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Home , COMCEC, Cyprus dispute, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Nicosia, Northern Cyprus

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Co m ments 501962–2012

Turkey’s Policy in the Context of ’s Presidency of the WP S Intensifies Its Efforts to Create International Legitimation for the “Turkish of ”, to Date Recognised Only by Günter Seufert

The Cypriot presidency of the EU Council has prompted Turkey to step up its efforts to boost international recognition for its self-administrated statelet in the north of the , using the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as an instrument in its endeavours. Ankara is concomitantly reacting to the current constellation of fronts in the Mediterranean, which has formed as a result of the dispute over access to recently detected gas deposits. If developments continue in the direction pursued to date, the is likely to rue its indecisive policy on Cyprus and Turkey, left in the cold as far as the newly-discovered resources are concerned, while increases its Mediterranean influence.

From Turkey’s perspective, Cyprus’ EU This is because Turkey refuses to recog- Council presidency, which commenced nise the island’s current Greek-Cypriot on 1st July 2012, is as a red rag to a bull. state. According to its version of events, This is not only because Nicosia is blocking the emergence of proportional representa- the opening of six chapters in Ankara’s tion in the Republic of Cyprus as stipulated accession negotiations with the EU, and in its 1960 constitution proved that the Turkish accession appears likely to founder creation of a Cypriot nation was never the thanks to the conflict, which has been prime intention. On the contrary, the per- smouldering for nigh on sixty years. More manent autonomy of two ethnic groups or pertinently, the EU Council presidency is religious communities was assumed, which boosting the international reputation of both retained their cultural identities and the Republic of Cyprus, thus threatening to would not assimilate. Turkey holds that the negate the Turks’ central argument in the destruction of the proportional representa- Cyprus question. tion regime by the island’s Greek popula-

Dr. Günter Seufert is a Senior Associates in SWP’s EU External Relations Division SWP Comments 34 October 2012

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tion in 1963 effectively extinguished the Geological Survey (UGSG) is assuming that state based on this principle. Moreover, as the Basin’s total reserves amount to 3.45 bil- Cyprus’ two major ethnic groups had been lion cubic metres of gas and 1.7 billion bar- understood as political equals from the rels of natural oil. The Eastern Mediterra- start, the creation of any new state on Cyp- nean is deemed a terra incognita as far as oil riot soil consequently required the approval and gas are concerned. As a result, expec- of both groups. tations regarding future discoveries are rife, In addition, Ankara assumes that the and hopes that the sea region could develop island’s proximity to the Turkish into an alternative source of supply to the – the distance is a mere 40 nautical miles – deposits in the former Soviet Union are run- gives Turkey a justified security policy- ning high. related interest in its foreign policy. The coastal states are demonstrating cor- As a result, Turkey has never accepted responding decisiveness when staking their the international view that the Republic of claims. However, valid bilateral agreements Cyprus, carried as it is by the Greek-Cypriot regarding the reciprocal demarcation of majority, represents the entire island. How- EEZs have only been concluded between the ever, precisely this claim receives renewed Republic of Cyprus and and between international endorsement in the wake of Nicosia and to date. Relations be- Nicosia’s takeover of the EU Council presi- tween Israel and , Israel and , dency. Lebanon and and Syria and Turkey As early as July 2011, Turkish Foreign remain unclear. Minister announced that The EEZs are a source of open conflict his country would not participate in any between the Republic of Cyprus and Tur- meetings chaired by the Greek-Cypriot in- key. In December 2010, Nicosia and Tel Aviv cumbents for the duration of the EU Coun- clinched a deal regarding the demarcation cil presidency, this in order to consolidate of their mutual EEZs, which served only to Turkey’s position at international level. As exacerbate the existing tension in Ankara’s far as the Cyprus problem itself, no one on strained relations with both countries. the island is anticipating progress during As Turkey refuses to recognise the gov- this period in what can only be termed ernment in Nicosia, it also denies it the faltering negotiations between the two authority to conclude international trea- ethnic groups to overcome . ties, deeming the agreements made by The discovery of major Nicosia regarding the demarcation of Ex- deposits in the lends clusive Economic Zones in the Mediterra- this political constellation additional eco- nean null and void. Ankara also denies nomic and strategic cause for conflict. Nicosia the right to exploit the natural gas deposits, referring to claims to this new- found wealth by . In Sep- Eastern Mediterranean riches tember 2011, Turkey concluded an agree- and disputes over Exclusive ment regarding the mutual EEZs with its Economic Zones protégé, the self-declared Turkish Repub- By April 2012, 1.025 billion cubic metres lic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which only of natural gas had been located in the so- it recognises, after its protests fell on called Levant Basin, which lies between Is- deaf ears in Nicosia. The same month, the rael, Lebanon and Cyprus. Nine of the elev- TRNC commissioned the state-owned en fields discovered are located in Israel’s Turkish oil company TPAO with explora- (EEZ), while the tions north of the island, in waters con- remainder falls within the boundaries of sidered by the Republic of Cyprus part of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. But that its EEZ. The stage was set for further esca- is by no means the end of the story. The U.S. lations.

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These duly developed, with Turkey . During the same period, military demonstratively dispatching a research units in the 6th fleet of the USA as well as vessel to the Aphrodite gas field, to which units from and Israel performed an Nicosia lays claim. This triggered military air and naval exercise which tested, among reactions from both the Republic of Cyprus other things, protective measures in place and Israel, whose fighter jets besieged the for oil rigs, and which was clearly intended ship, violating Turkish-Cypriot airspace and to call Turkey’s attention to the limits of its eliciting the deployment of military aircraft sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediter- by Turkey in response. When Israel’s Prime ranean. When Nicosia’s dispute with An- Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, became his kara over the demarcation treaty for the country’s first premier to visit Nicosia in mutual EEZs between Israel and the Repub- February 2012, Turkey reacted with a naval lic of Cyprus hove into view, Washington exercise which involved shooting in the and immediately affirmed Cyprus’ area of block 12 of the natural gas fields, right to conclude international treaties as which had been claimed by the Republic the sole representative of the entire island. of Cyprus, with live ammunition. Ankara’s situation looks no better as far as international law is concerned. Tel Aviv and Nicosia drew up their agreement on New “frontlines” in the the EEZs in accordance with the guidelines Mediterranean stipulated in the Conven- Nicosia and Tel Aviv have concluded co- tion on the Law of the Sea. Its standards operation agreements for the exploitation have become international common law, and safety of the natural gas fields and plan and are, as a result, binding for those to collaborate on the issue of gas export. nations which, like Israel and Turkey, have U.S. company Nobel Energy, in which Israel not yet sanctioned the treaty. holds shares, operates in both countries. With this, Turkey is currently largely Greek-Cypriot and Israeli newspapers report isolated in the Eastern Mediterranean. an escalation in military cooperation be- Ankara is experiencing a discrepancy, tween the two countries. According to press unknown until now, between its claim to sources, Israel is interested in using Cyprus’ be a new leading, regulatory power and the military airport, and reality of a front consisting of Israel, Greece is negotiating the establishment of an air- and the Republic of Cyprus, which is bol- base on the island. The Israeli air force used stered by those major Western players, USA Cypriot airspace for exercises as early as and EU. At the same time, Turkey remains October 2011. In May 2012, Cypriot Foreign embroiled in disputes with Syria and , Minister Erato Kozakou-Markoulli declared and its relations with are becoming that her country was indispensable to Isra- increasingly conflict-ridden. el’s security ahead of the American Jewish Committee’s annual global forum. In the wake of its dispute with Turkey, Turkey’s Cyprus policy: Israel has been drawing nearer to Greece. A case of déjà-vu The two countries signed a military cooper- From Ankara’s perspective, the current ation agreement in in September situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 2011. In late March 2012, a Greek-Israeli- appears to confirm the worst as far as the Cypriot investment summit took place in intrinsic assumptions of Turkey’s Cyprus with the involvement of the USA policy and the associated fears are con- and Noble Energy. In early April, the three cerned. countries signed a memorandum of under- The Republic of Turkey did not concern standing to link Israel and the Republic of itself with Cyprus, then part of the to the European electricity grid via colonial empire, during the initial decades

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of its existence after its foundation in 1923. Davutoğlu’s much discussed standard work Ankara only became alarmed in 1955, at Strategic Depth, Cyprus is the “lynchpin the prospect of the island uniting with of Turkey’s regional and global naval strat- Greece. In 1949, the Dodecanese were for- egy”. In his eyes, Nicosia’s 1998 attempt to mally united with Greece, and on 15 Jan- station Russian S-300 missiles on the island, uary 1950, 96 per cent of Cypriot located just 67 kilometres away, demon- voted for “”, or Cyprus’ union with strates that the security of the Anatolian Greece, during a organised by heartland is not guaranteed without Turk- the Orthodox Church. In Ankara, where ish involvement in Cyprus. In addition, memories of the invasion by Greek troops Davutoğlu considers the Turks’ situation on from 1919-1922 were still fresh, these devel- Cyprus a symbol and gauge of the extent to opments were regarded with suspicion and which Ankara is able to protect Turkish and interpreted as signs of a new wave of Greek Muslim minorities from Western Thrace aggression, as an encirclement policy and to Bosnia and . The Turkish mili- as an attempt to cut Turkey off from the tary has always affirmed the island’s in- Mediterranean. At the Conference dispensability, roundly rejecting conces- on Cyprus in August 1955, Turkey’s then sions within the context of negotiations Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, moved related to Cyprus. By contrast, liberal forces for the return of the island to Turkey in the within Turkey have reproached the mili- event of British withdrawal. In the follow- tary for overstating Cyprus’ strategic signif- ing months, the in Ankara icance and instrumentalising the Cyprus mitigated this demand, calling instead for a conflict in order to thwart Turkey’s EU more realistic “partition” () of the accession process. island into Greek and Turkish territories. It is far more difficult to sustain this The protection of Turkish Cypriots, fear accusation today. For in the face of the Arab of Greek encirclement and the strategic sig- upheavals, geopolitical wrestling over the nificance of Cyprus for Turkey’s influence future of Syria and the conflict surrounding in both the Mediterranean and the Middle the distribution of natural gas deposits in East have, in the eyes of the Turks, been the Eastern Mediterranean, the island has inseparable dimensions of a single conflict indeed assumed a new strategic impor- ever since. “The problem [in the Cyprus dis- tance. Tel Aviv is now also starting from pute, author’s note] lies in the security of this premise, even if other fears are being the 45 million Turks in the motherland, in formulated there during strategic discus- the security of the Turks on the island and sions. Influential Israeli circles regard the in maintaining the balance in the Mediter- island as the chief bone of contention in ranean”, declared Turan Güneş, Foreign the conflict regarding supremacy in the Minister in Bülent Ecevit’s 1974 govern- Eastern Mediterranean between an increas- ment, which had ordered the invasion of ingly radicalised Islamism and the West. Cyprus in the same year. At the time, Tur- key was not only concerned with the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, but also with the Ankara’s return to the use of the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in- traditional Cyprus policy tended to prevent both the encirclement of The island’s increased significance may Anatolia and secure Turkish access to the indeed be the reason why Turkish Prime Eastern Mediterranean. Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan resorted With Ahmet Davutoğlu’s new foreign to using Turkish military terminology for policy, directed as it is towards regional the first time in February 2011, referring to supremacy and global influence, each of “Turkey’s strategic interests in Cyprus”. As the three dimensions of the late as 2004, however, Erdoğan had advo- is shifted into an even wider context. In cated the acceptance of former UN Secre-

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tary-General ’s reunification in the OIC was extremely limited. It was plan, this in the face of fierce resistance and remains the only NATO state in a coali- from military quarters. Annan’s solution tion strongly characterised by a non-aligned proposed a bicommunal, bizonal perspective, and its laicistic regime makes of two states on Cyprus. Its rejection by the it an alien element within the organisation. , the EU’s inability to meet However, Ankara gradually expanded its its commitment regarding direct trade position. Turkey has been involved in fi- between the Turkish northern part of the nancing the OIC budget since 1974. In island and the Union and a prestige gain 1978 and 1979, its proposals resulted in the for the Republic of Cyprus in the wake of opening of the Statistical, Economic and its takeover of the EU Council Presidency, Social Training Centre for Islamic Coun- much feared in Turkish quarters, have, tries (SESRIC) in Ankara and the Research together with the island's new strategic Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture significance, resulted in Erdoğan’s rever- (IRCICA) in . In 1984, Turkey took sion to Turkey’s traditional Cyprus policy. over the chair of the Standing Committee As negotiations regarding the creation of a for Economic and Commercial Cooperation federal state are making no headway and (COMCEC) of the OIC, which is held by the the annexation of Northern Cyprus by Tur- Turkish President. In 2005, Ankara suc- key does not constitute a realistic alterna- ceeded in securing the election of Turkish tive, Ankara is now intensifying efforts to citizen Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu as OIC Secre- raise the area’s status. Here, Erdoğan can tary-General. It was the first time that this build on decades of preliminary spade- office had been awarded by vote. work by Turkish diplomacy. The chief inter- Turkey’s growing influence in the or- national forum for this strand of Turkish ganisation was reflected in OIC statements Cyprus policy was and remains the Organi- and declarations regarding the Cyprus sation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), based problem and in the increasingly high in Jeddah, . standing of Turkish Cypriots within the association. In 1975, for example, Turkish Cypriot The OIC as an instrument within leader Rauf Denktaş was asked to present Turkish Cyprus policy his view of the Cyprus problem at the 6th The OIC’s inaugural summit, held in Rabat Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. At in 1969, was the first gathering of Islamic the next meeting in 1976, the OIC foreign states with a political agenda attended by ministers recognised the “equal rights” of the Republic of Turkey in the wake of its both ethnic groups on Cyprus and invited establishment in 1923. In 1963, the Greek the Turkish Cypriots as “guests” to the Cypriots had removed the foundations for a ensuing conferences. In 1979, the “guests” mutual Greek and Turkish island state via were upgraded to “observers”, and OIC a unilateral constitutional amendment, member states urged to unite and chal- leading Turkey to step up diplomatic efforts lenge the economic embargo. Although to propagate and justify its Cyprus policy Turkey was unable to push though full from 1964 onwards. Turkey’s initiatives membership for the Turkish Cypriots at were directed specifically at Islamic and the 20th Islamic Conference of Foreign other countries in what was then part of Ministers, held in Istanbul in 1991, the the Third World, and the OIC became its draft resolution drawn up at the confer- chief arena. ence, approved by the 6th Islamic Summit Turkey’s interpretation of the Cyprus in Dakar in December of the same year, conflict emerged at that time, a stance granted the “Turkish community of Cy- which is once more setting the tone in prus” rights of representation in all OIC Ankara today. Turkey’s initial influence bodies in addition to the right to partici-

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pate in all OIC activities. Member states These events went hand in hand with the were simultaneously urged to consolidate continued acceptance of the Turkish stance their relations with the Turkish Cypriots in by the organisation. Participants at the all areas. Turkey greeted the results as “full 38th Islamic Conference of Foreign Minis- membership in all but name”. And indeed, ters, held in Astana in 2011, expressed their the resolution ensured that the question concern at “the unilateral claims by Greek of full membership for Northern Cyprus Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean” and remained on the OIC agenda. The next backed the Turkish Cypriot proposal to halt major step occurred in 2004. In the wake further explorations until a solution to the of the rejection of the by the Cyprus problem is found. At their 7th offi- Greek Cypriots, the 31st Islamic Conference cial gathering in Palembang () in of Foreign Ministers decided that the “Cyp- late January 2012, the OIC’s Parliamentary riot Muslim community” should be referred Union condemned the agreement between to as the “Turkish-Cypriot state” within the the Republic of Cyprus and Israel regarding OIC in future. The term is derived from the demarcation of their mutual EEZs and the Annan Plan, where it refers to one of declared their support for the reversal of the two constitutive states on which the the isolation of Northern Cyprus in the mutual federal Cypriot state would have event that the Cyprus negotiations foun- been based. dered once more. The most recent step in this process oc- curred on 4 April 2012, during the official Current initiatives designed visit of Derviş Eroğlu, “State Presi- to consolidate the TRNC’s inter- dent of the TRNC”, to the OIC. During this national legitimacy encounter, Eroğlu requested the opening of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu were able to build a Permanent Representation for the TRNC on these foundations in 2010, when the at the OIC, a proposal which was received current situation assumed clearer contours warmly by the organisation’s Secretary- in the light of the deterioration in Turkish- General. The Republic of Cyprus views this Israeli relations, the discovery of natural as a further step in the opposition’s efforts gas in the Mediterranean, the dispute over to achieve recognition for the TRNC. In- Exclusive Economic Zones, the anticipated deed, Eroğlu urged precisely this recogni- failure of the Cyprus negotiations and, tion at the meeting in the event of a break- finally, the Republic of Cyprus’ assumption down of negotiations. of the EU Council presidency. On 2 January 2010, the Turkish Foreign Minister paid a visit to the OIC Secretary-General. Both par- The balance in the OIC is tipped ties highlighted the necessity to strengthen towards Ankara OIC relations, and those of its member Despite its wide acceptance of the Turkish states, with the TRNC in the fields of trade stance and enhancement of the status en- and investment, , education and joyed by Turkish Cypriots within the orga- culture, this in order to overcome the “in- nisation, the OIC has not yet granted the equitable isolation” experienced by the TRNC full membership. Many OIC partner Turkish Cypriots. These proposals were states back UN resolutions directed against implemented gradually over the following Turkey’s policies, and no member of the two years. OIC Chairman Ihsanoglu re- organisation has officially recognised ceived several TRNC ministers and visited Northern Cyprus to date. the northern part of the island twice, while However, some reasons for this reticence the OIC hosted a trade fair for university have disappeared in recent months and education and an investment forum in years, while others have lost much of their Northern Cyprus. significance. These include, in particular,

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the declining influence of , America of legal positions, this fails to alter the out- and Russia in the region, Turkey’s erstwhile come, namely the undesirable creation of good relations with Israel, which have dete- opposing fronts in the Eastern Mediterra- riorated, the prospect of a successful con- nean, in any way. clusion to the Cyprus negotiations, which As a result, it is highly unlikely that the has now dwindled, and the economic and EU Enlargement Commissioner’s hopes will political significance of both the Republic come to fruition. Štefan Füle believes that of Cyprus and Greece in the eyes of the EU Council presidency will re-focus countries, which is also on the wane. Today, global attention on Cyprus, which could, in the stance adopted by the OIC in terms of consequence, have some positive influence the Cyprus dispute, the increasingly close on the negotiations surrounding the Cy- cooperation between OIC institutions like prus dispute. the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and According to the EU Commissioner, the TRNC establishments and the growing newly-discovered wealth of resources in the number of TRNC Permanent Representa- Mediterranean could function as a catalyst, tions in OIC member states are all helping uniting the island’s Greek south with its to increase the standing of Northern Cyprus Turkish north. However, there is little to in the Islamic world, simultaneously con- suggest this, and even the hope that Europe firming Ankara’s policy. Although it is im- could reduce its energy dependence on possible to foresee whether the TRNC will Russia via the Mediterranean gas deposits be granted full membership of the OIC and is rather unrealistic. if some OIC member states will officially It is certainly true that Nicosia has a recognise the Turkish “state” on the island, vested interest in bringing part of the yield it is an undeniable fact that the likelihood to the European market and that two states of this occurring is now higher than ever oriented towards Western Europe – the before. Republic of Cyprus and Israel – have the upper hand as far as the exploitation of Mediterranean gas reserves is concerned. Debacle for the Brussels policy? However, the only profitable transport In recent years, Brussels has done little to route for the gas would be a deep-sea pipe- prevent Ankara’s reversion to its old Cyprus line via the Cypriot Karpass peninsula to policy, influenced as it was by threat sce- the Turkish Mediterranean port of . narios and fears of encirclement and which The distance is short and the sea shallower can now apparently be seamlessly com- in this area, making the transport route bined with a policy of sabre-rattling in the financially feasible and economically justi- Mediterranean. The EU unilaterally insisted fiable. By contrast, the two other alterna- on Turkey’s implementation of the Ankara tives are technically complex and dispro- Protocol extending the customs union. portionately expensive: a pipeline leading Simultaneously, it was unable to establish from Cyprus to the Greek mainland via direct trade between the Turkish northern possesses little financial appeal in part of Cyprus and the EU, as it had been the face of the length of the route and promised after the failure of the Annan depth of the sea. And the transport of con- Plan. The EU accepted the unilateral block- densed gas via ship would incur high costs ing of central chapters in Turkey’s acces- for both gas liquefaction and regasification. sion negotiations by and the Repub- This makes this alternative unattractive lic of Cyprus, and expressed immediate and financially ineffective. As a result, the solidarity with Cyprus and Israel on the Cyprus problem will, in all probability, put issue of the Exclusive Economic Zones. paid to Europe’s hopes of deriving benefit Although, according to EU logic, all these from the natural gas deposits. political steps were taken for the defence

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Russia as winner of the Mediterranean chess game? Russia may be the one to benefit most from the opposing fronts in the Mediterranean. is already an important player in Nicosia. Russian tourists are the main clients of the Greek-Cypriot tourism in- dustry, and the property market is booming primarily as a result of Russian buyers. Rus- sian capital flows back to the motherland via the island. In 2011, Cyprus was the largest direct investor in Russia, with a rate of twenty per cent. Cyprus’ President and Dimitris Christofias

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und once studied in Russia, and likes to call Politik, 2012 himself Europe’s “red sheep”. He is critical All rights reserved of NATO, instead tending to defer to Mos-

These Comments reflect cow’s wishes and taking account of its solely the author’s views. interests. The last instance of this occurred

SWP in January 2012, when a Russian ammuni- Stiftung Wissenschaft und tion-laden ship bound for Syria was per- Politik German Institute for mitted to land in Cyprus before continuing International and to the Syrian port of , this despite an Security Affairs EU embargo to the contrary. Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 In 2011, Russia granted the Republic 10719 Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 of Cyprus a loan amounting to 2.5 billion Fax +49 30 880 07-100 , and Nicosia asked Moscow for more www.swp-berlin.org financial aid in July 2012. Publications [email protected] including the British Week and American ISSN 1861-1761 New York Times are not the only ones to fear

Translation by Harriet Spence that the injection of yet more Russian capital could give Moscow an increased say (English version of SWP-Aktuell 38/2012) in both Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterra- nean. These fears are shared by Brussels- based diplomats. In point of fact, it is highly likely that Russia’s energy companies will not leave the second call for tenders initiated by the Republic of Cyprus for exploration assign- ments in their Exclusive Economic Zone empty-handed, as Russia’s strategic support for Nicosia is once more essential in view of its conflict with Turkey. Little remains of the Western alliance between the EU and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, cited so frequently, today.

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