National War College where their equipment is funded by boosters he completed this essay. (Congress). Second, based on scouting

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reports, management (Chairman, Vice benchmarks needed to make jointness determines their relationship with each Chairman, and Joint Staff) reviews ex- as efficient as possible. Such bench- other, and decides how these processes pensive purchases by players to ensure marks enhance effectiveness and should be made more efficient. the equipment meets collective team moves the team closer to the end zone. Finally, perhaps the most critical needs (requirements). A change in One organizational benchmark of a problem with jointness today is the management policy has started to di- perfect system of jointness, for exam- conceptual void for choosing players rectly affect all the equipment each ple, would be to ensure that functional for a particular game. Beyond current player buys for himself.2 Third, there is service roles and func- one approved play book (doctrine and because the concept of jointness is not tions, professional mili- tactics, techniques, and procedures) tary knowledge, bud- with new plays steadily being written holistically designed institutionalizing getary constraints, and and old ones being revised, although it may not be as effective obvious political influ- at a slow pace. Fourth, the team prac- ence, jointness provides tices together more regularly to pre- no theoretical or practi- pare for each opponent (training and joint processes (doctrine, planning, cal methodology for choosing the exercises). Fifth, after each game, man- training, etc.) used by unified com- combination of players best suited to agement and the coaching staff watch mands and the Joint Staff also are used face a particular opponent (this goes to postgame films to remedy mistakes by the services for their particular the heart of joint power theory which (evaluation and analysis). Sixth, the functional processes (that is, the joint combines land, sea, air, and space- players, coaching staffs, and manage- doctrine development process would power synergistically to create power ment are attending schools together to be used to produce service doctrine). that is greater than the sum of its make the team more cohesive (profes- This benchmark has major implica- parts). Unfortunately, the current con- sional military education). tions for the Armed Forces, but it cept of jointness provides no intuitive While the team has won several would also dramatically increase the guidance except to ensure that every games based on this model, there is still efficiency and hence the effectiveness opponent faces a joint team, thereby information that players, coaches, man- of jointness. Thus, establishing the raising jointness from a way to con- agement, and the owner lack about the most efficient benchmarks for joint- duct operations to an end in itself. game. While the end zone represents ness is required. Solving this problem is beyond the the goal of jointness (enhancing the ef- There are no linesmen marking scope of this article, but it requires fectiveness of operations) and can be the progress of the ball as it moves continued study. easily understood, the team does not down the field. Given efficient bench- Many other aspects of jointness know the shape of the field. For exam- marks, there is no systematic means of can be illustrated by this analogy, but ple, no one has ever specifically defined determining if the effectiveness of the point is the same: because the con- or explained jointness for players, jointness is enhanced over time. Mak- cept of jointness is not holistically de- coaches, management, or the owner. ing this judgment requires an analyti- signed, the Armed Forces continue to The equivocal definition of jointness cal procedure that examines the com- supports numerous explicit intentions ponents and processes of jointness, of Goldwater-Nichols. Only by defining jointness consistently can the team work more efficiently together. Embarking for Agile Next, the team has trouble find- Provider ’94. ing the sidelines (football has two di- mensions, but jointness has several). If jointness is a way to enhance the effec- tiveness of military operations, bound- aries must be established to define the dimensions in which it operates. Se- nior leaders can then determine the components in these dimensions and identify relationships among them. This information can then be used to develop a process to measure the ef- fects of various changes on jointness. Moreover, there are no systematic yardmarkers on the field to tell the team whether they are headed toward the end zone. Markers do not measure the distance to the end zone in them- selves, but rather establish minimum U.S. Navy (Robert N. Scoggin)

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Seabees arriving from both documents with the aim of in the Middle East. revealing the true nature of jointness. First, based on unity of effort, jointness seeks to focus all the energy of the Armed Forces across the full range of military operations, through- out all the levels of war (strategic, op- erational, and tactical), in every envi- ronment (peace, crisis, and war), toward enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. While this centers on joint combat operations, it can also be applied to all other joint military activities, including those conducted in peacetime. Second, joint forces provide com- manders with multidimensional capa- bilities (land, sea, air, space, and spe- cial operations) that are more effective than uni-service forces by providing a U.S. Army (Michael Halgren) wider range of operational and tactical options which pose multiple, complex problems for an enemy. address questions of jointness empiri- we think about and train for war” (ac- Last, multiple service capabilities cally. As a result, institutionalizing it cording to the first edition of Joint Pub allow an innovative JFC to combine successfully will take much longer and 1). Its point is to “distill insights and joint capabilities, tactics, techniques, may not be as effective. wisdom gained from our collective ex- and procedures in asymmetrical as well perience with warfare” into basic prin- as symmetrical ways synchronized to A Definition for Jointness ciples to guide the employment of produce a total military impact greater In today’s environment, joint- joint forces. Since its conception in than the sum of its parts.3 Achieving ness appears to be synonymous with 1986, this has resulted in two genres of this effect is the most important tenet joint military operations. However, publications: joint doctrine and joint of jointness since it allows JFCs to pre- Joint Pub 1-02 defines joint as “. . . ac- tactics, techniques, and procedures sent few exploitable seams while tak- tivities, operations, organizations, (JTTP). The former present principles ing advantage of enemy weak points. etc., in which elements of more than and the latter address actions and In addition, this synergism can be one service of the same nation partic- methods to implement joint doctrine compounded as the effects are syn- ipate.” This is a holistic meaning that and describe how joint forces are to be chronized and integrated throughout covers all contexts; thus the term employed. the theater, including the rear area. jointness should be used in a holistic A survey of fifty joint publications The synergistic effects of synchro- sense, not just in the context of mili- under development and fifty approved nized joint forces are not limited to op- tary operations. reveals only two that provide any con- erations but include other military ac- In defining jointness, the critical ceptual, all encompassing discussion of tivities. For example, this synergism question is what makes military opera- joint warfare or joint operations: Joint can come from synchronizing the key tions more effective when conducted Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed “joint integrators,” defined as those jointly? The answer must be extrapo- Forces, approved in 1991, and Joint common joint functions that focus lated from the history of military oper- Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and integrate the efforts of the Armed ations. Fortunately, this history has the keystone volume in the operations Forces in preparing for and conducting been officially synthesized (albeit with series that underwent a long period of military operations. Besides joint doc- a leap of faith) and codified in contem- development before being approved in trine, these include joint training and porary joint doctrine. 1993. Readers of these two publica- exercises, professional military educa- To arrive at a definition that is all tions can draw different interpreta- tion, operation planning, force struc- encompassing rather than focused on tions regarding the principles of joint ture and resource planning, evalua- operations, we must first look at joint warfare; however, those found below tion, requirements, and readiness. doctrine, which “offers a common per- are based on characteristics that allow Hundreds of examples illustrate spective from which to plan and oper- joint forces to be more effective than how these integrators affect military ate, and fundamentally shapes the way single-service forces. They do not re- operations. One is the synergistic effect state doctrine, but rather synthesize of synchronized joint military educa- various principles, concepts, and ideas tion, which increases cooperation among all officers at the expense of

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Framework for Jointness joint integrators are common joint functions that focus and integrate the efforts of the Armed Forces as they pre- pare for and conduct joint military op- erations. This dimension of the frame- work includes eight established joint integrators: doctrine, training, opera- tional planning, education, readiness, force structure and resource planning, evaluation, and requirements. The levels-of-war dimension helps decisionmakers to visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks.4 The levels are usually divided into strategic, operational, and tactical. Although there are no limits or boundaries between them—given the information systems available to both decisionmakers and the public today—the levels undergo a serious compression or flattening out. This phenomenon blurs distinctions among the levels more than before, making it harder to identify unique processes. The contexts of jointness refer to settings in which jointness could be applied by CJCS and JFCs to enhance the effectiveness of joint military oper- ations. As indicated, this occurs mainly in joint operations, but two other areas directly affect joint force operations, namely, force structure and defense or- ganizations. Force structure refers to the number, size, and composition of the units that make up the Armed Forces (both personnel and equip- ment). Defense organizations refer to service parochialism and is a key in- their inherent multidimensional capa- institutions that primarily control tent and successful result of the Gold- bilities offer more options to JFCs. processes that directly or indirectly af- water-Nichols Act. When this is cou- Fourth, JFCs must synchronize capabil- fect joint military operations. Typi- pled with teaching newly approved ities for synergistic effectiveness. Fifth, cally, they include, but are not limited joint doctrine at these institutions, for jointness to be optimized, synchro- to, the Office of the Secretary of De- jointness is enhanced significantly. nization must be conducted across all fense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Therefore, neglecting to systematically joint integrators, not just joint opera- combatant commands, defense agen- focus the efforts of all joint integrators tions. Jointness then can be defined as cies, and services. Also, as exercises are fails to maximize one of the most im- a holistic process that seeks to enhance designed to emulate operations, they portant characteristics and inherent the effectiveness of all military opera- are included in the context of joint op- strengths of jointness. tions by synchronizing the actions of erations. In sum, the contexts used in Given this, we can begin to define the Armed Forces to produce synergis- the framework of jointness are joint jointness through generalizations. tic effects within and between all joint operations and exercises, force struc- First, it is a focused effort by the Armed integrators at every level of war. ture, and defense organizations. Forces across all levels of war. Second, With jointness thus defined and while it primarily relates to the use of A Framework and Process framed (see figure), we must develop joint forces to conduct military opera- With that definition we can see the analytical process for continually tions, it should embrace all joint activ- that the framework of jointness con- evaluating its evolution. A process ities. Third, joint forces are more capa- tains three dimensions: the contexts of should not be formed without under- ble than uni-service forces because jointness, doctrinal levels of war, and standing the system on which it is joint integrators. As mentioned earlier, based and a system cannot be shaped without knowing how it will function.

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Thus, a vision of the future system is shows how an inefficient benchmark operational reality. This problem has the first step. This is critical because can lower effectiveness. an exponential quality because as the one must understand how all compo- This established benchmark (yard- view of doctrine as outdated is rein- nents among the dimensions have in- marker) requires joint doctrine to be forced among the Armed Forces, it de- terfaced in the past as well as how they developed for extant capabilities.6 Joint creases the credibility of joint doctrine. should be combined to achieve the forces thus get joint doctrine two years After an initial survey of joint- greatest efficiency and effectiveness in after new joint operational capabilities. ness, the resulting assessment would the future. An initial look at the current frame- adopt a benchmark of jointness (as Next we must survey jointness by work reveals that two joint processes well as many other benchmarks) to breaking it into component blocks and affect this yardmarker, the develop- ensure joint doctrine is approved and identifying their contents. (The indi- ment of joint doctrine and require- promulgated with new joint opera- vidual blocks are located where com- ments. Further analysis reveals no rela- tional capabilities. Thus, a change in ponents of the three dimensions con- tionship between the requirements the joint doctrine development verge; for instance, blocks are found process and doctrine development, process to produce conceptual doc- where joint doctrine, organizations, which is unfortunate. For example, trine (operational concepts) for non- and the strategic level intersect.) The two joint surveillance target attack extant capabilities must be made. radar system (JSTARS) aircraft While the JWFC is tasked with devel- joint forces get doctrine two years (under development) were oping conceptual joint doctrine, rushed to the Persian Gulf dur- whatever process is being generated after new operational capabilities ing Desert Storm to enhance has not yet been linked with current coalition surveillance capabili- doctrine generation. Moreover, this contents of each block would include ties. Virtually none of the forces in the- concept of doctrine is not specifically all the joint processes (broken down to ater were aware of JSTARS capabilities related to new joint programs which their respective inputs, outputs, con- or had an operational concept to em- are funded and under development, straints, and resources) whose interac- ploy it. More importantly, these forces but to new conceptual thinking about tions directly or indirectly affect mili- had not developed trust in the data joint warfare. This change would then tary operations. Next, the connections which this system produced to fully couple the development process to (or interfaces) between every element exploit it. Most of these problems were new acquisition programs as they are of each process within the block are eventually overcome and the aircraft approved. identified to determine where inputs yielded crucial information that con- When a program is approved, a or outputs for each process are located. tributed to success on the ground. But conceptual doctrine study would deter- Once the contents of blocks are identi- operational concepts developed while mine how the new capability would af- fied, the interfaces leading from each learning how to employ these aircraft fect joint doctrine. Given the current block must be connected with the ap- could have been mitigated had some 24-month development cycle for doc- propriate processes in other blocks.5 conceptual doctrine been developed trine, this study would recommend After every joint process in the concurrently with the program and one of four courses of action two years framework is identified, the next step promulgated when these aircraft de- before the program enters the initial is to determine where the current ones ployed.7 operating capability stage: (1) do noth- are inefficient. The analyst must first There are other effects. As joint ing, (2) develop doctrine and/or JTTP identify all the benchmarks of each forces await the approval of doctrine, to account for the new capability, (3) process and determine which are ac- they must develop ad hoc field doc- revise current doctrine and/or JTTP for ceptable or must be modified, also trine in lieu of settled doctrine or JTTP. the capability, or (4) pursue courses which are missing and must be estab- Once the approved doctrine appears, it two and three. This would eliminate lished. Then analysts can determine may be more difficult to train these the lag time between extant doctrine needed changes for each process in the forces with it because they have devel- and new capabilities. framework. Recommended changes oped a different way to use the capabil- Finally, those changes should be can then be gamed to determine if ity. Moreover, after working with a ca- gamed to determine their impact on they increase the efficiency of joint- pability for two years, their doctrine other processes and to negate their ef- ness. If validated, they can at last be has operational reality and may be bet- fects. Viable decisions can then be implemented. ter. Field agents from the Joint made so that they have a “value While it is beyond the scope of Warfighting Center (JWFC)8 evaluating added” effect on jointness. this article to survey jointness (identi- joint exercises have reported to the Given a definition, framework, fying all its processes, interfaces, and Joint Staff and combatant commands and analytical process, several conclu- disconnects as well as establishing all that few joint forces are using doctri- sions about jointness can be reached. the benchmarks within the frame- nal publications and recommend an First, the effectiveness of joint change work), it is useful to provide a compre- immediate revision to align them with is directly related to the rate of that hensive example of how the frame- change. For example, while the Chair- work could enhance the effectiveness man has said that the pace of joint of jointness. The following example doctrine development is too slow, that

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pace also must accomodate numerous sions, the doctrine process on the range erations. Given that the high number revisions in doctrine almost as soon as of military operations, and the require- and tempo of operations experienced it is approved. Thus, before the mili- ments process on capabilities. Until all over the last few years will continue, it tary becomes familiar with doctrine frames of reference are harmonized, will be possible to make such a qualita- through education, training, exercises, joint effectiveness will continue to be tive and quantitative assessment and and operations, it changes. Yet given suboptimized. continue to refine the design. the evolving nature of jointness, the Fourth, the Chairman should task Lastly, the present state of joint- present 24-month development and an existing thinktank (such as the In- ness suggests uncertainty about its fu- 18-month revision cycle will con- stitute for National Strategic Studies at ture. What will be its next level? Admi- stantly force joint doctrine to catch up the National Defense University) to de- ral Owens suggested in these pages with tactics and capabilities. The trade- velop a vision, definition, and plan for that it will be reached when the Armed off is that if both cycles are reduced, instituting and monitoring jointness. Forces form standing joint commands the quality of joint publications This should lead to a master plan for to operate continually. While this is (which is directly proportional to de- implementing a method of holistically one direction the military might take, velopment time) will decline. designing jointness in the Armed the next step toward greater jointness The faster the joint environment Forces which, at a minimum, would may not involve moving to another changes, therefore, the less time there have three parts. The first would con- level; rather it could entail continuing is for the military to adapt and opti- sist of an initial assessment of joint- to conceptualize what jointness should ness by creating a perma- be so that it can be designed to get us the Chairman should task an existing nent process for surveying to the end zone in ten plays instead of it based on the framework fifty. JFQ thinktank to develop a plan for discussed above. This instituting and monitoring jointness process would identify all NOTES benchmarks, processes, in- 1 Sean D. Naylor, “Shali Slams Services terfaces, and disconnects for Lack of Joint Doctrine,” Navy Times, Sep- mize itself. Conversely, the slower in the current system, develop bench- tember 12, 1994, p. 5; “Gen. Shalikashvili change occurs, the better the chance to marks for a future system, develop rec- Sees Gap in Joint Force Ops,” National adapt and become more effective—at ommended changes to the current sys- Defense (October 1994), p. A15. the risk of failing to optimize the latest tem, and game those changes to 2 Bradley Graham, “Military Leaders Join tactics and capabilities. Hence, senior determine their holistic effects. This Forces to Plan for Future,” The Washington military leaders must be sensitive to routine would be repeated until every Post, August 22, 1994, p. A15. 3 the pace of change and its effect on combination of change was gamed to See Philip D. Shutler, “Thinking about Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 71, jointness. learn which blend added the greatest no. 11 (November 1987). Second, because jointness relies value to jointness. This package would 4 Department of the Army, FM 100-5, on developing synergistic effects, then go to CJCS for review and ap- Operations (Washington: Government Print- which in turn depend on multidimen- proval. The second part of the plan ing Office, June 1993), p. 6-1. sional and overlapping capabilities, would create a jointness oversight 5 Available DOD modeling programs in- there is a direct relationship between board comprised of former officials clude Integration Definition Language (see effectiveness and the capabilities avail- and retired officers with extensive Federal Information Processing Standards able to a JFC. The greater the number joint experience to advise the Chair- 183 and 184). 6 of capabilities, the greater the ability to man on recommendations made by Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Tech- innovate and enhance the effective- the process as well as to make addi- niques, and Procedures Development Program, Joint Pub 1-01, chapter 1 (Washington: ness of joint operations. Therefore, ef- tional suggestions. The third part Government Printing Office, July 1992), fective jointness means maintaining would establish a permanent mecha- p. I-2. the greatest breadth and depth of joint nism for nonintrusively monitoring 7 Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, and service capabilities possible. In ad- jointness by using the framework and Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report dition, efforts to satisfy the intent of tracking changes to ensure their suc- (Washington: Government Printing Office, Goldwater-Nichols “for more efficient cessful implementation. This would be 1993). use of defense resources” by streamlin- the functional equivalent of conduct- 8 Based on its draft “Activation Plan” ing redundant service capabilities must ing a “net assessment” of jointness. (October 27, 1994), the JWFC mission is to be weighed to ensure that any consoli- While the above plan for a holis- “assist the CJCS, CINCs, and service chiefs dation will not adversely affect joint tic concept of jointness is achievable in in their preparation for joint and multina- tional operations in the conceptualization, warfighting. the short term, the real test of whether development, and assessment of current Third, to maximize effectiveness, it adds value to jointness and improves and future joint doctrine and in the accom- joint integrators must have a common the effectiveness of the Armed Forces plishment of joint and multinational train- frame of reference. Some integrators can only be known through actual op- ing and exercises.” share frames of reference but others do not. For instance, joint planning and training processes are based on mis-

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The Greater Middle East Marine Corps (J. R. Tricoche) U.S.

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■ JFQ FORUM The Five Pillars of Peace in the Central Region By J.H. BINFORD PEAY III

n October 6, 1994, reports in the Persian Gulf and lead companies from the and Egypt poured into the command of the 24th Infantry Division began through Jordan and the Gulf states to center at U.S. Central Com- moving to tactical assembly areas, Iraq and Pakistan. Though Omand (CENTCOM) that two announced the withdrawal of reinforc- these nations share common cultural Iraqi Republican Guard divisions were ing Republican Guard divisions thus and religious traits, they are singularly moving by both rail and heavy equip- defusing the situation. This recent and collectively unique. ment transporters southward from demonstration of coalition resolve CENTCOM operational accom- their garrisons near Baghdad to assem- convinced Iraqi leaders that the risk of plishments also reflect flexibility, ver- bly areas south of the Euphrates. Eight confrontation was too high. To em- satility, and readiness to undertake a divisions threatened Kuwait with lead phasize the American commitment to complex mission: promoting regional brigades located only fifteen miles support regional security and to ensure interests, ensuring an uninterrupted from the border. Bellicose rhetoric, the that Saddam Hussein did not reverse supply of resources, helping friendly massive scale and tempo of mobiliza- his decision to withdraw, CENTCOM states provide their own defense and tion and deployment, uploaded am- continued the flow of forces to the Per- contribute to collective security, and munition, the high state of air defense sian Gulf. By the end of October, the deterring attempts by regional states to readiness, and other indicators all USS George Washington, achieve geopolitical gains by threat or pointed to a possible repetition of the 2,000 marines aboard the USS Tripoli use of force. To accomplish this mis- 1990 invasion. While unable to predict amphibious ready group, four Aegis sion, the command pursues a theater Saddam Hussein’s intentions, Ameri- cruisers, reinforcing Air Force strategy that deals with the challenges can analysts concluded that Iraq would squadrons with 275 aircraft, nearly a of today while preparing for those of be capable of attacking Kuwait with battalion-equivalent of special opera- the next century. five divisions in seven days. tions forces, and two brigades of the Viewing a renewed Iraqi threat to 24th Infantry Division joined the com- The Region Today Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as unaccept- posite wing of JTF Southwest Asia Maintaining regional stability and able, the President directed the Secre- (JTF–SWA) and U.S. Naval Forces Cen- security in the Persian Gulf is integral tary of Defense to immediately act in tral Command operating within the re- to the political and economic well- order to deter and, if necessary, block gion. Another 700 aircraft and 60,000 being of the international community. an Iraqi offensive. CENTCOM at once troops of the First Marine Expedi- Some 65 percent of the world’s proven modified on-the-shelf operational tionary Force (MEF), the 101st Airborne oil reserves are located in this region plans and orchestrated the deployment and 1st Cavalry Divisions, and III Corps which supplies the United States 22 of units from all services in what be- headquarters awaited deployment or- percent of its requirements, Western came known as Operation Vigilant ders. This impressive display of power Europe 43 percent, and Japan 68 per- Warrior. Postured to prevent Iraqi ag- projection achieved in days what had cent—with some experts suggesting gression against Kuwait and Saudi Ara- taken weeks during Desert Shield. these numbers will increase by 10 per- bia, the command built both on the The success of Vigilant Warrior as cent over the next decade. What is combat power of U.S. forward de- well as other operations—United more, much of this oil must transit the ployed and coalition forces and on Shield in Somalia, Southern Watch in , Bab El Mandeb, and American prepositioned equipment the skies of southern Iraq, and mar- Suez Canal, all choke points domi- ashore and afloat to emplace a defen- itime intercept operations in the Ara- nated by regional states. Oil supports a sive force. bian Gulf—illustrates the depth of our vibrant economic relationship between On October 10, as the first U.S.- understanding of the often paradoxical the United States and the Middle East based aircraft began landing at airfields dynamics of the region. A vast geo- in areas such as military equipment, graphic area of 19 nations, it extends construction services, and consumer goods. In 1993, for example, U.S. ex- General J.H. Binford Peay III, USA, is commander in chief, ports to the region were nearly $20 bil- Central Command, and formerly served as vice chief of staff, lion while imports totalled about $21 U.S. Army. billion. While low oil prices have

32 JFQ / Autumn 1995 JFQ Peay Pgs 10/1/96 9:50 AM Page 33 U.S. Air Force (Dave Nolan) U.S. Air Force

Kuwaitis on firing line for Vigilant Warrior.

E–3 AWACS during Bright Star ’94. U.S. Air Force (Tracy Hall-Leahy) (Tracy U.S. Air Force forced local states to reduce major pur- bility is situated astride sev- chases, the Middle East continues to be eral fault lines. It is the birth- an important commercial market, of- place of Judaism, Christianity, fering significant long-term economic and Islam as well as home to 427 mil- Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. All this indi- benefits.1 lion people who make up 17 ethnic cates that lifting U.N. sanctions will These factors account for Amer- groups, 420 tribal groups, and six certainly lead to Iraqi rearmament.2 ica’s vital interests in the region: main- major languages with hundreds of di- Fifteen years after its revolution taining a free flow of oil at stable and alects. This diversity—combined with Iran is competing with Iraq for domi- border disputes, competition nation of the Persian Gulf while simul- for resources, radical political taneously seeking to lead the Islamic the CENTCOM area of responsibility and religious movements, world. Its vast oil reserves, many engi- is situated astride several fault lines economic strains, and explod- neers and technicians, and large popu- ing populations—breeds in- lation permit it to overcome internal ternal and external conflicts. unrest and economic malaise to satisfy reasonable prices, ensuring freedom of This situation is exacerbated by Iraq its ambitions. This is evident in exten- navigation and access to markets, as- and Iran, the gravest regional threats to sive weapons development and the suring the safety of U.S. citizens and peace and stability. Both seek hege- procurement of submarines, attack air- property, and promoting the security of mony in the Gulf and have traditions craft, and anti-ship missiles. With friendly states while helping to build a of intimidating their weaker neighbors. these resources Tehran has underwrit- comprehensive peace. Other concerns Though it lost more than half of ten political and Islamic extremists include promoting respect for funda- its conventional military capability in worldwide, militarized the disputed is- mental rights and democratization, the Gulf War, Iraq still has the largest lands in the Strait of Hormuz, and providing humanitarian assistance, army in the region. That fact, along tried to torpedo the Middle East peace countering illegal trade in drugs, foster- with Saddam’s defiance of post-war process. Uncompromising devotion to ing economic development, preventing U.N. resolutions, alarms neighboring such policies indicates that Iran will re- the proliferation of weapons of mass states. Since the war Iraq has rebuilt main a threat to its neighbors for the destruction, and defeating terrorism. much of its conventional military in- foreseeable future. Safeguarding these vital and en- dustrial infrastructure, and the Octo- Tensions based on Iraqi and Iran- during interests is a herculean under- ber 1994 troop movements that precip- ian belligerence, combined with other taking. In terms of both conflict and itated Vigilant Warrior established Iraqi sources of conflict and extremist culture the CENTCOM area of responsi- capabilities to mobilize and move large movements, are inflamed by the prolif- numbers of forces quickly to threaten eration of weapons of mass destruc- tion. Some nations in the CENTCOM

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region, such as Iraq and Iran, are hard lens of the Cold War. Policies were pur- deriving full benefit from a limited for- at work attempting to steal, buy, pro- sued with the aim of denying the So- ward presence. This was the blueprint duce, and fabricate ballistic and cruise viet Union access. In this spirit, Amer- for a new theater strategy. missiles and nuclear, biological, and ica relied upon the “twin pillars” of CENTCOM is building on these chemical weapons. The difficulty of Saudi Arabia and Iran to promote re- experiences and moving into the next their quest is eased by the willingness gional peace and stability until the late century with a clear strategic vision: of nations such as North and 1970s. The Soviet invasion of ...to be a flexible and versatile com- to sell advanced weaponry to Afghanistan and collapse of the Shah mand—trained, positioned, and ready to anyone with hard cash. The situation of Iran’s regime in 1979 disrupted this defend the Nation’s vital interests, pro- is made more worrisome by the ease strategy and raised questions about mote peace and stability, deter conflict, with which older systems can be im- U.S. ability to secure access to Persian and conduct operations spanning the con- proved through purchases of off-the- Gulf oil and meet commitments to flict continuum; and prepared to wage un- friendly Arab states and Is- relenting, simultaneous joint and com- rael. In response, President our long-term goals are best bined operations to achieve decisive Carter proclaimed in Janu- victory in war. achieved by emphasizing cooperative ary 1980 that any attempt by an outside force to gain In the spirit of this vision, CENT- relationships and coalitions control of the region would COM pursues a multifaceted strategy be regarded as an assault on to address mutual security concerns of shelf technology. Such advances in our vital interests. To add weight to the United States and its regional part- weaponry and the nature of regional that statement, he established the ners. This strategy is oriented toward threats pose an ominous challenge for Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force promoting peace and stability, deter- the United States. As potential foes (RDJTF) in March 1980. ring conflict, limiting the intensity of continue to procure sophisticated sys- Standing up RDJTF amounted to conflict should deterrence fail, and tems and harden and conceal com- conceding failure in solving the knotty providing mechanisms to prevail in mand and control, launch, research strategic dilemmas of the previous combat operations when required. It is and development, and storage sites, three decades. RDJTF had to contend a flexible strategy that applies to each the Armed Forces will have increasing with many of the same difficulties that , capitalizes on personal rela- difficulty finding and striking them. had earlier plagued Strike Command tionships forged with local friends over and Readiness Command: long lines of a half century, and builds on the suc- Theater Strategy communications, lack of forward- cess of Desert Storm. While the com- Designing a strategy that protects based assets, limited access to states of mand retains the capability to act uni- American interests in this vital region is the region, a poor understanding of laterally, our long-term goals are best a daunting task. Innovative ways must local cultures and regimes, insufficient achieved by emphasizing cooperative be found to conduct operations over forces, inadequate funding, and over- relationships and coalitions that are lines of communications that stretch lapping command responsibilities. prerequisites for deploying and em- more than 7,000 miles from the United It was in this context that the Rea- ploying forces in the Gulf. States. Conversely, the distance from gan administration established CENT- CENTCOM forges partnerships Iraq to Kuwait City and its surrounding COM in 1983. The command matured and coalitions through a long-term, oil fields is about the same as that from over time under the leadership of Gen- flexible, three-tiered approach to deter Washington to Richmond. Planning erals Kingston, Crist, Schwarzkopf, and aggression and fight if deterrence fails. must compensate for the dearth of for- Hoar. Operational plans, security assis- The first tier, national self-defense, mal agreements and alliances with tance, and exercises reflected a sophis- calls for each nation to bear primary local states. Associated policies and op- ticated appreciation of regional chal- responsibility for its protection. During erations must reflect a sensitivity to re- lenges. In a succession of operations heightened regional tension or hostil- gional cultures. U.S. forces must be able that culminated in Desert Storm, the ity, friendly states would form the sec- to defeat adversaries ranging from in- command hammered out agreements ond tier, collective defense. This is best surgents to modernized land, sea, and with regional states, formed ties with exemplified by the members of the air forces while remaining versatile local leaders, learned to oversee joint Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in enough to respond to terrorists, drug and multinational operations, and cap- forming a multinational force known traffickers, environmental disasters, italized on superior American military as Peninsula Shield. Finally, on the epidemics, and famine. Finally, they professionalism and weaponry.3 In the third tier, the United States and other must be able to do it in a rugged terrain aftermath of the Gulf War and collapse extra-regional allies would join in and harsh climate. of the Soviet Union, CENTCOM meeting a threat to the region. This ap- Thrust into a more prominent strengthened the U.S. strategic posi- proach and associated initiatives offer role after World War II, the United tion by improving access to the region, another benefit by strengthening links States viewed the region through the enhancing military-to-military con- between the United States and regional tacts, building local forces, upgrading militaries, relationships that promote security assistance and exercises, and peace and stability.

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Seabees coming ashore in Egypt. U.S. Army (Michael Halgren)

theater warfight- and are prepared to counter Iraqi ag- ing headquarters gression. Since JTF–SWA inception in that is not located August 1992, its aircraft have flown in its area of re- 60,000 sorties, 47,000 over Iraq alone. sponsibility, the As seen in Vigilant Warrior, the JTF command must command and control apparatus is ca- U.S. Air Force (Blaze Lipowski) U.S. Air Force Arriving in the Gulf, rely on forward pable of orchestrating both land based October 1994. presence to deter and naval attack aircraft—a significant conflict, enhance improvement over the situation in Au- Five Pillars of Peace access, and support the transition from gust 1990. The above fundamentals underpin peace to war. At the same time, it is bal- Forward deployed Patriot batteries the five pillars of the CENTCOM the- anced around land, sea, air, and special and SOF detachments constitute the ater strategy: power projection, forward operations forces to limit the U.S. foot- ground dimension of forward presence. presence, combined exercises, security print while simultaneously positioning Though more limited in scope than assistance, and readiness to fight. The potent combat power forward. forward positioned naval and air forces, first pillar includes activities and quali- With a limited footprint and sig- these units contribute to deterrence by ties of the Armed Forces that support nificant lethality, naval forces are well strengthening CENTCOM capabilities. rapid projection of extra-regional forces suited to meet competing operational Patriot missiles, for example, could and their combat positioning. Deploy- requirements. Under U.S. Naval Forces counter an enemy with ballistic mis- ing and equipping these forces depends Central Command and Fifth Fleet, the siles by safeguarding key facilities. Simi- on strategic airlift and sealift and the naval component includes, on a recur- larly, SOF personnel improve the com- availability of en route basing world- ring basis, a carrier battle group, an bat skills of regional militaries, enhance wide. It also relies on the preposition- amphibious ready group, and cruise coalition interoperability, and reduce ing of equipment and supplies on missile-equipped surface ships and the risk of fratricide during combat. ships. This includes 12 vessels carrying submarines. In addition to supporting Another aspect of forward pres- an Army brigade set of equipment, 15 recent operations in Somalia and ence is the prepositioning of equip- comprising Marine Corps maritime Kuwait, CENTCOM naval forces con- ment ashore, a strategic linchpin that prepositioning squadrons, three with tinue to conduct maritime intercept complements strategic lift and preposi- Air Force supplies and ammunition, operations pursuant to U.N. sanctions tioned equipment afloat to further re- and five containing Army port opening against Iraq with nearly 23,000 chal- duce time-distance challenges and re- equipment. Through these resources lenges and over 12,000 boardings since lated risks to early deploying forces. In and more planned, the command can August 1990. crisis, prepositioning facilitates sustain- reduce the time-distance hurdles. The compact but lethal 4404 Pro- ment of theater forces and rapid intro- The second pillar, forward pres- visional Air Wing conducting Opera- duction of mechanized ground forces. ence, is the most visible indication of tion Southern Watch under the com- Accordingly, the command maintains U.S. commitment. With few perma- mand of JTF–SWA complements naval hundreds of Army, Navy, and Air Force nently assigned forces and as the only forces. Reconnaissance, attack, and vehicles and thousands of tons of support aircraft of the wing provide constant surveillance of southern Iraq (continued on page 38)

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■ JFQ FORUM U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

MISSION: The primary mission of U.S. area of responsibility includes 19 countries Central Command (CENTCOM) is to prevent located in southwest Asia and Africa. military coercion of friendly states and deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve BACKGROUND: CENTCOM was gains by a threat or use of force; and to help activated on January 1, 1983. It met friendly states to provide for their own secu- the requirement for a major theater rity and contribute to the collective defense. command to serve U.S. interests in The command also puts military capability Southwest Asia and Persian/Arabian Gulf behind national commitments to the region region. Tension in the area began to by preserving and protecting access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf. The CENTCOM Kuwait.

American and Jordanian aircraft during Infinite Acclaim. Signal Company (Casey Smith) T. th 55

U.S. Navy (Jim Grant)

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heighten in the late 1960s and early 1970s Mogadishu airport. following Great Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez. The Iran revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 changed the balance of power which clearly addressed the need for a counter-balancing force to maintain regional stability.

COMPONENT COMMANDS: U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT); U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF); U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command (MARFORCENT); and Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). JFQ U.S. Navy (Rhonda Bailey) U.S. Army (David M. Raffo)

Countries assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. U.S. Air Force (DavidU.S. Air Force Craft) Perimeter guard at Patriot missile site.

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(continued from page 35) ercise in Kuwait; and Ultimate Resolve, such as human rights and civilian con- a command post exercise in the Gulf. trol of the military advances responsi- equipment and supplies throughout Closely associated with combined ble defense management and democra- the region. A main feature is a preposi- exercises is security assistance, a pillar tization in their nations. tioned heavy brigade set of equipment which offers another avenue for satis- Together these elements of security in Kuwait. At the same time, efforts are fying legitimate self-defense needs of assistance reinforce forward presence progressing on placing a second regional friends. It is comprised of four and combined exercises to accentuate brigade set with division support major elements: foreign military sales, access, strengthen military-to-military equipment in another Gulf state as foreign military funding, mobile train- contact, encourage leaders to respect well as on exploring the possibility of ing and technical assistance teams, and human rights, and over time support positioning a third on the ground else- international military education and greater democratization. Also, security where in the region. With a heavy di- training (IMET). assistance is pivotal in coalition build- vision set of equipment positioned Foreign military sales in the re- ing by promoting all three tiers of the ashore, CENTCOM would enjoy im- gion account for a large proportion of U.S. regional defense program. proved operational flexibility to deal America’s worldwide total—46 percent The fifth and final pillar, readiness with a full range of threats and to cor- for FY90–FY94 and 36 percent in FY95, to fight, is oriented toward producing respondingly strengthen the deterrent with sales reaching $2.76 billion. Most operational plans to support the na- effect of forward presence. Gulf states prefer U.S. hardware and tional military strategy and ensuring Combined exercises enrich the have negotiated for major systems to that the battle staffs of CENTCOM other pillars of the theater strategy by include F–15 and F–16 fighters, Abrams headquarters and service components serving as vehicles for power projec- tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Patriot possess the equipment, procedures, tion, promoting forward presence, missiles, and Apache helicopters. These and skills to deploy rapidly in a crisis honing combat skills, broadening ac- sales offer tangible benefits to Ameri- and conduct high tempo joint and cess, fostering military-to-military rela- can industry and are an effective multinational operations. These goals are achieved with the other four pillars security assistance offers another avenue for satisfying and by routine wargaming of opera- tional plans and frequent conferences legitimate self-defense needs among joint, component, and service staffs. The command maintains a high means of upgrading regional military level of readiness through a series of tionships, and stimulating develop- capabilities and boosting interoperabil- rigorous exercises. In addition to exer- ment of coalition warfighting ity among U.S. and local forces. Simi- cises in the region, the command con- procedures. CENTCOM is on track in larly, foreign military funding helps ducts or participates in three others in generating a combined warfighting ca- poorer countries meet their legitimate the United States: Internal Look, con- pability comprised of 14 regional states self-defense needs through grants and ducted biennially, involves all compo- by 2001. In FY95, for example, the transfers of excess defense articles. nents; Roving Sands is a theater missile command conducted a total of 85 Modern weapons alone do not defense command post and field train- land, sea, air, and special operations produce reliable and combat ready ing exercise; and Blue Flag is an air op- exercises. While many were relatively forces. Comprehensive training is erations command post exercise. Col- small or component-oriented, a grow- needed to mold skilled, highly moti- lectively, the exercises enhance the ing number are both joint and multi- vated soldiers and competent leaders. proficiency of battle staffs in the full national. This trend will expand as To this end, the United States relies on range of combat functions. part of an effort to increase joint activ- the 1,000 to 1,500 personnel who The flexibility, versatility, and ities while improving readiness among make up mobile training and technical readiness of CENTCOM were tested regional partners in the long term. Fre- assistance teams. The benefits of these most recently during United Shield in quent exercises in , Egypt, Jor- teams go beyond improving regional January–February 1995. To withdraw dan, Kuwait, , , Saudi Ara- militaries and include buttressing for- the remaining U.N. peacekeepers and bia, the , and ward-deployed forces, improving ac- their equipment from Somalia, a U.S.- Pakistan focus on improving the cess, and cementing relations. Finally, led combined JTF took charge of 21 warfighting capabilities of friendly na- IMET funds enable regional civilian American and allied ships, 75 aircraft, tions and ensuring continued access in and military personnel to study at and 7,700 personnel in and around the the region. The sophistication of these American educational institutions. The area. The operation was fraught with exercises will grow to include other na- introduction of U.S. doctrine and danger. Although Somali clan leaders tions, which will enlarge a second set training to foreign leaders, as well as assured the United Nations that they of command post and field training their personal contact with American would not hinder a withdrawal, ques- exercises that focus on boosting coali- military and civilian personnel, tions lingered about their sincerity and tion warfare. They include Bright Star, strengthens long-term relationships. ability to control their warrior factions. a field exercise in Egypt; Intrinsic Ac- What is more, instruction on topics The command was determined to tion, a joint multinational training ex- avoid bloody street fighting and

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sought to minimize the risk to non- to minimize risks of chemical and bio- While this scenario reflects the combatants. It thus tailored its military logical agents; and the command will modern American way of warfighting, footprint ashore, adhered to well de- be prepared to form joint and com- U.S. forces cannot escape the fog and fined and rehearsed rules of engage- bined task forces capable of conducting friction of war despite their most ment, and provided security for the joint and combined operations. valiant efforts. Access to regional states last U.N. forces to board ships at Mo- Before and after hostilities com- might be complicated by the opera- gadishu on March 3. mence, CENTCOM will exploit all tional situation or political considera- Through the five pillars outlined sources of intelligence continuously to tions. Attack aircraft might miss their above, CENTCOM is establishing survey a potential enemy; to detect, targets. Carriers might be out of posi- peacetime relationships and infrastruc- track, and gain early warning of the tion in the first few days. Sand storms might delay air and ground units. Mis- nations deter by convincing potential adversaries that the sile defenses might not be leak proof. Logistic shortfalls might slow down risks of using force are unacceptable operations. In the final analysis, tri- umph in war will hinge as it always ture needed in a crisis and war. The use of ballistic missiles and weapons of has on the skill, discipline, courage, functions embedded in these pillars re- mass destruction; and to assess battle and sacrifice of American servicemen inforce the foundation of a theater damage. As our first forces arrive in and women. The CENTCOM theater strategy—military-to-military relations theater, they will emplace a multi-lay- strategy is designed to ensure that they and regional access—that is essential to ered missile defense founded on newly possess the greatest possible resources either deter conflict or to fight and win fielded lower- and upper-tier systems and flexibility to succeed. decisively in the Central Region. based on land and sea to safeguard As the command looks to the fu- critical facilities and friendly forces ture, it takes pride in its success in se- Ingredients for Decisive Victory from ballistic missiles and weapons of curing vital national interests in the Deterring conflict and preparing mass destruction. Central Region and in its progress in to fight are a continuum. Nations do Should hostilities commence, U.S. realizing long-term goals. Time and not deter aggression by rattling empty forces and their allies could expect again our people have delivered first- scabbards or mouthing thinly dis- heightened lethality, extended ranges, rate results, conducting combat opera- guised bluffs but rather by convincing and increased volume and precision tions, enforcing U.N. resolutions, potential adversaries that the risks of from munitions to produce greater dis- delivering humanitarian relief, partic- using force are unacceptable. This is persion of fighting formations. In such ipating in combined exercises, estab- achieved by designing, fielding, and circumstances, CENTCOM would use lishing close relations with regional exercising premier joint and combined imaginative and innovative forms of friends, negotiating basing agreements forces, having the will to use them, maneuver, battle command, intelli- and host nation support, and creating and communicating that resolve to ad- gence, fire support, and sustainment— processes and organizations needed to versaries. While the U.S. military must on the ground, at sea, and in the air carry out the theater strategy in both be sufficiently versatile to deal with a and space—cashing in on the comple- peace and war. full range of threats, it must focus on mentary capabilities of all services, Our mission and vision are clear. winning a high intensity war. The with systems linked electronically to Success requires CENTCOM to be flex- units, leaders, and individuals that can both detect an enemy at extended ible and versatile. To meet challenges do this will also possess the skill and ranges and achieve unprecedented op- to our national interests, we are pursu- flexibility to handle other missions. erational synergism. Then vital enemy ing a five-pillar theater strategy to sig- Efforts undertaken in accordance centers would be pounded by bombers, nal friends and foes alike that America with the CENTCOM theater strategy re- fighters, naval surface fire support, is resolute in securing regional peace flect these precepts and characteristics. cruise missiles, Army tactical missile and stability now and into the next If called upon, the command expects systems, attack helicopters, and special century. JFQ forces to rapidly mobilize, deploy, link operations capabilities. As an enemy up with prepositioned weapons and weakened under operational fires NOTES supplies, and fight on arrival. In time throughout the depth of the battle- 1 Office of the Assistant Secretary of of heightened tensions and crisis in the field, the command would mount a Defense for International Security Affairs, region, forces and supplies will be dis- fast-paced ground offensive. The cas- United States Security Strategy for the Middle persed to minimize their vulnerability cading, continuous beating unleashed East (Washington: Government Printing Of- to enemy strikes; camouflage and de- by these attacks would fix enemy fice, May 1995), p. 10. ception will deny an enemy precise lo- forces in place, blind them, demoralize 2 Ibid., pp. 15–16. cations of key facilities and troop for- them, strip them of sustainment, deny 3 Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The mations; forces will employ protective them air and artillery support, paralyze U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington: clothing, antidotes, and immunizations their decisionmaking, and ultimately Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 41, 360–84. collapse their military formations and will to fight.

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■ JFQ FORUM The Middle East: Challenges Born of Success By CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR. U.S. Army Massed tanks in Saudi desert.

ike Caesar’s , the Middle shore of the Mediterranean (, southern littoral of the Mediterranean East can be divided in three , Algeria, and Morocco) plus and to prepare for the reconquest of parts, each presenting a unique Mauritania. They have been of strate- . Crises in the eastern L challenge to U.S. interests and gic concern since early in American Mediterranean, Arabian Gulf, and cen- strategy. Each has its own history of history and were the scene of our first tral Africa during and after the Cold active American involvement and all trans-Atlantic intervention. In 1815, War were accompanied by repeated re- are undergoing significant change in provoked by repeated acts of piracy, minders of the importance of the the post-Cold War era, in part reflect- Congress declared war on Algiers. The in military movements to the ing the successes of past and present Navy and marines responded success- central and eastern Middle East as well policy. Ironically, these successes are fully there as well as in Tunis and as to sub-Saharan Africa. already giving rise to new challenges to Tripoli, assuring freedom of navigation Consistent with the past, U.S. our interests and strategy. in the Mediterranean and the safety of strategic interests still are focused on our citizens. maintaining stability, denying the The Maghreb and Southern World War II underscored the Maghreb to an enemy that could Mediterranean geostrategic relationship between the threaten Europe’s southern flank, sup- Maghreb and Europe. America fought pressing wanton acts of lawlessness The westernmost part of the Mid- with Britain and France to secure the and terrorism, preserving military ac- dle East is the Maghreb—those north cess and transit rights, and safeguard- African countries on the southern ing our citizens. Strategic partnerships

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with Morocco and Tunisia (and Egypt) the founding and expansion of Israel, period have ranged from warm support have bolstered friendly governments, and the concomitant extension of So- and successful military intervention to maintained access and transit rights, viet influence to Arab nationalist block Egypt from overthrowing the and constrained a radical regime in regimes in Egypt and Syria. For more Lebanese government in 1958 to the Libya while containing the political than four decades the Levant has been tragically unsuccessful intervention to chaos in Algeria. These relationships a principal focus of U.S. security policy. back the withdrawal of foreign forces have been the basis for a little-noted Over the course of forty-odd from Beirut in 1983. Nonintercourse yet significant American policy suc- years, the Levant has been the scene of with Beirut in the mid and late 1980s cess—prevention of a much worse situ- the most kaleidoscopic shifts in Ameri- was followed by a modest flow of U.S. ation than now exists in the Maghreb. can relationships in the world. The equipment to Lebanese forces in antic- U.S. influence there has rested so far, ipation of a withdrawal by Syr- however, on extending significant eco- ian and Israeli forces as well as nomic and military support to Mo- U.S. relations with the Palestinians by Iranian irregulars. American rocco and Tunisia. But the collapse of have undergone startling shifts financial and military support funding for aid is challenging all par- for Jordan, a fixture of Middle ties to find a new basis for cooperation East policy for over forty years, in pursuit of shared strategic interests. U.S. posture of neutrality in dealing ended abruptly in 1990 after Jordan’s The spread of political Islamic with Israel and Egypt as evidenced in de facto alignment with Iraq in the movements in has in- the of 1956 gave way to Gulf War. It then resumed (greatly re- creased strategic concern in Europe, es- alignment with Israel in the early and duced by U.S. budget constraints) as pecially in Spain, France, and Italy, mid-1960s, coupled with efforts to Jordan crafted a peace with Israel. that is reflected by NATO. The Atlantic check Soviet backing of Egyptian ambi- Amman’s only substantial “peace divi- Alliance is a forum in which U.S. poli- tions for hegemony in the region. By dend” seems likely to be forgiveness of cies toward the Maghreb can be coor- the late 1960s and early 1970s, the its debt by Washington. dinated with European partners. So far United States had ended its arms em- U.S. relations with the Palestinians NATO, however, distracted by events bargo on Israel, displaced France as have undergone startling shifts in the in the former Yugoslavia and integrat- principal military backer of Israel, and last five decades. Sympathy and gener- ing Central and East Europe into a sys- adopted a policy of containment to- ous assistance to Palestinians displaced tem of cooperative security, has not ward Egypt and Syria. With the Camp by Israel’s violent establishment of its forged a plan to bolster moderates and David accords in 1979, however, the independence gave way to hostility contain extremism in the Maghreb. United States began to provide a huge and ostracism of Palestinian elites as Until Europeans and Americans do so, amount of aid to Egypt. Since then, they turned to terrorism in their strug- they will be less than adequately pre- American policy in the Levant has fea- gle against Israel and its Western back- pared to deal with events on NATO’s tured a pattern of massive subsidies to ers. America now carries on an active southern flanks. Israel as well as Egypt, strategic part- dialogue with the Palestine Liberation nerships with both countries, and the Organization (PLO) and leads interna- The Levant and Eastern positioning of forces in the Sinai tional efforts to help Palestinians estab- Mediterranean through the Multinational Force and lish effective administration and recon- At the center of the Middle East is Observers (MFO). struct the economy in the the Levant, comprising countries that U.S. relations with Syria have being turned over to them by Israel. border the — changed significantly over this time. This remarkable history of shift- Egypt, Syria, , Israel, and the Years of hostility and lack of contact ing alignments in the Levant was pro- other parts of the former British were suddenly replaced by military co- duced by the Arab-Israeli conflict inter- League of Nations Mandate in Pales- operation in the Gulf War of 1990–91. acting with the U.S.-Soviet Cold War tine (Jordan and Israeli-occupied terri- Since then Washington has engaged in rivalry. In the early days of the Cold tories of the West Bank and Gaza). an active dialogue with Damascus. Im- War, the Soviet Union courted radical Prior to the Cold War, American in- proved prospects for peace between Is- Arab and exploited Arab volvement in the Levant was largely rael and Syria have even led to talk of a animosity toward Israel to garner influ- cultural, educational, and philan- U.S. military presence on Syrian terri- ence in Arab capitals. Within a decade thropic. This has been altered by the tory on the Golan Heights if Israel re- Moscow emerged as the dominant sup- end of British and French dominance, turns this strategic real estate. Ameri- plier of arms and ideological tutor of the destabilizing effects of wars over can relations with Lebanon over this Israel’s enemies. In response, the United States forged relations with regimes that were hostile to commu- nism and Arab , such as the Ambassador Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., is a distinguished fellow conservative monarchies, while draw- at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He served previously as ing steadily closer to Israel. assistant secretary of defense for international security Israel’s pioneering spirit, robust affairs and as U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia. democracy, and military prowess

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against daunting odds earned the ad- however, that they are unlikely to suc- relationship with the United States, in- miration of most Americans, while the ceed. Israel is already to some degree cluding combined air and ground exer- fanaticism and terrorism practiced by accepted by every Arab state and peo- cises, a feature of all our other strategic Israel’s most active enemies cost dis- ple as a legitimate part of the Middle partnerships. It will also make sense in possessed Arabs whatever Western East. For the first time since 1949, time to realign the Unified Command sympathy they might otherwise have there is no credible threat to its sur- Plan (UCP) to reflect Israel’s emergence gained. The commitment of American vival as a prosperous democratic state. as an accepted part of the region in Jews and Christian fundamentalists to Eventual peace with Syria and which geography has placed it. restored Jewish rule in the Holy Land Lebanon will lay a firm foundation for Egypt’s multi-faceted role as the reinforced U.S. relations with Israel. As its political and economic integration demographic and cultural center of the the stridently anti-Israeli regimes in into the broader region. This prospect , as an important Mediter- Nasser’s Egypt, Syria, and Iraq moved looms as an historic victory for Israel ranean and country, and as into the Soviet orbit, the U.S.-Israeli re- and a signal diplomatic achievement one of Africa’s few regional powers has lationship fell into in a Cold War con- for the United States. yet to find full expression in its rela- text easily understood even by those As peace percolates into the Lev- tions with America. Nor have Egyptian Americans with no emotional attach- ant, however, U.S. strategic partner- and U.S. forces created a firm basis for ment to the Jewish state. ships with both Israel and Egypt in- cooperating in areas of mutual con- By 1988, the apparent emergence creasingly find themselves in need of cern. Egypt is situated between the of Israel as the primary enemy of the new rationales for their sustainment. Maghreb and Red Sea/Arabian Gulf Soviet Union and its allies in the Mid- Support for Israel can no longer be jus- of the Middle East. Its con- dle East led the United States to for- tified in terms of countering the Soviet tributions to the coalition victory over malize its defense commitments to Is- Union. The Arab threat to Israel is al- Iraq reflected longstanding concerns rael. A memorandum of agreement on ready greatly diminished. American in- about the stability of the Arabian strategic cooperation signed in that volvement in securing Israel’s borders peninsula. It also has vital interests in year committed the United States to with Syria, if this emerges as a condi- the Horn of Africa, as operations in So- guarantee Israel’s security and assure tion of peace between the two as it did malia and action vis-à-vis Sudan have its military supremacy over actual and between Israel and Egypt, will assure recently demonstrated. The stability of potential enemies indefinitely. This continuing American involvement in the area around Egypt is also of great agreement is the basic charter of Amer- Israel’s defense. The threat to Israel will concern to the United States. The ica’s defense relationship with Israel. not disappear overnight, though it is downsizing of the Armed Forces may The premises on which this charter likely to diminish in time. In this re- serve to make military partnership was based, however, are now being gard, the prospect of continued Iranian with Egypt, as with Israel, even more rapidly overtaken by successes in U.S. hostility toward Israel is worrisome but desirable than in the past. and Israeli diplomacy that are reshap- much less immediate than past threats. The United States needs to open ing the Levant. The end of the Cold In short, threat analysis will shortly no dialogue with both Israel and Egypt on War eliminated both the Soviet Union longer provide a rationale for U.S. sub- mutually beneficial bases for security and all significant non-Middle Eastern sidies for Israeli defense at anything cooperation. Economic and military sources of support for Arab hostility to like previous levels. Similarly, sixteen assistance are vital to both countries Israel. Resolute and persistent Ameri- years after Camp David, U.S. aid to though increasingly unpopular in can diplomacy helped foster the cir- Egypt is difficult to justify as necessary America. Without a mutually agreed cumstances in which the PLO could to consolidate peace between Israel basis for these relationships after a embrace peace with a Jewish state that and Egypt. The U.S.-Egyptian strategic comprehensive Middle East peace is it once vowed to destroy. By doing so, partnership, like its Israeli counterpart, achieved, the U.S. public is likely to the PLO has acknowledged that coop- must find new foundations. question the need for huge subven- eration rather than confrontation is Crafting new underpinnings after tions to Israel and Egypt, not to men- now the realistic path to Palestinian an Arab-Israeli peace accord will not be tion new subsidies that Syria and self-determination. Israel enjoys nor- easy but may prove less difficult than Lebanon may demand as the price of mal relations with Jordan as well as some imagine. Israel’s emergence as an peace. Israel and its Camp David peace Egypt. Prospects for an eventual peace accepted part of the region should do partner Egypt already absorb the bulk with Syria, followed by normalized re- away with the political sensitivities of American economic assistance lations with Lebanon and the end of that have precluded U.S. inclusion of worldwide and nearly 100 percent of Iranian influence there, seem increas- Israel in dealing with regional security military assistance. The continued de- ingly sure. issues involving Arab and Islamic cline of U.S. assistance globally will ac- Both Israeli and Arab extremists states. Equipment and munitions centuate the privileged position of Is- can be expected to sabotage the emerg- prepositioned in Israel by U.S. Euro- rael and Egypt. Even if these two states ing peace between Israel and its neigh- pean Command (EUCOM) may, for the agreed that aid could be reduced to re- bors. All evidence to date suggests, first time, be usable in the Central Re- flect diminished regional threats and gion. Greater security may persuade Is- rael to risk a more mutually beneficial

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USS George Washington heading north through Suez Canal. U.S. Navy (Todd Summerlin) U.S. Navy (Todd

limit unhealthy reliance on subsidies industry, shifting traffic away from the the region. This point came into from Washington, a new rationale will canal. As the Cold War passed into his- painful relief when the Gulf states in- be required to justify continued aid at tory, however, Operations Desert stituted an oil embargo to exact a price acceptable levels. Shield/Desert Storm again underscored for massive U.S. assistance to Israel in the military importance of the Suez the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. The cu- The Gulf and Red Sea Canal and Red Sea corridor. By the late mulative costs to the American econ- The easternmost subregion in- 1980s, moreover, tens of thousands of omy alone, in terms of inflation and cludes the countries bordering the Ara- civil and military transports were tran- lost economic growth, have never bian/Persian Gulf and Red Sea been reckoned but must be counted in (Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, growing dependence on Gulf oil the trillions of dollars. Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emi- As the traditional epicenter of rates, Oman, Yemen, and Sudan). greatly added to the strategic Islam the has also American military involvement significance of the region become more important with the there dates from World War II. Ac- emergence of political Islam. The Saudi cess to and transit of the Gulf/Red monarchy’s irreproachably tolerant Sea was essential to power projection siting Egyptian and Arabian airspace management of holy places in Mecca into the China, India, and Southeast annually between Europe and Asia. and Medina deprives extremists of a Asian theaters of war against Japan. The Gulf War also dramatized the mili- platform from which to preach jihad The Suez Canal’s closure due to con- tary importance of these routes. against the West. America and its Euro- flict between Israel and Egypt brought Following World War II, the grow- pean allies, as well as moderate Mus- major changes in the global shipping ing dependence of the American and lims everywhere, have a stake in the global economies on Gulf oil greatly continuation of temperate rule over added to the strategic significance of the holy places.

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In sum, U.S. interests in the Ara- populous neighbor. The abiding U.S. The coalition was unable to set bian Gulf and Red Sea region have cen- interest in the secure flow of Gulf oil, objectives beyond the lowest common tered on oil, transit, and Islam for meanwhile, found expression in the denominator agreed to by consensus many years. These interests have found naval escort of Kuwaiti tankers as the (liberation of Kuwait, reduction of consistent expression in policies that fighting extended to the waters and Iraqi military potential). This left the sustain a balance of power and deny airspace over the Gulf. victors without a vision of a post-war control of the region to the enemies of The war ended in August 1988 Gulf. With no strategy for war termina- the industrialized democracies. From with both sides exhausted although tion, the coalition made no effort to the late 1960s to the fall of the Shah of Iraq clearly emerged as the dominant extract an Iraqi endorsement of peace Iran in 1979, American strategy foresaw regional military power. Gulf Arabs terms or recognition of the political partnership with Iran as the means to and the world should not have been consequences of defeat. (The meeting deal with instability. Reliance on coop- surprised by Baghdad’s decision two on March 2, 1991 with Iraqi comman- eration with Saudi Arabia, through the years later to take advantage of its un- ders at Safwan was a military-technical possible use of Saudi facilities, was seen discussion and not a political ne- as a further means of coping with an America can only adopt a policy gotiation. The United Nations was overt threat from the Soviet Union. of containing Iran and Iraq left to proclaim terms ex post facto Khomeini’s Islamic revolution ended and struggle to gain Iraqi compli- all possibility of cooperation with Iran ance with them.) The failure to and was followed by Moscow’s decision matched military strength. Iraq’s judg- translate military humiliation into po- to invade Afghanistan. The U.S.-Saudi ment that it could get away with an- litical disgrace for Saddam Hussein en- partnership evolved as the two coun- nexing Kuwait was facilitated by the abled him to avoid the personal conse- tries cooperated in providing crucial as- apparent loss of interest in the Gulf by quences of the debacle. Without a sistance to the Afghan mujahidiin. the superpowers as the Cold War vision for post-war Iraq, the coalition Since World War II, the United ended. The 1989–90 collapse of the So- mounted a halting, ad hoc, and tragi- States, with the cooperation of viet empire and the Soviet Union itself cally ineffectual response to the Shia Bahrain, had maintained a small naval freed Iraq of any need to defer to and Kurdish rebellions that followed presence in the Gulf. With the British Moscow. Meanwhile, given the end of the war. Saddam remained in power to withdrawal in the mid-1960s, this the threat to the Gulf, the Carter Doc- plot revenge against his American and force became the only permanent for- trine seemed to lose its relevance. As Gulf Arab enemies. eign presence and a key factor of re- Iraq blustered against Kuwait and the Meanwhile, the lack of an agreed gional stability. Washington responded United Arab Emirates over the spring concept for a post-war security struc- to Moscow’s flanking of the Gulf in and summer of 1990, some in Wash- ture to deter further Gulf conflict at Afghanistan by declaring a vital inter- ington were openly advocating the re- reasonable cost meant that no such est in strategic denial of outside powers moval of the U.S. naval presence from arrangement emerged. The absence of (), prepositioning the Gulf. thorough regional plans for U.S. equipment and munitions in Oman Baghdad’s various miscalculations prepositioned war reserve materiel left and Somalia, and reorganizing its com- culminated in a failure to withdraw be- this issue to piecemeal arrangements mand structure by eventually estab- fore Desert Storm ejected its forces with individual members of the Gulf lishing CENTCOM. This expansion of from Kuwait and reduced them to a Cooperation Council (GCC). The con- American presence was controversial level which Iran might once again flict ended with Saudi Arabia finan- among smaller Gulf states. Ironically hope to balance and constrain. U.S. cially exhausted and Kuwait preoccu- in light of subsequent events, the most forces and the coalition they guided pied with the hugh expense of vociferous objections came from accomplished both their assigned ob- reconstruction. No arrangements to Kuwait. jectives. In military terms it was a tri- share the costs of security for Gulf The bloody, eight-year war of at- umph of epic proportions, but its po- Arabs have yet been worked out with trition between Iran and Iraq absorbed litical result was less gratifying. As Basil them or with European and Asian al- the energy of the Liddell Hart, among many other stu- lies. It is difficult to argue that our and effectively prevented its export to dents of strategy, pointed out: stunning military victory has been Shias in the Arabian peninsula. The The object of war is to obtain a bet- translated into a “better peace.” Gulf Arabs perceived a vital interest in ter peace....It is essential to conduct war Saddam’s continued leadership of preventing Iranian victory over Iraq with constant regard to the peace you de- Iraq, combined with the absence of di- and in maintaining a balance of power sire....If you concentrate exclusively on alogue with Iran, has precluded a strat- between the two that could check their victory, with no thought for the after- egy of balancing these two giants ambitions for regional hegemony. This effect, you may be too exhausted to profit against each other. Such a tactic re- was also an interest of the United by the peace, while it is almost certain mains the preferred option for the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other that the peace will be a bad one, contain- Arabs. They cannot return to it, how- Gulf states offered substantial aid ing the germs of another war. ever, until Saddam’s feud with them is while American intelligence supported ended by his removal from power. No Iraq in staving off defeat by its more plan for accelerating such a succession

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in Baghdad seems to exist. As a result, Dealing with these dilemmas re- Finally, we cannot afford to rest America can only adopt a policy of si- quires that the United States and the on our laurels. The United States needs multaneously containing Iran and GCC reach agreement on a revised, a more equitable and effective pattern Iraq. Dual containment is much more comprehensive basis for defense coop- of regional defense cooperation and expensive and fatiguing than balanc- eration. Such an agreement must then deterrence both from and with the ing Iraq against Iran. It also yields the gain the support of the industrialized GCC. Nor should we continue main- initiative to Baghdad (which can pro- democracies. Both tasks have been taining Persian Gulf security essen- duce a war scare and hurried U.S. de- seen as so difficult that ployment to the Gulf whenever it de- neither has been at- sires) or Tehran (which can do tempted. What is certain, likewise). The expense of unantici- however, is that neither pated deployments to the Gulf can no will be achieved, in longer be easily recouped from Saudi whole or part, unless an Arabia and the other states. The United effort is made. In the States has, however, been very reluc- meantime, there is no ob- tant to confront the reality that it vious alternative to cur- must increasingly bear the cost of our rent policy in the Gulf operations in the Gulf alone or—as despite the risks and ex- may be infeasible in practice—arrange penses it entails. for allies outside the Gulf to help de- Americans like to fray the expense. (After all, their inter- solve problems and move ests in the resources and stability of on. In foreign affairs, the region that we are protecting are as however, the resolution The author with Jordan’s JCS great as our own.) of one problem often Chairman. As long as Saddam is in power, gives rise to another. That Saudis and other Gulf Arabs are likely is the case in the Middle DOD (R.D. Ward) to grudgingly go along with dual con- East. The United States tainment. But as long as there is no faces—or is about to credible GCC collective security struc- face—a challenging new agenda in all tially alone, with minimal or no con- ture, the threshold at which GCC three parts of that region. tributions from other industrialized members can summon American help Continued success in containing nations whose interests are equally at will remain low. U.S. forces will thus be unrest in the Maghreb cannot be as- risk and perhaps more so. A realistic at the beck and call of both Baghdad sumed. Circumstances have changed discussion of dividing defense respon- and Tehran. While there is no con- and the resources are no longer avail- sibility with the GCC and our Euro- certed effort to establish broad interop- able to carry on as before. We need a pean and Asian allies is both urgent erability among GCC forces as well as concerted approach and division of and long overdue. JFQ among U.S., Egyptian, and GCC forces, labor with our European allies to bol- the effectiveness of our security part- ster the security of our friends in the nerships will be reduced. The defense Maghreb, contain spillover from the of the Gulf will thus continue to fall political chaos in Algeria, and ensure disproportionately on America. As long that neither Algeria nor Libya emerges as Washington willingly shoulders as a significant threat to Europe. NATO most of the burden, our European and is the appropriate place to do this. Asian allies will be more interested in The prospect of increasingly nor- exploiting arms and other markets mal relations between Israelis and than in sharing responsibility for de- Arabs brings a need to rethink, refor- fense of common interests. As long as mulate, and readjust our security rela- there is no comprehensive GCC ap- tionship with both Israel and Egypt. proach to prepositioning U.S. equip- The current pattern of U.S. relations ment and munitions, there will be a has served all three parties well, but it substantial risk that our forces may not is neither sustainable nor relevant to be able to go into action in time and in the challenges and opportunities that sufficient mass to prevent the conquest will be born of peace. America needs to or intimidation of a GCC member work out mutually advantageous country by either Baghdad or Tehran. frameworks for defense cooperation suitable for changed circumstances with both Israel and Egypt. The begin- ning of dialogue with both should not be long delayed.

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■ JFQ FORUM The Growing Reach of RADICAL ISLAM DOD Egyptians with coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. U.S. Navy (Ed Bailey)

By WILLIAM H. LEWIS Christianity, many fear that it could not find active political expression magnify the rift between Western everywhere. When it does, however, ideals of parliamentary democracy and the exclusive goal is not to topple gov- he United States faces complex the authoritarian tenets of traditional ernments, though in some cases it is an challenges among those states Islam. This involves sensitive issues effective means of opposing regimes which constitute the greater such as the role of religion in politics with little tolerance for political expres- TMiddle East. From Morocco to and the impact of American policies in sion. Egypt’s long-established Islamic Pakistan, much of the region is in the areas where religious causes often jus- Brotherhood, for example, seeks partic- midst of an Islamic revival that re- tify political violence. ipation in the electoral process as a asserts religious values in contempo- Compounding this challenge is legally constituted political party. Its rary politics. While Western scholars the fact that Islamic revivalism does strategy has been to provide health care indicate that this does not necessarily and education in depressed areas of the portend a conflict between Islam and country. More radical organizations,

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such as the Armed Islamic Group in Al- Western values, they do not threaten ■ Opportunities—The failure of govern- geria and Jihad guerrilla group in Egypt, our security. Saudi Arabia, whose gov- ments to deal with social and economic dif- employ intimidation, subversion, and ernment enforces the strictest interpre- ficulties is fertile ground for activists. In terrorism to achieve their political tation of Islamic law in the Middle gross terms this includes issues of a popula- ends. While most states in the region East, has been a partner of the United tion growth rate that has approached 3 per- cent per annum (Morocco, Algeria, and are avowedly Islamic, only a handful States for more than half a century. On Egypt), 15–25 percent unemployment of governments adhere to Islamic the other hand, it is criticized by some among youth (Algeria), and adverse import (Sharia) law. Islamic groups for that relationship and debt ratios (Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and It would be a mistake for policy- and its refusal to allow popular politi- Algeria). makers to perceive Islamic militancy as cal participation. ■ Consequences—Radical strategies a monolithic trend. Revivalism and Within the greater Middle East, and violence disrupt internal power distrib- militancy are diverse, and what is re- two divergent strategies have evolved ution and lead to military rule or a break- quired is a grasp of the politico-reli- to cope with Islamic movements. One, down of authority. Extremists have no ef- gious level in the greater Middle East, adopted by secular states with single fective reform programs and almost the nature of the threats to existing in- party or military regimes (such as invariably become authoritarian. The result is eroding public support. The implications stitutions, and possible courses of ac- Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq), of the latter for the region or the West tion for the United States and those makes little distinction between main- could be substantial. European nations which are most di- stream and militant groups and deals rectly concerned.1 harshly with both. In essence, such Country Profiles governments forbid religious organiza- Islamic revivalism has been a Differing Perceptions tions from participating in politics. growing phenomenon in the greater The growing Islamic revival raises The other strategy is to open involve- Middle East since well before the Iran- important questions. Is this resurgence ment in the political life of the coun- ian revolution of 1979 which toppled a by-product of a search for spiritual try to mainstream groups but not to the Pahlevi dynasty. Most specialists extremists. Such partic- tend to mark its resurgence with the Islamic revivalism has been growing ipation compels move- Israeli victory in the 1967 war. Out of ments to be pragmatic since well before the Iranian revolution defeat and Moscow’s failure to inter- and separates moderates vene, disillusionment with Arab na- from militants. It re- tionalism, Marxism, and Western ma- meaning by alienated publics, a desire quires a good political atmosphere, terialism ineluctably led to a return by to eliminate Western influence from feasible prospects for economic many Moslems to their traditions and the region; or is it meant to replace in- progress, and shrewd management. values, including Islam. It produced a effectual, corrupt regimes with honest Devising strategies to deal with Is- gulf between the politically active and ones that provide access to power and lamic political groups is chancy at their governments, with scenarios that solve economic and social problems? best. Not infrequently, governmental conceptually fall into three identifi- Will such movements tolerate secular decisions are dictated by excesses, in- able stages: influence or introduce grand ideolo- cluding violence by radical move- ■ gies and ? Western ob- ments, which may or may not be con- movement from single-party con- trol during a period of economic and social servers are divided on these questions, nected to mainstream groups. For crisis toward pluralism, including participa- with some seeing resurgent Islam as purposes of analysis, several criteria tion of Islamic political parties xenophobic and conflict as inevitable. can help to identify the more radical ■ military intervention to establish That view is based on resurgent Islam groups, namely, goals, means, oppor- order and terminate the participation of the in its extreme form which seeks to tunities, and consequences: latter ■ internal violence by opposition overthrow pro-Western regimes, en- ■ Goals—The ostensible objective of dorses anti-Western strategies, and ad- each group is to counter omnipresent, in- groups threatening the military-controlled vocates religious over secular values. sidious neo-colonialist influence emanating regime which can lead to a failed state situ- Others perceive Islamic groups as from the West; the ultimate goal is to re- ation. not necessarily or primarily anti-West- place the secular authority of the state. Algeria, Turkey, and Egypt bear ern but rather as largely critical of inef- ■ Means—Against an implacable special attention in this regard. fectual local government. While the regime of disputed legitimacy, any means of Algeria. The deterioration of state social praxis that many movements opposition is viewed as legitimate. Opera- and society is readily apparent in Alge- tionally, violence is an appropriate way of want to impose—such as restrictions ria where the crisis stems from a variety upsetting the existing order, if need be by on women’s dress and harsh penalties tearing the political system up by its roots. of factors. A sharp drop in oil prices, Al- for theft—are not congruent with geria’s principal export, occurred in the mid-1980s. In consequence, social-eco- nomic progress slowed as the popula- William H. Lewis has taught at The George Washington tion grew rapidly. The younger genera- University and is a consultant to the Institute for National tion was alienated by pervasive Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

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has done in Jordan, thereby creating a Coalition soldiers at prayer during Desert constructive dialogue with mainstream Storm. Islamist politicians. Current indications are that Presi- dent Mubarak will not open the exist- ing political system to any appreciable degree. In prospect is a continued lethargy by a regime populated by technocrats with limited capacity to re- form the political system. The govern- ment prefers to focus on seditious ac- tivities of Islamic activists, pointing to the material and diplomatic support from Iran and Sudan. Both have been charged by the United States as prime

U.S. Air Force (Dean M. Fox) U.S. Air Force actors in the area of state terrorism. Sudan has provided training facilities for Egyptian and Algerian insurgents while Iran has gained notoriety for corruption, incompetence, and self- formations have been weak in leader- military and financial aid to Hizballah centered actions of a single-party gov- ship and racked by corruption. Mili- and Hamas, two organizations dedi- ernment. They protested in 1988, lead- tary modernization goals have not cated to failure of the current Arab- ing to more than 400 deaths at the been fully met. The government has Israeli peace negotiations. hands of security forces. Single-party sought to ease concerns over political Neither Iran nor Sudan are rule ended one year later and local and and human rights. But the steps it has paragons of a successful Islamic revolu- national elections were scheduled. To taken are unlikely to fully assuage tion. Both are pariah states which have many unhappy Turks failed to establish a positive record in Iran is the principal supporter of efforts and skeptical European resolving domestic political and eco- Union members. nomic difficulties. Under Hassan al- to unseat governments tied to the West Sectarian anger has Turabi, Sudan has not managed to been increasing, re- bring a wasteful, decades-old war with the dismay of the ruling oligarchy, flected in March street riots in Istanbul southerners to a successful conclusion dominated by the military, the Islamic and Ankara and a dramatic surge in and is trying to impose Islam by force. Salvation Front (FIS) emerged as a well the membership of the Welfare Party. The Sudanese economy is virtually in organized political movement. It virtu- The fragmented nature of Turkey’s po- receivership, barely able to stagger from ally swept out the oligarchy and threat- litical culture, reflected by the elec- debt crisis to chapter XI status. The op- ened the military. Finally, in 1992 the torate, could make this Islamic party position, however, is too weak to pose a military declared a state of emergency, the largest within parliament should credible threat. Iran is deeply em- outlawed FIS, and jailed 8,000 of its they win one-third of the vote in na- broiled in trouble with many of the members. Since then there has been a tional elections anticipated for 1996. country’s senior mullahs who are dis- growing, bloody insurgency with Egypt. Few secular Arab regimes tancing themselves from self-inflicted reprisals by government forces and the have been as subtle as Egypt’s in han- social and economic difficulties and threat not only of a failed regime but a dling the Moslem Brotherhood. On from those in positions of power who failed state. coming to power in the wake of Anwar are enriching themselves much like the Turkey. The potential difficulties Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak Shah’s clique. Iran is also in the throes facing Turkey are a product of its polit- adopted a strategy of “gentle contain- of double-digit inflation, falling pro- ical heritage. After an initial period of ment” of the Brotherhood while show- ductivity, and mounting debt. In 1995 gestation, Turkey turned to Europe and ing no mercy to Islamic Jihad and it experienced a number of industrial NATO as lodestars for future growth other bands seeking to overthrow the work stoppages and anti-government and military modernization. But nei- regime. Efforts by the government to demonstrations. Sixteen years after its ther Brussels nor the country’s political redress these problems have had only revolution, Iran faces a perilous time parties have developed a strategy for limited success. Islamic groups con- with the middle class, intellectuals, and securing these goals. There is reluc- tinue to enjoy popular support for bazaar merchants, who are skeptical of tance with regard to Ankara’s applica- their socio-economic programs. Rather the government’s policies and leader- tion for full European Union member- than neutralize all Islamic political and ship. However, there is no sign of any ship. Turkey’s secular political professional groups through police re- organized opposition that could pression, a more productive strategy threaten to topple the regime. might involve some opening up of po- litical processes, much as King Hussein

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The Radical Network acts. Even the United States is not im- has been evident in recent years, the Following the overthrow of the mune as the World Trade Center royal family will continue to exercise Iranian regime in 1978–79, most area bombing in 1993 and recent airport control so long as a majority of the specialists anticipated a wave of reli- terrorist alerts attest. princes remain united and supported giously based political upheavals. The The United States has declared by tribal groups. only successful effort occurred ten that it regards the Islamic revival as a The Islamic threat runs in cycles, years later in Sudan. In most instances, natural outgrowth of economic and however; and a critical factor will be radicals have only played spoiler roles. cultural reorientation, particularly in the performance of existing ruling 2 In recent years, however, support net- the wake of the Cold War. Hence, the groups, the extent to which they toler- works have emerged in the form of Clinton administration does not see ate political dissent, and how res- thousands of militants from the Islam as the next “ism” which will olutely they tackle myriad economic Moslem world who fought alongside confront the West or as a threat to in- and social ills. If they remain auto- the Afghan mujahedeen and who have ternational order. In the words of one cratic, morally bankrupt, and oblivious returned to Algeria, Sudan, and senior American official: to the demands of the middle class and Lebanon. Recruits find access to train- In countries throughout the Middle “lumpen proletariat,” they will be vul- ing in Sudan and Lebanon, while Iran East and North Africa, we...see groups nerable to challenges from ever present and some Saudi nationals offer finan- seeking to reform their societies in keeping dissidents. The latter, disillusioned by cial aid. But this network does not with Islamic ideals. There is considerable Marxist theories and secular national- amount to what can be called an Is- diversity in how these ideals are expressed. ism, have been compelled to turn to lamic “Comintern.” We detect no monolithic or coordinated in- religion and its attendant traditions. Iran is the principal supporter of ternational effort behind these movements. But the primary inspiration for politi- efforts to reduce Western influence in What we do see are believers living in dif- cal action is the overthrow of power the region, as well as to unseat govern- ferent countries placing renewed emphasis centers. Under duress, as recently seen, ments closely tied to the West. Iranian on Islamic principles and governments ac- intervention by local security forces involvement is also predicated on re- cording to Islamist political activity to becomes ineluctable. jection of the legitimacy of the state of varying degrees and in different ways. The task for the West is to develop Israel, and therefore on public opposi- strategies and contingency plans that It is also apparent that America tion to the Arab-Israel peace negotia- deal not with the threat of Islam but opposes those who substitute religious tions in progress since October 1991— rather with the problem of regime col- and political confrontation for con- a “flawed process” forced on Arab lapse and failed states. JFQ structive engagement with the rest of governments by the United States in the world. collaboration with Israel. As a result, NOTES Several questions emerge from the Tehran has maintained varying levels 1 Algerian case. Was the Algerian gov- “Living with Islam,” The Economist, vol. of support for Islamist groups such as 334, no. 7906 (March 18, 1995), p. 13. ernment originally not aggressive Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. 2 Innumerable studies on the Islamic re- enough in dealing with FIS or can po- The Islamic Republic of Iran has vival are available, although few evaluate litical reform forestall extremism? Will turned its proselytizing toward the the goals, organization, et al. of radical Algeria be seen as the first of a series of small Arab states in the Gulf where groups across the “greater Middle East.” potential dominoes in the region? One analytical milestone is Oliver Roy, The substantial Shia populations form a In the near term the Western al- Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: potentially dissident underclass that lies will be limited in their ability to Harvard University Press, 1994). Other con- seeks a greater political voice. Should influence political forces in the Middle tributions include works by John Esposito, Iranian-backed elements come to East. Events in Bosnia and elsewhere in The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New power in Bahrain, U.S. military access the , the Arab-Israeli peace York: Oxford University Press, 1992); James to facilities would probably be termi- Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States talks, and the Algerian civil war may nated—a boon to Tehran, which views (New York: Cambridge University Press, shape the political landscape for years the substantial presence in the Gulf 1986); Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the to come. But transformation of the re- area by the “great Satan” with consid- Moslem Brothers (New York: Oxford Univer- gion at the hands of radical Islamic erable perturbation. sity Press, 1969). groups is unlikely. At present, such The crude though spreading net- movements are not ascendant. Few, if work of radical Islamic groups in any, will come to power through con- France, Spain, and Italy is of mounting stitutional means. The election route is concern to local governments. The nu- barred to them in Morocco, Tunisia, cleus of their recruits emanates from and Egypt, which forbid political par- Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, all for- ties based on religion, region, or lan- mer French dependencies. Recent guage. Saudi Arabia bans parties com- bombings of the Paris Metro have pro- pletely and, although political ferment voked further worry. Western security services have been placed on a height- ened state of alert because of these

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Gulf Security and Iraq’s Uncertain Future

U.S. Navy Highway of Doom.

By PHEBE MARR ■ a program to destroy Iraq’s weapons spare parts. Industrial production is half of mass destruction (WMD) as well as intru- its prewar level and inflation is rampant. raq’s uncertain future hangs like a sive monitoring to prevent future WMD The dinar, valued at about $3 before the production pall over the Persian Gulf. Five war, now fluctuates at 800–1,000 dinars ■ no fly zones in the north and south to the dollar and has recently reached years after sanctions were imposed, to limit Iraq’s capacity for repressing its 2,250. One indication of Iraq’s declining followed closely by a punishing population I economy is per capita income, currently war, the regime in Baghdad still clings ■ rectification of Iraq’s border with to power. Moreover, despite Saddam Kuwait and a monitored demilitarized bor- reduced to a level of the late 1960s, be- Hussein’s recent enforced cooperation der zone. fore the rise in oil prices. with the United Nations, he has not Weapons of Mass Destruction. An- complied with all relevant U.N. cease- Saddam in a Box other critical constraint has been the fire resolutions. What lies ahead for These measures are designed to inspection regime to locate, destroy, Iraq? Is the current regime likely to compel Iraq’s compliance with a series and bar production of WMD and bal- survive? What difference does its sur- of U.N. resolutions put in effect as part listic missiles with a range over 150 vival or demise make to Gulf security? of the cease fire. However, they also kilometers. To this end, a U.N. moni- What challenges face the United States serve to contain Baghdad’s potential for toring system is being installed to as- and the international community in aggression by limiting its military capac- sure that such systems are not reconsti- dealing with Iraq in the near term as ity and encouraging a change of regime. tuted. The International Atomic well as in the more distant future? Sanctions. The most important ele- Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.N. As part of the Gulf War cease-fire, ment of these constraints is sanctions. Special Commission (UNSCOM) are the United Nations, under American The oil embargo has reduced Iraq’s for- charged with enforcing the regime. leadership, placed unprecedented con- eign exchange income from a prewar Thus far they have destroyed chemical straints on Iraq. They have been im- $12–15 billion to a current $1 billion. warfare facilities, missiles and missile posed using various instruments, sanc- Sanctions also restrict all imports except production factories, and other plants tioned by Security Council resolutions, food and medical items. Although Iraq devoted to nuclear weapons produc- and implemented by U.S. and allied produces some of its own food and oper- tion, although recent revelations may forces. They include: ates light to medium industry, sanctions require reopening inspection of some WMD categories previously considered ■ an austere sanctions regime which have created shortages of equipment and has deprived Iraq of oil revenues and all “closed.” Biological weapons have not imports not related to sustenance and med- ical necessities

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been fully identified and eliminated. south has been weakened but not Baghdad that Washington will continue Thousands of documents must be ana- eliminated. In addition, Operation to back constraints on the regime, lyzed and it must be determined Southern Watch provides further pro- weaken Saddam’s hold on power. As- whether any biological feed stock re- tection to Kuwait by giving the United sessments of his longevity were short- mains. Even if inspections result in the States and the Gulf Cooperation Coun- ened with the defections in August destruction of stocks and production cil (GCC) better warning should Sad- 1995 of several members of his immedi- facilities, without continuous intrusive dam contemplate another attack. ate family. Also relevant is Baghdad’s monitoring Iraq could restart some Kuwait-Iraq Border. A U.N. commis- isolation, sagging morale among the programs, especially biological and sion has aligned and demarcated the military, and growing opposition. All chemical, since it possesses a large pool Kuwait-Iraq border, with a 10-kilometer this evidence suggests a gradual narrow- of scientists and technocrats with the demilitarized zone on the Iraqi side and ing of the regime’s support base. expertise. a 5-kilometer zone on the Kuwaiti side, In the south the Shia are pro- No Fly Zones. Another element of monitored by the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Ob- foundly disaffected. Many dissidents the containment policy is no fly zones. servation Mission (UNIKOM). remain in the marsh area while others In the north of Iraq, the United States, Britain, and France conduct Provide Comfort, part of which comprises an the United States may face difficult decisions on sanctions air operation that prohibits Iraqi flights north of the 36th parallel. On the These formidable restrictions have stage cross-border raids from Iran. Sad- ground, a secure zone has been estab- succeeded in compelling compliance dam’s control, despite massive drain- lished to provide a safe haven for Kurds with some, though not all, WMD pro- ing of the marshes to remove a refuge who fled from control by the central visions and recognition of the newly for these dissidents, remains weak in government after their failed rebellion drawn border with Kuwait. Saddam the area. in 1991. A military coordination com- has lost sovereignty over portions of In the north the government has mittee comprised of American, British, Iraq; he has little income to revitalize lost control of much of the Kurdish French, and Turkish military represen- his forces; international monitors con- area. In the exclusion zone, two Kur- tatives patrols the area and supervises strain resuscitation of his WMD pro- dish parties and their militias are in the safety of the Kurds. In late 1991, gram; and sanctions are sapping the charge, while an umbrella opposition Iraq withdrew its troops from much of economy and ability of the regime to group, the Iraq National Congress, op- the north to a perimeter from the Syr- reward its power base. erates with impunity. Unfortunately, ian to the Iranian borders. It no longer Looking ahead the question is not early experience of Kurdish self-gov- exercises sovereignty in this exclusion the efficacy of these instruments to ernment has collapsed in party infight- zone. compel compliance with resolutions or ing, spoiling chances for a cohesive op- In 1992, a no fly zone was insti- to contain aggression, but rather how position movement. While the tuted south of the 32nd parallel to en- long they can last, whether they can opposition in the north is unable to able the coalition to monitor Iraqi bring about a change in the regime, unseat the regime, it runs extensive in- noncompliance with U.N. prohibitions and what might happen if they are formation and intelligence operations on repression of the Shia population. lifted or weakened. against the government and acts as a The no-fly zone also prevents the At some future point, the United base for desertions from Iraq. regime from using aircraft to support States may face difficult decisions on More significant is growing opposi- counterinsurgency operations. But Sad- the sanctions if, however gradually tion from the center of the country, es- dam did not withdraw his forces, and and reluctantly, Saddam Hussein has pecially from the military and the Ba’th remains in control on the ground. been compelled to adhere to key WMD Party who Saddam relies on for support. After Iraq mobilized troops on the resolutions. Ultimately only one of In the past two years, there have been Kuwait border in October 1994, the two outcomes is possible in Iraq, either numerous reports of attempted coups United Nations passed resolution 949 loosening sanctions with the current or plots against the regime, particularly which precludes Iraq from strengthen- regime or a change of leadership. It is from powerful tribal groups with mem- ing its forces in the south. According on long-term scenarios that analysts bers in high ranks of the regular army to Anglo-American interpretation, this are now beginning to focus. and Republican Guard. Last year, the means that units now north of the brutal execution of a dissident general 32nd parallel, including Republican A Post-Saddam Regime from a powerful Dulaim tribe sparked Guard units, may not move south of it. As time passes the potential for a rebellion in his home town, Ramadi, As a result, Iraqi sovereignty over the leadership change slowly improves, but where provincial officials were killed it is by no means certain. Sanctions, and public buildings were burned to the and more critically the growing sense in ground. This was followed by the forced resignations of two relatives of Saddam, Phebe Marr is a senior fellow in the Institute for National the ministers of interior and defense. Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and The dramatic defection in August 1995 author of The Modern History of Iraq. of Husain and Saddam Kamil (with

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the provisions of resolution 687 on Northern Security Zone and De Facto Military Demarcation Line WMD, and UNSCOM issues a satisfac- tory report, a majority in the Security Council might vote to ease sanctions. Without action to forestall this eventu- ality, the United States will have to use its veto if it wants the oil embargo maintained. Since sanctions must be reviewed every two months, continual use of the veto could raise tension with our allies as well as the cost of maintaining alliance cohesion on other issues such as sanctions on Libya and Iran over which there is already disagreement. If the veto is used, more leakage on sanc- tions could be expected as well as more challenges from Iraq. Alternatively, the United States and its allies could revise the sanctions regime to permit some oil exports to ease the humanitarian crisis, while maintaining a high degree of control over Iraq’s expenditure of its oil income. The Security Council passed resolution 986 (which was re- jected by Saddam), allowing for a lim- ited amount of oil to be exported over fixed periods with controls on income Source: General Accounting Office expenditure. Even if the embargo is eased, other restrictions (such as on imports) could be used to exert con- trol. Given international and especially American distrust of Saddam, full their wives, Saddam’s daughters), both tion and the extraordinary task of pen- restoration of Iraq’s control over its oil of whom held key posts in the inner etrating the security apparatus, a major is unlikely. A post-sanctions Iraq, even ruling circle, exposed serious cracks in constraint lies in the fear of chaos that if it came into being, might be only a the regime. could follow Saddam’s departure. Since marginal improvement for the Iraqi Meanwhile the economic situa- the defections, Saddam has undertaken people. tion is deteriorating, disaffecting the significant political damage control. He has reduced the power of his Regional Security in the near term it is more likely immediate family, strengthened The removal of Saddam Hussein ties with the Ba’th Party and the that Saddam will cling to power has unpredictable implications for the military, and “won” an election future of the Gulf. Who would succeed for president (he was the only him? What support would a new hard-hit middle class on which the candidate). His ouster is speculative. regime have? What agenda would it regime counts for passive support. Although it cannot be ruled out, it adopt? The most likely replacement is Maldistribution of wealth is acute, cannot be assumed. thought to be someone from the circle with high salaries and perks such as of power, either a military man or a Iraq without Sanctions cars and housing going to Saddam’s Ba’thist. Under this scenario a new supporters while middle class workers In the near term it is more likely regime would have a similar political lose their savings and must take multi- that Saddam will cling to power, at- orientation, the core of which would ple jobs to make ends meet. tempting to weaken the alliance ar- be a strong, modern Iraq, with the However, while sanctions are rayed against him to a point where he ability to project its power and influ- weakening Saddam’s power base, his achieves an easing if not a removal of ence. But such a regime might be only security system is still intact, making sanctions. While this process has been slightly better than the present one. an attempt to remove him highly dan- delayed, if he continues to accede to Those who subscribe to this outcome gerous and difficult. Aside from popu- argue that such a regime would be lar fear of the regime’s ruthless retribu- pragmatic. Bankrupt and isolated, it

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Maritime interdiction team boarding Iraqi vessel.

Iraqi prisoners of war. U.S. Navy (John Bouvia) DOD

would be forced to accommodate do- The end result of the second out- Saudi Arabia, with a potential to ex- mestic groups to maintain power and come is more predictable but more port 6 million barrels per day. If the to relax tensions to have sanctions threatening. If Saddam gets more oil in- growth of Iraqi exports is unchecked, lifted. This would be the most favor- come through a removal or easing of some European and Asian nations will able outcome. sanctions, his political tenure is more beat a path to its door for trade. Bagh- Unfortunately, removing the assured. His track record on policy is dad could be in a position to intimi- regime in Baghdad would likely be fol- clear and unlikely to fundamentally date and challenge GCC states in a lowed by instability. If not curbed, this change. He will use some of his wealth decade. Saddam’s survival would pre- could be a slippery slope, with the po- to buy off domestic discontent, but the sent the United States with the task of tential for ethnic and sectarian vio- lion’s share will go to supporters, espe- maintaining a long-term policy of con- lence and erosion of centralized con- cially family, and to the security system tainment and close monitoring of trol. A collapse of the government which will continue to repress the pop- Iraq’s WMD. would allow neighbors such as Iran, ulation. The military will be built up Syria, and Turkey to increase their in- slowly but surely, and Saddam’s ability Force Posture fluence over Iraq. Severe instability to cheat on WMD will grow. He might It is against a potential land threat could spill over into Gulf countries even get fissile material clandestinely from Iraq that a robust U.S. force pos- such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and for a if vigilance is re- ture is being put in place in the Gulf. Bahrain, which may have to cope with laxed. He is only 58 and could remain The challenge posed by Saddam Hus- increased Shia activity from southern in power for another decade or more. sein in October 1994 illustrated once Iraq, supported by Iran. Turkey could If sanctions are eased and oil be- again the need for swift and decisive de- also face more instability among the gins to flow, Saddam’s behavior may terrent capacity. In the wake of Desert Kurds along its borders. be more difficult to monitor and con- trol. Iraq has oil reserves of well over 100 billion barrels, second only to

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Iraqi Compliance with U.N. Resolutions

no. 833 ★ accept newly demarcated border with Kuwait ➧ accepted

no. 707 ★ complete disclosure of all WMD programs ➧ partially fulfilled

no. 687 ★ destroy all chemical, biological, and ballistic missiles ➧ partially fulfilled over 150 kilometers and research/manufacturing facilities ★ not acquire or develop nuclear weapons ➧ nuclear facilities dismantled ★ accept on-site inspection, verification, and monitoring ➧ inspection system in place/partially functioning for nuclear, biological, and nuclear missile facilities ★ repatriate Kuwaiti/third country nationals ➧ over 600 Kuwaitis still missing ★ return property stolen from Kuwait ➧ all property not yet returned ★ end participation in/support for international terrorism ➧ unfulfilled ★ establish assurance of “peaceful intentions” ➧ unfulfilled

no. 688 ★ end repression of Iraqi citizens/allow access to ➧ unfulfilled humanitarian organizations

no. 705 ★ pay compensation up to 30 percent of oil revenues to ➧ requires lifting oil embargo victims of Kuwaiti occupation

Storm, America has unprecedented co- where radical Islam is spreading anti- We must be prepared for several operation with GCC states, including Western sentiment, these states also scenarios. While a change of regime in defense agreements with five members must worry about the visibility of a Iraq would be preferable, Washington and close relations with the sixth, Saudi larger Western military presence. has no international mandate and few Arabia. The agreements provide a Meanwhile, it is not only a re- instruments to engineer that from out- framework for prepositioning equip- armed Iraq that presents a danger, but side. Such an outcome must rest with ment, access to facilities, combined ex- Iran as well. The threat from Iran is un- those in Iraq most capable of bringing ercises, and an ability to return rapidly likely to be a ground attack, as it is from it about. But the United States can in a crisis. In addition to increased air Iraq, but naval interdiction in the Gulf offer an external environment favor- and naval assets, combined exercises and possible use of missiles. Iran has able to change. While continuing pres- been busy milita- sure for compliance with U.N. resolu- combined exercises enable the United States rizing Abu Musa, tions, it can hold out prospects for an an island jointly improved international climate—a to rotate combat units through the region claimed by Iran gradual end to isolation and easing of and the United sanctions—if a change at the helm in with regional forces enable the United Arab Emirates. Subversion from Iran is a Baghdad gives way to a more accept- States to rotate Army and Marine com- constant threat for GCC countries, able government that adheres to both bat units through the region periodi- some with substantial Shia populations. international norms and respect for its cally without permanent bases. Both of these dangers make vigi- own population. The challenge here However, increased security is a lance essential for the foreseeable future. will be to help Iraq through a transi- burden for GCC states who must bear In the long term, it would be advisable tional period should a change occur. the expense. Gulf operations in October to include Iran and Iraq in a Gulf secu- If the regime stays in place, the 1994 may have reached $1 billion on rity framework, which would lessen the United States and the West will have to top of the $37 billion Gulf states spent need for a large American presence, but devise a policy that contains Saddam on Desert Storm. GCC states no longer given the regimes in these countries, Hussein but provides the population have the deep financial pockets they that seems a long way off. The potential with economic relief. Efforts to open once boasted. Saudi Arabia has one of for gradual change in Iran appears more up the country and allow contact be- the world’s largest debts, and lavish sub- likely than in Iraq, although that is also tween its many middle class profession- sidies to its people are being curtailed. an unknown and in any event will take als and the outside world could pay The steep costs of the war have now some time. Unless there is a regime dividends in the long term. It is contact been exacerbated by the decline of oil change in Iraq, little long-term behavior with this segment of the population prices from highs in the 1970s and change can be expected. that will provide the best avenue for 1980s. Defense expenditures, however producing the alternative leaders to necessary, are unwelcome. In a region those currently in power. JFQ

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AND THE IRAN“Great Satan”

By MARK J. ROBERTS Iran. While this affected some Ameri- demonstrate the resolve to engage po- can businesses, the economic impact tential aggressors, and simultaneously on Tehran may be more lasting. Yet be open to rapprochement with Iran. merica continues to repre- Iran has largely avoided blame for sup- sent the “great Satan” to porting acts of terrorism, despite its The Regional Dimension the Islamic Republic of Iran. continued involvement in planning Tehran’s perspective on security APresident Hashemi Rafsan- and conducting such violence. was changed little by the outcome of jani charged that the United States has In addition, internal problems the Gulf War, the breakup of the Soviet been poisoned by Zionist propaganda. threaten to fracture Iran. Broad-based Union, and the advent of a One Ayatollah, in blaming America for support for the regime has diminished order. Historically, its interests have bloodshed around the world, said that, to a level where it faces a breakdown of been fixed between the Persian Gulf “this satanic superpower will never be its politico-religious legitimacy. Eco- and , where a lack of bor- successful against the Islamic nomic and political crises have re- ders offered freedom of movement. Republic.” 1 The United States is Iran’s sulted in urban rioting and calls for au- The demise of the Soviet empire en- all-purpose demon. tonomy from centralized control. This abled Iran to establish relations with U.S. policymakers must resist the threatens Iran’s stability and empha- , Armenia, Turkmenistan, temptation to reciprocate by depicting sizes the fact that while it exports ter- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran as its own demon. If it were not and Uzbekistan. for terrorism, Iran’s in- The Iranian desire to play the famy could be reduced to the Iranian desire to play the dominant dominant role in Central Asia clashes inflated rhetoric, unreal- role in Central Asia clashes with with Turkish intentions. In addition, istic designs, and high despite a claim of regional solidarity,2 levels of defense spend- Turkish intentions Iran’s ambition of manipulating a ing. A workable strategy counterpart to the Arab League is not should be developed toward the Iran- rorism, that is not the answer to the attainable absent regional homogene- ian regime that is not based on com- aspirations of the Islamic world. ity and common purpose. Moreover, petitive demonization. Iran’s ability to engage the United Khomeinism is unpopular among Cen- Iran is only one of our many secu- States can be indirect and handled tral Asian elites with Soviet-style tech- rity concerns in the greater Middle through diplomacy, sabre rattling, and nocratic educations. East. Continuous state sponsorship of in the worst case force. But Iran will Since the ascension of Reza Shah terrorism led the Clinton administra- endeavor to impede American policy to the Peacock Throne in 1925 and tion to issue an executive order in May by rhetoric, posturing, and perhaps ter- through the regime of the Islamic Re- 1995 to ban trade and investment with rorism. To counteract this, the United public, Iran’s goal of becoming the States must maintain its presence in hegemonic power in the Gulf has been Mark J. Roberts is a Middle East special- the Gulf, engage in confidence build- a constant feature of its security poli- ist currently assigned to the Directorate ing measures with regional allies, cies. Before the revolution, Iran had of Threat Analysis in the Air Force the largest, most powerful forces in Office of Special Investigations. the region and perhaps the greater

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Middle East. However, the military of an attack on aviation or maritime The Nuclear Club suffered from shortages of spares, lack routes has kept Iran under interna- Iran has an aggressive overt and of technical expertise, and an inability tional observation. covert nuclear and ballistic missile pro- to operate equipment without foreign Current U.S. policy toward Iran gram with the intent of acquiring nu- assistance. stems from Clinton administration clear weapons. China has provided its The revolutionary purges and sub- concern over Tehran’s conventional favorite client in the region with both sequent eight-year struggle with Iraq and nuclear programs, including the a small reactor and a separator for pro- depleted the edge in manpower and acquisition of submarines and ballistic ducing radioactive isotopes as well as a technology formerly enjoyed by the missiles. Iranian criticism of our policy promise of more advanced technology. military. Since the mullahs believe that of “dual containment” grudgingly ac- Despite claims to the contrary, there is military power is basic to shaping the knowledges American presence in the no such thing as dual-use technology strategic environment, Iran seeks a region but views it as a step backward. transfer to Iran. Unless constantly in- military-technological advantage over As described by National Security Advi- spected, dual-use technology will find a military use whenever it suits the re- cipient, and all the nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technology that advances Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will be applied to that end. Interest in nuclear power on the part of Tehran is hard to explain un- less linked to a plan to acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear power plants do not make sense for Iran, which has the world’s second largest reserves of nat- gas—fuel that is not easy to sell and is thus suitable for domestic con- sumption. Generating power from natural gas requires a low capital in- vestment, whereas nuclear plants would cost billions of dollars in for- eign exchange, capital which Iran does not have. Iran may be trying to acquire nu- clear weapons from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. There are also indications that Russian military personnel in Iran provide guidance to Tehran’s nuclear program. According

DOD to former Director of Central Intelli- Iranian Kilo-class gence James Woolsey, Iran is attempt- Attack Submarine. ing to buy fully fabricated nuclear weapons. After the disagreement which surfaced at the May 1995 sum- its neighbors, especially Iraq, some- sor Anthony Lake, dual containment mit over Russia’s sale of a light water what heedless of the consequences of seeks to work with regional allies to reactor to Iran, Moscow broke ranks this policy. “maintain a favorable balance without with Washington. Russia does not The desire for regional primacy— depending on either Iraq or Iran” to share concern over Tehran’s pursuit of and a growing arsenal—could fuel one “counter the hostility of both Baghdad nuclear weaponry. 3 of Iran’s enduring ambitions—control and Tehran.” While entering the nuclear club of the Strait of Hormuz and, along For Iran the goal of being predom- opens a new era for a country, Iran’s with it, the Persian Gulf and Gulf of inant in the Gulf received new impetus interests are manifold. Many of its Oman. Through these waters transit with the defeat of Saddam Hussein and neighbors either have or are rumored more than 90 percent of all Iranian the acquisition of over 100 combat air- to have nuclear weapons—Israel, Iraq, government revenues, including all of craft from Iraq. It should be noted that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the country’s petroleum. Of great con- the purchase was comprised of hard- Pakistan, and India. Iran’s quest for nu- cern are its Hawk missiles, SA–6 batter- ware only—no spare parts, technical clear weapons, however, is motivated ies, 155- and 122-mm artillery, missile manuals, or maintenance. by political rather than security rea- boats, Silkworm missiles, and mines sons, its drive for status being a greater near vital choke points. The possibility

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Roberts

incentive than any particular threat. the United States is not a likely option, any opportunity to achieve this, al- Nuclear acquisition thus is seen by Iranian military power can constitute a though there may have to be superfi- Iran as a means of achieving compara- threat to all Gulf states except Iraq. cial concessions to appease some Iran- U.S. diplomacy and military plan- ian face-saving interests. U.S. planning must ensure ning must therefore ensure that A dialogue with Iran might con- that the Iranian military remains the Iranian military remains a vince other Islamic movements such as peripheral concern. those in Egypt and Algeria that the a peripheral concern The intensity of this arms United States is not hostile to Islam. If buildup is in part a reaction to there are talks, Washington and Tehran ble status with some of its neighbors the long embargo that followed the Is- will have to deal with the Islamic Re- while gaining military dominance vis- lamic revolution. As a result, it disre- public’s position that its political legiti- à-vis the Gulf states. On another level, gards the fact that Tehran can ill afford macy is based on rejecting America and nuclear acquisition would exhibit self the weapons because reliance and technological progress of dire economic con- while turning attention from internal ditions, social and re- social and economic difficulties. ligious dilemmas, and overburdened infra- Domestic Upheaval structure. Seen in this Empty mosques across the coun- light, undue attention try reveal a pervasive distrust of the has been placed on ruling mullahs, whose credibility and conventional arms power are waning. After years spent purchases since Iran is painting the West, and America in no more than a nui- particular, as scapegoats, the clerical sance, lacking the fever pitch has diminished to a point ability for power pro- where religious radicals are finding it jection and sustained difficult to maintain their legitimacy. military operations. It is ironic that the stature of the mul- In addition, the

lahs—the guardians of a theocracy—is build-up will in all U.S. Navy tarnished in this way. probability not be Iranian C–130. Thus far, Tehran’s nuclear program able to overcome the has been determined but not very ad- chronic lack of spares vanced. However, Iranian possession of that has plagued the country, render- its values totally. Iranian support for nuclear weapons would also funda- ing many of its combat systems inop- terrorism must also end without pre- mentally alter the framework within erable. More than an arms buildup, conditions. If such obstacles are sur- which we approach Gulf security. Iran’s internal difficulties pose the mounted, the door could open for dia- Washington will keep abreast of devel- greater threat to regional stability be- logue and perhaps lead in due course to opments to pro-actively direct the cause they may serve as a pretext for mutual recognition. JFQ course of events or respond appropri- the mullahs to undertake a campaign ately. At the very least, American strate- of terrorism to divert attention. High NOTES gists must prepare for a possible Iranian inflation and a migration of profes- 1 “Senior Ayatollah Warns of U.S. ‘Plots,’” nuclear threat and its ramifications. sionals have damaged prospects for Tehran IRNA in English, Foreign Broadcast Currently, Iran is engaged in an economic, social, and educational re- Information Service, 1644 GMT, 4 Nov 94 ambitious conventional weapons pro- newal. Moreover, domestic upheaval (LD0411192394) November 7, 1994, p. 66. gram. In the next few years, it will pur- could spill over into neighboring 2 “Editorial Says Talks with U.S. Ruled chase from 250 to 350 advanced com- countries. Out,” Tehran RESALAT in Persian, Foreign bat aircraft, 320 surface-to-surface Iran’s security interests have re- Broadcast Information Service, 1 Nov 94 missiles, 2,000 SAM launchers, and 2–4 mained constant since the revolution (NC1111211794), November 16, 1994, p. 69. 3 Kilo class submarines. Though these and might be furthered by limited re- Anthony Lake, “Confronting Backlash States,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2 (March/ numbers are daunting, Iran’s ability to gional integration (although probably April 1994), pp. 48–52. procure spare parts, maintain and op- not within the framework of an al- erate equipment, field it for prolonged liance) in a bid for acceptance into the periods, and employ it in an integrated community of nations. Cooperation fashion are suspect, calling into ques- with its Arab neighbors and America to tion the utility of these acquisitions. maintain the security of Gulf waters, al- While a full-scale confrontation with beit unlikely, is a valuable contribution that Iran could make toward regional stability. The United States should seize

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■ JFQ FORUM Turkey’s Role in the Greater Middle East By JED C. SNYDER

or much of the last five decades, Turkey has States and Europe. Turkey does not face serious external threats, but sev- been regarded by many European observers as eral factors contribute to a sense a strategic ally but not as a front line NATO among observers that it could become a security liability rather than an asset member. Its status in the Alliance—as a devel- because of , Greece, Bosnia, rad- F ical Islam, and alienation from Europe. oping Islamic state with a strong Ottoman tradition Finally, amidst cross-currents, that is nonetheless linked to the West—tended more Turkey must decide what models of often than not to isolate Turkey politically and also cultural, political, and social order to pursue. This dilemma is sharpened by raised questions about its identity. What Ankara per- its Ottoman and Kemalist past, the ceived as its crucial role in Western security and de- growing weakness of its political par- ties, and an inability to persuade Eu- fense matters seemed to many Turks to be discounted. rope of its economic credentials. Arguments within the U.S. policy community asserting that Turkey’s role as a Western partner was National Stability and Identity The legacy of Turkey’s Ottoman undervalued resonated only rarely in Europe. heritage remains enduring both in Turkey and in Western Europe. Al- though the Ottoman Empire expired This marginalization was rein- undergoing a reorientation in an envi- with World War I, many, particularly forced by twin images of Turkey: one of ronment characterized by the collapse in Europe, anticipate a newly expan- a warlike people that for six centuries of the Soviet Union and , sionist Turkey, disenchanted with the ruthlessly ruled an empire which en- conflict in the Balkans (vexed by an West, turning inwards toward its his- croached on Europe under a series of historic rivalry with Greece), newly in- toric roots in Central Asia and the despotic Ottoman sultans; the other of dependent states in Central Asia, insta- Middle East. a romanticized realm with harems, bility in the (Georgia and Many have questioned Turkish mosques, and dervishes. Neither depic- Azerbaijan) and the membership in the European Union tion provides an insight into the (Chechnya), a growing role in the Gulf (EU) on grounds that its ultimate orien- Turkey of today. (complicated by strained relations with tation may be non-European or even After more than seven decades of Iraq and the Islamic regime in Iran), anti-European. To Turks as well as some secularization and modernization, and Kurdish separatism fueled by a in Western Europe, however, this hos- Turkey is a paradox for those who campaign of terror. tility toward its EU application is fueled wonder how this politically pluralistic, As Ankara’s external threat per- by both European unemployment and secular nation can comfortably fit in ception evolves, its domestic situation resentment over the large number of the Western community while also re- has deteriorated under economic stag- Turkish guest workers, particularly in taining a mosaic of Middle Eastern, Eu- nation, shifting demographics, the Germany. This is a symptom of an in- ropean, and Asian influences. transition from a state-controlled creasingly rightist approach to immi- Like its alliance partners, Turkey economy, Islam as a political force, gration, which is most acutely ex- moved into the post-Cold War era un- sanctions against Iraq, failure to gain pressed in national, regional, and local prepared for the new world order. It is membership in the European Union, elections in France as well as Germany. and declining aid from the United

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Snyder

Turkey’s Spheres of Interest and Influence

Anger over what Turks see as an Kurds) and charges of human rights major cities, Ankara and Istanbul. This anti-Islamic bias—reinforced by the abuses could bar it from EU member- in turn has stimulated widened debate West’s unwillingness to give Bosnia’s ship and brand it a renegade. Prime over how much political pluralism Moslems arms—could turn their force- Minister Tansu Ciller shepherded con- Turkey can withstand. ful nationalism in a negative direction. stitutional reforms through parliament Unrelenting Western criticism of to expand political freedom in Turkey, The Kurds Turkey adds to the rancor and bolsters but further action is needed. There is another threat to Turkey’s -nationalist elements and radical The overall fragility of Turkey’s stability, unrelated to radical Islam Islamic parties, which are gaining political system and its susceptibility though affected by it. Civilian authori- greater attention, support, and politi- to fringe groups raise questions about ties and the military continue to fight cal legitimacy. its inherent stability. Of immediate Kurdish separatism, particularly the concern is the potential that support Workers Party (PKK), which for the secular system is sworn to use terror in creating an in- political Islam has stimulated debate over may fall under the dependent state from Kurdish commu- weight—though lim- nities in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. how much pluralism Turkey can withstand ited today—of mili- The total Kurdish population in the tant Islamic groups. area is estimated at 20 million. The Among the reservations about The role of religion and extent to community in Turkey is the largest, Turkey’s admission to the community which it can be used as a political tool some 12–14 million. of Western nations is doubt over its should not be dismissed, but neither In the southeast, where most Turk- commitment to . For should it be exaggerated. Resurgent po- ish Kurds live, the PKK objective is to example, there is concern that intoler- litical Islam has advanced by electoral carve out part of as a state. Ac- ance of minorities (particularly the victories of religious parties in two cordingly, Ankara declared an emer- gency in ten southeastern provinces and mounted local counterinsurgency operations, deploying 150,000 men. Jed C. Snyder is senior fellow with the Institute for National The government estimates that there Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. His are 15,000 PKK guerrillas with a reserve publications include Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf.

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of 45,000, and though the figures vary ties and human rights record must im- Insurgents are aided by Iraqi widely, Ankara is spending $5–7 billion prove if Turkey is to join the European Kurds from camps in Iraq, adjacent to annually on antiterrorist operations. Union or even the Customs Union, the Turkey’s southeastern border. The The current defense budget is estimated first step toward full membership. In- United States, Britain, and France pro- at $5.1 billion (4.1 percent of GDP). creasingly, many Turks regard this pre- tect this enclave in northern Iraq The PKK threat has opened a de- condition as prohibitively expensive. under Provide Comfort. In Turkish bate among Turkish intellectuals and eyes the operation contributes to PKK parliamentarians over restrictions on The Military Role terrorism by infiltrating guerrillas into political participation. At issue is Below the surface of political de- the extreme southeastern part of the whether terrorist restrictions, aimed at bate is a growing concern that the country, where 4–5 million Kurds separatists, should be relaxed. Presi- armed forces—generally regarded as dwell. The no-fly zone is maintained dent Suleyman Demirel, who recog- the institutional guardian of Turkish by assets deployed at Incirlik Air Base nizes the fragility of the political sys- democracy—may feel compelled to in- which complicates a difficult accord tem (having been twice removed as tervene if it appears that the country whereby the Air Force operates under prime minister by military coups in is polarized by radicals or faces chaos. the limited terms of the U.S.-Turkish the 1970s and 1980s), voiced concern On three occasions (including two Bilateral Defense and Cooperation that if political restrictions on ethnic coups) the military has stepped in to Agreement. If Ankara denied the use of groups are removed, people who “have restore order and then returned to its Incirlik, Provide Comfort might come lived together would then be unable to barracks. Western fears that, under so- to an abrupt halt with an adverse im- keep doing so and Turkey would be- cial and economic pressure, Turkey pact on its relations with Washington. come ungovernable.” could regress and adopt the despotic While the Turkish prime minister fa- The emerging debate has ramifica- ways of its Ottoman past continue to vors continued access to the base for tions beyond constitutional interpreta- be raised among those who remain non-NATO operations, the general tion or civil liberties. Much of south- uncertain about the military’s political staff is believed to be less enthusiastic eastern Turkey has been the scene of proclivities. and to have lobbied against it. Finally, an 11-year guerrilla war where the mil- Reinforced by a tradition of uni- the parliament votes periodically to itary has been unable to quell the sepa- versal service, the military is the lead- reapprove the operation, which re- ratist movement led by the PKK and its ing vehicle for social mobility and quires greater American arm-twisting sympathizers. Continued insurrection source of expertise for national leader- each time the issue comes up. threatens to destabilize the country ship. Hence, it enjoys great prestige The and is costing the government dearly, and wide support from the public at spawned a string of newly liberated financially and politically. Lifting or large. It earned a reputation for profes- Balkan states whose future is uncer- modifying the anti-terror laws could sionalism, nonpartisanship, and re- tain. This situation affects Turkey di- lead the PKK to intensify its efforts, spect of civilian control, an image im- rectly, as part of its population is Bos- possibly forcing military intervention planted in 1908 when a revolutionary nian by origin. For 500 years Bosnia and the declaration of martial law to movement of officers which included and Hercegovina were provinces of the control the region. This is the worst Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) known as the Ottoman Empire. Also, many Turks case scenario but is not implausible. Young Turks forced the Sultan to re- identify with Balkan Moslems who While PKK terrorism is an immedi- store a constitution that led to the number an estimated 10 million. Fur- ate internal security threat, longer-term founding of the Republic of Turkey. thermore, Turkey was the principal ar- and more serious social and political is- chitect of the Economic Co- sues arise from the movement of Kur- Encircled Ally operation Zone, founded in Istanbul in dish refugees from the southeast to When the fell many 1992 with an important Balkan com- cities (fleeing villages destroyed by the analysts thought the event would ponent. In many ways, the success of military), and the gradual integration favor the West. Turkey was among the this initiative rests on settling the pre- of Kurds into mainstream society. An first NATO members to challenge that sent crisis. Ankara has favored lifting increasing Kurdish awareness and polit- assessment as premature at best. Seen the U.N. arms embargo on the Bosnian ical agenda have evolved. Urban migra- from Ankara’s position at the cross- Moslems and is reportedly funneling tion and an assertive Kurdish national- roads of Europe, the Middle East, and aid to Bosnia. ism have fueled political radicalism, Asia, the security environment is more To the northeast, there is a low- contributing to support for Islamic par- tenuous now than at any time since level war between Armenia and Azerbai- ties, including the Refah which has in- World War II. jan over the enclave of Nagorno- creased its following in major cities. Turkey feels encircled by “New Karabakh. Another northeastern The government must weigh the World Order” conflicts and sees little neighbor, Georgia, continues to simmer severity of the PKK threat and the in- sympathy by its Western partners for after a series of civil insurrections which ternal challenges of growing Kurdish its own position, beginning with its in- brought Russian intervention. Compet- nationalism against Western sympathy ternal situation, which has regional ing paramilitary groups support strong for the Kurds and Europe’s insistence implications. regional rivalries, which may yet result that its treatment of oppressed minori- in Georgia’s fragmentation.

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Snyder Combat Camera Imagery (Kathy Bradley)

Turkish airmen Tankers and AWACS participating in aircraft at Incirlik. Deny Flight.

Combat Camera Imagery (Marv Lynchard) tering the regional military Turkic-speaking states of Central Asia, balance in the Caucasus in a which because of cultural and linguistic manner that the Turks find affinity with Turkey held out the Russian military interest in Geor- threatening. While Moscow’s military promise of close relations with Ankara, gia, which has strong historic roots, incompetence in Chechnya could be have spurned Turkish advances. has been rekindled. Moscow, in many considered reassuring in Ankara, the In sum, Turkey has seen its neigh- respects retaining its Cold War hostil- long history of Russo-Turkish military borhood decline substantially over the ity toward Turkey, has signed a deal rivalry has left a strong impression. last five years as Western doubts re- with Tbilisi to base large numbers of To the west, relations between garding the country’s acceptability for Russian forces in the country, includ- Greece and Turkey have again soured to EU membership have grown. To Turks, ing areas close to Turkey’s border. Fur- such an extent that NATO finds it al- however, its credentials as a modern ther, in an effort to bolster its military most impossible to hold useful exercises economy are not the obstacle to mem- in the Aegean be- bership or acceptance in the Western relations between Greece and Turkey have cause of disagree- community. Ankara believes that de- ments over maritime lays in considering its application for soured over maritime and air boundaries and air jurisdiction the Customs Union are attributable in boundaries. To the part to Europe’s determination to pun- presence in the aftermath of the Geor- south, the age-old dispute between ish Turkey for its incursion into north- gian and Chechnyan campaigns, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots endures, ern Iraq in March 1995 to strike at PKK Russian high command has signaled while Turkey, which backs a self-de- camps from which cross-border terror- its intent to abandon the limitations clared Turkish republic in northern ist acts were being mounted. The oper- placed on deploying forces on its Cyprus, is under renewed pressure from ation—the country’s largest in fifty flanks under the Conventional Armed Europe to withdraw military forces from years—involved 35,000 troops and was Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, thus al- the island after more than two decades. To the east, across the , the

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designed to stop PKK infiltration. The general staff had claimed that 2,500– 3,000 guerrillas operated from north- ern Iraq, which shares a 220-kilometer border with Turkey. While Turkish relations with the United States have been warmer than with Europe, Ankara has on occasion found Washington less than sympa- thetic. Turkey expected a political and financial windfall from its role in the Gulf War. Its bases, particularly Incir- lik, provided vital support to coalition forces. But this expectation was thwarted when Congress restructured foreign military financing in FY93, eliminating grants and converting mil- itary aid for both Turkey and Greece Harbor river border from grants to concessional loans, and between Turkey and Iraq. reducing total aid to Turkey by 10 per- Combat Camera Imagery (Efrain Gonzalez) cent. Subsequently loans were adjusted to market rather than concessional rates and cut again. In addition, some of this aid has been withheld for vari- While Turkey is among NATO’s that which preoccupied Germany and ous reasons, including concern over greatest boosters, it views the debate the Nordic nations. human rights abuses, Cyprus, and the over whether and how to expand the Turks have long argued that of Armenia. Finally, Turkey Alliance with some dismay. Ankara is among their contributions to NATO balks at the congressional practice of concerned that expansion eastward to was a unique ability to act as a bridge enforcing a 7:10 ratio in military aid include former Warsaw Pact nations to the Middle East as epitomized by its for Greece and Turkey. will dilute the NATO article 5 guaran- membership in the and Combined, these measures have tee—an attack against one will be re- the Central Treaty Organization. constrained military modernization garded as an attack against all mem- Ankara has traditionally argued that and Turkey still fields some equipment bers—and by extension would reduce Turkey can protect NATO interests in a of vintage. The accumu- the credibility of the NATO umbrella. region normally regarded as alien and lated resentment of the officer corps Also, many Turks remain unconvinced distant to the West. Yet when Turkey (which plays an influential role in poli- that Russian policy has been trans- has offered assistance, as in the Gulf tics) and political leaders is likely to formed from its Soviet antecedent. War, it has sometimes alienated its complicate U.S. efforts to renew bilat- Turkey is suspicious of Russian motives Arab cousins. eral defense arrangements which are in the Caucasus and Balkans, where Much is made of Turkey’s poten- the bedrock of the U.S.-Turkish mili- there is strong mutual enmity. Russian tial role in Central Asia. While the tary relationship. suspicions of Turkey’s motivations in Turks have explored opportunities Central Asia and Azerbaijan (opposing there, Central Asian states will be most Geopolitical Orientation Moscow’s ally, Armenia) are earnestly attracted to nations that can offer large Despite occasional periods of felt as well. capital investment projects and longer- strained relations with its partners, It seems clear that the NATO cen- term alternatives to dependence on NATO membership has been a major ter of gravity is shifting from Central Russian largesse. Investment along Rus- source of Turkish pride. Political and Europe toward the Mediterranean. sia’s southwestern flank which includes military leaders are quick to remind Western concerns over German secu- Azerbaijan is expanding, but it is rela- American and European analysts that rity, the nucleus of NATO defensive tively low, in large part because of at the height of the Cold War, strategy, have been reduced since the Turkey’s unfortunate economy (which Turkey’s contributions to NATO Cold War. Ground and air forces de- shrank by 5–6 percent last year as infla- dwarfed those of most members (in- ployed in Central and Northern Eu- tion reached 150 percent), and because cluding the United States) when mea- rope are down by half from the early of internal difficulties that have dis- sured as a percentage of GNP devoted 1980s. Yet the Turks see little evidence tracted politicians. to defense or in terms of ground that the Alliance has adjusted its strat- In the long run, Turkey’s role in forces committed to the Alliance. egy to reflect a larger role for its south- the Caucasus may actually be greater ern allies, whose focus on the Soviet than in Central Asia, since it can re- threat was always less immediate than solve the issue of transporting oil from the Caspian Sea region to markets in

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Europe and Asia. Here, Ankara is likely Ankara as a competitor in this poten- virtually all of its Western and non- to compete with Tehran, which has ag- tially lucrative market. The Russian Western neighbors. This transition gressively pursued Central Asia’s lead- preference is to ship oil from the Russ- from the period of global bipolar com- ers, particularly in Turkmenistan, in ian terminals at Novorossiysk on the petition presents opportunities and aid of reaching long-term arrange- Black Sea, which would require greater risks. Turks understand that many op- ments for oil exports. While Turkey of- access for Russian tankers to the Turk- portunities in a multipolar world could fers an attractive option to those who ish Straits. place them in conflict with nations fear Iran’s ideological course and politi- Competition over Caspian oil also that are also seeking greater security. cal meddling abroad, the long-term has a political dimension which infuri- Turkey’s dilemma differs from most, economic benefits of dealing with Iran ates Ankara. For several years, Turkey however, in that the Cold War’s end may be more promising. had been negotiating an oil agreement has further clouded rather than clari- Turkey’s potential transit route for with Azerbaijan. Before it could be fied its identity among Western and Caspian oil is likely to revive animosi- signed, however, the pro-Turkish Azeri non-Western nations. ties between Turks and Russians. In President Abulfez Elchibey was ousted During the Cold War, Western al- and replaced by a Soviet-era lies (including Turkey) could accept Moscow found it hard to acquiesce KGB official. Turkey suspects the ambiguities of the alliance because Russian complicity in toppling of coalition imperatives. But these am- over the Bosporus and Dardanelles Elchibey, whose views were biguities have become a source of ten- decidedly anti-Russian and sion, loosening alliance cohesion. 500 years they have fought more than who occasionally incited the Azeris of Turkey’s search for a new center of a dozen conflicts, many over the straits Iran to break with Tehran. Moscow was gravity and a distinct regional role is linking the Mediterranean and Black not eager to address the potential con- frustrated by its estrangement from Eu- . The Turkish Straits, dividing Eu- sequences of Iran’s break-up, which rope, which may create a greater de- rope and Asia, have been a source of threatened to trigger similar distur- pendency on the United States at a friction since the Montreux Conven- bances among Moslem populations on time when Washington is disinclined tion of 1936 which governs transit Russia’s periphery. to encourage it. through the straits. Moscow found it Besides competition with Mos- The unique status of Turkey in hard to acquiesce in Turkish sover- cow, Tehran has signed agreements NATO and close relationship with the eignty over the Bosporus and Dard- with Turkmenistan which could erode United States can be seen as an asset, anelles and has never accepted Ankara’s leverage with other poten- but it also complicates its relations wartime control of this vital passage by tially oil-rich states in the region. with nations outside the Western Al- Ankara. Moscow has often challenged Tehran has also announced support liance. Further, estrangement from its Turkey’s jurisdiction, most dramati- for the Novorossiysk option and may more traditional Arab and Islamic cally by sending the carrier Kiev back a Russian plan to build pipelines. friends could isolate it from the Middle through the straits. This fuels Ankara’s concern that a East and in the process reduce its effec- More recently, Ankara and Moscow-Tehran entente could doom tiveness as a bridge to increasingly Moscow found themselves on oppos- prospects for Ankara to profit from vital on NATO’s periphery. Few ing sides of an increasingly vital issue, Caspian oil trade. Moreover, Tehran’s of the security choices faced by Turkey the volume of tanker traffic through covert programs to develop weapons are mutually exclusive. The challenge the straits. More than 40,000 ships an- of mass destruction with Russian assis- will be to navigate a course to broaden nually make it one of the most clogged tance only reinforce Turkey’s sense of its relations with Europe, Russia, the routes in the world. Half of the foreign encirclement. Middle East, and Asia, while retaining flagged vessels are Russian, carrying If Turkey prevails in limiting traffic the ability to move between Western some 20 billion gallons of oil. Turkey through the straits, Moscow’s influence security partners and those outside fears oil spills or explosions from the in both Central Asia and the Caucasus that system. Turkey must weigh its 200,000-ton supertankers, which would diminish as hard currency from choices carefully. JFQ would endanger the 11 million resi- oil transit agreements was lost. This dents of nearby Istanbul. would come in the wake of Russia’s fail- While Russia acknowledges that ure to triumph in a confrontation with environmental dangers are real, it sus- a ragtag Chechnyan army and to pre- pects that Turkey’s true concern cen- vail in its struggle with Georgia. ters on its plan to build a pipeline from Russia is the only great power in the fields of Kazakhstan and Turk- the region and thus Turkey must ulti- menistan in Central Asia and Azerbai- mately accommodate Moscow or stay jan in the Caucasus to Turkish ports on clear of those issues that might bring the Mediterranean. Moscow perceives the two into conflict. Turkey’s discomfort with the post- Cold War security order is shared with

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Regional Implications of

NPROLIFERATIONBC

By ROBERT G. JOSEPH

he proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of increasingly capable ballistic and cruise missiles as delivery systems of choice, represents a central Tthreat to U.S. security interests and the use of force as an in- strument of U.S. national strategy. In response to this growing threat, the United States is pursuing a two-track approach. The first, designed to prevent proliferation, consists of bolstering traditional non-proliferation efforts—such as arms control, export controls, and security assistance and assurances—to dissuade any potential proliferator from pursuing NBC and missile programs. The second track, referred to as counterproliferation, consists of defense initia- tives across a broad range of activities—from doctrine to training and leadership development to acquisition—designed to protect against the strategic and tactical consequences of proliferation Agile Provider ’94. should prevention fail.

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Greater Middle East: Proliferation Profile

Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995.

Non-proliferation objectives have While a large majority of the nuclear weapons in its post-Cold War long been given high priority by the members of the international commu- defense posture, a number of hostile United States, which has taken the nity has supported the creation of states are actively pursuing NBC lead in establishing international legal these legal norms and abides by them, weapons. In fact, as evidenced by the norms against the possession and the a growing number of states have re- diffusion of dual-use technologies and use of NBC weapons. The 1972 Biolog- jected or manipulated the norms and the wide-scale use of chemical ical Weapons Convention and as yet associated safeguards to gain access to weapons in the Iran- and other unratified 1992 Chemical Weapons proscribed technologies. For example, conflicts, barriers to possessing and Convention are expressions of this ef- like North Korea and Iraq before it, using these weapons are actually erod- fort. The Clinton administration’s em- Iran’s formal adherence to NPT—while ing. Recent Iraqi admissions provide phasis on indefinite extension of the actively pursuing nuclear weapons—is further evidence which supports this Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) a cynical display of contempt for these conclusion. U.N. officials have ac- as well as its advocacy of a comprehen- legal norms and its ability to circum- quired documents revealing that, sive test ban are more recent indica- vent international controls. Iran’s while the United States was deploying tions of the desire to prevent prolifera- membership in good standing in the forces to the Gulf in the autumn of tion through arms control. Paralleling treaty regime, which permits it to take 1990, Iraq began to fill bombs and these regimes, the United States has advantage of access to technologies ap- Scud warheads with chemical and bio- long sought to promote multilateral plicable to weapons, clearly demon- logical agents for use against coalition export controls for sensitive technolo- strates the limitations of arms control forces as well as Israeli and Saudi cities. gies and materials. The Nuclear Suppli- approaches. Similarly, the willingness The documents also show that, follow- ers Group, Group, and Mis- of suppliers to provide this technology, ing its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq em- sile Technology Control Regime are in this case Russia, demonstrates the barked on a new crash effort to pro- prime examples of this effort. The on- limits of export controls. duce one or two nuclear bombs. This going U.S. attempt to transform the In part as a consequence, a signifi- effort, which was in addition to a long- Coordinating Committee on Multilat- cant paradox is now evident in the se- standing program to enrich uranium eral Export Controls (COCOM) into a curity environment: while the United for nuclear weapons, included a plan non-proliferation export control orga- States has renounced possession of of- to recover by April 1991 weapons- nization is another example. fensive biological and chemical grade uranium from safeguarded ra- weapons and is fundamentally reduc- dioactive fuel supplied by France for ing its nuclear stockpile and the role of the Osirak reactor. The utility and effects of NBC weapons differ by the type of weapon Robert G. Joseph is director of the Center for Counter- and scale of their use. While nuclear proliferation Research at the National Defense University weapons have certain attributes that U.S. Air Force (JillU.S. Air Force Miller) and on the faculty of the National War College.

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Logistic choke points are vulnerable targets.

make them particularly useful tools for stability in vital regions where the partners can command in theater. In political intimidation, chemical and United States has long-standing secu- this context, NBC weapons and mis- especially biological weapons pose rity commitments and the forward siles are prized as effective tools for co- presence of its forces. In the ercion against neighboring states and in the greater Middle East nearly half greater Middle East, an area for deterrence (for example, to deter of special concern, nearly the United States from intervening in the countries possess or are devel- half the countries already the region). Moreover, as demonstrated oping NBC weapons and missiles possess or are developing by the extensive use of chemicals and NBC weapons and missiles. ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq war Of these, Iran, Iraq, and and Iraq’s preparations for the use of other challenges. When compared to Libya stand out as the near-term biological weapons in the Gulf War, nuclear weapons, both are relatively threats to the United States. Given the these weapons are also viewed as hav- easy and cheap to acquire, and because dynamics of the region, other coun- ing great strategic and tactical value. the requisite support facilities lack tries such as Syria could quickly join Iran is embarked on a significant unique signatures, they are far less vul- these three states. arms buildup across the board, includ- nerable to attack. Moreover, post- ing aggressive NBC programs. Although 1960s advances in biotechnology make The Threat to the Area Iran signed the Chemical Weapons the use of biological weapons against Often considered rogue states, Convention, it subsequently expanded targets such as airfields and ports more Iran, Iraq, and Libya have objectives and upgraded its pro- feasible. Further, high-lethality, multi- which are inimical to U.S. interests and gram. According to open source esti- ple-delivery modes (including covert), therefore see the United States as a seri- mates, its chemical warfare program and limited ability to detect—and thus ous obstacle to achieving their goals. can produce hundreds of tons of agents defend against—biological weapons All appear to regard NBC weapons and annually, primarily choking and blister have serious implications for deter- missiles as valuable instruments for agents. A biological weapons program rence and warfighting. pursuing their regional political and dating back to the early 1980s has ad- Perhaps the most troubling impli- military ambitions and for overcoming vanced to the point where it probably cation from a U.S. political-military the conventional superiority that the has produced biological agents and perspective is that, of those states pur- United States and potential coalition weaponized a small quantity of those suing NBC and missile programs, a sig- agents. Iran’s nuclear program is ex- nificant number pose direct threats to pected to take eight to ten years to pro- duce its own weapons, perhaps five if

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evasion on all related issues indicate its intention to resume the quest for nu- clear weapons once freed from interna- tional sanctions. Finally, in large mea- sure because the U.N. cease-fire agreement permits Baghdad to de-

U.S. Marine Corps (J.R. Tricoche) velop, test, and produce missiles of ranges up to 150 kilometers, Iraq has held onto missile support equipment and propellant that can be used for longer-range missiles. In fact, since the Gulf War, Iraqi agents have success- fully acquired critical missile compo- nents from abroad in violation of the U.N. sanctions. Libya, though possess- ing less indigenous expertise than Iran or Iraq, has ac- tively sought both chemical weapons and ballistic mis- siles and may be pursuing biological and nuclear weapons. Tripoli has in- vested heavily in building chemical weapons produc- tion plants at Rabta and Tarhunah and is assessed to have a weapons stockpile of Tehran gets foreign assis- at least 100 tons of agents, tance. Given the Iraqi ex- Scud remains in including mustard and the Persian Gulf. perience, where it is clear nerve gas. In addition to its that the program was (PedroU.S. Air Force Ybanez) 300-kilometer range Scud much further advanced missiles, Libya has report- than assessed by the intelligence com- example, Baghdad has retained a sig- edly arranged to buy extended-range munity, and given the certainty that nificant amount of chemical weapons Scud–Cs and perhaps No Dongs from Iran will receive outside help, the time production equipment and is assessed North Korea. While its biological and required to acquire a crude nuclear to have preserved stockpiles of chemi- nuclear weapons programs are cur- weapons capability will likely be less cal agents and munitions. Some chem- rently assessed to be in the R&D phase, than official estimates. In its pursuit of ical weapons production could be re- Tripoli is seeking to transform its bio- ballistic missiles, Iran has acquired the sumed in weeks. Iraq’s offensive logical research program to produce extended-range Scud C from North biological program, which produced weaponized agents. Libya operates a Korea and is expected to receive the thousands of gallons of bacte- small nuclear research facility and is al- 1000-plus kilometer No Dong–1 from ria and botulism toxin, is of the great- leged to be recruiting Russian scientists the same source. est concern. While recently admitting to help establish a nuclear weapons Iraq’s NBC and missile programs to stockpiling massive amounts of bio- program. Experience—the launch of suffered a major setback with its defeat logical agents which it claims to have ballistic missiles against Lampadusa in Desert Storm. Many key facilities destroyed, neither war nor inspections and the use of chemical weapons in were heavily damaged or destroyed have completely degraded Iraq’s capa- Chad—reveals that the Libyan leader- from the air and others rendered inop- bility. Production of biological agents, ship sees these weapons as politically erable through continuous intrusive if not ongoing, could begin at any and militarily useful. Qadhafi’s ex- inspections. Nevertheless, despite ef- time. Similarly, Iraq still retains the ex- pressed desire to be able to strike the forts by onsite U.N. personnel, Iraq has pertise and technological base to re- United States with long-range missiles avoided detection and destruction of sume its uranium enrichment pro- is further indication. critical elements of its NBC infrastruc- gram, including machine tools and ture, as well as existing stockpiles of centrifuge designs. Even though its nu- chemical and biological weapons and clear program has clearly been dis- missiles. As a result of its costly but rupted, Iraq’s continued deception and successful efforts, it can resume its pro- grams soon after inspectors leave. For

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tion) as well as reassessments of coali- Threat Ranges tion objectives and resolve. If Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons and ballis- tic missiles able to strike Western Eu- rope, for example, forming and main- taining a Desert Storm-type coalition would have been even more difficult, if not altogether problematic. It is important to remember that deterrence works in two directions. Just as the United States will seek to deter an adversary from using NBC weapons, an enemy will seek to use the posses- sion of these weapons to deter Ameri- can and coalition forces from interven- ing and bringing to bear overwhelming conventional superiority. Failing to deter the United States, an NBC-armed enemy could decide to employ these weapons to drive up U.S. and allied ca- sualties for political and military im- pact. In order not to be deterred, the United States must demonstrate—to a potential enemy and to itself—that using NBC weapons will not produce political and military benefits that out- weigh the associated risks. For deterrence to succeed, the United States must have—and be per- ceived to have—the capability and will Source: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. to prevail in an NBC environment and retaliate against an enemy, holding at risk assets of value that can be attacked and destroyed if an enemy undertakes the action which was to have been de- terred. Given the importance of forg- Regional Deterrence The use or threat of use of NBC ing and maintaining coalitions in re- The possession of NBC weapons weapons against U.S. and coalition gional conflicts, U.S. deterrent posture and missiles by states like Iran, Iraq, forces in the greater Middle East, unless must also be credible to prospective and Libya raises the risks of engaging limited to small-scale tactical employ- partners. To be credible, deterrence in the area and complicates coalition ment such as chemical weapons on the must demonstrate consistency of pur- building, undermines deterrence based battlefield, could have major strategic pose as well as determination over the on conventional superiority, and and tactical repercussions for accom- long haul. The U.S. reputation for re- threatens the U.S. ability to conduct plishing missions and objectives, affect- solve among allies and potential ene- operations. Consequently, it is essen- ing deployment into theater, sustaining mies alike is affected by its actions over forces, and conducting com- time and across the spectrum of secu- for deterrence to succeed, the United bat operations. For example, rity policy. large concentrations of Deterrence remains the first line States must have the capability and troops and equipment pre- of defense against NBC weapons, and will to prevail in an NBC environment sent a major vulnerability to the basic elements of deterrence must NBC attack. In a region like be maintained and strengthened. How- the Gulf with relatively few ever, traditional approaches to deter- tial to rethink how such weapons airfields and ports, business as usual is a ring NBC use in an unstable region could be used against the United States formula for disaster. such as the greater Middle East are in- or coalition partners in a regional con- Any NBC use would almost cer- herently uncertain. Many of the condi- text and what must be done to deter tainly fundamentally alter the political tions that contributed to deterrence in and defend against them. nature of the conflict as well. Even the threat of use could lead to pressures (such as driving wedges in the coali-

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the Cold War are not present—for ex- deterring NBC use. For this reason, it is be a joint solution. Inside and outside ample, mutual understandings of the necessary to resist further attempts to DOD, many initiatives in R&D, doc- implications of NBC use and effective delegitimize U.S. possession of nuclear trine, gaming, and force planning communication. In the final analysis, a weapons. (such as special operations forces) are deterrent strategy requires knowledge underway. Problems do exist, however, of the strategic personality of one’s ad- Defense Against NBC both with regard to how far technol- versary, to include a cognizance of the When one considers deterring ogy can offer solutions as well as insti- region, the culture, the military forces, Iran’s mullahs or a Qadhafi or Hussein, tutional problems such as service prior- and the regime itself. it is clear that deterrence could fail. Be- ities, budgetary constraints, and a For these reasons, the United cause of the inherent complexities of realistic grasp of the implications of States must reexamine the require- deterrence and the problematic nature NBC use on military operations. ments for, and assumptions of, deter- of its success, it is necessary to plan for The Armed Forces have an essen- rence in a regional context. In the its failure. As previously indicated, tial role to play across the entire range CENTCOM area of interest this means should this occur and NBC weapons be of issues affecting the deterrence of, strengthening the U.S. capability to re- used against U.S. and coalition forces, and the defense against, proliferation. taliate conventionally so that the con- the political implications would be pro- CENTCOM and other regional com- sequences of contemplated aggression found and the military effects could be mands are well placed to understand are clear to leaders such as Saddam substantial at both the strategic and op- the politico-military-cultural dynam- Hussein. Moreover, it requires finding erational levels. ics which are critical to effective de- more effective ways to communicate Given the potential impact of terrence. Inputs from the commands resolve and capabilities through de- such use on individual units and larger are also key to determining how best claratory policy and private channels. formations as well as on civilian infra- to convey intentions and resolve, in The credibility of U.S. deterrent forces structure, the United States must have declaratory policy and private chan- can also be enhanced through such sufficient capability both to render the nels. Most important, regional com- measures as deployments and exercises. use of NBC less effective and to prevail manders in chief have the overall re- In this regard, it may be necessary on the battlefield. Moreover, the re- sponsibility for contingency planning to review the formulations of the vari- quirement for mitigating the effects of and execution of military options to ous U.S. negative security assurances in NBC use can extend, particularly deter, defend against, and destroy the context of regional deterrence, within a coalition, to the protection of NBC threats in their respective areas keeping in mind that American superi- civilians—both those essential to the of responsibility. JFQ ority in conventional force cannot be war effort and the population at large. expected in every case to deter war or In short, the United States must use of NBC weapons after war has be able—in terms of doctrine, training, begun. For example, declaring that the and equipment—to protect its forces United States will not use nuclear and ensure they can operate and pre- weapons against non-nuclear parties to vail in an NBC environment. This re- the NPT may be perceived by states quires maintaining effective conven- such as Iran to exempt them from pos- tional and nuclear forces as well as sible nuclear retaliation if chemical or detailed contingency planning for de- biological weapons are employed terrence and defense in a regional con- against American forces. This would text. Moreover, it demands that de- clearly undercut the value of the U.S. fense—both active (for example, nuclear deterrent which, if Iraqi leaders ballistic and cruise missile defenses) are to be believed, was decisive in Bagh- and passive (effective chemical/biologi- dad’s decision not to employ chemical cal weapons suits and detectors)—be and biological weapons. Iraq’s concern given high priority and that counter- was based on a direct American warn- force capabilities suited to the unique ing that it would suffer catastrophic characteristics of NBC targets be consequences if it used chemical or bio- strengthened (for example, the ability logical weapons against the coalition. to kill deep underground targets). Iraq interpreted this to mean nuclear re- With such an arsenal of capabili- taliation. Thus, even though the post- ties, U.S. deterrent posture would be Cold War role of nuclear weapons in strengthened. In fact, deterrence by de- U.S. defense policy is not precisely de- nial—denying the enemy the benefits fined, nuclear weapons remain the ulti- of NBC use—is the best guarantor of mate sanction and a vital element of deterrence success. It is also the best hedge in the event deterrence fails. NBC proliferation represents a joint problem for which there can only

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■ Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy

By ROBERT M. SOOFER U.S. Army (Moses M. Mlasko) Patriot in Kuwaiti.

heater ballistic missile (TBM) defense As defined in Joint Pub 3-01.5, joint theater was first used operationally during missile defense (JTMD) is composed of four inte- Desert Storm in response to Iraqi Scud grated operations: attacks against Saudi Arabia and Israel. T ■ passive missile defense—individual and collective Since there was no joint doctrine or concept of measures taken to posture the force to minimize the ef- operations for theater missile defense (TMD), the fects of a theater missile (TM) attack commander in chief (CINC) decided what to pro- ■ active missile defense—measures to intercept, de- tect with limited assets. It was readily apparent, stroy, and/or negate the effects of TMs after launch though, that TMD was a joint mission. Not only ■ attack operations—actions to neutralize or destroy were Army Patriot missiles deployed on land, but an adversary’s ability to produce, deploy, and employ TMs the Air Force flew thousands of sorties in opera- ■ command, control, communications, computers, tions against mobile Scuds as satellites provided and intelligence—capabilities to coordinate and integrate the joint force component capabilities to conduct pas- warning and cuing information, and Navy Aegis- sive defense, active defense, and attack operations. equipped ships tracked enemy ballistic missiles. This treatment of the role of TBM defense in Within the same publication the term theater theater strategy and operational art highlights missile is used for ballistic, air-to-surface, and Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine cruise missiles with targets in a given theater (though short-range, non-nuclear, direct fire mis- ballistic missile threats are of for Joint Theater Missile De- fense.1 However it goes be- siles, bombs, and rockets are not included). For foremost concern yond doctrine by exploring purposes of analysis, and not to minimize other operational considerations threats, this article deals exclusively with ballistic for employing TMD in various phases of combat. missile threats which, according to Joint Pub 3-01.5, Finally, some background is provided on TMD in are of foremost concern. Moreover, the focus is national military strategy.2 primarily on the active defense component of joint TMD operations.

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National Military Strategy Theater Strategy The end of the Cold War turned defense The growing ballistic missile threat is well planning from the global Soviet threat to regional documented. In the administration’s judgment, challenges. In a statement delivered to the House as contained in the Bottom-Up Review, regional ag- Armed Services Committee on March 30, 1993, gressors could soon field 100–1,000 Scud-class Secretary of Defense Les Aspin indicated that, ballistic missiles, some armed with nuclear, chem- “With the demise of the Soviet Union, threats to ical, or biological (NBC) warheads.4 There are re- stability in key regions throughout the world ports that today at least 15 nations have ballistic have become America’s principal military con- missiles, a number that could rise to 20 by the cern and a major determinant of our defense bud- year 2000.5 According to Joint Pub 3-01.5, there is get priorities.” a tendency toward increasing range, lethality, ac- Accordingly, the administration advanced a curacy, and sophistication. national military strategy with complementary Theater ballistic missiles may often have objectives: first, promoting stability through re- greater political than military significance. They gional cooperation and constructive interaction, can pose a political threat by weakening the will and second, thwarting aggression by credible de- of defenders when targeted at civilian areas. With terrence and robust warfighting capabilities. They longer-range missiles, aggressors could strike the will be achieved through peacetime engagement, territory of our allies, endangering the coalition. deterrence and conflict prevention, and the ability to A CINC may have to consider TBM operations fight and win. More specifically, the Armed Forces outside his immediate theater in this instance. must be able to: Joint doctrine also indicates that TBMs could ■ deter and defeat aggression in two nearly simul- be used throughout a conflict against tactical, op- taneous major regional contingencies erational, and strategic targets to disrupt offenses, ■ maintain overseas presence of permanently sta- defenses, and support, and to reduce friendly ca- tioned forces by exercises, port calls, et al. pabilities. These targets are political (for example, ■ deter and prevent use of weapons of mass de- cities, cultural sites, non-coalition states, and vul- struction (WMD) and their delivery systems nerabilities with propaganda value) and military ■ support peace enforcement and missions such (for example, lines of communication, logistical as counterterrorism and disaster relief. facilities, counter-TMD activity, countervalue at- Theater missile defenses will play a key role in tacks on population centers, and choke points). implementing this new strategy. Our forces in- It should be noted that regional TBM powers creasingly will be stationed in regions where po- for the most part operate under targeting and em- tential adversaries have theater ballistic missiles. In ployment constraints. This can restrict the vari- support of overseas ground presence, TMD systems ables that CINCs must consider in determining operating with early warning systems can provide the need for TMD protection. For example, TBMs limited- and wide-area defense against theater bal- can be limited by range, suitable deployment listic missiles for forward-deployed and expedi- areas, accuracy, daily rates, and reconnais- tionary forces. They can defend U.S. and local sance and battle damage assessment. Estimates of forces, bases, harbors, airfields, and cities. Similar enemy TBM capabilities would affect TMD de- protection can be afforded to military units sup- ployment decisions. For instance, poor accuracy porting peace enforcement and humanitarian mis- may mean that hardened targets can forgo de- sions. Finally, TMD can contribute to the deterrent fenses, range limitations can put targets out of mission of forward deployed U.S. forces by reduc- reach, and lack of reconnaissance may reduce the ing their vulnerability to ballistic missile attack risk from TBM attack against mobile assets. Spe- and countering the threat or use of WMD. cific targets for theater ballistic missiles might in- The Gulf War illustrated the political and clude air defense artillery sites, command and military value of protection against threatened or control elements, communication nodes, aircraft actual use of ballistic missiles and WMD. Deploy- facilities, seaports and harbors, logistic centers, ing TBM defenses against this threat will allow power and water plants, nuclear delivery systems U.S. leaders to execute campaign plans and main- and storage sites, naval ships and fleet operating tain coalition solidarity.3 areas, ground maneuver forces, amphibious ob- jective areas, cities, industrial complexes, mer- chant shipping, and terrain choke points.

Robert M. Soofer is a member of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. He wrote this article based on research conducted while attending the National War College.

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Operational Considerations digenous forces. In some instances, U.S. forces During pre-hostilities, TMD deployment is may be stationed in or near the theater and may intended to deter aggression by demonstrating move to assist defenders. The bulk of forces, how- U.S. resolve and coalition solidarity. Such deploy- ever, is likely to come from the United States. De- ments can dampen incentives for preemption by pending on the type, range, and accuracy of denying an enemy ballistic missile force quick enemy ballistic missiles, targets can be political to and undefended access to key targets. If conflict is demoralize the public and disrupt a coalition or unavoidable joint doctrine states that TMD can military to support an offensive. The latter include 3 protect deployed coalition forces, critical assets, air defenses, air bases, aircraft on the ground, C and vital interests; detect and target TBM plat- nodes, marshalling areas, and logistics facilities. forms; detect, warn, and report TBM launches; co- Chemical warheads may be used against troop ordinate multifaceted responses to attack with concentrations or airfields. Ballistic missile attacks other combat operations; and reduce or minimize can be particularly effective in degrading anti-air- the effects of TBM damage. craft capability and gaining command of the skies. One factor that theater TBM planners must An enemy may have a limited number of ballistic take into account in developing JTMD strategy is missiles which are held in reserve. Additionally, that the assets to be protected almost always out- ballistic missile attacks may occur outside the the- number active defense assets. Offensive attack op- ater as a deterrent against external involvement. erations for TMD are similarly limited and will be During this phase U.S. and coalition assets, further strained by added theater requirements. whose TBM capability may be outnumbered or The following is not an attempt to define a con- nonexistent, are the most vulnerable. If our forces cept of operations for JTMD. Rather, it hopefully are not forward deployed in theater, their only reveals the operational considerations that dictate TMD assets will be offshore or ground-based in JTMD use during the various phases of combat nearby theaters. Assuming that naval assets are in operations.6 The discussion under each phase de- range protection can be afforded to allied popula- scribes the situation during the phase, illustrates tion centers and forces under ballistic missile at- the potential TBM threat, and analyses TMD pri- tack. Depending on the scenario, a priority can be orities and available capabilities. civilian targets, national command authorities, Pre-hostilities. In a crisis U.S. forces may be re- political nodes, or ports where reinforcements ar- quired to deter aggression while reassuring rive. TBM launchers can be attacked by sea-based friends and allies. This may require a demonstra- air or land-based fighters from nearby theaters. If tion of force such as joint exercises; moving land, U.S. forces are already in theater, defending them sea, or air forces into the is an essential priority. TMD gives commanders area; or deploying theater Commanders with limited TMD will have difficulty prioritizing their assets, often having to flexibility in deploying forces ballistic missile defenses as recently seen in South choose between local populations and their own Korea. In some instances, forces. Inaccurate TBMs, however, are far more TMD deployments would be welcome and pro- likely be used against civilian targets since they ceed in the context of alliance or coalition agree- are not as effective against military targets. TMD ments. Ground-based systems could be moved attack operations must be weighed against other into place as a visible sign of U.S. commitment. uses of joint capabilities such as direct attacks on 3 But land force deployments may not be welcome advancing enemy forces, C I nodes, and air de- in other instances or when the United States does fenses. Finally, passive measures can be taken to not wish to make its deployment obtrusive for reduce the vulnerability of in-place U.S. forces to fear of exacerbating the crisis, which makes off- TBM attack. shore TMD preferable. In any event, in crises Phase 2—Build Combat Power. Once an attack where ballistic missile use is possible, TMD gives is halted, a coalition focuses on building combat commanders greater flexibility in deploying and power and logistics while reducing the enemy’s employing forces—whether in theater or poised capability and will to fight. As more land, sea, to react to imminent hostilities. The Patriot bat- and air forces arrive from the United States and talion sent to South Korea last year is an example: allied nations, the emphasis shifts to isolating half of the missiles were positioned to protect de- enemy ground forces and destroying them, neu- ployed U.S. forces (although the bulk remained tralizing air and naval forces and their logistics, unprotected) and others protected a major rein- and attacking targets in the rear. Meanwhile, U.S. forcement area, the port of Pusan. or coalition forces prepare for a counteroffensive. Phase I—Halt the Invasion. Where feasible the Enemy TBMs can be employed against air highest defense priority is to minimize the terri- bases and ports to thwart reinforcements. TBM tory and strategic facilities that can be captured. The responsibility for initial defense rests with in-

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USS Antietam cruising to Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy (David Lloyd)

strikes can be ex- based TMD can be released to other theaters. pected against troop Highly integrated communications between sur- marshalling areas as veillance and warning assets, active defenses, and well as rear areas. attack operations (that is, cooperative engage- They can also be used ment) should be available to contribute to the to break the will of TMD mission in this phase if not earlier. Special defenders by inflict- operations forces can also be made available to Aftermath of Scud ing casualties that target and destroy enemy TBM launchers behind attack. would otherwise be enemy lines.

U.S. Air Force (LeeU.S. Air Force Corkran) impossible because of Phase 3—Defeat the Enemy. In this phase U.S. U.S. land and air- and allied forces mount a large-scale land, sea, air power in theater. The counteroffensive to destroy enemy war-making most effective use of TBMs, however, may be capability, retake territory, and achieve other striking at the political cohesion of a coalition. strategic or operational objectives including am- Depending on the range of enemy TBMs, they phibious assault landings in an enemy’s rear. By can also be used against targets outside the the- this time allied TMD operations should succeed ater to widen a conflict or fragment coalition in degrading the TBM threat. Most likely, the few partners, as when Iraq launched Scuds against Is- remaining TBM assets are used against strategic rael. If Saddam had possessed Chinese CSS–2s targets to disrupt a coalition through attacks on (now deployed in Saudi Arabia), he could have at- populations or political, economic, or religious tacked targets in Europe. targets. Again, depending on circumstances, an If it takes months for a build-up, protecting enemy can withhold TBM fires in anticipation of the cohesion of a coalition or alliance is a high a counteroffensive and use them to halt ground priority. This can require TMD deployments to advances, channel attacks into more defensive other theaters vulnerable to TBM attack. Civilians positions, repel amphibious assaults, or disrupt and infrastructure must be protected as a coali- the ability of a coalition to sustain the counterof- tion buys time to mount a counteroffensive. The fensive. Facing imminent defeat, an enemy can next priority is protecting theater reinforcement also employ NBC on TBMs. With a shift to offen- areas and lines of communication. With the sive operations, available aircraft for TMD attack build-up of air forces in theater, attacks on TBMs can decline, putting a greater burden on active can increase with active TMD assets protecting defense. TBM must support the advance of front high-priority resources. Mobile ground-based as- lines. With the vulnerability of amphibious oper- sets such as Patriots and, in the future theater ations, the objective and supporting fleet opera- high-altitude area defenses, can protect inland areas previously out of sea-based TMD range. Sea-

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tions areas as well as air bases must be priorities doctrine and a concept of operations, applicable for sea-based TMD. to other combined operations such as NATO air Phase 4—Provide Post-War Stability. Forces re- defense. At very least, the United States should main in theater following an allied victory to en- look at ways to connect TMD with extant re- sure compliance with peace accords or cease-fire gional battle management/C3 systems to take ad- agreements and to help vantage of indigenous capabilities. assets to be defended will reestablish friendly gov- ernments. As with Iraq, In the final analysis, for as long as national exceed active TMD capabilities this can require a sus- military strategy calls for forward deployed U.S. tained presence with the forces and the ability to respond to regional prospect of small-scale hostilities. With an en- crises, there will be an important role for theater emy’s will broken and its armies destroyed, there missile defenses. The ballistic missile threat will is little likelihood of TBM action against military only intensify as various states develop longer- targets. A terrorist threat or possibility of retribu- range missiles with greater accuracy and ability to tion against political targets, however, must not deliver WMD. As the Gulf War demonstrated, an be ruled out unless allied forces maintain com- effective defense must integrate land, sea, and air plete control over enemy territory. Protecting assets operating under joint doctrine. Despite the populations and vital assets within TBM range is necessities of joint doctrine, however, strategies prudent until the threat is nil. Ground-based ac- for using TMD in contingencies will rest with the- tive TMD units can be redeployed for this pur- ater commanders who must wrestle with consid- pose as needed. Surveillance and warning systems erations that are only touched on here. JFQ also must be kept in place. Assets to be defended both inside and out- NOTES side a theater will exceed active TMD capabilities 1 Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile projected for the next 10–15 years (and for only Defense (Washington: Government Printing Office, one major regional conflict). Given the uncer- March 30, 1994). tainty of the TBM threat and its context, the mis- 2 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President sion will have to rely on joint capabilities and the and the Congress (Washington: Government Printing Of- synergy of integrated active and passive defenses, fice, January 1994), pp. 51–56; Ballistic Missile Defense attack operations, and C4I, all of which must be Organization, 1993 Report to Congress on the Theater Mis- rapidly deployable or employable from the sile Defense Initiative (Washington: Government Printing United States, forward bases, or ships. Office, 1993); and Dennis McDowell, “Theater Missile Defense: A Joint Enterprise,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 6 Serious choices will have to be made to (Autumn/Winter 1994–95), pp. 80–87. maintain alliance solidarity between the protec- 3 Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of tion of cities and infrastructure and the defense the United States: A Strategy of Flexible Response and Selec- of U.S. and allied forces. The choice may vary tive Engagement (Washington: Government Printing Of- with the operational phase, but active TMD capa- fice, February 1995), pp. 4–6. bilities must defend centers of gravity, despite the 4 According to Les Aspin, “The United States cannot risk of an attack to lower priority assets which are accept a situation in which the threat or use of ballistic not directly defended according to joint doctrine. missiles armed with WMD constrain its ability to pro- One way to maximize limited active defense ject military forces to meet commitments abroad and assets is to develop and deploy land, sea, and air- achieve national security objectives. Once deployed, U.S. forces must have TMD defense capabilities to deal based TMD systems with the ability to detect, with ballistic missile threats.” See, Annual Report, p. 53. track, and control missiles. An example used by 5 By decade’s end, active defense assets could include the Vice Chairman, Admiral William Owens, in nine advanced capability Patriot battalions (six per bat- an article published last year in JFQ, is to deploy talion with eight launchers per battery), two THAAD land-based acquisition and fire control radar in batteries (operational prototypes), and one sea-based theater to control missile interceptors fired off- TMD system on an Aegis-equipped cruiser. By compari- shore by sea-based platforms. Not only would this son, the advanced-capability Patriots can defend four extend the range of sea-based defenses, which are times the area of Patriots employed during the Gulf limited by the line-of-sight radar on Aegis ships, War, while THAAD increases the defensive area ten-fold. but also ease demands on airlift by obviating the The sea-based system will be slightly better than the ad- vanced Patriot. early need for land-based launchers and missiles. 6 See Annual Report, pp. 13–15. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine Likewise, sea-based radars can pass acquisition for Joint Operations, identifies these phases as pre-hostili- and tracking information to land-based systems ties, lodgement, decisive combat, follow-through, and already in place. post-hostilities and redeployment. Another way to compensate for limited TMD is to encourage our allies to deploy their own sys- tems. This calls for a joint and coalition TMD

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THEATERBallistic Missile Defense By RONALD R. FOGLEMAN

look upon theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) from an op- erational perspective—and as an observer of emerging technol- ogy with an eye to integrating current and future Air Force ca- Ipabilities to assist joint force commanders (JFCs). As such, I view TBMD from a pragmatic, joint perspective. Ballistic missiles continue to spread around the globe. More than 15 countries pos- sess operational missiles and others have programs to acquire them. This development, and the spread of weapons of mass de- struction (WMD), is cause for grave concern and determined ac- tion. While we are hopeful that the missile technology control regime and state-to-state negotiations will help constrain ballistic missile proliferation, we must prepare to defend against ballistic and cruise missile attacks in future conflicts.

Desert Storm carry out operations to defeat a well armed ag- gressor. Simply the threat of such attacks might This scenario was seen on a small scale in deter the coalition from responding to aggression Desert Storm. Using low-tech Scud missiles, Iraq in the first instance. threatened coalition cohesion, affected planning In the Gulf War we also had trouble defend- for combat operations, and killed 28 American ing against Scuds when delivery vehicles broke troops in Dharan. The proliferation of more so- into several large pieces during the terminal phisticated ballistic missiles with greater accura- phase. Debris made it difficult to identify and in- cies and submunition warheads poses a tougher tercept the actual warhead; so terminal defenses challenge. Armed with them, an enemy could dis- are likely to be stressed by ballistic missiles fielded rupt a U.S. or coalition response unless an effec- with warheads that release submunitions at or be- tive counter is fielded. fore apogee in the missile’s flight. Saturation ballistic missile attacks against lit- During Desert Storm we also learned the im- toral forces, ports, airfields, storage facilities, and portance of countering mobile ballistic missile ca- staging areas could make it extremely costly to pability. An aggressive Scud hunt with air assets project forces into a disputed theater, much less paid significant dividends. Capitalizing on our dominance of Iraqi airspace, we denied the enemy use of fixed Scud sites and made it dangerous for General Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF, is chief of mobile Scuds to move. The combination of sensor staff, U.S. Air Force, and formerly served as assets we had at that time—JSTARS, U–2, TR–1, commander in chief, U.S. Transportation Command.

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and AWACS—flew with impunity over enemy ter- Attack Operations ritory. They cued ground- and airborne-alert air- The Air Force is aggressively working to im- craft to vehicular movement, frequently resulting prove its ability to mount attack operations in rapid attacks on suspected launchers. We against mobile theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). dropped area denial mines to inhibit the mobility These operations are part of the overall theater air of Scud transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). After battle orchestrated by the joint force air compo- Scud launches, we concentrated attack aircraft in nent commander (JFACC). The goal is to destroy launch areas to hunt suspected launchers. enemy TBMs and the infrastructure that supports Our attacks against the Iraqi forces effec- them—day or night, in good weather or bad. As tively suppressed rates of fire, disrupted opera- indicated by Desert Storm, attack operations can tions tempo, and limited multiple launches. The have a tremendous impact on TBM effectiveness. enemy had 500–600 missiles and upwards of 36 Ultimately, we need a balanced mix of offensive TELs but fired only 88 Scuds. Having previously and defensive operations to counter such mis- demonstrated a high launch rate in the Iran-Iraq siles. In this context, we are developing and exer- War by firing almost 200 Scuds, Iraq should have cising operational concepts and capabilities to at- been able to expend its entire Scud inventory. tack the breadth of the enemy TBM target system. That it did not is a tribute to intense coalition air These efforts will rely heavily on accurate in- operations that destroyed launchers and related telligence preparation of the battlespace. Prior to logistics or kept the enemy too busy hiding to fire a conflict intelligence specialists will develop a its missiles. These operations also precluded coor- comprehensive understanding of enemy TBM to dinated launches of Scuds that could have over- include: missiles, related equipment, and launch- whelmed our limited point defenses. ers; support infrastructure; employment doctrine, We can statistically show that Iraq launched tactics, and concept of operations; and likely op- Scuds more often during bad weather with low erating areas and geographical limitations. Also, ceilings than in good weather—perhaps believing intelligence analysts will propose friendly force that bad weather offered pro- operations and tactics to counter enemy TBM. All tection from attack. The bot- less than 4 percent of strike this will be provided to the JFACC for develop- tom line is that coalition ment of a counter-TBM portion of the air cam- sorties were against the dominance of Iraqi airspace paign. A key object of that campaign will be to ballistic missile target set apparently drove the enemy delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy mobile TBM to seek the cover of clouds to operations through preemptive attacks. Barring protect its TELs. Despite that, we will seek to destroy TELs immediately claims to the contrary, the effort required to after launch. Simply, if the missile flies, the TEL achieve these results was not excessive. Less than dies. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace 4 percent of the 42,000 strike sorties flown during will identify high payoff targets such as forward the war were against elements of the Iraqi ballis- operating bases, command and control nodes, tic missile target set. Ultimately, coalition domi- hide sites, pre-surveyed launch sites, and con- nation of the air and vigorous attack operations necting roads in TBM operating areas. provided a disincentive to launch Scuds. Preemptive precision strikes against point All of this argues strongly for the United targets and application of denial weapons will States to develop a balanced TBMD. It also helps greatly hinder enemy near-term TBM activity. explain why that is a high DOD and Air Force pri- Meanwhile, lethal precision attacks against the ority. At present the bulk of the funding is going TBM support tail will undercut long-term opera- to the Army and Navy for development of several tions. Enemy preparations for mobile TBM different systems primarily designed to intercept launch at or near a launch site offer an excellent ballistic missiles in terminal phases. This is the opportunity to identify and destroy a TEL with catcher’s mitt approach. We have not sought an lethal air strikes and thus prevent launch. If an Air Force role in this part of the equation except enemy launches a mobile TBM, detection of the for early warning and theater command and con- launch will key our attack operations. We will trol. Instead, we have focused on other elements capitalize on overhead and surface sensors, spe- that can capitalize on the unique capabilities of cial operations forces, JSTARS, AWACS, Rivet Joint air and space forces to negate enemy missiles. aircraft, U–2s, and unmanned aerial vehicles They include attack operations, boost phase inter- (UAVs). The inputs will identify the launch point cept, and battle management, command, control, and cue Air Force and other service assets for communications, computers, and intelligence time-critical strikes. (BMC4I). Numerous initiatives are underway to stream- line the sensor-to-shooter loop and to enhance the ability to detect, track, target, and destroy

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Fogleman

TR–1. DOD BMDO Clementine 1 aboard Titan IIG. mobile launchers. Upgrades to sen- sors on JSTARS, U–2, F–15E, and F–16 aircraft will provide automatic target cuing and recognition. Enhance- ments to the joint tactical informa- tion distribution system (JTIDS) will

improve timelines of joint attack op- DOD erations. The acquisition of UAVs with high resolution sensors, long range, and extended loiter time will enable us to F–15E will facilitate pilot identification of TELs for zero in on TEL locations throughout the depth of attack. Procurement of advanced precision muni- a theater. Transmission of real-time intelligence di- tions will help assure effective target engagement rectly to the cockpit from aircraft and overhead and destruction. These enhancements will ad- sensors via communication satellites will provide vance time-critical targeting and attack of mobile time-critical target and threat data. Near-real time ballistic missiles. digital targeting data from U–2s and UAVs to an

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In Roving Sands ’95 we successfully attacked boost phase intercept capability means warheads the breadth of enemy TBM, with 17 percent of from the intercepted missiles will fall back on the air effort going to TBM attack operations over enemy territory, not our own. This is a strong dis- five days. Joint air forces (Air Force F–15Es and incentive against TBMs—especially if mated to Marine Corps F–18s) attritted enemy TBM infra- WMD. Moreover, developing warheads that frac- structure (TELs, cranes, support equipment) by 40 tionate before apogee greatly complicates the ter- percent. Also, numerous TELs were detected by minal defense task, potentially overwhelming it. U–2s and UAVs before missile launches. Such ex- Recent developments in laser technology in- ercises refine our concept of operations and deter- dicate that our most promising option for boost mine how best to use new capabilities. phase intercept is the Air Force airborne laser Also of interest is a recent study by the Joint (ABL) program. Live-fire lethality tests indicate TMD Project Office that determined the added that ABL will accomplish speed-of-light cata- payoff from combining strophic kill of theater missiles in boost phase domination of enemy airspace attack operations with when they are most vulnerable. The concept calls terminal defenses in the for ABL platforms to be air-refuelable, wide-body will enable aircraft to attack early days of a conflict. aircraft able to deploy worldwide and close with TBMs with impunity The study showed a 61 other early-arriving air assets. It will arrive within percent reduction in hours and quickly establish an on-orbit combat air enemy missile launches, patrol to protect arriving U.S. and coalition forces. 85 percent in TELs, 71 percent in active defense ABL will have an on-board, passive infrared missiles employed, and 50 percent in leaker mis- sensor with a 360-degree sweep capable of au- siles that got through all defenses. tonomous detection, acquisition, and tracking of Ultimately, effective attack operations hinge TBMs without external cuing, but equipped to on dominating enemy airspace. The F–22 will be fully exploit external cuing when available. It will crucial to seizing airspace and incorporate a high energy, chemical laser in the exploiting it to counter mo- multi-megawatt class with enough laser fuel for bile ballistic missiles. Its domi- 30 to 40 engagements per 12 to 18-hour mission. nation of enemy airspace will Moreover, the airborne laser will engage TBMs enable friendly strike and sen- above the cloud deck out to hundreds of kilome- sor aircraft to conduct attack ters as it stands off from enemy territory. An on- operations against TBMs with board system will slew the telescope, determine impunity. While flying com- final target track, dwell the laser, and select other bat air patrol, the F–22 will ex- targets to intercept. It is anticipated that ABL can ploit real-time intelligence in engage at least three nearly-simultaneously the cockpit and deliver preci- launched TBMs before booster burn out. sion air-to-ground munitions The airborne laser also will offer a limited ca- against TELs or hide sites. This pability to intercept enemy cruise missiles and on-hand capability may well high value airborne assets such as enemy sensor preclude the need to scramble platforms and command and control aircraft. This other attack aircraft to strike capability will complement, not replace, that of pop-up targets. By dominating the F–22. Initial funding for the design of an ABL airspace in this fashion, the demonstrator has been included in the FY97 pro- F–22 will provide a strong in- gram objective memorandum. We plan to field a centive for an enemy to demonstrator by the year 2002 that will offer sig- forego robust TBM operations. nificant operational utility in a contingency. While ABL is the best solution to boost Boost Phase Intercept phase intercept, we continue to support the The second area of TBMD BMDO efforts to develop technology for a hyper- being emphasized is boost velocity boost/ascent phase missile. This kinetic phase intercept (BPI). Devel- energy, airborne interceptor would be carried on oping the capability to destroy fighters for high altitude release against ballistic a missile in its boost phase is missiles prior to reaching apogee. The Air Force is vital. As the director of the currently working with the Navy to address the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Defense Orga- concept of operations for employing it. THAAD. nization (BMDO), Lieutenant The Air Force recognizes that a boost phase General Malcolm O’Neill, indicated in congres- intercept will not negate the need for highly ca- sional testimony, ballistic missiles are best tar- pable terminal defenses. On the other hand, BPI geted in the boost phase when they are large, vul- nerable, and highly stressed targets. An effective

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weapons will contribute to a layered defense control while improving connectivity to forward against theater ballistic missiles. First, BPI deters units in the planning phase of missile defense. an enemy’s use of WMD by keeping it out of the In partnership with BMDO and the Marine “WMD box.” Second, it vastly expands the over- Corps, we are developing a combat integration all area protected by a layered defense. Third, ter- center to enhance decentralized execution of op- minal defense engagement tasks remain manage- erations against mobile TBMs. The center receives able, especially in light of submunition warheads sensor data from space-based assets and joint that could fractionate before they enter the termi- radar systems, then employs JTIDS to flash target- nal phase or the defense engagement area. ing and warning information across a theater. On a related note, the potential payoff from Meanwhile, it uses various decision aids to rec- BPI initiatives makes it important that Congress ommend offensive and defensive actions against approve the entire $49 million requested in the a specific TBM threat. The initial prototype was President’s budget for BMDO work on these pro- employed with excellent results during exercise grams. We’ve seen a tremendous shift in funding, Roving Sands. It achieved robust connectivity and we see the remaining funding being cut. We with sensors and shooters throughout the theater. think this is a mistake. Operators routinely processed sensor inputs and tasked attack assets within one to two minutes. BMC4I Another Roving Sands success story was the The third area involves improving battle JFACC situational awareness system which com- management, command, control, communica- bines key theater intelligence information in a tions, computers, and intelligence (BMC4I) re- single easy-to-grasp visual presentation that can quired for TMD. In March 1995 the Air Force be viewed on a laptop computer screen. Both Ma- achieved an initial operating capability with the rine and Air Force users lauded its contribution to attack and launch early reporting to theater the conduct of the air battle, particularly theater (ALERT) system. This builds on improved defense missile defense operations. support payload (DSP) data processing hardware In consolidating management of imagery and software plus enhanced communications collection, analyses, and distribution to improve links with quicker warning of launches from imagery support, we must not undo improve- space-based sensors, ments made in integrating all types of intelli- and better cuing data gence into our combat infrastructure and archi- we must not undo improvements for theater defenses tecture. The stresses placed on a commander’s C4I in integrating intelligence into than during the Gulf to deal with time-critical targets, particularly War. A space-based in- TBMs, make it essential that imagery be inte- combat infrastructure frared system is being grated as a seamless element of his operations. developed that will re- The Air Force is seriously pursuing its charter port ballistic missile launches directly to affected to work with the other services to develop a the- theater forces and provide critical mid-course ater-adaptable, jointly integrated theater air de- tracking and discrimination data for terminal de- fense BMC4I system. As executive agent, we will fenses. This in effect will extend an interceptor’s integrate existing architectures and develop fu- range and increase its effectiveness against ballis- ture ones that provide warfighting CINCs a flexi- tic missile warheads. ble, seamless command and control system. JTIDS has become the primary data link for Theater ballistic missile defense is a high pri- joint theater missile defense operations, and the ority for the Nation and the Air Force, and it is es- installation of JTIDS terminals aboard sensor, sential to maintaining our joint warfighting capa- command and control, and shooter platforms is bility. Air Force initiatives in attack operations, now underway. Moreover, we are developing boost phase intercept, and BMC4I will contribute JTIDS enhancements to provide reliable connec- significantly to achieving this goal. JFQ tivity that will reduce attack timelines and en- hance the probability of success. The Air Force is upgrading its theater air con- trol system to provide responsive command and control for missile defense. With BMDO and the Advanced Research Project Agency we are work- ing to automate processes, field advanced deci- sion aids, and rapidly disseminate information to command and control nodes and joint shooters in near-real time. Also, the implementation of a contingency theater automated planning system will enhance the effectiveness of command and

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Airborne Warning and Control System. U.S. Air Force

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. U.S. Navy (Bruce Morris)

DEEP STRIKE: The Evolving Face of War

By ALBERT R. HOCHEVAR, JAMES A. ROBARDS, JOHN M. SCHAFER, and JAMES M. ZEPKA

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While the applicability of deep strike may be argued in given combat situations, its potential use and related planning and coordination should be examined. Also, in view of force reduc- tions, the efficient, synchronized, and synergistic role of combat power in the deep battle is man- dated to influence the outcome of the adjacent close-in battle, which will determine victory or defeat. Thus deep strike must be defined and a conceptual framework developed for its use in joint warfare. Five assumptions are germane to this process. First, conflict remains non-nuclear. Using nuclear weapons elevates battle planning and manage- Marvin Lynchard) ment to a higher theoretical tier and invalidates Stealth fighter. concepts derived from the conventional battle- field. Second, with advancements made in accu- U.S. Air Force ( racy, strategic and tactical concepts are not helpful in dealing with precision weapons. Also, in forsak- ing the division between tactical and strategic lev- els of organizing, training, and equipping forces, the Air Force eliminated distinctions among air- frames and major commands, referring collec- tively to combat air. Third, deep battle is primarily an extension of aerospace power that utilizes a platform operating either in or passing through the environment. Consequently, not only must the role of combat fixed-wing aircraft in the deep eep strike operations, a traditional do- strike be analyzed, but also cruise missiles and main of the Air Force, have evolved long-range artillery missiles. Fourth, contributions with the advent of long-range land- from national reconnaissance aircraft and satel- based and sea-based weapons. To maxi- D lites as well as special operations forces (SOF) are mize force effectiveness and synergy in the adja- irrefutable. Operating under separate guidelines, cent close battle, joint doctrine must define deep national-level direction of such assets is beyond strike operations as well as concomitant responsi- the scope of deep strike command and control ar- bilities for command and control and mission ex- chitecture. Last, these operations are not applica- ecution. This issue arose in a ble to low intensity/. Gulf War post mortem that the exigencies of the identified the lack of a focal Service Perspectives point for deep strike target European battlefield have Army. The exigencies of the European battle- planning, coordination, and field have shaped the Army perception of deep shaped the Army attack execution as a cam- strike warfare. Massed echelons were a dilemma to paign shortfall.1 While several NATO planners who sought to arrange the battle- solutions have been pro- field to avoid the exhaustion of wave after wave of posed, deep strike remains at the center of a enemy forces without being able to trade space for heated controversy. It is not defined in service time in the face of superiority. Until the 1970s doctrine, much less joint publications. It takes combat operations were seen as two separate con- various forms and meanings. The Army uses deep tests: ground forces fighting the close battle while battle, deep attack, and deep strike interchangeably; airpower attacked deep. The Army adopted Air- the Navy adopts the holistic term strike warfare; Land Battle to counter the numbers and tactics of and the Air Force refers to interdiction, air interdic- the Warsaw Pact. It called for destroying enemy tion, and battlefield air interdiction. forces before they reached the close battle area so that front line commanders would engage a weak- ened enemy. AirLand Battle was a realization that Commander Albert R. Hochevar, USN; Major James time and distance are central to success. Synchro- A. Robards, USA; Major John M. Schafer, USAF; nized attacks on enemy forces as they were intro- and Major James M. Zepka, USAF, collaborated duced to the main battle area were essential to dis- on this essay while attending the Armed Forces rupting and destroying follow-on formations. Staff College.

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■ DEEP STRIKE DOD Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System. To realize the intent of this doctrine, the products from national sources in step with the Army found that a joint approach had to be battle. Along with intelligence, there are represen- taken to ensure victory in the close fight. In Field tatives in a mixed-service cell from corps artillery, Manual 100-5, Operations, deep operations are de- corps aviation, air defense artillery, the Air Force, fined as “those directed against enemy forces and and even naval fire support as well as electronic functions beyond the close battle. They are exe- warfare, targeting, SOF, and planning functions. cuted at all levels with fires, maneuver, and lead- By joining the multiple launch rocket system ership. . . . They expand the battlefield in space (MLRS) and the Army tactical missile system (AT- and time to the full extent of friendly capabili- ACMS), Army aviation (attack helicopters), Air ties.” Thus the traditional concept of waging bat- Force close air support, electronic warfare, and tle independently of the other warfighting arms naval fire support representatives, the cell acquires was relegated to the historical archives. a multidimensional warfighting character. Collo- The corps is the focal point of joint deep cating representatives enhances coordination by strike operations. Although division commanders using critical assets, facilitating interservice com- have a deep strike capability, a corps has the peo- munication, and focusing on a common goal. Al- ple, expertise, equipment, and focus to execute though the composition and design of the cell an entire operation. To facilitate operations and varies slightly from corps to corps, the function cope with requirements of deep strike, a special- and intent remain the same throughout the Army. ized cell has been created to integrate the com- Navy. According to Naval Warfare Publica- mander’s intent into a battle plan. Pivotal to this tion 1, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, strike process is an accurate, is the timely flow of intelli- warfare encompasses “the destruction or neutral- gence that includes acquiring and disseminating ization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional or nuclear weapons.” Since air- frames, tactics, techniques, and procedures are

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similar in achieving target destruction, airpower at such distance from friendly forces that detailed projection from the sea operates on the same integration of each air mission with fire and basic tenets as that of the Air Force. movement of friendly forces is not required.” The Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM), Again counter air involves operations aimed at at- however, is unique to the Navy. Capable of being taining and maintaining a specified degree of air fired from a submarine or surface ship, it has a superiority by destroying or neutralizing enemy range of 650 nautical miles. The Tomahawk made forces. The intent and conduct of such opera- its public debut in the Gulf War as it deftly navi- tions, as defined in joint doctrine, are fundamen- gated downtown Baghdad to destroy various tar- tally identical to the Air Force perceptions dis- gets. Unmanned, air breathing, and expendable, cussed previously. it can be made “with less expensive materials Since Desert Storm, commanders and doc- than a strike aircraft and need not incorporate all trine developers have sought to reconcile various of the complex electronic or defensive systems of views on coordinating and conducting the deep a manned aircraft.” 2 It can also be rapidly repro- battle.3 To mitigate its impact on service doctrine, grammed to meet changing target requirements. a definition must meet the intent of extant ser- Air Force. Although not specifically defining vice doctrine yet be flexible enough to offer prac- deep strike, the Air Force uses the terms air interdic- tical, unconstrained guidance. Deep strike can be tion and counter air operations. The former is de- defined as operations conducted to destroy, de- fined in Air Force Manual 2-1, grade, or neutralize enemy land, sea, and air Tactical Air Operations, as “oper- forces before they are brought to bear against JFCs must integrate the ations conducted to destroy, friendly forces. attack by ensuring that neutralize, or delay . . . military To give a land force commander sufficient potential” while the latter term depth for high-tempo maneuvering, deep strike deep strikes are effective defined in Air Force Manual 1-1, operations should be conducted beyond the fire Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the support coordination line (FSCL) and emphasize United States Air Force, as “oper- improving the efficiency of targeting and attack- ations directed against the enemy’s air offensive ing targets beyond this line. An approach is and defensive capability in order to attain and needed that recognizes the deep, close, and rear maintain a desired degree of air superiority.” areas of the battlefield and establishes organiza- Interdiction missions are either preplanned tions and responsibilities to conduct combat op- air strikes against specific targets or armed recon- erations in them. Moreover, in an era of shrink- naissance sorties with the primary purpose of lo- ing resources, it is imperative that such cating and attacking targets of opportunity. Con- organizations be standardized to support war- ducted against a single target or selected portions fighting commanders, since an enemy may not of a targeted complex, missions against a specific allow time to adapt to a new theater or threat as target are designed to have the maximum effect was the case in Desert Storm. on an enemy’s ability to sustain intense, high- tempo offensive and defensive operations. Armed Target Coordination reconnaissance sorties are directed against enemy Joint force commanders (JFCs) must ulti- materiel, personnel, and facilities in a specified mately integrate and synchronize all the aspects of area. Their desired effect is to destroy, trap, or attack and set conditions for victory by ensuring limit the mobility of forces and materiel. that deep strikes are effective and contribute to the defeat of a hostile main battle force. Since JFCs Joint Doctrine cannot personally coordinate the entire campaign, The objective of counter air operations is to they can form a joint targeting coordination board maintain air superiority, thus preventing enemy (JTCB) with senior service component and staff of- airpower from effectively interfering with opera- ficers to assist and advise them as command and tions by friendly forces. Freedom of movement control authorities. According to Joint Pub 3-0, afforded by air superiority ensures that joint mili- Doctrine for Joint Operations, a board will typically tary objectives are achieved by either eliminating review target information, develop guidance and or curtailing an enemy’s general air threat. Like priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target the Air Force, joint doctrine employs the terms air lists (it should also maintain a complete list of re- interdiction and counter air. Air interdiction is de- stricted targets and areas where SOF are operating fined in Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- to avoid endangering operations). Although briefly tionary of Military and Associated Terms, as “air op- outlined in Joint Pub 3-0, JTCB structure and au- erations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay thority is vague and does not provide JFCs with a the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces

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readily available organizational framework to con- synergism of advanced, long-range weapons sys- trol deep strike operations. The criticality and com- tems such as aircraft and missiles. Command and plexity of the deep strike mission mandates that control demands the capability to process, dis- the basic JTCB structure be standardized with flexi- play, and communicate target acquisition data bility for various contingencies. from service components and national intelli- Deputy JFCs make ideal JTCB directors. Fa- gence assets to JTCB. miliar with the overall campaign strategy, they The Air Force domain of deep strike opera- have authority to quickly resolve targeting issues. tions, therefore, must include Army surface-to-sur- For maximum synergism and synchronization of face ATACMS and Navy sea-launched TLAM a campaign, joint force air component comman- weapons systems. The fundamental means of Air ders (JFACCs) and joint force fires coordinators Force command and control—the tactical air con- (JFFCs) should serve on JTCBs. Incorporating the trol system (TACS)—has the people, procedures, commander’s intent, avail- and hardware to plan, direct, and control opera- able resources, and limita- tions with other services and allies. With the con- the services must be able to tions, including rules of trol agencies and communication-electronics facili- detect ground targets deep engagement, into a joint ties to ensure centralized control and decentralized fire support plan along execution of air assets, TACS can readily incorpo- behind enemy lines with full authority to order rate and accommodate the command and control fire missions, the ex- requirements of Army and Navy deep strike sys- panded JTCB mission tems. Located at an operations center, such as the should be to coordinate, integrate, and prioritize Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), the deputy joint force requirements to include identifying JFC, via JFACC, may exercise control over long- and prioritizing resources for target acquisition range weapons with the battle-tested airborne and battle damage collection. warning and control system (AWACS), the Air- borne Command And Control Center (ABCCC), Setting Priorities the contingency TACS automated planning system To establish the focus and level of effort for (CTAPS), and the new joint surveillance and target deep strike operations, the following priorities can attack radar system (JSTARS). be adapted to evolving battlefield conditions. The first priority of deep strike operations should be Integrating the Attack enemy command, control, and communications JSTARS, an airborne multi-mode radar with architecture and facilities. Although attacking this associated C3 equipment, battle tested during target set may not be immediately helpful, the Desert Storm and now in full-scale development, long-range effects of inflicting strategic paralysis can integrate long-range, deep strike weapons. It will be to dramatically reduce an enemy’s ability offers airborne radar to detect, track, and classify to maneuver on the battlefield or perform normal ground forces, along with processing equipment, functions of government. The second priority controller stations, and command and control in- should be fielded forces, including establishing air terfaces. JSTARS furnishes targeting information superiority through counter air operations with to tactical aircraft, standoff missiles, or Army ar- joint suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD), tillery for precise, real-time attacks against mov- striking enemy sea forces, and interdicting land ing enemy targets, including helicopters and forces beyond FSCL before they can be brought to slow-moving, fixed-wing aircraft. bear against friendly forces.4 The third priority The Army and Air Force recognized that in should be key production facilities including oil, order for AirLand Battle to be a viable doctrine, power, and defense industries, especially those the services not only must have weapons that can that produce weapons of mass destruction. Fourth disrupt and destroy second echelon forces but is the transportation infrastructure—railways, must first be able to detect ground targets deep roads, and bridges—to prevent, neutralize, or behind enemy lines.6 This is what JSTARS does. delay additional land forces from reaching the for- With the introduction of JSTARS, together ward edge of the battle area. The last priority, the with the proven use of AWACS and ABCCC, an civil populace, is targeted by psychological opera- entirely new set of targeting capabilities is avail- tions and nonlethal classified means.5 able to JTCB. Targeting data processed on these Because the ultimate goal of deep strike is aircraft could be sent to Army or Navy compo- victory in the close battle, centralized command nent commanders via a joint tactical information and control, along with comprehensive, accurate, distribution system (JTIDS) link to CTAPS termi- and near-real-time intelligence, will maximize the nals. Interconnected terminals at all component operations centers can provide automated target- ing, collection management, situation analysis,

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and improved air tasking order (ATO) develop- The complexity of modern warfare shows ment and distribution tools. that synchronization and synergy are essential to Centralized control of air assets has long fighting and winning with minimal friendly casu- been recognized as a tenet of campaign planning. alties. To ensure that resources are not misused From Operation Torch to Desert Storm, this con- through inefficiency and service parochialism, cept has proven its value. Joint doctrine cedes the command and control architecture for JTCBs role of centralized control/decentralized execution should coordinate deep strike operations. JFQ to JFACCs as controlling authorities when two or more service components contribute aircraft or NOTES standoff missiles to operations. JFACCs have been 1 Fred F. Marty, “Synchronizing Fires in Joint and effective in controlling Air Force and Navy air- Combined Operations,” Field Artillery Journal (February craft. But a dilemma arises when Marine fixed- 1993), p. 1. wing assets are included because doctrine has long 2 Richard K. Betts, Cruise Missiles and U.S. Policy regarded Marine Corps aircraft as close support (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1982), p. 3. weapons. Consequently, Marine force structure 3 John H. Cushman, Thoughts for Joint Commanders deemphasizes field artillery and surface-to-surface (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1993). 4 missiles. Transferring tactical air support provided John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign (Washington: by the air combat element from its command and National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 17. 5 James P. Coyne, Air Power in the Gulf (Arlington, control could jeopardize ground operations. Nev- Va.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1992), p. 44. ertheless joint doctrine is continuing to move to- 6 Millard Barger, “What the Air Force Has To Do To ward centralization as seen in Joint Pub 3-56.1, Put the ‘Air’ in the AirLand Battle,” Armed Forces Journal Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. International, vol. 123, no. 12 (June 1986), pp. 59–64. JFACCs must not only be the sole points of con- tact for air operations but must liaise with JFFCs to ensure the integration of ground systems and scheme of maneuver into air campaigns. With ATACMS, MLRS, and attack helicopters, and the development of the extended-range AT- ACMS and tri-service standoff attack missile (TSSAM), the land component commander (LCC) now plays a crucial role in JFC execution of the deep battle. An organization that integrates and coordinates land-based deep fire systems is re- quired to represent LCC needs at both the JFC level and laterally within the ground forces.

Because of all-weather, 24-hour capable land systems and the need to deconflict airspace to ex- ecute timely JSEAD, JFFCs as senior land force FS- COORDs function as LCC agents on deep battle matters. JFFCs may also remedy the Marine close air support dilemma. If JFCs consider it necessary to give command and control of Marine aircraft to JFACCs, JFFCs would be the means of realign- ing fire support to assist Marine ground forces. Army field artillery brigades and attack heli- copters may be assigned new support missions to cover the shortfall. Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, should address this JFFC con- cept as well as both Army and Marine aspects of land warfare. Since JTCBs are vehicles for coordi- nating and synchronizing land, sea, and air based weapons systems in deep strike operations, JFFCs should supplement, not supplant JTCBs. Taking LCC intent for fighting the ground war close and deep, JFFCs, via JTCBs, must integrate it with air campaigns designed by JFACCs.

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The Devil Was in the Details

By D.M. GIANGRECO

orld War II ended with the dropping of “the bomb” on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This sudden and unan- ticipated conclusion to the conflict was greeted with Wjoy by the entire Nation, not least by the 2.5 million Americans slated to invade Japan’s Home Islands including it- self. The invasion forces were not only to come from the Pacific; First Army, which had pummelled its way from to the heart of Germany, and , which was based in Eng- land, were on the way. Morale was not good among veterans of the Battle of the Bulge, , and other campaigns. As James Jones later wrote: “What it must have been like to some old-timer buck sergeant...[knowing] that he very likely had survived this far only to fall dead in the dirt of Japan’s Home Islands, hardly bears thinking about.”

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Combat had been so bloody and prolonged MacArthur, asserting that “there is no substantia- that those who experienced it first hand felt little tion beyond Truman’s own memory.” He adds need to justify their belief that the atom bomb that “a casual and informal estimate would have probably saved their lives. Their families, indeed, been out of character for Marshall, whose state- most Americans, understood this. Today, this senti- ments were always careful and measured.” But it ment is under attack by many who hold that using is possible that the President was telling the the bomb against Japan was cruel and unneces- truth, and that the numbers given were indeed sary; but aside from the decades-old numbers game Marshall’s “careful and measured” opinion. played by revisionist historians and veterans’ When Marshall briefed Truman prior to the groups alike, virtually no research has been pro- session on July 25 at the , he duced on the invasion plans. John Ray Skates, a was under no obligation to portray MacArthur’s visiting professor at the U.S. Army Center of Mili- casualty figures as the last word. Both men were tary History, recently tried to fill this void in The intimately familiar with losses in the Pacific over Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. (See the the previous year—over 200,000 wounded, plus review of Skates’ book by H. P. Wilmott in JFQ, 10,000 American dead and missing in the Mari- Autumn/Winter 1994–95, p. 127, which prompted anas, 5,500 on and around Leyte, 9,000 on this article.) , 6,800 at Iwo Jima, 12,600 at Okinawa, and Skates examines the invasion plans, offering 2,000 killed in the unexpectedly vicious fighting details on esoteric subjects such as resupply over on Peleliu. Both also knew that, save for some op- the beach and combat air patrols against suicide erations around New , real casualties were aircraft. But while his book is a windfall for any- routinely outpacing estimates and the gap was one interested in the final days of the war, a widening. They also knew that while America al- range of problems negates much of its value and ways emerged victorious, operations often were makes it useful to those attempting to reengineer not being completed as rapidly as planned—with history. Skates states, for instance, that “the last all the added cost in blood and treasure that such months of the were stirred [by] pas- lengthy campaigns entailed. sions that drove the war into extremes of vio- Leyte is a perfect example. It was to the lence” with “passion, hatred, and frustration Luzon campaign what the Kyushu invasion was moving almost beyond rational limits.” Debate to the capture of Tokyo, a preliminary operation over how many casualties might have resulted to create a huge staging area. Today, we can recall from an invasion has long been a preoccupation MacArthur wading ashore triumphantly in the of revisionist historians, and Skates joins the fray Philippines. But what Truman and Marshall knew with gusto. He uses contradictory figures ascribed only too well was that MacArthur was supposed to various civilian and military leaders with os- to have retaken Leyte with four divisions and tensibly self-serving motives. That they might have eight fighter and bomber groups striking have attempted to make the best estimates possi- from the island within 45 days of the initial land- ble with the information at their disposal does ings. Nine divisions and 60 days into the battle, not seem to occur to him. One example is a casu- however, only a fraction of that airpower was op- alty estimate that General George Marshall re- erational because of unexpected terrain condi- ceived from General Douglas MacArthur. tions (and this on an island which the United States had occupied for forty years). Nor had The Numbers Game fighting on the ground gone as planned. The MacArthur had twice come up with figures Japanese even briefly isolated Fifth Air Force exceeding 100,000 casualties for the first three headquarters and also captured much of the Bu- months of combat on the southern island of rauen airfield complex. Kyushu which Skates contrasts with President Skates records incredulously that a figure of Harry Truman’s post-war statement that Marshall up to one million casualties far exceeded those had said that the casualties from invading sustained in Europe. But while the naval side of Kyushu and —including the Kanto Plain the Pacific War displayed the broad, sweeping and Tokyo—could range from 250,000 to moves so loved by historians, land combat had 1,000,000. Even discounting the fact that the fig- little in common with the maneuver warfare that ures represent expected losses for the entire cam- went a long way toward keeping casualties com- paign in the Home Islands, Skates claims they ex- paratively low in northwest Europe. The closest ceed those which Marshall received from commanders came after D-Day to corps-level combat which was the stock and trade of Army D.M. Giangreco serves on the editorial staff of and Marine divisions in the Pacific was the pro- Military Review. Among his publications are longed fighting in Normandy’s hedgerows and Airbridge to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis of 1948 and Huertgen Forest—close-in, infantry-intensive Stealth Fighter Pilot. slugfests that produced many dead on both sides.

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Provisional Order of Battle for Invasion of Japan ()

Source: General Headquarters, U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Operation Coronet Staff Study.

MAINLAND JAPAN DATELINE: December 8, 1945.

(Associated Press) U.S. forces land on Kyushu as smoke masks the beaches from and shore batteries.

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It is also important to note that when they met in told that the bomb would become available in Potsdam, Truman and Marshall knew that total August, he reputedly remarked, “In the meantime U.S. casualties were approaching the 1,230,000 I have a war to fight.” mark that Skates finds unfathomable, the bulk An article of faith among some critics of the having occurred in just the previous year. bomb is that Truman and his advisors knew that Marshall had MacArthur’s figures on July 25, Japan was on the ropes and would soon surren- 1945, and had seen countless other well-inten- der. The reality in 1945 was vastly different and tioned estimates. He also appreciated that at leaders at all levels worked under the assumption some point the President—as any commander in that the United States would go all the way to chief might do—was going to ask him a question Tokyo the hard way. Construction of the massive that would rely not only on the numbers in prefabricated components of a portable harbor to hand, but on his intuition and experience as a support forces invading Honshu had a priority soldier. An artillery commander from the Meuse- second only to the which had Argonne battles of World War I would ask a man produced the bomb. Stateside hospitals were who had walked over the same bloody fields, readied for a flood of wounded. “But general, what do you really think?” Skates takes Truman and his contemporaries to task for considering casualty figures that “were A Time to Invade without basis in contemporary planning” but There were plenty of estimates that confi- asks readers to feel comfortable with his own esti- dently asserted that strategic bombing, , mate of a “tolerable” total of no more than or both—even the invasion of Kyushu alone— 20,000 while confidently asserting that the Japan- would bring Japan to its senses, but no one could ese would have surrendered posthaste before the provide a convincing explanation on how long invasion of Honshu. He makes much of a post- that would take. The millions of Americans war report by Colonel Riley Ennis of the Opera- poised to take part in the largest invasion in his- tions Division of the War Department on how the tory, as well as those supporting them, could only war might have progressed absent the bomb. stay poised for so long. Leaders in both Washing- Ennis, a newly-promoted colonel, was tasked to ton and Tokyo knew this just as well as the the- produce this brief analysis, clearly put together in ater commanders in the Pacific. After learning of a hurry by someone whose heart was not in it. In the bomb, MacArthur ignored it save for consid- a way, though, it actually does not differ much ering how to integrate the new weapon into from numerous other documents produced after plans for tactical operations at Kyushu and Hon- the war in that it was not based on original re- shu if Tokyo was not forced to the surrender search and analysis but patched together from table. Nimitz was of a similar mind. On being various sources that tended to be liberally salted with hindsight unavailable six months earlier.

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Ennis guessed the number of casualties that claim turned out to be wrong, the confirmed fig- would have resulted from invading Kyushu by es- ures were ominous enough for Marshall to pon- sentially lifting MacArthur’s original estimates der scrapping the Kyushu operation altogether and merging them with post-war sources such as even though MacArthur maintained that it was a Sixth Army report on “Japanese Plans for the still the best option available. With this in mind, Defense of Kyushu.” When reading this and other the ratcheting down of potential casualties on analyses, it is difficult not to notice that they fol- Kyushu is all the more puzzling. low the tendency to build scenarios or conclu- So what can be learned from The Invasion of sions around the Japanese defensive strength of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb? The author’s re- mid-August when pitted against U.S. offensive markably low casualty estimate seems to derive strength amassed in November. As with other from the well-documented weakness of Japanese such reports, a slight whiff of overoptimism is forces as they existed 75 days—and, as will be discernable. It concludes that casualties would seen, actually 105 to 120 days—from the invasion have ranged from 75,000 to 100,000 for the of Kyushu; an incomplete understanding of how Kyushu operation. But Skates then takes this fig- Japanese defensive operations were conducted; an ure, quips that his “study of the record leads to uneven application of logic on estimates of similar conclusions,” and proceeds to reduce it to Japanese combat strength after a defeat on 60,000 to 75,000 without giving the reader a clue Kyushu; and an eager willingness to select and on how he did it. shape facts that support the thesis that U.S. forces The attempt by Skates to build a what-did- would have suffered relatively few casualties in an Truman-know-and-when-did-he-know-it case is invasion, and that Tokyo was ready to throw in all the more disingenuous when one learns that the towel. the author is aware that four days after Marshall’s briefing came the July 29 change to an earlier re- Naming the Day port on enemy strength on Kyushu. This update The Joint Chiefs originally set the date for set alarm bells ringing in MacArthur’s headquar- the invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) as ters as well as Washington because it stated December 1, 1945, and for Honshu (Operation bluntly that the Japanese were rapidly reinforcing Coronet) as March 1, 1946. To lessen casualties Kyushu and had increased troop strength from the launch of Coronet would await the arrival of 80,000 to 206,000 men “with no end in sight.” two armored divisions from Europe to sweep up Finally, it warned that Japanese efforts were the Kanto Plain before the valleys turned into “changing the tactical and strategic situation vast pools of rice, muck, and water crisscrossed by sharply.” While the dramatic no end in sight elevated roads and dominated by rugged, well-de- fended foothills.

MAINLAND JAPAN AT SEA DATELINE: March 1, 1946. March 24, 1946.

(Associated Press) Fires swept USS Antietam after U.S. forces hit the Japanese suicide pilot beach on Honshu. crashes into planes being refueled near the stern.

[U.S. Navy photo]

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Giangreco

Before the British experienced the tragedy of While subsequent post-war prisoner interroga- pushing XXX Corps up a single road through the tions did not reveal any plans to systematically Dutch lowlands to Arnhem, U.S. planners were deluge low-lying areas, a quick thrust up the aware of the costs that would be incurred if the Kanto Plain would not have been as speedy as Kanto Plain was not secured for mobile warfare Skates suggests. First, there were no bridges in the and airfield construction prior to the wet season. area capable of taking vehicles over 12 tons. Every Intensive hydrological and weather studies begun tank, self-propelled gun, and prime mover would in 1943 made it clear that an invasion in early have to cross bridges erected for the event. Next, March offered the best chance of success, with the logistical considerations and the sequence of fol- situation deteriorating as the month progressed. low-up units would require that armored divisions With good luck, relatively free movement not land until Y+10. This would provide time for across the plain might even be possible well into the defenders to observe that the U.S. infantry’s April. Unfortunately, this assumed that the snow generic tank support was severely hampered by al- run-off from the mountains would not be severe, ready flooded rice fields and would certainly sug- or that the Japanese would not flood the fields. gest ways to make things worse for the invaders.

The Inundation of the Tokyo Plain—Areas of natural flooding in the wet season (shaded brown) and tem- porary artificial flooding (gray) are shown at left; combined areas of paddy fields (blue) and flooding form obstacles at right which indicate full impact of both natural and man-made barriers.

Source: Military Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

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A late start on Honshu would leave Ameri- for December 1, 1945 and March 1, 1946, respec- can forces to fight their way up flood plains that tively, it was apparent that the three-month pe- were only dry during certain times of the year but riod between X-Day (Olympic) and Y-Day (Coro- that could be suddenly inundated by the enemy. net) would not be sufficient. Weather ultimately If the timetable slipped, U.S. soldiers and marines determined which operation to reschedule be- would risk fighting in terrain similar to that later cause Coronet could not be moved back without encountered in Vietnam, less the helicopters, risking serious restrictions on the ground cam- where convoys moved on roads above paddy paign from flooded fields and the air campaign fields. Unfortunately, foul weather would have from cloud cover that almost doubles from early delayed base development on Kyushu and spelled March to early April. MacArthur proposed mov- a late start for the operation. ing the Kyushu invasion ahead by a month, Engineer planning for Coronet envisioned Nimitz concurred, and JCS agreed. Olympic was the construction of 11 airfields on Kyushu for the set for November 1, which also gave the Japanese 31 air groups that would soften up Honshu. less time to dig in. Bomb and fuel storage, roads, wharves, and base Yet these best-laid plans would not have un- facilities would be needed to support those air folded as expected even if the atomic bomb had groups plus Sixth Army holding a 110-mile “stop not been dropped and the Soviet entry into the line” one third of the way up the island. All plans Pacific War had not frustrated Tokyo’s last hope centered on construction of the minimum essen- of reaching a settlement short of unconditional tial operating facilities, but that minimum grew. surrender (a Versailles-type outcome was unac- The 31 air groups increased to 40, then to 51—all ceptable to Truman and many of his contempo- for an island on which there was considerably raries because it was seen as an incomplete vic- less terrain information than was erroneously col- tory that would require the next generation to lected about Leyte. Many airfields would come on refight the war). The end result would have been line early to support ground operations on a bloody campaign in which pre-invasion casu- Kyushu, but lengthy strips and support facilities alty estimates rapidly became meaningless be- for Honshu-bound medium and heavy bombers cause of something that the defenders could not would only start to become available 45 days into achieve on their own: knocking the detailed U.S. the operation. Most were not projected to be timetable off balance. ready until 90 to 105 days after the initial land- ings on Kyushu in spite of a massive effort . A Season for Kamikazes The constraints on the air campaign were so The “divine wind” () of a powerful clear that when the Joint Chiefs set the target typhoon destroyed a foreign invasion force head- dates of the Kyushu and the Honshu invasions ing for Japan in 1281, and it was for this storm that Japanese suicide aircraft of World War II were

KAGOSHIMA, JAPAN DATELINE: June 1, 1946. (UPI) Soldiers from the U.S. Sixth Army continued mopping up enemy- held caves along 120-mile front in mountains of Kyushu.

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named. On October 9, 1945, a similar typhoon had held out, this storm would have had pro- packing 140-mile per hour winds struck the found effects. It would have been the closest American staging area on Okinawa that would watched weather cell in history. Would it move to have been expanded to capacity by that time. the west after hitting Luzon, where the Army was Skates relates in a matter-of-fact way that U.S. an- preparing to invade Honshu, or would it take the alysts estimated that the storm would have normal spiraling turn to the north, and then caused up to a 45-day delay in the invasion of northeast as the October typhoon? Would slow, Kyushu—well beyond the initial date of Decem- shallow-draft landing craft be caught at sea or in ber 1. The point that goes begging, however, is the Philippines where loading operations would that while these reports from the Pacific were cor- be put on hold? If they were already on their way rect in themselves, they did not take account of to Japan, would they reach Kyushu’s sheltered what such a delay in base construction on bay? And what about the caissons for the artifi- Kyushu would mean for the Honshu invasion, cial harbor? This precious towed cargo could not which could have been pushed back as far as mid- fall victim to the storm and be scattered at sea. April 1946. Whatever stage of employment U.S. forces If there had been no atomic bomb and were in during those first days of April, a delay of Tokyo also had attempted to hold out for an ex- some sort—certainly no less than a week—was tended time—a possibility that even bombing ad- going to occur, one that First and Eighth Army vocates grant—the Japanese would have appreci- could ill afford and that Japanese militarists ated the impact of the storm in the waters around would see as another sign that they were right Okinawa. Moreover, they would know what it after all. This is critical. Skates notes that much of meant for the follow-up invasion of Honshu the land today contains built-up areas not there which they predicted as accurately as the inva- in 1946, but appears blissfully unaware that any- sion of Kyushu. Even with the storm delay and one treading this same flat, dry “tank country” in friction of combat on Kyushu, the Coronet sched- 1946 would, in reality, have been up to their ule would have led U.S. engineers to perform vir- calves in muck and rice shoots by the time the in- tual miracles to make up for lost time and imple- vasion took place. ment Y-Day as early in April as possible. But the There is also the claim made by Skates of an “divine winds” packed a one-two punch. “overrated” kamikaze threat. While it is not possi- On April 4, 1946, another typhoon raged in ble to discuss that subject here, one aspect is the Pacific, this one striking the northernmost worth emphasizing: U.S. intelligence turned out Philippine island of Luzon on the following day, to be seriously wrong about the number of Japan- inflicting only moderate damage before moving ese planes available to defend the Home Islands. toward . Coming almost a year after the Estimates that 6,700 could be made available in war, it was of no particular concern. But if Japan stages by the final invasion grew to only 7,200 by the time of the surrender, but turned out to be

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short by some 3,300 in light of the armada of There is a fine chapter on the redeployment of 10,500 planes which the enemy planned to use in First Army from Europe, a decent section on Pas- opening phases of both operations. The number tel deception operations, and a sensitive account actually available turned out to be over 12,700. of plans for the possible use of poison gas during To bolster his case, Skates gives unusual the invasion. Anyone with an ax to grind on the weight to some reports. But all documents are not strategic, political, and moral questions surround- created equal. Thus when he uses a quick and ing the bomb, however, will find its flawed con- dirty estimate by Ennis to refute the statements of clusions providential for conducting their private Truman and Marshall, his argument appears to be wars. Skates has said exactly what some might rather shallow at first blush then turn disingenu- want to hear, but the fact remains that Truman ous as it becomes clear that he is cloaking the re- was under no obligation to accept a figure of port in terms that imply the existence of multiple 200,000 (or “just” 20,000) American dead to as- sources: “The postwar analysts were certainly cor- suage the guilt of the revisionists. JFQ rect in their estimate that Coronet would not have been necessary.” That sort of overstatement The photographs reproduced in this article depict the following occurs with unnerving frequency, although the actual events of the World War II: page 88, USS Indiana firing salvo at Imperial Japanese Iron Works in Kamaishi unwary reader likely accepts this documentation (U.S. Navy) and under a protective smoke screen American at face value because, while the basic outlines of forces make a landing somewhere in the South Pacific, 1944 invasion plans are understood, few have grasped (U.S. Army); page 89, Marines landing in Japan (U.S. Navy); their fundamental details. page 90, Marines invade Iwo Jima (U.S. Marine Corps/Neil Gillespie) and cleaning up on USS Nashville after kamikaze Skates makes occasional obligatory acknowl- attack (U.S. Army); page 91, a flame-throwing tank of the U.S. edgments to just how fierce the fighting would 10th Army pouring it on a Japanese entrenchment on have been but is convinced it would have been Okinawa (U.S. Army); page 92, enemy-held cave on Okinawa brief with “tolerable” casualties only “in the range (U.S. Marine Corps/Thomas D. Barnett, Jr.) and flight deck of of Okinawa.” Even if one appeals to the remark- USS Nassau (U.S. Navy); page 93, Coast Guardsmen and troops filling sandbags for gun emplacement on Leyte Island (U.S. ably low casualty estimate that the author snatches Coast Guard); page 94, discharged Japanese soldiers on board from the air, it is reasonable to assume that if Tru- train (U.S. Navy/Wayne Miller) and members of the 151st man had not done exactly what he did to end the Infantry Regiment advancing under enemy fire on Carabao in war, many of the same people who today decry the Philippines (U.S. Army). dropping the bomb might well be condemning him for needlessly expending thousands of Ameri- can lives in an unnecessary invasion. Military professionals will pick up on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of this book.

KOBE DATELINE: September 18, 1946. Japanese soldiers captured by the 86th Infantry Division in Hyogo Province en- route to POW camp.

[U.S. Army Signal Corps photo]

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JMETL: The Key to Joint Proficiency By JOHN R. BALLARD and STEVE C. SIFERS

odern warfare is joint warfare. There- than they can effectively train to given time limitations, much less fiscal con- fore the Armed Forces must train straints. Since there are some tasks to jointly in order to fight successfully. which units will be unable to train, let alone train to standard,2 commanders Unfortunately, today we face resource must prioritize the list to select tasks M which must be trained. This is also ac- constraints that make it no longer possible to train complished by reviewing the refer- each task to proficiency. The joint community, like ences mentioned and selecting the the services, must determine which tasks are neces- most likely combat tasks. These then sary and warrant training. To get the most out of become the mission essential tasks for a unit. available resources, objectives must be derived by as- Next is determining how well sessing probable future operations. The joint commu- trained a unit is for the items on a METL. A standardized assessment tool is nity lacked the means to do that in the past; now the necessary. The Army uses written condi- joint mission essential task list (JMETL) can make tions and standards for each task as the assessment tool. Currently there are training more efficient in ensuring success. conditions and standards for most tasks required.3 However, when the process As U.S. forces operate in a world there are important differences be- began there were only limited pub- of diverging threats and growing fiscal tween them, METL provides a founda- lished conditions and standards, and constraints, it is critical that training tion for JMETs.1 The Army training many of them varied from unit to unit. systems use the most effective require- model begins by assessing all the tasks The Army has an organization- ments-based methods available. The that a unit may ever perform. A unit wide process to standardize the names full implementation of a joint training reviews its mission statement entered of tasks and related conditions and system rooted in joint mission essen- on the modified table of organization standards. This procedure will carry on tial tasks (JMETs) can make this possi- and equipment, any operation plans or in some form as conditions and stan- ble. This article looks at including orders against which it is force listed, dards shift with new information and JMETs in training and readiness sys- guidance from higher headquarters, technology. Conditions and standards tems to improve joint proficiency in and Army publications. The assess- become objective measures which a specific mission areas. ment leads to a list of all possible tasks unit uses to assess when it is suffi- for a given unit. ciently trained for a task and can move Background Lists may be long, as in the case of on to others. JMETs benefitted from the Army a combat arms unit such as an armor Assessments result in selecting experience in developing unit mission battalion, or short for specialized units, tasks that units should include in their essential task lists (METLs). While as with a postal detachment. For most next training period. In theory units do units this initial list has more tasks not prioritize tasks on their METL. All should be of equal importance or not be on the list, since supposedly essen- John R. Ballard is associate professor of history and strategy tial tasks should be trained to standard at the Armed Forces Staff College and Lieutenant Colonel all the time. However, time, money, Steve C. Sifers, USA, is a member of the Joint Training and unit priority make it difficult if not Directorate at U.S. Atlantic Command.

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SH–60 picking up standards for the joint force METL. Ef- survivors of simulated fective training requires these parame- crash. ters to give commanders objective measurements against which to apply themselves. This knowledge set will also give the joint forces a plan to allo- cate resources to achieve desired readi- ness levels. Instead of conducting large-scale, expensive exercises, the joint force commander needs to con- duct focused training to assess the pro- ficiency of his forces to conduct the tasks they will be required to perform in combat. With this assessment the commander can create a training plan to move the unit toward proficiency. This type of training requires standard- ized tasks, conditions, and standards at the joint level.

Air Force (SeanAir Force Worrell) In the past most joint forces have

U.S. been formed in an ad hoc manner. De- spite this, key personnel in potential joint force headquarters have intu- itively known what tasks were critical impossible to train to standard on all the joint training conducted in the last to mission accomplishment. In each METL tasks. Therefore units identify nine years has used imprecise training case they have identified many of duties for which they are untrained or vehicles. Training driven by large-scale these tasks and set about accomplish- need practice as the focus of the next field exercises that are based on artifi- ing them, for the most part without di- available training days. Unit profi- cial scenarios and held without de- rect guidance or assistance; but they ciency in METL tasks should determine tailed analysis to identify the appropri- could have been more effective had the requirement for training and form ate tactics, techniques, and procedures these tasks been identified in advance. the basis of the unit training plan. as objectives rarely optimized resources It is time for the joint community to or yielded focused training. While routinely publish task lists (JMETL) as The Joint Process such exercises had utility and did pro- well as the conditions and standards The Army training model follows duce benefits, they were too costly and that go with each duty. Sufficient in- the precept that operational require- inefficient to remain the norm. More formation is available to formulate ments should drive training. It ensues seriously, some training vehicles have conditions and standards for all joint become mere sounding boards for forces from the lessons of former large developing doctrinal theories, using exercises, after action reviews (AARs) we should train to fight in the personnel as training support for on recent joint operations (such as So- joint environment just as we do initiatives that research and devel- malia and Haiti), and experiences of opment has failed to address. Such current CINCs and their staffs. in service-directed training practices must be replaced with a process that targets training to pro- Ongoing Improvements from the success of the Army process duce increased readiness with every Deducing the essential from a list that joint operational requirements dollar spent. of all possible tasks for joint forces or should also drive joint training. We Practice does not make perfect, units operating in a joint environment should train the way we intend to only perfect practice makes perfect. is the logical starting point for deter- fight in the joint environment just as This applies to joint forces as well as mining force JMETLs. Unfortunately, we do in service-directed training. service component forces. For joint or- such a list does not exist. Analyzing These precepts should be fundamental ganizations to measure their readiness the joint strategic capabilities plan to every training plan. they need to know what missions and (JSCP) and the complete file of opera- Unfortunately, this has not been tasks they will most likely perform in tions plans is the best way to develop a the norm since the passage of the combat and in operations other than list. This takes time and thought from Goldwater-Nichols Act. Too much of war. Then they need to know the stan- key operations and plans personnel, dards for performance of these tasks but the resources to accomplish it are and under what conditions they must in place. execute them. Such a knowledge set provides the tasks, conditions, and

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Navy and Air Force aircraft during Roving Sands ’94. Combat Camera Imagery (DelanieCombat Camera Imagery Stafford)

The joint community has identi- Fortunately, significant improve- ■ Avoiding duplicating training accom- fied universal joint tasks to support ment has been made in 1995, incorpo- plished at service component level. The ser- training and listed them in the univer- rating the best of the entire joint com- vices are capable of producing trained, in- munity. The result is an teroperable units, and conducting improved UJTL, version interoperability training. Service training in a resource-constrained environment can support joint requirements, and when 2.1, which reorganizes the we cannot train for tasks that we do conducted and assessed, service exercises tasks to fit joint doctrine should form a large portion of the joint not intend to perform in combat and reflects the input of readiness system. The only thing lacking is all unified commands. The a means to account for joint tasks accom- new UJTL can and should plished in service training. While these two sal joint task list (UJTL). Originally empower the requirements-based sys- tenets may lead one to rely heavily on sim- many were disenchanted because UJTL tem of the future. ulation and modeling to train higher level appeared to approach the require- Beyond UJTL, precise tasks must joint organizations, nothing beats the real ments-based training from the wrong drive the joint training program. But thing. It is still productive to shake out an perspective, and its terminology was the program must also reflect warfight- entire joint organization when the mission and force readiness levels warrant, even at generic and lacked current joint usage. ing priorities to maximize readiness in considerable cost. Also, there was not enough input from a period of resource reductions. Among ■ Avoiding interference in service warfighting CINCs and too much work these goals are: training. The services must stay proficient in had been contracted; thus, the docu- ■ Matching specific tasks to specific au- required tasks as a foundation for joint ment was out of touch with tech- diences. While multi-echeloned training is training and operations. Likewise, service niques. Acceptance of the first UJTL possible, the joint community no longer training must not be used as an excuse for version was also hampered by a lack of has resources to conduct it worldwide. not conducting joint training. A balance understanding of the process and po- Training events must aim at a particular must be struck since both are essential. tential uses. By the time most officers level of joint training and at the units or ■ Orienting only on essential tasks. In a began to read about its operational staffs which must execute the missions that resource-constrained environment we can- not train to tasks that we do not intend to tasks in section II, they had already the training supports. This is the core of the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) training perform in contingencies and combat. Exer- lost confidence in the document. program. cises and other training events that do not

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directly contribute to readiness require- technology may appear expensive, its ACOM role, practice and limits on re- ments must be deleted from joint training. use over the long term is much more sources outside CONUS validate the The prioritization of exercises and training economical and precise than deploy- need for JFCs to achieve joint integra- must begin with a JMETL for supported ing large numbers of soldiers, sailors, tion in the United States before their commanders. JFCs must weed out adven- airmen, and marines to act out “big forces deploy. The Chairman has made ture training and roll all resources into mis- blue arrows.” JMETL development a priority, and sion-required training. Once essential tasks are identified this focus has been strongly supported and training is redesigned for the ap- by the services and CINCs. The design Completing the Process and develop- The first step toward solving this joint training in the next century will generate ment of the re- problem has been the development of quired tools to militarily precise joint tasks that bridge a process for standardizing essential tasks begin require- the full spectrum of warfighting from ments-based strategic through tactical levels. This propriate audiences, the final step is to training is complete. All that remains started with a simple mission analysis develop supporting conditions and is to educate personnel at all levels on of tasks identified in the JSCP for each standards to measure and standardize the benefits of the system and com- warfighting CINC. Then theater staffs training effectiveness. Conditions and plete the honing of the joint exercise applied their in-depth knowledge of standards make objective feedback pos- program. the culture, history, and geography of sible, and that completes the process Joint training in the next century their areas of operations to identify es- by returning results and lessons will be requirements-based. This will sential capabilities. Many essential learned into the design stage of train- generate a process for defining and tasks are not joint, and many joint ing development that strengthens standardizing essential tasks so that techniques and procedures will not be weak areas and incorporates capabili- limited resources are allocated based essential to a specific geographical area. ties into future employment planning. on need. Perceived trends will eventu- Since JSCP taskings have been ally provide commanders with a basic used to identify strategic tasks at the- Challenges Overcome tool to assess joint readiness. In turn, ater level, operations plans (OPLANs) The volume of possible joint tasks JMETs will impact on training, focus- can be used to define area of responsi- makes the development of JMETs a ing efforts more on tasks and forces re- bility (AOR)-specific operational and challenge, although the scope of con- quiring specific training emphasis. even tactical tasks required by a CINC’s currence needed to fully implement This will have a positive effect on bat- theater strategy. Each theater has its the program was expected to be the tle space proficiency of joint forces. own force requirements and opera- greatest obstacle. Not only did the dif- JMET development is vital to im- tional tasks reflected in OPLANs. Such ferent theater CINCs have to reach proving joint training and readiness plans are continually updated to reflect consensus on what tasks are truly and should be widely discussed. Train- methods required to obtain a CINC’s joint, but the services had to agree to ing funds are becoming the sole discre- objectives. In most cases specific essen- train these joint tasks in addition to tionary resource. Their efficient use tial tasks can be identified. These tasks their own service METL. Both chal- will be critical to the readiness of can become JMETs for forces assigned lenges have been met and the Navy forces whose proficiency will be essen- in the individual OPLANs. and the Air Force have even started to tial to victory in the battle space. The UJTL can then serve as the menu design service METLs to support the Armed Forces need a means of assess- to form subordinate force JMETLs for joint system. ing joint proficiency and plan training. designated joint force commanders. Almost as challenging was bridg- Fully developed JMETLs, with associ- The list of JMETs for an AOR should re- ing the language barrier that plagues ated conditions and standards as dis- flect plans that are critical to a regional many joint projects. Even if various cussed here, are the right tool and the strategy and reference joint tactics, staffs agree on what is fundamentally best path today for joint training. JFQ techniques, and procedures that have joint and essential, producing plain proven successful. language descriptors at all levels to ac- NOTES Even with sound JMETs, most count for service culture, capabilities, 1 See FM 25-100, Training the Force, and joint trainers must significantly reori- and techniques while reflecting joint FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training. ent their instruction to maximize its doctrine will be an awesome task. 2 In the Army system the standard for a effect on a specific audience. This Finally, the support of the Chair- task is frequently a specific goal (such as the means that command post or com- man and the joint force integrator mis- time required to complete a road march), puter assisted exercises are the best sion of ACOM have greatly facilitated whereas under the joint system the stan- way to train for strategic and opera- institutionalizing JMETL among the- dard may be described in terms of a mea- tional tasks. Field training exercises are ater staffs and service components. Al- sure of mission accomplishment. 3 good vehicles for accomplishing cer- though some were skeptical of the The Army is still refining the process of tain tasks, but they are wasteful if used conditions and standards. See H. Hugh to practice strategic or operational Shelton and Steven C. Sifers, “Standardized Training Assessment,” Military Review, vol. planning tasks. Though computer 74, no. 10 (October 1994), p. 5.

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Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Mili- tary Operations Other Than War.1 The Beyond the Range of model consists of two parts, war and military operations other than war. The model indicates that war is princi- pally combat but also may include noncombat operations.2 It presents Military MOOTW as principally noncombat but indicates that it may be combat. What is the difference between combat MOOTW and combat as a part of war? Moreover, what is the difference be- tween noncombat war and noncombat Operations MOOTW? Finally, is it possible to pro- nounce the acronym MOOTW? By ANN E. STORY and ARYEA GOTTLIEB Adding to this confusion is the fact that some prefer to use the acronym OOTW. War is clearly combat, but part of the ambiguity with the current model octrine must be clear and logical. However, is that although the term war is dis- the current joint doctrine model, known as cussed in joint doctrine, it is not de- fined. This makes it difficult to under- the range of military operations, is confusing stand the other than war portion of the and ambiguous and should be replaced. It range of military operations, especially D since both war and MOOTW may be is time to move beyond the range of military opera- combat or noncombat according to tions in search of a model that properly portrays the the model. For the uninitiated, military Armed Forces as the military instrument of national power. Toward that end, a MOOTW fails to provide the fundamental new model entitled the military opera- principles required in joint doctrine tional framework is proposed here. It sig- nifies a return to basics in combat and operations other than war may imply noncombat operations, as well as the continuing that personnel are not put in harm’s preparation needed for both. way in these operations. But one needs only to remember the October 1993 tragedy in Somalia to understand that Adopting a new model is the next quickly changed into MOOTW. This MOOTW and casualties are not mutu- step in an evolutionary doctrine devel- leads to an examination of the lack of ally exclusive; indeed, violence occurs opment process that will ensure our a framework, which is a flaw in joint in many of these operations. forces can respond to any challenge. doctrine, and how one service has ad- The reason for the confusion The proposed model may not be the dressed the flaw with a concept of should be apparent. MOOTW is an ultimate solution, but it is a necessary MOOTW groupings. Finally, the pro- ambiguous concept that fails to pro- move in the right direction. Before pre- posed model will be explained and the vide the fundamental principles re- senting this model, a review of the joint doctrine hierarchy addressed. quired in joint doctrine and is thus range of military operations, concen- flawed. The model known as the range trating on the concept of military op- The Range of Military of military operations is therefore also erations other than war (MOOTW is Operations faulty. appropriate). In addition, it is neces- The term the range of military oper- sary to explain how the concept of low ations was first introduced in Joint Pub Low Intensity Conflict intensity conflict (LIC) evolved into 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and in The process of writing Joint Pub military operations short of war and 3-07 began in the late 1980s at the Army-Air Force Center for Low Inten- Lieutenant Colonel Ann E. Story, USAF, is currently assigned sity Conflict (CLIC) at Langley Air to the Air Force Doctrine Center and Major Aryea Gottlieb, Force Base, Virginia. In 1991 the Joint USAF, serves with the 16th Special Operations Wing. Doctrine Center (now the Joint

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Marine during sweep for guns in Somalia. Combat Camera Imagery (PerryCombat Camera Imagery Heimer)

Warfighting Center) conducted the tended to imply Cold War or coun- was within its charter, which makes two-phased evaluation of a test version terinsurgency. Another reason was that CLIC the focal point for Army and Air of Joint Pub 3-07 to validate its con- the lengthy definition of LIC4 revolved Force matters relating to military opera- tents. One phase was a worldwide sur- around protracted struggles, generally tions in low intensity conflict. The revi- vey and the other was JCS Exercise Ba- in the Third World, but failed to say sion reoriented the pub from Cold War likatan held in the Philippines. While what the United States would do in re- to post-Cold War issues such as forward both phases validated the document, sponse. Finally, while in common use, presence, crisis response, and the emer- the exercise made it clear that its title, the term was absent from the language gence of ethnic rivalries. Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low In- of other agencies, notably the Depart- Even with a revised focus, the tensity Conflict, was misleading. Ac- ment of State. This presents a stum- post-Cold War version of Joint Pub cording to the exercise report, that was bling block in the 1990s, the decade of 3-07 was similar in its format to the because it did “not accurately describe interagency cooperation. Cold War version. Both used opera- the contents of the publication and... tional categories to frame the concept [was] potentially offensive to host na- Intermediate Step and focus attention, but there are sig- tions.”3 As the originator of Joint Pub 3-07, nificant differences. First, the category Not only was the term LIC repug- CLIC proposed a new term, military op- of peacekeeping operations was redesig- nant to other nations (challenging erations short of war, to subsume LIC. nated peace support operations to coin- their national survival is anything but They then revised the publication. This cide with the British term, and ensuing low intensity), but it started to lose draft versions shortened it to peace op- favor for other reasons. One was that it erations. This change to peace (support)

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categories or structure) is flawed, but Figure 1. Military Operations Other Than War that does not mean the explanation of any of the various types of MOOTW is Support and Assistance Nonviolent Forceful necessarily defective; but rather it is Domestic Support Operations Arms Control Enforcement of Sanctions the concept of MOOTW that is in error. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Show of Force Enforcing Exclusion Zones An alphabetical list of 16 items is just that. It neither associates an operation Nation Assistance* Protection of Shipping with a common purpose (such as com- Support to Insurgency* Strikes and Raids bat or noncombat) nor focuses on the appropriate military role. For example, Combatting Terrorism there is a vital difference between air- power for a show of force and for en- Counterdrug Operations forcing an exclusion zone. In other Ensuring Freedom of Navigation words, one cannot easily grasp the am- biguous MOOTW concept that was re- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations cently approved as joint doctrine. *Note: The United States reserves the right to Peace Operations use force during support to counterinsurgency MOOTW Groupings (part of nation assistance) and during support Recovery Operations to insurgency when it is in its interest to do so. A framework is needed to clarify how the military instrument is used in non-war situations. An example con- sistent with current joint doctrine is found in the second draft of Air Force operations led to discussion of its mili- counterdrug operations, domestic sup- Doctrine Document 3, Military Opera- tary components, peacekeeping and port operations, enforcement of sanc- tions Other Than War.8 This framework peace enforcement. Second, DOD sup- tions, enforcing exclusion zones, en- consists of three MOOTW groupings— port to counterdrug operations became suring freedom of navigation, support and assistance, nonviolent, a separate operational category rather humanitarian assistance, nation assis- and forceful—as shown in figure 1. than remaining buried under contin- tance, noncombatant evacuation oper- The intent of an operation, not the gency operations. Third and perhaps ations, peace operations, protection of possible level of force, is the character- most notable, the term LIC was re- shipping, recovery operations, show of istic that places it within a group. The placed by the more encompassing mili- force, strikes and raids, and support to rationale behind the proposed tary operations short of war based on the insurgency. MOOTW groups, in addition to pro- November 1991 version of Joint Pub 1, The introduction to Joint Pub 3-07 viding the framework that was alluded Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces.5 states that some military operations to earlier, is to make it easier to under- The new term was quickly chal- other than war involve the use or stand the role of the Armed Forces lenged because it inadvertently im- (particularly airpower plied that postwar actions (such as Pro- and spacepower) in vide Comfort) were excluded. Also, the in any military operation self-defense non-war operations. term short of war suggested that disas- may be necessary and there could Of the various types of ter responses (such as domestic MOOTW, 10 clearly fit cleanups after hurricanes) were not in- be casualties into one of the groups; cluded. Both claims were valid, so mili- the remaining six tary operations short of war was changed overlap between the to military operations other than war. threat of force while some do not. The second and third, depending on the Moreover, a definition was proposed terms combat MOOTW and noncombat situation. for the new term that stated not only MOOTW are also used in subsequent The intent of the first group, as its what it is but what it is not.6 paragraphs. However, neither the struc- name implies, is for the military to ture nor substance is developed further. provide support and assistance. This The Next Step In a chapter detailing different types of does not necessarily mean the environ- A later version had a condensed MOOTW, there is no attempt to indi- ment in which the operation is con- MOOTW definition7 and one visible cate which side of the structure (force ducted is sterile or calm; certain risks difference that at first glance appeared or no force) applies to given operations. may be unavoidable. As in any military cosmetic, the elimination of opera- It is apparent that the MOOTW operation, appropriate self-defense ac- tional categories that had served as a concept (a list of operations without tions may be necessary, and there framework. Joint Pub 3-07 contained could be casualties. One example of 16 representative types of MOOTW: domestic support operations was the arms control, combatting terrorism, multiservice response to the April 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City.

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noncombatant evacuation operation Air Force personnel in may be unopposed in one situation Oklahoma City. and opposed in another. Overlap can also occur if the situation deteriorates to require force beyond self-defense. For instance, a peacekeeping operation (which is a component of peace opera- tions) is assumed to be nonviolent. If the negotiated truce that established the operation is violated by any of the parties to the conflict, or if any party withdraws its consent for the opera- tion, there may be an abrupt transition to peace enforcement (also a compo- nent of peace operations). The concept of MOOTW group- ings is a step in the right direction, but may not be the ultimate solution. The groups deliberately stop short of taking the next step because the ser-

Air National Guard (MarkAir National Guard A. Moore) vice doctrine writer wanted to main- tain consistency with approved joint EF–111 over Italy doctrine. The next step is to acknowl- during Deny Flight. edge that the MOOTW concept, for the reasons already cited, is flawed. Therefore, by extension the range of military operations is also flawed. The corrective action lies not in attempt- ing to refine the MOOTW concept, but in discarding it and moving be- yond the range of military operations. The Military Operational Framework The hour has come to take that next step. However, this is not the first time steps were taken to change joint doctrine. The authors of the current Joint Pub 3-0 made a bold move when U.S. Air Force (U.S. Air Force R. Hamilton) Tana they replaced the operational contin- uum (peacetime competition, conflict, and war) with the range of military op- The second group includes opera- The third group includes opera- erations. The current joint doctrine tions in which the intent is to be non- tions where the intent is clearly to be model divides military operations into violent. As with the first, this does not forceful. This is military power in the war and MOOTW without providing mean the environment is sterile or classic sense, bombs and bullets on tar- for any overlap. In addition, while the calm. Personnel should always be pre- get against an enemy. In recent years, accompanying text in Joint Pub 3-07 pared to take appropriate defense mea- our forces have participated in all four explains that operations may occur si- sures for themselves, and commanders types. One example is Operation multaneously, this point is not clearly must always be prepared to defend Southern Watch, initiated in 1992 to illustrated in the model due to its their units. Again, casualties may enforce an exclusion zone prohibiting “boxlike” appearance. Once an opera- occur. While the intent of operations Iraqi air operations in the established tion is “put into a box,” it should not in this group is to be nonviolent, a no-fly zone. be “confined” to the box as is the case strong military presence is appropriate. Completing the figure are the six with the current model. Desert Shield is a classic case of a show operations that do not always fit While the current model includes of force that was active in nature but neatly into any one group (shown in the terms combat and noncombat, they had a nonviolent intent. the lower right corner of figure 1). De- are not the basis for the range of mili- pending on the situation, they may be tary operations; war and MOOTW are nonviolent or forceful. For example, a

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the two components. It is time for a but still confuse the two. For example, advice, training, and logistics are pro- model that accurately portrays the mil- Operation El Dorado Canyon (against vided though forces do not normally itary instrument of national power in a Libya in April 1986) is termed a strike actively engage in insurgencies.) In framework that focuses on both com- or a raid in Joint Pub 3-0. For clarity, noncombat operations the military is bat and noncombat operations. This these terms should be combined. An used in so-called nontypical or nontra- model must allow for overlap, a fluid operation to restore order is what is now ditional military roles. transition from one operation to an- known as a peace enforcement operation Operations in the intersecting other, and numerous simultaneous op- (part of peace operations). Since peace area are actions that, depending on the erations at any given time. Also, it enforcement is a misnomer the new situation, may or may not involve must include a solid foundation of title focuses on intent and places it in combat. Therefore, personnel must be continuing preparation. Our proposed the context of a volatile and uncertain ready to conduct combat operations model (the military operational frame- situation that is not peaceful. quickly. If combat is unavoidable, U.S. work) is depicted in figure 2 using a The right side of the noncombat forces will have both the right equip- variation on a Venn diagram. operations portion of figure 2 consists ment and appropriate mindset. Exclu- The military operational frame- of actions that are clearly not in- sion zone operations consist of what is work consists of intersecting areas tended to involve combat. But some known as enforcing exclusion zones (pro- (combat operations and noncombat risks are unavoidable and casualties hibiting specified activities in given operations) supported by a solid foun- may occur. Personnel should be pre- geographic areas) and enforcement of dation of preparation. Broken lines pared to take appropriate self-defense sanctions (stopping movement of desig- surrounding the overlapping area measures, and commanders should be nated items into or out of given areas). (shown in green below) allow for a prepared to defend their units. Truce- The operations are similar, and like fluid transition from one operation to keeping replaces what is known as strikes and raids are often confused. another and delimit the area in which peacekeeping, another misnomer. There For clarity, they too should be com- an operation may be combat or non- is no peace to keep; instead a negoti- bined. Freedom of navigation opera- combat. They also allow for simultane- ated truce between the parties to a tions include not only this type of op- ous operations. conflict is maintained. This is not ap- eration as described in Joint Pub 3-07, The left side of the operations parent when the misnomer is used— but also what is known as protection of portion consists of actions that involve redesignating the operation as truce- shipping. Again, they are similar and combat. Retaliatory actions (formerly keeping clarifies its real objective and should be combined. strikes and raids) are punitive measures emphasizes its unpeaceful atmosphere. As noted, underlying each opera- to destroy an objective for political or The intent of support and assistance op- tion is a solid foundation of education, military purposes. The reason for a erations, as the term suggests, is the training, exercises, modeling, and sim- new title is that current definitions are provision of military support and as- ulations. They are essential in prepar- indistinguishable and are sometimes sistance for domestic and interna- ing to conduct operations anywhere in used interchangeably. Doctrine devel- tional purposes. (Support to insur- the military operational framework at opers carefully vet definitions in classi- gency is included since military any time. Moreover, the foundation fying an operation as a strike or a raid enables mental and physical prepara- tion to meet future operations, analyze

Figure 2. The Military Operational Framework

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Figure 3. Existing Joint Doctrine Hierarchy Figure 4. Proposed Joint Doctrine Hierarchy

Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Joint Pub 3-0.1 JTTP for Operations to Restore Order Than War Joint Pub 3-0.2 JTTP for Antiterrorism Joint Pub 3-07.1 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense Joint Pub 3-0.3 JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Joint Pub 3-07.2 JTTP for Antiterrorism Operations Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations Joint Pub 3-0.4 JTTP for Truce-Keeping Joint Pub 3-07.4 JTTP for Counterdrug Operations Joint Pub 3-0.5 JTTP for Domestic Support Operations Joint Pub 3-07.5 JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Joint Pub 3-0.6 JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations Joint Pub 3-0.7 JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense (part of Joint Pub 3-07.6 JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance nation assistance) Joint Pub 3-07.7 JTTP for Domestic Support Operations Joint Pub 3-0.8 JTTP for Support to Counterdrug Operations

current operations, and learn lessons semiannual meetings of the Joint Doc- bold new step by moving beyond the from recent operations and apply trine Working Party. Additional JTTPs range of military operations and into them in the future. would be numbered 3-0.9 and so forth. the military operational framework. JFQ When Joint Pub 3-0 undergoes as- Joint Doctrine Hierarchy sessment the range of military opera- NOTES The proposed model to move be- tions as well as the MOOTW concept 1 Since Joint Pub 3-07 has been recently yond the range of military operations should be rescinded. A revision should approved but not distributed, this article into the operational framework im- focus on a model of combat operations has been based on the final coordination pacts on the hierarchy of joint pubs and noncombat operations with a copy (December 22, 1994). but not as significantly as might be ex- solid foundation on preparation. After 2 The reformatted Joint Pub 3-0 (Febru- pected. It is likely that the same num- the revision, the subordinate JTTPs can ary 1, 1995) drops the noncombat portion ber of publications will be needed, but also be revised as needed and then of war from the model, although the with a revised focus. Currently, there renumbered during their assessments. MOOTW portion remains confusing and are two pertinent sources of doctrine— The end of the Cold War brought ambiguous. 3 Letter, Joint Staff (J-7), 00965A–92, sub- Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-07—as well as new challenges which require that ject: “Final Evaluation Report of Joint Test seven volumes of supporting joint tac- joint doctrine clearly and logically ex- Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in tics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) plains how the military instrument of Low Intensity Conflict,” June 3, 1992. which are listed in figure 3.9 The two national power is used. The model dis- 4 See Joint Pub 3-07 [test], October 1990, doctrine pubs should be consolidated cussed herein may not be the solution, p. GL–6. into a new version of Joint Pub 3-0 but it is a step in the right direction. It 5 The January 10, 1995 version uses the which retains the title of Doctrine for begins the quest for a new model to re- term military operations other than war rather Joint Operations. It need not be lengthy, place the range of military operations than military operations short of war. 6 but it is important to put all doctrine and the ambiguity of the MOOTW See Joint Pub 3-07 [draft final pub], in one document to avoid duplication concept. Lest it go unsaid, the recent April 10, 1993, p. GL–13. 7 Joint Pub 3-07 [final coordination], and faulty perceptions of combat and approval of the long-overdue Joint Pub December 22, 1994, pp. GL–3, GL–4. noncombat operations. 3-07 is commendable. Though the 8 The draft is dated April 3, 1995. At least eight JTTPs are necessary MOOTW concept is flawed, Joint Pub 9 Now that Joint Pub 3-07 is approved, which will call for a new numbering 3-07 was sorely needed. The assessment the Joint Staff has issued a program direc- system (some will also require new ti- process and the subsequent revision of tive to change Joint Pub 3-07.3 to JTTP for tles). Since they will be subordinate to Joint Pub 3-0 can correct this flaw. Peace Operations, thereby including peace Joint Pub 3-0, these JTTPs should be This is not a call for immediate enforcement. numbered 3-0.1 through 3-0.8 (see fig- changes in joint doctrine. Rather, it is ure 4). This does not include JTTPs simply the search for a model that which may be required (such as exclu- properly represents the Armed Forces sion zone operations). Future JTTPs as the military instrument of national must be formally proposed and ap- power. Doctrine, particularly joint doc- proved for subsequent development at trine, must focus on the fundamental principles of combat operations as well as noncombat operations to support national interests. It is time to take a

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Mogadishu.

Lessons Unlearned: Navy ( Mitchell) Terry U.S. Somalia and Joint Doctrine

By C.KENNETH ALLARD forces were beset by deficiencies in command, namely, the United Nations, joint operations which persist ten years U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols and U.S. Special Operations Command. s the Armed Forces prepare Act.1 The larger lesson of the book on As arduous as it was for CENTCOM to for new peacekeeping as- which this article is based, Somalia Op- exercise operational control over vari- signments, the lessons erations: Lessons Learned, is that we ous coequal units in a theater that was Alearned from operations in must forge closer links among three 9,000 miles from headquarters, the Somalia continue to have cutting-edge processes: the way we plan operations, arrangements reflected the need to relevance. Some of those lessons were the way we draw lessons from those keep U.S. forces far removed from the clearly learned and applied in Haiti, operations, and the way we apply the reality or appearance of direct U.N. while others dominate planning for lessons in formulating joint doctrine. command. They also confirmed the rel- any Bosnian deployment. These spe- evance of standing doctrine and a les- cific insights are important for current Old Lessons, New Realities son that should be added to Murphy’s and future operations, but our experi- Unified command is one of the laws of armed combat: “If it takes more ence in Somalia also highlighted the oldest problems in joint operations, but than ten seconds to explain the com- enduring problem of effectively inte- there is widespread agreement that the mand arrangements, they probably grating joint operations. Despite the concepts of unity, simplicity, and oper- won’t work.” difficulties of working with the United ational control underpin any com- Another chronic problem was Nations and coalition partners in a mand structure. However, during U.N. joint task force (JTF) organization. new, demanding class of missions, U.S. Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II Even though JTFs have represented a there were three de facto chains of balance between continuity of com- mand and the integration of addi- tional capabilities for more than fifty Colonel C. Kenneth Allard, USA, is a senior fellow in the years, striking that balance in Somalia Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National was a surprisingly random process. The Defense University and author of Command, Control and humanitarian assistance survey team the Common Defense. sent to coordinate the initial airlift had

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barely arrived before being redesig- its own logistical tail and competed for seas, inadequate port intelligence, and nated as the JTF for complex and dan- lane space on a narrow information delayed deployment of transportation gerous operations that lasted six highway—primarily the commercial specialists, three Army pre-positioned months. Built around the nucleus of a INMARSAT satellite at a cost of six dol- ships spent weeks shuttling between Marine headquarters, the JTF that con- lars per minute. East African ports. Two eventually re- trolled United Task Force (UNITAF) Another constant in joint opera- turned to Diego Garcia without un- gave way after a difficult transition to tions is the planning process, espe- loading their cargoes, a disturbing the hastily formed UNOSOM II staff. cially as it influences force deployment shortcoming in an environment which The officers forming this staff had and lift. While the joint operations was austere but not the scene of com- been individually recruited from Army planning and execution system bat operations. units worldwide and only a third of (JOPES) forms the basis of that process, While Somalia certainly illustrated them had arrived in-country by the moving and sustaining the forces sent the persistence of old problems, it also time their mission was launched. to Somalia revived the friction be- demonstrated the continuing impor- When a JTF was added to UNOSOM II tween the discipline needed to run the tance of mission analysis in adapting in the wake of the firefight in which system and the flexibility demanded existing capabilities to new circum- by warfighters. A great effort was stances. Several of those innovations communications is the critical required to reconcile bookkeeping may serve as precedents for the future: methods for tracking Army units Rules of engagement. Though com- link in operations with the airlift deployment data mon to every operation, ROE are espe- to move them. Even so, tele- cially important if the objective is to 18 Americans died, the 10th Mountain phone calls, faxes, and repeated visual limit the level of violence. Somalia had Division provided the nucleus with checks were necessary to insure that the virtue of keeping ROE simple, di- less than two weeks from initial notifi- the “ramp reality” agreed with airlift rect, and unclassified so that they were cation to in-country hand-off and few requirements in the automated data as well understood by the local people organic capabilities for conducting base. Similar problems afflicted sealift. as by the peacekeepers. joint or multinational operations. Through a sad combination of rough These difficulties were overcome through dedication, hard work, and professionalism of those sent to do a tough job. But the worrisome fact is NOW IN ITS SECOND PRINTING that, during the period of UNOSOM II alone, U.S. forces also engaged in a dozen other major operations that re- quired forming JTFs—from enforcing a Somalia Operations: no-fly zone over Iraq to providing flood relief at home in the Midwest. Lessons Learned Communications is the critical by Kenneth Allard link in operations. While no Grenada- style interoperability fiascoes arose in Somalia, there were some similarities. . . . there should be no mistaking the For example, the same series of Army fact that the greatest obstacles to unity and Marine tactical radios had compat- of command during UNOSOM II were ibility problems because of differing modernization and upgrade cycles. For imposed by the United States on itself. the few weeks Navy ships were off- Especially at the end of the operation, shore, the Army hospital in Mogadishu these command arrangements had could not talk to them nor were Army effectively created a condition that medical evacuation helicopter pilots cleared to land on them. Another allowed no one to set clear, problem was the stovepiping of differ- unambiguous priorities.... ent data systems. At the height of American involvement in a country that lacked even a functioning tele- phone system, at least ten different Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995. data systems were in use. Most were 113 pp. $4.25 built on single service requirements [ISBN 0–16–045577–4] but handled a host of common func- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents tions: intelligence, personnel, logistics, and even finance. Each system brought [GPO stock no. 008–020–01352–8]

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MEDCAP in Somalia. U.S. Air Force (James Mossman)Air Force U.S. Air Force (James Mossman)Air Force U.S.

Disarmament. During UNITAF, best indicate mission success or failure. For that reason and also to look at peacekeepers confiscated only weapons Many indicators in peace operations the full scope of the operation, the So- seen as a threat to the force, for exam- will differ from those in more conven- malia archive was reduced to a hard- ple, crew-served weapons and arms tional scenarios. But all must answer copy printout comprising some 200 caches. Disarming Somali clans, how- two critical questions: What is the mis- separate reports totalling nearly 400 ever, was a nation-building objective of sion and how will we know when we pages. The individual reports became UNOSOM II. The ensuing hostilities have accomplished it? more revealing as the relationships suggest that employing forces to dis- among them were tracked across all arm a populace is to commit those JULLS But Not Gems three phases of the Somalia operation: forces to a de facto combat mission as The book, Somalia Operations: the early airlift and humanitarian assis- active belligerents. Lessons Learned, was principally based tance, the U.S.-led coalition of UNITAF, Civil-Military Operations Center. Es- on those operational reports compiled and the de facto combat of UNOSOM tablished early in UNITAF, this center through the joint universal lessons II that took place under U.N. control. was one of the most significant inno- learned system (JULLS). This system Although this unusual approach vations of the operation. An out- has been a fixture since the mid-1980s to the JULLS system of micro-analysis growth of the standard military ap- when it was created in response to re- yielded some important macro-level proach to the liaison function, it peated General Accounting Office criti- insights, the Somalia archive also high- became an invaluable way of coordi- cism of the lack of an automated sys- lighted some fundamental problems in nating information and activities be- tem to evaluate joint training the way we collect and analyze our op- tween the JTF, multinational contin- exercises. Administered by the Joint erational lessons: gents, and 49 different international Staff (J-7), JULLS reports are solicited ■ The JULLS system is built around in- agencies operating in Somalia. from individual participants in joint dividual reports that are primarily used to Mission Creep. Although much has operations as well as from major head- identify and solve specific problems. Be- been written on mission creep in So- quarters and service components. Re- cause it is difficult to determine the linkage malia, it is clear that the major ports are reviewed by unified com- of these problems to larger issues solely changes in mission and direction came mands as well as the Joint Staff, through keyword searches, JULLS reports from the national command authori- usually to document remedial actions. can be a “science of single events” unless ties. The object lesson for the future is Because it is a combination of service they are related to other evidence (as actu- ally occurred during this project). that military leaders have a critical re- and joint reports linked by keywords, ■ Individual JULLS reports range from sponsibility to select milestones that JULLS has a well-deserved reputation the trivial to the profound; but because as a user-unfriendly system. they lack specific context information or other corroborating data, it is often hard to

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judge their validity. Worse, normal person- joint doctrine is validated. Such link- about what now passes for joint doc- nel turbulence and lengthy processing age is essential to subjecting new ideas trine is that it was compiled by dili- times often make it impossible to track on joint warfare to operational testing gently polling the usual sources—the down those who originally submitted them. and rigorous analysis. The process sug- services and other affected parties. That ■ There is always tension between the gested here is a more systematic practice would not pose a dilemma if candor needed for improvement and the approach to field testing ideas on joint- the results were simply taken as tenta- perceived or actual potential for embarrass- ment caused by putting oneself on report. ness through exercises, training, readi- tive ideas about what works and then There is similar tension between the need ness, and combat itself (see figure 1). subjected to field testing. But as matters Refining ideas through the stand, the only consistent tests are the the solution is to link what we say to operation of organized feed- least common denominators: brokered back loops is what will yield solutions and bureaucratic interests. what we actually do a body of joint doctrine val- This military equivalent of politi- idated by systematic opera- cal correctness contrasts sharply with tional testing. Although it is uncertain the more forthright approach the for thoughtful review of JULLS reports as if this process might lead to an overar- Army adopted a decade ago, with com- they work their way through the system ching joint paradigm as a complement pulsory after action reviews at every and the temptation to eliminate or water down those which show commands or ser- to the American way of war, develop- level of training and operations plan- vices in an favorable light. Reports on the ing an integrated body of doctrine vali- ning. While neither perfect nor pain- de facto combat phase of UNOSOM II, for dated by field experience is a basic goal less, the process promoted candid self- instance, were delayed for months in the in itself.2 improvement that eventually was case of one command as such tensions were Current practice could not be far- imbedded in service culture. It also presumably thrashed out. ther from this ideal. There are 103 titles tied operations planning to lessons These problems suggest that the in the hierarchy of joint pubs, a stag- learned in a period of vigorous doctri- JULLS system is a throwback to an era gering number considering that com- nal experimentation—much of it aided in joint operations when fault finding piling joint doctrine did not really by computer simulation and sophisti- was studiously avoided to preserve in- begin until after Goldwater-Nichols. cated technology. That precedent un- terservice comity. Because of institu- Eye-numbing page counts further com- derlines what the services do best: pro- tional reluctance to trace operational pound the problem: a new publication vide laboratories to develop the basic effects back to first causes, the system on noncombatant evacuation proce- elements of combat power. Joint insti- acts as an endlessly repetitive lessons dures is more than 200 pages. While no tutions must now provide an essential unlearned exercise that usually resolves human could possibly read such a vast counterpoint by searching for new only marginal issues. As one jaded vet- array, few would ever want to, since the ways to combine those elements—with eran put it: “I could take any operation writing is notoriously verbose and next-generation simulations playing we’re starting next week and write the stilted. Yet the most precarious aspect the role in larger combinations that first 30 JULLS today.” they now exercise in training individ- ual warriors. As one observer recently Doctrinal Changes and Constants The Evolution of Joint Doctrine and Strategy A system that concentrates on after-the-fact fixes that never seem to recur in just the same way is singularly ineffective in dealing with a constantly Single Events Combined Arms Synergy at changing international environment. Individualized Actions Global or Regional Levels The volatility of this environment cre- ates incentives for the Armed Forces to lessons learned master the most persistent obstacles to in combat the integration of joint capabilities. TASK: Most effective joint operations, How else do we deal with chaos and use of land, sea, and ideas about validated joint joint strategic what works exercises, and doctrine paradigm adaptive adversaries than by eliminat- aerospace power training ing those difficulties which we can and should control? lessons learned in training The solution is to link what we Levels of combined synergy say to what we actually do. Specifi- • National Security Strategy • National Military Strategy cally, it means a closer alignment of • Combined/Coalition • Joint functions that often proceed indepen- • Service dently: the way joint operations are • Individual Branch/Arm planned and evaluated, and the way Source: C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 261.

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Allard

noted, “It is hypothetical wars, not real leap of faith to conceive of future enemy. As crises from Somalia to Bosnia al- ones, that will shape doctrine in the cyber-systems serving as trusted associ- ready indicate, adversaries can offset mili- years to come.”3 ates to those hard-pressed humans tary inferiority with innovative tactics that All the more reason, then, to use who function as operations planners. take advantage of errors on our part. ■ the analytical rigor of modelling and The person in this future loop, how- Somalia reveals that many institu- tional mistakes are corrected (when the chips ever, would be able to draw on really are down) only through extraordinary muddling through is no longer an his own professional experience efforts by junior officers, NCOs, and most of as well as artificial intelligence to acceptable alternative all by individual soldiers, sailors, marines, reconcile unique mission re- and airmen. Our senior leaders, however, quirements with joint doctrinal have a special obligation to limit the need simulation to tackle head on the dis- principles and even the most recent for such heroic efforts and sacrifices. turbing tendency in joint operations to operational insights. In that way, cur- Senator Strom Thurmond recently keep making the same mistakes. rent operations could be linked far defined stupidity as doing the same Among other things, this means not more effectively to our best ideas about thing over and over while expecting putting the cart before the horse. what works and what does not. different results. We should by now re- Rather than being inflated with addi- But future possibilities and persis- alize the basis of the historical problem tional volumes of indigestible prose, tent problems evoke a familiar argu- in joint doctrine as well as the futility the current collection of joint doctrine ment: this is just the normal cost of of expecting different results from the needs to be screened for those funda- doing business and is more than offset same muddled processes. Those with mental organizing principles which by a genius for muddling through, es- responsibility for the further develop- ought to guide the integrated employ- pecially when the chips are down. But ment of this uniquely American joint ment of joint combat power, including like many familiar arguments, this one culture might well consider what must criteria to decide when operations has outlived its usefulness. There are be done to set these things right. JFQ should be joint and when they can be four related reasons why muddling handled by a single service. Those con- through is no longer an acceptable al- NOTES cepts should be tried and tested ternative: 1 through joint exercises conceived with This article draws on the author’s ■ The international security environ- recently published book entitled Somalia such specific purposes in mind. A ment will be marked by continuous discon- Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington: JULLS process truly worthy of the tinuities for the foreseeable future. It is a National Defense University Press, 1995). name could play a vital role in sup- basic requirement that forces operating in 2 C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, porting this process, much as Army this environment not only limit their vul- and the Common Defense (New Haven: Yale after-action reviews contributed to the nerabilities but also act more quickly and University Press, 1990), pp. 260–62. refinement of AirLand Battle doctrine. effectively than an adversary. In a chaotic A new body of field-tested joint doc- environment, we must first eliminate self- induced disorder. trine would also validate the artificial ■ One of the most important environ- dividing lines in the current hierarchy mental discontinuities is technology. of joint doctrine by distinguishing Whether change is seen as an ongoing mili- bedrock principles from the mass of tary-technical revolution, a future revolu- tactics, techniques, and procedures tion in military affairs, or a much larger rev- that are part of the operational infra- olution in the security arena, it will structure but are far more transient. profoundly affect the integration of joint That distinction alone would be a capabilities. Given the pace and scope of worthwhile contribution to educating this revolution, failing to test assumptions future joint warfighters, a well-under- about jointness is extremely dangerous. Ba- sically, high tech means tighter teamwork. stood baseline being fundamental to But often it takes a tragic mistake (such as the virtuoso improvisations that will the shoot down of the Blackhawks over be expected of them in years to come. northern Iraq in 1994) to highlight the in- adequacies of old thinking and outmoded Shaping the Future assumptions. The ultimate expression of such a ■ Because this new security environ- revised approach to joint doctrine ment presents difficulties for policymakers, might not necessarily be contained in the military is being asked to do more with another series of publications even if less. With declining force levels and bud- the writing and methodology were im- gets, there is less margin for error in what we do or how we do it. Persistent errors be- proved. The next generation of expert come vulnerabilities to be exploited by an computer systems can significantly aid joint planning, provided that we first clarify our assumptions about linking thoughts to actions. It does not take a

Autumn 1995 / JFQ 109 JFQ Tritten Pgs 10/1/96 11:57 AM Page 110

Developing Naval Doctrine ...From the Sea

U.S. Navy USS Virginia.

By JAMES J. TRITTEN frank and open discussion of doctrine By World War II there was a ma- in the Navy for years. One might con- ture, formal, and centralized system for clude that the Sampson-Schley debate developing and evaluating doctrine in ollowing their victories in the virtually banished the term doctrine the Navy, one that guided rather than Spanish-American War, Admi- from the naval lexicon, inhibiting a directed the fleet commander on how rals William T. Sampson and generation of officers from exploring to fight. While conventional wisdom FWinfield Scott Schley engaged the nature and content of doctrine. says that the Navy has never had a in a lively public debate over their re- Lieutenant Commander Dudley centralized military doctrine, the U.S. spective records at the Battle of Santi- W. Knox wrote a prize-winning essay fleet in World War II operated under a ago in July 1898. The Spanish admiral, in 1915, published in the U.S. Naval In- series of hierarchical doctrinal publica- Pascual Cervera, outmaneuvered the stitute Proceedings, that attempted to re- tions. At the top was War Instructions: North Atlantic Squadron and managed vive doctrine as an issue. While Knox , F.T.P. 143 and F.T.P. to enter the Cuban harbor at Santiago failed to bring doctrinal debate to the 143 (A), which was issued by Com- where he maintained a fleet-in-being. fore, doctrine was no longer a forbid- mander in Chief, United States Fleet, After several failed attempts, a combi- den subject. It appeared in tactical and published in 1934, then revised nation of joint actions ashore and at publications whose readership was al- and republished in 1944. The first sea lured the Spanish fleet out of the most exclusively Navy officers. It also stressed joint operations and the harbor. Cervera was defeated in the en- took root in the unwritten but ex- wartime version led off with a chapter suing battle. tremely powerful form of shared expe- on the importance of combat leader- The argument over how the battle riences derived from service at sea, ship competencies. should have been fought lasted for fleet exercises, and war college courses. Underneath that publication was years; a Presidential order was needed to Doctrinal debate resumed in ward- General Tactical Instructions, F.T.P. 142, stop the debate. The acrimonious en- rooms and classrooms rather than in issued by the Chief of Naval Opera- quiry into tactics and doctrine follow- professional journals. tions in 1934. Next in the hierarchy ing the Spanish-American War deterred was Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine, 1941, U.S.F. 10. The Pacific Fleet cre- James J. Tritten is a special academic advisor in the Joint/ ated its doctrine once the experience Combined Doctrine Division of the Naval Doctrine Command of the war had been internalized: and author of Our New National Security Strategy. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific

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Tritten

Fleet, Current Tactical Orders and Doc- Doctrine need not be written to naval forces in joint and combined op- trine U.S. Pacific Fleet, PAC-10, pub- be effective. Unwritten customary erations. The center has recently pub- lished in 1943. There were also type naval doctrine has long existed in the lished Naval Warfare, the capstone doc- doctrines and tactical orders prepared form of the commander’s intent, as trine manual for the naval service. for each class of ship. Fleet and multi- well as in the cumulative experience of As a capstone document, Naval national doctrine also existed in the admirals and commanders. There is a Warfare forms the bridge between the Atlantic Fleet where Atlantic Convoy In- long history of informal beliefs of the naval component of military strategy structions published by the Royal Navy officer corps as Navy doctrine; doctrine and naval tactics, techniques, and pro- was accepted as doctrine. Despite some may even have been more powerful in cedures (TTP). Naval Warfare addresses claims, written Navy doctrine did not that form than in the official written the employment of naval forces as well detract from operations at sea during versions which coexisted. The symme- as levels and principles of war. It forms try between doctrine the framework for subsequent develop- the Navy is contributing to multiservice, and international law is ment and refinement of naval doc- noteworthy. Informal trine. Naval Warfare is the first step to- joint, and combined doctrine doctrine is to law based ward common understanding of the on custom as formal precepts and procedures of naval the war, nor did operations suffer from doctrine is to treaties. While both warfighting. a lack of written doctrine. Recently, forms of the law are equally valid, While NDC is the first multiser- Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1, treaties are far easier to change. vice naval doctrine command, it is not Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, con- As they examined the nature of the first command to write naval doc- tinued the evolution of the Navy’s doc- change and continuity in the early trine. The doctrine division of the Ma- trinal thinking. 1990s, the Armed Forces described rine Corps Combat Development Cen- The following look at the evolving their vision of the future. The Navy’s ter has been in operation for several Navy attitude toward doctrine provides white paper entitled...From the Sea di- years, and naval contribution to joint a framework for understanding the ser- rected the naval services away from doctrine is well established. In earlier vice’s current perception of doctrine, open-ocean maritime strategy toward times, doctrine was prepared by major and examines the important differ- naval expeditionary forces for joint naval commands and by Washington ences between single-service Navy doc- and combined operations in the lit- headquarters. trine and multiservice naval doctrine. toral. It also announced the establish- An example of how the Navy is It also analyzes the lessons learned ment of the Naval Doctrine Command adapting existing naval doctrine can from historical research of doctrine in (NDC) which opened in March 1993 be seen in its response to maneuver navies, concluding that the Navy is under the supervision of both the warfare, a concept that was articulated fully engaged in the doctrine-develop- Chief of Naval Operations and the clearly by the Marines in 1989. Maneu- ment process and is contributing to Commandant of the Marine Corps. It ver warfare has been espoused by the multiservice, joint, and combined doc- was designated the focus for develop- Navy in Naval Warfare, and NDC will trine, strategy, and operations. ing doctrine to sustain the strategic soon publish the concept of maneuver concepts outlined in...From the Sea warfare at sea. This action parallels re- Changing Perspectives and subsequent documents. Publica- cent Air Force investigation of maneu- Naval doctrine has existed in vari- tion in 1994 of Forward ...From the Sea ver warfare and Army adoption of ous forms since World War II, some reaffirmed the tenets of the original some of its tenets. It remains to be seen more obvious than others. Written white paper and made modest en- whether maneuver warfare eventually doctrine addressed naval (that is, Navy hancements in some areas. becomes joint doctrine if it is adopted and Marine Corps) concepts of both NDC is charged with developing by all four services. joint and combined doctrine as well as multiservice naval concepts, integrated that which is service-specific. Doctrine multiservice naval doctrine, and Navy A Formal Approach for amphibious warfare also appeared service-unique doctrine. Its missions Like other professions, the mili- in service-specific naval warfare publi- include providing a coordinated Navy tary of many nations have historically cations, tactical notes, and memos. and Marine Corps position in joint relied upon a system of knowledge and And the Navy recognized that the bulk and combined doctrine development beliefs to define their job. But unlike of its doctrine existed in the unwritten and ensuring that naval and joint doc- medical practice, military doctrine shared experiences of its officers. But trine are addressed in training and ed- varies substantially among nations in as one observer recently noted, it was ucation, and in operations, exercises, much the same manner that doctrine time for the Navy to take stock of its and wargames. Priority is given to doc- differs among the military arms and concept of doctrine development and trine that addresses the new geo-strate- services of a nation. Sometimes doc- the status of doctrine in the naval ser- gic environment and a changing threat trine has been written and centralized vices. Establishing a connection be- and efforts that enhance integrating and sometimes it has been unwritten tween the Goldwater-Nichols Act and and decentralized, especially in navies. the Gulf War, the Navy faced a poten- All forms of military doctrine, how- tial gap in warfighting concepts. ever, have at least two elements in

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■ NAVAL DOCTRINE

common: how the profession thinks more palatable to develop naval doc- other countries have had difficulty de- about warfare and how it acts in com- trine within the context of the familiar ciding which service doctrine should bat. Each element is necessary to create Navy-Marine team than in the new shape operations when a second ser- joint environment. vice is acting in support. Although a joint doctrine which governs the strategic The other services, system of joint doctrine should pre- Joint Staff, and uni- clude such conflict, it will take time to and operational levels is written for CINCs fied CINCs influence address and settle the issues that will the process in a man- inevitably appear as joint and service doctrine; neither is sufficient without ner that can take control of naval doc- doctrine evolve. the other. trine away from the Navy. It should be no surprise that doc- Joint doctrine, which governs the There are various reasons for re- trine has a vital multinational dimen- strategic and operational levels of war- taining multiservice doctrine centers. sion. Multinational operations, in their fare, describes the ways service assets Sponsoring services can retain direct varied forms, play an important part as are employed to achieve strategic ends. control over the operations of such the Armed Forces review and modify Joint doctrine is primarily written for agencies, generally outside of the for- doctrine. In responding to crises under CINCs. The services train and equip mal joint process and without the par- the auspices of international organiza- military forces, but it is the unified ticipation of the Joint Staff or unified tions, alliances, or ad hoc coalitions, CINCs who actually use forces in sup- commands. Such activities also have some form of doctrine is needed to en- port of national policy. the advantage of allowing service coor- sure common understanding of pur- The services influence the form dination, a procedure that can resem- pose and actions. The Cold War stimu- and content of emerging joint doctrine ble making laws or sausages, at a level lated such an evolution in NATO, but in various ways, including comments that generally does not prejudice either not easily or quickly. No other interna- from each service and the participation the process or the product. tional organization has a comparable of service officers assigned to the Joint NDC has given the Navy its first common understanding of how mili- Staff and the staffs of CINCs. Service centralized command responsible for tary professionals think about warfare headquarters and service and multiser- publishing doctrine for the fleet. Since and how they plan to act in combat. vice doctrine centers and commands it is a multiservice command—naval Some form of national military doc- influence the process. Though each doctrine publications bear the signa- trine, including U.S. doctrine, may service plays an important role in tures of the Chief of Naval Operations have to be used as a surrogate in opera- drafting joint doctrine, they cannot and the Commandant of the Marine tions outside NATO. veto the results. The Chairman is the Corps—some of its products contain final arbiter of joint doctrine. multiservice doctrine. The Navy will Lessons of History Since the services may need to co- use the command for Navy doctrine, The single most important lesson operate outside the approval authority but the Marine Corps will still utilize to be learned concerning the develop- of CJCS, there are provisions for multi- its doctrine division at the Marine ment of doctrine by world navies is service doctrine to guide the employ- Corps Combat Development Center. that navy and multiservice naval doc- ment of forces of two or more services Multiservice naval doctrine trine has existed under other names in coordinated action. Multiservice bridges policy, processes that produce throughout history. In addition to doctrine is primarily for the strategic strategy, and preparation of informa- written naval doctrine, which goes or operational levels of war. Much of tion related to TTP. Just as there are back at least to the 13th century with the thinking behind multiservice doc- some joint TTP, there will be some the publication of Título XXIV, De la trine predates Goldwater-Nichols. multiservice naval TTP dealing with guerra que se face por la mar by Rey de Cooperation between the services the multiservice naval environment. Castilla Don Alfonso X el Sabio in on multiservice doctrine is exemplified Individual Navy and Marine-specific 1270 at the Spanish royal court, infor- by AirLand Battle doctrine. The U.S. TTP will be the domain of the respec- mal customary doctrine has existed as Army Training and Doctrine Com- tive services. Thus multiservice naval a shared culture of values and princi- mand (TRADOC) and Air Force Tactical doctrine will primarily be concerned ples in the minds of admirals and com- Air Command started the multiservice with the operational level of warfare, manders in most navies. Air-Land Forces Applications Agency in which influences both the strategic There are numerous lessons to be 1975, which has since become the Air, and tactical levels, as is generally the learned from a preliminary review of Land, Sea Application (ALSA) Center. case in the other services. the history of navy doctrine. First, While it may be simply a matter of The compatibility of service and navies have studied and borrowed doc- time before these multiservice organi- joint doctrine will become an issue in trine from one another for years—just zations are absorbed by a revamped the future. As the services revise doc- as we routinely borrow technology. We Joint Warfighting Center, there is rea- trine to meet service needs and joint learned about carriers from the Royal son to believe in the longevity of mul- doctrinal guidance, they will be re- Navy which was to follow American tiservice doctrine. The Navy finds it far minded that service doctrine is not doctrine when its carrier forces were supposed to be inconsistent with joint integrated in the Pacific Fleet during doctrine. For example, some services in

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Tritten

World War II. Second, important doc- Fourth, it is axiomatic that pre- each division. Their leaders had a great trinal lessons can be drawn from his- war doctrine cannot foresee all eventu- capacity for independent action and a tory, even from the age of sail. Even a alities. No matter how well military determined avoidance of fixed pat- cursory study of history reveals that doctrine is thought out before a war, terns. That perception was later up- the most vexing doctrinal issues have dated by a former TRADOC com- remarkable durability, regardless of the operators at sea and in the mander who emphasized that Army era or the technology of the fleets: field will prevent doctrine from doctrine is not prescriptive. At the ■ What should be the principal form same time, he went no further than of attack? becoming doctrinaire to state that current Army doctrine ■ Should escorted ships or their es- is “as nearly right as it can be.” His- corts be the object of the attack? history demonstrates repeatedly that tory supports the view that doctrine ■ How much of the attacking force forces and technology will be used in should guide rather than direct. should be held in reserve? What is more im- ways that no one anticipates. The com- portant, protecting escorted ships—or an inva- bat leader must not only know service Shifting from open-ocean opera- sion force—or defeating an enemy’s offense? doctrine but when to follow it and tions to joint littoral warfare will be as ■ How should navies fight in the lit- when to deviate. Only then will the traumatic as moving from toral, where most naval warfare has occurred? commander know that deviation has to carriers. The challenges in...From ■ What is the appropriate command and control as naval forces project power occurred and what that means. the Sea and the importance of jointness ashore? Finally, operators both at sea and in to the Armed Forces represent a signifi- ■ How can allies and ad hoc coalition the field must be given the latitude to cant change. The Navy is documenting partners be integrated to achieve a single apply judgment to doctrine. Their input current naval doctrine, and in the purpose? from the fleet and field will prevent doc- process adjusting from open-ocean op- ■ How far should local commanders trine from becoming doctrinaire. Any erations to the joint littoral environ- comply with doctrine issued by bureaucracies? learning organization must be able to ment. The next step will be to help the ■ How much should commanders question long-established assumptions, fleet internalize the doctrine. Once the rely on enemy intentions as opposed to ca- principles, and practices to find and val- Navy has accepted the legitimacy and pabilities? idate new ideas if the organization value of formal written doctrine, it will Such issues have been debated for hopes to remain doctrinally sound. be time to start developing doctrine for hundreds of years and illustrate the en- A foreword to the 1943 edition of the future as well as the world of pro- during qualities of questions about Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. gramming, that is, acquisition. Those how to fight that cross national, geo- Pacific Fleet (PAC-10) stated that the responsible for developing and ex- graphic, and technology boundaries. document was “not intended and shall plaining naval doctrine have avoided Third, formal navy doctrine suf- not be construed as depriving any offi- the debates over roles, missions, and fered a setback with the introduction cer exercising tactical command of ini- functions. of new technologies and end of the tiative in issuing special instructions to Navy doctrine is the art of the ad- Anglo-French wars in the age of sail. his command...the ultimate aim is to miral; it is not and can never be an During those conflicts much naval obtain essential uniformity without exact science. Navy and naval doctrine warfare occurred without significant unacceptable sacrifice of flexibility.” reflect a common cultural perspective new technologies to tip the scales. The authors continued, “It is impracti- on war and military operations other Hence before steam, advances in war- cal to provide explicit instructions for than war. Doctrine in the Navy and fare at sea came via other evolving every possible combination of task the Marine Corps must be dynamic forms, such as doctrine. Navies de- force characteristics and tactical situa- even as it attempts to identify and pre- bated doctrine and some wrote exten- tions...attacks of opportunity are serve that which is enduring in naval sively when technology was static; necessarily limited by the peculiarities experience, traditions, and values. then as doctrine advanced so did com- of each situation, by the judgment of Formal naval doctrine will shape bat potential. subordinate commanders, and by the the judgment of naval leaders at all lev- The ironclad forced navies to deal training they have given their person- els of conflict in the same way that cus- with improvements to naval art and nel....No single rule can be formu- tomary traditional doctrine has done combat potential through technology. lated to fit all contingencies.” These for hundreds of years, but it will adapt Once the wars between Britain and are good words to live by. more readily to change. JFQ France were over, the assumed adver- An Army study of the relationship sary changed to other nations or to no of combat leaders to battlefield tactical This article is based on a report by the same title specific nation, and the need to refine success in Europe during World War II published by the Naval Doctrine Command. doctrine was no longer urgent. Little identified one feature common to all effort was devoted to learning to fight divisions ranked among the top ten— smarter. Perhaps the relative indepen- the superior quality of the leaders in dence of fleets at sea also contributed to the lack of a recent tradition of for- mal doctrinal development.

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■ A Guantanamo Diary— Operation Sea Sign

USS Whidbey Island with 2,000 Cubans picked up at sea.

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vealed potential flaws in deploying CA personnel. Sufficient capabilities, which should have been a planning factor, were deployed reactively rather than proactively. The delayed arrival of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion as well as both Army Reservists from the 416th Civil Affairs Battalion and Marine Re- servists from the 4th Civil Affairs Group a Signal did not jeopardize the mission, but their presence could have facilitated communication with refugees. The ini- tial table of organization for JTF–160, By W. DARREN PITTS based on CA assets on the ground, was inadequate for Sea Signal. The primary mission was humanitarian assistance. y late summer 1994 the ex- CA support to Sea Signal included both pansion of refugee operations civilian containment and control and just to the south of Florida civic assistance. Bhad reached a crisis. The U.S. Civilian containment involved naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba physical development of refugee was already host to more than 14,000 camps as well as matters of internal Haitian refugees. With existing camps communication and security. Its suc- at McCall airfield filling to capacity, cess depended heavily on the degree to U.S. personnel immediately began con- which security forces and CA person- struction of others in the Radio Range nel augment J-3/S-3 staff and advance complex. As Coast Guard and Navy party/site survey teams. The planning vessels began interdicting more than should have identified civil affairs as a 3,000 Cuban rafters per day, it was dis- principal player in executing the tressing to realize that they also would JTF–160 mission. have to be quartered. Gitmo was ill-pre- Civic assistance provided for med- pared to provide for the security, ical, dental, and veterinary care; basic health, and welfare of an additional sanitation; logistics and maintenance; 34,000 Cubans at what would amount and other tasks. Ideally, such projects to $1 million per day. are short term, high impact, low cost, The subsequent efforts of JTF–160 and technologically simple, with a rea- transformed Guantanamo while forc- sonable certainty of completion. This ing the departure of military depen- was a tough litmus test for Sea Signal. dents to the United Although some missions are simple in States. This survey of Op- concept, they are logistically difficult. support to Sea Signal included civilian eration Sea Signal focuses Multi-Service Operations containment and civic assistance on security and opera- tions associated with dis- One aspect of integrating civil af- placed persons with em- fairs assets into Sea Signal was multi- phasis on the critical role of civil service participation. With the excep- affairs (CA) and psychological opera- tion of Desert Storm and several other tions (PSYOP). joint operations, not many efforts have been conducted by both Army and Ma- The Mission rine civil affairs. Army civil affairs is a The rapid buildup of military in- special operations forces (SOF) asset frastructure to support Sea Signal re- and Marine civil affairs is a proven Ma- rine air-ground task force (MAGTF) re- source. As such, when a Marine head-

Captain W. Darren Pitts, USMCR, is aide-de-camp to the commanding general, Reserve Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Command Element Atlantic). He served as a civil affairs

DOD ( Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.) officer during Operation Sea Signal.

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■ GUANTANAMO DIARY

quarters is designated the lead JTF com- ting up both formal and informal rela- Refugee Processing ponent, it is practical to first use its or- tionships with their Army counter- On arrival, Cuban refugees were ganic capability before seeking external parts, active and Reserve. In future op- typically put in camps to await pro- support. This practice reflects the appli- erations the Marine Corps should cessing at the migrant processing cen- cation of sound doctrine. With regard assign CA liaison officers to CINCs as ter. Because of a lack of vehicles, some to civil affairs, the Army’s ability to well as to Army civil affairs com- refugees took up to two weeks to reach conduct large-scale operations such as mands. This would lead to a better ap- the center. As Coast Guard and Navy those in Haiti could be complimented preciation of the unique CA capabili- vessels continued to pick up rafters at by tactically-oriented Marine CA assets ties of both services and facilitate record rates, off-loading and transport- which focus on operational support in training among active and Reserve ing migrants impacted on vehicular the tactical AOR. civil affairs units. support between the camps. JTF–160 Since jointness represents the fu- initiated a database known as the de- ture of military operations, the Marine ployable mass population identifica- Corps should make its CA capabilities tion and tracking system (DMPITS), better known to CINCs and the Joint consisting of a five-station processing Staff. The Marines should consider set- Haitians await center. Fully staffed, it could process volunteer repatriation. 1,500 migrants per day, although the average was between 800 and 1,200. DOD

Gitmo airfield converted for 10,000 migrants. DOD (Helene Stikkel)

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Pitts

Despite DMPITS, family members often were housed in separate camps, some for months. This resulted in frus- trating, time-consuming activities to unify families. Because of the intensive labor and transport needed for family reunification, increased participation by other organizations should be con- sidered. Governmental organizations (GOs) and non-governmental organi- zations (NGOs) are actual force multi- pliers. Among those organizations at Guantanamo, the Community Rela- tions Service (CRS) of the Department of Justice and the World Relief Organi- zation (WRO) were key contributors. CRS was the lead agency for imple-

mentation of the Family Reunification DOD ( Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.) Cubans on board USCGC Tampa being searched.

JTF–160 setting up air transportable hospital.

DOD ( Alexander C. Hicks, Jr.)

Military police conducting quick response training. DOD

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■ GUANTANAMO DIARY CUBA

Program which sought to reunite fam- ily members, many of whom had been separated at sea either prior to U.S. NAVAL BASE interdiction or during DMPITS process- GUANTANAMO BAY ing. Because of Sea Signal’s push to E A HAlTI send as many Cubans to Panama as N S B E A possible, the program impacted on all C A R I B facets of the operation. WRO, on the other hand, arranged the collection and distribution of donations for the refugee population. Both GOs and NGOs should coordi- nate their activities through JAMAICA civil affairs whenever possible. In late August and early Sep- tember, living conditions became hor- rendous according to one camp com- Military police patrolling mander. As average daily temperatures refugee camp. soared over 100 degrees, trash and human waste awaited the arriving refugees as well as security forces. This environment was suddenly home to men, women, children, and infants. legal status, family reunifi- According to some participants, cation, problems of the the civil affairs contingent was initially sick and elderly, unaccom- a token (comprised of two officers and panied minors, and treat- one enlisted at staff level). With more ment by the security forces. than 3,200 migrants arriving each day, Easing tensions and the security and health problems over- segregation of single males

whelmed the facilities. There were DOD and troublemakers enabled shortages of running water, medical fa- camp commanders to dele- cilities, and sanitation (porta-potties) gate greater responsibility in the camps. Infrastructure for internal activities to these democra- Airlift and sealift for this humani- JTG-Bulkeley sought to provide a tically elected leaders. tarian mission had to be shared with safe and habitable environment for the CA personnel had interpreters JTF–180 which was gearing up for a refugees and keep the migrant popula- whose background, maturity, and pro- tion informed on their legal status ficiency could vary on a daily basis. JTG-Bulkeley sought to provide a and on options such as relocation Some were school-trained while others to Panama (Operation Safehaven) spoke fluent Spanish but could not safe and habitable environment and repatriation to Cuba. In addi- read the language. There were also dif- tion, JTG-Bulkeley sought to tar- ficulties arising from variations in di- showdown in Haiti. Living conditions get quality of life issues to improve mi- alect. But the mission could not have deteriorated and tension mounted as grant living conditions. been accomplished without linguists. camp populations swelled. Risks to Civil affairs focused on develop- More than once, Spanish-speaking per- military personnel grew exponentially ing and sustaining camp infrastruc- sonnel identified and defused volatile and the political signals from Washing- ture. Military police and civil affairs situations before they turned violent. ton fueled the volatile fire of despair commanders met with Cuban camp Crisis, however, was not always within the tent city. leaders daily, often going tent to tent. the order of the day. Cuban teachers The camps were being constructed A critical aspect of their job was simply taught English to children. Men and filled to capacity in a matter of days, listening, providing information, mak- worked in makeshift craft shops. Recre- with command then turned over to in- ing assessments, and advising the com- ational programs entertained and oc- coming military police units. Was Sea mander. As soon as health and comfort cupied the general population. By mid- Signal really a military police mission? problems were resolved, other issues October, security concerns had given Refugees, furious over living conditions which had been festering under the way to intramural baseball, and some and the abrupt change in immigration surface quickly arose. Cubans even opted to go on daily runs policy, complained, demonstrated, and With CA assistance the camps with members of the security force. eventually rioted. elected government councils (camp leaders) to represent their concerns. Typically, they raised issues on their

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Pitts DOD Erecting tents to house JTF–160 personnel. military information support team (MIST) was invaluable although ini- tially separate from the CA effort. MIST provided excellent products and pro- grams for security forces as well as civil Cuban refugees being affairs. The stated mission of the team served on food line. was to assist with population control, DOD safety, and sanitation to increase force protection. MIST executed its mission by pub- Shortly after the August 1994 indefinitely. From a security perspec- lishing ¿Que Pasa?, a weekly newspaper demonstrations, the migrant camps tive Camp X-Ray was impressive, al- for the Cuban camps, and operating were designated as being for single though it was not a prison as some “Radio Esperanza,” which broadcasted males, families, or unaccompanied mi- have suggested. Infractions committed from 0900 to 1700 daily. The paper ini- nors, although single females and mar- by detainees included theft, assault tially was ignored by the Cubans who ried couples still were housed with sin- and battery, prostitution, and black said it looked official and did not ade- gle men in many cases. The maximum market activities. Their segregation was quately address their interests, namely, population of each camp was set at intended to avoid a breakdown or dis- obtaining visas and gaining entry to 2,500. In October 1994, additional sub- ruption of law, order, and discipline in the United States. Eventually, MIST and camps were created to segregate the camps. Some refugees made impro- civil affairs linked up, and Cuban-writ- Cubans who wanted to be repatriated vised weapons out of cot ends, tent ten contributions were soon introduced or relocated to Panama. Moreover, poles, soda cans, et al. which were rou- into ¿Que Pasa? Thereafter readership MAG 291 and Camp X-Ray were estab- tinely confiscated in security sweeps. and overall receptiveness quickly im- lished to administratively segregate proved. MIST personnel came from the those who endangered the safety and PSYOP Support 1st PSYOP Battalion and the Dissemina- welfare of others. Those migrants who It is important to note that psy- tion Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group committed infractions were moved to chological operations were neither au- and operated with civil affairs until MAG–291 for 7–30 days. Felons and thorized nor conducted by JTF–160. September 1994. MIST provided ex- those who posed serious and docu- But PSYOP support in the form of a tremely valuable service to both the JTF mented threats went to Camp X-Ray staff and refugee population.

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■ GUANTANAMO DIARY

PSYOP assets were deployed to supported CINCs. First, are JFCs de- On May 2, 1995, almost nine Cuba before January 1992 to support ploying and integrating CA assets in months after Sea Signal began, the ad- Operation GTMO. Planning for the op- contingency operations at the appro- ministration announced a reversal in eration assumed no more than 2,500 priate time? Also, will valid require- policy. All but a handful of the Cubans migrants, and discussions at U.S. At- ments be ignored or minimized be- would be allowed to enter the United lantic Command focused on whether cause the capabilities reside primarily States. According to The New York PSYOP support was even needed for in the Reserve components? More than Times, “[Cubans] were being admitted this type of mission. In the final analy- 90 percent of civil affairs personnel are for humanitarian reasons and because sis it is important that PSYOP be put Reservists, and there is only one active Washington feared rioting this sum- under the operational control of civil duty civil affairs battalion. mer at the naval base. But recognizing affairs since it allows for coordinated Given the lessons of Operation that the decision to admit them could activities and more effective support in GTMO in 1992 and those learned from set off a new flood of boat people, the such operations. Sea Signal, further debate and perhaps administration said that it would in some top-level guidance regarding civil the future return all Cuban refugees Security and Infrastructure affairs deployment and employment is who flee [from Cuba] to that commu- The security mission was clear: to needed before the next JTF reinvents nist country.” maintain control of the refugee popu- the wheel. The execution of two simul- What should we be ready for lation and to protect American person- taneous civil affairs operations (in next? With regard to civil affairs, Sea nel assigned to the Signal reflected both an earnest appli- base. Two Army mili- despite the aggressive efforts by JTF–160 cation of past lessons and blatant over- tary police battalions, sight of others. JFQ reinforced by two Air civil affairs was an afterthought Force security police companies, provided internal security. Haiti and Cuba) at the low end of the A Marine infantry regiment was re- spectrum challenged those who partic- sponsible for external security. The ipated. What opportunities exist, if rules of engagement (ROE) for security any, for facilitating joint CA training forces stressed the humanitarian na- for these operations? ture of the operation and only came With regard to Guantanamo, one into play during demonstrations, out- can only speculate on the rapid plan- bursts of frustration, and intentional ning that accompanied the tasking for acts of violent misconduct. Sea Signal. In anticipation of future op- Military police company com- erations, should force planners overes- manders typically had responsibility timate the CA dimension of the mis- for two refugee camps. Internal as well sion, given the lead time to marshal as external guards were posted and pa- operational support? trolled the camps continuously. They Despite the aggressive efforts by carried nightsticks and hand-held ra- the staff of JTF–160, civil affairs was dios. Each watchtower had a two-man πan afterthought. Critical tasks must team. Marines, on the other hand, pro- be performed from the outset of an op- vided perimeter security and carried eration. The world watches CNN. M–16s. A quick reaction force was kept When a crisis is real, everyone knows on standby to quell riots or extract it. The question for joint planners and problem refugees from volatile situa- warfighters is whether the OPLANs tions. A few refugees jumped the wire and their respective force lists reflect and attempted to swim home. This initial use of Reserve civil affairs units? was an ever-present danger and Ameri- Or perhaps a better question is should can personnel could only assist swim- they include them? mers who requested help. JTF–160 enveloped a gray area of The ongoing nature of Sea Signal low intensity conflict contingencies— represents a unique opportunity for se- part security, but mostly civil affairs. curity forces and civil affairs to master Most junior officers would argue that civilian containment and control pro- both security forces and CA personnel cedures. The handling of large num- should have arrived on the same air- bers of displaced people raises several craft. If Sea Signal is an indication of important questions for planners and the new politico-military landscape, force planning for security and civic assistance missions requires serious re- thinking.

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OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN ■

General Lemuel Cornick Shepherd, Jr. (1896–1990) Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

VITA orn in Norfolk, Virginia; graduated from Virginia Military Institute (1917); commissioned in the Marines and ordered to France (1917); aide to com- Bmandant (1920–22); served aboard USS Nevada and USS Idaho (1922–25); Marine barracks, Norfolk (1925–27); 4th Marines, China (1927–29); field officer’s course, Quantico (1930); Haiti (1930–34); Marine Corps institute staff (1934–36); Naval War College (1937); 5th Marines (1937); Marine Corps schools staff (1939–42); 9th Marines (1942); 1st Marine Division, Guadalcanal (1943); Cape Gloucester (1943); 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, (1944); 6th Marine Division, Okinawa (1945); assistant commandant and chief of staff (1946–48); commandant of schools (1948–50); Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; Inchon landing (1950); 20th commandant (1952–55); chairman, Inter-American Defense Board (1956); returned to active duty (1956–57); died at La Jolla, California.

On June 28, 1952, the President signed into law a bill amending U.S. Marine Corps Museum the National Security Act so as to grant co-equal status on the Portrait by Bjorn Egeli. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on matters which he decided were of direct concern to the Marine Corps. The Commandant’s selection of matters of Marine Corps concern was binding unless overridden by the Secretary of Defense on the recommendation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. By “co-equal status,” the Congress meant that the Commandant would enjoy all the rights of JCS membership on a matter of direct concern to the Marine Corps under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

—Chronology of JCS Organization, 1945–1984

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■ THE JOINT WORLD

JTF–SWA efficiently develops and Joint Publications. The availability of Lessons Learned distributes the ATO. Using the latest ver- joint publications in theater is increasing sion (5.11) of the contingency theater but remains a problem worldwide. J-7 is JTF–SWA automated planning system (CTAPS), the working on this shortcoming and distrib- JTF is able to distribute the ATO three to uting joint pubs to all JTFs. While CD– Led by the Evaluation and Analysis four hours before the deadline. Trans- ROMs are the preferred medium, many Division (J-7), Joint Staff, a team of sub- mission time is excellent, with a goal of units do not have the equipment to uti- ject matter experts visited Joint Task 90 seconds. Planners augment the order lize them in the field and paper copies Force Southwest Asia (JTF–SWA) in May with locally produced PowerPoint flow are thus required. Access to joint pubs 1995. This operation reflects CENTCOM diagrams. (As in Deny Flight, planners and a widespread familiarity with joint preparation and support of forces execut- and operators prefer a flow diagram, doctrine will continue to improve inter- ing assigned missions. The visit focused which is not available in CTAPS.) The di- operability. on air operations with emphasis on plan- agrams are E-mailed via CTAPS to units. This visit to JTF–SWA highlighted a ning, coordination, and conduct of the- The Navy CTAPS connectivity is good, real-world operation, and the resulting ater-wide operations, command rela- enhanced by a JTF liaison team that lessons learned form a basis for enhancing tions, targeting selection, air tasking meets each arriving aircraft carrier to future operations. These assessments pro- order development and distribution, and brief JTF procedures. Additionally, a car- vide planners with a first hand view of joint doctrine integration. rier liaison officer works in the ATO capabilities and potential problems. JFQ The team observed operations and shop during the carrier battle group pres- conducted interviews at the headquarters ence. The French and British are well in- of U.S. Central Command; JTF–SWA in tegrated into ATO development, but Exercises Riyadh; U.S. Naval Forces Component their forces rely on the collocated Ameri- th Central Command in Bahrain; 4404 can units to provide paper copies of FUERZAS UNIDAS ’95 Composite Wing (Provisional) in daily ATOs. Dhahran; Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait; ATOs run for 24 hours, but flight A combined joint task force was and British Forces and French Air Forces operations only occur during a portion formed for Fuerzas Unidas-Peacekeeping in Saudi Arabia. of each day. The order is effective at a Operations ’95, a command post and JTF–SWA is carrying out an opera- specified point prior to the first takeoff field training exercise that was conducted tionally and politically demanding mis- and, depending on takeoff time, may from August 21 to September 1 in Buenos sion of enforcing the no-fly zone. The begin at different hours of the day. This Aires. Hosted by the Argentinean army, JFC and his staff have provided leader- affords a single ATO for an entire day in- the exercise was held under the sponsor- ship and guidance that has resulted in a stead of dividing the day between two ship of U.S. Southern Command with strong mission focus in an operation ATOs at 0600. All missions affecting more than 250 participants, including with a high operational tempo and per- JTF–SWA are on the ATO. Although both military and civilian personnel sonnel turnover (the JTF tour of duty is JTF–SWA CTAPS is the best that has been from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 90 days). In addition, some specialty or- observed, many non-CENTAF personnel Uruguay, and the United States. ganizations (such as combat search and arrive with little or no CTAPS training. A Of the players, over 80 percent of rescue and Patriot units) are feeling the local program is effectively training new the Argentines, Brazilians, Uruguayans, strain of high world-wide personnel operators, but the 90-day tour signifi- and Americans had previously served in tempo. For continuity the JFC billet will cantly impacts on developing an experi- at least one peace operation. The exercise transition to a one-year assignment. The enced planning staff. drew 50 representatives from 17 coun- overall demands on resources are being Command and Control. While theater tries and the United Nations as well as overcome by quality people who opti- command arrangements do not coincide observers from the National Security mize limited assets. exactly with joint doctrine, the relation- Council Staff, Office of the Secretary of Joint/Combined Air Operations. Joint ship works. JTF–SWA is essentially a JTF Defense, Joint Warfighting Center, and combined air operations reflect strong staff in that it has no service or func- National Defense University, et al. published guidance and daily oversight of tional components. A complicating fac- The Argentinean army war college operations to ensure a consistent focus on tor is that the JFC only has tactical con- provided the venue for a series of plan- the mission. JTF–SWA does not have a sep- trol of forces made available by ning conferences and a computer simula- arate JFACC since the operation’s size and CENTCOM component commanders. tion, which was driven by a master events nature allow the JFC to accomplish the This does not provide operational con- scenario list and which used both the functions including targeting, which is trol of the forces that the JFC employs joint conflict model and the civil affairs fairly static. JTF–SWA develops ATOs using and does not facilitate unity of command model. Participants also toured the newly doctrinal divisions of combat plans to pro- at JTF level. Although this situation is established Argentinean Joint Peacekeep- duce the order, combat operations to ef- not optimal, the JTF is making it work ing Training Center (CAECOPAZ) located fect ATO execution, and intelligence to and accomplishing the mission. at Campo de Mayo outside Buenos Aires. support the plans and operations divi- The ROE program is excellent. JTF– Overall, the exercise offered oppor- sions. Effective liaison is key to the process SWA ensures that these rules are briefed tunities to enhance military-to-military by ensuring that U.S. Navy, French, and to all aircrew members before they fly. relations, foster regional security coopera- British representation is included in ATO Both the weekly JTF-wide scenario exer- tion, and demonstrate roles and missions development. cises incorporated in aircrew training and of armed forces in peace operations. A a JTF developed training matrix are su- follow-on exercise is planned for August perb. In addition, carrier aircrews are 1996 in Montevideo, Uruguay. JFQ briefed and participate in scenario exer- cises as they arrive in the AOR.

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THE JOINT WORLD ■

chaired by the Army, sent out 4,000 United States. This discussion reveals Education questionnaires to survey interest in a how the unified command plan has joint logistics course and identify the become less protective of service NEW AFSC COURSES duty positions of potential students. The prerogatives and more an instrument of survey revealed a training void that led jointness. Available from the Director The Joint Command, Control, and to the development of a three-week for Joint History, OCJCS, Room 1B707, Electronic Warfare School (JCEWS), an el- course to prepare mid-level managers The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. ement of the Armed Forces Staff College, from the active and Reserve components 20318–9999. JFQ has redesigned its resident courses into (majors/lieutenant commanders and lieu- two new offerings to meet the needs of tenant colonels/commanders) as well as 420 students annually. The school has civilians (in grades GS–12 through Periodical Literature merged the Joint Electronic Warfare Staff GS–14) for assignments that involve joint Officer Course (JEWSOC) and the Joint logistics planning, interservice and J.V. Arbuckle, “Command and Control of Command and Control Warfare Staff Of- multinational logistics support, and joint Canadian Forces in Combined Opera- ficer Course (JC2WSOC) to emphasize the logistics in a theater of operations. tions,” Canadian Defence Quarterly, emerging importance of C2W while re- The Joint Course on Logistics is de- vol. 25, no. 1 (September 1995), pp. taining the important EW portions of signed to: (1) integrate DOD programs 17–21. C2W. The new two-week course is known for effective and economic logistical sup- Eric L. Chase, “Summing Up Roles and as the Joint C2W Staff and Operations port to national strategy and a basis for Missions: A Marine Corps Perspective,” Course (JC2WSOC), and the first class is resource decisions; (2) compare the ap- Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 79, no. 7 scheduled for January 1996. The course is proaches of the Defense Logistics Agency (July 1995), pp. 60–66. focused on the doctrine, concepts, and (DLA) and the services in support of Edward J. Filiberti, “National Strategic procedures that joint, combined, and ser- DOD, joint, and theater objectives, and Guidance: Do We Need a Standard vice C2W officers need to perform their how DLA and the services project logis- Format?” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 3 duties. The curriculum will consist of tics capability to support the CINCs; (3) (Autumn 1995), pp. 42–54. three parts: a foundations block on doc- integrate multinational logistics as a sup- Timothy J. Haraden, “Joint From Day trine and basic concepts; a block on C2W port multiplier; (4) develop plans for ser- One,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, elements and service C2W capabilities; vice component logistics resources in vol. 121, no. 7 (July 1995), pp. 37–39. and an applications block on informa- support of theater contingency opera- George F. Kraus, Jr., “Information Warfare tion warfare, ship and aircraft tours, and tions; (5) assess the effectiveness of joint in 2015,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- a practical exercise. Sponsored by the Di- and service strategies as well as CONUS ings, vol. 121, no. 8 (August 1995), rector for Operations (J-3), Joint Staff, the sustainment capabilities on logistical pp. 42–45. course will be taught seven times each support decisions; and (6) apply DLA and John Mackinlay and Jørn Olsen, “Squar- year on the TS/SCI/TK level for military service logistic support capabilities in de- ing the Circle: Europe’s Armies Train personnel in grades E–7 through O–6 as veloping contingency scenarios. for Peacekeeping and Warfighting,” well as DOD civilians in equivalent The curriculum manager for the International Defense Review, vol. 28 grades. An unclassified version of the course, which will be administered at (October 1995), pp. 74–78. course will also be offered once each year Fort Lee, Virginia, is Abraham F. Chad- William A. Owens, “Report on the JROC for allied students. wick of the Army Logistics Management and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” The school also has redesignated its College who may be contacted at either Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 79, no. 8 other resident course. The five-week Joint (804) 765–4710 or DSN 539–4710 for (August 1995), pp. 46–53. Command, Control, and Communica- further details on course offerings and John M. Quigley, “Creating Joint tions Staff and Operations Course service quotas. JFQ Warfighters,” U.S. Naval Institute Pro- (JC3SOC) is now the Joint Command, ceedings, vol. 121, no. 9 (September Control, Communications, Computers, 1995), pp. 62–65. and Intelligence Staff and Operations History John D. Rosenberger, “The Key to Joint Course (JC4ISOC). The 14-block course Readiness,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- includes a 7-lesson information warfare ings, vol. 121, no. 9 (September 1995), block and a field trip to Washington. UNIFIED COMMAND pp. 58–61. Sponsored by the Director for Command, The Joint History Office has pub- Gregory C. Sieminiski, “The Art of Nam- Control, Communication, and Computer lished The History of the Unified Command ing Operations,” Parameters, vol. 25, Systems (J-6), Joint Staff, the course is Plan, 1946–1993. Beginning with a dis- no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 81–98. taught six times each year on the cussion of efforts to establish a system of TS/SCI/TK level for military personnel in unified commands following World War Also noted... grades W–1 through O–6 as well as DOD II, the monograph traces the evolution of civilians in equivalent grades. JFQ high-level, global command arrange- “Multinational Force Command Authori- ments of the Armed Forces from just after ties Handbook: Proceedings of the World War II to the reorganization of Central Region-Chiefs of Army Staff JOINT LOGISTICS U.S. Atlantic Command. An overview (CR-CAST) Working Group on Com- traces the debates over command mand Authorities Required for a Multi- In September 1990 the joint logis- arrangements for the Pacific and , national Force Commander” (Carlisle tics commanders (JLC) tasked an ad hoc strategic nuclear forces, and general pur- Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, group to study the need for mid-level ex- pose forces based in the continental September 1, 1995), 104 pp. JFQ ecutive training. This group, which had representation from each service and was

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Gudmundsson, whose books are also re- THE ART OF WAR— viewed here. Maneuver Warfare: An Anthol- ogy groups 21 pieces in three parts that PAST, PRESENT, Hooker recommends should be read as “a FUTURE collection of essays, perhaps only tangen- tially linked, each making its own inde- A Review Essay by pendent contribution to an evolving body of thought.” It is good advice. DAVID J. ANDRE The first part of the volume sets the stage with a theoretical discussion of ma- Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology neuver warfare as a concept and a system of ideas. Some mature professionals may edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr. Navato, California: Presidio Press, 1993. view this approach as largely a com- 409 pp. $35.00 pendium of timeworn, even obscure [ISBN 0–89141–499–1] ideas. But the many defining arguments presented by Daniel Bolger in “Maneuver On Artillery Warfare Reconsidered” and Robert Leon- by Bruce I. Gudmundsson hard in “Maneuver Warfare and the Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1993. United States,” along with Richard 176 pp. $55.00 Hooker in “Ten Myths about Maneuver [ISBN 0–275–94047–0] Warfare” and James McDonough in “The Operational Art: Quo Vadis?” are worth Fighting by Minutes: Time and the price of the book, despite one’s previ- the Art of War ous exposure to the subject. by Robert R. Leonhard The verdict in this part of the book Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994. on maneuver warfare theory is perhaps 186 pp. $55.00 best captured in a quip by Tallulah DOD [ISBN 0–275–94736–X] Bankhead which is cited at the beginning of Bolger’s piece, “There is less here than about change in a large organization, im- meets the eye.” Or, as Bolger himself con- plementing strategies often are as impor- f the past, current, and prospective fu- cludes after disparaging the social science tant as ideas themselves. Iture nature of the art of war is likened approach to the study of war, “Maneuver Stylistically and substantively this is to a tapestry, its texture will be largely warfare is bunk. No competent soldier, the weakest part of the volume, which is the result of how theoreticians and prac- let alone the entire U.S. military estab- unfortunate in light of the rich theoreti- titioners alike have sought to deal with lishment, should embrace it.” cal and case-study history of organiza- key issues: maneuver, fires, and the ele- The other side of the coin is well tional behavior and the process of inno- ment of time. If one believes that large- represented by the venerable William vation. It does, however, offer a useful scale theater warfare is passé and that Lind. Regardless of whether one agrees examination of Franz Uhle-Wettler—Ger- military operations other than war will with his interpretation of military his- man army veteran of World War II and be dominant in the future, then the tory, especially as it involves his analysis former tanker, general staff officer, and three books under review may only be of of cause and effect (viz., maneuverists lieutenant general—on the much misun- historical or general interest. However, if usually win and attritionists usually lose), derstood and even more abused concept one thinks it is important for the world’s the fact remains that it was largely Lind’s of auftragstaktik, and Michael Duncan remaining superpower, in a period of early ruminations on maneuver war- Wyly’s experience on how to teach ma- constrained defense budgets and force fare—many succinctly captured in the neuver warfare. Aside from rehearsing drawdowns, to ensure the quality and ef- lead essay—that originally got so many the campaigns that should be part of any fectiveness of its forces and prepare for people thinking seriously about it. lecturer’s stock information on maneuver the possible rise of dangerous regional, Part two addresses institutional im- warfare and recommending further read- niche, or peer military competitors, then plications of maneuver warfare. It is ings, Wyly’s piece is valuable because he the works offer something of practical, widely appreciated that innovation is comes out four-square against teaching substantive value. commonly resisted in large organiza- maneuver concepts solely through the Richard Hooker has gathered a range tions. In the military, to the extent that use of historical examples. In his view, of ideas by former senior military practi- this results in advancing what Stephen the best way to get a student’s mind to tioners, well schooled and thoughtful Peter Rosen terms a “new theory of vic- grasp decisionmaking is to employ a mix- younger field grade officers, and seasoned, tory” in Winning the Next War: Innovation ture of historical and hypothetical cases. non-uniformed theoreticians. Contribu- and the Modern Military, such resistance The final part of Maneuver Warfare tors include Robert Leonhard and Bruce can be especially dogged, even virulent. presents eight historical studies that por- So if you believe in maneuver warfare, tray successful applications of maneuver the real challenge lies in figuring out concepts or contrast them with other how to sell it to skeptics, not to say to styles of warfare, mainly attrition. supporters of the familiar, comfortable Hooker sets the stage in an introductory Colonel David J. Andre, USA (Ret.), is a status quo—and making it stick. This essay which notes that the maneuver and defense consultant and formerly served as part of the book thus reaffirms the time- attrition schools of thought are not so chairman of the department of military less wisdom that, when trying to bring much polar cases as reflections of cul- strategy at the National War College. tural and organizational predispositions

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that dominate doctrine and operations of In spite of its unevenness, Maneuver revisits the perennial question of a pre- armies, a distinction often lost on hard Warfare has much to offer the reader, es- ferred relationship between artillery and core maneuverists. pecially the pre-staff college Army or Ma- ground maneuver forces: whether ar- Gudmundsson leads off this part of rine Corps officer. But it is in the context tillery should be a supporting arm that the anthology with a well-researched dis- of the ongoing U.S. force drawdown, and helps ground troops gain fire superiority course on the German tradition in ma- such issues as how best to organize to over enemy maneuver units (the tradi- neuver warfare, followed by pieces on the fight future wars, that the book might tional French view); whether a more co- French during World War I, the “Rommel most usefully be studied by experienced operative or “artistic” arrangement is model,” Wavell and the first Libyan of- professionals. The Germans, for example, preferable (the German theory); or fensive of 1940–41, the Wehrmacht ap- able innovators and executors of maneu- whether fires might generally be capable proaches to command and control as ver warfare, lost World War II in part be- of playing the leading role in future war, well as deception, the German conquest cause they were outnumbered. But the Is- including substituting for ground combat of Yugoslavia, and early German opera- raelis, who also always lacked the troops (a view widely heard today but, tions against . Apropos of the resources of their adversaries, nonethe- one suspects, difficult to realize in prac- other two books under review, Robert less deliberately turned to maneuver- tice). To close the circle, each perspective Doughty’s essay on the French in World based doctrine and leadership in the has different implications for command War I nicely prepares the reader for what hope of solving unforgiving strategic and control of artillery units. But as the Gudmundsson explicates in greater detail problems. This underlying and appar- book makes clear, how one decides these in Artillery, including the tension in the ently competing logic may be a way to issues is often less an analytic matter French army between artillery (fires) and better inform the debate over how than a function of how one systemati- infantry (what passed for maneuver in shrinking forces might best execute their cally views the whole, as between con- those sanguine days) and how the reality growing menu of traditional and nontra- trasting perspectives on war (Jomini, of the battlefield led the French to mod- ditional missions in the new world Clausewitz, and Douhet) and positional ify their operational doctrine and cede (dis)order. versus mobile warfare. On Artillery is full the major role to artillery. John Antal in Maneuver is rarely possible without of such dialectical conundrums. “The Wehrmacht Approach to Maneuver fire support, including indirect fire ar- Other enduring issues raised by Warfare Command and Control” aptly tillery. This arm exerted a profound influ- Gudmundsson are the willingness to in- complements the contribution by Uhle- ence on World War I. During the inter- novate; maneuver versus attrition war- Wettler in explaining the overall com- war period, the British, French, and fare; the balance between a long-range mand and control process, including the Americans responded to artillery-domi- artillery duel and close-in forward fight; German approach, to the estimate of the nated positional, attrition warfare with infantry versus other artillery as the pri- situation and operations order, as well as more artillery (that is, hardware). The mary target; locating enemy batteries; the “brief-back” technique, all of which Germans, meanwhile, sought an opera- the frequent impotence of counter-bat- are easily recognizable today in both tional answer (that is, brainware) by opt- tery fire; locating artillery forward versus Army and joint doctrine. ing for relational maneuver, combined the rear; fighting as batteries versus The publication by the Army in arms panzer divisions supported by tacti- massed (and, if massed, concentrating or 1976 of FM 100–5, Operations, effectively cal airpower, and by adapting operational dividing fires of massed batteries); field launched the military on a two-decade and organizational concepts for employ- guns versus howitzers; the number of running duel on the relative merits of ing artillery accordingly. tubes per battery; division versus corps as maneuver versus attrition warfare. It has Gudmundsson explains this and the optimal echelon of command; how resulted in a lot of either/or, is/is not. more in On Artillery, a well researched and best to task organize artillery, including James McDonough, in a particularly documented book. He begins by acknowl- centralization (the operations research thoughtful piece in Hooker’s anthology, edging the many works currently avail- solution which takes artillery comman- separates himself from both sides of this able or soon to be published on Ameri- ders out of the loop and separates fire argument by noting that a concept like can, British, and Russian artillery, along planning from maneuver in infantry maneuver warfare does not stand alone. with surveys of artillery developments units) versus decentralization; timing As the Germans and Russians demon- from the Middle Ages to the present. He fires against certain kinds of targets; the strated time and again during World War then chronologically examines field ar- notion of “maneuver of fire”; and the II, commanders can shift from one to an- tillery in conventional war by contrasting problem of fratricide. other and, indeed, conduct both simulta- French and German approaches during On Artillery highlights the fact that, neously. In many cases it is simply a mat- the period bounded by the Franco-Pruss- just as there was extensive experimenta- ter of scale. On the tactical and ian War and World War II, with reference tion and much debate among German operational levels, maneuver by one part to later experience by Israel and the planners before and during World War II of a force might require more linear, po- United States. In so doing, he admits that over the approach for employing artillery sitional operations by other elements. scant attention is paid to artillery in am- with panzer and other units, there is now The Gulf War seemed to bear this out. In phibious, airborne, guerrilla, urban, a lack of consensus on the implications McDonough’s view, real doctrine must be mountain, or and also of the lessons from World Wars I and II a complete fighting doctrine—a balance that the employment of coastal, siege, or for the use of artillery, and fires more of maneuver, fires, protection, leader- antiaircraft artillery is largely ignored. generally, in future wars. Gudmundsson ship, sustainment, command and con- Gudmundsson points out that the cautions that a constrained fiscal envi- trol, and the like, all attuned to the situa- difference between the artillery doctrines ronment may exert a pernicious influ- tion at hand. It cannot be just maneuver. of France and Germany lay in the way ence on national security decisionmak- their respective officers viewed troops. ing: witness the French reluctance, in This led to contrasting approaches to spite of strong evidence to the contrary, command and control. Accordingly, he

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to change artillery because it had just On Artillery makes an excellent con- war should strive to control these charac- been purchased. tribution to the history of the military teristics. Of particular interest to those Throughout history, the author art, to one of the defining components of trying to better understand and advance notes, technology has made it possible to modern warfare, and to the ongoing as- thinking on RMA, he observes that the separate indirect field artillery from the sessment of future possibilities for orga- most revolutionary developments close combat of infantry (the “great di- nizing and operating artillery and other throughout history have been those that vorce”), thus dividing the combined means for delivering fires. Military histo- challenge or change military time calcu- arms battle into two struggles. Almost as rians and staff college-level officers will lations. From there, it is conceptually but soon as this happens, however, a new find it of particular value. a short step to information warfare, a class of weapon is found in a role aban- William Lind reminds us in Maneu- subject receiving increasing attention doned by the artillery. Developments in ver Warfare that great captains have in- within the Office of the Secretary of De- fire support promise to exacerbate the stinctively grasped the importance of fense and among the services. great divorce. But whether, as Gud- time and speed in warfare. But he attrib- Correctly or not, maneuver warfare mundsson seems to believe, the “revolu- utes the anchoring of maneuver theory is often viewed as residing mainly on the tionary” fiber optic guided missile in time competitiveness to the work of operational level of war. But in Leon- (FOG–M), with its “unique guidance sys- John Boyd, who held that conflict can be hard’s view time plays a critical role on tem,” is the gap filler that can end the understood as time-competitive cycles of all levels. For example, he sees the con- great divorce remains to be seen. Merci- observing, orienting, deciding, and act- test for time as the most important fully, he treats highly technical issues in ing, and the side that can go through strategic problem facing the United a nontechnical language and greatly en- this cycle (the “OODA” loop) faster than States. Given ample time, America—the hances the value of his technical insights the other develops a decisive edge. In an- only remaining superpower—can meet by relating them to the higher levels of other new title, Fighting by Minutes: Time any threat. But having shifted from a de- war. Numerous footnotes and a bibliogra- and the Art of War, Robert Leonhard car- terrence-oriented, forward-deployed mili- phy that includes important French and ries this thinking still further. As the au- tary establishment to a rapid response German sources add still more to this thor of an earlier volume on maneuver strategy involving forces based primarily study of artillery. warfare, he is particularly well grounded at home, time is more than just critical: On Artillery is mainly of value to for this. Beginning with the judgment it is often the enemy. those interested in the modern history of that time is increasingly becoming the In theory, the United States can act indirect field artillery. Regrettably, the critical dimension in warfare, his thesis, militarily in days, hours, minutes, even chapter titles and the index do not reveal simply stated, is that the most effective seconds (there is talk today of “simulta- the riches to be found between its covers. way to perceive, interpret, and plan oper- neous” or “real-time” theater-wide opera- A broad assortment of timeless issues, al- ations is in terms of time rather than tions.) In terms of tangible events, how- ready summarized, is addressed, but care- space. True to his conviction, he consid- ever, Leonhard warns us that “time is ful reading is required to isolate, identify, ers this work to be not just a professional nature’s way of making sure that every- and distill them into a larger synthesis. infantryman’s theoretical discussion of thing doesn’t happen at once.” Friction The discussion of the future of artillery is the changing nature of war, but as offer- aside, the complexities of war operate to limited to a final two-page chapter and ing a major paradigm shift—from spatial ensure that everything cannot happen at should have been ignored altogether. At to temporal. He characterizes his product once. “Friction does not just make ac- the same time, one of the book’s as nothing less than a theory of temporal tions in war more difficult, it also makes strengths is an issue-based historical per- warfare, and arrives at it by examining them take longer.” (Are these the words spective on which the professional mili- how time interacts with weaponry, units, of two insufferable empiricists, Clause- tary can draw in thinking about the fu- logistics, doctrine, morale, decisionmak- witz and Guderian, speaking to us from ture, including innovation. For example, ing, and the spatial dimensions of war. beyond the grave?) Leonhard would have much thought on the implications of the Apparently sharing Lind’s perspec- us understand that it might be more ac- revolution in military affairs (RMA) for tive on the great captains, Leonhard is curate to describe the implementation of fire support tends to revolve around not willing to go as far as some contem- American warfighting strategy tempo- where (geography and echelon) and how porary futurists in declaring that time is a rally in terms of weeks, or months—not (timing and C2) to employ fires, and the new dimension in warfare—the last, lat- just now but for years to come. This is need to rapidly neutralize an enemy’s in- est, or fourth dimension. Here he merely often suggested by wargames and con- creasingly long-range, accurate, and avers what most well schooled and expe- firmed by contingencies. Forward pres- lethal fire-delivery means. The desirabil- rienced military professionals already ence is our hedge; but though necessary ity of developing and exploiting techno- know: that time is “the first and primary it is seldom sufficient. logical and operational asymmetries in dimension that commanders and leaders Fighting by Minutes takes up the tem- the employment of fires, particularly on have had to struggle with from the dawn poral characteristics of warfare: duration, the operational level of war, tends to fall of history. Length, width, and height do frequency, sequence, and opportunity. early victim to the belief that virtually all not exist if they have no reality in time.” Duration has a beginning and end, but modern armies in the future will be able Leonhard identifies four temporal Leonhard might have said more about to see and shoot about as far and as effec- characteristics of war—duration, fre- “onset.” Recent wargames and other tively as everyone else. This view, of quency, sequence, and opportunity—and analyses suggest that real leverage may course, both ignores and—for all but a devotes a chapter to each of them. Pro- be gained by applying pre-hostility hos- single-minded technologist—highlights ceeding from the fact that time can be tilities, for example, in sophisticated ap- the importance of doctrinal concepts for observed, measured, and then manipu- proaches to information warfare. The au- organizing and using fire support sys- lated, he concludes that a commander in thor asserts that the relationship between tems, a singularly important idea to technological disparity and duration is which Gudmundsson frequently returns. spurious. Large imbalances in strength

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and technical advancement do not per- an enemy’s actions but, more impor- ized control versus centralized/detailed force mean that a war will be shorter. tantly, the order of the two combined. control, and two competing theories of Similarly, he views as specious the argu- In many ways the chapter on oppor- war (the Gumbo and Nodal theories), ment that length of a war is a function of tunity, the fourth and last temporal di- may justify the hefty price of the book. the relationship between attack and de- mension of war, is the best. To Leonhard, Depending on the flow of information, fense (if the former is qualitatively supe- opportunity is not simply a decision either of the basic types of command and rior to tactical defense because of point but a time-sensitive point, “and control may be effective, but “there is no weapons technology, a war will be that changes all the rules.” A good and intrinsic, universal merit in mission tac- shorter, and vice versa). It may apply to timely decision, while critically neces- tics alone.” Indeed, he argues that de- battles, but not wars—a distinction that sary, is not sufficient. There must be ef- tailed control has gained strength as a vi- often gets blurred. The major determi- fective action, which requires an execut- able command technique in recent years nant of war duration, he says, is an at- ing unit to have the requisite capabilities owing to the essential shift in informa- tacker’s objectives. (One suspects that a to act. Here the author delves into a tion flow as a result of the growth in reli- defender’s objectives and cultural predis- major issue that often surfaces among able sensor and communications tech- positions might also be relevant.) Other those who ponder future-oriented opera- nology. As for Gumbo versus Nodes, the determinants include relative incompe- tional and organizational concepts. Logi- unceasing search for greater range may tence (the commander who makes fewest cally, in pursuing fleeting opportunities, carry little-understood (by nonoperators) mistakes wins) and number of partici- one headquarters should be responsible. penalties and missed opportunities. pants (more means longer). Also, short “Unfortunately, real experience in war The author concludes that there are wars tend to produce fewer changes. often indicates that the one who decides tough choices ahead, such as deciding the Winners claim that their doctrine works and the one who acts usually are at two level of command that will be decisive in and maintain the status quo, while losers different levels: the headquarters decides a conflict, and how to provide it with suf- consider that theirs did not and make and instructs a subordinate headquarters ficiently robust organic combined arms changes. to act.” So while eliminating echelons capability and real authority. Further, Frequency in war involves how fast may be a good idea in theory, it almost there is the danger of giving a commander things happen: tempo. “Frequency lies at certainly is not in practice—that is, un- long-range weapons that do not mix well the heart of how we perceive warfare. less the remaining echelons are provided with other assets, that overburden intelli- . . . Of all the temporal characteristics in with the requisite combined arms. And it gence capabilities, and that even threaten warfare, frequency is the one that lies at is virtually impossible to determine in the most critical principle of war, unity of the foundation of doctrine, tactics, and advance any one organizational alloca- command. Lastly, fighting doctrine must strategy. When revolutionary changes tion of resources and authority that will be balanced to allow for an effective mix occur in warfare, most of the time it is cover even the major possibilities. of directive and control. This is indeed a because there has been a change in fre- Current notions of commanders on daunting agenda for analytic action, and quency at some level—a change in how virtually all levels participating interac- we should press on with it. fast things happen.” In general, and as tively in the same net and operating Two chapters on surprise are more borne out by history and logic, the largely autonomously on the basis of a abstract. The author’s sense of the “real greater the frequency in war, the shorter commander’s intent or by negation may issue” involves whether to get to the ob- the war. Leonhard thinks that change in eventually solve this dilemma. But while jective area first or with the most—to frequency on the tactical level—espe- these ideas undeniably have a certain preempt or concentrate. He says that it cially major change—is the greatest cause theoretical appeal, they have yet to be really is situational but that the Army of revolution in military art and science. demonstrated, much less convincingly, trains only for the latter. Still, a synthesis He reasons that doctrine can be accom- outside of the relatively narrow realm of may be possible, as he explains using the modated to frequencies which are near a few large naval platforms engaging a concept of a “preemption-concentration the norm. But if changed significantly in relatively small number of enemy plat- cycle.” either direction (blitzkrieg versus trench forms—the classic example of “few-on- Leonhard concludes with a chapter warfare thinking), doctrine begins to fal- few.” And this has never been done in on coup d’ oeil, or a commander’s inner vi- ter to the extent that, at the extremes, modern warfare. At the least, these futur- sion, and how time is the independent war may not even be perceived. (Recall istic concepts tend to ignore the kinds of variable and space must be made to con- the earlier comment on “pre-hostility complexities that quickly arise in cases of form. The commander’s art thus involves hostilities.”) At either extreme old doc- “many-on-many,” as well as the differ- structuring a campaign designed to force trines usually succumb. ence between being able to communicate an enemy into contradictory dispositions Those who believe the next major with someone and being able to control at each point in time. This begins with war will be resolved in one powerful them—especially when the span of con- viewing the campaign not in terms of blow can skip the sometimes vague chap- trol becomes very large. time required but rather time available. ter on sequence. But those who perceive Leonhard begins an extended treat- Seemingly intending to motivate readers that warfare typically is resolved in mul- ment of mission tactics with the follow- to initiate heated arguments with those of tiple, discrete—if increasingly high-fre- ing observation: “The U.S. Army has fi- the opposite persuasion, Fighting by Min- quency—events, or those who remain nally adopted mission tactics—just in utes ends with the observation that, while uncertain, should take heed. Seeing time for it to become irrelevant to mod- opportunities will prompt commanders to virtue in necessity, Leonhard believes ern warfare.” He then continues, “the delegate, the demands of unity of effort there is power in sequence. Each event in theory of mission tactics does not play will prompt them to centralize. He re- war has a value that depends upon out in practice, because higher headquar- solves the dilemma in his own mind by events that precede and follow it. Out- ters retains control of the resources.” It is all concluding that commanders should or- comes favor commanders who contrive downhill from there. His take on the rel- ganize in such a way as to empower the to control not just the order of their or ative advantages of directive/decentral- higher echelons. (Let the debate begin.)

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Ambitious in scope, and thus some- victory.” The balance of the work con- what uneven in its presentation, Fighting MORE THAN DEEDS sists of diverse case studies—six from by Minutes is an important book: logical World War II—that support his conclu- and systematic in its development, sophis- OF DERRING-DO sions: the German attack on Eben Emael, ticated, analytic, often subtle, frequently Belgium (1940); the Italian manned tor- irreverent, and consistently mind expand- A Book Review by pedo strike at Alexandria, Egypt (1941); ing. Serious students of all levels of war JOHN M. COLLINS the British raid against Saint-Nazaire, past, present, or prospective future—and France (1942); Otto Skorzeny’s rescue of especially future—will learn much from it. Benito Mussolini from Gran Sasso, Italy Although it may be a bit daunting for all Spec Ops, Case Studies in (1943); the British midget sub attack on but the best read and analytically minded Special Operations Warfare: the Tirpitz (1943); the Ranger rescue mis- younger professionals, it should be stud- Theory and Practice sion at Cabanatuan, a Japanese PW camp ied at staff colleges and higher levels and by William H. McRaven in the Philippines (1945); the unsuccess- by anyone pondering the likely nature of Novato, California: Presidio, 1995 ful American operation at Son Tay prison future war, including RMA. Many of Leon- 402 pp. $27.95 camp in North Vietnam (1970); and the hard’s conclusions and hypotheses would [ISBN 0–89141–544–0] Israeli counterterrorist operation at En- make good raw material for future-ori- tebbe, Uganda (1976). ented wargames and simulations, for as he The cases selected span the conflict says, “With an insight into the nature of he best ideas are expressed briefly. spectrum from peacetime engagement to fourth-dimensional fighting, the road is TLaw libraries, for example, are loaded global war. All emphasize direct action open to new doctrines, new tactics, and with volumes that interpret the Constitu- combat missions against extremely tough new strategies.” tion, but the document itself, including targets, but the author seems confident Grasping the concepts of maneuver, all 26 amendments, takes up only a few that his theory applies to every form of fires, and time remains critical to under- pages. The SOP of the erstwhile Strategic special operations. Moreover, he con- standing the art of war—past, present, Research Group, activated at the Na- tends that conventional forces rather and future. All three books reviewed tional War College in 1971 “to develop than Rangers, SEALs, air commandos, or above contribute to an appreciation of innovative studies...for consideration other special operations units may be the these vantage points. The past is history by decisionmakers at the highest levels of principal participants (Jimmy Doolittle, and the present is largely ephemeral; the the U.S. Government and Armed Forces,” who led a flight of 16 B–25 bombers from future, however, including the possible confined its reports to fifty or fewer dou- the aircraft carrier USS Hornet to attack nature of war, is yet to be. How it unfolds ble-spaced pages. Tokyo in 1942, most certainly substanti- can be of profound significance, not just William McRaven, current comman- ated this view). for the military art but for the well-being der of SEAL Team Three, is well within of nations, indeed of entire civilizations. Perhaps most importantly, the future is something on which military profession- als can start to work now, to influence, shape, define, and even bring about. With this in mind, Gudmundsson posits that there are essentially two ap- proaches to conceptualizing war. One, practiced by J.F.C. Fuller, involves arriv- ing at opinions and designs by a process of deduction from first principles. The other, as practiced by Guderian, is empir- ical. It begins from the premise that war has been, is, and always will be a practi- cal business whose particulars are suffi- Air Force special ciently complex to defy brilliant theories tactics unit. and devalue the strongly held beliefs of DOD those who lack operational experience or a fundamental appreciation of it as prac- ticed by others. the limitations imposed on the Strategic Spec Ops expounds six principles of It is curious that many people today Research Group when in the first 25 special operations derived from eight who are trying to put their stamp on the pages of Spec Ops he offers a theory to case studies: simplicity, security, repeti- future tend to favor Hart’s (and Douhet’s) help decisionmakers “determine, prior to tion, surprise, speed, and purpose. They essentially theoretical deductive ap- [a special] operation, the best way to “dominated every successful mission,” proach, and generally shrug off if not dis- achieve relative superiority, then...tai- McRaven finds, and if “one of [them] was dain the experience-honed views of some lor special operations planning and overlooked, disregarded, or bypassed, of history’s most innovative military preparation to improve our chances of there was invariably a failure of some thinkers and lionized field commanders. magnitude.” Five principles correspond It will be interesting to see how this plays closely with objective, surprise, simplic- out in the future. JFQ John M. Collins is senior specialist ity, and security, longstanding principles in national defense at the Congressional of war. Speed is one facet of maneuver. Research Service, Library of Congress. Only repetition is distinctively different.

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Large conventional forces, however, can- The predominant emphasis is on not apply these principles to gain relative FROM STRATEGISTS hegemonic war, fought between great superiority, the author states, because it powers and over vital interests. The essays is difficult for them “to develop a simple TO STRATEGY are masterful accounts, showing impres- plan, keep their movements concealed, sive scholarly achievement and depth. conduct detailed full-dress rehearsals A Book Review by The earliest is Donald Kagan’s stimulating (down to the individual soldier’s level), AUDREY KURTH CRONIN chapter on Athenian strategy in the Pelo- gain tactical surprise and speed on target, ponnesian War. It is a good start, for an and motivate all the soldiers in the unit analysis of Pericles’ failed strategy is fasci- to a single goal. At some point the span The Making of Strategy: Rulers, nating, inviting thought on the danger of of command and control becomes too States, and War not matching means to ends, and the pit- great....Large forces...are more suscep- edited by Williamson Murray, Macgregor fall of assuming rationality (or at least tible to the frictions of war.” Knox, and Alvin Bernstein predictable thought) in an enemy. Alvin McRaven further finds that “relative Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Bernstein’s piece on Rome (264–201 B.C.) superiority is a concept crucial to the the- 1994. also draws readers into another category— ory of special operations.” That precondi- 680 pp. $34.95 that of the alien milieu of a warrior cul- tion of success “is achieved at the pivotal [ISBN 0–521–45389–5] ture, where violence is raised to the level moment in an engagement” that may be of virtue. (Such thinking may not be that before or during combat, as the cases trategy-making is an ancient yet elusive foreign today—especially in the inner confirm. “Once relative superiority is Sart. Inextricable from history, it has em- city.) Bernstein’s admonition that we must achieved, it must be sustained in order to ployed historical examples in exploring war- avoid believing that others view strategy guarantee victories,” and if lost is diffi- making since at least the time of Thucy- and the use of force in the same terms cult or impossible to regain. “An inher- dides. More recently, the transition from the that we do is always good advice. ent weakness in special forces is their age of the professional soldier to that of Other excellent chapters include lack of firepower relative to a large con- mass armies and unlimited warfare has Arthur Waldron’s on Chinese national secu- th th ventional force...they lose the initia- forced leaders of industrialized states to rity strategy in the 14 to 17 centuries. tive, and the stronger form of warfare focus even more attention, time, and re- The conflict between nomadic “barbarians” generally prevails.” sources on the imperative to learn from the and the “morally superior” Ming dynasty Most books about special ops simply triumphs and debacles of the past. The book invites reflection on the influence of culture describe daring exploits. This one is far reviewed here follows in that tradition. It is on strategic thinking. Mobile warfare as more useful because the theory which it an imposing collection of essays on strategy conducted by nomadic steppe people made presents invites us to think, to adopt beginning with the Peloponnesian War in much Chinese military theory obsolete. what applies, or to either elaborate or re- the fifth century B.C. and ending with Eliot Cohen’s examination of the United place it if we know better ways to sustain American strategy during the Cold War. States between the world wars debunks the capabilities that small, specialized forces The Making of Strategy is intended to traditional argument that the Nation with- can employ to defeat larger, well-armed describe procedures by which “political drew at that time into military paralysis, ar- opponents. In sum, Spec Ops will benefit and military leaders evolve and articulate guing instead that it developed institutions, strategists or tacticians who hope to beat strategies in response to external chal- weapons, and a mobilization base that were apparently insurmountable odds by con- lenges” and expand on the extant litera- essential in wartime. “The experience and ducting special ops. It should be on the ture, especially the 1941 classic, Makers of memories of those years help account for desk of every official who must decide Modern Strategy, edited by Edward Mead the otherwise inexplicable willingness of when and where to commit special oper- Earle, as well as a more recently updated the American people to tolerate...vast ations forces. JFQ version of that work edited by Peter Paret. peacetime military establishments; the pre- Arguing that the earlier volumes focused mium on readiness and avoidance of sur- on the influence of individual thinkers, prise attack; the willingness to conceive of the editors of this new collection purport national security in global rather than local to stress the process by which strategy is terms; and the American military’s persis- made. In an age of industrialized warfare, tent preference for excessively neat patterns mass armies, complex bureaucracies, and of civilian-military relations.” These are democratic decisionmaking, this mandate thought-provoking pieces with much to in- seems more realistic. No one person really terest today’s strategist. Missing “makes” strategy in the modern age or ar- There are numerous other fine efforts: an Issue? guably even decisively influences it, except Geoffrey Parker on Habsburg Spain, John during war. But understanding the consis- Lynn on France under Louis XIV, Peter Copies of back tent variables that have affected its forma- Maslowski on America before the Civil War, numbers of JFQ tion throughout history might lend in- Brian Sullivan on Italy in World War I, and are available in sight into the contemporary process Wilhelm Deist on Germany before and dur- limited quan- wherein major states plan for or avoid ing World War II. Each is a classic and will tities to members of the Armed conflict. That is the goal of this volume. become a standard reference for decades to Forces and institutions. Please send come. But the issue for the reviewer is whether this collection transcends the your request to the Editor at the Audrey Kurth Cronin teaches at the high quality of the individual essays to address or FAX number listed on the University of Maryland and is the author of achieve harmony and cohesion on a masthead. JFQ Great Power Politics and the Struggle over higher level. Is the whole greater than the Austria, 1945–1955. sum of its parts? Here one is less sure.

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Some of the finest military histori- extremely scant, with only one article cov- There is also a problem of terminol- ans are represented in The Making of ering U.S. strategy from 1945 to 1991. ogy. Military professionals and defense Strategy; there is not a poor essay in the And there is nothing on post-1945 Soviet specialists have spent much time defin- book. Murray et al. are to be commended strategy. Why is the prime focus of strate- ing strategy. No doubt this has been for a pervasive standard of excellence. gic minds in this century not explored? overdone. Doctrinal debates over the But editing such an anthology also in- Michael Handel writes on Israel, but that wording of a definition and its implica- volves explaining why one period is cho- is hardly far afield from European/Ameri- tions can be wasted efforts. The complex- sen and another omitted and how bal- can strategic thinking. Perhaps an essay ity of the subject is reflected in the diffi- ance and strategic vision (using the on the Arab or Gulf states would have pro- culty of defining it precisely. But in a phrase advisedly) are injected into an en- vided another dimension. There is noth- single work it is wise to be consistent, tire collection. Are we presented with a ing on China, Korea, India, or any other and this collection is not. volume that reflects the expertise of the contemporary Asian power. Is the next The authors argue that definitions contributors rather than a purposeful ap- enemy likely to come from Europe? of strategy are pointless, because “strat- proach to the study of strategy? One conclusion from these case egy is a process, a constant adaptation to Eight of the nineteen essays deal studies seems to be that having a rigid in- shifting conditions and circumstances in with strategy before and during World tellectual frame of reference is dangerous a world where chance, uncertainty, and War I or II. This is understandable: these in strategy. The Ming Chinese, for exam- ambiguity dominate.” Clausewitz is ap- are periods about which the most is ple, approached the Mongols from a nar- parent throughout this collection, and known, on which scholars can most ef- row cultural perspective and thus largely the folly of a rigid system of definition fectively plumb the depths of archives. It failed to develop an effective national se- and rule-making is well understood. Fur- is also logical to focus on war, since strat- curity policy. Both the British and French thermore, defining strategy broadly is egy is theory, and its strengths or weak- considered war too horrible to contem- well suited to contributors whose pur- nesses are determined in warfare. But are plate in the interwar years and were al- pose is to show how discreet factors— systemic wars the best source of insight most obliterated by a highly radical Ger- namely, geography, history, culture, eco- for today and the future? The editors of man ideology with revolutionary goals. nomics, and governmental systems— The Making of Strategy state that they are In the Peloponnesian War the Athenians have affected the strategic process. not trying to be encyclopedic; compre- assumed “rational calculation” by the But reading this book one is inclined hensiveness on such a theme is unrealis- Spartans, and their strategy was defeated to ask what is not strategy? War-making tic. But some discussion of why certain in part because the enemy’s psychology on a grand scale has become a national areas are heavily explored while others confounded their expectations. In select- enterprise, drawing on all resources of the are not would be enlightening. ing cases from the modern era, the edi- modern state. And is there a difference Save for the interwar years and tors display a strong American and Euro- here between grand strategy, military World War II, for example, virtually the pean bias. The later chapters, at least, strategy, and policy? The articles contra- entire focus is on Europe. What of Japan? may fall into the very trap that the edi- dict each other. Admittedly, strategy and The coverage of the post-1945 years is also tors seem to advise against. the making of strategy are very elusive concepts. The advantage of studying the makers of strategy is that by concentrating 1996 SYMPOSIA on individuals one has a clear focus and INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES thus avoids the problem of trying to con- NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY vince 19 strong-minded contributors to agree. Some of them comment on the five A symposium on general factors, but many do not. The lack “Stability in the Asia Pacific: of a sense that the authors share a com- mon view of what strategy is—or at least a An Integrated Strategy for Security” general sense of what the strategic process will be held on February 13–14, 1996, at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. is—undermines the focus of the volume. The book is dedicated to those who The third annual died in Vietnam, “because their leaders had Joint Operations Symposium no patience with history or with the im- will be convened on August 14–15, 1996, ponderables that are the stuff of history.” at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. Yet, little attention is given to the type of warfare that seems to be predominant today—limited regional conflict. What To obtain details on future symposia or registration material for the above events, about the making of strategy in such cases? contact: National Defense University Is it really strategy? Or is strategy only made ATTN: NDU–NSS–SY when all national resources are involved? Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 Again, a clearer notion of what is meant by Telephone: (202) 287–9230/DSN 667–9230 “making strategy” would be helpful. Fax: (202) 287–9239/DSN 667–9239 Finally, the treatment of the period Internet: [email protected] since 1945 is particularly unsatisfying as Further information on upcoming events, recent publications, et al. is available to U.S. defense planners today try to project Internet users via the National Defense University World Wide Web server. Access any strategy into an uncertain future. There is Web Browser (for example, Mosaic or Netscape) by addressing http://www.ndu.edu. no doubt that the is in Symposia programs and registration material are normally posted on the server 90 days transition, and at such a time it is natural prior to events. to look to the recent past.

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Colin Gray’s sweeping generaliza- Khaled seems to have understood the na- tions about the United States during the A PRINCE ture of the Iraqi opposition force better Cold War are not always fulfilling. The than did the Americans. He did not have thrust of his argument is that America is OF A TALE reams of intelligence or years of training, ignorant of strategy-making but has but he grasped certain fundamentals. In muddled through the Cold War surpris- A Book Review by particular, as he stated at the time, the ingly well. There are brilliant and PATRICK L. CLAWSON battle of al–Khafji on January 30–31 was provocative statements; however, the a signal event. As Michael Gordon and lack of historical documentation to back Bernard Trainor saw it in The Generals’ generalizations and the already dated na- Desert Warrior: War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the ture of some assertions undermine the ar- A Personal View of the Gulf War by Gulf (reviewed in JFQ, Summer 1995), the gument on many points. the Joint Forces Commander battle revealed just how impotent Iraq Much of the discussion centers on by Khaled bin Sultan, with Patrick Seale was against the coalition forces. It pro- nuclear strategy during the Cold War. London: HarperCollins, 1995. vided evidence that the Iraqis were ut- 492 pp. $35.00 Gray criticizes the American tendency to [ISBN 0–06–017298–3] terly incapable of fighting a modern war focus on apolitical solutions to nuclear and were dispirited to the point of inef- problems, relying on the artificial cate- fectiveness. Thereafter, Khaled correctly chism of deterrence to the detriment of predicted that the land war would be a understanding the political nature of strat- he Saudi royal family is discreet to a cake walk. egy-making. Moreover the United States Tfault. That makes the autobiography If criticism of Schwarzkopf for over- does not look beyond the near-term: of Prince Khaled bin Sultan, senior Saudi estimating the threat is one theme of “[T]he lack of foresight ingrained in cul- commander during Operation ture and institutions can render even the Desert Storm, son of Saudi defense idea of long-range planning mildly hu- minister Prince Sultan, and HRH General morous.” In the realm of the nuclear, he is nephew of King Fahd, all the more Khaled bin Sultan. to some degree correct; Americans are fas- remarkable. He does little to mask cinated by technology and will approach his motive, which is to take issue the world with a problem-solving bias. It with the account of the Persian is, as he points out, part of our culture. Gulf War found in It Doesn’t Take a But there seems to be little under- Hero by Norman Schwarzkopf. standing of the role of economic and do- When that book was published, mestic political factors. The problem-solv- Khaled challenged what he termed ing approach may be ahistorical and “slanted remarks” and “con- apolitical in some senses, but it is the only cocted” stories “distorted...to politically viable stance from a domestic give [Schwarzkopf] all the credit viewpoint. This is not Great Britain. Gray’s for the victory over Iraq while run- overarching argument—that U.S. civilian ning down just about everyone and military planners have no real under- else.” standing of strategy-making, yet that To be blunt, in comparing DOD American grand strategy in the Cold War these two “I like me” books, the years was a resounding success—appears Prince comes across as more of a to be contradictory and ungenerous. And gentleman (or should I say more of a Desert Warrior, another is the cavalier ap- it is unhelpful to those of us who, by prince?) than Schwarzkopf. Khaled did proach used to end the war. Khaled’s ac- studying recent history, hope to glean well to engage the services of Patrick count of the March 3 meeting at Safwan new insights for fathoming the future. Seale, a British journalist–cum–author with Iraqi Lieutenant General Sultan This book has much to offer students with a deep knowledge of the Middle East Hashim Ahmad has the ring of truth to it. of military history, comparative defense and experience in doing difficult biogra- According to Khaled, not much thought planning, and the evolution of strategy. phies (his work on Syria’s President Hafez was given to the political impact of the The quality of the writing and scholarship al–Asad is a classic). The criticism in meeting, and so major errors were made: is high, and it goes beyond the Earle and Desert Warrior is in the archetypal British Saddam Hussein and his top officials were Paret volumes to cover new ground in a pi- style, offered more in sorrow than anger. able to avoid being seen conceding to the oneering way. The volume easily makes the Instead of resentment of Schwarzkopf’s allies, no statement of surrender was re- case that the process of making strategy is condescension toward the poor perfor- quired, not much was done for Kuwaiti at least as important as those who make it. mance of Saudi land forces and command POWs (whom Iraq might well have It therefore fulfills its purpose and is a valu- structure, there are detailed accounts of handed over if pressed), and the Iraqi side able contribution to the field. There are in- points on which Khaled comes across bet- was able to preserve various privileges consistencies, and the book provokes more ter than his American counterpart. (such as helicopter flights) which were in- questions than it answers, yet intelligent Those points include one of the valuable in maintaining Saddam’s rule de- readers will find it engaging. The essays can most important of the war: in retrospect, spite uprisings in March and April 1991. be sampled like vintage port—individually Khaled is wise not to claim that he spoke savored even if not always complementary. out against these mistakes. He portrays There may be no easy answers; but there is Patrick L. Clawson is an analyst in the himself as troubled by the events but pre- much here to stimulate thought about past Institute for National Strategic Studies at pared to defer to the United States for the approaches and their relationships to cur- the National Defense University and author sake of allied unity and out of respect for rent strategic dilemmas. JFQ of Iran’s Challenge to the West. its expertise. Perhaps. But it is also possi-

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ble that Saudi leaders were just as unpre- arose from a seminar on the “Army in pared as the Americans for an end to the THE MILITARY IN the Service of Society and Democracy” war. Desert Storm was a spectacular sponsored by the Konrad Adenaur Foun- achievement on many fronts, but it was ISRAELI SOCIETY dation in Israel. Over half of the book ex- not a shining example of how to carry amines the role of the IDF in Israeli soci- out war termination. A Book Review by ety, including an excellent chapter on Although the implicit criticisms of JOSEPH E. GOLDBERG civilian control by Moshe Lissak. Because Schwarzkopf in the last third of Desert the military has played a significant part Warrior are well worth reading, the first in integrating a heterogeneous Jewish two-thirds are thinner fare. Anyone look- Civil-Military Relations in Israel population into Israeli society through its ing for insight into how Saudi decision- by Yehuda Ben Meir educational function, the IDF has con- making works will not find it here. And New York: Columbia University tributed to the growth of the state be- Press, 1995. some sensitive issues are discussed in yond its obvious security accomplish- 235 pp. $29.95 ments. In addition, the book devotes terms that do not jibe with what sea- ISBN 0–231–09684–4] soned regional analysts would expect or chapters to civil-military relations in the United States, Singapore, France, Britain, what some journalists reported at the The Military in the Service of Society Yugoslavia, and Germany. time. Specifically, Khaled would have us and Democracy: The Challenge believe that his involvement in procure- The volume by Yehuda Ben Meir be- of the Dual-Role Military gins with two fine chapters on civil-mili- ment from Saudi sources was motivated edited by Daniella Ashkenazy purely by the desire to ensure that deals tary relations. He emphasizes that a com- Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood plete separation of these two sectors of were done at low cost to the Saudi exche- Press, 1994. society would be as unwise as it would be quer, while other accounts attribute to 229 pp. $55.00 impractical to achieve. The civil sector him an interest in the distribution of the [ISBN 0–313–29004–0] must grasp the realities of the assets, both profits. According to Financial Times re- human and material, that are available to porter Simon Henderson, Khaled “made pursue their strategic objectives while the far too much money from the war. Esti- emocratic governments, ever fearful military must be aware of political objec- mates vary from several hundred million of losing their freedoms, have held to D tives. The danger, he believes, stems less dollars to up to $7 billion, according to the principle of civilian supremacy over from a military takeover than from civil senior Western officials.” the military. The Federalist Papers articu- authorities simply deferring to the mili- lated the Founders’ suspicion of standing Despite its subtitle “A Personal View tary in formulating ends as well as means. armies and defended the Constitution of the Gulf War,” the first third of Desert Military solutions are not always the best against the accusation that it provided in- Warrior is about the Prince’s upbringing course of action. This danger becomes sufficient safeguards against the military’s and life prior to Desert Storm. It is slow acute, of course, in times of crisis. encroachment into civilian affairs. going. While involved in some fascinat- Ben Meir offers a model of civil-mil- Two recent publications on Israeli ing events, he is not about to spill family itary relations that divides policy con- civil-military relations help us to better or national secrets. In particular, he tells cerns into political affairs, domestic mat- understand this relationship in democra- us little of what we would like to know ters, national security, and the armed cies in general and Israel specifically. Civil- about the deal for Chinese long–range forces. Whereas civilian involvement is Military Relations in Israel by Yehuda Ben missiles for which he was responsible justified in all these areas, military activ- Meir and The Military in the Service of Soci- (How was the United States kept in the ity in the political and electoral processes ety and Democracy, an anthology edited by dark? What kind of political discussions is prohibited. His discussion of policy Daniella Ashkenazy, each make a valuable took place inside Saudi Arabia about pur- and the existing literature is illuminating contribution to the growing body of liter- suing this deal? What dialogue was there and is a contribution in its own right. ature on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). with the Chinese about the geostrategic Civil-Military Relations in Israel Since independence Israel has found implications of the deal?). frankly discusses past IDF involvement in itself in a constant state of hostilities. It is not surprising to find that a critical issues. But despite this involve- Not counting the Scud missile attacks Saudi prince is guarded. Khaled comes ment, the Israeli state has ensured that during the Persian Gulf War, Israel has from a culture in which knowledge is military participation is depoliticized. In been at war five times since 1948. It has power and knowledge shared is power part, Ben Meir traces this tradition to a also been constantly threatened by ter- lost. The pleasure is to find how open he heritage which has nurtured belief in lib- rorist acts. The contribution of the mili- is about Desert Storm. And it is satisfying erty and warned Israelis of the dangers of tary to Israel’s survival is therefore greatly to find an Arab leader who offers a rather militarism. But he also acknowledges the appreciated and, as Avraham Carmeli’s sobering analysis, without hyperbole, unique contribution to civilian control chapter in The Military in the Service of So- with only the normal level of bragging by the country’s first prime minister and ciety and Democracy points out, inductees found in such accounts, and with scat- defense minister, David Ben Gurion. into the Israeli army hold the IDF in high tered comments about shortcomings on Clausewitz’s dictum that strategy ex- esteem and see military service as con- his side. That Khaled and Schwarzkopf ists to fulfill political ends is quoted so tributing to their personal growth as well frequently that we forget that not only did not see eye to eye on every issue was as national security. Ashkenazy’s book expectable. Indeed, what is most striking do military ends serve as a means to ac- about their respective accounts is how complish political objectives, but that well the U.S. and Saudi sides worked to- political objectives also must take strate- gether despite cultural differences. JFQ Joseph E. Goldberg is director of research at gic capabilities into account. Both books the Industrial College of the Armed Forces reviewed open us to a number of dimen- and coeditor of the Dictionary of the Arab- sions of civil-military relations on which we should all reflect. JFQ Israeli Conflict (forthcoming).

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Autumn 1995 / JFQ Cover 3 Cover4 JFQ9 10/1/96 9:16 AM Page 1

coming next... D-Day Veracruz—1847 plus tuning the instruments of U.S. power, accomplishing the joint training mission, harnessing the revolution in military affairs and more in the Winter 95–96 issue of JFQ

JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C.