Importance of Mineral Rights and Royalty Interests for Rural

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A publication of the Agricultural & Applied The magazine of food, farm, and resource issues Economics Association 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) Importance of Mineral Rights and Royalty Interests for Rural Residents and Landowners Timothy Fitzgerald JEL Classifications: D23, K11, L71, Q40, R33 Keywords: Mineral Rights, Oil and Gas, Royalty Interest

The United States is unique in the world insofar as private individuals Figure 1: Onshore Oil and Gas Production in the Continental United States 1997-2014 own a majority of subsurface minerals. While federal and state governments also own minerals, the market for mineral prospects includes many sell- ers and buyers. Many mineral owners are willing to lease acreage for exploration and experimentation with new extraction technologies (Hefner, 2014). Those individuals capture a share of the proceeds if and when production occurs. Local residents own minerals and stand to gain from production, but the extent to which they do so is not well known. Understanding the legal framework of minerals rights and royalty interests is critical to better understand the magnitude of economic gains from oil and gas royalties. Recent years have brought a dra- matic technological change to the U.S. Source: EIA. Oil converted to Btu at 5.83 MMBtu/bbl. oil and gas sector, described as the “natural gas revolution,” or the “shale gale” to reflect the presence of both natural oil and gas production in recent past and, in other regions, gas and petroleum in widespread shale deposits (Yergin, never. Places with marginal resources using conventional 2011; and Deutch, 2011). Technological changes in extrac- technology became very profitable with new technology. tion techniques have made extraction of unconventional As a result, regions such as rural Pennsylvania, much of resources economic, vastly increasing potentially produc- which overlies the Marcellus shale, have become hotbeds tive acreage. That change, in turn, has pushed exploration of oil and gas activity. and production into numerous regions that had not seen

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1 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) AAEA-1114-202 Chesapeake Energy claims 1 million Table 1. Mineral Ownership in Select States, 2012 mineral owners have signed leases Coverage Owner Owner Counties Leases In-state In-county Federal State with their company, or nearly 1 in State (Count) (Percent) (Percent) 300 Americans (Zuckerman, 2013). Colorado 25 42,336 61.17 34.52 17.1 1.7 Those million leases could be concen- Louisiana 54 100,723 81.7 51.16 1.3 23.2 Montana 8 16,919 47.73 25.16 15.1 6 trated in the hands of far fewer than New Mexico 3 20,177 36.51 18.96 51.1 19.4 1 million mineral owners, however, North Dakota 13 88,557 36.4 15.13 11.7 23.5 and the owners may or may not live Ohio 32 31,175 95.85 74.03 N/A N/A Oklahoma 60 460,952 60.28 24.58 0.7 19 atop their minerals. So understand- Pennsylvania 26 50,094 90.32 65.66 N/A N/A ing the specific structure of leasing Texas 190 618,905 80.92 28.23 0.2 6.2 and mineral ownership is elemental Utah 1 1,574 64.1 12.39 48.8 1.5 to the economic effects of oil and West Virginia 16 34,258 65.32 41.85 N/A N/A Wyoming 10 6,733 41.35 29.35 63.2 6.8 gas development. Kinnaman (2011) Total 447 1,472,403 74 .96 36.46 11.7 12.1 cited the failure to consider location Source: DrillingInfo. where royalties are received and spent Notes: In-state and in-county ownership statistics equally weight each county in state. The as a major shortcoming of studies statistics reported in this table cover all mineral owners and all years. Totals reflect the unweighted averages across all counties included above. Federal and state ownership statistics that forecast the economic impact of are revenue shares reported in Fitzgerald and Rucker (2014), which explains methodology natural gas development. underlying the estimates. The totals for these columns are 2012 cumulative oil and natural gas production-weighted averages for states that have data. Mineral Rights and Royalty The value of the change in U.S. counties, and that value is likely to Interests production due to this technological be captured differently. Understand- change is impressive. Figure 1 shows ing such variation is useful in making Many different entities own min- U.S. oil and natural gas production more accurate forecasts of local eco- eral rights in the United States: pri- and benchmark prices since 1997. nomic performance. vate individuals and firms, federal and state governments, and in fed- Between 2008 and 2013, onshore oil Predicting support for develop- production in the lower 48 states in- eral trust for tribally owned minerals. ment and attendant policy issues is The provenance of mineral ownership creased by 81%; natural gas produc- a second key implication of under- tion increased by 30% over the same for these different groups varies and standing dispersal of mineral rents. is often directly related to the his- time span, but began to increase be- Widespread ownership and realiza- fore 2008. How much of the value of tory of property claims in a particular tion of royalties shape a different po- location. Prior to 1908, the federal this change accrues to local residents, litical landscape than concentration and the spatial pattern of royalty cap- government conveyed rights to all and absenteeism do. Policy issues minerals through homestead claims, ture, are important questions asked such as natural gas and crude oil ex- by policymakers. with very little acreage ineligible for ports, construction of the Keystone claim. After that time, and especially Royalties accruing locally might XL pipeline from Canada to the Gulf after 1916, mineral rights were never well have different effects than rev- Coast, and regulation of hydraulic conveyed to private owners and, in- enue that accumulates to oil and gas fracturing are likely to vary accord- stead, reserved by the federal govern- companies, which are often based out ing to the degree to which residents ment. States and tribes received min- of state. Gilje (2012) investigates the benefit from oil and gas activity. State erals from federal land grants. As a consequence of local capture of oil and local policy issues also arise, such comparison, in most other countries and gas royalties, finding increased as the collection of tax revenue from the government retains ownership of deposits in local branch banks lead out-of-state mineral owners. Tracing all subsurface minerals. The diffuse to an increased number of business ownership and mineral rent distribu- ownership in the United States gives establishments dependent on external tion is a more direct link to individ- many owners an opportunity to ben- credit. Counties with more oil and ual economic welfare than previous efit from resource wealth. gas production experienced an addi- studies of employment effects (We- tional 8.2% in deposit growth during ber, 2012; and Jacobsen and Parker, Property rights are sometimes the period 2000-09. A major source 2014). likened to a bundle of sticks. In that of these additional deposits is pro- framework, mineral rights are not As testament to the potential one stick, but a sub-bundle, because ceeds from oil and gas royalties and wide scope of benefits to royalty lease bonus payments. The size of roy- rights to distinct minerals can be held owners from oil and gas production, separately. For example, coal and alties themselves is not well known. independent oil and gas producer The value of production varies across petroleum rights can be separately

2 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) owned. Mineral rights can also be separated from surface rights. Sever- Figure 2: Measures of Local Mineral Ownership, Pennsylvania and Texas ance of minerals from surface, commonly called split estate, is a typical arrangement—surprisingly so to some people. The U.S. government reports 57.2 million acres of federal minerals that underlie private surface, though these holdings are concen- trated in states in which many land claims were made after 1908. Forty percent of the federal split estate is in Montana and Wyoming; adding Colorado, New Mexico, and North Dakota increases the proportion to nearly three-quarters. Split estates are related to dissatisfaction with development (Collins and Nkansah, In Press), and one rea- son for that dissatisfaction is the in- ability of a surface owner to share in Source: DrillingInfo. Elaboration by the author. the value of the extracted minerals. This begs an important question— often begins when mineral property the royalty revenue usually far sur- why would it ever make sense to split is conveyed between generations. An passes the bonus payment. However, up the sticks in the bundle? The abil- example is a mineral owner bequeath- the risk of no production may make ity of mineral owners to sever mineral ing equal shares to multiple children. bonus preferable to royalty. rights from the surface, or rights to By default, mineral rights are con- In addition to these two payments, one mineral from others, hinges on veyed as tenants-in-common rather the lease language can be negotiated the degree to which one owner can than as owners of separate acreage, on an individual basis. While almost benefit from both surface and min- implying each of four children owns all leases share a common structure, erals (Huffman, 1982). Specializa- a quarter of the whole acreage, rather contractual protections in the form of tion provides an important rationale than all of one quarter of the acreage. lease stipulations may be important to for severance (Barzel, 1997); because This fractionalization compounds some owners. An important example agriculture and oil and gas produc- with generations and fecundity. of such a stipulation is a surface use tion require different combinations In a vast majority of cases, an oil clause. Such clauses legally restrict the of inputs, it is natural to expect that and gas company interested in explor- extent to which a developer can oc- separate ownership of the surface ing for and producing oil or gas does cupy the surface. Owners of severed and mineral rights would generate so by leasing rather than buying the minerals likely have less incentive to larger gains than requiring a single acreage. Oil and gas leases are op- include surface use clauses, but may owner. The same argument applies to tion contracts with several important be keenly interested in other types of separation of the rights to different dimensions. The option has a pri- clauses, such as “Pugh” or delay roy- minerals. However, the gains from mary duration and, if that duration alty clauses. Oil and gas leases can be specialization come at the expense elapses before production occurs, the customized to the wishes of the min- of increased transaction costs (Ch- lease expires. A common example is a eral owner. ouinard and Steinhoff, 2008); in the three-year primary term. Usually the Private oil and gas leases are ne- case of federal oil and gas leases, bid- mineral owner is interested in mini- gotiated between mineral owners and ders appear to anticipate those higher mizing the delay until production procurement specialists called land- costs (Fitzgerald, 2010). begins. men. Landmen may work for oil and A key issue surrounding mineral Monetary compensation from gas companies interested in produc- rights is that ownership of a single private leases comes in two parts—a ing the minerals themselves, or may acre is often divided among more royalty share of gross production reve- work as independent contractors who than one individual. Fractionaliza- nues and an upfront payment called a procure leases and bundle them for tion of mineral rights is common and bonus. If a lease ultimately produces, sale to developers. Regardless of the

3 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) Table 2. Variation in Ownership, North Dakota and prices. Because of the geophysics Percent Percent Number of extraction, production usually falls County In-County In-State of Leases over time from each well. More wells Billings 2.1 36.28 4,859 may be drilled on a property, and that Burke 11 35.47 7,262 can increase royalty payments. Price Divide 7.35 28.54 6,745 Dunn 11.31 41.85 9,030 risk remains an issue for royalty own- Eddy 0 0 2 ers, who may not have access to the Mckenzie 12.06 32.74 18,102 full range of hedging strategies due to McLean 11.84 39.89 752 scale. Mercer 17.68 43.96 803 Mountrail 16.82 38.28 10,245 Royalty ownership comes with Renville 13.16 43.14 2,735 its own special set of problems. One Stark 30.3 43.38 5,756 important reality for royalty owners Ward 33.03 47.38 1547 is that the operator has much better Williams 30.09 42.33 20,719 information about produced quanti- Notes: In-state and in-county percentages are ties, price received for products sold, calculated on a per-lease basis, without correcting and the costs of moving products to for acreage or fractionated mineral interest. See Table 1 for additional notes. the point of sale. A second important reality is that the operator of the well type of landman with whom the min- and arrive at a prospective well site. is usually able to deduct reasonable eral owner negotiates, there are two The amount of time spent drilling expenses incurred in transporting and reasons to expect that an asymmetry varies depending on the depth and processing the produced quantities of information prevails between the complexity of a well. After the well from the wellhead (where royalties lessor and the lessee. First, because oil is drilled, it must be completed, in- are theoretically due) to the point of and gas leases can have a long dura- cluding treatments such as hydraulic sale (where a price can be attached to tion, negotiation of a lease may be in- fracturing that affect the reservoir the units that are sold). These post– frequent for any given mineral owner. characteristics and likely production production costs, or deductions and In contrast, landmen acquire leases from the well. Only after completion allowances, are a regular item on a regularly and, during busy periods of is the well ready to begin producing royalty owner’s check stub and often leasing, one landman may be work- commercially and sale of products amount to 10% or more of the gross ing on multiple leases simultaneously. can begin. Most leased mineral own- royalty. Here, again, the royalty owner This gives the landman an informa- ers eagerly anticipate the first sales be- is often at an informational disadvan- tional edge with respect to the struc- cause of the expectation of accruing tage. The operator likely considers the ture of leases as well as current condi- royalties. benefit of alternative gas-processing tions in the leasing market. Second, contracts, whereas the royalty owner the technical demands of modern oil Being a Royalty Owner may have limited knowledge of why gas processing is needed. and gas production increase the infor- Because most mineral owners do mation required to assess the value of not develop minerals on their own, Royalty owners commonly have mineral acreage. Company landmen one of the most important events in disputes with operators. These dis- are instructed to procure acreage in the life of an oil and gas owner is when putes are often settled amicably, but specific areas, and many independent he or she becomes a royalty owner. sometimes result in legal action that landmen have technical training that After a paying well is brought in on receives a judgment. Questions about allows assessment of the resource be- the lease, a division order is signed adherence to lease stipulations, mea- fore negotiating. Most mineral own- by the mineral owner to specify the surement and timing of production, ers lack comparable experience, and terms on which royalties will be paid. lease expiration, or accounting for may be forced to rely on informa- Signing the division order makes the post-production costs all crop up pe- tion provided by the landman in the mineral owner a royalty owner. riodically. Considerable precedent re- course of negotiation. duces uncertainty about the outcome The first check usually pays six of any given dispute, helping to lower After a lease is signed, a delay months of royalties, and so is often costs of resolution. of months may elapse before addi- a large sum. In most cases the roy- tional activity occurs. Leases may be alty owner will subsequently receive assigned to new owners, who then monthly checks. Royalties are almost Mineral Owners have to determine where and when to always calculated on gross revenue, so Understanding the disposition of drill wells, obtain necessary permits, they can fluctuate with production mineral rights and how leases lead to

4 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) royalties leaves an important ques- examined here. However, for almost Economic Value of Royalties tion about who are mineral owners. all of the reported counties in Texas, Royalties are calculated based on Are local residents the owners of their the minerals are controlled within the gross revenues. Aggregate quanti- own minerals, or do absentee owner- state. This is an important distinction ties produced are widely available. ship and split estate direct most of the between Texas and other states. The extent of price dispersion and rents of mineral development into the Mineral ownership is not uniform variability in royalty rates makes es- pockets of others? within states. Variation within one timation of gross royalties more dif- To gain some insight into min- state, North Dakota, is reported in ficult. As a starting point, one large eral ownership, Table 1 summarizes Table 2. Across the 12 counties for mineral owner secures a uniform a substantial collection of mineral which there are reliable data, in-state royalty rate—the federal government leases complied by DrillingInfo from ownership ranges from a high of near- for onshore production. The federal 12 of 32 producing states. These ly one-half to less than one-third. The government reported oil and gas roy- states include 8 of the top 10 pro- in-county numbers are lower, ranging alties of $2.7 billion for fiscal year ducing states in 2012, and all are in from one-third to only 2% in Billings 2013. Royalties represented 92% of the top 20. Within states, the leases County. North Dakota has a high de- total revenues from onshore oil and were summarized at the county level gree of absentee ownership compared gas for 2013, with the balance made to account for geographic variation in to eastern states. up by bonus and rental payments. leasing terms and underlying geology. Table 1 also reports the percent This underscores the importance of The first columns report the number of mineral production revenue at- royalties relative to other forms of of counties represented in the sample tributable to federal- and state-owned compensation. and aggregate number of distinct minerals in selected states (Fitzgerald The federal royalty figure also leases in those counties. and Rucker, 2014). A weighted aver- provides a guideline for the aggre- There are considerable differ- age of the states with data on govern- gate value of royalties. Suppose all ences in mineral ownership across the ment mineral ownership, using 2012 other mineral owners captured the states. The data allow matching of the production of oil and gas as weights, same share of production as the fed- reported address of the grantor with is included in the total. This suggests eral government. In that case, the ag- the lease location. When the grantor that 76.2% of producing oil and gas gregate royalties in fiscal year 2013 reports an address in the same state as minerals in the onshore lower 48 are would be about $23 billion. the lease, the lease is recorded as be- privately owned. ing owned in-state. When the grantor reports an address in the same county as the leased property, the final col- Table 3. Summary of Oil and Gas Lease Royalty and Term umn records whether the minerals are Oil & Gas Mean owned within county. Counties Counties Royalty Term The contrast across states is de- State (Count) (Count) (Percent) (Months) picted in Figure 2, which compares Arkansas 38 27 15.69 53.42 California 3 31 17.46 45.52 mineral ownership in counties in Colorado 25 38 14.91 53.00 Texas and Pennsylvania. A large ma- Kansas 38 91 13.5 38.00 jority of the counties in Pennsylvania Louisiana 54 63 21.26 38.55 for which there are data indicate that Mississippi 42 43 18.4 47.02 most of the minerals are controlled Montana 8 34 15.4 52.69 by Pennsylvania residents. In fact, a New Mexico 3 13 20.8 38.49 North Dakota 13 18 17.74 46.07 large majority of counties also have Ohio 32 61 12.63 47.62 local ownership of minerals, as mea- Oklahoma 60 74 18.59 35.88 sured by counties. In contrast, ab- Pennsylvania 26 36 13.98 58.24 sentee ownership is more common Texas 190 228 19.6 37.46 in Texas counties. Like Pennsylvania, Utah 1 11 16.57 56.68 some counties are characterized by a West Virginia 16 50 13.56 59.96 Wyoming 19 22 15.33 52.33 very high proportion of local owner- Total 559 840 17.65 42.89 ship. Greater variation across counties Source: DrillingInfo. within Texas is evident, with several Notes: County-level production statistics for private counties reporting no in-county min- mineral owners for oil or gas produced in the county 2000- eral ownership for the sample of leases 2011. State means equally weight each county in state. A total of 2,315,574 distinct leases were included.

5 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) Table 4. Gross Value and Capture of Private Oil and Gas anecdotal deductions on private min- Royalties, 2012 erals. This estimate is subject to some Gross Federal Gross In-State unobserved variation in when royal- State Value Value Royalty Value ties are paid for production in the Colorado 9,346 199.8 1,131.5 692.1 Louisiana 14,785 24 2,373.2 1,938.90 federal reports, but the gross value Montana 2,678 50.5 325.4 155.3 estimate presumes royalties are paid New Mexico 11,366 726 697.4 254.6 concurrent with production. North Dakota 23,313 340.9 2,680.0 975.5 Using state-specific average roy- Oklahoma 14,321 12.5 2,137.8 1,288.70 Texas 88,835 22.2 16,297.3 13,187.80 alty rates to generate predictions of Utah 4,198 256.1 345.7 221.6 gross royalty due to private mineral Wyoming 11,012 869.9 506.4 209.4 owners in 2012, we see that Texas is Total 224,860 3,160.3 31,359.3 far and away the most important state Notes: Values are in millions of 2012 dollars. Reported states for generating royalties. In part this each have individual calculations for average private royalty rate, proportion of minerals privately owned, and proportion of is because it is the largest producing minerals contolled in state. States with missing values were state, but also because it has a high assigned production-weighted averages and are included in the proportion of private minerals and total. Corresponding aggregate federal royalties are reported as relatively high royalty rates. The ag- $2.7 billion for FY2013 (September 2012-13). gregate 2012 value of private royalties for the major states considered in State governments own and lease quality basis differentials. Table 4 was about $31 billion. substantial mineral acreage. Because Table 3 presents information The final column of Table 4 pro- different states have retained differ- about private oil and gas lease terms. vides an estimate of the share of pri- ing amounts of land, the importance Dispersion in royalty rates is promi- vate royalties that are captured by of state ownership varies across the nent both within and between states. in-state mineral owners. Of course, states. In general, western states have Lease terms vary from just over mineral owners in a state such as Tex- retained more land in state ownership three years in several active states to as may also be receiving royalties from and are more likely to have active closer to five years in Utah and West production in other states, and so this leasing programs. Exceptions exist, Virginia. however. For example, Michigan is a estimate is clearly an underestimate of relatively modest producing state, but As an illustration of state variation total royalty income. However, due to almost one-quarter of gross revenues in the value and capture of oil and gas substantial out-of-state mineral own- are generated on state minerals. royalties, Table 4 reports calculations ership, a state such as North Dakota for several states using 2012 calendar sees a large chunk of royalty income Unlike federal minerals, a sum- year production figures. (The gross disappear across state lines. Local fig- mary of royalty payments from pri- production revenue values natural gas ures are even lower. vate oil and gas production is harder as dry gas and does not take natural to come by. Because private minerals gas liquids into account.) The re- Questions for the Future account for about 75% of onshore ported states have precise estimates U.S. production in recent years, of the amount of production from The effects identified here are -fun we could estimate gross royalties as federal minerals. Valuing the federal damentally short term. The long-run three-quarters of the usual royalty production share at the federal roy- financial implications are not well rate times gross revenue. At least four alty rate of 12.5% gives an estimate understood. Given the nontrivial factors contribute to the variation in of gross royalties due. The estimate revenues accruing to public mineral private royalty payments. First, there of $3.16 billion is higher than the re- owners, the long-term fiscal posi- is considerable dispersion in private ported net royalty receipts, although tion of state and local governments royalty rates, in contrast to federal the calendar and fiscal years do not depends on the ability to use current or even state-owned minerals. Sec- match up precisely. One possible in- revenues wisely. For example, many ond, royalty rates vary across regions ference is that this approximation states devote severance tax revenue and over time. Third, royalty owners is too high. A second is that trans- to a trust fund. Other states, such as never actually see the gross royalty, portation and marketing allowances Montana, instead dedicate revenues but instead receive a net royalty after amount to about 14.5% of gross roy- to operational budgets. Disposition transportation and marketing allow- alty value for the federal government. of private oil and gas windfalls is ances are deducted. Fourth, product There are no previous estimates of the subject to a similar tradeoff between prices vary around the country, large- magnitude of post-production costs, investment in long-term productivity ly in keeping with transportation and but this figure is within the range of and current consumption.

6 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2014 • 29(4) Over the long term, the usage of For More Information Huffman, J.L. 1982. “The Allocative oil and gas royalty income is a criti- Impacts of Mineral Severance: Barzel, Y. 1997. Economic Analysis cal question. The reallocation of rents Implications for the Regulation of Property Rights, 2nd ed. Cam- across alternative types of capital is a of Surface Mining.” Natural Re- bridge University Press. key question. Most states receiving sources Journal 22:201-237. Chouinard, H., and C. Steinhoff. mineral royalties use the proceeds at Jacobsen, G.D., and D.P. Parker. 2008. “Split Estate Negotiations: least in part to fund education, which 2014. “The Economic Aftermath The Case of Coal-Bed Methane.” is a reallocation from natural to hu- of Resource Booms: Evidence Review of Law and Economics man capital. Rural residents in North from Boomtowns in the Ameri- 4:233-258. Dakota and eastern Montana have can West.” Economic Journal 124: experienced decades of population Collins, A.R., and K. Nkansah. In 18 Oct. declines. A current population influx Press. “Divided Rights, Expanded Kinnaman, T.C. 2011. “The Eco- has increased the demand for social Conflict: The Impact of Split -Es nomic Impact of Shale Gas Ex- services, but with the longevity of the tates in Natural Gas Production.” traction: A Review of Existing Bakken play still in question, infra- Land Economics. structure investments are as difficult Studies.” Ecological Economics Deutch, J. 2011. “The Good News 70:1243-1249. for local governments as decisions about Gas – The Natural Gas Weber, J.G. 2012. “The Effects of a about investing in the community are Revolution and Its Consequenc- Natural Gas Boom on Employ- for royalty owners. es.” Foreign Affairs 90:82-93. ment and Income in Colorado, Questions that rural residents and Fitzgerald, T. 2010. “Evaluating Split landowners have about oil and gas Texas, and Wyoming.” Energy Estates in Oil and Gas Leasing.” Economics 34:1580-1588. development, broadly, and issues of Land Economics 86:294-312. mineral rights and leasing, in particu- Yergin, D. 2011. The Quest: Energy, lar, are often difficult to answer. And Fitzgerald, T., and R.R. Rucker. Security, and the Remaking of the the existing outreach mechanisms, 2014. U.S. Private Oil and Natu- Modern World. New York, N.Y: such as the cooperative extension ral Gas Royalties: Estimates and Penguin. Policy Considerations. Agricultural service, have very limited expertise in Zuckerman, G. 2013. The Frackers: Economics and Economics Staff this area. Oil and gas attorneys can be The Outrageous Inside Story of the Paper 2014-1, Montana State very useful to landowners considering New Billionaire Wildcatters. New University, Bozeman. leases or other contracts. However, York, N.Y: Penguin. the expansion of development into Gilje, E. 2012. “Does Local Access to new provinces has outstripped the Finance Matter?: Evidence from Timothy Fitzgerald (timothy.fitzger- supply of unconflicted attorneys with US Oil and Natural Gas Shale [email protected]) is Assistant Profes- expertise in oil and gas issues. While Booms.” Working Paper, Boston sor, Department of Agricultural Eco- this shortage is likely to correct itself College, Mass. nomics and Economics, Montana State without intervention, the asymme- Hefner III, R.A. 2014. “The United University, Bozeman. tries of information discussed above States of Gas.” Foreign Affairs are likely to continue in the interim. 93:9-14.

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