Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations

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Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds Exploring Afghan Perceptions of Civil-Military Relations Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations Research conducted for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam Mirwais Wardak Idrees Zaman Annabel Taylor 2008 Copyright: © British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group June 2008 Cover photo: Philip Poupin www.philip-photos.com This report can be downloaded from www.baag.org.uk Contact: [email protected] Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the authors The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan, the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group, their members, agencies that have sponsored the research or other NGOs, Afghan or international’. This report has been sponsored by Care International UK, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, Christian Aid, Cordaid (the Netherlands), ICCO&Kerkinactie (the Netherlands), Oxfam Novib (the Netherlands) and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds Exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations Research conducted for the European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan (ENNA) and the British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam Mirwais Wardak Idrees Zaman Annabel Taylor 2008 ENNA European Network of NGOs in Afghanistan 2 | Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds Contents Abbreviations 3 Chapter 5: Governance and security 51 Executive summary 4 5.1 Civilianising PRTs 53 5.2 Coordination 53 Introduction 12 5.3 Governance 55 5.4 Security 59 Research methodology 14 5.5 Private security companies 63 Chapter 1: Chapter 6: Afghans in the civmil debate 18 Social transformation, intelligence 1.1 Afghan NGOs 19 gathering and cultural sensitivity 65 1.2 Government 21 6.1 Social transformation 65 1.3 Civil society, communities and 6.2 Information and intelligence 68 the media 22 6.3 Cultural sensitivity 71 Chapter 2: Chapter 7: Imported and local principles 24 Conclusion and recommendations 73 2.1 Civilian casualties 25 7.1 Summary of recommendations 76 2.2 Principles of Afghaniyat and Islamiyat 26 Annex 1: Chapter 3: Interviewees 81 Security for NGOs 28 3.1 NGO perceptions of insecurity 29 Annex 2: 3.2 Perception and Identity management 30 Ministry of Interior Directive Related to PRTs 82 3.3 Military and civilian approaches to NGO security 32 Annex 3: 3.4 Military impact on civilian identity 36 Bibliography 83 3.5 Provenance of assistance 38 3.6 Afghan NGO staff 40 Chapter 4: Expectations, effectiveness and impact 43 4.1 Sustainability 43 4.2 Charity versus development 45 4.3 Accountability and transparency 45 4.4 Contacts and consultations 46 4.5 Management of actors 48 4.6 Landscape of conflicts 48 4.7 Contractors – ‘the face of greed’ 49 | 3 Abbreviations ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ANA Afghan National Army ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy ANGO Afghan non-government organisation ANSO Afghanistan NGO Safety Office ANP Afghan National Police AOG armed opposition groups CDC community development council CF coalition forces CIMIC civil-military cooperation CIVMIL civil-military DIAG disbandment of illegal armed groups GoA government of Afghanistan HIG Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDLG independent directorate for local governance IHL international humanitarian law INGO international non-governmental organisation IO international organisation ISAF International Security Assistance Force (NATO) ISAF X tenth command of ISAF MoI Ministry of the Interior NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO non-governmental organisation NSP National Solidarity Programme OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PDC provincial development committee PRT provincial reconstruction team psyops psychological operations QIP quick impact project SSR security sector reform UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan WHAM winning hearts and minds 4 | Afghan Hearts, Afghan Minds Executive Summary Throughout Afghanistan, there are silent but chilling donors and NATO representatives pressuring them reminders of the constant loss of innocent lives in a to align with ‘hearts and minds’ strategies. conflict which has spanned three decades, and one that continues to claim innocent lives today: Civilian actors in the civil-military (civmil) debate, crowded graveyards; a gravelike structure in a including NGOs, have also primarily engaged with provincial capital to remind passers-by of the specific elements of the military responsible for children killed in a roadside bomb. The identities of monitoring and interacting with civilian actors, the killers and the victims may change but the result framed as CIMIC in military jargon. However for the majority Afghans remains the same – a lack of infringements into ‘humanitarian space’ have been security against a stark backdrop of continuing carried out by other elements of the military, which poverty and underdevelopment. are currently not engaged in the civmil debate. There is also a vast range of NGO positions on civmil Within donor-countries, politicians, media and the relations, reflecting a complex history of NGO public are beginning to question the achievability of development, a complicated operational context stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. At the and a certain level of incoherence in the positions same time, donor governments have sought to and approaches of individual PRTs. integrate their aid, foreign policy and military agendas in an effort to find a ‘comprehensive In light of this, civmil relations retains its importance approach’. Pressure from donor governments and for those individuals, whether military or civilian, military actors to deliver ‘instant’ development and working to bring sustainable peace and democracy is pushing NGOs into unexplored development to Afghanistan. territory and promoting an uneasy marriage between ‘the three Ds’ – development, diplomacy This research has tried primarily to address Afghan and defence. Efforts by the international community concerns and unpack some of the commonly held and national actors to put appropriate and effective assumptions about Afghan engagement with and coordination mechanisms in place, design and within the main areas of the civmil debate. In implement joint strategies have proven difficult. particluar, it aimed to: • provide an evidence base for advocating to While significant efforts have been made to donors, policymakers and the military for overcome the most obvious and avoidable clashes of assistance that can be appropriately, safely and interest and inconsistencies between military and effectively implemented in Afghanistan civilian actors, fundamental challenges remain. Some • present NGOs with an analysis of the international military contingents have sought to characteristics of insecurity and conflict in improve their coordination with government Afghanistan structures. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) • assess concerns regarding ‘blurring the lines’ or have also worked with some cash-strapped NGOs other impacts on the future of programmes and on short-term and project-level activities, but the safety of staff and beneficiaries difficulties inevitably arise because of very different • explore and convey the perspectives of local objectives. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) populations on security and development issues. are under pressure from all sides: from communities to deliver without jeopardising security; from A total of 140 people were interviewed in two government to implement national programmes; provinces,1 including aid agency staff, government from criminal groups and armed opposition groups employees, religious and local leaders, (AOGs) who threaten their safety; from politician- policymakers, military personnel, diplomats, donor 1 Paktia and Uruzgan – sponsoring NGOs are operational in one, while the other has only a skeletal Afghan NGO (ANGO) presence. Both provinces represent different levels of security and civil-military relations experience. Executive Summary | 5 agency staff and academics. The range of views, at media in order to familiarise people and generate times contradictory, demonstrates the complexity of discussion which may lead to a demystification of the the context and the need for regular, in-depth jargon as well as a sense of ownership. Afghan research of this kind which can help NGOs and NGOs need to be provided with sustained support others gain a better understanding of the to build their capacity to engage with some policy environment within which they operate. Anonymity processes on an equal footing, and to implement of interviewees was stressed at all times. programmes on the basis of a principled and effective approach to assistance, rather than short- 1. Afghans in the civmil debate term projectised and instrumentalised approach. Despite the number of Afghan individuals and GoA organisations who deal with civmil relations on a daily basis, there is little or no Afghan voice in Although civmil interaction should include debates on civmil. Discourse amongst policy-makers representatives of the Afghan security and defence on ‘stabilisation’ through ‘winning hearts and minds’, forces, it rarely does. In fact, some individuals
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