Islam, Models and the : The New Balance of Power following the Arab Spring1

Burhanettin DURAN* and Nuh YILMAZ** Abstract Key Words

The has created a fertile Model, Islam, balance of power, Middle ground for the competition of different models East, theo-political, New Sunnism, Arab (Turkish, Iranian and Saudi) and for a new Spring, Salafi, Shia, Wahhabi. balance of power in the Middle East and North Africa. These three models, based on three distinct styles of politics, go hand in hand Introduction with competing particular politics of Islam. Their search for a new order in the region The aim of this article is to discuss the synthesises covert and overt claims for regional changing balance of power in the Middle leadership, national interests and foreign policy priorities. This article argues that the new East and North Africa (MENA) region emerging regional order will be established on following the Arab Spring by focusing either a theo-political understanding, in other on the foreign policies of the four leading words on securitisation and alliances based states- , , and on sectarian polarisation which will lead to Egypt- and their political and religious more interference from non-regional actors, or on a gradual reform process of economic models. The main emphasis will be the integration and diplomatic compromise. In way in which how these four countries the first case, biases and negative perceptions use their models as vehicles to compete will be deepened in reference to history and for supremacy in a new regional order. to differences in religious interpretation, and will result in conflict, animosity and outside Therefore, the problem will not be interference. In the second case, there will be a dealing with what model people should/ chance to establish a cooperative regional, non- would follow but how these models have sectarian perspective accompanied by a critical, been used and enhanced through various but not radical, attitude towards the West. soft and hard power instruments. We discuss the three models in relation to each other through their relationship

* Professor of political science at İstanbul Şehir to US (the global other) and Israel (the University. regional other) in shaping the potential ** George Mason University. fourth model of the emerging Egypt.

139 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, pp. 139-170. Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

In reality, these three models are based quo through solutions coming from on three distinct styles of politics. These compromise. Instead of a theo-political three models go hand in hand with three stance that emphasises polarisation and different peculiar politics of religion. The , this model introduces a Iranian model legitimises itself as against political theology based on pluralism. the US, Israel, imperialism and the West through an “”. It aims for a radical change in the regional status In the search for regional quo that was established, yet pursues hegemony there is need for pragmatic politics when necessary. transnational institutions, As a tool for legitimacy, Iran follows a religious rhetoric and polarising and sectarian (Shi’ism) theo- practices that can reach non- political2 policy. In contrast, Saudi governmental actors outside of Arabia legitimises its own regional vision national borders. by formulating itself as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Sunnism and These three models have been Islam, opposing reforms and envisions attempting to influence a potential an authoritarian model in favour of fourth model, the Egyptian model. It the status quo. This model follows a is still unclear what the Egyptian model polarising and sectarian (Sunni) theo- will look like; however, this model will political policy. While Saudi Arabia is be deeply influential in building a new facing a more radical Salafist (right- regional order. From the Tahrir effect4 wing) opposition, the Iranian regime is on other countries to Morsi’s election to up against a more moderate and liberal presidency and the coup d’état against 3 (left-wing) opposition. Thus, these him on 3 July 2013, whatever happens two theo-political models increase the in Egypt will affect other countries in potential for conflict in the region by the region.5 Fred Dallmayr sees the inviting foreign powers to intervene in Egyptian Tahrir revolution as Islam’s regional politics. response to Western modernity and The third model, the Turkish model, that it is a democratic alternative to the aims for economic integration and is secular Kemalist revolution and Iranian based on Turkey’s increasing popularity Islamic reform.6 Saudi Arabia’s reaction due to its economic success and foreign and Israel’s securitised response to the policy performance. This model prefers Egyptian model, the US’s the gradual transformation of the status promotion agenda and its will to protect

140 Islam, Models and the Middle East its authoritarian allies in the region, will transnational institutions, religious affect the future of this transformation. rhetoric and practices that can reach non- governmental actors outside of national Discussion of the Models borders. The countries who aspire to be and Regional Powers in models must have the determination to mobilise their resources to encourage the Search for Order in the their non-governmental organisations Middle East to be active outside of their national borders. Despite this, these countries do The Arab Spring forced all the regional not push their “model” on others to be powers in the Middle East to manage this readily imitated by others. Except for revolution and to try to find a new Middle Iran shortly after the 1979 Revolution, Eastern order. Even if Turkey’s claim of it none of them have claimed to provide forging a new order is more commonly a universal model to the region or the known, both Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s Islamic world. search for a new order goes farther back In the model debate, different than Turkey’s claim. Their search for a interpretations of Islam and its new order synthesises covert and overt mobilisation are vital. The regional claims to regional leadership, national countries mobilise their own versions of interests and foreign policy priorities. The Islam to strengthen their soft power and parameters that define this competition for legitimacy purposes.7 Saudi Arabia to influence the new emerging order are and Iran are both mobilising the ulama not merely the strategic; rather there are for this cause, and are openly making competing ideologies and visions for the theo-political claims. The greatest future of the region. In other words, the advantage for these two countries is the “model discussion” is a power projection consensus on the strategic vision among opportunity related to differing regional political and state elites. Having the demands and visions of the various excluded from countries on how the new emerging the political life, Egypt seems to lose the regional order should be. significance of its theo-political claims. Therefore, any claim to be a “model” However, it would continue to become combines strategic goals, national theo-politically influential in its search interests, security concerns and for influence in the regional power ideological visions. In the search for struggle since it had theo-political claims regional hegemony there is need for even during the Mubarak era as a result

141 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

of al Azhar University.8 While in the representative of Shi’ism, , Egyptian case, both the recent coup d’état which is just another version of Sunnism, and the influence of external powers will will not remain unchallenged. The “new limit these claims, in the Turkish case, Sunni” arguments and positions that political culture, intra-elite problems may spring from normalisation of Egypt and internal power balance will limit and transformation of Turkey’s religion- theo-political claims. In spite of these politics experience will be potential limitations, the JDP’s foreign policy challenges to Wahhabism and Shi’ism. within the limits of secular nation-state seems to protect the Islamic interests The limits of regional models and of regional peoples, and strengthens new nationalism the Religious Affairs Directorate. Still, after the Arab Spring, the alternative It is clear that none of the competing religion-politics relationship models and countries can solidify values that could theo-political policies may force Turkey create consent throughout the region. to recalibrate the role of religion in her The exclusionary nature of Shi’ism and policies. If Egypt comes out successful Wahhabism does not allow them to forge from its current turmoil, a pluralistic and an inclusive consensus that is based on democratic “new Sunnism” might arise political participation of minority groups as a response to Shi’ism and Wahhabism and women’s rights for the entire region. in the long run. That said, however they In discussing the idea of “model”, it is became integral part of state policies, not true to assume that a model should Shi’ism, Sunnism or Wahhabism cannot be absolute and flawless but rather it be seen as all-inclusive (monolithic) should be taken as experience sharing. religious movements. Each represents a particular Islamic understanding, and Following the Arab Spring, a new all are pluralist and historically and pragmatic nationalism that blends Islam politically founded positions. Therefore, with Arabism is rising.9 These new the new struggle for an emerging versions of nationalism are intertwined regional order will not be between with the claims that there is need for a the Islamic and Western new order established through regional colonists or Israel, but whether Islam leadership. In the different regional will be interpreted in a theo-political leadership models, Iran, Turkey and or political theological position. While even Egypt claim that they are trying to Iran is an unchallenged theo-political find regional solutions to the problems

142 Islam, Models and the Middle East of the region while rejecting external The Iranian Model: Shia 10 interference. While Iran formulates Politics between Radical regional solution that would lead to Change and the Status Quo less influence from the US and other Western actors, Turkey attempts to The 1979 not only balance the influence of Iran’s soft inspired Islamist movements against and hard power policies to ease the the West and the US, but it also played disturbances felt by Saudi Arabia and the a major role in spreading the idea of other Gulf countries. Iran’s influence and revolution and its critique of Israel. its vocal support for were Even though Iran was unsuccessful in balanced by Turkey after the 2009 Davos exporting the model, it incident. It is quite likely that Egypt influenced other Islamist movements would have changed its policy towards who came to see as the main Israel and would be more critical due source of the state.11 to its democratic responsiveness to the Whether it is right or wrong, the demands of its people if President Morsi term “Shia Crescent” has signified a had not been toppled by the Egyptian growing concern about Iran’s policies military. in the region. To be more precise, after the US invasion of , Iran’s increasing power projection in the region has While Iran formulates regional increased its area of influence through solution that would lead to less its support for the pro-Iranian Shia in influence from the US and other Iraq, the Shi’ite opposition in Western actors, Turkey attempts and the increased activity of the Shi’ite to balance the influence of Iran’s population in western Saudi Arabia,12 soft and hard power policies to through the mobilisation of the Zaydis ease the disturbances felt by of Yemen13 against the Saudi-backed Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Yemeni government, and the conversion countries. of to Shi’ism in . With Iranian support for the Shi’ite Hazara people in , and of Of the regional powers in the position course in and of model countries, the first and in Palestine, the picture has become even undoubtedly the most radical one is Iran. clearer.

143 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

Shia politics as a theo-political leaders and that their loyalty is to Qom instrument in Iran. King Abdullah II of Jordan and former President Mubarak of Egypt The idea of a Shia awakening after expressed this impression by stating that 14 the invasion of Iraq in 2003 links three the Shia are untrustworthy citizens. phenomena: the Shia majority taking The “Shia Crescent” theory is based on power in Iraq, Iran’s rise as a regional the Shia taking power in Iraq, and Iran’s power, and Shia groups gaining power growing influence on Shia population in 15 in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, , Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. We argue that Bahrain, the the idea of a Shia Crescent is the result of (UAE) and . With the Shia polarising sectarian rhetoric in the region. awakening, the various Shia groups in That being said, Iran’s manipulation of the Middle East have become braver and of its ability to mobilise about taking power and the religious the Shi’ite populations for its national and cultural interaction among them interests creates the basis for Iran’s soft is increasing. Two dimensions of the power and its vision of Shi’ism as a theo- foundation of this reawakening can be political instrument. determined: Iran’s regional policies based It should be noted that Shi’ism has on Shi’ism, and the partially integrated been successfully used by Iran in two and partially competing status of Shia ways. Historically, Shi’ism provided a politics in Iraq. Even though Shi’ism strong foundation for Iran to transcend may seem at a disadvantage because of its specific national interests and concerns. smaller population, it actually has a more This sectarian identity, which was advantageous position than Sunnism even manifested in the Shah’s era, has when it comes to having a transnational continued after the Iranian Revolution network. Unlike Sunnis, the fact that to support Iranian policies, and has Shia must form their religious provided an ideological legitimacy beliefs by imitating a clergyman beyond national borders. Made up of (marja’al-taqlid) naturally creates a Islamist and nationalist elements, this transnational religious network. In the Shia identity criticises Arab nationalisms Sunni world, there is the impression that or Pan-Arabism. The decline in the the vilayat al-faqih doctrine created by legitimacy of the secular Baath regimes Ayatollah directs was deepened with the downfall of all Shia to follow the Iranian religious the Saddam regime and has been leadership over their own religious completed with the Arab Spring. In

144 Islam, Models and the Middle East this respect, Khamenei was able to technology that includes enriching find an accommodating political scene uranium. Iran sees its nuclear programme after 2003 and 2011, which Khomeini as a critical element to increase internal was not able to find after the Iranian national solidarity, as well as to bolster its Revolution. claim that it is setting up a new order in 19 The Shia reawakening in a different the region. way made Iranians uncomfortable as some in Iran started following Ayatollah The Arab Spring and the limits Sistani and paying alms to Sistani’s of the Iranian model representative in Qom, which indicates that there will be competition for In the earlier stages of the Arab Spring, religious leadership within Shi’ism.16 Iran supported the protest movements. In other words, it is inaccurate to say For Iran, the protests were the reaction that the Iranian religious leadership is of Muslim peoples against “the Western- uncontested in gaining the loyalty of supported secular dictators”. In the Shia population. This all started addition, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, after Najaf once again being a religious like the Arab revolutions, was realised centre for the Arab Shia after the 2003 through non-violent protests, boycotts Iraqi invasion. This may lead to a and civil unrest. As a result, the Iranian competition between Ayatollah Sistani’s administration argued that these vilayet al ummah theory17 and Ayatollah revolutions were influenced by the Khomeini’s vilayat al-faqih theory. Iranian Revolution and that the “great However, because of the Syrian crisis, it awakening” promised by Khomeini was is difficult to see whether this would lead taking place.20 Thus, it was thought that to a differentiation. the increasing influence of the Muslim Iran has built its regional alliances by Brotherhood in Egypt and similar Islamic promoting itself as an axis of resistance. movements could support the Islamic To transcend the sectarian limits, Iran politics represented by Iran. Pro-reform has emphasised the Palestinian problem. Iranian authors also believe that the This has also allowed it to establish a regional reform movements first began transnational policy. In this sense, Israel’s with Khatami’s election to presidency continuing aggressive and offensive in 1997 and that if this process had policies helps Iran to continue its regional not been interrupted, Iran would have alliance.18 The second component of been in a more influential position than Iran’s foreign policy is having nuclear Turkey.21

145 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

On the other hand, Iran’s interpretation contextual. Iran, too, now gives emphasis of the regional revolutions as “anti- to the difference between the interests of Western” was aimed towards its internal its allies and the others, and has almost politics. The fact that a youth movement completely given up an approach based that emphasises freedom, democracy and on principles. income distribution overlaps with the Iranian opposition is seen as a handicap for Iran. It should be remembered that As the Libyan, Syrian, Yemeni, demonstrations by the opposition to and Bahraini examples show us, express solidarity with the Tunisian it will not be easy to eliminate people in February 2011 were harshly the authoritarian regimes in put down. This shows the limits of the the region despite the Arab Iranian model. Spring and even they can reproduce themselves under the To overcome sectarian limitations, cloak of “democratic” military Iran’s field of hegemonic rhetoric in the intervention as in the Egyptian Middle East has always been constructed around the notion of “anti-imperialism”. case. Contrary to many analyses, the strategic alliance between Syria and Iran has been The weakest side of the Iranian in fact around this notion and not on model is its counterproductive and 22 sectarian bonds. Using anti-imperialist reactionary political language and its rhetoric, Iran, which has been able to political practice, which is founded on form alliances with both the Alawites sectarian polarisation. In addition, when and the Sunni revisionist powers, has the daily secular choices and freedoms attempted to define itself as the leader of this model are examined, the loss of the resistance bloc, and has somewhat of legitimacy among its own people is been successful. However, one of the thought provoking. results of the Arab Spring is that it has revealed that Iran’s “anti-imperialism” Syria has also created a serious rhetoric is unable to go beyond sectarian legitimacy issue for Iran. Despite its limitations as Iran changed this attitude Islamic foreign policy agenda, Iran’s when faced with the risk of losing its support for Arab nationalist and secular most important ally, Syria.23 Thus, Baath regimes against the Islamists has Iran’s initial excitement is now less out turned almost all of the regional Islamist of principle and more fragmented and movements against it. This could possibly

146 Islam, Models and the Middle East erode Iran’s potential to be a regional The Saudi Arabian Model: power and result in the decrease of its A Monarchy Favouring the area of political influence.24 For political Status Quo and Wahhabism movements who found their rhetoric on democratisation, participation and Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region income distribution, the Iranian model has often been overlooked. With its is not appealing. support for various Salafist movements, The Iranian model is hard-power its close alliance with the US and its centred and has been influential on Shia leadership in the Gulf, and especially populations and anti-US/Israel groups to its formation of a “Sunni bloc”25 against secure material resources. The soft power Iran, Saudi Arabia is one of the most element of this model is unable to go important countries in the region. The beyond the Shia and some non-Sunni fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq and groups of the region. the demise of the Mubarak regime in Egypt have decreased these countries’ The most appealing side of the Iranian influence on the Arab world. The Saudi model is undoubtedly its view of the model represents a conservative Wahhabi US as an external global power who authoritarian regime26 as it cannot constantly and cruelly interferes in the even accept the idea of a constitutional region, and its exclusion of Israel as an monarchy. In this respect, even though actor that was implanted in the region it is a pro-status quo model, it has a by Western powers. Iran’s anti-US and critical role in shaping the structure of Israel discourse delegitimises the pro- the new order.27 By providing asylum to American countries in the region and the fallen leader of Tunisia, supporting Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian model. Iran Mubarak and the coup d’état in Egypt now looks as if it has abandoned the idea and sending Gulf Cooperation Council of a regional model based in the region (GCC) troops to Bahrain, this model itself in favour of its sectarian interests, has shown that it is a supporter of the and this has considerably limited its regional status quo. However, when the opportunity to be a distinctive model new Arab revolts appeared in favour of that begun with the revolution. Saudi Saudi Arabia in Libya, Syria, and partially Arabia, who represents a different style in , even though they threatened of politics and emphasises security, is the status quo, this model supported the situated directly opposite to this model. forces of the Arab Spring. In another

147 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

way, Saudi Arabia represents a model to the leaders of rentier regimes even if it that will act as a barrier to stop the waves is not so favourable for the people. of the Arab Spring from hitting the oil- rich Gulf monarchies. The regional order and the Paradoxically, even though the Saudi transforming function of the US model is the opposite of the Iranian and the GCC model, its theo-political power works in a similar way in its sectarian direction The GCC, central in shaping the and polarising nature. The Saudi Arabian regional order, exceeded its initial monarchy, feeling surrounded and economic integration role and recently threatened by Iran, is trying to overcome gained military functions. The new the demands for democratisation and twofold mission of the GCC is to participation through social aid policies. maintain internal security and protect While the US is trying to manage the regional status quo. For this purpose, the regional transformation with an and led by Saudi Arabia, the GCC aims “orderly transition” approach, the Saudi to protect the regional monarchies from model’s refusal to reform itself solidifies radical movements and endeavours to its authoritarian side in the short run. guarantee stability in order to maintain However, this approach will lead to loss the new economic structure in the Gulf, of its legitimacy in the longer term.28 where the Gulf countries have recently Despite this, the Saudi model, by been trying to plan their post-oil and utilising the “Iranian threat” to gain the natural gas economy and are increasingly “Sunni leadership”, is following sectarian becoming a geo-economic centre of and polarising policies. The strength of finance.29 The GCC initially regarded the Saudi model is visible in the Gulf Saudi Arabia’s basic role as the protector countries’ policies of securitisation and of the Gulf monarchies against the authoritarianism. As the Libyan, Syrian, influence coming from Iran and Iraq.30 Yemeni, and Bahraini examples show Saudi Arabia, by refusing the US’s call to us, it will not be easy to eliminate the meet with Bahraini opposition, instead authoritarian regimes in the region opting to interfere militarily via the despite the Arab Spring and even they GCC, proves that Saudi Arabia is the can reproduce themselves under the cloak guardian of the status quo, and it will even of “democratic” military intervention as oppose the US’s demands to fulfil this in the Egyptian case. In this respect, the role.31 Saudi aspiration to include Jordan Saudi model seems appealing- especially and Morocco in the GCC indicates that

148 Islam, Models and the Middle East it intends to form an opposing balance the Two Holy Mosques (moral politics: against the Arab Spring. This strategy soft power) and large income from oil is legitimised through an anti-Iran (realpolitik: hard power) not only makes discourse.32 it easier to apply a transnational policy, but also allows Saudi Arabia to challenge Within this environment of rising Iran, Hezbollah and al Qaeda in sectarian polarisation in the region after competition for the “authentic” version the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia maintains of Islam.35 its critical position in US strategy. In the GCC, the US is trying to balance the situation by not losing Saudi Arabia33 Saudi Arabia has not become yet keeping the Arab Spring alive. This a target country for democracy formula will not only ease the Saudi promotion as the current system family and save face, but will also stop ensures that oil will smoothly be Iran. The US, who wants to already start transferred to the international shaping the new order in the Middle markets, and also due to its East, would be agreeable to the GCC distinguished role in protecting turning into a NATO-like security the status quo in the region will alliance against the rising Iranian threat. be preserved.

Wahhabism and expansionist Despite opposing Wahhabi comments, theo-politics the official Wahhabi community’s support for Saudi foreign policy is The strongest aspects of Saudi Arabia’s critically vital for the survival of the model are Wahhabism’s transnational regime. This support has allowed the connections, its sectarian legitimacy, Saudis to maintain its relations with US financial strength and Western political on the basis of mutual strategic/national and military support. The Saudi claim interests.36 The and al that they are pursuing a religious policy Qaeda example, on the other hand, has and are serving Islam has made it shown the extent to which the limits of convenient to use the “true representation Wahhabism can go. Despite all this, Saudi of Islam” rhetoric to present their Arabia has not become a target country political/strategic interests and goals, for democracy promotion as the current and to defend them in the media.34 The system ensures that oil will smoothly be Saudi claim of being the Custodian of transferred to the international markets,

149 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

and also due to its distinguished role in Arabia, will make the competition protecting the status quo in the region harder for Saudi model.38 All the will be preserved. predictions that the Salafis will remain loyal to the Saudis do not necessarily The limits of the Saudi model reflect the reality as the and the regional balance of is not uniform and homogeneous and power is instead socially heterogeneous and politically diverse. The Saudi model will continue to represent the pro-US, Sunni The weakest side of this model is the authoritarian political position in the impossibility of the reproduction of its region. strongest aspects i.e., realpolitik and moral politics. Due to its conservative and authoritarian limits, it is difficult Saudi support for Sunni groups for the Saudi model to be an alternative first during the Afghan War in for the masses. The anti-participatory the 1980s against the Soviet conservative attitude that manifests itself Union and especially later in in the daily segregation against women for Iraq against Iran has turned it example does not have a perspective that into a regional power. can be maintained in the long run even if the high oil revenues are distributed On another level, Saudi support for like bribes. The participatory character Sunni groups first during the Afghan of the Turkish model, and any eventual War in the 1980s against the Soviet democratisation of Egypt, will challenge Union and especially later in Iraq against the Saudi model in the long term. Iran has turned it into a regional power. In the long run, in spite of the While empowering the sectarian political detrimental effects of the recent military groups among the Sunnis in Lebanon, intervention, the Tahrir revolution will Saudi Arabia suffered a serious blow put Egypt back at the centre of the with the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. Arab world. A potential Saudi-Egyptian Bringing military possibilities to the competition over the regional order may table as well for the regional competition also be a competition over who will win for power after Hariri’s assassination, Egyptian Salafis, and this may sour the Saudi Arabia supported the Islamist and relations between the two countries.37 Sunni section of the opposition in Syria In addition, the Brotherhood’s extensive and aims to block Iran’s growing clout in network in the Gulf, including Saudi the region.

150 Islam, Models and the Middle East

After the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia President George W. Bush’s “freedom felt isolated as a result of the US’s lack agenda” presented Turkey as a symbol of of support for Mubarak and Saleh, and moderate Islam and a potential model attempted to diversify its relations with of democracy for the Middle East.40 In countries that may counter-balance the a more recent example President Barack US, such as Pakistan and China. Saudi Obama pointed to Turkey as a model for relations with China have been extended the Islamists in moving to a democracy to the areas of the economy, energy from the previous authoritarian Middle and petro-chemicals.39 However, with East regimes in after the Arab Spring. Pakistan, it has a military partnership, common sectarian policies and a strategic There has been a “Turkish balancing act against Iran. Saudi policy model”, which has spanned the proved counter-productive in Egypt 20th Century. that has aimed at where the absence of sectarian tension portraying Turkey as a “new” alienated mainstream Sunni groups from modern and secular country or its model. as a “source of inspiration” for modernising countries. The Turkish Model: Increasing Self-confidence Had the model debate remained ideas and the New Balance for only US presidents, Turkey would between the West and Islam not have been the object to such a debate. However, the Islamist political There has been a “Turkish model”, leaders of the transitioning countries which has spanned the 20th Century. in the Middle East, such as Rashid that has aimed at portraying Turkey as Ghannushi’s in a “new” modern and secular country Tunisia or the Muslim Brotherhood of or as a “source of inspiration” for Egypt, have also openly expressed their modernising countries. However, the intention to benefit from the Turkish real focus behind the recent discussions experience to disassociate themselves has been the last 10 years when the JPD from the likes of Iran and the .41 has governed the country. The following On the other hand, seeing Turkey as a two examples show how the notion of country that bridges democracy and “Turkey as a model country” has been Islam, under the JDP government the played out. In the post- 9/11 era, US Turkish model appeals to diverse groups

151 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

in the region.42 Thus, the reason Turkey enough to live in a democratic system. is seen as a model is simultaneously Therefore, until this maturation, military both Kemalism and the JDP experience. elites should oversee the transition.43 With the new balance it has established These are the people who have attempted between security, democratisation and to contain the effects of the Arab Spring economic development, and its new with a “counter-revolutionary” agenda.44 definition of national interests, the JDP represents an interesting experience. With the new balance it has Another reason why Turkey is seen as established between security, a model is the gradual move towards democratisation and economic civilian control over the military. In development, and its new other words, now that the political elite definition of national interests, decide on national security issues, it has the JDP represents an interesting become a very appealing example for experience. countries like Tunisia and Egypt in their recent transitional period. The second group, predominantly The Turkish model’s appeal and Islamists, see Turkey as a model because of paradox the transformations that have happened in Turkey in the last decade under the The striking point about Turkey’s JDP rule. The real issue is that the JDP, model is its appeal to diverse political a democratically elected government, positions and agendas because there are has brought multiple “Turkish models” for different together, integrated Islamists in politics, actors. The first group, the overwhelming established the rule of law and civilian majority of the authoritarian secular supremacy over military elites and elites, reads the Turkish model as a brought about economic development.45 controlled modernisation through the What is more, Turkey’s ability to criticise supervision of a military bureaucracy to Israel46 makes the Turkish model more moderate and integrate Islamist actors appealing for Islamist movements. into the political system. This group’s Turkey’s ability to transform civilian- understanding of military relations is appealing as these is contaminated by Eurocentric and actors have been struggling to transform Orientalist visions. According to them, the “neo-Mamluk”47 administrations in the people of the region are not mature which the military elites ruled and had

152 Islam, Models and the Middle East economic privileges. It is a natural choice new regional order have made Turkey’s for the Islamists who have joined politics experience more appealing. As opposed only after the Baathist movements left to the polarisation and securitisation the political scene. of the Iranian and the Saudi models, The third group is the people who this new foreign policy strives to solve look at Turkey and see democratic current conflicts through economic transformation, lively economic partnership and integration with a development, a diverse political life that non-sectarian position. This model sees advocates for freedom and a pluralistic sectarian polarisation as a danger not life style.48 This group is interested in only theologically, but also underlines Turkey for its liberal agenda, yet this its potential to justify non-regional ironically shows both the appeal and the interference in regional problems. This limitations of the Turkish experience. It is model is integrated with the West, but an attractive model to be inspired by, but at the same time defends a regional if the Turkish model is seen as a model order that is established by regional to be imposed on Egypt or Tunisia, all actors. Erdoğan’s effective leadership, these political groups will accept only combined with foreign policy rhetoric some of what they understand and reject that criticises the Western countries the rest, and thus the model rhetoric will and Israel when needed, is appealing for 51 backfire. For example, Turkey’s Kemalist many in the region. Erdoğan’s vocal and secularist political regime will be criticism of Israel during the 2008 Gaza unacceptable to Islamist groups.49 Even if crisis and in 2009 in Davos has made one could claim that the transformation him an important leader who is able of the Islamic movement in Turkey can to have close and constructive relations be an example to Islamic movements in with the West but also can be critical the Middle East, Turkish ’s and independent of the West at the same “impoverishing sensitivity”50 towards a time. For people in the region, Turkey public role of Islam may repel many. is a country that is able to determine its national interests and stand up to the The strength of the Turkish West’s influence if necessary, and seems model: The new foreign policy to display the characteristics that these peoples would like to see in their own governments. Turkish foreign policy makers’ constant references to regional dynamics Turkey’s “critical engagement” with and regional actors as carriers of the the West as a member of NATO and

153 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

a membership candidate to the EU, order based on fraternity”. In addition, as in other words showing that it can a supposedly “central country”, Turkey’s cooperate when necessary and can be discourse to be the “owner, pioneer, independent at the same time, challenges servant” of the new Middle East that the Iranian and Saudi Arabian models. will bring justice to the region will invite It shows that one does not have to have other regional powers to participate.52 a hostile relationship with the West to become an independent and dignified Theo-political vs. political and that being in alliance with the US theology: The need for a new does not mean one must be obedient to language all policies. The most important aspects of the For people in the region, Turkey Turkish model are its democratic is a country that is able to tradition, civilian control of the military, determine its national interests rule of law, independent foreign policy and stand up to the West’s and its relation with Islam. Contrary to Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey does influence if necessary, and seems not constitute its political relationship to display the characteristics with Islam on strict theological patterns that these peoples would like to or supra-historical senses; rather uses a see in their own governments. historico-political language of “justice” and human rights in formulating its Turkey defends a regional order which regional vision. Turkey’s advantage, on is founded by regional actors, respects the one hand, is its ability to turn its regional social dynamics and is against experience into an applicable form that any foreign military interference as can be repeated in diverse temporal and it harms and delays regional stability. spatial contexts. On the other hand, its Turkey’s claim to manage the “winds of weakness is its relatively poorer level change” in “pioneering” a new regional of religious discourse as a source of order centres on democratic vision. legitimacy and intellectual influence on The “New Middle East”, a term coined region, simply because of the result of and extensively used by Turkish actors, the years of the securitisation of Islam in rejects ethnic or sectarian differences as Turkish domestic politics.53 The recent a source for polarisation, and claims to lift of the ban against the hijab, including establish this new order as “a peaceful in the parliament, gives the impression

154 Islam, Models and the Middle East that the Turkish model’s secularism is bringing religion into political goals freeing itself from securitisation. and formulating political goals using a What is common to the countries in religious vocabulary. post-Arab Spring transition is that the Baathist-secular-authoritarian structures What is common to the have been replaced by semi-democratic countries in post-Arab Spring ones where Islamists participate in transition is that the Baathist- the political processes. Elections have secular-authoritarian structures resulted in either Islamist-dominated have been replaced by semi- governments or an Islamist opposition. democratic ones where Islamists The Islamists’ participation in a legal participate in the political political life through democratic processes. elections will lead to the competition of diverse religious interpretations. This will further strengthen the interaction The Turkish model is met by the theo- between religion and political legitimacy. political claims of Saudi Arabia and Iran, In the Iranian and Saudi models, the and challenged by the Islamic rhetoric theo-political struggle that places religion in countries like Egypt. Erdoğan’s at the centre of their quest for religious emphasis on a “religious generation”, his influence is the most serious challenge increasing usage of religious concepts that Turkey will face. What made “the and his aim to spread religious schools Turkish model” appealing in post 9/11 (the imam hatip schools) seems to be period was its unique understanding an attempt to confront these regional of religion, in other words its “Turkish challenges rather than a search for a Islam”. Even though the term Turkish domestic agenda. Turkey, challenged by Islam sounded good to Western ears, it theo-political discourses, has to move was not positively received in the Middle away from Kemalism’s securitisation of East. religion on the one hand, and has to craft a new political language that does In this respect, it is difficult for not fall into the trap of theo-politics on Turkey to compete with Iran and Saudi the other hand. Arabia on the basis of theo-political backgrounds while focusing on religious As part of this realisation, Turkey legitimacy in politics, determining has been transforming governmental politics based on theological attitudes, institutions and the civil society to craft

155 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

this language and back its claims of geopolitical position, uniting the Levant regional leadership. Turkey’s increasing with Maghreb (in addition to its role role in the Organisation for Islamic as a bedrock of ancient civilisation), Cooperation (OIC), co-chairing the makes this country central to the Arab Alliance of Civilisation initiative54 and world. This central role feeds two the leadership role that it has assumed opposite tendencies in interpreting on international issues such as Somalia Egypt’s geographical location and its and Rakhine State (Arakan) gives the application to foreign policy: isolationist impression that the relationship between and activist. While the first tendency religion and politics is entering an era of claims that the country should not get transformation. Turkey’s recent emphasis involved in regional issues, the second on the Ministry of Religious Affairs, tendency sees Egypt as “a link” between hosting meetings such as the Summit Africa and Eurasia. This second tendency of African Islamic Leaders, efforts to presupposes that Egypt should follow carry such projects by using language an active foreign policy in Africa and that unifies and focuses on education the Arab world and that it should take 55 to Africa and Asia and attempts to lead on a leadership role. In this respect, in educating clergy is related to this the hope for change fed by the Tahrir tendency. However, compared to appeal revolution responds to the desire for the of the polarising and sectarian nature rise of Egypt, and to be a leader or model of the theo-political language used by country that will have a dignified foreign Wahhabism and Shi’ism, it does not policy in the Arab world. seem possible for Turkey to close this gap in the short term. The appeal and limitations of the Egyptian model The Egyptian Model in With its long historic, religious and Flux: From an “Islamic cultural past, Egypt has soft power Democratic Model” to a potential. The al Azhar Mosque’s central “Liberal” Authoritarianism? role in the Arab world in religious education supports Egypt’s position. The new coming experience/model Many people, educated in Egyptian of Egypt will be a critical component schools and either under the influence of the new emerging regional order of Arab nationalism or the Islamic as it is the fourth power centre. Its reawakening, currently work in the

156 Islam, Models and the Middle East educational institutions or ministries in and Saudi Arabia, a difficult journey the Gulf countries.56 That’s why Egypt’s awaits Egypt. The concern that Egypt soft power may influence the domestic would create due to its location and politics of the nation-states of the historical depth can be approached region: Arabism. Decision makers in the from multiple angles: because of the Arab countries are being forced to use a Gaza issue, the historic bonds between pan-Arabist political language in their Hamas and the Brotherhood and the foreign policy that gives priority to the prominence of the Camp David Accords sensitivities of the Arab public in order in the regional order, Israel saw the Morsi to be able to legitimise their domestic administration and any possibility of a policies. Especially after the Arab Spring, democratic Egypt as a threat. Egypt, as the language of Arabism has become a an Arab power, may balance Iran in the common sentiment that represents the Middle East, while all the world powers Arab public.57 However, even though and regional powers have been involved Arabism was the language of political in the developments in this country. and social demands and this shows All these critical issues and the foreign that this ideology still has a chance in interest in Egypt make observers hopeless the region, this does not mean that the for the Tahrir revolution. That is why it Arab Spring had a pan-Arabism agenda is quite likely to see the Tahrir revolution which has fallen behind the region’s become more like the revolutions of requirements.58 The defunct President 1848 than those of 1989.60 Morsi’s administration would have sounded its claim to being a model more Many people, educated in loudly if there has been no rupture in the Egyptian schools and either process of democratic transition and if under the influence of Arab it could transform this social sensitivity nationalism or the Islamic into a concrete policy that would appeal to the Arab world’s problems and ideals.59 reawakening, currently work in the educational institutions or Moreover, we can say that there will be ministries in the Gulf countries. two major problems that will challenge Egypt: democratisation and economic development. Stemming from these No matter how much the Tahrir two issues and the potential threat that process gives priority to political a rising democratic Egypt will pose to demands, Egypt, as the sixth largest regional countries, especially to Israel natural gas producer, is faced with serious

157 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

economic problems. The instability will come to power again. The Muslim reduce foreign investment in the country Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed and make the economy even more Morsi gained 51% of the votes; however, fragile. The economic conditions are not former Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq promising because economic decisions won 49%, a clear indication of the old are made by the military elite, who are regime’s prowess. Eventually, President also part of the economy.61 In addition, Morsi’s tenure was ended by the army the Egyptian army’s inability to fully chief commander Abdel Fattah al Sisi’s control the Sinai Peninsula, a situation announcement of a coup d’état on 3 July which led to the constant bombing of 2013 and this was a clear indication of the Transjordan gas pipeline, disrupting how the democratic transformation the country’s national gas income. In was vulnerable to political tides in the addition, a decline in tourism revenue country. would further worsen the situation. For this reason, it is not difficult to predict that Egypt’s economic problems will After the bloody suppression of directly affect politics. Also, Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood the this kind of economic pressure will not transformations in the country easily be able to form its own political and the kinds of political line and independent foreign policy very language/practice that will be soon. This will negatively affect Egypt’s created will affect the nature of 62 role in forming a new regional order. the new regional order. The major problem with the Egyptian model is the role of the military in the process of transition to democracy. The Although the civil resistance of Supreme Council of the Armed Forces the Muslim Brotherhood against (SCAF) quietly took control of the the coup d’état is really straining the administration on 11 February 2011. military, Egyptian politics is on the Liberals and Islamist forces, which had way to establish a new kind of military united during the revolution, engaged in guardianship regime, which can also be a power struggle soon after. It emerged defined as a “liberal” autocracy.63 This during the presidential election on 30 will also contribute to the reproduction June 2012 that this struggle would of a new authoritarianism in the Middle prevent the liquidation of the remnants East. One should be prepared for a of the old regime and that they could long-term new authoritarianism with

158 Islam, Models and the Middle East the flavouring of democracy. In Egypt, Morsi and viewed the fall of the Muslim the military tutelage over politics is not Brotherhood as “a golden opportunity to likely to be removed in the short term. advance their political ambitions”.65 Undoubtedly, after the bloody The delayed transformation of the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood Islamic movement in Egypt the transformations in the country and the kinds of political language/ The transformation of the Muslim practice that will be created will affect Brotherhood, the leading source of the nature of the new regional order. A Islamist movements in the Muslim transformation, based on participation, world, would contribute to Egypt’s soft democratisation, freedom and justice power. As opposed to the Salafist Nour was possible and it had the potential of Party’s demand to apply stringent Sharia challenging the sectarian66 and polarising codes, the Freedom and Justice Party sides of Shi’ism and Wahhabism by (FJP) founded by the Brotherhood called developing a new and pluralistic and for a civil and democratic state with an non-sectarian Sunnism. A potential Islamic reference. The participation of religious alliance between al Azhar and Egyptian Islamists in politics and their the Muslim Brotherhood, even though performance was expected to create a new this potential alliance has been severely synthesis of Islam and democracy, which tainted by the Grand Sheikh of al Azhar might have brought a revolutionary Ahmed el-Tayeb’s siding with the 3 July change to the Muslim world. Another coup d’état, has the capacity to bring critical dimension of the political Egypt to a very important position in experience of the Egyptian Islamists has the regional theo-political competition. been the competition between Salafism Going beyond this, both the Muslim and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood and al-Azhar have been consequence of this competition will challenged by the Salafist movements. have regional implications that may The sense of this mutual threat might make for more pragmatic and politically lead to an alliance being formed for diversified Islamisms to form.64 The a new Sunnism, which would make recent coup has made this competition way for Egypt to create a new Islamic much more complex. Although most language. Al Azhar, as the historical of the Salafi groups and parties have centre of wasatiyya (centrism) in the taken a pro-Morsi stand, the Nour Party Islamic world, may play this role in the backed military intervention against region.67

159 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

One of the most distinctive results of The possibility that the civil war in the possible democratic Egypt as a model Syria will pave the way for the Muslim for the region would be the opportunity Brotherhood in Syria to come to that the two democratic models (Turkey the power fuelled the “Brotherhood and Egypt) would have to cooperate Crescent” fear. Nevertheless, the Arab and balance the sectarian and polarising Spring ended when grassroots movement policies of Saudi Arabia and Iran. in Syria turned into a civil war. Similarly, However, with the recent military there was a reversal when Egyptian intervention, Egypt will continue to Commander-in-Chief and Minister of be a model in flux for the near future Defence Abdel Fattah al Sisi overthrew President Morsi on 30 June 2013. The and any transformation of the Muslim coup, which was supported by Saudi Brotherhood will be pushed forward to Arabia and other Gulf countries in an uncertain date. order to protect regional status-quo and non-democratic regimes, enabled The fall of the Muslim supporters of the old regime in Egypt Brotherhood and its regional to take control. As a result, a period of implications instability began for Egypt which was expected to serve an inspiring example The Arab Spring paved the way for for the democratisation of the region. the Islamist parties in the Middle East It would be wrong to interpret Morsi’s and North Africa and launched a new overthrow only in terms of Egyptian period called “the Muslim Brotherhood domestic politics. As a matter of fact, Crescent” by the King Abdullah II of the Muslim Brotherhood experience will Jordan. The victory of Hamas in the 2006 greatly influence the political balance in elections marked the start of this period the region in the middle and long term. which reached a peak with the Tunisian That President Morsi was ousted by a and the Tahrir revolutions in 2011. coup d’état based on street politics, and Other successful steps of this process that thousands of Morsi supporters were included the rise to power of the Justice killed with real bullets in Rabia and other and Development Party in Morocco, the squares as senior Muslim Brotherhood critical role of Al-Islah Party in Yemen officials were sent behind bars put and the increasing power of politicians the movements that are close to the close to the Muslim Brotherhood in Brotherhood in a difficult position. Even Libya. though it is still in power, the Justice

160 Islam, Models and the Middle East and Development Party in Morocco was and the Salafist Nour Party’s support for weakened. The Ennahda movement, the coup created a pseudo-democracy/ which has adopted a reconciliatory revolutionary discourse. This will, in policy but has been strongly opposed turn, contribute to the birth of new by the leftist-secular parties and groups forms of authoritarianism in the region. since the very beginning, is at risk of being overthrown in Tunisia. Affiliated The Morsi administration could movements in these countries, on the have contributed to creating an one hand, try to keep their distance from international public opinion the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They, which would both convince on the other hand, seek reconciliatory the Islamist groups and push political means in order not to experience Israel to make concessions in the catastrophe witnessed in Egypt.68 the resolution of the Palestinian This new period, called “the fall of the issue. Muslim Brotherhood”, seems to give birth to new consequences in the region. The Muslim Brotherhood has been the Secondly, the democratic mainstream movement of the Islamist transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood would have proven to be movements in the Middle East in the last the new successful balance between century. It has influenced and balanced participation and legitimacy to the both the Shi’ite and Salafi movements. people of authoritarian regimes in the One may anticipate some losses that Gulf. Accordingly, the second wave of would occur in the region due to the fall democratisation would have swept away of the Muslim Brotherhood. these countries with the help of either The first and biggest loss due to the reforms or new revolutions. It is not a fall of the Muslim Brotherhood is the coincidence that the UAE and Saudi weakening of the legitimacy granted Arabia, where the largest number of to the discourse of democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood supporters live, will of people that was brought about are behind the coup in Egypt. These by the Arab Spring. The opposition countries were able to preserve the status ignored the result at the ballot box and quo for now and showed once again that took to the streets with the help of the they are on Israel’s side in terms of limiting Egyptian army, removing the discussion the will of the people in the region. It is of democracy. The Sheikh of al Azhar meaningful that the Gulf countries, just

161 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

like Israel, feel the same fear of the rise of Fourthly, a democratic Egypt led by the Muslim Brotherhood in the region the Muslim Brotherhood would soften and they turned this fear into a common the power struggle between Iran and policy. Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. Doing politics on the same wavelength as Turkey, the Morsi administration could The regional policies of these have put Egypt in a key position in four powers, the structure of the regional power struggle. The Morsi their domestic politics, their administration could have contributed relations with the West, Russia to creating an international public and Israel, and their interaction opinion which would both convince the and competition will shape the Islamist groups and push Israel to make new structure of this regional concessions in the resolution of the order. Palestinian issue. Fifthly, moderate and democratic Thirdly, The Muslim Brotherhood religious discourse of the Muslim has a critical role in integrating Islamist Brotherhood could have overcome movements into the democratic system the Shi’ite-Wahhabi polarisation and thus avoiding their radicalisation. with the help of the new Sunnism. A The success of this experience would new religious discourse to be created have shown the Islamist grassroots, with the help of the Brotherhood including the Salafis, that democracy is and al Azhar could have balanced the expansionist religious discourse of Iran the only game in town. This would limit and Saudi Arabia through petrodollars the attraction of radical organisations and sectarianism. The support of the such as al Qaeda to the youth. It seems al Azhar leadership for the coup d’état difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood harmed the democratisation process of to protect even its own grassroots from the Islamic world. However, as the new violence when it is kept out of democratic government needs religious support 69 politics. Given the manipulations to justify its authoritarian rule against of deep states and foreign intelligence democratic Islamist movements, these agencies in the region, it would be a huge events may paradoxically strengthen the success to keep these reacting groups out “autonomy and influence” of al Azhar as of violence. an institution.70

162 Islam, Models and the Middle East

Sixthly, the opportunity of the Muslim Brotherhood to turn “anti-Westernism” In this environment, where into a “soft criticism of the West” was Iran and Saudi Arabia compete missed. Favouritism towards Israel will as model countries, Turkey continue to incite the hatred of the will either stay above sectarian Islamist movements against the West polarisation and develop an while these movements believe that the “active multidimensional West adopts an insincere attitude towards policy” that supports democratic Egypt as was the case in Algeria.71 The transformation, or it will let the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood both competition flow and accept its in Egypt and the region, unfortunately, passive position. postponed all these opportunities. Considering these alternatives, the Conclusion new emerging regional order will be established on either a theo-political Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt understanding, in other words on play central roles in the region and are securitisation and alliances based all claiming to be establishing a new on sectarian polarisation which will regional order. These states use religious lead to more interference from non- and symbolic capital to primarily regional actors, or on a gradual reform legitimise the claims of their regimes and process of economic integration and administrations and this is very closely diplomatic compromise. In the first case, related to the model debate. Beyond biases and negative perceptions will be the different forms of administration deepened in reference to history and to and strategic visions, the claims of these differences in religious interpretation, models are based on different Islamic and will result in conflict, animosity and interpretations and they place their view of Islam (their theo-political or political outside interference. In the second case, theologies) at the heart of the national there would be a chance to establish a interests/strategies. The regional policies cooperative regional, non-sectarian of these four powers, the structure of perspective accompanied by a critical, their domestic politics, their relations but not radical, attitude towards the with the West, Russia and Israel, and West. A probable new Sunnism would their interaction and competition will be able to go beyond sectarianism and shape the new structure of this regional the polarising agendas of Wahhabism order. and Shi’ism. This will contribute to

163 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

preventing regional conflicts based on limits of its soft power policies and is sectarianism. turning towards “smart power” policies. Still, the impression that this policy is a While in Iran a republican model based democracy promotion policy will attract on vilayat al-faqih has lost its ability to reaction in the region. inspire other Islamic movements in the region, it still protects and solidifies its Instability in Egypt may help the Arab influence over Shia groups, especially monarchies in the region to breathe those in the Gulf, through the ideological comfortably for a while. Again, this indoctrination and aid Iran provides to coup has also given the Bashar al Assad its partners. However, Iran’s influence on regime in Syria an opportunity to get Shia groups in the region feeds the fear of tougher against its opponents. The a Shi’ite Crescent especially in the Gulf, removal of Morsi from power has helped thus producing a counter-hegemonic Israel’s national interests, too. As far as “Sunni bloc” under the leadership the regional equations are concerned, of Salafism and Wahhabism. In this it is possible to say that the front of process, Salafism makes the indirect democracy formed by Turkey and Egypt claim of holding the monopoly to speak has been weakened in the presence of the for Sunnism. In this environment, where polarising and pro-sectarian politics of Iran and Saudi Arabia compete as model Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is particularly countries, Turkey will either stay above observed that Saudi Arabia will play a sectarian polarisation and develop an critical role in Egyptian politics through “active multidimensional policy” that Salafis and the petrodollar system. That supports democratic transformation, means deepening competition in terms or it will let the competition flow and of making a new regional order in the accept its passive position. With the Middle East. It also means that it will unyielding attitude it has adopted against be more difficult for Turkey to balance the Syrian regime that is massacring its the Iranian and Saudi Arabian politics of own citizens, Turkey is discovering the polarisation.

164 Islam, Models and the Middle East

Endnotes

1 The authors are very grateful to Eric Hougland, Kemal İnat, Talip Küçükcan, Hasan Kösebalaban, Talha Köse and Ali Balcı for having taken the trouble to comment on the draft. Needless to say, the authors alone are responsible for any mistakes that may have remained. 2 We intentionally employed the concept of “theo-political” instead of political theology. Political theology refers to secularised versions of theological concepts in the realm of politics after centuries of struggle. Carl Schmitt describes this as “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts”. See, Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985, p. 36. In this theory, “God” turned into “lawgiver” and “miracles” turned into the “exception” in modern politics. As opposed to this political theology, theo-politics, as we coined in this article, refers to something quite the contrary. Theo-politics is the re-theologisation of modern political concepts in a contemporary political context. In this practice, political concepts and positions have been formulated as theological necessities rather than political decisions. This process goes hand in hand with the claim that to “represent the one and the only authentic and legitimate religious position” in the world. Therefore, theo-politics, by definition, works through exclusionary, conflictual, ahistorical and dogmatic mechanism. This new phenomenon among the Muslim-dominated countries of the region carries the risk of turning inter-state political conflicts into sectarian war. 3 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of , Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2008, p. 56. 4 Roger Owen, “The Arab ‘Demonstration’ Effect and the Revival of Arab Unity in the Arab Spring”, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2012), p. 374. 5 See, Nathan J. Brown et al., The Emerging Order in the Middle East, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/24/ emerging-order-in-middle-east/awff# [last visited 12 October 2013]; Katerina Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications”, International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 1 (January 2012), p. 75. 6 Fred Dallmayr, “Radical Changes in the Muslim World: Turkey, Iran, Egypt”, Globalizations, Vol. 8, No. 5 (2011), p. 640. 7 Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam, pp. 32-33. 8 See, Olivier Roy, “The Transformation of the Arab World”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July 2012), p. 11. 9 See, Michael Bauer and Thomas Schiller, The Arab Spring in 2012, Center for Applied Policy Research, p. 2, at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/ Detail/?lng=en&id=136306 [last visited 10 August 2013]. For a contrary argument see, Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East”, p. 75. 10 Morsi called for dialogue between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran to find a way to stop the bloodshed in Syria. Foreign ministers of the Syria “contact group” held their first high-

165 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

level meeting on 24 September 2012 in Cairo but Saudi Arabia opted to stay away from this meeting, see, Samia Nakhoul and Edmund Blair, “Mursi Steps onto World Stage Seeking Balance”, The Daily Star, 29 August 2012. 11 Deborah J. Gerner, “Middle Eastern Politics”, in Deborah J. Gerner and Jillian Schwedler (eds.), Understanding the Contemporary Middle East, 2nd edition, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p. 123. 12 See, Toby Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group”, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 179- 197. 13 Ali Parchami, “The Arab Spring: The View from Tehran”, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2012), p. 39. 14 See, Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring”, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 3 (December 2011), p. 522; Mary Ann Tétreault, “The Winter of the Arab Spring in the Gulf Monarchies”, Globalizations, Vol. 8, No. 5 (2011), p. 632. 15 Laurence Louer, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. 243-244. 16 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2007, pp. 179, 219-221. 17 Nicolas Pelham, A New Muslim Order: The Shia and the Middle East Sectarian Crisis, London, I.B. Tauris, 2008, pp. 204-205. 18 Michael Scott Doran, “The Heirs of Nasser: Who Will Benefit from the Second Arab Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3 (May-June 2011), p. 20. 19 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Washington, Carnegie, 2006, pp. 8-10. 20 Hakkı Uygur, “İran ve Arap Baharı”, SETA Analiz, No. 52 (March 2012), pp. 13-14. 21 Uygur, “İran ve Arap Baharı”, p.15; “Khamenei Hails ‘Islamic’ Uprisings”, at http://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201124101233510493.html [last visited 28 November 2013]. 22 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 88; Robert Malley, Karim Sadjadpour, and Ömer Taşpınar, “Symposium- Israel, Turkey and Iran in the Changing Arab World”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 1- 24. 23 Parchami, “The Arab Spring”, p. 42. 24 Iran’s support for Hamas and the Palestinian resistance movements has been the basis of its legitimacy as has been used to show that Iran can transcend the limits of sectarian boundaries. “Hamas Reduces presence in ”, The National, 25 December 2011.

166 Islam, Models and the Middle East

25 Saudi Arabia presents its Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as a true form of . See, Noorhaidi Hasan, “Saudi Expansion, the Salafi Campaign and Arabised Islam in Indonesia”, in Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, p. 265. 26 For the principles and practices of Wahhabi conservativism see, Mohammed Ayoob and Hasan Kösebalaban, “Introduction: Unraveling the Myths”, in Mohamed Ayoob and Hasan Kösebalaban (eds.), Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009, pp. 3-4. 27 For Saudi’s counter-revolutionary role in the Arab Spring see, Al-Rasheed, “Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution”; Mehran Kamrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution”, Orbis, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2012), pp. 96-104. 28 For the learning process in Saudi Arabia see, Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’”, Globalizations, Vol. 8, No. 5 (2011), pp. 647-653. 29 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Repositioning the GCC States in the Changing Global Order”, Journal of Arabian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2011), pp. 231–247. 30 Abdul Khaleg Abdulla, “The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature, Origin, and Process”, in Michael C. Hudson (ed.), Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, London, I.B. Tauris, 1999, pp. 150-170. 31 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Saudi Arabia’s Action in Bahrain Strains Ties With United States”, New York Times, 14 March 2011. 32 Vali Nasr, “Will The Saudis Kill the Arab Spring”, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011- 05-23/will-the-saudis-kill-the-arab-spring-.html [last visited 12 December 2013]. 33 Nawaf Obaid, “Amid the Arab Spring, A U.S.-Saudi Split”, The Washington Post, 16 May 2011. 34 Madawi Al-Rasheed, “Introduction: An assessment of Saudi Political, Religious and Media Expansion”, in Madawi Al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, pp.1-5, 21. 35 Bahgat Korany and Moataz A. Fattah, “Irreconcilable Role-Partners?: Saudi Foreign Policy between the Ulama and the US”, in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press, 2010, p. 365. 36 F. Gregory Gause III, “Official Wahhabism and the Sanctioning of Saudi-US Relations”, in Ayoob and Kösebalaban (eds.), Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia, p. 135. 37 Ewan Stein, After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?: Revolutionary Egypt: Promises and Perils, p. 27, at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Home.aspx [last visited 5 November 2013]. For Salafis in Egypt see, Stephen Lacroix, Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism, Doha, Brookings Doha, 11 June 2012.

167 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

38 For the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait see, Scheherezade Faramarzi, “Kuwait’s Muslim Brotherhood”, at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5116/kuwaits-muslim-brotherhood [last visited 22 August 2013]. 39 See, Nader Habibi, “Growth in Economic Relations of China and with the GCC Countries”, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 25, No. 2 (November 2011), pp. 52- 67; Makio Yamada, “Gulf-Asia Relations as ‘Post-Rentier’ Diversification? The Case of the Petrochemical Industry in Saudi Arabia”, Journal of Arabian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2011), pp. 99-116; and Lisa Curtis, “The Reorientation of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Toward Its Region”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2012), p. 261. 40 Etga Uğur, “Intellectual Roots of ‘Turkish Islam’ and Approaches to the ‘Turkish Model’”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (October 2004), pp. 327-345. 41 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz, “Whose Model Which Turkey?”, Foreign Policy, 8 February 2011. 42 See, Shibley Telhami, “Opinion: What Do Egyptians Want?”, POLITICO, at http://www. politico.com/news/stories/0512/76590.html [last visited 17 November 2013]. 43 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec 1997-Feb 1998). 44 Aslı Bâli, “A Turkish Model for the Arab Spring?”, Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 3, No. 1-2 (2011), pp. 28-29. 45 The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, as prominent Syrian intellectual Sadik al-Azm argues, has been following “the Turkish model” from April 2005, long before the Arab Spring. See, Sadik J. Al-Azm, “The ‘Turkish Model’: A View from Damascus”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2011), pp. 633-641. 46 For the changing Turkish foreign policy toward Israel under the rule of the JDP see, Ali Balcı and Tuncay Kardaş, “The Changing Dynamics of Turkey’s Relations with Israel: An Analysis of ‘Securitization’”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April-June 2012), pp. 99-120. 47 Bulliet coins the term “Neo-Mamluk” to describe the post-Second World War Middle Eastern political system that rules a country by a leader, military elites and their families. He argues that this political system produced a certain type of legitimacy, and the Arab Spring proves that the Neo-Mamluks have lost their legitimacy. Richard W. Bulliet, “Neo-Mamluk Legitimacy and the Arab Spring”, Middle East Law and Governance, Vol. 3, No. 1-2 (2011), pp. 60-67. 48 Shibley Telhami, “The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll”, at http://www.brookings.edu/ research/reports/2011/11/21-arab-public-opinion-telhami [last visited 21 November 2013]. 49 See, Meliha Benli Altunışık, “The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1-2 (Winter/Spring 2005); Kemal Kirişci, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and The Transformation of the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2011), pp. 33-55.

168 Islam, Models and the Middle East

50 Burhanettin Duran, “The Experience of Turkish : Between Transformation and Impoverishment”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 5-22. 51 See, Nuh Yılmaz, “Change in Turkey Has Shown Another Way for Middle East”, The National, 2 February 2011; Telhami, “The 2011 Arab Public Opinion Poll”. 52 See, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech delivered at National Assembly on 26 April 2012, at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil2/ham/ b10001h.htm [last visited 15 June 2013]. For Turkey’s new Middle East policy see, Hasan Kösebalaban, “Turkey and the New Middle East: Between Liberalism and Realism”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn 2011), pp. 93-114. 53 See, Mensur Akgün and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, Ortadoğu’da Türkiye Algısı 2011, Istanbul, TESEV, 2012. 54 Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, “Turkey’s Role in the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 387-406. 55 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “Regional Leadership: Balancing off Costs and Dividends in the Foreign Policy of Egypt”, in Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press, 2010, p. 170. 56 Mamoun Fandy, “Egypt: Could It Lead the Arab World?”, in Judith S. Yaphe (ed.), The Middle East in 2015: The Impact of Regional Trends on U.S. Strategic Planning, Washington, National Defense University Press, 2002, pp. 59-74. 57 Özden Zeynep Oktav, Basra Körfezinin Değişen Dinamikleri, Istanbul, Beta, 2011, p. 24; Bauer and Schiller, The Arab Spring in 2012, p. 2. 58 Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East”, p. 74. 59 For a pessimistic article regarding the impact of the Egyptian revolution on the political and strategic landscape in the Middle East in the short and medium term see, Mohammed Ayoob, “Beyond the Democratic Wave in the Arab World: The Middle East’s Turco-Persian Future”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2011), pp. 57-70. 60 Springborg, “Whither the Arab Spring?”, p. 12. 61 Robert Springborg, “The Precarious Economics of Arab Springs”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2011), p. 99. 62 Robert Springborg, “The Political Economy of the Arab Spring”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2011), p. 428; Geoffrey Aronson, “The Middle East Conflict After the Arab Spring: The Case of Palestine”, European View, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2011), p. 218. 63 Daniel Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 56-68; George Joffé, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects”, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2011), p. 524.

169 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz

64 Lacroix, Sheikhs, p. 9. 65 Khalil Al-Anani, “Salafis Try Their Hand at Religious Politics”, Washington Post, 11 May 2013. 66 Ayoob argues that the conflicts in the region, especially in Syria, are not sectarian conflicts but political ones as both Iran and Saudi Arabia follow their own strategic interests. We agree that they both follow their strategic interests; however, the ways they define and constitute their strategic interests, and the discourse through which they defend their positions, are increasingly sectarian. Moreover, both countries have been using sectarian discourses to fortify their positions and this will eventually risk spinning out of control and turn into an “absolute sectarian conflict”. Mohammed Ayoob, “The New Cold War in the Middle East”, The National Interest Blog, at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-new-cold-war-the- middle-east-7974?page=show [last visited 22 August 2013]. 67 Nathan Brown, “Contention in Religion and State in Post-revolutionary Egypt”, Social Research, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Summer 2012), p. 538. 68 See, Raphael Lefevre, “A Falling-Out Among Brothers”, at http://carnegieendowment.org/ sada/2013/07/30/falling-out-among-brothers/ggtn [last visited 13 September 2013]. 69 Khalil al-Anani, “Egypt: Reconciliation or Repression”, Al-Monitor, 30 August 2013. 70 Ahmed Morsy and Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s al-Azhar Steps Forward”, at http:// carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/07/egypt-s-al-azhar-steps-forward/gt0b# [last visited 13 September 2013]. 71 For a critique of the US priorities in terms of democratisation in Egypt see, Shadi Hamid and Peter Mandaville, “A Coup Too Far: The Case For Reordering U.S. Priorities in Egypt”, Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing, September 2013.

170