Economic Theory 26, 765–791 (2005) DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0585-2
Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Dionysius Glycopantis1, Allan Muir2, and Nicholas C. Yannelis3
1 Department of Economics, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK (e-mail: [email protected]) 2 Department of Mathematics, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK (e-mail: [email protected]) 3 Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, IL 61820, USA (e-mail: [email protected])
Received: December 15, 2003; revised version: November 18, 2004
Summary. We point out several conceptual difficulties of the rational expectations equilibrium concept. In particular we show that such an equilibrium need not be incentive compatible and need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equi- librium . A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with the private core is also provided. We conclude that the private core is a more appropriate concept to capture the idea of contracts under asymmetric information.
Keywords and Phrases: Differential information economy, Rational expectations equilibrium, Coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility, Implementation, Game trees, Private core.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D5, D82.
1 Introduction
A differential information economy (DIE) consists of a finite set of agents each of which is characterized by a random utility function, a random consumption set, random initial endowments, a private information set and a prior probability distribution on a finite set of states of nature. A DIE is an extension of the Arrow- Debreu-McKenzie economy which enables us to model the idea of trade under asymmetric information. The rational expectations equilibrium (REE) concept (see for example Radner, 1979; Allen, 1981; among others), is an extension of the deterministic Walrasian