No Business as Usual: an analysis of Dutch policy towards Russia in the wake of MH17

University of Amsterdam MSc Political Science: International Relations Research Project: Conflict: Political Economy, Colonial Legacy, Foreign Policy

Author: Michael van Dam, 11044705 Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan Second Reader: Dr. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh Date: 5 June 2020 Version: Definitive

(This page intentionally left blank)

Table of contents

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..5

List of abbreviations……………………………………………………………………….6

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………7

Chapter 1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..8

1.1 Historical background…………………………………………………………8

1.2 Research Plan………………………………………………………………….9

1.3 Relevance……………………………………………………………………...10

1.4 Outline………………………………………………………………………....11

Chapter 2 Literature Review……………………………………………………………12

2.1 Political………………………………………………………………………..12

2.2 Economy………………………………………………………………………15

2.3 EU perspective………………………………………………………………...17

2.4 Russian Perspective…………………………………………………………...19

2.5 Security………………………………………………………………………..20

2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….21

Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………..23

3.1 Foreign Policy………………………………………………………………...23

3.2 National Interest………………………………………………………………25

3.3 Liberal institutionalism and Normative Power…………………………...…..28

3.4 Foreign Policy Analysis………………………………………………………30

3.5 The Rational Actor Model……………………………………………………32

3.6 Conceptualisation of Variables……………………………………………….34

Chapter 4 Methodology…………………………………………………………………35

4.1 Operationalisation of the Variables……………………………………………35

4.1.2 Research Design……………………………………………………..37

4.2 Sources………………………………………………………………………...39

4.3 Reflection……………………………………………………………………...40

Chapter 5 Security……………………………………………………………………….42

5.1 Territorial Security…………………………………………………………….42

5.2 Digital Security………………………………………………………………..47

5.3 Security against foreign influence…………………………………………….50

5.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….54

Chapter 6 Koopman……………………………………………………………………..55

6.1 Trade…………………………………………………………………………..55

6.2 Energy…………………………………………………………………………58

6.3 Russia’s neighbourhood……………………………………………………….62

6.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….……….65

Chapter 7 Dominee……………………………………………………………….………67

7.1 Human Rights………………………………………………………….………67

7.2 MH17………………………………………………………………….……….71

7.3 Crisis Areas: Ukraine and Syria…………………………………….………….75

7.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………….……………..78

Chapter 8 Conclusion………………………………………………………..……………80

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………..…………84

Appendix: Code Book…………………………………………………………..………….97

Acknowledgements

The road that I have followed that eventually led me to this moment has been long, but worthwhile. When I graduated from high school I never figured I would end up pursuing an academic master’s degree. Yet, my interest in history drove me to study to become an historian. During this study I developed a fascination for contemporary international relations and so I ended up following this path. This decision has proven to be the right choice as it broadened my world view. It has not been an easy task to write my dissertation as the writing process coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. Although the lockdown measures did erase some distractions for finishing my research, it was a mental burden to stay focussed as the world almost seemed to collapse around me. As a result, the past few months have been quite stressful as I had to attend to both finishing my thesis and worrying about my future in a world torn by a global pandemic. Against this backdrop, I am obliged to express my sincere gratitude to those who helped me to reach the finish line. Firstly, my mother; without your mental support throughout the years, I’m not sure if I would have been able to keep my head above the water of my eternal ocean of self-doubt. You always had faith in me and encouraged me to never give up, thank you! Secondly, my father; you basically funded my entire tertiary education and therefore spared my from being captured by immense student loans. Whereas your parents never offered you the same opportunity, thank you! Thirdly, I also owe my supervisor dr. Said Rezaeiejan my gratitude. You provided great and fast feedback and your constructive criticism steered my in the right direction. Thank you for your time! Lastly, I want to thank Dr. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh for his time to assess my thesis as a second reader. Thank you!

Michael van Dam Velserbroek, June 2020

5

List of abbreviations AIV Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken

AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst

CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl

EAEU Eurasian Economic Union

EU European Union

EUCO European Council

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis

GGE United Nations Group of Governmental Experts

JIT Joint Investigation Team

MH17 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCTV Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid

NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

RAM Rational Actor Model

RVO Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland

UN United Nations

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

VNO-NCW Vereniging VNO-NCW

VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

6

Abstract

The aim of this study is to answer how the policy of the Netherlands towards Russia has developed in the wake of the MH17 disaster. The main theme of friction in this work is the ongoing Dutch debate of whether the country should primarily focus on playing the role of a ‘Koopman’ (Merchant) or a ‘Dominee’ (Pastor) when it interacts with other sovereign actors in a foreign policy context. However as Russia is an important actor in the field of security (military threat, cybersecurity and exerting foreign influence), this dimension was also addressed in this study. By studying these individual topics based on theoretical insights derived from liberal institutionalism, normative power and the rational actor model, it was possible to identify links between them that ultimately constituted the development of the Russia policy. The findings can be summarised as the following. The Netherlands security interest in its Russia policy was not influenced by the MH17 disaster. It can be characterised mainly as following in line with international partners, primarily NATO. Cooperation in an EU and NATO context was the main theme that constituted the Dutch approach in safeguarding its security interests in relation to Russia. This policy course did position the Dutch internationally as a trustworthy ally that believes in cooperation. As a Koopman, the Dutch did not forget that it had an economic interest in Russia, but The Hague refrained from ‘openly’ interacting with Moscow directly. Instead it rather dealt with local authorities, via the EU or the Russian sphere of influence. Since the Dutch did not play their ‘Koopman’ role openly, it could credibly play its Dominee role. The Hague again looked towards international partners and institutions for aid in fulfilling its national interests. The main strategy of The Hague was to employ normative pressure on the Russian Federation to frustrate its role in violating human rights, meddling in crisis areas and resisting cooperation in the MH17 investigation. Therefore, the Dutch policy developed in a rational manner that allowed it to satisfy all national interests without compromise.

7

Chapter 1- Introduction

1.1 Historical Background

After the end of the Second World War, the Dutch Foreign policy has been based on three pillars: ‘International rule of law’, ‘Multilateralism’ and ‘European Cooperation’ (Hellema 2014: 5). In the immediate Post-war period, foreign policy was rooted in a notion of a global battle between good and evil, reinforced by the Netherlands’s collective memory of wartime experiences, which poses the Dutch as ‘good’ and the Germans as ‘evil’. The Cold War period was a continuation of this battle with the Dutch being on the side of the ‘good’ Americans vs the ‘evil’ Soviet-Union. However, this illusion faded as the Vietnam War made clear that the Americans were not inherently good and the Netherlands role in the Indonesian War of Independence gradually entered into the collective memory of the nation (Both 2014: 3) At the same time, the Netherlands sought to compensate for losing its status as both a maritime and colonial power. A fitting role was found in the principle of being a ‘Gidsland’ (Guiding Nation). Both political and societal factions agreed that it would be up to the Netherlands to change the world for the better by setting an excellent example for the world to follow. This translated into liberal drugs, prostitution and abortion policies. In the international domain and via international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Netherlands became a strong advocate for humans rights, environment and global disarmament and spent more than average on development aid in the third world (Klijn 2011: 135-139). However, despite the seemingly idealistic character of the Dutch foreign policy, the economic element cannot be ignored. Even more so, policymakers realised that a free and independent trade environment is paramount to the Netherlands. This led to the realisation that the space the Dutch have for conducting trade is subject to foreign influence and this sparked an active Dutch foreign policy and the desire to always have a seat at the negotiation table (Idem: 123). Acting within the sphere of alliances such as the European Union (EU), UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to secure its national interests became the pillars of Dutch foreign policy, but the Dutch would retain a specific native element, that of being a ‘Gidsland’ by trying to be on the forefront of changing the world for the better. This policy translated into the ongoing political and societal debate of ‘de Koopman vs de Dominee’

8

(Merchant vs the Pastor). To clarify, this means the question of whether economic or idealistic issues should be the main focus of foreign policy and its aligned diplomatic efforts (Hoebink 2006: 478-480). The debate that originated in the 1970’s carried over into the 21st century. However, until 2014 the dilemma never hit the Netherlands at home. This changed with the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in which 193 Dutch nationals perished, presumably at the hands of Russian backed separatists in Ukraine. This incident was a national trauma for the Dutch population and there was strong political and societal pressure on the government to undertake a serious effort in bringing those who were responsible to justice. However, the fact that the disaster was linked to Russia was problematic, considering that strong economic ties between the Netherlands and Russia had develop since the fall of the Soviet-Union in 1991; with the Netherlands being one of Russia’s major trade and investments partner and in turn Russia being the largest supplier of the Dutch energy needs via gas and oil exports (Tocht 2015: 1-3). Efforts of the Netherlands to compel Russia into compliance via UN institutions such as the Security council have proven to be futile. At the same time, Ukraine being the location of the disaster has possibly brought a pry between the Dutch interests of bringing perpetrators to justice and the Dutch and EU interests of deepening political and economic relations with Ukraine and maintaining economic relations with Russia. The old pillars of maintaining an idealistic foreign policy within the framework of multilateralism in the sense of international organisations and the rule of law have now been challenged and the question is:

“How has the Netherlands policy towards Russia developed since the MH17 disaster?”

1.2 Research Plan

The disaster has to be considered as an event that altered the ‘normal’ course of relations between the Netherlands and Russia. The former had to alter its approach to the latter which is multiple times its size in both geographic and demographic terms. There are multiple dimensions that one needs to consider before the main question can be answered in an integral manner. These dimensions consist of three subjects that will be analysed. Firstly, the main characteristics and developments in the Dutch Russia policy regarding security implications shall be examined. Second, the implications of the Dutch economic strategy regarding Russia or as it will be called in this thesis, the ‘Koopman’ aspect. Third, the normative ‘Dominee’

9

approach of the Dutch government in persuading Russia to cooperate with MH17 investigation, human rights and other ´gidsland duties´. Firstly, ‘security’ was an issue before the disaster took place. In 2014 Russia invaded and annexed the Crimea and supported separatists militarily in a civil war that was fought in the eastern part of Ukraine. This created tensions between NATO and Russia. The Netherlands, being a NATO member state, could not afford to be on the side-line in this conflict. In the same year, the Netherlands became a victim of this war. The focus in this chapter shall lie on how security themes developed in the Russia strategy of the Netherlands with the previous mentioned background in mind. Secondly, the ‘Koopman’ aspect of Dutch foreign policy will be thoroughly analysed. The Netherlands is a ´trade nation´ that heavily relies on exports for generating its national wealth. Russia was an important trade partner and market for Dutch businesses. At the same time, Russia is the largest supplier of Dutch energy needs, regarding gas and oil imports. It is quite challenging or even undesirable to neglect a state with this status of importance. In this regard, the focus shall lie on how the economic part of the Russia strategy is polished towards a new political reality that exist between these two nations. Thirdly, the ‘Dominee’ component of Dutch foreign policy towards Russia will be the centre of focus in the next chapter. While the traditional role that the Netherlands attributes itself, namely that of a normative nation that has the duty the make the world a better place to life in, has now transformed into a less altruistic character, since the stakes are now ´rooted in its own backyard´. A nation that lost 193 of its citizens cannot afford to remain silent and be immobilized on the international stage. Especially since the role of Russia in the occurrence of the disaster was suspected at an early stage. Therefore, a focus shall lie on how the strategy is tailored towards compelling Russia into compliance with the investigation into the disaster and how multilateral contexts such as the working through the EU, UN and NATO were involved here.

1.3 Relevance

The relevance of this research is twofold. It will serve to fulfil both an academic and a societal necessity. Regarding the academic component, this research will expand upon existing research that has been conducted on the question how the Netherlands policy towards Russia has developed since the MH17 disaster. It is important to note here, that whereas existing material has already covered loose components of the complex dynamics that define the

10

relationship between the Netherlands and Russia, i.e. economic, political, security, societal, no work has been produced that ties these component together in a coherent manner. It will be the aim of this research to accomplish this task, by employing foreign policy analysis. As an additional merit, the research will provide an academic element in addition to the abundant journalistic articles that have been written on the topic. Regarding the societal component, the research will contribute to a better understanding of the decision making process of the Dutch government. Relations between the Netherlands and Russia were shook, because of MH17. A political dilemma for the Dutch ensued: how would it find a balance between the economic and societal interests of a grieving nation? And how would its other interests be affected by this? It is relevant to inquire into how a middle sized Western democratic nation copes with this dilemma, considering a contemporary trend of the revitalisation of great power politics. Although no claim is made here that the research has a high degree of transferability, considering its unique case. Regardless, the research is important, not only from a Dutch perspective, but also for a wider global audience. Since it provides an overview of how a nation and the individuals who reside inside its borders can maintain a voice in an international arena of great powers and the Netherlands is not the only country that faces this challenge.

1.4 Outline

This thesis consists of eight chapters. This chapter served as an introductory chapter and provided context and an overview of what one should expect reading this work. In the next chapter, the current state of literature on the topic of this thesis shall be summarised and reviewed. The third chapter shall provide a theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of the empirical data. The methodology, research design and data sources will be discussed in the fourth chapter. The actual empirical analysis shall commence from the fifth chapter and onwards to and including the seventh. In the fifth chapter, we will examine the security aspect of the Netherlands Russia policy. In the sixth chapter we turn to the economic dimension that is relevant the Koopman role of the Netherlands policy towards Russia. The seventh chapter will account for the Dominee role of the Netherlands and therefore display the Netherlands normative policy actions. Finally, in the eight chapter we will formulate an answer to the pivotal question of this thesis, by utilising the insights that we have gained from the three empirical chapters.

11

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

Regarding prior research into the Netherlands relations with Russia after the occurrence of the MH17 disaster, it is notable that relatively few academic sources have been produced in the last couple of years. This does not mean that no authoritative work is available. Quite to the contrary, journalistic and think tank articles were written. It will be primarily these works that will be studied in this literature review. However, academic work is not completely absent from this review. In the light of the Netherlands embeddedness in the frame of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the scholarly work on the relations with Russia on an EU level will also be examined. This literature review is constituted of five categories that relate to the subject, namely ‘Economy’, ‘Politics’, ‘European perspective’, ‘Russian perspective’ and ‘Security’.

2.1 Political

A compact but insightful sketch of the immediate diplomatic efforts towards Russia has been written by Han ten Broeke.1 Ten Broeke’s main characterisation of the Dutch approach towards Russia in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster is ‘neutrality’. Apparently it was vital to the Dutch interests to appear to the international community as neutral as possible, despite the fact that Netherlands was the largest victim of the disaster. This position of neutrality has to be appreciated as mere pragmatism on the side of Dutch officials. By displaying an image of neutrality they believed it would generate the highest chance of success in achieving three main goals. These goals were set in the following particular order: 1) repatriation of the victims, 2) determination of the disaster’s causes, and 3) investigation and trial of the perpetrators. The success of achieving these hinged on the cooperation of both Ukraine and Russia who could exert influence on the pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, the location of the disaster. Acting neutral was vital to prevent the antagonization of Russia and securing its cooperation. (Ten Broeke 2019). Ten Broeke deemed the success of achieving the first two goals and with the first goal in particular as the merits of Mark Rutte and Frans Timmermans (former Minister of Foreign affairs). ‘They were the right men at the right position at the right time’, because both men possessed capable diplomatic skills which they employed to rally the international community

1 Ten Broeke was spokesperson for the ruling party VVD on matters of foreign policy and the Dutch armed forces, at the time of the MH17 disaster. It is important took take into account that ten Broeke as a former high ranking VVD politician had (and possibly still has) close relations with Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who also held this position in 2014. 12

to the Netherlands side and appease Russia at the same time.2 In his final remark, Ten Broeke summarises the causes of success as ‘maintaining good contacts’, agile diplomacy’ and ‘realpolitik leadership’ (Ibid). There are certain elements of Ten Broeke’s argument that seems to be worthwhile to further investigate. At first, the goals of the Netherlands. It is mentioned that the Netherlands had vital interest in appearing neutral on the international stage. However, Ten Broeke fails to provide a clear picture of how this translated to its foreign policy strategy towards Russia. What elements were specifically altered to maintain a neutral position? Secondly, how did the notion of neutrality being the best course of action came about? One could argue that this seems to be the natural outcome when one country needs another country´s favour, but this does not correspond to what Ten Broeke describes in the same article of what Australia’s initial strategy was. Namely a course of seeking a direct confrontation with Russia, which was prevented by the efforts of the Dutch. (Ibid). Therefore for this thesis it is prudent to build upon what Ten Broeke’s analysis lacks. Namely a clear set of concepts that guides an inquiry into the decision-making process of a state. For instance, ´neutrality´ is not a passive immobilised course of action, but rather a deliberate action. Hence, the reason why one needs to dissect what action a state makes or refrains from making and what consequences this entails. Furthermore what rationale is the backdrop behind this course of action. This thesis will seek to answer this mechanism. The Hague Centre for Strategic studies published a report on developments regarding international conflict. This report was produced in cooperation with Clingendael Institute. The report was written by three authors who employed both qualitative and quantitative data for their analysis. The approach of the researchers adhered to academic standards in the sense of providing clarity about the utilised methodology and dataset. The main findings related to the research question were assessments of what kind of actor Russia is from the perspective of the Netherlands. For instance, Russia is deemed as a ‘counterpart’. Counterparts are of strategic interests for Netherlands, but they do not share the same values as the Dutch. In the case of Russia, the authors translate this into a Dutch reliance on Russia as a supplier of energy, hence the strategic interests, but at the same time the meddling of Russia in the Ukrainian Civil War is was denounced by Western democracies.

2 There are other elements however that seems to be more problematic. For instance, Ten Broeke does ascribe a high amount of credit to just two men: Mark Rutte and Frans Timmermans. Considering that the other was a colleague of both, it seems fair to assume that Ten Broeke’s assessment is tainted by his personal relationship with them. Also the primary sources that the author utilises are his own experiences as a VVD politician who was part of this political process. A certain amount of academic neutrality is therefore not guaranteed. 13

The authors do not mention Russia’s stance in the MH17 dossier (Spiegeleire et al.: 16). Another article that sheds more light on the Dutch perspective was written by Clingendael researcher Barend ter Haar. The main aim of the article ‘Dutch narratives about Russian-Western relations’ is to provide an overview of how Dutch foreign policy has developed across the years in congruence with the broader relations between the West and Russia. Ter Haar offers the reader concepts to help understand how Dutch foreign policy has been constructed. These are ‘trade, engagement and withdrawal’. The advocates of trade believe that international trade made the Netherlands a very prosperous nation and therefore foreign policy should be directed towards promoting foreign trade and investment. At the same time, elements such as contributing to international stability and the rule of law should be incorporated in this policy. Engagement refers to an active contribution to a peaceful and prosperous world. Not just out of self-interest but also out of a moral duty. Foreign policy should therefore by directed towards supporting international organisations such as the EU, UN, etc. Lastly, withdrawal refers to a more isolationist stance. The advocates for it believe that engagement and international cooperation and immigration only serve the needs of a select elitist group, but harms the interest of the rest of the Dutch population (Ter Haar 2017: 89-90). In Ter Haar’s assessment of the Dutch-Russian relations in 2017, it is revealed that the relations between the Netherlands and Russia are sour, because the former blames the latter for the security crisis in Europe as a result of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. As was established by Ten Broeke, the government avoids accusing the Russian government directly for the downing of MH17. Furthermore, major economic interests are paramount. The two countries have a relative high bilateral trade volume and the two countries would benefit from cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism (Idem: 94-96). The different approaches to foreign policy are rather visible here. Whereas engagement advocates would be horrified by seeking closer relations with Russia, because of MH17 and the Crimea, ‘Withdrawal’ and ‘Trade’ advocates would probably disagree. ‘Trade’ advocates would appreciate opportunities to mend trade relations and ‘Withdrawal’ advocates assume involvement in the international affairs of others (even though MH17 is a Dutch affair) might hurt the interests of the Dutch people. These concepts can be helpful to give some structure to how the decisions regarding the Russia strategy were made. What interests dominated the narrative? Still, the employed sources are rather limited in Ter Haar’s article and they only date back to 2015.

14

Together with her colleagues Hubert Smeets and Laura Starink, Rothenberg wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament in which they sketch the past development of relations between the Netherlands and Russia in the light of both the ‘Ukraine crisis’ and the MH17 dossier. The letter is a call to action, thus one needs to approach this letter from a critical standpoint in the sense that the information that is displayed in the letter does serve to reinforce achieving a goal, namely that of inciting the Dutch parliament to seek rapprochement to the Russian civil society. According to the authors, since 2014 the Dutch government has pursued a double strategy. This strategy was twofold: the Dutch government would support and advocate for European sanctions targeted to Russia to keep the pressure on its government, but at the same time, Dutch foreign policy actions had to correspond to ‘keeping the door open’ to enter into a dialogue with the Russians. The most recent Russia strategy of the Dutch government does not aim to bring any significant changes to the just described approach. The main reason for this is that Russian president Vladimir Putin is not expected to leave office before 2024 and any significant reforms are therefore not expected in the coming years. (Rothenberg et.al. 2019). This letter only seeks to criticize the Russia strategy and therefore this document is the only employed source. Again there is some merit in this letter that can be utilised for this thesis. The rigidity that the authors describe is certainly something to look out for. The aim of the thesis is to describe how the strategy has developed (read: changed), but is this necessarily the case? It is quite possible that policy matters have not developed much since external circumstances just did not justify this course of action.

2.2 Economy

In 2015, Van der Togt wrote an analysis about the relations between Russia and the Netherlands in the aftermath of MH17.3 There is one point that stands out and that is the conclusion that the Netherlands had to make a dichotomic choice between playing the ‘merchant’ or the ‘pastor’. Even though nobody officially accused the Russians, the EU was united in posing ‘third tier’ sanctions on Russia immediately after the disaster. The author does not make clear what ‘third tier’ sanctions contain and whether the sanctions were

3 One needs to note that this analysis was written in 2015, only one year after the disaster. Considering that this thesis will span a timeframe of six years (2014-2020), the amount of insight that can be gained from this piece is rather limited, considering that major development took place in the years thereafter. 15

imposed as a result of MH17 or if this matter played a background role. However, the author does note that imposing the sanctions on Russia without the occurrence of MH17 would have been less likely. Russia responded and imposed sanctions on the EU as a countermeasure. According to the author, because of these developments, it only took a year until talks about restoring economic relations resurfaced. The author notes that energy companies such as Shell and Gasunie in particular are very keen on going back to ‘business as usual’ and even under the regime of the sanctions these businesses seem to already conduct business again with Russian partners (Van der Togt 2015: 3-7). The argument of Van der Togt does confirm that the ‘Koopman’ and ‘Dominee’ role posed a problem. How can these two policy aspects be reconciled with each other, or in other words how do the ‘merchant’ and ‘Pastor’ cope with each other? Meanwhile, economists from the economic office of the Rabobank, state that the Netherlands does not have to worry about the impact of the current sanctions for its economic well-being. The export volume to Russia is relative small. If the Netherlands would decide to impose additional sanctions against Russian on top of the sanctions that it had imposed in an EU context it would hurt the Dutch economy more than the Russian economy. In return, if the Russian Federation would decide to impose additional sanctions against the Netherlands, they would avoid sanctioning sectors that directly damages Russian interests, such as generating revenue via the energy sector (Wim Boonstra and Tim Legierse 2014). The authors write from a rational economic perspective and they employ this theoretical perspective to provide a predictive outlook on the development of economic relations between these two states. However, their rational model contains a noteworthy flaw. The rational actor is here considered to be ‘one-dimensional’. Just a mere single source informs here whether a decision is rational or not, namely the economic perspective. However, states are not one-dimensional and they have to harbour different types of national interests. Therefore, it is unhelpful to analyse the economic situation from an isolated position. One needs to factor in other interests such as normative goals and security interests. In the case of the Netherlands, besides being a ‘Koopman’, the country is also a ‘Dominee’ and this fact will influence how it will fulfil its ‘Koopman’ role. This thesis will serve to provide an overarching account of how the Netherlands balances the different interests. Another author places emphasis on the economic efficacy of the imposed sanctions. Nora Neuteboom writes that the sanctions did not substantially damage the Russian economy, although the productivity on the long term might be affected. Domestic institutions like the Russian central bank can shield the Russian private sector from suffering a shortage of foreign

16

exchange, also the oil prices did contribute to stabilise the economy. Therefore, the Russian state has no reason to alter its political course, since the overall effects on its economy are minimal. The author states that the EU is not likely to lift the sanction due to the domestic political situation in France and the US (Neuteboom 2017). The analytical problem here however, is that the author mainly focused on the economic dimension of the sanctions. The efficacy of the sanctions is measured in economic terms like growth and productivity. This is unhelpful when we take into account the broader political perspective. Sanctions do not solely serve a material economic goal, like the author suggests. Instead, sanctions also serve a normative goal, such as damaging legitimacy and thereby exerting pressure on the other actor. If we were to solely focus on the economic efficacy of sanctions than we could not properly explain certain policy actions from a rational point of view.

2.3 EU perspective

What are the broader implications of the relations with Russia for the EU as a whole? The German ‘Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik’ published a paper answering this very question. This institute, although independent, does seek to advise the German government on issues related to foreign and security affairs, it also advises the EU, NATO and UN.4 The main argument of their publication ‘Strategische Autonomie Europas: Akteure, Handlungsfelder, Zielkonflikte’ regarding the EU and Russia is that the EU is dependent on Russia for its energy needs and that some EU member states have a greater interest in keeping relations relaxed, since they made a deal with Russia on constructing the Nord Stream pipeline. This issue however splits EU member states, because some EU member states value security issues more than the economic ones (Lippert et.al 2019: 28). This realisation is especially problematic considering that Russia has an interest in pitting EU member states against each other. This objective coincides with splitting Europe from its American ally, with whom relations have cooled since Donald Trump took office. The author does argue that it is vital for the EU to develop independent means to guarantee its own safety, considering that it cannot solely rely on the US to do so. The Russians on their part wish to split the EU from the US, but seeing the EU actually developing independent capabilities is not in its interests (Idem: 33-34). The stance this publication takes is a realist one in which power dimensions seem

4 Die Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ueber-uns/ Consulted on 15 march 2020. 17

dominate. At the same time the EU is here posed as a goal seeking actor, in this case security. The Netherlands is also a goal seeking actor and for the purposes of this thesis; analysing the development of this point of view seems to be a prudent course of action. At the same it is also interesting to look more into the European perspective of the Dutch energy debate, since it is also a party in the construction efforts of the Nord Stream Pipeline. Lastly, since the largest pressure on the Russian government is the result of European sanctions, we need to know what was written about the process of these sanctions. In the article ‘Die neue Wirklichkeit der Außenpolitik: Diplomatie im 21. Jahrhundert’ the authors discuss what the most significant development has been for international diplomacy in the 21st century so far. Regarding the process of imposing the economic sanctions, the authors argue that even though Russia did try to undermine unity among EU member states, it did not succeed as a result of ‘network diplomacy’. Not all member states where very content with imposing sanctions since it would jeopardise their economic interests. The authors primarily see the extensive diplomatic efforts of German diplomats and business relations to be the factor of success in maintaining unity throughout the EU. Although, the Germans main efforts were to seek support for imposing sanctions, does not mean that all branches of German society were on board with it. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was opposed to an increase in the amount of sanctions on Russia. Also on a local level the ‘state government of Bavaria conveyed a ‘lighter tone’ to President Putin with regard to the sanctions. (Stanzel 2018: 52-53). It is hard to judge whether German efforts were the decisive factor in pushing the sanctions forward, based only on this article. The evidence is not compelling. The author neglects to refer to other major stakeholders in the conflict, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Regardless the disunity that the German government experienced on local level is inspirational for this thesis. To develop a coherent Russia policy, it seems only natural that the Dutch government did consult major actors in the Dutch business sector. Considering that the Netherlands is a decentralised unitarity state, it does not seem likely however that lower branches of government undermined the national Dutch government. The authors claim that on a European level there is much to be gained from cooperation on anti-terrorism activities. Still, the EU and Russia failed to do so. Again, this is the result of problematic relations that spurred from wars in Ukraine and Syria. Difficult relations between the West and Russia need to be understood against this backdrop (Spiegeleire et al.: 57). The EU’s problematic relation with Russia is mainly the result of the wars in Ukraine

18

and Syria. The national trauma for one of its member states does not seem to weigh much in this regard, if we take the analysis of HCSS for granted. It is however worthwhile to look more into how the Netherlands rallied the EU behind its cause in its Russia objectives. Furthermore the report also raises the stakes for the Netherlands, considering that Russia is important for its energy supply and the Dutch Russia strategy certainly has to reflect this. The analysis would have benefited from a clear focus on what the main points of contestation are between the Netherlands and the EU. No framework of interests is employed here which would have helped to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics that are behind the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

2.4 Russian perspective

Another perspective on Russia is provided by Hella Rothenberg a Slavistics expert and journalist who writes for the journalist collective ‘Raam op Rusland’.5 Rothenberg writes that Russia’s return in the council of Europe is a major victory for the Kremlin. Russia was suspended from attending council session in 2014 and lost its voting right in the council. This measure has now been revoked by the council. Various European countries are not content with this decision with countries as Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom in particular. Germany and France however wished to prevent Russia from acting on its threat, that it would withdraw from the council completely if the suspension would not be lifted. Germany and France on their part then negotiated with Russia on its reinstatement as a full-fledged member of the council. Rothenberg writes that Russia had to provide extra guarantees that is would adhere to the Minsk protocols. Also, the ability of the council to issue sanctions against one of its members will be constrained in the future. This article does show some clear developments on European-Russian relations. First, the leading EU countries Germany and France clearly show a desire to preserve and possibly repair relations with Russia. Also there is still a clear divide within Europe on how to deal with Russia. Even more so, MH17 was not part of the negotiations between Berlin, Paris and Moscow. From a Dutch perspective this might prove to be problematic that it seems to lose support in Europe. Rothenberg is not clear about the sources she utilised, but her comments on the current

5 This institute is partner of the University of Leiden and aims to spread knowledge and fostering a critical debate on the development of Russia. https://www.raamoprusland.nl/. Consulted on 16 march 2020. 19

developments of European relations with Russia are in a unfavourable manner for the Dutch perspective are worthwhile to look into. The first journalistic product in this review is the article ‘ Russia's Roadmap Out of the MH17 Crisis’. This article was published by the digital newspaper ‘the Moscow times’.6 The main line of argument by Eastern European studies Professor Mark Galeotti is that Russia has been secretive and obstructive in the case of the MH17 investigation because admitting blame would expose the Russian regime as untrustworthy. For more than five years the Russian government claimed that it had nothing to do with the Ukrainian Civil War. Russia has nothing to gain from openly admitting blame, because the narrative of lying still benefits the Russians more than ‘coming clean’, Furthermore, the Kremlin relies on patriotic feelings experienced by its diplomats, military officials and entrepreneurs to serve the state. In turn, the Kremlin will go to great lengths to protect and back them up when necessary. By extraditing the perpetrators of the MH17 disaster to the Netherlands, it would violate this trust. Finally by dealing with the Dutch behind the curtains and avoiding admitting guilt openly, it would still take a position of humility instead of strength, which is unacceptable for Russia (Galeotti 2019).7 The author does raise some significant points. Namely that Russia cannot afford to admit guilt, because of (geo)political reasons. Is seems highly unlikely that Dutch policymakers are unaware of this. Still, on their part, they could not afford to not try to work with Russia. It is worthwhile to look more into the Dutch strategies to cooperate with Russia even though the latter had a clear incentive to avoid this.

2.5 Security

The following argument was written by the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV).8 The AIV approaches the topic from a security standpoint. The situation in Ukraine must be regarded as the result of Russia’s wish to bring the country back into its sphere of

6 It is interesting to note that the Moscow times is supported by the Dutch foundation "Stichting 2 Oktober" to promote independent journalism in Russia, which on their turn are partners of the Dutch ministry of Foreign affairs. https://stichting2oktober.org/ Consulted on 20 March 2020. 7 Galeotti writes from a Russian point of view and it is unclear what sources form the basis for his argument. It is likely that he relied on his professional expertise on the subject to construct his argument, but actual empirical research is probably not applied here. 8 An independent body which advises the Dutch government and parliament on foreign policy. Although the organisation is independent from the Dutch Foreign office, one still needs to consider that the main aim of this organisation is to provide advice and this particular policy brief was requested by the Dutch government, which ultimately comprises academic neutrality and distance (AIV 2017: 26). 20

influence (Idem: 16). This realisation is not connected in the article to the Dutch efforts of dealing with the aftermath of the MH17 crisis and no security implications are given for these efforts. Still the document does make a connection to Dutch-Russians relations in the wake of the disaster in the form of cyberattacks and propaganda. In the last couple of years the Netherlands has been targeted by Russia on various occasions related to the disaster by disseminating false and contradictory information to frustrate events such as the presentation of the results of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT). The AIV states that Russia has grown to be one of the biggest threats to the Netherlands in terms of cybersecurity (Idem: 10). As mentioned earlier the document is a policy brief and most content is related to providing recommendations to government on how to deal with certain issues. Therefore there is not much background information available on the development of the Dutch policy towards Russia, but rather how it should develop. However, the AIV does refer to cybersecurity and the dissemination of false information. This seems to be worthwhile to look into, because there is a high probability that this new challenge had an effect on the Dutch strategy towards Russia.

2.6 Conclusion

To conclude, there are major and complex dimensions that one needs to take into consideration when it comes to dissecting the development of the Netherlands policy towards Russia in the aftermath of MH17. For instance what are the major stakes? For the Netherlands these are economic and moral issues. What are the power dimensions? Does the Netherlands possess the power to achieve its goals and does this translate into its Russia policy? The Netherlands foreign policy however is embedded in a wider framework of an European foreign policy and it does rely on its allies to meet its goals, but what are the implications if the needs of these allies are not in congruence with the needs of the Netherlands, how does the Dutch government adept to this? Furthermore, how much space did The Hague in its Russia policy allocate to achieving normative goals, such as finding justice for MH17, and did this frustrate achieving economic goals? As the authors, that have been discussed in this chapter, primarily focussed on specific aspects regarding their specialised fields, it will be the aim of this thesis to structure all these elements into a coherent narrative. While for instance the economic perspective that has been covered here is compelling when studied in isolation, it becomes less fruitful when one considers normative, political and security goals. Also the Netherlands as an EU member state has to cooperate with its European allies and this diminishes policy freedom. Therefore a

21

proper account of the development of the Netherlands policy towards Russiawill be offered in this thesis by examining the different perspectives translated into interests by the Dutch government such as economic, normative and security interests. These ‘loose pieces’ will be connected and thereby help to support the construction of an overarching view on how the Netherlands manoeuvred and acted in relation to Russia with regard to the problems that arose as a result of an endeavour to balance the different interests the Netherlands has.

22

Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework

Since one specific aspect of the Dutch foreign policy, namely its Russia strategy, plays a pivotal role in this thesis. It is prudent to firstly define what actually constitutes foreign policy. There are several possible approaches to foreign policy and it is important to note that currently no academic consensus regarding the concept exists. Therefore we need to examine the different possible definitions first, before we can conclude which definition best suits the purposes of this thesis. Furthermore, we need to identify relevant theoretical concepts that will serve as the ‘building blocks’ for this research.

3.1 Foreign Policy

One of the possible definitions of foreign policy states that ‘foreign policy is merely the sum of external relations conducted by independent actors’ (Hill 2003: 4). The author claims that the policy aspect refers to an effort of independent actors to apply coherence to a set of individual decisions, hence policy is a sum. The ‘foreign’ aspect refers to the reality of a world separated into different communities and that actors in this reality need strategies to cope with each other (Idem: 5). Therefore we can conclude that policy is a set of actions that one can undertake, whereas ‘the foreign’ is the target of this set of actions. If we accept this definition than we accept an ontology that dictates a world of observable facts, namely the set of actions and the respective targets. In this world, foreign policy is independent and only meant to cope with foreign states. This also implies that policy cannot be dissected into individual actions, since policy is ‘a sum’ and is only measurable as a set. Furthermore, the definition also means that the result of the actions is the only part that matters for the level of analysis. A clear distinction can be made between ‘the result’ of an action and the ‘intention’ of an action. Beach elaborates on this notion in his critique on Hill’s definition. He defines foreign policy as “both the broad trends of behaviour and the particular actions taken by a state or other collective actor(s) as directed toward other collective actors within the international system.” (Beach 2012: 3). Accepting this definition means that we can include a wider variety of eligible actors for employing foreign policy. For instance this definition allows for a more inclusive collection of actors, since supranational organisation like the European Union (EU) can also be considered to be a collective actor. This notion has serious implications for this research.

23

Considering that the Netherlands is an EU member state, accepting that both the Netherlands and the EU conduct their own foreign policy has consequences for the Dutch Russia strategy. A meta-analysis of a state with a foreign policy that seeks to alter the foreign policy of another actor to satisfy its own needs would become optional here. The definitions that we have discusses so far both neglect the domestic component of foreign policy. It exists independently from society. According to Groom we can ascribe different meanings to foreign policy based on the conceptual framework that one adheres to. For instance if we were to follow a pluralist account of what foreign policy is, then foreign policy would be ‘downgraded’ to merely being one of many possible interactions in a system of transactions. States are no more important in a network of actors, who conduct transactions, than civil society, NGO’s, churches and corporations. The nature of these transactions can be religious, economic, cultural, ethnic or politically based (Groom 2007: 199). Therefore foreign policy is just one of the many possible transactions and is influenced by domestic forces. Another view of what foreign policy entails is provided by Alden and Aran. They employ a ‘snapshot’ of contemporary Russian foreign policy to discern the complexity of foreign policy. They argue that the amount of influence a leader can exert in his country and conceptions that he/she may have regarding the identity and place his country takes in global politics do actually shape decision-making in foreign policy. At the same time, civil society can pose as an opposite force to the ruling government by offering an alternative perspective of what the nation’s foreign policy should entail (Alden & Aran 2012: 2). According to this perspective on foreign policy, the role of the nation’s leader and his ideas on what the country should do and what it should be, takes a pivotal role in foreign policy development. The leader does not hold a monopoly in this regard, since domestic forces like civil society can form an opposing power. It is interesting to note here that national interest is the result of identity. A country’s position in the world dictates its interests and policy should be aligned towards this goal. This does raise an important question though. Is it required to have national interests to construct foreign policy? If we take Brian White’s argument into account, it seems that, at least on the surface, this is not necessarily the case. For White it is worthwhile to consider that foreign policy can be analysed from a European perspective. The author calls this ‘European foreign policy’. Much like Hill, does White view foreign policy as a sum. However in this case, the sum is constituted by national foreign policies and the ensuing external relations which in their turn make up an European foreign policy. (White 2001: 38).

24

The problem with this approach is that the ‘roots’ are neglected. In other words, if an European foreign policy is constructed by a sum of national foreign policies, then how are the national foreign policies constructed? In the preceding paragraphs an overview of various perspectives of what foreign policies can be and contain has been provided and various points of contention have been identified so far. These points tend to focus on the ontological questions of who are the relevant actors in foreign policy? How broadly should policy be defined? And who or what is responsible for the construction of a certain foreign policy? The upcoming paragraphs will seek to answer a different question. Although it has now been made clear what foreign policy can be. However, up until now, a clear indication of what ‘feeds’ a foreign policy is still missing. In order to truly understand what drives the construction of a foreign policy. We need to examine the role of national interests. This will be discussed in the next section.

3.2 National Interest

National interest in itself as a guide for foreign policy goals is inadequate according to Hill, as it is ‘tautologous’: ‘No reasonable policy-maker would ever go against the interest of the nation’ (Hill 2003: 128). The more important question should be what interests are actually national and why? One cannot simply qualify national interests in ‘terms of power, security, prosperity and independence’ as these interests are too broad and disagreement about what they actually entail commences, once the discussion is brought up about the specificity of these goals. For Hill, this concept helps to identify whether a policy helps to serve public concerns or whether it is derived from an interest. But to this author, phrasing these functions as national interest is problematic (Idem: 128-129). Although Hill raises a strong point regarding the subjectivity of certain interests, it is unhelpful to claim that national interests in its entirety do not exist. For instance, imagine country A, which possesses a strong military apparatus and seeks to conquer territory from country B, which on its turn has a much weaker military. Looking at this situation from the perspective of a foreign policy maker, it seems evident that security is indeed a national interest. The policymaker’s perception of how to serve this interests may be subjective. For instance one approach could be to appease country A, but another approach might be to seek an alliance with country C against country A. Still, security as a national interest is no point of contention in this thought experiment.

25

As was established in the introduction. The Netherlands has two main branches that influence its foreign policy: ‘Koopman’ and ‘Dominee’. To make sense of these two role concepts on an analytical level, we shall now discuss compatible theory. One author who agrees with the notion that national interest as a concept is not useless, is Nuechterlein. He states that abandoning the concept would be futile since the term has been deeply integrated in the vocabulary of diplomats and other officials.9 Nuechterlein defines national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.” (Nuechterlein 1976: 247). However, the author is not satisfied with this definition. He states that in order to provide a helpful frame to a scholar, the national interest should be divided into four basic needs, which on their turn underpin foreign policy. These four needs are defence, economy, world order and ideology. Firstly, ‘defence’ relates to shielding the nation-state and its citizens from physical harm or the undermining of its political system by an external party. Secondly, ‘economy’ is about improving the general well-being of the state in relative terms to other states. This particular interest corresponds to the notion of being a ‘Koopman’. The Netherlands as a ‘Koopman’ seeks to generate and improve its national wealth by securing trade relations with other states. Thirdly, ‘world order’ relates to the maintenance of an international political and economic system that is the most beneficial to your state. Fourthly, ideology implies that protection and the fostering of a set of values that the people of the nation state perceive as ‘universally good’ (Idem: 247-248). Both ‘world order’ and ‘ideology’ can be matched with the specific Dutch concept of ‘Dominee’. The Netherlands seeks to improve the world by making a contribution to fostering the adoption of ‘good’ values across the world. It should be noted that these ‘root sources’ of national interest will not play an equal role in every state. It is hard to imagine a small state with little relative economic and political power to put much emphasis on altering the world order. Nonetheless, these four basic needs do serve an important role in actually identifying the formation process of foreign policy. Then how do we differentiate between interests and ‘national interests’? Kenneth Waltz does offer a solution. He argues that a distinction exists between national interests and intentions. Waltz views intentions as being orientated towards the short-term timeframe. Intentions are derived from domestic preferences to obtain small political or economic advantages. However pressures from the international sphere are neglected. National interests

9 Hill (2003) actually confirms this (p.128) that this is still the case in 2003. Considering that Nuechterlein wrote his article in 1976, it implies that not much has changed in the meantime. 26

are, in contrast to intentions, formed by the international sphere and relate to issues of power and security (Waltz 1979: 65-66). According to this analyses, individual preferences by leaders or even civil society cannot make an important difference regarding the formation of foreign policy, considering that the goals that this policy seeks to serve are primarily the result of interactions with the external sphere. National interest therefore has an exogenous nature. It is interesting to note that foreign policy itself seeks to alter the international sphere. When a state would succeed in this objective, the international sphere itself would be subject to change. As a result, a state’s interests would be renewed. Thus this would be a case of a feedback loop, although not a very formidable one. The conceptual debate that has been outlined above, has shown that various perspectives on foreign policy and how it is ‘fed’ exist. Hill regards foreign policy as merely a sum of external relations, conducted by independent actors. Beach on the other hand disagrees with Hill on the notion that foreign policy is a sum. Instead foreign policy should be dissected into the intention and results of actions. Furthermore, both broad trends as particular actions of one actor against another actor are of value here. A quite different approach can be found in the pluralist framework. According to this framework foreign policy as an interaction between international actors is not unique and subject to influence of other types of international transactions. According to Alden and Anran, the role of the leader and its perception of the nation’s identity and role in the world shape foreign policy and with it its behaviour on the international stage. White contributes to the debate by implying that foreign policy can contribute to an even broader concept, namely European foreign policy. Not all authors mention what ‘feeds’ foreign policy. Hill criticizes the utility of the concept ‘national interest’. He views the subjectivity of interest as problematic for categorising something as national. Waltz does however view national interest as a helpful concept. Still, the main national interest that are important for foreign policy are power and security and the main root for these interests are exogenous. In contrast to Waltz, Nuechterlein identifies national interest as endogenously based. The main roots for national interest has a wider variety in Nuechterleins’s account by including ideology and world order and economy besides security. Based on the overview that was sketched above, this thesis will accept the account that Beach has provided regarding what foreign policy comprises of. However this thesis will follow Nuechterlein’s account of how foreign policy is fed by national interest. Considering that this research aims to examine how the Netherlands policy towards Russia has developed

27

after occurrence of the MH17 disaster, it is helpful to accept a definition of foreign policy as a concept that includes both broader and particular actions, since the development can only be accurately examined if we can detect individual measures that were undertaken by the Dutch state to achieve its goals. As a result, an explanation of national interest and what this contains and how it influences foreign policy is the best theoretical fit.

3.3 Liberal institutionalism and Normative Power Before we address how foreign policy should be analysed, it is worthwhile to firstly consider the theoretical implications for the Netherlands. As was established in section 3.2, Nuechterlein’s account of national interest can be matched to the concepts ‘Koopman’ and ‘Dominee’. For the purposes of this research, these theoretical insights are fruitful, but not sufficient enough. As the Netherlands is a country whose international relations are embedded in international organisations and institutions, we do need theory that accounts for how such as state behaves on the international stage. Furthermore, a theoretical account is required for how a country, that is significantly smaller in size than its target country in political, demographic, military and economic terms, can still play the role of ‘Dominee’. One could make an analogy to the biblical story of David versus Goliath in which the Netherlands somehow needs to acquire its own version of David’s sling. Regarding the first issue, we can draw from the theoretical insights of Liberal institutionalism. This is an international relations theory who’s conceptual roots can be traced to both liberalism and realism. The liberal institutionalist scholar does accept realist notions of state-centrism in which the state is the centre of analytical attention, an anarchic system where states are ultimately self-reliant and lastly, states are rational actors who act in their own best interest. However, where realists would assume that international relations are a ‘zero-sum game’, in which only relative winners can exists, liberal institutionalists, on the contrary, reject this notion and assert that states can benefit from absolute gains (Johnson and Heis 2018: 10). Liberal institutionalist depart from classical liberal thinking by emphasizing the role (international) institutions play on the global stage. According to liberal institutionalist thought, international institutions spread peace and democracy and therefore play a key role in fostering cooperation between states (Idem: 12). However, the core assumption for the ‘success story’ of international institutionalism should be found in the idea that states act in their own best interest. States do not relinquish sovereignty to international institutions just for the sake of cooperation. Instead, sovereignty is used as a bargaining resource that states

28

can negotiate away for benefits that they can obtain via institutions (Keohane 2012: 127). For some states this can include influence over other states, while for other states security is the main reason to be part of an institution. Institutions are functional because they can “provide information, coordination, enforcement or other benefits that states could not access on their own” (Johnson and Heis 2018: 10). Although, we can see how the ‘Koopman’ aspect of Dutch Foreign policy can be matched to the liberal institutionalist notion of cooperation through institutions, namely that institutions could help protecting Dutch economic interests in relation to Russia. However, it does fail to provide a precise account of how the ‘Dominee’ aspect unfolds. When we discuss the relations between the Netherlands and Russia we cannot neglect the ‘power dimension’ between these two countries. However, first we need to know what the concept ‘power’ entails and via what means one can exercise it. Barnett and Duval (2005) argue that one can divide power into two cores. The first core addresses the question of whether power is an attribute, shaping circumstances of other actors or whether it is inherently social and shapes actors (Barnett and Duval 2005: 46-47). The second core is about whether power is a direct relation between the object and subject with a tangible short distance or if it diffuses via institutions that mediate the effect of power (Idem: 47-48). Based on these two cores, one can identify four ‘forms’ of power. Compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. However, for the purposes of this thesis only the first two forms are relevant. Compulsory power should be understood as direct control over others or as ‘the ability of A to get ‘B’ to do what ‘B’ otherwise would not do’. In this scenario ‘A’ wins because of A’s material or ideational resources (Idem: 49-50). This definition does allow norms and symbols to be ‘fuel’ for power. Institutional power is less direct than compulsory power, because it works via institutions as intermediary. In this scenario, ‘A’ lacks domestic power resources to compel ‘B’, but institutional arrangements and A’s favourable position to it does allow ‘A’ to exercise indirect influence over ‘B’ (Idem: 51-52). This form of power is strictly normative. Now that we have established that there are two ‘paths’ of exercising power over another actor’, it is crucial to determine how these paths unfold. In the case of the Netherlands. The only viable material resources it could employ to coerce Russia would be economic means such as prohibiting foreign direct investments in Russia by Netherlands based businesses. A military threat by the Netherlands towards Russia, would not be taken seriously by Moscow. However there are other means of exercising power, namely ideational, or normative power. Normative power means the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (Manners 2002: 240). According to Ian Manners the European Union is a normative power

29

and it diffuses its norms via six ways. Firstly, contagion as means of diffusion. In this regard, norms spread ‘unintentionally’. By setting a ‘virtuous example’ actors will adopt norms voluntarily (Idem: 247). Secondly, informational diffusion “is the result of the range of strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, such as initiatives from the presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission” (Ibid). Thirdly, “procedural diffusion involves the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as an inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU itself” (Ibid). Fourthly, transference of norms occurs when the EU demands conditions for “the exchange of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means” (Idem: 248). Fifthly, overt diffusion “occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations” (Ibid.). Embassies and monitoring missions in third states are responsible for the diffusion here. Lastly, the cultural filter dictates to what extent third parties are susceptible to certain norms (Ibid.). It is reasonable to argue that other actors could use these forms of diffusion as well. As we established earlier, an actor can either exercise power over another actor directly, or via institutions. The Netherlands should therefore employ these forms of diffusion either by itself or via the EU or UN.

3.4 Foreign Policy Analysis

In the preceding section we established what foreign policy is and what underlying factors contribute to its formation. Nevertheless, a vital component of conducting this research to this thesis topic is still missing. This being how we should analyse foreign policy. IR scholars do disagree on to what acadamic field foreign policy analysis (FPA) belongs to. Some scholars would argue that FPA is a distinct discipline and requires a distinct theoretical toolbox to conduct proper analysis. Beach disagrees with this argument. He states that FPA is a subdiscipline of International relations (IR) scholarship and therefore FPA does not require a distinct theoretical toolbox. For Beach it is the scope of analysis that differentiates FPA from IR. Where IR seeks to explain political phenomena that cannot be bound to a single actor, FPA is in fact limited to a single actor. (Beach 2012: 3-4). Alden and Anran define FPA as “the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system”. In practise this means

30

that FPA focusses on “the sources of conduct of states in international affairs, the significance of foreign policy decision-making, the role that state and non-states actors have within the overall distinctive process, as well as the influence of institutional and societal factors in shaping foreign policy” (Alden & Aran 2012: 4-5). Like these authors, Hill concurs with these descriptions of FPA. According to him FPA “enquires into the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states. It does this by giving a good deal of attention to decision-making, initially so as to probe behind the formal self-descriptions (and fictions) of government and public administration” (Hill 2003: 12). Based on the descriptions of these authors we can identify a common theme. Decision-making is one of the most prevalent components of analysing foreign policy. All authors mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, mention this component to be one of the key areas that FPA seeks to analyse. For Beach the actors who play a key role in the decision-making process of FPA can be individual leaders, collectives and states. Although the actor can have a different analytical shape, the main characteristic for these actors are the same. Namely, the actors are “intelligent, intentional (…) that have the ability to learn from past events and respond creatively to a given context, actors can actively attempt to change a given context in order to make it more amiable to the achievement of their own goals.” (Beach 2003: 17). Thus, actors appear to be rational and act in the best way they can in a structuralised environment, although there is a degree of agency available for the actors to shape their unique decision- making process. One important question still remain however, how do we measure this process? Nuechterlein’s view expands on his conceptualisation of national interest. He states that we first need to examine the notion of ‘intensity of interest’. This concept should be utilised to determine what interest has priority for a state. For instance, while supporting a coup d’état in a particular country might be considered as repulsive under ‘normal’ circumstances, it could actually become acceptable when the economic interests outweigh the interests that relate to world order (Nuechterlein 1976: 248). The intensity of an interest is a determining factor for the prioritisation of the interests. In this scenario a trade-off was made in which economic interests are regarded as more important to the nation than maintaining a particular world order. However, one needs to note that the intensity of interests differs for different states. According to Nuechterlein, a capitalist state will prefer the just sketched scenario, whereas a socialist state would prioritise world order instead (Ibid.). Nuechterlein’s overview of a state’s decision making process is problematic to some

31

extent. The concept ‘intensity’ indicates a fixed perception of what constitutes a nation’s motives for undertaking a particular course of action. It implies that rationality is bound to a set of particular characteristics instead of foreign policy goals. However, states do seek to serve their best interest and therefore a sense of rationality should be applied in analysing its decision making process. According to Beach, the most commonly accepted theory of the decision making process among FPA scholars is the so called ‘Rational Actor Model’ (RAM) (Beach 2003: 25).

3.5 The Rational Actor Model

The ontological and epistemological reality for RAM can be characterised as that it “predicts that a rational actor will choose the foreign policy that maximizes gains with the minimum of cost” (Idem: 100). As was established in the previous paragraphs, the main line of argumentation for foreign policy development follows an ontological assumption of states as rational actors who seek to serve their national interest. In this section we shall expand on this by examining the theoretical implications of the rational actor model further and purposively neglect the methodological implications here, as we shall discuss these in the next chapter. The model states that the decision-making process for achieving maximised utility consists of two phases. In the first phase, “the problem will be identified, the goals will be ranked, all relevant information will be gathered and possible courses of action identified” (Idem: 98). Thereafter in the second phase, “the alternatives are assessed on the basis of utilities and probabilities associated with all possible outcomes. Then, an optimising decision is made in choosing alternative courses of action.” (Ibid). However, what paradigm does the RAM adheres to? So far, the national interest ‘security’ has been mentioned multiple times as of now. Does this mean that realism, theoretically informs the RAM? Hill refutes this notion. He states that following a realist framework, one views states as security maximisers. Therefore decision-makers will prioritise this interest. This process is however contrasted by how the situation would unfold if the RAM is employed. As the rational actor seeks to maximise its utilities, it is not determined what utilities should actually be prioritised (Hill 2003: 115-116). The Rational Actor Model was formulated as a model in in Graham T. Allison’s work Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). The RAM is just one of

32

three models that Alisson presents in his work. The main characteristic of the RAM, classified by Allison as ‘model 1’, is that it ‘attempts to understand events as purposive acts of unified national governments’. An analogy can be made here to individuals, as if states were people. The actions they undertake must be understood in line with the respective goals they tried to fulfil (Allison 1971: 4-5). Still, Allison provides two more models. They will be briefly discussed here, before a more thoroughly examination of model 1. Allison calls model 2 the ‘Organizational Process Model’. This model dictates that organisational procedures, or behaviour, translate into outputs. These outputs will generate a particular course of action. The patterns are fixed. Organisational features and certain patterns of behaviour determine how a governmental organisation copes with a particular situation (Idem: 6). In contrast to model 1, actions are not related to the goals they are meant to serve, but are rather ‘born’ because of bureaucratic tradition. Model 3, or Governmental politics model, postulates the notion that different branches of government compete with each other for power. All branches have their own interests and the resultant of foreign policy action is a game that is played by these individual branches (Ibid). To clarify for the purpose of this thesis, we shall adhere to the theoretical principles of model 1 (RMA). For this model all decisions, actions, and strategies an actor makes are the result of what this actor believes are the best course of action to take, to satisfy its national goals. For all intents and purposes, this model 1 is the best ‘theoretical fit’, since the development of the Netherlands policy towards Russia can best be understood as if the country is an unitary actor with clear goals, these being economic well-being, normative goals, and security. Furthermore, the Netherlands is a unitary state with little room for federative branches that seek satisfy their own needs first. The rational actor model paradigm consists of organizing concepts’, there are four organising concepts, namely national actor, defined as the unitary decision-maker, ‘the problem’, defined as actions taken in response to strategic challenges, ‘Static selection’ as the sum of activity the government has chosen as a ‘solution’ and lastly action as a rational choice. The fourth concept consists out of four components as well. 1) goals and objectives, 2) alternatives, 3) consequences, 4) choice (Allison 1971: 32-33). Goals and objectives mean utility and pay off. What benefits do they yield. In the context of this thesis it would translate into justice and closure for a large portion of the Dutch population or in economic terms: trade value that contributes to the national wealth. Alternatives are basically ‘decisions trees’, or in other words a set of acts that will lead to a certain outcome. Consequences are the actual

33

outcomes from following a certain path. Lastly, choice is the last step in a decision-making process and it involves choosing the alternative that lead to a consequence that best matches the goals and objectives (Ibid.).

3.6 Conceptualisation of Variables

Based on the theoretical discussion in this chapter, four possible variables have been identified that influence foreign policy. These being defence, economy, ideology and world order. However, to fit these variables into this particular research it is necessary to convert them to more suitable variations. As was noted earlier, the variable economy can be matched to the concept ‘Koopman’. World order and ideology will be merged and grouped under the concept ‘Dominee’. The concept defence will remain intact as it does not fit under either of these possible specific Dutch concepts, but will be renamed to Security as it is still rather relevant to the formation of the Netherlands policy towards Russia. The first variable, Koopman will be conceptualised as “the enhancement of the nation- state's economic well-being in relations with other states.” (Nuechterlein 1976: 248) The second variable, Dominee will be conceptualised as “(contributing to the)10 maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.” and “the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people of a nation- state share and believe to be universally good.” (Ibid.). The third variable, Security will conceptualised as “the protection of the nation state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence (and digital threats)11 directed from another state, and/or an externally inspired threat to its system of government” (Ibid.).

10 Bracketed excerpt of the quotation was added by me, as solely mentioning the maintenance of the international order, which could be interpreted as a sole effort of the Dutch, can be considered as naïve. 11 The bracketed exerpt of the quotation is not part of the original text, but added by me. Considering that Nuechterlein’s work was published in 1976, it is reasonable to assume that digital threats were no priorities of national concern. The situation in 2020 is rather different as the world in the present day is tremendously more digitalised. Therefore I concluded that it was prudent to add digital threats as part of the conceptualisation. 34

Chapter 4 Methodology

Having identified what main theoretical guidelines this research will follow. The next step is to establish the methodological foundation for this thesis. This chapter will discuss the employed methodology and the operationalisation of the relevant variables, the research design and data collection. We will firstly turn to discuss how the relevant variables shall be operationalised. The research design for this thesis will be a single case study with a qualitative content analysis. The main argument for choosing this design will be discussed in this chapter. Finally, the main data sources that this research depends on, shall be identified and the main means of collecting the data will be accounted for.

4.1 Operationalisation of the Variables

As was established in the theoretical framework foreign policy is “both the broad trends of behaviour and the particular actions taken by a state or other collective actor(s) as directed towards other collective actors within the international system.”. These actions on their turn are ‘fed’ by national interests. After examining the literature these interests are ‘Koopman’, ‘Dominee’ and ‘Security’. These interests are the main variables that this research will depend on for guiding the analysis. The official Russia strategy of the Dutch government which was revealed in 2019 will serve as a ‘guide’ for the specific policy areas regarding the national interests the Netherlands has in relation to Russia. As was made clear by examining the literature, states are rational actors who seek to maximise utility. The decisions they make are connected to the goals they help to achieve. Therefore, all courses of action the Dutch government takes relative to its relation with Russia, will be viewed as decisions and they will be matched to their respective goals. As was established in the previous chapter ‘Security’ will be conceptualised as “the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence (and digital threats directed from another state), and/or an externally inspired threat to its system of government” (Nuechterlein 1976: 248). This conceptualisation focusses on security issues of the Netherlands in relation to Russia. One needs to understand that in this context Russia should be considered as a potential threat for the Netherlands and the variable security in the Netherlands policy towards Russia should be viewed in this light. Therefore we can make an

35

analytical subdivision of the potential security issues, practices and actions the Dutch government has to cope with it. In 2019, the Dutch government stated in its ‘Russia Strategy’ (2019) that Russia poses a security risk for the Netherlands in the fields of territorial sovereignty, societal influence and cybersecurity (Blok 2019a: 7). Therefore, we shall analyse: ‘efforts to increase digital security’, ‘efforts to increase territorial security’ and ‘efforts to increase societal security’. Drawing from liberal institutionalist theoretical insight, a special focus shall lie on what role international organisations and institutions play in these efforts. The second variable, ‘Koopman’, will be conceptualised as “the enhancement of the nation state's economic well-being in relations with other states.” (Nuechterlein 1976: 248). In the context of the Netherlands policy towards Russia, the economic interests should be viewed as policy to safeguard the interests of the Dutch business community as they contribute to the national wealth of the Netherlands. Major economic sectors in this community include the agriculture sector and the energy sector. In the ‘Russia Strategy’ we find that the Netherlands has a major interest in trade and acknowledges Russia’s role as a major energy supplier. Furthermore, the economic neighbourhood also has the attention of the Dutch (Blok 2019a: 11-12). The overall Russia policy should contain substantial content to satisfy these needs. Therefore on an analytical level, we shall examine: ‘efforts to maintain energy supply’ and ‘efforts to maintain the export volume of the Netherlands to Russia’, efforts to maintain economic accessibility via Russia’s neighbourhood. The third variable, ‘Dominee’, will be conceptualised as “(contributing to the) maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.” and “the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people of a nation state share and believe to be universally good.” (Nuechterlein 1976: 248). Complementary to this definition we find in the Russia Strategy three connected subjects. The Netherlands considers Russia to be a state that violates human rights and addressing these violations is necessary and the Netherlands seeks Russia’s compliance in trying the MH17 culprits. Lastly, the Netherlands is worried about Russia destabilizing crisis areas such as Ukraine and Syria (Blok 2019a: 2-4, 9). Therefore this variable shall be analysed as ‘efforts to contain Russia in Crisis areas’, ‘efforts to promote human rights in Russia, ‘efforts to try the perpetrators of the downing of MH17’. As established in the previous chapter, a special focus shall lie on the constructivist informed notion of normative power. Inspired by how the EU seeks to diffuse

36

norms, we shall examine how the Netherlands employs norm diffusion as a tool for achieving its normative goals.

4.1.2 Research Design

The main method for this thesis will be a qualitative content analysis. Firstly, however we need to identify what this research method entails. Thereafter, we shall look to why this method fits this type of research. According to Kohlbacher content analysis should be defined as the ‘study of recorded human communication’ (Kohlbacher 2006). The main implication for this thesis is that it is not required to generate new data, but rather to make use of existing data. Interviews with policymakers could be a fruitful addition to the data source, but this would only be the case if there is a gap in the data. Furthermore, content analysis is ‘essentially a coding operation’, because the researcher transforms the raw data into a standardised form that allow the researcher to conduct analysis systematically. This process places the researcher in a position where one needs to judge the meaning of a text. In essence content analysis "comprises techniques for reducing texts to a unit-by-variable matrix and analysing that matrix quantitatively to test hypotheses" (Ibid.). This study will depend on the deductive category application variant of content analysis. The consequence of this decision is that the research process is based on ‘prior formulated, theoretically derived aspects of analysis’ (Mayring 2000). To be more concise, one needs to provide explicit definitions of the relevant variables and coding rules for the employed analytical categories and therefore clearly indicate how one shall code the text and what criteria will apply (Ibid.). The Rational Actor Model will serve as the main theoretical guideline for this thesis. And the main principle inherent to this model is that actors consider their options rationally. For epistemological purposes it is important to clarify here, that one can measure how an actor perceives the best manner to maximise utility. They firstly choose a path that leads to an outcome that best suits the goals and objectives of the state in question. As the (macro)goals were already identified in the theoretical framework as national interests, it is apparent that one needs to analyse the actions a state takes to achieve these goals and why it chose this path. For this thesis, the best manner to measure these, is by analysing official government documents such as policy documents, parliamentary proceedings, strategy documents,

37

parliamentary and ministry letters. Subsequentially, evidence emerges as the analyst places himself in the chair of the government. One examines the ‘strategic characteristics of the problem which permits the analyst to employ the principles of rational action’ (Allison 1971: 32-33). Therefore a qualitative content analysis appears to be the best approach. The text will be analysed for official stances of the Dutch government regarding its objectives in its relation with Russia. Thereafter segments that contain the course of action that the Dutch government undertakes to reach these goals need to become visible from these documents. A coding protocol will guide the analysis and the coding process was conducted manually. The coding scheme will follow the principles of the RAM. The indicator’s categories and the corresponding codes will signify policy motives, policy alternatives, the chosen policy decision and the goals the policies decisions seek to satisfy. Therefore the coding scheme comprises the following categories related to the corresponding indicators. The variable Security, has the indicator ‘efforts to increase digital security’ and shall correspond to the categories ‘Increase digital security Choice’ coded with DIGICHO, ‘Increase digital security Alternative coded with DIGIALT, ‘Increase digital security Goal’ coded with DIGIGOA, ‘Increase digital security Identification’ coded with DIGIIDEN. The indicator ‘efforts to increase territorial security’ shall correspond to the categories ‘Increase territorial security Choice’ coded with TERCHO, ‘Increase territorial security Alternative coded with TERALT, ‘Increase territorial security Goal’ coded with TERGOA, ‘Increase territorial security Identification’ coded with TERIDEN. The indicator ‘efforts to protect against foreign influence’ shall correspond to the categories ‘Protect against foreign influence Choice’ coded with FORCHO, ‘protect against foreign influence’ coded with FORALT, ‘Protect against foreign influence Goal’ coded with FORGOA, Protect against foreign influence Identification coded with FORIDEN. For the variable Koopman, the indicator ‘efforts to maintain energy supply’ will have the categories ‘Energy Choice’ coded with ‘ENECHO’, ‘Energy Alternative’, coded with ENALT, ‘Energy Goals’ coded with ENGOA, ‘Energy identification’ coded with ENIDEN. The indicator ‘efforts to maintain the export volume of the Netherlands to Russia’, shall correspond to categories ‘export preservation Choice’ coded with EXPCHO, ‘export preservation alternative’ coded with EXPALT, ‘export preservation Goal’ coded with EXPGOA, ‘export preservation Identification’ coded with EXPIDEN. The indicator ‘efforts to maintain economic accessibility via Russia’s neighbourhood’ will have the categories Russia’s neighbourhood choice’ coded with APRCHO, Russia’s neighbourhood Alternative’

38

coded with APRALT, Russia’s neighbourhood Goal’ APRGOA, Russia’s neighbourhood Identification’ coded with APRIDEN. The third variable ‘Dominee’ has the indicator efforts to contain Russia in Crisis areas and shall correspond to the categories ‘contain Russia in Crisis areas Choice’ coded with CRISCHO, ‘contain Russia in Crisis areas Alternative’ coded with CRISALT, ‘contain Russia in Crisis areas Goal’ coded with CRISGOA and ‘contain Russia in Crisis areas Identification’ coded with CRISIDEN. The indicator ‘efforts to try perpetrators of the downing of MH17’, shall correspond to the categories ‘Justice quest Choice’ coded with ‘JUSCHO’, ‘Justice quest Alternative’ coded with JUSALT, ‘Justice quest Goal’ coded with JUSGOA and ‘Justice quest identification’ coded with JUSIDEN. The indicator ‘efforts to promote human rights in Russia’ shall correspond to the categories ‘Human rights promotion Choice’ coded with HUMCHO, ‘Human rights promotion alternative’, coded with HUMALT, ‘Human rights promotion Goal’, coded with HUMGOA, ‘Human rights promotion Identification’, coded with HUMIDEN. For all categories and their corresponding codes the principle, that the analysed texts need to contain a clear reference to what the Dutch government is taking action for to fulfil the needs of what the category describes, will apply. For instance, for the category ‘digital security measures’ the texts does need to reference to the words ‘digital security’ and the actions described in the texts are explicitly related to these words.

4.2 Sources

This research will primarily rely on primary sources. There are multiple motivations for this. Firstly, as this research will cover a relative recent time span, there is no extensive list of authoritative work that can be consulted for an outlook on the development of Dutch foreign policy. Moreover, the topic of this thesis is quite specific as the aim of this will be to mainly cover the Dutch foreign policy approach towards Russia. Complementary to this observation is that in the academic literature, the study of Dutch foreign policy has been heavily neglected in general. The secondary sources that will be utilised here will mainly serve to provide background information. Most primary sources will be textual governmental sources. These include, policy documents, parliamentary proceedings, memorandums, strategy documents, parliamentary and ministry letters. Also existent interviews in news articles will be included. The first variable ‘Koopman’ was measured by analysing primary data collected from the (online) archives of Ministry of agriculture Ministry of foreign affairs, Ministry of

39

economic affairs, VNO-NCW 12, Advisory council on international affairs. All previous mentioned data types will be gathered from these sources. The second variable ‘Dominee’ was measured by analysing primary data collected from the (online) archives of Ministry of foreign affairs, Advisory council of international affairs, Netherlands mission to the UN, NGO’s, Ministry of Justice and Security. All previous mentioned data types will be gathered from these sources. The third variable Security was measured by analysing primary data collected from the (online) archives of NATO, EU commission, EU Parliament, Ministry of defence, Ministry of Foreign affairs, House of Representatives, Advisory council of international affairs and news articles. All previous mentioned data types will be gathered from these sources.

4.3 Reflection

For the sake of academic neutrality and transparency it is important to reflect on the methodological choices that have been made for this thesis and what implications it has for the credibility, dependability and transferability. The main method is a qualitative content analysis. The process of coding can be described as being a subjective practise and in turn this would damage the dependability of the research. However, the codes that are utilised for this research can be applied objectively if one would accept and follow the same theoretical principles, namely that of the Rational Actor Model, we should expect fellow researchers to apply the same codes to the same data. Additionally, one could argue that the RAM is still flawed as ‘rationality’ is still a vague concept, as people can disagree on what would be rational behaviour. However, from a methodological perspective this is not an issue. Since it is the researcher’s job to examine what the unit of analysis deems as rational and not to apply the researcher’s own perception of rationality. Another issue that one should keep in mind while reading this work is the availability of open sources. This thesis depends solely on public information that has been disclosed by the Dutch government, EU and other institutions. The credibility of this thesis however is being safeguarded by the research design itself. As we shall examine a time period of six years, we will be able to identify common themes in the Dutch policy as it developed overtime. Therefore, despite the fact that we do not have access to classified data, we are still

12 Dutch employers' federation 40

able to utilise the open sources of different points in time, to identify patters that indicate a certain development. Adding classified documents to the analysis process would have yielded additional details and depth to the narrative, but would not have changed the overall outcome. Furthermore, to what extent are the findings of this research applicable to other contexts? Firstly we do need to recognize that is impossible to directly transfer the findings of this research to other contexts, since the Dutch state as unit of analysis, has unique properties and operates under unique circumstances. However, this research does contain general properties that can be transferred into other contexts. The Netherlands is not the only middle sized Western democratic nation that has to adjust to a reality of the revitalization of great power politics and as a consequence, has to find a way to balance its national interests in this context. The findings of this research can serve as a guide and an ‘analytical lantern’ for countries that are in a similar (international) political situation.

41

Chapter 5 Security

As the current state of affairs in 2020 dictate, the relations between the West and Russia have deteriorated to a point in which both sides cannot trust each other to respect their respective sovereignty. Even though the relations between the two blocks started to shatter considerably after the Russian invasion of the Crimean peninsula, for the Dutch perspective however, an extra layer to the renewed conflict was added by the downing of flight MH17. As we shall examine in this chapter, the Netherlands became a target for Russian clandestine activities. Furthermore, as the Netherlands is a member of both NATO and the EU, its territorial integrity also became threatened again. In the period 2014-2020 the Dutch governmental institutions have considered multiple policy options and decisions to guarantee the integrity of the Netherlands security in the field of its territorial sovereignty, foreign influence and cyber security. It will be the purpose of this chapter to establish why the Netherlands made certain policy decisions and what goals they sought to satisfy.

5.1 Territorial Security

After the Second World War, the Netherlands became a member of NATO in 1949 as the country deemed it impossible to defend its national borders on its own, as the invasion of the Netherlands by Nazi-Germany in May 1940 made clear. The security section of the Netherlands policy towards Russia must be viewed against this backdrop. The main strategy for the Dutch to protect its border, is rooted in multilateralism. This was the case in 1949 and is still relevant in the period 2014-2020. The following quotation is from the minister of Defence, Ank Bijleveld: “We are all situated in a region where Russia is very present and active: the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic. Russia is acting assertively: pilots do not report when they enter our airspace, ships passing through the channel unannounced, and even simulated attacks on military targets. That's why it's good that we talk to each other regularly.” (Bijleveld 2018)13. Minister Bijleveld describes here her attendance to the

13 The original quotation is in Dutch. Almost all quotations in this thesis, derived from Dutch ministers, are exclusively translated from original Dutch sources.

42

‘Northern Group’, this is a partnership of Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom and Sweden (Ministry of Defence 2018a). This proves that it is Dutch policy to keep other ‘like-minded’ state actors close on a diplomatic level. However, this partnership does not only seek to serve to maintain active diplomatic channels with ‘obvious’ allies, it also seek to offer more substantial measures. For instance, the Ministry of Defence reports that the partnership is utilised to "merge EU and NATO initiatives. For example, ministers discussed measures to facilitate the movement of military personnel and equipment.” (Ibid.). These discussions must be viewed as part of what can be regarded as ‘forward hazard containment’14. In case of a military conflict with Russia, the Netherlands does not plan to fight this conflict on its own soil. The country does not share a border with Russia, therefore to reach the Dutch border, the Russian armed forces would require to cross the Baltic states, Poland and Germany first. Therefore it would be beneficial for the Dutch armed forces and their allies to be able to quickly move their capabilities to the first frontline, namely the Baltic states. This strategic notion is reflected by current Dutch policy. The Netherlands forms a battlegroup together with Belgium, Czech Republic, Iceland and Norway and is led by Germany and aims to protect Lithuania against foreign incursions into its territory. (NATO 2019). The Dutch foreign minister and Defence minister, Stef Blok and Ank Bijleveld respectively, jointly stated in 2019 to the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) that: “The advanced NATO presence in the Baltic States and Poland serves as a reassuring measure for these countries and as a deterrent to Russia. Your House previously reported that the mandate for the Dutch contribution to this advanced NATO presence in Lithuania will run until 2020. Since there are no indications of a change in Moscow's position, the government has decided to mandate the Dutch contribution to extend NATO's presence in Lithuania through 2021” (Blok and Bijleveld 2019). The main policy appears to be to deter Russia from taking aggressive measures against the Baltic states. According to the principles of liberal institutionalism, the position of the Dutch is quite aligned with what the theory dictates, namely that cooperation through institutions will yield benefits for all involved parties. The Netherlands policy action to contribute actively as a NATO member in the defence of Lithuania does allow the Netherlands to prevent having to fight on its own territory. At the same time, Lithuania is assured of its safety by NATO countries.

14 My description. 43

Source: Van Dam (2020) via mapchart.net.

Further evidence of the pivotal role that NATO plays in the security aspect of the Netherlands Russia strategy can be partly identified in a NATO pledge that was made by again both the foreign minister and the defence minister. They conveyed the following message to NATO via an official ‘National plan on the defence investment pledge 2018’: “This government is committed to further increase defence spending in order to fulfil the Defence Investment Pledge. A step towards this goal is to invest in our capability targets as stated in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Of these capability targets, we have prioritised five. These are: procurement of additional F-35s, reinforcement of land capabilities through investment in direct and indirect firing power, strengthening of maritime capabilities through investment in BMD-capabilities and additional enablers for our Special Operations Forces” (Ministry of Defence 2018b: 1-3). This quotation proves that the Netherlands as of 2018, takes its role within NATO rather seriously. How can this policy action, be linked to Russia however? The linkage is found in a letter that both ministers send to the House of Representatives in which they elaborated on the pledge they made to NATO: “NATO does not automatically prevail in a potential conflict with Russia. It is therefore necessary that NATO members take such a scenario into account and be able to respond effectively in a NATO context” (Bijleveld and

44

Blok 2018)15. The Netherlands is aware that the main instrument of its defence strategy is in a fragile state. Therefore it can be considered that it is a policy goal to help raising awareness regarding taking NATO seriously, is prudent for all members. Therefore setting an example can be seen as a policy measure to achieve this goal. NATO plays a key role in the decision-making process for the Dutch government regarding its security issues with Russia. However what alternatives have been considered by decision-makers in the formation process of this strategy. To examine this quotation, we shall turn to looking to the election programs of the two ruling parties who received the most votes during the last election in 2017, the VVD and CDA. Regarding defending the national territory the election program of the VVD dictates that: “To be able to face any opponent on the modern battlefield, we must constantly invest in men, new military equipment and innovations. We ask a lot of our soldiers and that is why they deserve the best equipment with which they can perform their tasks safely and effectively. Sufficient budget must be available to acquire the best and most modern equipment.” (VVD 2017). Aside from relying on NATO as the Netherlands main instrument of defence, the largest ruling party VVD and party of minister Blok, does place emphasis on the Netherlands own capabilities regarding its territory.16 Especially the phrase “face any opponent on the modern battlefield” is rather expressive, considering that ‘any opponent’ must include Russia. The other ruling party, CDA and party of minister Bijleveld, does not necessarily rely on sole Dutch capabilities. However, like the VVD, this party also considered different options for NATO. In their campaign program they state that “With the current risks of terrorism, the instable European borders and the new, more modest role for the United States, the Netherlands must fulfil its own responsibility within Europe, together with countries that share a common strategic interest.” (CDA 2017). The CDA did not expect that the Netherlands could rely on the United States in future conflicts. Since NATO depends on American leadership, the CDA regarded closer ties with European partners as a plausible alternative. It should be noted that the ‘Northern Group’ can be seen as reflection of this intention, although the Northern Group is situated in the NATO framework. A more substantial example of a Dutch commitment to European cooperation for its national defence does exist though. In 2019 minister Blok presented the, in chapter 4

15 Letter to the House of Representatives 16 I’m aware that campaign promises are highly flexible and their main purpose is to attract voters. Strong language must be seen as a tool. Still, in highly functioning democracies, one should be able to trust the core message that democratic parties aim to spread. 45

referenced, ‘Russia Strategy’ to the House of Representatives (at their request). In this strategy the minister states that: “There have also been several initiatives undertaken in an EU framework recently, initiatives such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the improvement of military mobility in Europe. The Netherlands supports initiatives that lead to closer defence cooperation in Europe” (Blok 2019a). One can determine, based on this quotation, that EU cooperation in terms of defence, is regarded by the Dutch as a main pillar of its defence policy besides NATO. This behaviour of the Netherlands could also have been predicted with liberal institutionalism. As the Netherlands is a rational actor it does seek institutional cooperation that best suits its needs. Although NATO does still play a key role for the Netherlands in regard of its territorial security interest, that does not mean it is not prudent ‘to bet on two horses’. Especially since this rational actor has detected that one of those ‘horses’ might become less reliable in the near future. To further expand upon the framework of liberal institutionalism, the Netherlands with respect to its security issues in an institutional perspective, is not bound to just NATO and the EU. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also play a role in the Dutch policy. In 2011 the Netherlands signed an agreement, the so-called ‘Vienna Document’. This agreement allows all signing parties to ‘exchange a variety of information, conduct on-site inspections, evaluation visits, observation visits, and other military-to-military contacts’ (US Department of State 2011). The Netherlands made use of this agreement by sending observers to Russia in 2016 to inspect the Russian-Ukrainian border region. In turn the Russians sent observer to the Netherlands to monitor the military exercise Autumn Falcon (Ministry of defence 2018c). For the Netherlands this arrangement should be viewed as “the idea (…) that openness and transparency prevent conflicts” (Ibid.). The Netherlands here depends on mutual benefits. By adhering to this institutional framework, both the Netherlands and Russia should enjoy more transparency and by extension safety. One important aspect needs to be noted still. As IR scholar Mark Galeotti remarks, the West does have other ways to fight back against Russia in a military conflict between these two parties. He states that “The West can fight back in many ways. For example, by deliberately letting the Russian economy collapse. Russia can initially conquer territory, but it cannot win the battle on the long term.” (De Boer 2017). All examined policy documents in this chapter have not mentioned this approach explicitly. More details on the economic aspect of the Netherlands policy towards Russia will follow in the next chapter, but it should be noted that as a rational actor it is remarkable, that this option has not been properly discussed.

46

5.2 Digital security

Another vital part of the security component of the Netherlands policy towards Russia is its digital infrastructure. Perhaps this part plays an even more central role in its policy than territorial security as minister Bijleveld commented in 2018 that the Netherlands is in a state of a ‘cyberwar’ with Russia. The minister has already offered NATO to deploy Dutch ‘cyber soldiers’, in extension to this remark, Bijleveld stated that “We must get rid of the naivety in this area” (Nu.nl 2018). Again, like its territorial security interests, for its digital interests the Netherlands appear to look towards NATO. It is not surprising that the Netherlands seeks a multilateral approach, especially when one observes that this has been the main route for Dutch safety for the entire second half of the twentieth century, then why should they change their course of action for a twenty-first century problem? Nevertheless, unlike an actual war, a cyberwar can be fought clandestinely and therefore the threshold to start one is less of a burden to overcome. Regardless, an actor does need a reason still, to start a cyberwar with another country. The Netherlands reckons itself as one of Russia’s targets. The Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) stated that: “Our country is an interesting target for espionage for Russia. Because of MH17, the strategic importance of the Netherlands has been strongly increased. The Netherlands has also been an interest of Russia for a long time, due to the membership and being the host of international institutions” (NCTV 2019: 15). This realisation does have some unforeseen consequences however. First, the motivation that the NCTV displays for Russia to consider the Netherlands a target is not universal for all NATO members. The MH17 investigation does not involve all NATO member and furthermore not all member are hosts for international institutions. Second, according to article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty an armed attack against one or more members is considered to be an attack against all (NATO 2019). But a cyberattack is not ‘an armed attack’. What alternatives does the Netherlands have? Regarding its cyber security policy against Russia, the country relies on the international rule of law. During a debate between members of parliament and minister Blok and Bijleveld, the question was raised if additional international regulations were needed to defend the cyber sovereignty of the Netherlands. Minister Blok responded by stating that: “That question has been raised in various places. At the moment there already is international regulation about decent (cyber)traffic between different countries. The suggestion that there is no regulation is in itself incorrect and also

47

undesirable (…) Ms Bruins Slot also pointed to the Tallinn Manual17 - that there are practical tools for how best to apply which rule of law in a specific situation. Against this background, when it comes to implementation, the Netherlands indeed sees an important role for itself, which we also play” (DHOR 2018: 12). Dutch cybersecurity policy is in itself based on the notion that states will play by the rules. The Dutch do rely here on normative power and at the same time, also believe that they can play an important role in this regard, hence the remark ‘the Netherlands indeed sees an important role for itself’. The concrete approach the government takes was described by minister Blok as “In line with this, in the appropriate forums such as the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE), the Netherlands advocates anchoring the recognition that international law applies in the cyber domain.” (Ibid.). Specific details on how the Dutch employ normative power in their role as a ‘Dominee’ will be covered in chapter 7, but we do need to recognize here that the Netherlands does not necessarily make use of international institutions to foster cooperation but rather to impose coercion on actors, such as Russia, that the Netherlands itself cannot control. Nonetheless, the Dutch government does not have to rely solely on its own normative power to defend its cyber sovereignty. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Dutch rely on the notion to employ multilateralism to solve national problems. Therefore, one would expect the Netherlands to also mobilise the EU for its cause. This assumption is confirmed by minister Blok’s following statement: “Russia has an offensive cyber program. Since 2015, the Dutch intelligence and security services have warned against Russian digital threats (…) the government also underlines the importance of international cooperation, for example in the form of the use of diplomatic instruments, such as the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox” (Blok 2019b: 6). The Dutch government does refer here explicitly to the EU as an asset for its cybersecurity interests. Furthermore, Russia is mentioned within the same context. The rational choice here, is that a small country would have difficulty with dealing with a large threat. Therefore cooperation through an international organisation such as the EU, is the most feasible option. Furthermore, this option could be viewed as an alternative for ‘NATO’s protective umbrella’. Even though an cyberattack does not necessarily has to be affiliated to a military threat. This does not mean that these areas do not overlap in some cases. In 2019, Dutch media outlets reported that Russian ‘trolls’ harassed family members of Dutch military personnel who were stationed in Lithuania via ‘creepy’ telephone calls. Journalists reported

17 An NATO sponsored study on the application of international law to cyber conflicts 48

that Russian hackers were able to acquire these phone number via hacking the mobile phones of Dutch military personal (Volkskrant 2019). In response to this report, parliamentary questions were posed to minister Bijleveld to what extent the Netherlands responded diplomatically to Russia in the aftermath of this incident. Minister Bijleveld stated that: “In a broader sense, it is not always possible to establish irrefutably the origin of incidents. The Netherlands will attribute where possible” (Bijleveld 2019: 2). Although the minister does not necessarily explicitly deny that the Netherlands conveyed objections to the Russian government, it is unlikely that this has happened because the minister indicates that the identity of the 'perpetrator' is not fully known. Employing a normative action such as ‘attributing was therefore not possible’. That does not mean that Dutch policy towards Russia in this regard was never successful. In response to the proven Russian attempt to hack into the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which is headquartered in The Hague, the Dutch government decided that the best course of action was to go public with the results of the Dutch intelligence agency. Minister Bijleveld stated that: It is not customary to publicize concrete results from intelligence services. However, the cabinet is now deliberately choosing to make this operation and the Russian intelligence officers involved public, so that it is now more difficult for them to operate internationally.” (Bijleveld 2019). The description of this practise would be ‘naming and shaming’ of Russia’s efforts. Again, we must here note the backdrop of multilateralism. The Netherlands believes in cooperation with other states and the effectiveness of normative power . Otherwise going public with this information would not make much sense. This sentiment is reflected in Ferd Grapperhaus, Dutch minister of Justice and Security, his statement to the House of representatives, related to the ‘Russian hack’. According to Grapperhaus: “The Netherlands is committed to internationally strengthen the coordination in the field of political attribution of cyber-attacks. Carrying out an active political attribution policy contributes to deterrence and it makes the Netherlands less attractive as a target for cyber-attacks” (Grapperhaus 2019: 6). The active policy of the Dutch government in dealing with Russia’s cyberattack is characterised by appealing to the international community. The rational choice is not dissimilar for reaching out to the EU. The alternative would be to deal with Russia on its own. Which is rather challenging for a small state. However, not the entire cybersecurity section of the Dutch Russia policy is dedicated to multilateralism. Some measures were taken unilaterally. For instance, one general example could be the decision in 2019, one year after the attempted hack against the OPCW, to raise to

49

budget for cybersecurity. The Dutch minister of Justice, Grapperhaus, rationalised this decision as it necessary for the “security of vital processes and thus national security is paramount” (Grapperhaus 2019: 2). National security is considered ‘paramount’ here. Making more budget available in the aftermath of such a substantial attack can be seen as a rational choice. At the same time it is also a rather general measure and not necessarily directed towards Russia specifically. A more targeted measure against Russia can be found in the decision of the Dutch government to phase out the services of the Russian anti-virus company Kaspersky. The minister of justice stated that: “The worrying picture in the field of digital threats has led to sharpened considerations regarding the use of digital products and services with a view to safeguarding national security. In that context, the government has determined that, as a precautionary measure, Kaspersky antivirus software will be phased out of the national government.” (Grapperhaus 2018: 1). The Netherlands now regards Russian companies as a security threat. The minister is even more explicit about the government’s motivation to quit using Kasperky’s services by stating that: “Kaspersky Lab is a Russian company headquartered in Russia and therefore subject to Russian law. This legislation requires companies such as Kaspersky to support Russian intelligence services in the performance of their duties (Ibid.). No normative power or cooperation through institutions are involved here. The government makes a rational decision here. One option could be to continue using the services of the Russian company Kasperky and therefore risking a security breach or choosing the alternative risk averse option and quit using their services. The Netherlands as a rational actor, chose the latter.

5.3 Security against foreign influence

The final aspect that minister Blok mentioned in the Russia strategy regarding security is protection against foreign influence. As was already established earlier in this chapter, the Netherlands security interests are related to the actions that are undertaken by the Russian state. The Netherlands identifies ‘problems’, which are in the perception of the Dutch, caused by the Russians. For instance, in 2016 the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), the Dutch intelligence and security agency, published an annual report on what security risks were relevant for the Netherlands in the year 2015 the year after the downing of flight MH17. The agency stated that: “When it comes to espionage and influencing in the Netherlands, then Russia and China are the key actors” (AIVD 2016: 4). The agency elaborates on Russia’s role by mentioning that “Russia seeks political, military, scientific and

50

technological intelligence. Russian intelligence services are covertly present and active in the Netherlands, just like in other Western countries (…) The Russian Federation is also very adept at setting up influence operations and the use of propaganda. This is the result of decades of experience in this field” (Idem: 6). We do need to appreciate here, that intelligence agencies are secretive organisations by nature. The information that we can consume is just the tip of the iceberg, therefore it is challenging to confirm what specific details the Dutch agency uncovered regarding Russian operations. Regardless, the description of the Russian state cannot by any mistake by classified as anything else than that of a ‘hostile’ state. This empirical fragment is in line with what we uncovered in the previous paragraphs about territorial and cyber security. When it comes to foreign influence, it does not get any better for the relations between the Netherlands and Russia. Strangely enough however, the fact that the Netherlands is targeted by Russia in its ‘influencing operations’, was not the ‘prime motivator’ for the Dutch to reconsider its relations with the Russians. In 2015, former Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Bert Koenders discussed in a letter to parliament the relations between the two states. According to Koenders: “Nevertheless, the new reality also has an effect on bilateral relations. In any case, as long as Russia persists in the interference in Eastern Ukraine, it cannot be "business as usual" in the way the Netherlands approaches Russia bilaterally” (Koenders 2015a: 4). The foreign minister does mention here Russia’s meddling in the affairs of sovereign states, namely that of Ukraine. Still, it is quite notable here, that the Dutch minister fails to address the Dutch stakes. Especially considering that the Dutch intelligence agency was aware of Russian operations at this point in time. There is no empirical data available that we can utilise to find an explanation for this anomaly. However, as we shall see later, the Netherlands also relies on multilateralism for protection against foreign influence. By drawing on the theoretical insights of liberal institutionalism and the rational actor model, we can explain this course of action. As the Netherlands is both an EU and NATO member state, it is quite possible that the Netherlands public stance to reconsider its relations with Russia, is to appease its allies, since the both organisations have condemned Russia’s involvement in Ukraine (European Parliament 2015: 2) (NATO 2015: 1). Cooperation through institutions will yield benefits for states and therefore the Netherlands as a rational actor chose to align its security interests with that of NATO and the EU on a public level because aligning your interest with these institutions can foster cooperation between states, which in turn yields benefits for the Netherlands. It was not until 2017, when possible Russian meddling in the Netherlands was

51

discussed by the government openly. In response to a parliamentary question that was raised about this issue, the former minister of Foreign Affairs Halbe Zijlstra, responded by stating that “It must be stated that foreign interference in our democratic processes is not acceptable (…) digital means are sometimes used to influence decision-making processes, imaging and public opinion. (…) That is why awareness and 'social resilience' are essential.” (Zijlstra 2017: 17). This quotation makes clear that in 2017 the Dutch government already formulated policy to combat foreign influence into Dutch domestic affairs, namely that of promoting social awareness. Nevertheless, the word ‘Russia’ is not mentioned once in this response. This indicates that the Dutch state did not openly ‘pointed its finger’ to Russia at the time, as a specific nation that meddles into Dutch affairs. Again, we cannot neglect the fact that the AIVD already openly reported on Russian influencing campaigns against the Netherlands. Therefore, we can dismiss the notion that the government was not aware of these operations conducted by Russia. It is interesting to note, that the sentiment of the Dutch government changed after the poisoning of the British double agent Sergei Skripal. However, once again, the Dutch government included the European Union in its public statement: “the European Union concluded in the European Council that they agree with the United Kingdom's analysis that it is very likely that Russia bears responsibility” (Blok 2018a: 2). And in response to this conclusion the Dutch asserted: “That is why it is important to show Russia that there are borders that cannot be crossed (…) The removal of foreign intelligence workers is based on international law, in particular Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Traffic” (Ibid.). The Dutch government deemed it necessary to show Russia that it cannot cross ‘bounderies’. The corresponding Dutch response to the event was to expel Russian diplomats. Again, this action must be viewed in the context of a multilateral approach and fits in a trend of tying the fate of the Dutch to that of its allies. In the aftermath of this event, the government presented its measures against foreign influencing campaigns against the Netherlands, to the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer). The government made clear that the Netherlands needed more protection against foreign influence, this is shown by the following statement: “the government undertakes efforts to increase resilience against unwanted foreign interference” (Blok 2018b: 2). The word ‘resilience’ appears to become a theme for Dutch policy against Russian meddling, although it needs to be noted here, that the Netherlands does not specifically tailored the approach against Russia specifically. However, since we already established that Russia’s interfering into Dutch domestic affairs was a key security issue for the Netherlands in 2019.

52

We must place these measures into this context as well. The main course of action to create more resilience was to pull together with its EU and NATO allies. The minister stated that “It is necessary to create more awareness at national and European level and to further investigate the perpetrators, motives and potential consequences for European (and Dutch) stability. In this context, the EU has established a framework that can contribute to an approach. An important part of this is the establishment of an EU partnership, where intelligence analysis are made on foreign interference, among other things, as part of a hybrid threat. In addition (…) The Netherlands recently became a member of the Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats”(Idem: 3) 18. The role of international institutions plays a pivotal role again in contending with Russia’s influence operations. As we established that that states are rational actors, we must conclude here that the Dutch government believed that a multilateral approach in its policy towards Russia as a security threat in the sense of foreign influence, was the best course of action. In the following year in 2019, the AIVD published its next annual general intelligence report. Once again, it stated that Russia targeted the Netherlands in foreign influence campaigns, because ‘the country is on its radar because of the downing of MH17 and its NATO and EU membership’ (AIVD 2019: 3). However, in contrast to the preceding years, the government mentioned in a parliamentary letter that: The AIVD notes that there are ongoing (online) influencing activities on social media derived from Russia (Ollongren 2019: 4). The fact that these activities are now openly mentioned by the government, indicates that the foreign influencing campaigns were deemed a higher priority by the Dutch government at this point in time. As recently as March 2020, the government mentioned two international partnerships that were vital to combat disinformation campaigns. The government stated that: “In order to be able to detect potentially destabilizing disinformation campaigns faster and exchange knowledge, the Cabinet is participating in the EU Rapid Alert System. The Netherlands also joined the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism” (Blok 2020a). With the announcement of these partnerships, we can conclude that the Netherlands anno 2020 is quite aware of the threat of Russian influencing campaigns and has spent the previous year’s forging alliances with other ‘like-mined’ states. Although it started out with acknowledging that Russia meddles into the affairs of other states, namely that of Ukraine, but failed to recognize its own security issues,

18 In this partnership, 13 countries, together with the EU and NATO, are developing exercises, training and tools to raise awareness. In addition, the Netherlands contributes to annual EU / NATO exercises, in which attention is also paid to hybrid threats. 53

at least on a public level, then in the following years more partnerships were developed with allied countries to combat influencing campaigns.

5.4 Conclusion

For the Netherlands’s security interests in its relation with Russia, three themes have been discussed in this chapter: territorial security, cybersecurity and security against foreign influence. For all three themes it has been shown that the Netherlands acts in its own best interests when it formulated its policy approach towards Russia. For all themes, both multilateral and unilateral measures were taken. However, when it comes to the topic ‘security’, the Netherlands has a clear preference for the multilateral approach. In the case of territorial security, the Netherlands relies on NATO. Even though the country does not share a land border with Russia. An armed attack against one of its NATO partners is considered as a security threat, since one cannot rule out a Russian plan to march into Dutch territory if a conflict of significant scale breaks out in Europe. Therefore the country positioned a portion of its military capabilities in Lithuania together with other NATO countries to deter Russia from an aggressive strike. Its uniliteral measures such as raising the defence budget must be seen as way for the Dutch to make a commitment to NATO. To keep the Netherlands save from cyberattacks the Netherlands once again looked towards international partners, although in a less clear institutionalised manner as it did for its territorial security interests. The main approach of the Dutch was the normative action of ‘attribution’. Its main course of action here was to show to the international community that Russia is an aggressive state and that anyone can fall victim to their practises. Basically the Netherlands tried to shame Russia for its actions. However, on a more domestic level, the country deemed the Russian software company Kaspersky as a security threat and therefore decided to stop doing business with it. Lastly, the protection against foreign influence was centred around an unwillingness to openly discuss Russian meddling into Dutch affairs. Although the fact that Russia is a state that actively meddles into the affairs of other states was openly acknowledged. Eventually, the Dutch became more open about the fact that Russia actively conducted influencing operations against the Netherlands and responded by reaching out to allied nations in NATO and the EU and participated in partnerships designed to combat foreign influencing activities such as disinformation campaigns.

54

Chapter 6 Koopman

Even though the Netherlands does consider Russia as a security threat, that does not necessarily mean that the country has no economic interest in that very same ‘security threat’. In this chapter we will examine the second interest of the Dutch foreign policy towards Russia namely the desire of the Netherlands to acts as a ‘Koopman’ in its interaction with other nations, or to phrase it differently: to enhance the welfare of the nation. In the Netherlands Russia strategy of 2019 the government stated that protecting Dutch business interest is a priority and that it would endeavour to assist these businesses. We shall see that there is one business sector in particular that was hurt because of concurrent relations between the Netherlands and Russia. However, one more important aspect was mentioned in the strategy namely energy. Although the government did not mention any specific details on how the Netherlands seeks to maintain a good relation with Russia based on the energy needs of the country, we shall see that the situation is more complicated. Based on this complication a new approach was necessary. After the examination of this approach we shall discover an interesting method the Dutch government employed to establish an indirect link with Russia.

6.1 Trade

As was established in the introduction, the Netherlands is a trading nation and as any self- respecting merchant is aware off, maintaining a good relation with your customers is imperative. The Netherlands, being a Koopman (Merchant) should therefore aim to maintain good economic relations with other economic partner states. There is one important caveat however. The Dutch Koopman does not operate alone. It is bound to a union of various countries with their own political and economic interests, namely the EU. Although it might be in the best interest of the nation to act in a certain way, that does not mean that the Netherlands had the opportunity to act in the particular way it wanted to act, since its fate is for an important part intertwined with that of the EU. The most significant example of the just sketched situation is that of the imposition of sanctions by the Russian Federation on the entire EU. This measure was taken by the Russian state as a result of imposition of sanctions against Russia by the EU. The Russian government announced the following in 2014: “In order to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation (…) shall be prohibited or limited to foreign economic operations, providing for import into the territory of the Russian Federation of certain agricultural products, raw

55

materials and foodstuffs originating in the states, that have decided to impose economic sanctions against Russian legal entities and (or) individuals or joined such decision.” (Putin 2014: 1). This action of Russia should be viewed as a pressure tool against the EU to lift their sanctions against them. As of 2020 this has not occurred yet however (Council of the European Union 2020). This is not surprising considering the reason the EU had to impose sanction against Russia: “Since March 2014, the EU progressively imposed restrictive measures against Russia. The measures were adopted in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine.” (Council of the European Union 2014). Russia has not relinquished its control over Crimea in the meantime and therefore, lifting the sanctions will not be a viable political action for the EU under present conditions, as yielding to Russia would result into a diplomatic defeat for the EU. It is therefore safe to say, that the EU and Russia reached a ‘stalemate’ regarding the sanctions they imposed on each other as result of their diplomatic conflict. In what way is this relevant to the Netherlands however? As a member of the EU, the Netherlands was also hit by the Russian sanctions. On a first glance one would expect that this would have been a rather large burden on Dutch economic interests, considering that the Netherlands is in fact the second largest global exporter of agricultural goods, behind the United States and ahead of countries like Germany, Brazil and France (CBS 2016). Surprisingly, however this is not necessarily the case. Former Dutch minister of Economic Affairs in 2014, Henk Kamp, commented that: “Dutch agricultural exports to Russia is a limited part of the total Dutch sum of agricultural sector export value” (Henk Kamp 2014: 1). It suffices to say that the rational approach of a state under these circumstances would mean that dealing with Russia’s sanctions would not be top priority for this state. One who makes such an assumption would indeed be correct, still this does not mean that the Netherlands as a Koopman did not experience any problems with these sanctions. The minister stated that “Nevertheless, certain sectors and companies are hit hard by Russian countermeasures (…) In addition to the direct trade channel, indirect effects can also play a role, such as negative confidence effects among producers and consumers, declining spending and the spread of financial market turmoil” (Ibid.). A proper Koopman would appreciate the obstacles these consequences form for its economic interests. And indeed, the Netherlands did develop policy to respond to the new situation. On a domestic the level, the Netherlands appears to have responded rather quickly to the situation, if we can believe former Dutch minister for Foreign Trade, Lilianne Ploumen. She stated that: “we contacted the agricultural sector in particular immediately after Russia

56

announced the countermeasures, as well as other sectors that may be affected by the measures.” (Ploumen 2014: 17). There is no practical way to confirm the minister’s statement, still it is reasonable to assume that the minister speaks the truth, as the involved business sector would have responded to contest the minister’s statement. Therefore, we can conclude that the Netherlands does indeed take the sanctions seriously, even though the country claimed that it was not ‘hit that hard’. This conclusion is in line with the assumption that a Koopman would indeed find it necessary to protect economic interests, even if the interest is not a top priority. Yet, just contacting targeted business sectors can hardly pass as a ‘firm’ measure to protect your interests. In response to the implementation of the Russian sanctions, the Netherlands did formulate an approach of action to cope with the ramifications of the mentioned sanctions: “The government considers it very important to take measures from the outlook of an even playing field, to turn toward a European level in order to limit the consequences for the agricultural sector in particular, which is most affected by the Russian measures.” (Kamp 2014: 2). A noteworthy caveat can be identified from this excerpt, namely that the Netherlands considers dealing with the sanctions to be an EU effort to create an even playing field. Even though a rational actor who seeks to safeguard its own economic interests might find it more fruitful to disregard an even playing field. We cannot explain this behaviour in the sense of the Netherlands role as a Koopman. However as liberal institutionalism informs us, states have an incentive to cooperate with each other through international organisations. The Netherlands as an actor who did not suffer ‘elaborate’ consequences as result of the sanctions, can afford to not place its own interests on the forefront, but instead work together with its political allies in the European Union as this can yield benefits on other political fronts. We shall turn to this in the next chapter however. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude that the Dutch had no further interest in safeguarding their economic interests in the agricultural sector. In response to the sanctions the Dutch government made clear that ‘The cabinet seeks to encourage the business community to search for alternative outlets and markets and the Cabinet intents to actively support businesses in this endeavour’ (Ibid.). Although the government states that it ‘will not do the work’ for the business community, it does in fact offer active support where needed. This action can be interpreted as a ‘low-key’ approach to work outside the EU and support Dutch businesses. The results of this approach should be qualified as rather successful, although the credits should not necessarily be given towards the Dutch government. For instance, after the implementation of the sanctions, the export value of Dutch agricultural

57

products towards Russia dropped from €1,8 billion to €940 million. But as a consequence, the nature of Russian demand for Dutch agricultural goods shifted. Since Russia could no longer rely on imports it had to expand its own production capacity further. In order to be able to do this, the Russians required other Dutch agricultural products such as genetic animal and plant material, animal feed ingredients, agricultural machinery, pesticides (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 2018). These products are not on Russia’s sanctions list and therefore allowed the Dutch to take this opportunity. It became active policy for the Netherlands to support businesses in this specific new business areas. The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality reported on its official website: “Agricultural Counsellor of the Netherlands embassy in Moscow, Meeuwes Brouwer, was invited to attend the Agro Complex-2020 exhibition as well together with a group of Dutch companies’ active in different subsectors of agriculture” (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 2020a). A government official still takes part in promoting trade between the Netherlands and Russia as of 2020. And the two countries still maintain in this sense an economic relationship regarding agriculture. Still, it cannot be said, that active policy on the part of the Netherlands should be designated as the main source for this observation. Furthermore, no observation has been made on the Dutch part to try to lift the Russian sanctions. As of 2020, the embassy of the Netherlands monitors the situation regarding the sanctions, but no diplomatic success has been reported (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 2020b). Naturally one should consider to what extent these efforts would have yielded any significant result, but it still rather noteworthy, that the Dutch mainly focussed on mitigating the effects of the sanctions.

6.2 Energy

In the previous paragraph was established that the sanctions Russia imposed on the EU were mostly targeted towards agricultural products. Even though, some agricultural products were exempt from sanctions. The question then rises, in what way does the topic energy relate to the Netherlands policy towards Russia? Firstly, we need to identify how energy as a topic was problematized by the Dutch government. In 2014, the foreign minister mentioned the following in response to a question raised by a member of parliament regarding the dependency on Russian gas imports: ‘A reference was made to imports of Russian gas. Let us be honest about that: there is mutual dependence in this field. Therefore, if we want to reduce

58

this mutual dependence, we will have to step up our joint energy policy. That's what needs to be done. This will place some of our EU partners in a vulnerable position towards Russia. We are not the only ones there. There are countries in Eastern Europe that are currently very dependent on it. It is not just a game of taking positions; there are dependencies. A number of EU countries import a lot of gas from Russia. So it is important to keep working on diversification, so to take strategic measures to reduce our dependence on one supplier’ (Koenders 2014a: 15). The minister acknowledges here that there is indeed a dependency on Russian gas imports and does indeed qualify this as problematic, since it is the goal of the Netherlands to reduce dependency on these imports. The main course of action to take here according to the minister should be to find multiple suppliers of gas. At the same time, the minister does not necessarily see the dependency on these imports as the largest problem for the Netherlands. This is not surprising however, considering that in 2014 no decision had been made yet about closing down the domestic gas fields in the Dutch province Groningen. He primarily mentions that other EU partners are more vulnerable. From a rational perspective, it is not hard to see why being dependent on one supplier of a strategic resource, especially Russia, is problematic. Again however, we notice that the Netherlands is in solidarity with other countries. Still, international organisations are capable to yield multiple benefits for participating countries and even though the Netherlands is not hit as hard by other countries by this dependency, it does profit from a mutual endeavour to find alternatives. It needs to be noted here however, that the EU framework regarding energy supply in which the Netherlands takes part is not limited to just EU countries. The EU has its own agenda and this does result in implications for the Netherlands position towards Russia. For instance, in November 2014 the foreign ministers of the EU member states discussed the situation of Ukraine in the EU council of foreign affairs. According to the Dutch foreign minister, the EU countries: ‘stressed that Ukraine should reform its energy sector structurally, focusing on more efficient use of energy and other things to reduce energy consumption on the short term. Some ministers underlined the importance for Ukraine to be less dependent on Russia for its energy needs’ (Koenders 2014b: 3). In the case of the Netherlands this brings a new dimension to the table. As the Netherlands desired to cooperate with EU partners to solve its dependency on Russian gas imports than its fate is at the same tied to that of a ‘third party state’ namely Ukraine. Indeed, as we shall see later, Ukraine cannot be ignored when we examine the Netherlands policy towards Russia regarding energy. Also, this proves that the situation regarding importing Russian energy was not as polarised as Lippert argued. There seemed to be a consensus in the EU that dependency on Russian gas was problematic and did

59

not merely ‘prioritise’ ‘economic issues above security ones’. After identifying the desire of the Netherlands and various other EU countries to reduce dependency on Russian gas imports, we should expect to observe developments in this direction in the Dutch policy. However, the contrary proved to be true. In 2015, Russian energy corporation Gazprom signed a deal with European partners, such as the Dutch Royal shell, to construct a new gas pipeline (Nord Stream 2) from Russia to Europe. A notable detail here is that the pipeline does cross Ukrainian territory, even though Russia and Ukraine were in conflict at the moment (Reuters 2015). Indeed, this fact does raise additional questions. For example how does the Dutch government justify this apparent shift in its approach? After examining an excerpt from former undersecretary of Finance, Eric Wiebes it becomes more clear. For instance the undersecretary stated that: “There is much debate about the project (Nord Stream 2) in a European and transatlantic context. Elements in the discussion are dependence on imports from Russia's, Gazprom's involvement, the implications for Ukraine and the development of gas demand in Europe and in the context of declining gas production in the EU, partly due to declining Dutch gas production. The Dutch government does not play an active role in the creation of this pipeline (…) it is no business as usual in our relationship with Russia due to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the continued undermining of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.” (Wiebes 2017: 3). The Dutch government is now more ‘vague’ in its description of the problematisation it made in 2014. The undersecretary mentions that ‘there is a lot discussion’, but fails to mention that the Netherlands did actively take part in that discussion beforehand. Also, the undersecretary completely negates any role of the Dutch government in the realisation of the new pipeline. This is noteworthy, especially considering that the undersecretary mentions that ‘no business as usual’ is possible as the result of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. The only rational explanation for this course of action can be that that finding an alternative for Russia as a supplier of gas was harder than expected for the Dutch and they went for the most viable economic option. The interests of the ‘Koopman’ does seem to have priority. In light of what we just examined, it is interesting to note that in 2018, the Netherlands does however seem ‘to come clean’ about its supposed role in the construction of Nord Stream 2. The foreign minister stated that: “The Netherlands certainly has an eye for the geopolitical implications of our energy policy. At the same time, the government sees that natural gas production in the Netherlands is declining due to the decision to completely phase out gas extraction from the Groningen field. If the Dutch demand for natural gas decreases less rapidly than gas production in the coming years, energy companies will have to import

60

more gas to continue meeting this demand. Partly in view of the geopolitical aspects, the Netherlands is therefore committed to diversification and the energy transition” (Blok 2018c: 9). Here, the Dutch government does recognize the importance again of striving for less dependency on the Russian gas, mainly because the Netherlands can in the future no longer depend on its own gas reserves as the country decided to close these fields down. Still, the minister does however mitigate the strength of his statement by stating that: “the government considers a transit role for Ukraine important. The Netherlands is working together with Germany to draw attention to the importance of gas transit” (Ibid). This excerpt proves that the Netherlands on the short term has no policy to indeed ‘diversify’ its energy suppliers. By stressing Ukraine as a transit country, it cannot be anything but to conclude that the Netherlands is still very much committed to the Nord stream 2 pipeline project and therefore to Russian gas imports. Although it should be mentioned that the government still does desire to directly tie itself to the project. The minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy in 2019 declared that: “The government also gives no directives to companies where they import their gas from and the Dutch market is open to anyone who wants to sell gas here.” (Wiebes 2019a: 2). Again, the main course of action as it appears to be here, is that of ‘remaining as independent as possible’. It should be noted that the government has explicitly states its desire to diversify its energy supply, but at the same time mentions that the Dutch market is open to anyone who wishes to sell gas, which included Russia. More evidence for a policy of neutrality can be found in the following quotation of a report of a meeting between various EU member state ministers of Economic Affairs at which they discussed European energy policy and the realisation of Nord stream 2: “These negotiations are conducted under the direction of the European Commission between Gazprom (Russia) and Naftogaz (Ukraine) and concern the transit of Russian gas after 31 December 2019.” (Wiebes 2019b: 6). The Dutch government emphasises the role of the EU and downplays its own role in the matter. The rational actor here realises that it can make use of international institutions to achieve two goals. The first being to secure energy for the nation and second, to stay away from Russia as much as possible, since ‘it cannot be business as usual’. We also discover here an answer to what Ten Broeke neglected to provide, namely that the energy element of the Russia policy, was also subject to a neutral policy, even though one would suspect that energy would be a ‘good enough’ reason to remain into contact with Moscow. There is however one major actor that has a stake in this project and that is the United

61

States. When the Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte visited American president Donald Trump, the latter stated that the US is ‘concerned’ regarding Nord Stream II given the implications of Russian gas dependence (Blok 2018c: 1). The United States did not just remained ‘concerned’ regarding Nord Stream II, but did undertake action by sanctioning European companies who are involved in the construction of Nord Stream II (Slager 2019). In this regard, the Netherlands does not appear rather ‘neutral’ anymore. The Dutch minister of International Trade, Sigrid Kaag stated that: “The cabinet has taken note of the US sanctions against Russia, which targets companies working on Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream. The government considers these sanctions undesirable, due to the consequences for business in the Netherlands and other EU member states. The Netherlands has also expressed this position in the past year in diplomatic contacts with American officials, and will continue to do so (…) The government is in close contact with the EU, various countries and the business community about this and possible new sanctions by the US against Russia” (Kaag 2020: 2). Although the minister does not make any remark concerning energy supply, but merely that the sanctions hurt Dutch business interests, it is still noteworthy that the Americans conveyed their concern regarding Nord Stream II to the Dutch government first and later sanctioned involved parties. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Netherlands is in close contact with its EU partners regarding American sanctions against Russia. Why would the Netherlands be concerned about sanctions towards Russia, especially considering that it has a conflict with it as well? The answer is that the Netherlands does need Russian energy imports as do other European countries. The problem is that because of the current state of affairs, it cannot be business as usual, therefore actively tying the Netherlands to a direct partnership with Russia is impossible and therefore they created a policy of indirectness and neutrality to safeguard its energy interests.

6.3 Russia’s neighbourhood

After discovering that dealing with Russia directly was a rather sensitive matter for the Dutch government, we should turn towards examining alternative approaches to satisfy the ‘Koopman’ needs of the Netherlands. One possible approach is to enhance business relations with countries that can be linked to Russia. An example of this was an ‘economic mission’ that the Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland (RVO), the Netherlands Enterprise

62

Agency, organised in Kazakhstan in 2017. The former minister for Economic Affairs Henk Kamp was present at the mission. It is interesting to note that the mission coincided with the World Exposition of 2017 and Kazakhstan’s neighbour country Russia was present here as well (VNO-NCW 2017). Now it is necessary to state that this one example is no evidence for a specific covert policy approach of the Dutch to establish an indirect trade link with the Russians. However, the fact that the Dutch choose to send a mission to Kazakhstan should not be designated as an isolated action. The EU still has an interest into maintaining some sort economic relation with the Russian Federation. This statement can be backed by the following excerpt from a proposition document published by the European commission: “The EU's strategic interest is and remains to strengthen closer economic ties with Russia. However, the outlook for this is primarily determined by the development of Russia's internal and external policies, which so far show no sign of the necessary changes. Developments within the Eurasian Economic Union also give food for thought.” (European Commission 2015: 30). Even though the EU’s sanctions against Russia were already in full effect, the commission still valued the economic ties between the EU and Russia. The fact that the commission explicitly mentions the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) cannot be neglected. It is not surprising that the EU appreciated the value of the EAEU as cooperation through international organisations yield benefits for all participating parties. Still, Russia is the most senior member of this union as the other states carry far less economic weight. Furthermore, the EAEU can also be considered as a rival for the EU as Russia seeks to turn the EAEU into a supranational organisation like the EU (Hensley 2014). Against this backdrop it is rather noteworthy to examine the EU-Kazakhstan partnership and cooperation agreement that was signed in 2019. Kazakhstan is a member state of the EAEU and therefore would normally be economically tied to Russia. For the EU, however this was no obstacle to still find an opening to forge a cooperation between the two actors. The Dutch government mentioned the following about the agreement: “The EU is responsible for half of Kazakhstan's foreign trade and half of its foreign investment in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is linked to Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union (…) In principle, the agreement between Kazakhstan and the EU does not necessarily have to affect the relationship between Kazakhstan and third countries (…) The partnership is a matter for Kazakhstan and the EU, about which neither party is accountable to China or Russia. As far as is known, Russia and China have not formally responded to the partnership” (Blok 2019c: 5). It appears that the EU and therefore the Netherlands as well have taken an interest in

63

Kazakhstan. The country is an increasingly important supplier of gas and oil for the EU, but in turn the EU is Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner (European Commission 2020). By making an agreement with a state that is part of Russia’s sphere of influence, the EU and therefore the Netherlands sought to get indirect access to Russia as well. Kazakhstan can serve as a transit country for European and Dutch goods. After all, the Kazakhstan is part of the same single market as Russia via membership of the EAEU. In light of this information, the Dutch economic mission to Kazakhstan in 2017 should not be viewed as just a bilateral matter between the Netherlands and Kazakhstan. Is not a stretch to assume that forging relationships with Russia’s neighbours is an integral part of the Netherlands policy towards Russia, as dealing directly with the Russians is not fully possible, considering that the Dutch government has stated that ‘it is not business as usual’ with Russia. Although the Dutch did recognize that Russia remained an important trade partner for the Netherlands and that multiple Dutch based businesses had various business interests in the country (Koenders 2015b: 6). To simply ignore these interest of the Dutch business community would be rather imprudent for the Koopman. This also disproves Ter Haar’s (2017) argument that ‘engagement’ and ‘trade’ cannot ‘go hand in hand’. Dutch policymakers found a way to reconcile these ‘pillars’ via a ‘detour’. To further strengthen this observation, Kazakhstan is not the only member state of the EAEU that the EU has made a partnership with. The same approach was taken towards Armenia. The Dutch government is firm in classifying this strategy as perfectly normal: “The agreement is a matter between Armenia and the EU, of which neither side has to answer to Russia” (Blok 2019d: 3). The government explicitly states that Russia has not much to do with the agreement, although the government contradicts this very statement by naming the country in the first place. If it had no stake in the matter, than the Dutch government would not have mentioned it. The Netherlands is very much aware that forging a partnership with Armenia means breaching Russia’s economic sphere of influence. The ‘Koopman’ as a rational actor has quite some reason to do so as it allows closer access to a market that it explicitly has valued before, namely the Russian one. Although, it is important to mention that these partnerships cannot be deemed as actual ‘free trade agreements’, for instance tariff liberalisation is not possible as this would mean that the EU would have to negotiate with the entire EAEU (Idem: 9). This would mean that the EU has to also negotiate with Russia directly, which was a rather sensitive matter anno 2019. Breaching Russia’s sphere of influence can be a risky endeavour as the country will not always just ‘standby and watch’. For instance, in 2014 the EU signed an association treaty

64

with Ukraine. Russia issued a diplomatic protest to this treaty. The Netherlands stated the following about Russia’s objection: “The EU is aware of the (well-founded or unfounded) objections of Russia. The EU and Ukraine have expressed their willingness to look at these concerns through a trilateral consultation mechanism (…) The Netherlands and the EU reject the idea that Russia would have the right to limit in any way the sovereign power of third countries to establish relations with the EU.” (Koenders 2015c: 3). The policy of the Netherlands which is rooted in EU policy in this context, is merely to keep open the option of entering into a dialogue through a consultation mechanism, but the bottom line is to simply ignore Russia’s sphere of influence. In this example there is no case of entering Russia via a possible ‘backdoor’ since Ukraine is not part of the EAEU. In this instance however, the Koopman has to deal with Russia not as customer but as a competitor. Since access to the Ukrainian market would indeed benefit ‘Koopman Netherlands’ in its interest to shut out the Russians as possible competitors. The best approach for this, is naturally, through the EU and that’s why the Dutch explicitly refer to it, in their policy statement.

6.4 Conclusion

Three themes have been discussed in this chapter. These being: trade, energy and Russia’s neighbourhood. With regard to the Netherlands fulfilling the role of ‘Koopman’ it has become clear that in all relevant area’s the Netherlands finds a way to satisfy its economic goals. As was the case in the previous chapters regarding the security, the Netherlands does rely on a multilateral approach in its policy actions. As was made clear in the first paragraph the Netherlands was hit by sanctions that were imposed by Russia against the EU agricultural sector. Initially the Netherlands stated that compared to other countries it was not hit as hard. However, it did participate in an EU wide initiative to support European farmers. It claimed that it was important to create an even playing field for all member states. However, the government did still support agricultural businesses unilaterally by helping to promote agricultural products that were not on Russia’s sanctions list. By pursuing this policy, the Netherlands showed solidary to its allies in the EU, but at the same time satisfied its Koopman needs to maintain agricultural exports to Russia. When it came to energy, the Netherlands claimed a more neutral role. As promoting agricultural exports could occur on a local level , this was not the case for energy. The Dutch government had to cope with the situation that it could no longer be ‘business as usual’ with Russia. Therefore the Dutch government made clear that gas imports was a responsibility for

65

the free market. Also, it sought to diversify its energy suppliers. Still, when the United States announced sanctions against the involved partners of the construction of Nord Stream 2, the Netherlands protested. In extent of this observation, Ukraine was regarded as an important transit country for the gas pipeline. Lastly, as dealing with Russia on a national level became problematic, we can detect both European and Dutch initiatives to pry into to the neighbourhood of Russia. For instance, the Netherlands sent an economic mission to Kazakhstan and the EU decided to start a partnership with this country. Kazakhstan is an EAEU country and shares an internal market with Russia, therefore we can conclude that the rational Koopman found a way into Russia via a backdoor. However, Russia was seen as an economic competitor when it came to Ukraine. The Netherlands firmly rejected that Russia has a claim on with whom Ukraine can enter into a partnership with. At the same time, it supported the EU’s efforts to establish a dialogue mechanism to help Russia alleviate its concerns about the partnership.

66

Chapter 7 Dominee

It has been Dutch policy to act as a ‘Gidsland’ (guiding nation) since the second half of the 20th century. The Dutch role to actively promote human rights, international institutions and the international rule of law has been domestically qualified as ‘Dominee’ or (Pastor). Since the Netherlands actively seeks to ‘preach’ to other nations about what should and should not be. The Netherlands primarily targets non-western countries when it comes to satisfying normative goals. Naturally Russia is one of these countries. However, after the downing of MH17 the Dutch Dominee role became more ‘urgent’ for the Dutch. Since many Dutch citizens perished as result of this disaster, the Netherlands had to respond in a manner to achieve domestic goals, namely to try the perpetrators of the disaster. However, this is just one aspect of the Dominee role. It further comprises promoting human rights. Furthermore, the Russian role in Ukraine and Syria cannot be ignored. Therefore we shall aim in this chapter to examine how the Dutch sought to promote human rights in a country that it is in conflict with, how it sought justice for MH17 victims and lastly how it responded to Russia’s role in Ukraine and Syria.

7.1 Human rights

When the Netherlands seeks to satisfy normative goals, such as promoting human rights, it is reasonable to assume that it will try to find allies or work through international institutions. After all, we already identified this when we examined the Dutch Security and ‘Koopman’ interests. Indeed, when we inspect a report that discusses Russia’s intention to withdraw from the Council of Europe, this become apparent. For instance, “The government believes that Russian membership of the Council of Europe is of great importance (…) Not only does it contribute to anchoring norms and values in Russia with regard to human rights, but the Council of Europe is also an important forum for dialogue with Russia on human rights, the rule of law and democracy.” (Blok 2018d: 1). This excerpt proves that regarding to discussing human rights with Russia, the Council of Europe plays an important part in the Dutch strategy. However, if Russian membership is indeed rather important to the Dutch, then what efforts did it undertake to safeguard Russian membership? Before we can answer this question we need to address why the Russians were about to withdraw from the Council of Europe.

67

After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Russian voting rights in the Council of Europe were revoked by the parliamentary assembly. In 2017 in response, the Russians suspended their payment of its contribution to the Council. A year later Russia threatened to withdraw from the Council all together (Casier 2018). Therefore the Dutch government stated that: “The cabinet is prepared to see whether the Netherlands, together with like-minded countries, can support the presidency of the Council of Europe in finding a solution” (Idem: 2). It’s impossible to measure how large the role of the Dutch has been in finding a solution. Regardless, it is noteworthy to find that a seemingly antagonist state from the perspective of Russia, employed diplomatic channels to help solve its conflict. Furthermore, in contrast to what Rothenberg (2016) argued, Russia’s return to the Council of Europe, was not merely a victory for Moscow, but also benefited The Hague. Here again, this situation must be explained via the RAM. The Netherlands regards the Council of Europe as one of the most fruitful ways to promote and discuss human rights with Russia. Therefore to undertake efforts to safeguard Russian membership is quite rational. However, this incident was not the only event where Russian membership of the Council of Europe proved to be ‘shaky’. In 2016, the Dutch were worried about signals that indicated that Russia would no longer adhere to the binding agreements it made with the Council of Europe regarding respecting human rights and being committed to the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Ministry of General Affairs 2016: 19). With regard to achieving that Russia continues to adhere to the agreements, the Dutch government mentioned the following: “The Netherlands regularly addresses Russia in the Committee of Ministers with regard to the implementation of court rulings (…) In regular diplomatic contacts, the Netherlands also continues to point to Russia's obligations to safeguard human rights”(Ibid.). On a first glance it is not quite apparent how exactly the Dutch planned to achieve its goal by merely pointing out to Russia its obligations. However, if we apply the theory of normative power as was proposed by Ian Manners, it becomes more clear. Actors can set a ‘virtuous example’ for others to follow. The Dutch diplomats could have pointed out the value of adhering to the international agreement by stating what doing so had brought the Netherlands. At first, applying this theory does not seem quite compelling, however, when we consider that the Netherlands is internationally considered as a ‘justice nation’, for example it hosts the International Court of Justice, the so-called ‘Dutch virtuous example’ gains more weight. However, the Netherlands employed more instruments than just bilateral communication. The Dutch government made clear that Russia can be hold to its obligations

68

by addressing the issue at “the Universal Periodical Review of the UN Human Rights Council, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the OSCE's Annual Human Dimension Implementation Meeting.” (Koenders 2015d: 3). In this case, the Netherlands relies on institutional power as was described by Barnett and Duval. Through these institutions the Netherlands employs indirectly procedural power against Russia. At the same time the Netherlands argued that “By continuing to focus on dialogue with Russia on human rights obligations and support for civil society and through people-to-people contacts, the Netherlands is trying to counteract negative developments in Russia.” (Ibid.). In this instance we should again look towards the case of setting a ‘virtuous example’ as a means of diffusing norms. The source does not indicate how the Netherlands plans to ‘support’ civil society in Russia and how people-to-people contacts play a role in this. Positioning the Netherlands as an exemplary country to the Russian people directly could be a plausible course of action for the Dutch policy. It has become a theme for the Netherlands to rely on international organisations. The Council of Europe proved to be a valuable asset for the Netherlands to achieve its normative goals in Russia, but the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) cannot be neglected. For instance while a global superpower like the United States, withdrew from the UNHRC because it believed that the UN-body "makes a mockery of human rights" (BBC 2018). The United States lost its believe that the Council could help satisfy its interests. The Netherlands on the other hand regards the UNHRC to be vital for promoting human rights. The Dutch government stated in 2020 that “The government sees the Human Rights Council as the most important UN forum for the protection and promotion of human rights. In addition, the Human Rights Council is playing an increasingly important role in combating impunity” (Blok 2020b: 1). In addition to valuing the council as useful forum, Dutch policy aims to “strengthen and reform the Human Rights Council from within. To this end, the Cabinet is committed to (…) , improving the quality of the Human Rights Council membership and adequate funding.” (Idem: 2). Being part of a multilateral framework does allow the Netherlands to voice its stance on human rights to a global audience. Furthermore through the mechanism of norm diffusion it aims to improve human rights. To connect this insight to Russia, we need to understand that the Netherlands already identified human rights violations within Russian borders. Considering that the UNHRC is vital to the Dutch efforts to promote human rights, it is clear that UNHRC is an important factor for the Netherlands policy towards Russia regarding promoting human rights. Although working through international institutions is indeed rather important for the

69

Netherlands quest towards improving human rights in Russia. The country also developed an approach to enhance human rights by working together with domestic interest groups to influence affairs abroad. In 2018, the Netherlands supported a project with 1.1 million euros that aims to enhance local support groups for LGBTI rights in Eastern-Europe, including Russia (Blok 2018e: 4). While at first, this case seems to be loose and an isolated example for how the Netherlands tried to indirectly exert influence and to impose its own values on other states. On the contrary, this example fits in a broader strategy of the Netherlands to operate on a ground level. After the arrival of signals in the Netherlands that indicated that Chechen LGBTI people were persecuted in their respective region in Russia, the Netherlands aimed to take the lead. First the Dutch embassy in Russia accommodated regional shelter for refugees. (Koenders 2017a: 1). Also the embassy ‘kept in close contact with the families of human rights defenders on trial.’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017: 24). In the aftermath it rallied its Western partners to its cause to pressure the Russian authorities to investigate the persecutions (Idem 2017: 2). Naturally, the Netherlands relied on international partners to amplify diplomatic pressure on Russia. However, the Dutch embassy played an important facilitating and coordinating role. In this instance we should appreciate another form of norm diffusion here. Embassies and their physical presence and actions help to diffuse norms. Therefore, we should not only regard the Dutch action to help out Chechen LGBTI refugees as ‘morally just’, but also as an policy action to foster its human rights agenda in Russia. However, the main strategy for the Netherlands to satisfy its normative goals regarding human rights in Russia, remains to be the multilateral approach. Although there are examples of the Netherlands operating solely, it does appear that the Netherlands prefers to involve other partners when it seeks to influence Russia regarding human rights violations. This course of action does appear to be rather normal considering the different positions the two counties occupy on the international stage. Still, we cannot accept this notion as it would be too simplistic. When we analyse a Dutch report that reflected on the Netherlands efforts to promote human rights, we can see that The Hague identified that the Dutch quest to promote human rights has encountered heavy resistance from great powers like China and Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The Netherlands cannot afford to alienate great powers and their sphere of influence on the global stage, in its endeavour to promote human rights in Russia and beyond. As a rational actor that carefully balances its interests and acts accordingly, we should also see the Netherlands multilateral approach as a ‘shield’ against possible backlash from great powers such as Russia and their corresponding sphere of influence.

70

7.2 MH17

Immediately in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster that occurred on 17 July 2014 , various news outlets already reported on possible Russian military involvement in the tragedy (NOS.nl 2014). Needless, to mention that the Dutch government must also have been aware of this at the time. Regardless, the Netherlands did not held the Russian state liable until May 2018 (Rijksoverheid.nl 2018). Before this period, the Netherlands stance regarding Russia’s role in the occurrence of the disaster, needs to be categorised as ‘neutral’. In 2017 in response to a question raised by a member of the Dutch parliament, the prime-minister replied that: “If the Public Prosecution Service called on the Cabinet to support it in its work, the Cabinet would immediately do so. However, the Cabinet will never call Ukraine or Russia itself about the criminal settlement of the MH17. That would create the impression that the Dutch government has an opinion on who is to blame for what. (…) We do not want in any way to have a political fingerprint on the investigation. We only take actions and follow-up actions if requested by the Public Prosecution Service” (Tweede Kamer 2017: 86-87). It is interesting to note here, that in contrary to Dutch policy towards human rights, the government does not seek to actively play its ‘Dominee’ role here. Naturally, one could argue that the this is a logical step, the Dutch ascertained leaving a ‘political fingerprint’ on the investigation would result in damaging its credibility. The rational move for the government here does indeed appear to be ‘neutral’ and the ‘Dominee’ role does not fit in this strategy. In light of this approach it is noteworthy that the EU took a rather different approach. Although, like the Netherlands, the EU did not particularly blame Russia directly for the disaster, the message from the following quotation does indicate that the EU does regard Russia to be ‘indirectly’ responsible: “the Council urged Russia to actively use its influence over the illegally armed groups (…) to withdraw its troops at the border and to stop the increasing flow of weapons and militants across the border in view of a rapid and visible de- escalation. The Council decided to accelerate the preparation of further targeted sanctions as a result of the European Council meeting of 16 July 2014” (Timmermans 2014a: 5). After the disaster the EU decided to ‘accelerate’ the process of imposing additional sanctions against Russia. It is also clear that in the perception of the EU, the violence in Ukraine was partly caused by Russian ‘negligence’. Furthermore, the Dutch did have the unanimous support of the European Council of the EU (Timmermans 2014b: 3). Against this backdrop we need to take into account that for the Netherlands the urgency to pressure Russia, does diminish to an extent. Considering that the EU already (indirectly) imposed sanctions against Russia for the

71

downing of MH17, it was not really necessary for the Netherlands to unilaterally take a firm stance against Russia. In this sense, the Netherlands policy of neutrality could be backed by a ‘not so neutral’ EU policy. By taking this approach, the Netherlands hoped to not jeopardise the credibility of the MH17 investigation, but at the same time a firm reaction in response to the downing could still be made. This also makes clear that the efficacy of sanctions, as Neuteboom argued, is not the main issue, but rather the imposition of the sanctions itself as a means of sending a ‘message’, albeit in a indirect manner. Naturally, the Dutch approach to pursue a policy of neutrality did serve a goal. Eventually, the Netherlands did hold the Russian Federation liable for the occurrence of the MH17 downing. Dutch policy was tailored to utilise the results of the investigation conducted by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT), made up of police and judicial institutions of the Netherlands, Australia, Malaysia, Belgium and Ukraine (OM.nl 2020). The JIT concluded that flight MH17 was shot down by Russian backed separatists in Ukraine with a Buk installation which was part of the 53rd anti-aircraft brigade of the Russian army (Blok 2018f: 1). Based on this conclusion, The Hague decided to hold the Russian state liable for the disaster. However, the Dutch did not act on their own. It already cooperated closely with the JIT countries, but not a political level. With Australia, the Netherlands did jointly hold Russia liable and called upon them to enter into negotiations with both the Netherlands and Australia (Ibid.). The Dutch government described this action as “on the basis of international law, this is a means of achieving truth and justice.” (Idem: 2). Where the Dutch initially were wary to ‘point their finger’ into Russia’s direction. The policy is now to actively sway the Russians into cooperation. The first step was to publicly state their stance on Russia’s role in the event and how they should act onwards. By jointly making this statement with Australia, this action increased in political weight. The Dominee role of the Netherlands became more prevalent here, still as states are rational actors, they will undertake an action that will satisfy in the best way possible its political needs. Just two countries making a joint statement cannot have been the only component of the policy. We already established that the Netherlands has a preference for multilateral cooperation and works through institutions to exert (normative) power. Therefore, we must also take into account how the Netherlands continued to the second the step. There is reason to assume that the groundwork for step two was laid back in 2014 together with Australia, when the Netherlands policy was still in the ‘neutral phase’. After the downing of MH17, Australia submitted a resolution to the UN Security Council and was

72

subsequently adopted by it (Henley 2014). The following passages of the resolution will prove to be important in the subsequent phase: “Calls on all States and actors in the region to cooperate fully in relation to the international investigation of the incident, including with respect to immediate and unrestricted access to the crash site” and “Demands that those responsible for this incident be held to account and that all States cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability” (UN Security Council 2014). With these passages the Netherlands holds the normative tools to pressure Russia. We can find evidence for the Dutch approach to utilise the normative power of the UN for its national needs by examining the following quotation: “The finding that MH17 was brought down with a Buk launcher that belongs to a Russian army unit, which is information that should have been shared by Russia. In this sense, crucial information has been withheld from the investigation by Russia. Resolution 2166 states that the UN Security Council should be kept informed of the progress in the implementation of the resolution.” (Blok 2018g: 3). The Dutch government is aware that Russia has violated the terms of Resolution 2166, which was passed by the Security Council. This meant that Russia had violated the terms that it had agreed to four years earlier. It is impossible to determine whether this event was ‘planned’ and was part of the actual Dutch policy to seek justice for MH17 or if the Netherlands just responded accordingly to the realisation that Russia violated resolution 2166. However, based on the knowledge ‘that behind the curtains’ Russia had been a ‘suspect’ from the beginning and that policymakers had reasons to believe that Russia would not admits its own role in the disaster openly; this does strongly indicate that the resolution, that was submitted by Australia in cooperation with the Netherlands (AD.nl 2014), was meant to be complementary to the international investigation conducted by the JIT. To capitalise on Russia’s violation, the Netherlands utilised the platform of the UN to voice its critique on Russia’s behaviour regarding the subject. Both the prime minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte and its minister of Foreign Affairs Stef Blok addressed the UN. Minister Blok addressed the UN security council and mentioned the following about Russia:

I also want to remind you that our efforts to establish an international tribunal under Chapter 7, through this Council, were blocked by a Russian veto.

As a consequence, the Netherlands and Australia now call on the Russian Federation to engage seriously and constructively with us in this matter and accept its responsibility.

73

Along with this, the Russian Federation needs to start cooperating fully with the JIT’s ongoing criminal investigation.

When it comes to establishing truth and accountability for what happened to MH17, no State has 'the right to remain silent'. Quite the contrary: it has a duty to cooperate constructively. To shed light on the truth, not to obscure it with continuous mist.

I call on the Russian Federation to take this responsibility. (Blok 2018h: 1-2).19

Prime Minster Rutte addressed the General Assembly of the UN and asserted the following:

In May this year, the Joint Investigation Team presented conclusive evidence about the origin of the missile launcher that was used to down the aircraft.

This has only bolstered our resolve that, in the interest of the victims and their loved ones, the full truth must be uncovered, justice served and responsibility accepted.

In accordance with Security Council resolution 2166, we call on all states to fully cooperate with ongoing efforts to this end. (Rutte 2018: 2).20

One main theme needs to be discussed here. Namely, that Russia’s role in actively obstructing the investigation is being displayed here. The Russian Federation is accused openly by the Dutch of withholding crucial information and frustrating the process of serving justice for the MH17 victims. The Dutch policy here needs be categorised as ‘naming and shaming’. The main aim of this policy must be seen in the light that normative power is the ability to shape what should be perceived as ‘normal’. By openly asserting, in the company of all members of the international community, that Russia has obstructed and withheld information for an investigation into something that was officially supported by a UN resolution was a way to characterising Russia as a ‘non-normal’ state and making it an international pariah. Naturally the degree of success is a point contention. The fact that the Netherlands chose this route needs to found in the fact that all states enjoy full benefits by cooperating through international institutions, therefore an appeal to a multilateral platform like the UN seems to be a rational step for an actor that does not possess the material power to compel Russia into

19 No Translation 20 No Translation 74

compliance. Besides the UN, Dutch policy also included the assumption that other organisations it has close ties with will continue to support Dutch efforts. Although policy documents do not display an accurate account of what kind of support the Dutch government had in mind, it does reveal that the Dutch policy is characterised by a dependency on a wide variety of international relations. One of the international organisations is naturally the EU and the Dutch government asserted the following: “In the past, the EUCO has demonstrated unanimous solidarity with the efforts of the Netherlands and other like-minded countries to achieve truth, justice and accountability for the victims and their surviving relatives, in line with UNSC resolution 2166. The Netherlands is confident that the EUCO will express its support again” (Blok 2019e: 4). Although it is no surprise that the Netherlands appeals to the EU for support, it is noteworthy that The Hague does the same to NATO: “The Netherlands will also continue to call for Russia to cooperate fully with the criminal investigation by the Joint Investigation Team regarding the downing of MH17, in line with Resolution 2166. The Netherlands will also continue to actively request support from international partners, including NATO.” (Blok 2019f: 3). Again, while it is uncertain what kind of support the Dutch count on, the main aim appears to be that the Netherlands seeks to be internationally well connected on the issue of MH17, while at the same time its reckons Russia to be(come) the isolated party. Although multilateralism seems to be the core of the Dutch policy to seek justice for MH17, one unilateral aspect can be ascertained since 2020. In response to a question that was raised by a member of parliament regarding a published research report on Russian public opinion, the foreign minister asserted the following about the trial of MH17: “In addition, in the context of promoting reliable information provision, it will also be examined whether it is possible to translate and publish the summary of each session day in Russian” (Blok 2020c: 2). The Dutch government does actively consider to make information about the trial to be easily accessible for Russia citizens. The option can only be viewed as a means to sway Russian public opinion and therefore altering Russian national interests. Although the feasibility of this action is ‘far-fetched’, it is still noteworthy that Dutch policy contains a uniliteral element.

7.3 Crisis Areas: Ukraine and Syria

The MH17 dossier was for the Netherlands a ‘personal’ issue. It hit ‘close at home’ and the Dominee role, became more ‘self-centred’. However, it does not necessarily mean that the

75

Netherlands Dominee role only seeks to satisfy normative goals, just for the common good. National interests must be appreciated here as well. This becomes apparent when we examine the Dutch approach towards Russia regarding their role in Ukraine and Syria. As minister Blok mentioned in his Russia strategy in 2019, these two conflict areas and Russia’s involvement in it are of special interest to the Netherlands. Therefore we should expect this interest to be reflected in the general Netherlands policy towards Russia. Indeed, when we inspect the Dutch government’s national annual report of 2015, we find multiple insights, that even after the downing of MH17, the actual crisis area, Eastern Ukraine, was still an important matter for its Russia policy. The concern The Hague holds for this part of Europe is reflected in the following statement: “Also in 2015, Russia's stance, which persists in the illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilizing action in Eastern Ukraine, has raised concerns about instability on the Eastern side of Europe” (Koenders 2015e: 8). The Hague’s options were not versatile however. Sanctions were already imposed against Russia and the governments statement that: ‘other forms of pressure were utilised to aim for maintaining a dialogue with Russia’, are rather vague (Ibid). Still, another policy approach was open for The Hague. In light of Russia’s meddling in Ukraine, the Dutch government openly intensified support for ‘independent Russian media’ (Idem: 9). On their turn, this can be considered as an attempt of the Dutch to influence Russian society. However, we should not regard this as an example of norm diffusion as this policy action cannot be regarded as promoting Dutch values. As an EU member state, Dutch policy will always be aligned to overall EU policy to an extent. The same applies to the situation in Ukraine. The EU decided that the conflict in Ukraine should be divided into two separate situations. Russian meddling in Eastern Ukraine is one event that Russia has been sanctioned for by the EU. The annexation of the peninsula Crimea by Russia is regarded by the EU as a separate event and should be treated as such accordingly (Idem: 44). The Dutch government supported this approach as the government stated that: “The Netherlands will continue to make an effort for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine (..) The sanctions package imposed by the European Union as result of the illegal annexation of Crimea (...) will be maintained as long as the situation on the peninsula does not change.” (Idem: 45). It is interesting to question to what extent the Dominee role of the Netherlands is completely rooted in national interest. Based on the statement above, we can clearly detect an EU taking the lead in its approach towards Ukraine. The Hague supports the EU’s efforts and declared it will make ‘an effort for the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine’ but neglects to actually communicate an outline of what these efforts

76

are supposed to be. Therefore the Dutch seem to rely on EU directions for this matter. The rational actor explanation here dictates that the situation in Ukraine is a low priority for Dutch national interests, but at the same time appearing for the EU that the Netherlands ‘does care’ about the situation is of high importance. The Dominee role here seems to be about keeping up appearances. More evidence for this conclusion can be found by examining the Dutch stance on the ‘Association Agreement’ between the EU and Ukraine. The prime motivator for The Hague to care about the situation in Ukraine seems to be the role that the EU can play in this area. The Dutch Advisory Council for International Affairs (AIV) determined that: “The implications concern a particular stability on the European Eastern Border and its relationship with Russia, the situation in Ukraine and the EU's role as a global actor. The AIV also addresses this context in its advisory letter and specifically points out that the Netherlands should not break solidarity with its EU partners, in the light of geopolitical relations with Russia.” (Koenders 2017b: 2). Geopolitical interest and rivalry between the EU and Russia is the main reason for The Hague to promote stability in Ukraine. The Dominee does not necessarily ‘preach’ because it has a clear vision for a ‘just world’, which the Netherlands as a guiding nation, seeks to contribute to establishing one, but ‘preaching’ is also a policy instrument to satisfy its national interests through the EU, namely stability in Europe. Although Ukraine is not the only crisis area of concern for The Hague. The situation in Syria cannot be neglected. The Dutch government ‘did care’ for the situation as it was in 2016: “The role that Russia and Iran play in Aleppo's drama is of particular concern.” (Tweede Kamer 2016). Again, we do find evidence that the Dutch were willing to exert pressure on Russia as the foreign minister stated that: “We are in constant dialogue with the European Union and other like-minded countries on how to increase pressure on Assad and his allies.” (Ibid). Still, no clear policy action has been determined here. Furthermore, the Dutch consider it problem that: “there is currently no shared vision in Europe” (Ibid). Independent policy making is not an option for The Hague regarding the situation in Syria. One particular issue here can serve as an explanation for this behaviour, beside the trend that the Netherlands relies on its European allies to satisfy its normative goals. We have already discovered that international organisations such as the UN play an important role for the Dutch in exercising pressure on Russia. Still, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and therefore holds the right to veto resolutions. This proved to be a problem for effective norm diffusion and exerting pressure. However, in turn this also provided The Hague an opportunity to address the Russians in a multilateral setting. The Hague argued that:

77

“The Russian attitude in the Security Council is causing much frustration for countries that want to hold all warring parties in Syria accountable for the use of chemical weapons. The Netherlands consistently calls Russia to account for this, both in the Security Council and the OPCW Executive Council, and bilaterally.” (Blok 2018i: 4). The Dutch can in this context rely on creating goodwill among ‘like-minded’ countries and in this regard the Dominee role seems to be directed at preaching against Russia to strengthen relationships with third countries, but in the sense of actually contributing to finding a proper solution for Syria the role is less successful, considering that in 2019 the Dutch ascertained that Russia still employed its veto right excessively (Blok 2019g: 22).

7.4 Conclusion

In this chapter we have examined the three mains subjects of interest for the Dominee aspect of the Netherlands policy towards Russia, namely humans rights, MH17 and the Crisis areas Ukraine and Syria. As the Dominee role is rooted in normative objectives, The Hague does rely on normative power to satisfy these interests. However, multiple interest were of different priority for The Hague and this reflected into what extent the Dutch took the initiative. With regard to promoting human rights, The Hague did seek to establish a line of communication with Russia. In line with this goal, the Dutch government tried to act as a mediator between the members of the council of Europe, because they feared that a Russian withdraw from this Council would make it harder for the Dutch to actively promote human rights and addressing this issues in a multilateral European setting. Even more, international organisations and institutions, such as the UNHRC can be considered to be successful instruments for the Dutch as they allow them to indirectly diffuse norms. On a bilateral level though, the Dutch sought to set a virtuous example by acting domestically in Russia via its embassy and utilising it to show on a ground level how the Netherlands undertakes efforts to strengthen human rights in Russia. When it came to seek justice for MH17, one could argue that the stakes for The Hague were raised. The main line of Dutch policy did not deviate considerably from its other efforts to sway Russia. It sought international partners and the support of its European allies. Firstly however, the Dutch refrained from any action of holding the Russian Federation liable for the downing MH17 as the credibility of the JIT investigation was a core part of its policy action to seek justice for MH17 via Russia. After the investigation was concluded, the Netherlands

78

cooperated with Australia to publicly hold the Russian state liable and reproached them for violating the UN security council resolution 2166, which was submitted by Australia in cooperation with the Netherlands. The objective became to try to isolate Russia internationally in its behaviour of non-compliance. The Crisis Area Ukraine and Syria were of less importance to The Hague however. Although the government announced multiple times that the areas do hold significance for the Netherlands, these announcements must be viewed in a broader EU context. As the Netherlands does have an interest in maintaining stability in Europe and regarding the EU as the main instrument to accomplish this, it was only rational for the Dutch government to support EU efforts and help contain Russia. In the Syrian case, the Dutch were virtually powerless as Russia wields significant power in the UN Security Council, however by taking up its Dominee role and addressing Russia´s ´frustrating´ behaviour could have helped to strengthen relationships with ´like-minded´ countries.

79

Chapter 8 Conclusion

The central aim of the previous chapters was to provide an account of the different main themes that are of central importance for a nation’s overall foreign policy. Since the Netherlands is the unit of analysis in this thesis, we have been examining the three building blocks of the Netherlands foreign policy towards Russia, namely Security, Koopman and Dominee. This last chapter shall utilise the insights from the preceding chapters to formulate an answer to how the Netherlands’s Russia policy has developed since the MH17 disaster. In the fifth chapter we examined the Netherlands security interests and based on the 2019 Russia strategy inspected three security interests in particular, these were territorial security, cybersecurity and security against foreign influence. It was identified that multilateral and unilateral measures were part of the policy, but a multilateral approach was preferred. Regarding territorial security, the Netherlands relied on NATO. It does not matter that the two countries do not share a land border, as an armed attack against one of its NATO partners is considered as a security threat. Also one cannot rule out a Russian plan to march into Dutch territory if a conflict of significant scale breaks out in Europe. Therefore the country positioned a portion of its military capabilities in Lithuania together with other NATO countries to deter Russia from an aggressive strike. Other measures were of uniliteral character such as raising the defence budget. This was part of the Dutch policy to make a commitment to NATO. Cyberattacks from Russia formed another point of concern for the Netherlands. As is the case for territorial security, international partners were paramount. The main approach of the Dutch to combat cyber threats politically was to employ the normative action of ‘attribution’. Its main course of action here was to show to the international community that Russia is an aggressive state and that anyone can fall victim to their practises. Basically the Netherlands tried to shame Russia for its actions. However, on a more domestic level, the country deemed the Russian software company Kaspersky as a security threat and therefore decided to stop doing business with it. In contrast to cybersecurity, the protection against foreign influence was centred around an unwillingness to openly discuss Russian meddling into Dutch affairs, despite the fact that Russian meddling into the affairs of other states was openly acknowledged. Eventually, the Dutch became publicly more open about the fact that Russia actively conducted influencing operations against the Netherlands and responded by reaching out to

80

allied nations in NATO and the EU and participated in partnerships designed to combat foreign influencing activities such as disinformation campaigns. The sixth chapter was centred around the Netherlands as a ‘Koopman’. The economic interests of the Netherlands regarding Russia must be found in trade, energy and Russia’s neighbourhood. A Koopman seeks to satisfy his economic interests and by examining Dutch policy in these areas it became apparent that even restrictions such as sanctions can be worked around. Much like its security interests, the Netherlands relied on multilateralism. To maintain its trade relations with Russia in the areas it was interested in, the Netherlands had to work around the sanctions imposed by Russia against the EU agricultural sector. Although the Netherlands stated that in comparison to other countries, it was not hit as hard. Nonetheless, it did participate in an EU wide initiative to support European farmers. It claimed that it was important to create an even playing field for all member states. However, the government did still support agricultural business unilaterally by supporting promotion efforts of agricultural products that are not on Russia’s black list. By pursuing this policy, the Netherlands showed solidary to its allies in the EU, but at the same time satisfied its Koopman needs to maintain agricultural exports to Russia. A vital aspect for the economic well-being of a nation is energy, but initially the Netherlands claimed a more neutral role. As promoting agricultural exports could occur on a local level, this was not the case for energy. The Dutch government had to cope with the situation that it could no longer be ‘business as usual’ with Russia. Therefore the Dutch government made clear that gas imports were the responsibility for the free market. Also, it sought to diversify its energy suppliers. Still, when the United States announced sanctions against the involved partners of the construction of Nord Stream 2, the Netherlands protested. In extent of this observation, the Ukraine was regarded as an important transit country for the gas pipeline. However, a good merchant does find alternative solutions for its problems, as dealing with Russia on a national level became problematic, we can detect both European and Dutch initiatives to pry into to the neighbourhood of Russia. For instance, the Netherlands sent an economic mission to Kazakhstan and the EU decided to start a partnership with this country. Kazakhstan is an EAEU country and shares an internal market with Russia, therefore we can conclude that the rational Koopman found a way into Russia via a backdoor. However, Russia was seen as an economic competitor when it came to Ukraine. The Netherlands firmly rejected that Russia has a claim on with whom Ukraine can enter into a partnership with. At the same time, it supported the EU’s efforts to establish a dialogue mechanism to help Russia

81

alleviate its concerns about the partnership. The seventh chapter discussed the Netherlands role of being a ‘Dominee’. With regard to this role, the Netherlands considered human rights, MH17 and crisis areas to be the most relevant policy areas in its approach to Russia. Normative power proved to be the best tool it had in engaging with these respective policy areas. At the same time, the interests for The Hague were ranked into different priorities as became evident from the amount of initiatives The Hague took. For promoting human rights in Russia, The Hague did seek to enter into a dialogue with Russia. The Dutch government tried to act as mediator between the member of the Council of Europe, because they feared that a Russian withdraw from this council would make it harder for the Dutch to actively promote human rights and addressing this issues in a multilateral European setting. Even more, international organisations and institutions, such as the UNHRC can be considered to be successful instruments for the Dutch as they allow them to indirectly diffuse norms. On a bilateral level though, the Dutch sought to set a virtuous example by acting domestically in Russia via its embassy and utilising it to show on a ground level how the Netherlands undertakes efforts to strengthen human rights in Russia. However, with respect to seeking justice for MH17, one could argue that the stakes for The Hague were raised. The main line of Dutch policy did not deviate considerably from its other efforts to sway Russia. It sought international partners and the support of its European allies. Firstly however, the Dutch refrained from any action of holding the Russian Federation liable for the downing MH17 as the credibility of the JIT investigation was a core part of its policy action to seek justice for MH17 via Russia. After the investigation was concluded, the Netherlands cooperated with Australia to publicly hold the Russian state liable and reproached them for violating the UN security council resolution 2166, which was submitted by Australia in cooperation with the Netherlands. The objective became to try to isolate Russia internationally in its behaviour of non-compliance. In comparison to human rights and especially MH17, the Crisis Areas Ukraine and Syria were of less importance to The Hague however. As the Netherlands does have an interest in maintaining stability in Europe and regarding the EU as the main instrument to accomplish this, it was only rational for the Dutch government to support EU efforts and help contain Russia. In the Syrian case, the Dutch were virtually powerless as Russia is a powerful member of the Security Council, however by taking up its Dominee role and addressing Russia´s ‘non-normal’ behaviour, could have helped to strengthen relationships with ´like- minded´ countries.

82

By combining the insights of these three chapters we can ascertain that the Netherlands in the period after the downing MH17 considered Russia as a problematic but important state that one has to work with. The Netherlands already regarded the Russians as a security threat, even before the disaster. After the disaster the situation remained the same and the Dutch had quite little influence on the ensuing process. It worked with partners to safeguard its security interests, although this situation can also be regarded as maintaining the status quo. Despite the fact that Russia was considered by the Dutch as a ‘hostile state’, did not stop The Hague from maintaining economic relations with Russia. Still, as Russia was deemed as a hostile state, normal relations were not possible. Therefore the Dutch actively sought to refrain from dealing directly with the Russian government but instead sought alternative detours via its neighbourhood, relying on European partners and also openly denying any economic affiliation with Russia. Although it goes too far to make an analogy to ‘dealing under the table’, we cannot neglect the fact that Dutch economic policy towards Russia was centred around the notion that business should continue, without making it obvious. As a result of this stance, the Dutch fostered the space it had to play its Dominee role. Since openly tying itself to Russia in economic affairs would certainly have diminished the normative impact the Dutch sought to make. With regard to the Netherlands approach towards Russian meddling in Ukraine and Syria it is clear that the Dutch played a subservient role for the EU. However with regard to especially MH17 the Dutch took a neutral approach at first, but eventually sought to exert full pressure on Russia via normative power and took an openly disapproving attitude on the international stage towards Russia. The same goes for the Netherlands role as a guiding nation in seeking to improve human rights. As a consequence, internationally the Dutch could not be deemed as hypocritical since its approach towards Russia remained consistent. Therefore, the Netherlands policy towards Russia after the downing of MH17 developed in a pragmatic manner in which none of the interests were neglected, but the policy approach for the different interests were designed in such a way that they would not contest each other. After the downing of MH17 the Netherlands could continue to play both the Dominee and the Koopman.

83

Bibliography

Advisory Council on International affairs (2017), Russia and the Defence Efforts of the Netherlands, https://www.advisorycouncilinternationalaffairs.nl/documents/publications/2017/03/03/russia- and-the-defence-efforts-of-the-netherlands

Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2012). Foreign policy analysis: New approaches. London: Routledge.

Allison, Graham T. (1971) Essence of Descison: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Company.

Beach, D. (2012). Analyzing foreign policy. Basingstoke, Hampshire [U.K.]; New York: Palgave Macmillan.

Blok, Stef (2019a), ‘Rusland Strategie’ https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/12/23/ruslandstrategie. Consulted on 03/04/2020.

Both, Norbert (2014) ‘The Netherlands and its Foreign Policy System’, in From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1990-1995. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Broeke, Han ten. (2019) ‘MH17: Een diplomatieke reconstructie’, Spectator Clingendael, https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/dossier/de-geopolitiek-van-mh17?p=1

Galeotti, Mark. (2019) ‘Russia's Roadmap Out of the MH17 Crisis’, The Moscow Times, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/17/russias-roadmap-out-of-the-mh17-crisis- a66453

Groom, A. (2007). Foreign Policy Analysis. International Studies, 44(3): 195-215.

Haar, Barend ter. (2017) ‘Dutch narratives about Russian-Western relations’, Clingendael, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Dutch_narratives_about_Russian- Western_relations.pdf

Hellema, D. (2014) Nederland in de wereld : De buitenlandse politiek van Nederland . Vijfde druk 2014, geheel geactualiseerd. Houten: Spectrum Uitgeverij.

Hoebink, Paul (2006). “Hoe de Dominee de Koopman versloeg”, Internationale Spectator, 60(11): 578-584.

Hill, C. (2003). The changing politics of foreign policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

84

Klijn, H. (2011) Russia, our distant neighbour : the burden of conventional beliefs . Place of publication not identified: Netherlands Atlantic Association.

Kohlbacher, Florian (2006) The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research. Forum: Qualitative Social Research. [Online] 7 (1), . [online]. Available from: https://doaj.org/article/3cc2f35a804343f1b0d4db01c3096300.

Linden, Rianne van der. (2019) ‘Deze Rus komt niet meer aan het werk omdat hij de Russische theorieën over MH17 ontkrachtte’, Eenvandaag, https://eenvandaag.avrotros.nl/item/deze-rus-komt-niet-meer-aan-het-werk-omdat-hij-de- russische-theorieen-over-mh17-ontkrachtte/

Lippert, Barbara and Nicolai von Ondarza , Volker Perthes (2019). ‘Strategische Autonomie Europas: Akteure, Handlungsfelder, Zielkonflikte’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/strategische-autonomie-europas/#hd-d19583e790

Mayring, Philipp (2000) Qualitative Content Analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social Research. 1 (2), . [online]. Available from: https://doaj.org/article/f4fb9df45dc74f0087924950f5445842.

Nuechterlein, D. E. (1976) National interests and foreign policy: A conceptual framework for analysis and decision-making. British Journal of International Studies. [Online] 2 (3), 246– 266.

Rottenberg, Hella. (2019) ‘Terugkeer in Raad van Europa is politiek succes voor Rusland’, Raam op Rusland, https://raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/nederland-en-europa/1311-terugkeer-in-raad-van-europa-is- politiek-succes-rusland

Spiegeleire, Stephan de., Kars de Bruijne, Frank Bekkers, Minke Meijnders and Tim Sweijs. (2018) Strategische Monitor: Stilte voor de Storm?. The Hague Centre of Strategic Studies, https://hcss.nl/report/strategische-monitor-stilte-voor-de-storm

Stanzel, Volker (2018). ‘Die neue Wirklichkeit der Außenpolitik: Diplomatie im 21. Jahrhundert’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/die- neue-wirklichkeit-der-aussenpolitik-diplomatie-im-21-jahrhundert/#hd-d47014e2953

Smeets, Hubert, Laura Starink en Hella Rottenberg (2020) ‘Russische burgers willen contact: doe daar uw voordeel mee, regering!’, Raam Op Rusland, https://raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/nederland-en-europa/1513-russische-burgers-willen-contact- doe-daar-uw-voordeel-mee-regering

Tocht, Tony van der. (2015) ‘Toch weer terug naar “business as usual”?’, Clingendael, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Nederlands-Russische-betrekkingen-na- MH17_0.pdf

85

Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

White, B. (Brian P. (2001) Understanding European foreign policy . Basingstoke: Palgrave.

CH5 Territorial Security

Blok, Stef (2018a), ‘Kamerbrief over verslag NAVO ministeriële 27 april 2018’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/17/kamerbrief-over-verslag-navo-ministeriele-27- april-2018. Consulted on 05/04/2020.

Blok, Stef (2019a), ‘Rusland Strategie’ https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/12/23/ruslandstrategie. Consulted on 03/04/2020.

Boer, Marno (2017), ‘Voor westerse militairen is de vuurkracht van de Russen even schrikken’, trouw.nl, https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/voor-westerse-militairen-is-de-vuurkracht- van-de-russen-even-schrikken~bb23fac1/ (Consulted on 04/04/2020).

Bijleveld, Ank and Stef Blok (2018), ‘Brief van de Ministers van Defensie en van Buitenlandse Zaken’, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-28676-308.html. Consulted on 03/04/2020.

CDA.nl (2017) ‘Verkiezingsprogramma’, https://www.cda.nl/standpunten/verkiezingsprogramma/. Consulted on 03/04/2020.

Ministry of Defence (2018a) ‘Noordelijke partners bespreken dreiging Rusland’, https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/06/06/noordelijke-partners-bespreken-dreiging- rusland. Consulted on 05/04/2020. Ministry of Defence (2018b), ‘National plan on the Defence Investment Pledge – the Netherlands’, https://english.defensie.nl/downloads/publications/2018/12/14/national-plan-on-the-defence- investment-pledge-%E2%80%93-the-netherlands. Consulted on 01/04/2020.

Dutch Ministry of Defence (2018c), ‘Russen kijken in Nederlands militaire keuken’ https://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/09/27/russen-kijken-in-nederlands-militaire- keuken. Consulted on 01/04/2020.

NATO (2019), ‘Boosting NATO’s presence in the east and southeast’, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm. Consulted on 02/04/2020.

US Department of State (2011), ‘Overview of Vienna Document 2011’, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/cca/c43837.htm. Consulted on 06/04/2020.

86

VVD.nl (2017) ‘Verkiezingsprogramma’, https://www.vvd.nl/verkiezingsprogramma_s/. Consulted on 04/04/2020.

Cyberwar

Blok, Stef (2019b) ‘Uitvoering van de gewijzigde motie van de leden Stoffer en Verhoeven over opstellen van een Ruslandstrategie’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z26157&did=20 19D53771. Consulted on 08/04/2020.

Brouwers, Arnout (2019), ‘Mensen met Russisch accent’ bestoken thuisfront Nederlandse F- 16-piloten met telefoontjes’, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/mensen-met- russisch-accent-bestoken-thuisfront-nederlandse-f-16-piloten-met-telefoontjes~b734f436/. Consulted on 10/04/2020.

Bijleveld, Ank (2018), ‘Kamerbrief over verstoring Russische cyberoperatie in Den Haag’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/10/04/kamerbrief-over-verstoring-russische- cyberoperatie-in-den-haag. Consulted on 09/04/2020.

Bijleveld, Ank (2019), ‘Antwoord op vragen van het lid Belhaj over het bericht ‘’Russen’ intimideren vrouwen Nederlandse F16-vliegers’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2019D34309. Consulted on 14/04/2020.

Grapperhaus, Ferd (2018), ‘Voorzorgsmaatregel ten aanzien van gebruik Kaspersky antivirussoftware’, https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/14/voorzorgsmaatregel-ten-aanzien- van-gebruik-kaspersky-antivirussoftware. Consulted on 12/04/2020.

Grapperhaus, Ferd (2019), ‘Kamerbrief met beleidsreactie CSBN2019 en voortgangsrapportage NCSA’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/06/12/tk-beleidsreactie- csbn2019-en-voortgangsrapportage-ncsa. Consulted on 11/04/2020.

Grapperhaus, Ferd (2020), ‘Kamerbrief evaluatie Citrix-problematiek en reactie rapport WRR’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-justitie-en- veiligheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/03/20/tk-kamerbrief-evaluatie-citrix- problematiek-en-kabinetsreactie-wrr-rapport. Consulted on 11/04/2020.

Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (2019), ‘Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland CSBN 2019’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/06/12/tk- bijlage-cybersecuritybeeld-nederland-csbn-2019. Consulted on 10/04/2020.

Nu.nl (2018), ‘Minister Bijleveld: 'Nederland in cyberoorlog met Rusland'’, https://www.nu.nl/internet/5513204/minister-bijleveld-nederland-in-cyberoorlog-met-rusland- .html. Consulted on 14/04/2020.

87

Tweede Kamer (2018), ‘Spionage door Rusland’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2019D03706&did=2019D03706. Consulted on 13/04/2020.

Foreign influence

AIVD (2015), ‘Jaarverslag AIVD 2015’, https://www.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd_nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2016/04/21/jaarverslag-aivd- 2015/jaarverslag-aivd-2015-definitieve-webversie.pdf. Consulted on 15/04/2020.

AIVD (2018), ‘Jaarverslag AIVD 2018’, https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2019/04/02/jaarverslag-aivd-2018. Consulted on 18/04/2020. Blok, Stef (2017), ‘Schriftelijke antwoorden op vragen gesteld tijdens de eerste termijn van de begrotingsbehandeling van Buitenlandse Zaken op 14 november 2017’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2017Z15450&did=20 17D32412. Consulted on 19/04/2020.

Blok, Stef (2018b), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen over uitzetten van 2 Russische inlichtingenmedewerkers’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van- buitenlandse-zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/08/beantwoording-kamervragen- over-uitzetten-van-2-russische-inlichtingenmedewerkers. Consulted on 20/04/2020.

Blok, Stef (2020a), ‘Tussenrapportage Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z06966&did=20 20D14866. Consulted on 21/04/2020.

Grapperhaus, Ferd and Kajsa Ollengren (2018) ‘Kamerbrief ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging’, https://www.aivd.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/03/16/kamerbrief- ongewenste-buitenlandse-inmenging. Consulted on 16/04/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2015a), ‘Beleidsbrief betrekkingen met Rusland’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2015Z08626&did=20 15D17608. Consulted on 18/04/2020.

NATO (2015), ‘NATO-Russia Relations: The Background’, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_12/1512-backgrounder_nato- russia_en.pdf. Consulted on 17/04/2020.

Ollongren, Kajsa (2019), ‘Beleidsinzet bescherming democratie tegen desinformatie’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z20078&did=20 19D41916. Consulted on 15/04/2020.

88

CH6 Trade CBS (2016), ‘Nederland tweede landbouwexporteur ter wereld’, CBS.nl, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/23/nederland-tweede-landbouwexporteur-ter-wereld. Consulted on 15/04/2020. Council of the European Union (2020),’Beperkende EU‑maatregelen als reactie op crisis in Oekraïne’,https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/. Consulted on 16/04/2020. Council of the European Union (2020), ‘Timeline - EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine’, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine- crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/. Consulted on 17/04/2020.

EU delegation to the Russian Federation (2014), ‘EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine’, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_restrictive_measures_in_response_to_crisis_in_ukrai ne_eng_web.doc.pdf. Consulted on 19/04/2020.

Kamp, Henk (2014), ‘Betreft Sancties door Rusland op gebied land- en tuinbouw’ - 11 augustus 2014, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/08/11/kamerbrief-over- sancties-rusland-op-gebied-land-en-tuinbouw. Consulted on 19/04/2020.

Kamp, Henk (2014), ‘Maatregelen n.a.v. boycot Rusland’ 15 augustus 2014 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/08/15/kamerbrief-maatregelen- naar-aanleiding-van-boycot-rusland. Consulted on 13/04/2020.

Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (2017), ‘Nederlandse agrarische handel met Rusland groeit met 10%’, agroberichtenbuitenland.nl, https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/actueel/nieuws/2018/04/06/nederlandse-agrarische- handel-met-rusland-in-2017-met-10-procent-gestegen. Consulted on 20/04/2020.

Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (2020a), ‘Dutch agribusiness most welcome doing business in Russia’s Bashkortostan region’, agroberichtenbuitenland.nl, https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/landeninformatie/rusland/nieuws/2020/04/15/dutch- agribusiness-most-welcome-doing-business-in-russia%E2%80%99s-bashkortostan-region. Consulted on 17/04/2020. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (2020b), ‘Grens Rusland niet open voor gesanctioneerde agroproducten’, agroberichtenbuitenalnd.nl, https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/landeninformatie/rusland/nieuws/2020/03/24/grens- rusland-niet-open-voor-gesanctioneerde-agroproducten. Consulted on 16/04/2020.

Putin, Vladimir (2014), ‘On the application of certain special economic measures to ensure

89

the security of the Russian Federation’, https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/safety/docs/ia_eu-russia_ru-eu-import- ban_20140806_unoff-trans-en.pdf. Consulted on 20/04/2020.

Tweede Kamer Commissie (2014),’Verslag van een algemeen overleg, gehouden op 9 september 2014, over Economische missies en exportbevordering’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2014Z13121&did=2014D32438. Consulted on 19/04/2020.

Energy Blok, Stef (2018c), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen begrotingsbehandeling Buitenlandse Zaken’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/11/15/beantwoording-kamervragen- begrotingsbehandeling-buitenlandse-zaken. Consulted on 21/04/2020.

Kaag, Sigrid (2020), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen over Nederlandse bedrijven geraakt door VS sancties Russen bouwen omstreden gaspijpleiding zelf af’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/02/07/beantwoording-vragen-over-nederlandse- bedrijven-geraakt-door-vs-sancties-russen-bouwen-omstreden-gaspijpleiding-zelf-af. Consulted on 22/04/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2014a), ‘Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2018D12345&did=2018D12345. Consulted on 24/04/2020. Koenders, Bert (2014b), ‘Verslag van de Raad Buitenlandse Zaken van 17 november 2014’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2014Z21382&did=20 14D43129. Consulted on 23/04/2020.

Ministry of General Affairs (2018), ‘Brief trans-Atlantische relaties’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/brieven/2018/07/10/verslag-bezoek-minister-president-aan-washington- op-2-juli-2018. Consulted on 24/04/2020.

Reuters, ‘UPDATE 2-Gazprom, European partners sign Nord Stream-2 deal’, https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-forum-nord-stream/update-2-gazprom-european- partners-sign-nord-stream-2-deal-idUSL5N11A0G420150904. Consulted on 21/04/2020.

Slager, Seije (2019) ‘Waarom de VS de aanleg van de Nord Stream 2-gaspijp willen voorkomen’, Trouw.nl ,https://www.trouw.nl/buitenland/waarom-de-vs-de-aanleg-van-de- nord-stream-2-gaspijp-willen-voorkomen~b7bffa30/. Consulted on 23/04/2020.

Tweede Kamer (2019), ‘Kamerbrief over motie van van Ojik en Sjoerdsma over diversificatie van import van gas’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse-

90

zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/05/20/kamerbrief-over-motie-van-van-ojik-en- sjoerdsma-over-diversificatie-van-import-van-gas. Consulted on 24/04/2020.

Wiebes, Eric (2017), ‘Antwoord op vragen van de leden Van Raan en Beckerman over het mogelijk steunen van de fossiele sector door middel van exportkredietverzekeringen, in dit geval Boskalis en van Oord’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2017Z10869&did=2017D 27818. Consulted on 21/04/2020.

Wiebes, Eric (2019a), ‘Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg over de geannoteerde agenda Energieraad op 4 maart 2019’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2019Z03520&did=2019D07534. Consulted on 21/04/2020. Wiebes, Eric (2019b), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen over Energieraad 4 december 2019’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/11/27/kamervragen-over-naar- aanleiding-van-het-schriftelijk-overleg-energieraad-4-december-2019. Consulted on 24/04/2020.

Russia’s Neighbourhood

Blok, Stef (2019c) ‘Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2019Z00644&did=2019D01431. Consulted on 25/04/2020.

Blok, Stef (2019d), ‘Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag (2019 Goedkeuring van de op 24 november 2017 te Brussel tot stand gekomen Brede en versterkte partnerschapsovereenkomst tussen de Europese Unie en de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie en hun lidstaten, enerzijds, en de Republiek Armenië, anderzijds (met Bijlagen, Protocollen en Gezamenlijke Verklaring) (Trb. 2018, 41)’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2019Z16735&did=2019D47723. Consulted on 26/04/2020.

Blok, Stef and Sigrid Kaag (2019), ‘Geannoteerde agenda Raad Buitenlandse Zaken / Handel van 21 november 2019’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z22296&did=20 19D46301. Consulted on 27/04/2020.

European Commission (2015), ‘EU-voorstel: Handel voor Iedereen: Naar een meer verantwoord handels- en investeringsbeleid COM (2015) 497’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2015Z19926&did=2015D40516. Consulted on 25/04/2020.

European Commission (2020), ‘Countries and regions: Kazakhstan’,

91

https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/kazakhstan/. Consulted on 27/04/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2015b), ‘Beleidsbrief betrekkingen met Rusland’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2015Z08626&did=20 15D17608. Consulted on 26/04/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2015c), ‘Nota naar aanleiding van het verslag’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2015Z02897&did=2015D06002. Consulted on 28/04/2020.

Henley, Jon (2014), ‘A brief primer on Vladimir Putin's Eurasian dream’ Guardian.com, https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/feb/18/brief-primer-vladimir-putin- eurasian-union-trade. Consulted on 27/04/2020.

VNO-NCW (2017), ‘Economische missie naar Kazachstan met minister Kamp’, vno-ncw.nl, https://www.vno-ncw.nl/weekbulletin/economische-missie-naar-kazachstan-met-minister- kamp. Consulted on 28/04/2020.

CH7 Human Rights

BBC (2018) ‘US quits 'biased' UN human rights council’, https://www.bbc.com/news/44537372. Consulted on 29/04/2020.

Blok, Stef, (2018d), ‘Kamerbrief over de stopzetting van de jaarlijkse contributie aan de Raad van Europa door Rusland’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/11/21/kamerbrief-over-de-stopzetting-van-de- jaarlijkse-contributie-aan-de-raad-van-europa-door-rusland. Consulted on 30/04/2020.

Blok, Stef (2018e), ‘Kamerbrief over intensivering mensenrechtenbeleid’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/10/30/kamerbrief-over-intensivering- mensenrechtenbeleid. Consulted on 31/04/2020.

Blok, Stef, (2019), ‘Kamerbrief over beleidsdoorlichting Europees Nabuurschapsbeleid’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/11/29/kamerbrief-inzake-beleidsreactie-op-iob- beleidsdoorlichting-europees-nabuurschapsbeleid. Consulted on 30/04/2020.

92

Blok, Stef (2020b), ‘Kamerbrief over de inzet van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de VN- Mensenrechtenraad (2020-2022)’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/02/14/kamerbrief-inzake-de-inzet-van-het-koninkrijk- der-nederlanden-in-de-vn-mensenrechtenraad-2020-2022. Consulted on 31/04/2020.

Casier, Tom (2018), ‘A Classic Dilemma: Russia’s Threat to Withdraw from the Council of Europe’, https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/02/21/classic-dilemma-russias-threat-withdraw-council-europe. Consulted on 29/04/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2015d), ‘Antwoord op vragen van de leden Maij en Servaes over het bericht dat Rusland uitspraken van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens negeert’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2015Z14258&did=2015D 29924. Consulted on 31/04/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2017a), ‘Antwoord op vragen van de leden Groothuizen en Sjoerdsma over het bericht “Organisaties: Nederland doet te weinig voor Tsjetsjeense homo’s’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2017Z08414&did=2017D 19937. Consulted on 31/04/2020.

Mijatovic, Dunja, ‘3rd Quarterly Activity Report 2019 1 July to 30 September’, https://rm.coe.int/090000168098ccd9. Consulted on 30/04/2020.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017), ‘Human Right’s report 2017’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/rapporten/2018/05/28/mensenrechtenrapportage-2017. Consulted on 31/04/2020.

Ministry of Foreign affairs (2018), ‘Mensenrechtenrapportage 2018 - Inzet en resultaten buitenlands mensenrechtenbeleid’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/rapporten/2019/05/29/bijlage-kamerbrief-mensenrechtenrapportage-2018. Consulted on 30/04/2020.

Ministry of General Affairs (2016), ‘Verslag van een schriftelijk overleg over de geannoteerde agenda Raad Algemene Zaken van 18 januari 2016 en het verslag van de Raad Algemene Zaken van 15 december 2015’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2016Z00641&did=2016D01378. Consulted on 29/04/2020.

93

MH17

AD (2014), 'Ontwerpresolutie VN-missie bij rampplek bijna klaar', ad.nl, https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/ontwerpresolutie-vn-missie-bij-rampplek-bijna- klaar~a25fb786/. Consulted on 01/05/2020.

BBC (2014), ‘MH17 plane crash: EU to widen Russia sanctions’, BBC.com, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-28415248. Consulted on 03/05/2020.

Blok, Stef (2018f), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen over de persconferentie van het JIT over de ramp met MH17’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/neerhalen-vlucht- mh17/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/30/beantwoording-kamervragen-over-de- persconferentie-van-het-jit-over-de-ramp-met-mh17. Consulted on 03/05/2020.

Blok, Stef (2018g), ‘Kamerbrief over staatsaansprakelijkheid Rusland inzake MH17’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/neerhalen-vlucht- mh17/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/25/kamerbrief-over-staatsaansprakelijkheid- rusland-inzake-mh17. Consulted on 02/05/2020.

Blok, Stef (2018h), ‘Toespraak minister Blok in VN-Veiligheidsraad over MH17’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/neerhalen-vlucht- mh17/documenten/toespraken/2018/05/29/toespraak-minister-blok-in-vn-veiligheidsraad- over-mh17. Consulted on 01/05/2020. Blok, Stef (2019e), ‘Geannoteerde agenda Europese Raad inclusief art. 50 samenstelling van 20 en 21 juni 2019’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z12246&did=20 19D25230. Consulted on 03/05/2020.

Blok, Stef (2019f),’Geannoteerde agenda bijeenkomst NAVO ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken op 20 november 2019’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z22348&did=20 19D46439. Consulted on 02/05/2020.

Blok, Stef (2020c), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen over onderzoek Russische publieke opinie MH17’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/04/07/beantwoording- kamervragen-over-onderzoek-russische-publieke-opinie-mh17. Consulted on 03/05/2020.

Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (2020),’Strafrechtelijk onderzoek door Joint Investigation Team (JIT)’, https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-vliegramp/strafrechtelijk-onderzoek-mh17-jit. Consulted on 02/05/2020.

94

NOS (2014), ‘MH17: wat denkt Rusland?’, Nos.nl, https://nos.nl/artikel/676553-mh17-wat-denkt-rusland.html. Consulted on 02/05/2020.

Rutte, Mark (2018), ‘Speech by Prime Minister Mark Rutte at the UN General Assembly, New York’, https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2018/09/27/speech-by-prime-minister-mark- rutte-at-the-un-general-assembly-new-york. Consulted on 03/05/2020. Rijksoverheid (2018), ‘Nederland stelt Rusland aansprakelijk’, Rijksoverheid.nl, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/neerhalen-vlucht-mh17/rechtspraak-en- waarheid/nederland-stelt-rusland-aansprakelijk. Consulted on 01/05/2020.

Timmermans, Frans (2014a), ‘Stand van zaken i.v.m. vlucht MH17 en uitkomst Raad Buitenlandse Zaken 22 juli 2014’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2014Z13680&did=20 14D27526. Consulted on 02/05/2020.

Timmermans, Frans (2014b), ‘Verslag Buitengewone Raad Buitenlandse Zaken van 15 augustus 2014’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2014Z14098&did=20 14D28403. Consulted on 03/05/2020.

Tweede Kamer (2017), ‘Tweede Kamer, 81e vergadering Woensdag 31 mei 2017’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/bae04d6f-d529-4580- 8d64-91ff9d1745a3#id1d682e7f. Consulted on 02/05/2020.

UN Security Council (2014), ‘Resolution 2166 (2014): Adopted by the Security Council at its 7221st meeting, on 21 July 2014’, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2166%282014%29. Consulted on 01/05/2020.

Ukraine/Syria

Blok, Stef (2018i), ‘Beantwoording Kamervragen over berichten inzake een gifaanval in Douma’, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse- zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/05/28/beantwoording-kamervragen-over-berichten- inzake-een-gifaanval-in-douma. Consulted on 04/05/2020.

Blok, Stef (2019g), ‘Schriftelijke antwoorden op vragen gesteld tijdens de eerste termijn van de begrotingsbehandeling van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (35300-V) op 13 november 2019’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019Z22085&did=20 19D45900. Consulted on 07/05/2020.

95

Koenders, Bert (2017b), ‘AIV advies EU-Oekraïne Associatieovereenkomst’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2017Z03852&did=20 17D07939. Consulted on 06/05/2020.

Koenders, Bert (2015e), ‘Situatie in Oekraïne’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2018D14005&did=2018D14005. Consulted on 06/05/2020.

Tweede Kamer (2016),’Tweede Kamer, 38e vergadering Woensdag 21 december 2016’, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/8717f81f-4ed9-4e71- 9203-1e702ab33914#id510dedb3. Consulted on 07/05/2020.

96

Appendix 1: Code Book

VARIABLES INDICATOR CATEGORY CODE KOOPMAN ‘efforts to maintain export preservation EXPCHO the export volume Choice’ of the Netherlands to Russia’ ″ ″ export preservation EXPALT alternative’ ″ ″ export preservation EXPGOA Goal’ ″ ″ export preservation EXPIDEN Identification ″ ‘efforts to maintain Energy Choice ENECHO’ energy supply’ ″ ″ Energy Alternative’ ENALT ″ ″ ‘Energy Goals ENGOA ″ ″ Energy ENIDEN identification ″ ‘efforts to maintain economic APRCHO economic accessibility via accessibility via Russia’s Russia’s neighbourhood neighbourhood choice’ ″ ″ economic APRALT accessibility via Russia’s neighbourhood Alternative ″ ″ economic APRGOA accessibility via Russia’s neighbourhood Goal ″ ″ economic APRIDEN accessibility via Russia’s neighbourhood identification DOMINEE efforts to contain contain Russia in CRISCHO Russia in Crisis areas Crisis areas Choice ″ ″ contain Russia in CRISALT Crisis areas Alternative ″ ″ contain Russia in CRISGOA Crisis areas Goal

97

″ ″ contain Russia in CRISIDEN Crisis areas Identification ″ efforts to try ‘Justice’ quest JUSCHO perpetrators of the Choice’ downing of MH17 ″ ″ ‘Justice’ quest JUSALT’ Alternative ″ ″ Justice quest Goal JUSGOA ″ ″ Justice quest JUSIDEN identification ″ ‘efforts to promote Human rights HUMCHO human rights in promotion Choice Russia ″ ″ Human rights HUMALT promotion Alternative ″ ″ Human rights HUMGOA promotion Goal’ ″ ″ Human rights HUMIDEN promotion identification SECURITY efforts to increase Increase digital DIGICHO digital security’ security Choice ″ ″ Increase digital DIGIALT security Alternative ″ ″ Increase digital DIGIGOA security Goal ″ ″ Increase digital DIGIIDEN security Identification ″ efforts to increase Increase territorial TERCHO territorial security’ security Choice’ ″ ″ Increase territorial TERALT security Alternative ″ ″ Increase territorial TERGOA security Goal ″ ″ Increase territorial TERIDEN security Identification ″ ‘efforts to increase Increase Security FORCHO Security against against foreign foreign influence influence Choice ″ ″ Increase Security FORALT against foreign influence Alternative

98

″ ″ Increase Security FORGOA against foreign influence Goal ″ ″ Increase Security FORIDEN against foreign influence Identification

99