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Case-Specific Counterterrorism Policies for Islamic Fundamentalist Groups

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Case-Specific Counterterrorism Policies for Islamic Fundamentalist Groups University of Central Florida STARS Honors Undergraduate Theses UCF Theses and Dissertations 2016 Case-Specific Counterterrorism Policies for Islamic Fundamentalist Groups Jessica L. Shoemaker University of Central Florida Part of the American Politics Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the UCF Theses and Dissertations at STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Shoemaker, Jessica L., "Case-Specific Counterterrorism Policies for Islamic Fundamentalist Groups" (2016). Honors Undergraduate Theses. 117. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/117 CASE-SPECIFIC COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES FOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS by JESSICA L. SHOEMAKER A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Political Science in the College of Sciences and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Fall Term, 2016 Thesis Chair: Dr. Houman Sadri ABSTRACT Since 9/11, counterterrorism policies have been one of the crucial policy issues facing the United States. After the attacks on the United States, counterterrorism in this country transformed. Fifteen years later, counterterrorism is typically organized as a one-size fits all approach. This approach generalizes all terrorist threats, trying to target terrorism as a whole. This thesis explains how this is an improper approach to counterterrorism. Instead, policies should be case-specific and created in regards to the specific characteristics embodied by each terrorist organization. These characteristics include history and ideology, organizational and leadership structure, finances, and tactics and targets. These characteristics have been proven to comprise the composition of a one-of-a-kind terrorist organization. Each group expresses these characteristics differently, even if they share the same geographical location or religious background. Through research utilizing academic journal articles, current events, government publications, and published books, it is discovered how the unique characteristics displayed by Islamic Fundamentalist groups have counterterrorism policy implications. In order to portray this, this thesis analyzed characteristics of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban. Through these case- studies, it was shown how distinct these groups are from one another and how these differences should be accounted for in counterterrorism policies. Once these differences are implemented into individualist counterterrorism policies, the United States can provide effective policies that target specific aspects of each terrorist organization instead of trying to combat terrorism as a whole. ii DEDICATIONS For my parents and family, thank you for always supporting me no matter the dream, For my professors, thank you for pushing me farther than I ever thought I could go, For my friends, thank you for cheering me on along the way, For every single person who has been negatively impacted by terrorism. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank Dr. Houman Sadri for encouraging me as a junior to consider the Honors in the Major program at UCF. Your guidance was exactly what I needed, not only to initially start the process, but to finish the entirety of this thesis. Much thanks also goes to my other thesis committee members, Dr. Bruce Farcau and Professor Jerome Randall. The classes you both have taught on the topic of terrorism made me realize how passionate I was about the subject and that I want to work in counterterrorism. My family, especially my parents, have also continuously helped me throughout this process, whether they realize or not. The constant encouragement and the opportunities you have given me have made me the person I am today. Even 1,200 miles away, you both have allowed me to flourish at UCF. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 Methodology and Research Design............................................................................................. 4 Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 7 Significance ............................................................................................................................... 16 Background Information ........................................................................................................... 18 The 5 Pillars of Islam ................................................................................................................ 20 Sunni’s v. Shi’as ........................................................................................................................ 24 Islamic Fundamentalist Characteristics ..................................................................................... 28 II. Al Qaeda Case Study................................................................................................................ 30 History and Ideology ................................................................................................................. 30 Organization and Leadership Structure ..................................................................................... 40 Finances ..................................................................................................................................... 45 Targets and Tactics.................................................................................................................... 50 III. ISIS Case Study ...................................................................................................................... 56 History and Ideology ................................................................................................................. 56 Organization and Leadership Structure ..................................................................................... 67 Finances ..................................................................................................................................... 72 Targets and Tactics.................................................................................................................... 77 IV. Taliban Case Study ................................................................................................................. 81 History and Ideology ................................................................................................................. 81 Organization and Leadership Structure ..................................................................................... 90 Finances ..................................................................................................................................... 95 Targets and Tactics.................................................................................................................. 101 V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 103 Al Qaeda Counterterrorism ..................................................................................................... 105 ISIS Counterterrorism ............................................................................................................. 113 Taliban Counterterrorism ........................................................................................................ 123 References ................................................................................................................................... 135 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Table of Characteristics ................................................................................................ 104 vi I. Introduction The issue of terrorism has been on the forefront of political elections, government decisions, and the safety of the American public. This has caused the United States government to keep terrorism as one of the main aspects of American policies, especially foreign affairs. In order to do this, the United States develops counterterrorism policies. International counterterrorism policies, according to the U.S. Department of State, promotes “U.S. national security by taking a leading role in developing coordinated strategies and approaches to defeat terrorism abroad” (U.S. Department of State). Typically, the United States government creates a broad counterterrorism policy that incorporates aspects from multiple terrorist organizations in different regions around the world. Or, the U.S. focuses on one specific attribute of a terrorist group (like their finances) and fails to recognize multiple characteristics in their policies. By combing these two types of counterterrorism policies, the United States can create a more successful and preventative counterterrorism plan. Each individual policy will focus on each terrorist group that is a threat to the United States. The unique characteristics of each terrorist group will be incorporated into these individualized counterterrorism policies. This information and prior research contributed
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