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Home , Eastern Mediterranean, Northern Cyprus

NO. 62 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction

Turkey, the EU and the Eastern Mediterranean Crisis Militarization of Foreign Policy and Power Rivalry Sinem Adar and Ilke Toygür

The Eastern Mediterranean crisis reflects two overlapping developments. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of ’s increasingly assertive posturing in the inter- national arena. At the same time, it shows the intensity of the geopolitical competi- tion between Turkey and its adversaries, such as and the UAE. The EU Member States’ different levels and forms of engagement with Turkey obstruct a consensus on how to coherently respond to these developments. With accession negotiations stalled and discussions focused on areas of conflict rather than cooperation, EU- Turkey relations are mired in stalemate, while the militarization of foreign policy is becoming increasingly prevalent in the EU’s southern neighbourhood.

On 12 October Turkey announced that the Even though ordered the Oruc Oruc Reis – the research ship at the centre Reis back to port on 30 November, the East- of a row with and the of ern Mediterranean crisis will remain a press- – would continue its operations off ing issue for various reasons. The mounting the southern coast of the Greek of tension in August showed that a military . The announcement surprised collision between the NATO allies Greece many, not least because Ankara had with- and Turkey is not a remote possibility. It drawn the Oruc Reis to the Turkish coast in also exposed Turkey’s increasing inter- September and both Greece and Turkey had national isolation. While Turkey’s maritime expressed readiness to resume exploratory boundary conflicts with Greece and Cyprus talks under the NATO umbrella. On 15 have overlapped with its power rivalry October German and French diplomats against Egypt and the UAE, in recent months accused Turkey of “provoking” the - they have rapidly turned into discord be- pean Union (EU) and noted that if Ankara tween Turkey and the EU. At the same did not resume the dialogue, it could face a time, the diverging interests of the Member tough response from the EU. That warning States vis-à-vis Turkey have revealed the echoed the 1 October European Council difficulties the EU faces in adopting a uni- (EUCO) conclusions on external relations. fied approach towards Ankara.

Turkey’s Confrontational “Blue Homeland” (mavi vatan) doctrine, Foreign Policy according to which naval supremacy is necessary to thwart attempts by Greece and Since the 2016 failed coup, Turkish foreign Cyprus to control the seas surrounding Tur- policy-making has been driven primarily key with the backing of the transatlantic by the readiness to “pull [the country] up by alliance. At stake are Turkey’s right to mari- its bootstraps”. This shift in Turkey’s secu- time boundaries, its ownership of hydro- rity outlook is based on two premises. First, carbon resources and the status of the Turk- because of the lack of solidarity during the ish Republic of , which is 2016 attempted coup and the US partner- recognized only by Turkey. ship with the PYG / YPD in northern The doctrine combines the expression against ISIS, Ankara believes it can no longer of Ankara’s traditional security concerns fully trust its Western partners. Second, it about Northern Cyprus with an emphasis regards the West as in terminal decline ow- on access to resources – a reflection of ing to the retreat of liberalism and the power Turkey’s overwhelming energy dependency vacuum created by the US withdrawal from (its 2019 energy imports totalled some its multilateral commitments under the US$41 billion). It has received widespread Trump Presidency. These two premises have support – from both left- and right-leaning led to a significant shift from the soft-power ultranationalists as well as President Erdo- policies of the early 2010s to an overtly con- gan and his aides. This alliance of political frontational foreign policy in the past two actors mirrors the reconfiguration within years on numerous fronts – from Syria to the state apparatus in the wake of the 2016 (most recently) Nagorno-Karabakh. Ankara attempted coup. rejects the regional status quo ante and wants to expand its sphere of influence from the to the MENA . Rivalry: The deployment of Turkish warships to Turkey versus Egypt and the UAE watch over drilling activities in Cyprus’s (EEZ) was by no Yet, the alliance is prone to disagreement. means an isolated incident, nor was the The architects of the “Blue Homeland” provocation of Greece through the signing doctrine support not only continued mili- in 2019 of an EEZ agreement with the tary posturing against Greece and Cyprus in Libyan of National Accord the Eastern Mediterranean but also a mari- (GNA), which rides roughshod over the time agreement with Egypt and as Greek island of ‘s maritime bounda- well as contacts with Bashar al-Assad. That ries. The conflict between Turkey, Greece stance is supported by the main opposition and Cyprus over EEZs began in the early actors. But given that under the leadership 2000s and intensified with the discovery of Mr Erdogan, the AKP supported (and con- of natural gas reserves in the early 2010s. tinues to support) the Muslim Brotherhood It is only recently, however, that Ankara’s during (and after) the Arab Spring, it would approach began to switch from diplomatic be difficult to achieve a rapprochement objections at the UN to the deployment of with Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi or Al-Assad. military tactics. Turkish decision-makers see Against this background of Turkish their country’s exclusion from the EastMed opposition to the regional status quo ante, Gas Forum (EMGF) and the aligning of both Ankara's confrontational foreign policy in its adversaries (such as the UAE and Egypt) the Eastern Mediterranean has contributed and its Western partners with Greece and to turning the crisis into a regional prob- Cyprus as affirming the urgent need for lem. Cairo feels increasingly threatened by self-reliance. Ankara owing to its support of the Muslim The ideological backbone of Ankara’s Brotherhood, senior members of which are actions in the Eastern Mediterranean is the in exile in Istanbul; and the Turkish mili-

SWP Comment 62 December 2020

2 tary intervention in in early 2020 – tion in early 2020, supports Greece which changed the balance of power against and Cyprus and advocates a confrontational General Haftar, whom Cairo supports – approach. This stance has similarities with only intensified that feeling. Egypt also sees Turkey’s, not least the emphasis on sover- Turkish actions in the Eastern Mediterrane- eignty, the display of military might and an as a challenge to its efforts to become a increased defence spending. Greece’s pur- regional hub for energy trade and the distri- chase on 14 September of French weaponry bution of liquefied natural gas. and France’s joint military exercises with Cairo is not alone in regarding Turkish Greece, and Cyprus are cases in point. actions in the Eastern Mediterranean as a French President Emmanuel Macron sees security threat. The UAE and Turkey sup- the creation of Pax Mediterranea as providing port opposing actors in Syria and Libya. At new grounds for political cooperation over the same time, the UAE considers the close the Mediterranean and as crucial to halting relations between Turkey and – the Turkey’s “imperial fantasies”. former gave the latter diplomatic and mili- Southern European states such as Italy, tary support during the so-called Qatar and seem to seek a balance crisis in 2017 – to pose a challenge to its between Pax Mediterranea and Turkey. regional hegemonic aspirations. Italy, for example, has conducted separate Since early 2019 the combined impact military drills in the Eastern Mediterranean of all these factors has been to turn the not only with Greece and France but also Eastern Mediterranean crisis into a perfect with Turkey. In pursuit of its goal of energy storm. The Mediterranean is now a multi- diversification and mindful of the need to stage theatre for demonstrating military protect its economic and security interests might and engaging in geopolitical com- in Libya, Rome carefully seeks to balance petition. This is evidenced by developments adherence to the EU’s internal solidarity ranging from the formation of the EMGF principle and the maintenance of workable and the recent agreement on transforming relations with Turkey. Meanwhile, both the forum into a Cairo-based regional orga- Spain and Malta expressed solidarity with nization to the increasing military and Greece and Cyprus at the MED7 Corsica diplomatic cooperation between Greece, meeting in September. But at the same time Cyprus, France, Egypt and the UAE. they advocate a more reconciliatory ap- proach to Turkey. Spanish banks, alongside French and Italian ones, are most exposed Responses from within the EU to Turkey’s economic woes, while Turkey and Malta cooperate on migration. Turkey’s confrontational foreign policy – Eastern European and Baltic states have which directly affects Greece and Cyprus their own strategic considerations, too. but at the same time has been a source of In general, a smooth relationship with Tur- irritation for other EU Member States – has key – a long-standing NATO ally – is im- intensified efforts within the EU to forge a portant since the alliance plays a crucial common policy towards Turkey. While the role in their national security. Some leaders Union has become party to the conflict with have even established a personal friendship Greece and Cyprus, well-known differences with President Erdogan. between the Member States over their , which is home to ’s engagement with Turkey have come to the largest and has strong surface. economic ties with Turkey, is in favour of Take, for example, France. In line with a dialogue-based approach to Ankara. Per- both its quest for a more independent Euro- haps unsurprisingly, initiated media- pean foreign policy and its discomfort over tion efforts between Turkey and Greece in the change of power in Libya to the GNA’s August. advantage following the Turkish interven-

SWP Comment 62 December 2020

3 EU-Turkey Relations: the long-term interests of the EU. Given Between Confrontation and the decreasing vote share of the ruling Rebuilding Trust AKP/MHP and the increasingly visible cracks within that alliance, the EU should keep Member States tend to approach their rela- membership talks as a normative instru- tions with Turkey on the basis of their ment for the future – if and when Turkey national interests and shape their stance at begins to pursue democratic repair. the EU level accordingly. It is imperative Besides instruments directly targeting that the EU pursue a careful balancing act Turkey, there is also the larger question of between confronting Turkish unilateralism peace-building in the EU’s southern neigh- © Stiftung Wissenschaft and preventing bilateral tensions from bourhood, especially since the Eastern und Politik, 2020 determining policymaking at the EU level. Mediterranean has become a playground All rights reserved Owing to the current stalemate in EU- for multiple proxy wars and a battlefield for Turkey relations, reconciliation is difficult, reconfiguring the status quo in the MENA This Comment reflects if not impossible, at present. Since the region. The militarization of foreign policy, the authors’ views. 1 October EUCO conclusions, there have though not unique to Turkey, seems to be The online version of been several alarming developments, such both the catalyst and the consequence of this publication contains as Mr. Erdogan’s call for a boycott of French this power rivalry. Decision-makers within functioning links to other products during the spat with France over the EU should take into account the regional SWP texts and other relevant Islam; the decision to open Varosha, an dimension of the Eastern Mediterranean sources. abandoned southern quarter of the Cypriot crisis when considering policies with which SWP Comments are subject city of , which fell under Turkish to confront Turkey. Given that defence to internal peer review, fact- control during the 1974 Cyprus invasion; capability is one of the prerequisites (albeit checking and copy-editing. and Mr Erdogan’s recent call for a two-state insufficient in itself) for the militarization For further information on solution in Cyprus. All this has only con- of foreign policy, the EU could make more our quality control pro- tributed to the existing stalemate. effective use of the instrument of arms cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- Still, certain steps could be taken to pre- embargo, including on dual-use materials. berlin.org/en/about-swp/ vent further deterioration. The EU should Sanctions against the defence industry is quality-management-for- signal to Turkey that its claims in the East- another instrument that the EU could con- swp-publications/ ern Mediterranean, particularly those over sider. At the same time, Member States Kastellorizo and the distribution of energy should exercise caution about deploying SWP resources, have been heard. At the same arms sales to other actors as a tactical tool Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik time, it should continue insisting that Tur- to counterbalance Turkey. German Institute for key abide by international law. Reviving a International and discussion about areas of cooperation and Security Affairs their scope conditions could further help to improve the functioning of foreign policy. Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin The EU could also use various economic Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 instruments to pressure Turkey, such as lim- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 iting IPA funds and Turkish participation in www.swp-berlin.org EU programmes or launching inquiries into [email protected] disputable trade practices under the current Customs Union agreement. And while sanc- ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2020C62 tions are always available as a tool, effec- tiveness would very much depend on scope. Even though the official suspension of membership talks might appear an attrac- tive option, it would not necessarily be in

Dr Sinem Adar and Dr Ilke Toygür are researchers at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at the SWP.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the German Federal Foreign Office. SWP Comment 62

December 2020

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