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- Forward Induction Reasoning Versus Equilibrium Reasoning EPICENTER Working Paper No
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- Characterizing Solution Concepts in Games Using Knowledge-Based Programs
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- Solution Concepts.Pdf
- This Segment: Techniques for Solving Games