Aspiring Powers, Regional Rivals Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the New Middle East
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aspiring powers, regional rivals turkey, egypt, saudi arabia, and the new middle east Gönül Tol, David Dumke, eds. a collaboration between the middle east institute and the university of central florida aspiring powers, regional rivals turkey, egypt, saudi arabia, and the new middle east Gönül Tol, David Dumke, eds. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial Uses permitted by copyright law. For permission requests, write to the publisher. Copyright © 2019 The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1763 N Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Follow MEI: @MiddleEastInst /MiddleEastInstitute Contents Introduction vii Gönül Tol heirs of the empire: turkey's diplomatic ties with egypt 1 and saudi arabia until the mid-20th century Hakan Özoğlu turkey's relations with egypt and saudi arabia: 17 from hopes of cooperation to the reality of conflict Meliha Altunışık struggle for the center: egyptian relations with Saudi arabia 38 and turkey in the second decade of the 21st century Abderahman Salaheldin Saudi foreign policy 1932-2001: egypt, turkey, and regional priorities 56 David Dumke saudi arabia, egypt, and turkey: three regional powers on 71 the battleground of islam Thomas W. Lippman the political veneer of economic exchange: turkish relations 86 with saudi arabia and egypt Robert Mogielnicki conclusion 101 Gönül Tol Acknowledgements he production of this volume was a collaborative effort involving the hard work of many. First and foremost, we would like to thank all of the contributing authors Twhose scholarship and subject-matter expertise underpins this volume. They bore with us patiently as it took shape and their insights animate its pages. The Middle East Institute would also like to give special thanks to David Dumke and the University of Central Florida for their generous support, which helped make this work possible. Contributors Gönül Tol Gönül Tol is the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies. She is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies. Hakan Özoğlu Hakan Özoğlu is the director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at the University of Central Florida. His research focuses on Kurdish nationalism and Turkish history. His books and articles on different aspects of the Middle East have appeared in five languages. Meliha Altunışık Meliha Altunışık is a professor with the Department of International Relations at Middle East Technical University in Ankara. Her research focuses on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Abderahman Salaheldin Abderahman Salaheldin is an author and career diplomat. He served as Egypt’s ambassador to Turkey from 2010-2013. Previously, he held the positions of assistant foreign minister for Arab and Middle Eastern affairs and ambassador to the Czech Republic. David Dumke David Dumke is the director of the Office of Global Perspectives at the University of Central Florida, overseeing international programs, centers, and strategy. He is a Middle East specialist with extensive experience in academia, business, and policy. Thomas W. Lippman Thomas W. Lippman is an award-winning author and journalist who has written about the Middle East and American foreign policy for more than four decades. A specialist in Saudi Arabian affairs, he previously served as the Middle East bureau chief forThe Washington Post. Robert Mogielnicki Robert Mogielnicki is a resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, where he focuses on political economy in the Gulf. Previously, he worked in consulting and as a journalist for media outlets in Egypt and Tunisia. INTRODUCTION | vii introduction Gönül Tol he Arab uprisings have dramatically transformed the geopolitics of Tthe Middle East. Early hopes for a positive transformation gave way to dramatic intensification of violence, civil wars, and failed states. The uprisings not only transformed the internal dynamics of regional states, but they also led to a new regional order. The traditional great powers like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are no longer major players.1 Others such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have started inserting themselves into regional decision-making. All the while, U.S. influence in the region is in decline. Although the U.S. retains a significant military presence, the perception that it is withdrawing from the Middle East is strong.2 Regional states increasingly believe that U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Middle East is confused and Washington’s resolve to push for stability is weak. The regional insecurity, compounded by misgivings about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, has paved the way for a pattern of intervention. Regional states think they must act unilaterally to deflect the threat emanating from escalating civil wars. In such a regional security dynamic, states are worried not just about viii | GÖNÜL TOL INTRODUCTION | ix conventional national security threats but also regime survival.3 As the old regional order crumbles, states put forward their own projects for a new order and seek new allies. Russia is pleased to extend a helping hand and fill the American void. Moscow has emerged as a key power broker and military actor. Russia has not only become the key outside actor in the Syrian conflict. It has also developed a multi-faceted relationship with Turkey, boosted military ties with Egypt, become a significant player in Libya and a security broker between Iran and the Gulf countries, and expanded energy cooperation with Saudi Arabia. An important component of this new regional order is the emergence of two rival camps, one between Turkey and Qatar and the other between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Israel. The Middle East Institute’s Turkish Studies and the University of Central Florida’s Middle East and South Asia Initiatives launched a project to better understand the triangular relationship between three regional states — Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt — in an effort to gauge whether they can overcome their policy differences to play a constructive role in a “post-American” region beset by armed conflict and state failure. Despite its domestic problems and the decline in its regional standing, Turkey remains an important actor that can complicate efforts to provide stability in the region. The Arab uprisings that began in 2010, as well as domestic developments, forced a change in Turkey’s relations with the region. Military engagement has regained currency as a tool to project its power. From Syria and Iraq to Qatar, Kuwait, and Somalia, Turkey has extended its military muscle. But for a country that aspires to lead the region, relying on military might alone isn’t enough. If Turkey wants to carve out a sphere of influence, it needs non-military tools as well, such as trade, cultural engagement, and alliances with key regional states. Saudi Arabia is one of those key states. The region’s center of gravity has shifted toward the Gulf in recent years. Due to its strategic location and huge financial resources, Saudi Arabia is one of the most important countries in the region. Its newly pro-active foreign policy under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman makes the kingdom’s relations with regional powers very important for the Middle East and beyond. Egypt was once the key actor in the region due its geography, size, history, and military strength. It has, however, lost its old standing and turned inward in recent years, particularly after the 2011 uprising, to deal with multiple political crises and economic problems. Yet, Egypt still wants to play a major role in regional affairs, and on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it still does. As late as 2015, these three countries were hailed as the “Sunni vanguard” against an increasingly resurgent Iran.4 They were seen as the leaders of an INTRODUCTION | ix anti-Iran front that were united in their quest to curb its power. Although the anti-Iran sentiment has brought these countries together in some instances, their relationship with one another is too complicated today to form a united front. They have conflicting visions for the region and are willing to pursue aggressive policies to realize them. Whether they can reconcile those visions to play a constructive role in addressing regional problems is the topic of the chapters in this book. Authors analyze how their country of expertise sees its relationship with the other two states. Hakan Özoğlu’s chapter provides an excellent overview of the ups and downs in relations between the Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic and Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Meliha Altunışık delves into the state of relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia under Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party; she argues that these Arab countries were initially open to Turkey’s activism in the region, but the way Turkey is perceived in these Arab capitals changed after the Arab uprisings. Abderahman Salaheldin’s chapter focuses on how Egypt sees its role in the Middle East and its relations with the region’s two heavyweights. David Dumke explains the Saudis’ regional outlook and Riyadh’s relations with Egypt and Turkey from 1932 to 2001. Thomas Lippman focuses on the Saudi vision for the Middle East and how Turkey and Egypt fit into that. Robert Mogielnicki analyzes the economic linkages between the three countries and concludes that deteriorating diplomatic and political relations have not affected their economic ties. This study is a first attempt to understand the general state of affairs between three key regional countries. Given that regime survival has become one of the main priorities for all of these actors, more attention should be given to domestic factors in these countries to better understand the complex dynamics among them.