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EASO, Country Guidance: Afghanistan

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EASO, Country Guidance: Afghanistan European Asylum Support Office Country Guidance: Afghanistan Guidance note and common analysis The country guidance represents the common assessment of the situation in the country of origin by EU Member States. June 2019 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Country Guidance: Afghanistan Guidance note and common analysis This document updates the ‘Country Guidance: Afghanistan’ published in June 2018. The country guidance represents the common assessment of the situation in the country of origin by senior policy officials from EU Member States, in accordance with current EU legislation and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This guidance note does not release Member States from the obligation to individually, objectively and impartially examine each application for international protection. Each decision should be taken on the basis of the individual circumstances of the applicant and the situation in Afghanistan at the moment of the decision, according to precise and up-to-date country information, obtained from various relevant sources (Article 10 of the Asylum Procedures Directive). The analysis and guidance provided within this document are not exhaustive. June 2019 Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00800 numbers or these calls may be billed. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN 978-92-9485-055-3 doi: 10.2847/464275 © European Asylum Support Office 2019 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. 5 — COUNTRY GUIDANCE: AFGHANISTAN Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 9 Guidance note: Afghanistan ................................................................................................................................ 13 I. Actors of persecution or serious harm ......................................................................................................... 14 II. Refugee status .............................................................................................................................................. 16 Guidance on particular profiles with regard to qualification for refugee status .................................................. 17 III. Subsidiary protection ................................................................................................................................... 26 Article 15(a) QD: death penalty or execution .............................................................................................. 26 Article 15(b) QD: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ........................................... 26 Article 15(c) QD: serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict ............................................................... 27 IV. Actors of protection ..................................................................................................................................... 31 V. Internal protection alternative ..................................................................................................................... 32 a. Part of the country ..................................................................................................................... 32 b. Safety .......................................................................................................................................... 32 c. Travel and admittance ................................................................................................................ 34 d. Reasonableness to settle ............................................................................................................ 34 VI. Exclusion....................................................................................................................................................... 38 Common analysis: Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................... 42 I. Actors of persecution or serious harm ......................................................................................................... 43 The Afghan State and pro-government elements ........................................................................................ 44 Insurgent groups .......................................................................................................................................... 44 Other non-State actors................................................................................................................................. 45 II. Refugee status .............................................................................................................................................. 46 Analysis of particular profiles with regard to qualification for refugee status ..................................................... 48 1. Members of the security forces and pro-government militias ............................................................ 49 2. Government officials, including judges, prosecutors and judicial staff; and those perceived as supporting the government ......................................................................................................................... 50 3. Individuals working for foreign military troops or perceived as supporting them .............................. 51 4. Religious leaders .................................................................................................................................. 51 5. Members of insurgent groups and civilians perceived as supporting them ........................................ 52 6. Individuals at risk of forced recruitment by armed groups ................................................................. 53 7. Educational personnel ......................................................................................................................... 54 8. Humanitarian workers and healthcare professionals .......................................................................... 55 9. Journalists, media workers and human rights defenders .................................................................... 56 10. Children ........................................................................................................................................... 56 COI summary and risk analysis ............................................................................................................ 57 Nexus to a reason for persecution ....................................................................................................... 60 11. Women ........................................................................................................................................... 60 COI summary and risk analysis ............................................................................................................ 60 Nexus to a reason for persecution ....................................................................................................... 63 6 — COUNTRY GUIDANCE: AFGHANISTAN 12. Individuals perceived to have transgressed moral codes ............................................................... 64 13. Individuals perceived as ‘Westernised’ .......................................................................................... 65 14. LGBT ................................................................................................................................................ 66 15. Persons living with disabilities and persons with severe medical issues ........................................ 67 16. Individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy ....................................... 68 17. Ethnic and religious minorities ....................................................................................................... 69 a. Individuals of Hazara ethnicity ................................................................................................... 69 b. Shia, including Ismaili ................................................................................................................. 70 c. Hindus and Sikhs......................................................................................................................... 71 d. Baha’i .......................................................................................................................................... 71 18. Individuals involved in blood feuds and land disputes ................................................................... 71 19. Individuals accused of ordinary crimes ........................................................................................... 73 20. Afghans perceived as wealthy ........................................................................................................ 74 21. Individuals who were born in Iran or Pakistan and/or who lived there for a long period of time . 75 III. Subsidiary protection ..................................................................................................................................
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