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Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs America’s ‘Greater Middle East’ and Europe Key Issues for the Transatlantic Dialogue Volker Perthes SWP Comments Within the next few years, if not over the next few decades, the Middle East will become the focus of international geopolitics and thereby largely determine relations between Europe and America. The US administration has embraced the cause of bringing a ‘new order’ to the region and has underscored this by announcing a ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ (GMEI), for which it will seek transatlantic approval at the forthcoming June 2004 NATO and G8 summits. The content of that initiative comprises a Republican administration. Even a Demo- series of political, military and economic cratic administration is likely to make the programmes. These will include multilat- reform and re-making of the Middle East eral and bilateral measures to democratise part of its own, as well as a transatlantic Middle Eastern countries, offers of free agenda. trade made to individual countries, the At the same time, America’s GMEI is still geographical extension and deepening of far from worked out to the last detail. In the OSCE-Mediterranean partnership and a fact, the grandiose geopolitical concept em- programme of military co-operation akin to bodied in the title of the initiative partly NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The initiative conceals a lack of fresh ideas. This situation reflects a growing awareness in Washing- constitutes an opportunity for Europe: ton, in the wake of the war in Iraq, that in instead of merely tagging along with (or the fight against terrorism and the prolif- rejecting) US initiatives, it can – and should eration of weapons of mass destruction – play a prominent role in shaping the (WMD), it is not enough to make military debate about a comprehensive transatlantic threats to unfriendly regimes or to topple strategy towards its southern neighbour- them. Belatedly, Washington has also hood. Europe’s approach will differ, at realised that structural problems in the least in part, from the American one. This region need to be tackled. Europe should has been hinted at by Germany’s Foreign expect quite assertive demands from Minister, Joschka Fischer, in his speech at Washington to take part in a reorganisation the Munich Security Conference. This paper or restructuring of the ‘Greater’ Middle outlines some of the key issues that will East. This will be the case not only under a dominate the debate about a common SWP Comments 3 February 2004 1 policy on the Middle East and describes them with punitive measures, sanctions what it sees as the German and European and maybe even the possibility of an positions in this transatlantic discussion. externally imposed regime change, Euro- pean policy-makers will likely try to sup- port reform-minded forces within the The democratisation of Arab and countries in question and nudge existing Middle Eastern countries regimes towards the path to reform The US and the EU agree that a democratic through dialogue, material support, and transformation of the Arab world or the forms of conditionality. These different wider Middle East is a goal that should be approaches become particularly obvious pursued. Europeans will likely remind their with regard to Iran. Despite shared trans- US counterparts that Europe has pursued atlantic interests (not the least of which is this goal even before September 2001, and the abandonment of Iran’s nuclear weap- has not merely “discovered” the lack of ons programme), the United States and democracy in the Arab world in the context Europe continue to regard Iran through of its struggle against international ter- fundamentally different prisms, and this rorism. As a matter of fact, democracy- will no doubt continue to stand in the way building, the support of civil society, the of any joint policy. Washington still con- rule of law, and human rights have been siders Iran to be a ‘rogue state’ whose key elements of the political and security regime refuses to adapt the country’s chapter of the “Barcelona process” (the domestic and foreign policy to Western Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) both in (and, probably, popular) demands. Europe, its multilateral and bilateral dimensions in contrast, sees Iran as a problematic part- (Barcelona Declaration and individual ner, but also as a complex society with association agreements). From a European enormous possibilities for progressive viewpoint, therefore, what is needed is not domestic policy developments. It also a “forward strategy of freedom” (George W. views it – as may occasionally be pointed Bush), but a common perspective for out – as currently the most pluralistic political, economic and social change in system in the Gulf. Europe’s neighbourhood that builds on Europe’s pragmatic efforts to foster the potentials in these countries and takes democratisation often entail embracing their societies on board, respects their the unsatisfying principle of ‘taking dignity, and realises the linkages that exist countries from where they are’ and rather between political and economic under- banking on good examples set elsewhere development on the one hand and un- (best practices) and dialogue than on resolved territorial conflicts on the other. threats of regime change. In other words, European policy-makers may well be prepared to support even minor reform Complex processes steps (education, administrative reform, or In the transatlantic debate, Europeans may economic policies) in a country like Syria, also have to point out that democratisation even if the speed of political development is not a linear process, but rather a lengthy, in that country lags way behind what complicated undertaking full of contradic- Europe would like to see, while criticising tions, political battles and setbacks. Some- countries like Tunisia, Palestine, Lebanon what simplified, the differences between or Israel for deficiencies of democratic the American and European approaches development or human rights violations can be described as follows: whereas the that may be comparatively less serious. One United States tend to cite the democratic of the lessons of the Barcelona process is deficits of governments that oppose West- that it may be wise to break up the concept ern interests in the region and threaten of “democracy” into its constituent ele- SWP Comments 3 February 2004 2 ments, such as: the rule of law, indepen- Where is the ‘Greater Middle East’? dence of the judiciary, transparency, To develop policies for a particular region accountability, strengthening of civil of the world, it is important to know which society, etc. This may make it easier to take countries one is actually talking about. A the elites of these countries along, and sensibly targeted policy can only be devel- create common interests rather than fears oped if sufficient consideration is given to of externally enforced regime change. regional conflicts and their linkages, to the However, shortcomings in Europe’s self-perception of individual states and policy of trying to further the cause of societies, and to those transnational poli- democratisation should not be ignored. tical, socio-cultural and economic relations Indeed, neither Berlin nor Brussels have dis- that make people feel that they actually cussed the issue of the conditionality of eco- belong to a particular region. Participants nomic aid and political relations in satis- in the US debate on the ‘Greater Middle factory depth, let alone operationalised it. East’ as well as some of their European col- leagues associate the concept with very different geopolitical notions. Phrases like Democracy as an objective, “from Marrakech to Bangladesh” sound not a prerequisite for action by the West good, but they are not particularly clear. In While the democratic transformation of the a preparatory working paper for the June Arab states is clearly a goal, it cannot from 2004 G8 Summit, the US administration a European perspective be considered a has defined the ‘Greater Middle East’ as precondition for political engagement, including the Arab states, Israel, Turkey, especially not for a serious engagement in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some the Middle East peace process. Occasionally, pundits go further and include all of American or Israeli commentators claim Central Asia or the Caucasus. Yet, at the that only democratic states can make same time analysts often refer to the Arab peace; it would be premature, therefore, to countries alone when they start identifying resume serious peace efforts in the Middle specific problems. East unless major Arab states turn demo- To find a definition that is useful for cratic. Practically, this claim serves as a Europe’s foreign and security policies, pretext for those who do not want to the aforementioned factors – transnational resume serious peace talks; and it is certain- relations as well as the reach of regional ly empirically wrong. The first Arab state conflicts – will have to be taken into con- that made peace with Israel, Egypt, is not sideration. On this basis, it makes sense exactly a model democracy – and yet, the to define the wider Middle East as includ- Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement has been ing the Arab countries, Israel, Iran and stable for a quarter century. The reverse, Afghanistan, but not to extend it beyond however, is true: peace between Israel and these countries. its Arab neighbours would enhance region- Of course, regions are never sharply al and external efforts to bring about a delimited, and some political dynamics link democratic transformation (see below). the countries mentioned here with others, Tying Western attempts to broker peace to like Turkey, Pakistan, the Caucasus or the democratisation of Arab countries, how- Central Asia. However, an excessively broad ever, would merely exacerbate the lack of definition of the region hinders the devel- credibility of US and Western policies in the opment of political strategies. Thus, Euro- region.

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