Islam, Models and the Middle East: The New Balance of Power following the Arab Spring1 Burhanettin DURAN* and Nuh YILMAZ** Abstract Key Words The Arab Spring has created a fertile Model, Islam, balance of power, Middle ground for the competition of different models East, theo-political, New Sunnism, Arab (Turkish, Iranian and Saudi) and for a new Spring, Salafi, Shia, Wahhabi. balance of power in the Middle East and North Africa. These three models, based on three distinct styles of politics, go hand in hand Introduction with competing particular politics of Islam. Their search for a new order in the region The aim of this article is to discuss the synthesises covert and overt claims for regional changing balance of power in the Middle leadership, national interests and foreign policy priorities. This article argues that the new East and North Africa (MENA) region emerging regional order will be established on following the Arab Spring by focusing either a theo-political understanding, in other on the foreign policies of the four leading words on securitisation and alliances based states- Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and on sectarian polarisation which will lead to Egypt- and their political and religious more interference from non-regional actors, or on a gradual reform process of economic models. The main emphasis will be the integration and diplomatic compromise. In way in which how these four countries the first case, biases and negative perceptions use their models as vehicles to compete will be deepened in reference to history and for supremacy in a new regional order. to differences in religious interpretation, and will result in conflict, animosity and outside Therefore, the problem will not be interference. In the second case, there will be a dealing with what model people should/ chance to establish a cooperative regional, non- would follow but how these models have sectarian perspective accompanied by a critical, been used and enhanced through various but not radical, attitude towards the West. soft and hard power instruments. We discuss the three models in relation to each other through their relationship * Professor of political science at İstanbul Şehir to US (the global other) and Israel (the University. regional other) in shaping the potential ** George Mason University. fourth model of the emerging Egypt. 139 PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, pp. 139-170. Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz In reality, these three models are based quo through solutions coming from on three distinct styles of politics. These compromise. Instead of a theo-political three models go hand in hand with three stance that emphasises polarisation and different peculiar politics of religion. The sectarianism, this model introduces a Iranian model legitimises itself as against political theology based on pluralism. the US, Israel, imperialism and the West through an “axis of resistance”. It aims for a radical change in the regional status In the search for regional quo that was established, yet pursues hegemony there is need for pragmatic politics when necessary. transnational institutions, As a tool for legitimacy, Iran follows a religious rhetoric and polarising and sectarian (Shi’ism) theo- practices that can reach non- political2 policy. In contrast, Saudi governmental actors outside of Arabia legitimises its own regional vision national borders. by formulating itself as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Sunnism and These three models have been Islam, opposing reforms and envisions attempting to influence a potential an authoritarian model in favour of fourth model, the Egyptian model. It the status quo. This model follows a is still unclear what the Egyptian model polarising and sectarian (Sunni) theo- will look like; however, this model will political policy. While Saudi Arabia is be deeply influential in building a new facing a more radical Salafist (right- regional order. From the Tahrir effect4 wing) opposition, the Iranian regime is on other countries to Morsi’s election to up against a more moderate and liberal presidency and the coup d’état against 3 (left-wing) opposition. Thus, these him on 3 July 2013, whatever happens two theo-political models increase the in Egypt will affect other countries in potential for conflict in the region by the region.5 Fred Dallmayr sees the inviting foreign powers to intervene in Egyptian Tahrir revolution as Islam’s regional politics. response to Western modernity and The third model, the Turkish model, that it is a democratic alternative to the aims for economic integration and is secular Kemalist revolution and Iranian based on Turkey’s increasing popularity Islamic reform.6 Saudi Arabia’s reaction due to its economic success and foreign and Israel’s securitised response to the policy performance. This model prefers Egyptian model, the US’s democracy the gradual transformation of the status promotion agenda and its will to protect 140 Islam, Models and the Middle East its authoritarian allies in the region, will transnational institutions, religious affect the future of this transformation. rhetoric and practices that can reach non- governmental actors outside of national Discussion of the Models borders. The countries who aspire to be and Regional Powers in models must have the determination to mobilise their resources to encourage the Search for Order in the their non-governmental organisations Middle East to be active outside of their national borders. Despite this, these countries do The Arab Spring forced all the regional not push their “model” on others to be powers in the Middle East to manage this readily imitated by others. Except for revolution and to try to find a new Middle Iran shortly after the 1979 Revolution, Eastern order. Even if Turkey’s claim of it none of them have claimed to provide forging a new order is more commonly a universal model to the region or the known, both Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s Islamic world. search for a new order goes farther back In the model debate, different than Turkey’s claim. Their search for a interpretations of Islam and its new order synthesises covert and overt mobilisation are vital. The regional claims to regional leadership, national countries mobilise their own versions of interests and foreign policy priorities. The Islam to strengthen their soft power and parameters that define this competition for legitimacy purposes.7 Saudi Arabia to influence the new emerging order are and Iran are both mobilising the ulama not merely the strategic; rather there are for this cause, and are openly making competing ideologies and visions for the theo-political claims. The greatest future of the region. In other words, the advantage for these two countries is the “model discussion” is a power projection consensus on the strategic vision among opportunity related to differing regional political and state elites. Having the demands and visions of the various Muslim Brotherhood excluded from countries on how the new emerging the political life, Egypt seems to lose the regional order should be. significance of its theo-political claims. Therefore, any claim to be a “model” However, it would continue to become combines strategic goals, national theo-politically influential in its search interests, security concerns and for influence in the regional power ideological visions. In the search for struggle since it had theo-political claims regional hegemony there is need for even during the Mubarak era as a result 141 Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz of al Azhar University.8 While in the representative of Shi’ism, Wahhabism, Egyptian case, both the recent coup d’état which is just another version of Sunnism, and the influence of external powers will will not remain unchallenged. The “new limit these claims, in the Turkish case, Sunni” arguments and positions that political culture, intra-elite problems may spring from normalisation of Egypt and internal power balance will limit and transformation of Turkey’s religion- theo-political claims. In spite of these politics experience will be potential limitations, the JDP’s foreign policy challenges to Wahhabism and Shi’ism. within the limits of secular nation-state seems to protect the Islamic interests The limits of regional models and of regional peoples, and strengthens new nationalism the Religious Affairs Directorate. Still, after the Arab Spring, the alternative It is clear that none of the competing religion-politics relationship models and countries can solidify values that could theo-political policies may force Turkey create consent throughout the region. to recalibrate the role of religion in her The exclusionary nature of Shi’ism and policies. If Egypt comes out successful Wahhabism does not allow them to forge from its current turmoil, a pluralistic and an inclusive consensus that is based on democratic “new Sunnism” might arise political participation of minority groups as a response to Shi’ism and Wahhabism and women’s rights for the entire region. in the long run. That said, however they In discussing the idea of “model”, it is became integral part of state policies, not true to assume that a model should Shi’ism, Sunnism or Wahhabism cannot be absolute and flawless but rather it be seen as all-inclusive (monolithic) should be taken as experience sharing. religious movements. Each represents a particular Islamic understanding, and Following the Arab Spring, a new all are pluralist and historically and pragmatic nationalism that blends Islam politically founded positions. Therefore, with Arabism is rising.9 These new the new struggle for an emerging versions of nationalism are intertwined regional order will not be between with the claims that there is need for a the Islamic ummah and Western new order established through regional colonists or Israel, but whether Islam leadership. In the different regional will be interpreted in a theo-political leadership models, Iran, Turkey and or political theological position. While even Egypt claim that they are trying to Iran is an unchallenged theo-political find regional solutions to the problems 142 Islam, Models and the Middle East of the region while rejecting external The Iranian Model: Shia 10 interference.