CEU eTD Collection A Comparative Analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina and EU Conditionality in Post-Conflict States: inPost-Conflict EU Conditionality In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Advisor: Professor Michael Miller Studies Nationalism Program Studies Central European University Central European Bianca DobrikovicBianca , Budapest, Master of Arts Submitted to Submitted 2012 CEU eTD Collection Abstract examining BiH as a case study examining BiHasa Cyprus. case study to comparatively of this paper is to explore EU’s the use of conditionality in a post-conflictstate by aim Thus, the states. of post-conflict accession prospective the into perspective insightful Also apost-conflictstate, ethnically and territorially Cyprusdivided, provides an state toenterthecurrent 27-member union. In 2004, Cyprus gainedfull membership. post-conflict first be the not BiH will fulfilled, are conditions if all However, framework. integration a conditional for necessary capacity institutional the have not does has been slow, lackingthe completion clarity of 174 criteria, as set by theand EU. As a result, consistency. BiH’s path toward accessionUnion membershipmembership since 2008.However, inthe isunion conditional upon Moreover, as a Bosnia andhas been for country Herzegovina European an official potential post-conflictcandidate state, BiH i CEU eTD Collection Bibliography ...... 56 Conclusion6: Chapter ...... 53 Chapter 5: Comparing conditionality inBiH and Cyprus ...... 49 Chapter 4:The caseof BiH ...... 38 Chapter 3:Background information to the caseofBiH ...... 26 Cyprusofcase Chapter 2: The ...... 15 Chapter1: Theoretical Framework 6 ...... Introduction ...... 1 Table of Contents Recommendations for further research further for Recommendations Limitations of the study Monitoring mechanisms Credibility ofobligations Credibility ofincentives Attempts at constitutional Analyzingreform: domestic factors Assessing BiH’sprogress from2008-2011 Bilateral Relations between BiHandthe EU framework aconstitutional Agreement: DaytonPeace The apeacetreaty DaytonPeaceAgreement: The Evolution oftheconflict The EU’sfailed use of conditionality Bilateral relationsbetweenCyprusandtheEU Obstacles tosolving problem the Evolution of the “problem” Using conditionality in post-conflict states Determining successful uses of conditionality Rationalist andconstructivist explanations ofconditionalityForms Defining conditionality review literature and structure Paper Research design hypotheses questionsand Research ...... 3 ...... 6 ...... 7 ...... 54 ...... 49 ...... 26 ...... 51 ...... 50 ...... 15 ...... 18 ...... 2 ...... 22 ...... 4 ...... 55 ...... 38 ...... 12 ...... 8 ...... 34 ...... 29 ...... 10 ...... 19 ...... 31 ...... 40 ii CEU eTD Collection fulfilled, BiH will notbe the first post-conflict state to enter the current 27-member union. In are if conditions However, all arrangements. institutional stable BiH,creating ‘Europeanize’ conflict state like BiH. With severe fragmentations, the EU may have more space to assumption is EU thatthe mayassumption leveragein have alegitimate more fostering An initial Peace Agreement. Dayton the peaceagreement, by a 17-year-old institutionalized status as a post-conflict state. consistency. and provisions (Djukic 2012). As a result, BiH’s path toward accession has been slow, lacking clarity 2000 Summit, andlastly, 2003Thessaloniki the Agenda. In total, BiH must fulfill 174 Agreement, the1997Regional Approach, 1999Stability the for Southeastern ,Pact the legalof including, frameworks, 1993Copenhagen the Criteria, 1995Dayton the Peace membership remains conditional upon BiH’s capacity meetto thecriteria as defined by a number Commission, will continue to do so “all the way to theirfuture accession” (2008: 1). Full framework of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), and according to the European (EU) membership since 2008. As a potential candidate country, BiH follows the the theoretical section. theoretical the 3 Nathalie Tocci’s in be found can resolution conflict on specifically, more role, EU’s onthe reading Further significant. extremely is 2 Albaniaare and (under UNSCR 1244/99) (Commission countries 2012). candidate potential other the BiH, to addition In . and , , Macedonia, of Yugoslav former the , are countries candidate Currently, requirements. conditional ofthe percentage alarger met having process, accession the in along further are countries but candidate states, member prospective 1 Introduction When speaking of EU , I refer to its credibility in the accessionprocess. This will be explored further in Although the focus of this paper is not onconflict resolution, the status of the two cases as post-conflict countries It is necessary to distinguish potential candidate countries from candidate countries. Both groups classify as Several factors may attribute to BiH’s tumultuous accession progress—one being its being progress—one BiH’saccession mayto tumultuous attribute factors Several (BiH) has been an official potential candidate country candidate potential official an been has (BiH) Herzegovina and Bosnia The EUand Conflict Resolution: Promoting peace inthebackyard 2 As a post-conflictstate, BiH has a unique history, delicately (2007) 3 transition in a post- . 1 for 1 CEU eTD Collection influence in transforming candidate countries. candidate intransforming influence of stability for membership. required me Thisleads tothefinal question: a number of anddomestic have prohibited factors international BiHfrom reaching the desired adhering to the conditions set by the EU? In line with the existing scholarship, Ihypothesize that seek to answer the following as : has BiH upheld its end of the responsibility, receptively BiH? Without placing adisproportionate amount of responsibility on sidethe EU,I the of will question:has EUeffectivelythe used its transformative ability foster stabilityto in post-conflict by examining BiH as a case study comparatively to Cyprus. Iwill seek toanswer the following questionsResearch andhypotheses itsof political deadlock. EU’s the criteria for BiH arelengthy and seemingly they failthorough, guide to thecountry out conditionality in BiH in an attempt to avoid a similar outcome to that of Cyprus. However, while strengthened has EU the is that assumption prevailing The communities. two the isolated further Rather than fix the political and economic problems of the country, the EU ossified tensions and conditionality in BiH.In Cyprus, EUrushed the adivided into ill-equipped state membership. states. The most apparent corollary of the Cypriot case to BiH is the EU’s tightening of divided, Cyprus aninsightful provides intoperspective prospective the accession of post-conflict 5 Commission. If specifically discussing the Greek Cypriot territory, Republic the of Cyprus (RoC) will be used. 4 culminated accession not conditionality inits potential power transformative 2004, Cyprus In her 2006 book, A note on terminology: I referto the memberstate as “Cyprus” in line with the reports of the European The aim of this paper is to explore the EU’s use of conditionality in a post-conflict state , Heather Grabbe uses the term “transformative power,” which means the EU’s enormous potential enormous EU’s the means which power,” “transformative term the uses Grabbe , Heather 4 gained full membership. Also a post-conflict state, ethnically and territorially The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and 5 inBiH? why , in fact, has 2 CEU eTD Collection Bosniak-Muslim-controlled territory. 7 current situation in BiH. evenly make comparisonbetween the two cases. Rather, the case of Cyprus serves as one lens inwhich to view the6 conditionality. In its analysis, this paper will rely on the existing scholarship, EU progress useof on EU’s the literature large body of tothe anewperspective willcontribute this approach similar outcomes, and such outcomes will be assessed. By focusing on two post-conflict states, within the existing literature as a significant failure of the EU. Applying it in BiH would to a sufficient basis for comparison. Moreover, the “Cyprus model” their past conflicts are significantly different. However, asmodern ethnic conflicts, they provide of this paperis not to draw sweeping generalization from the two cases. The two countries and BiH will be explored and analyzed through the lens provided by the Cypriot case study. The aim paper will use anasymmetrical design Research important in analyzing the current situation in BiH. monitor BiH’s progress effectively. Here, the EU’s use of conditionality in Cyprus becomes international level, the EU has failed to provide credible incentives, credible conditions, and inability passto a constitutional reform package, a vague provision of EU membership. On the shared vision for future BiH relations with the EU. This will be further explored in the country’s lines.along Because ethnic political nationalistof havefailed tendencies, construct a elites to has country stalemate negatively impacted the 2006elections, the since political dividing elites apolitical On the domesticintegration. level, BiH’s have obstructed factors international The “Cyprus model” in BiH would advocate forthe separate EU integrations of the Serb-controlled territory and Although I use a comparative analysis, emphasizing its asymmetrical nature is important. This paper will not In attemptingadequately to assess the above-mentioned questions, methodologically, this As mentioned above, I hypothesize that the answeris two-fold, in that both domestic and 6 comparative analysis. Although the focus will remain on BiH, 7 for EU integration is viewed is integration EU for 3 CEU eTD Collection Diez, Tocci, Akcali, and Kaymak, this chapter finds that the accession of Cyprus into the EU, Cyprus andtheEU, EU’sfailedthe use of conditionality in Cyprus.Relying on works the of case: evolution of its conflict, obstacles to solving the problem, bilateral relations between of European Central beenlargements the and Eastern countries will used. international and domestic provisions for success. In this section, examples from the most recent Anastasakis, Grabbe, and Phinnemore theorize the role of conditionality, focusing on post-conflict states will be explored. In their works, Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, Tocci, implications of the successes and failures of conditionality. Here, the use of conditionality in Then, rationalist andconstructivist will frameworks be presented to explain theoreticalthe to leading of define theorists political existingliterature. the according accession conditionality The aim member beto states. new will potential on conditionality of andEU accession effect concludes mainthe findings of this paper. atin chapter and BiH; sixth fault factors Cyprus the international the analyzes comparatively BiH domestic andanalyzesthe its fifth prospective integration; factors obstructingthe chapter provides background information on BiH; fourth the chapter explores the use of conditionality in case; Cypriot thirdthe the introduces secondchapter the in chapter framework; theoretical the Paper structure and literature review provide comprehensive empirical either evidence to supportor myrefute hypotheses. reports, and policy briefs. In the end, the utilized sources, along with my own analysis, will Next, Iwill present the Cypriotcase study. Iwill analyze fourmain areas of the Cypriot I will begin by my positing withinresearch the larger theoretical on framework usethe This paperis in structured firstsix chapters: the chapter contextualizes mainthe concepts 4 CEU eTD Collection 4). line with a Stabilization and Association Agreement and the European Partnership priorities” (2008 Progresscapacity Report: to implement Europeanstandards…to gradually approximate its legislation and policies with themembership, analyzes thesituation inBiH on the basis of the economic criteria formembership, and reviewsdescribed BiH’s relationsBiH “briefly between for report BiH progress and the the Union, Commission, the to analyzes According the situationReports.” “Progress in BiHtheir in in terms countries of thecandidate political criteria for 8 for furtherrecommendations will research be presented. the failures,mostly, toBiH’s status as a post-conflict state. attribute They in BiH. failed part, most the for has, conditionality political that find they works, section will also rely on recent scholarly literature by Aybet, Bieber, Dzhic, and Wieser. In their analysis on domesticthe prohibiting factors BiHfrom complying with conditionality. This succeeded and in which areas ithas failed stability. tocultivate From Iwillthis, conduct an current criteria for membership. Based on the reports, I will determine in which areas BiH has because in EUand2008, the BiH reached a new European Partnership, which outlines mostthe BiH’s progress in fulfilling or not fulfilling certain criteria. These years have been selected conditionality in BiH. I will analyze the EU’s progress reports understand the present-day situation. In the following chapter, I will explore the EU’s use of information because BiH’s very specific history must be thoroughly understood in order to currentinstitutional the of An country.isthe setup entire chapter for provided thebackground necessary backgroundinformation on evolutionthe of conflictthe in 1990s the and explaining intended. through the use of political conditionality,failed to solve the conflict on the as was Since 2002, the Commission has reported regularly on progress made by Western Balkan potential candidate and candidate potential Balkan by Western made progress on regularly reported has Commission the 2002, Since In the final chapter, conclusions will be drawn, and limitations of the study and From the Cypriotcase, I will delve into the primary case of BiH, first providing 8 from from 2008 until 2011totrack acquis , in 5 CEU eTD Collection precedence over other democratic bottom- goals and criteria” (Anastasakis 2008:366). democratic andcriteria” (Anastasakis other bottom-upprecedence over goals case of law rulethe BiH demonstrate, will is of weak;thus “the oflaw goals and take order as the states, post-conflict In civilsociety. and/or instead of elections law andorder prioritize conditionality challenges democratization in post-conflict states when some of the demands asymmetric power relationship of imposition, pressure, control, and threats” (2008: 366). Often, is “basedon an and unequal conditionality Anastasakis, to According democratization. instrument of EU conditionality is not always democratic; in fact, it can run counter to ‘democratic’ conditionality. For the aim of this paper, a distinction is necessary. Simply, the level. institutional the on transformation political of notion the emphasize to attempt an in conditionality political analyze exclusively will paper this exist, democratic principles” (Smith in 1998: 256 Tocci 2007: 10). While forms other of conditionality of advancement the and rights human of protection the to relating conditions of fulfillment the to anotherlinking,entailsbenefits state, the to orinternationalof perceived by a state organization, fulfillment of an attached condition (Tocci 2007: 10). More specifically,“political conditionality conditionality is a instrategy which a rewardis either orwithheld granted depending on the the civil society of the candidate and potential candidate countries. In its broadest sense, the accession process of the target state, transforming the governing structures, the economy, and Definingconditionality Framework 1:Theoretical Chapter Moreover, some of the existing scholarship equates ‘political’ conditionality with Since 1973, with each enlargement of the EU, conditionality has played a larger role in 6 CEU eTD Collection specified side payments(Tocci 2007: 11). exerted over time, not necessarily exclusively at the time of, orfollowing the delivery of, at opposing ends of the timeline. Thus,in between the two extremes, conditionality can be unilaterally” (Zalewskiin 2004 Tocci 2007: 11).Ex andante ex delineatepost thetwoextremes mayneedbe an torespected, lawfully agreement otherwise thecontracts be suspended “either conditions are fulfilled before the contract is signed [ex ante], or conditions specifiedin punishmentandcoercion”over (Tocci 2007: 10). 2004: 663).According tothe ,itprefers “cooperation and engagement conditions and withholds the reward if itfails tocomply” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier Under the EU’s strategy,“the EU pays the reward if the target complies with the means negative conditionality is used not in its sensetheoretical of reinforcementby punishment. of a punishmenta on target state for violating aspecified obligation (Tocci 2007: 10). infliction involves the conditionality conditions. negative Thus, contracted the with compliance membership in Cyprus. On the other hand, a ‘stick’ is used to punish a target state’s non- full in in andconditional will assistance conditional beBiH, case explored the studies: used by ‘carrots’ EUareeconomic the assistance andfull Each of membership. incentivesthese is referred to as a ‘carrot,’ inducing good behavior from the target state. The most common Within condition predetermined (Tocci 2007: 10). field the international of this reward relations, Positive conditionality promises a reward that is contingent upon the fulfillment of a ofconditionality Forms Ex ante and ex post refer to the timeline of the fulfillment of obligations. Tocci suggests, However, EU conditionality mainly follows a strategy of reinforcement by reward. This Political conditionality exists in four forms: positive, negative, ex ante, and ex post. 7 CEU eTD Collection the EU needs to have domestic allies in target countries, or the adjustment costs for target in approaches that tohaveinfluence,instance,suggest order rationalist countries. For candidate 2005). of conditionality is the EU’s monitoringeffective system (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 12).Also tothe credibility important of by theEU”(2011: conditionality merit-based application rewardif the meet fully they indeed requirements.Thus,credibility the ona consistent, depends rewards after meeting the EU’s demands. Yet they also must believe that they will only receive credibility has two sides; “the candidates must be certain that they will receive the promised country. First, on the EU’s side, conditionality must be credible. According to Sedelmeier, and both from EU the target effortthe isrequiring two-fold, Theanswer of conditionality? effectiveness the what determines rationalists, to According countries. andcandidate candidate theory deals explicitly with the EU’s use of conditionality as a tool to influence potential facilitating changes in response toEUadjustmentpressures” (SedelmeierRationalist 2011:11). domestic change. Formal domestic institutions and veto players are the main factors impeding or It by legal empowersdomestic topursue certain actors. offering actors and political resources “adaptationalthat, from pressure EUchangesthe the foropportunity utility-maximizingstructure enlargement. of EU framework larger the within conditionality accession contextualize political attempt to theory and constructivist theory. This section seeks to compare and contrast both theories in an explanations andconstructivist Rationalist The second answer toefficiency is in the domestic politics of the potential candidate and According to rationalists, the EU’s domestic impact follows a ‘logic of consequences,’ in frameworksdiscourse: rationalist current dominate literature, two the Within existing the 8 CEU eTD Collection open aslegitimate to persuasion EUpromotes open rulesthatthe andand toconsider the appropriate” be to likely more is government the regard, in high it holds or EU, the with identifies positively the accession process. According to constructivists, “if a candidate country, elites and publics, external imposition moreto of a mutual partnership. By allowing the candidate to assist in setting conditions and making rules, the process shifts from country. candidate or potential of the candidate if for the active participation itallows legitimized inare codifiedinternationally Moreover,(Freyburg 2009 Sedelmeier 2011:15). is process the whichthrough EUpromotes the its rules (Sedelmeier 2011:15).The ruleslegitimized are if they factor is the legitimacy of the rules that the EU promotes as well as the legitimacy of the process dependent upon actions from the EU and the target state. First, at the international level, the key likelihoodthe that this model persuasion of and socialization is effective? Again,itis two-sided, with the EU identity, which maintains its own set of values and interests. What, then,increases (Sedelmeier 2011:11).The social learning redefines process the domestic identity,it realigning as legitimate them they because regard EUnorms internalize actors domestic socialization, follows a ‘logic of appropriateness.’ According to constructivists, following a process of and 2009in Sedelmeier 2011:14). 2008 (Toshkov candidates in the law EU of transposition the on effect strong a have preferences of the target state to align with the rules of the EU. Both government capacities and political (Sedelmeier 2011:14).Moreover, administrative capacities play rolea significant in abilitythe rules” EU adopting from politics in domestic benefits intrinsic expect can in which governments must below (Sedelmeier 2011:14).Lowdomestic adjustment costs are “instances As with rationalist theory, constructivist theory recognizes the role of domestic politics in Conversely, while rationalist thought follows the ‘logic of consequences,’ constructivism 9 CEU eTD Collection generally overcome domestic resistance against the adoption of democratic and human rights human and of adoption democratic the against resistance domestic generally overcome material incentives of social learning, such as imitation, persuasion, or social influence do not in Union; the nothing hasof short that proven effective (Schimmelfennig2008:920).Non- crucial Evidently,(2008: 920). largestincentive the the EU can isoffer that of full membership are compliance for incentives international of kind and size the Schimmelfennig, to According with the contracted conditionality. However, not all incentives produce similar results. country. candidate/candidate EUandthe of potential both responsibilities of the establish aclearerunderstanding mentioned to above frameworks theoretical apply the internationalinteraction of factors and domestic (Schimmelfennig 2008:920).This section will ofconditionality uses successful Determining countries. andEU in candidate potential candidate the of power transformative potential the understand comprehensively to attempt in an theories applicable tothe situations on Therefore, ground. the the following section will pullfrom both in Aybet andBieber 2011:1916).Treating the twoframeworks as mutually is exclusive not learning (Finnemore and SikkinkRisse-Kappen 1998; and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig 2002 process of social that initiate to beadegree of rationalization hasto process…there learning theories. As Aybet and Bieber point out, “although the process of socialization occurs through a Epstein 2008; andDimitrova Rhinard2005). ‘resonance’between EUdemandsthe and rulesdomestic and political (Brosigdiscourses 2010; (Sedelmeier 2011:16).Within existingthe scholarship, is this termed a‘cultural match’ or As mentioned above, the EU must create credible incentives for the target state state to comply the target for credibleincentives create EUmustmentioned the above, As simultaneous the of importance the emphasize constructivists and rationalists Both In line with the recent works of scholars, this paper calls for the coalescence of the two 10 CEU eTD Collection rights. They found that overall the Regular Reports show the EU lacks clear benchmarks on Reports of Commission the to track candidatethe incountries’ progress minority protecting while foregoingit for its member (2003: states 12). The authors also analyzed the Regular paradox; the EU is attempting to enforce minority rights protection on states outside of the EU 1997Treaty the on EuropeanCommunitiesthe (TEC). Such ambiguity an highlights evident rightsgroup with Copenhagenthe criteria. This thenshifted back protecting to rights group with norm was evidentthe shift from protecting the individual of rights a minority protectingto the a to define constitutes national emergenceof the complicating minority.a European what Further documentsthe lack an overall consistency and clarity For instance,(2003: 1). documents the fail regard tominority protection.rights In analyzing EUtreaties from 1993 until find1997, they that research, Hughes and Sasse question the normalization of European and international norms with Eastern Europe show, in fact, the EU has not maintained such desired consistency. In their Recentresearch of conditionality usage in 2004and the 2007 enlargements in Central and (Johnson 2008; Schimmelfennig 2008:920).According toSchimmelfennig: compliance. 2008: 920).They emerge asfutile at attempts sufficiently incentivizing target countries into aid associationare or weak agreements, too (Kelley Vachudova 2005in 2004; Schimmelfennig financial as, such membership; EU full of threshold the below incentives material Even norms. 920). any country either positively or negatively on the basis of other considerations (2008: human performance rights of targetthe countriesit andought not todiscriminate against enlargementdecisions, EU then, the ought tobeguided onlyby democraticthe and freedoms,fundamental andtherule oflaw (Article norms’ 6,TEU). In makingits fundamental political ‘principles liberty,of democracy, respect for human rights and to adhering offer to‘anyEuropean ageneral state’ membership tothe perspective First, and in line with Article 49 of the (TEU), the EU ought consistency normative requires conditionality credible established, once Moreover, 11 CEU eTD Collection implementing the contracted requirements for membership. The case of BiH will demonstrate areweakened states rendering byinefficientcentral them incapable governments, of post-conflict often, most However, criteria. said implementing of capable in place, is government it does not deliberately state this within the list of criteria, it assumes that a strong central accession process. First, the EU assumes the target state has a strong central government. While 2011). This can be to attributed two assumptionsmakes the to EU prior state’s targetthe states in post-conflict Using conditionality compliance costs are low for domestic actors, will political conditionality succeed. of credibilitythe membershipof incentives (Schimmelfennig, etal. Thus, 2006:240). only when the security or integrity of the target state, domestic actors are less likely to comply—regardless power (Vachudova 2005:4in Schimmelfennig 2008:921). In addition,if compliance threatens requisites emerged as costly too illiberalfor ruling Compliance elites. undermined theirhold on 921). For instance,in , , and , complying with membershipEU decreases evenand sometimes blocks institutional success” (2004: 175in 2008: Schimmelfennig inparliament opposition nationalist strong or leadership “authoritarian Kelley, to According levels of responsibility. EU success is contingent upon favorable domestic conditions as well. Sasse 2003). on the integration of minorities, almost to indicate a preference for assimilation (Hughes and andemphasis others over minority groups arethepreference of certain from reports the emerge superficially them integrationthe pushing through Moreover,process. other concerns that measuring progress. The reports are designed to render each candidate country as a success story, EU conditionality whenappliedproblems poses states post-conflict to and(Aybet Bieber countries also mustcertain take on candidate/candidate potential Switching perspectives, 12 CEU eTD Collection constitutes the majority in the country. Political leaders within fear centralization within RS the leaders atighter majority in Political the country. the constitutes government. Although a census has been not sincetaken 1991,the Bosniak population still supporting adecentralized government andthe elites in Federationthe supporting acentralized should have. Opinions follow ethno-nationalist lines, with the elites of the Serb Republic Within the country, political elites disagree on the amount of power the central government movingfurther awayfrom a point of compromise, diverging alonglines. ethno-nationalist or most other post-conflict states for that matter. On the other hand, political elites in BiH are to achieving astable democracy Such (1977: 31). a prerequisite has not normalized within BiH, emergeasprerequisites compromise” elites among the to andawillingness attitude “amoderate groups makesegmented of However,society hegrand coalition (1977). upLijphart’s suggests, elites in ensuring stability in a divided society is crucial. Political elites representing the various overemphasis on the role of political elites. According to Arend Lijphart, the role of political However, in post-conflict states, conditionality, alargely top-down measure, fails because of its entity level” (2011:1913). engaging with state-level norms, the institution usually finds itself engaged in ethnic norms at the areweak, institutions state-level andinstead because differently societies inof post-conflict (2011: 1806).Moreover, Aybetand Bieberconclude “processes conditionality of work areagencies hinderedby inimplementing weaknesses criteria the their by defined ” and respective institutions government central its the confined“due authority, for to accession,” emergesfurther progress obstacletowards as“an to government Herzegovina’s central this point. According toDzihic and Wieser, the limited functionality of Bosnia and The second assumption is that a unified political elite base exists within the country. 13 CEU eTD Collection conditionality. First, the case of Cyprus will be presented in the next chapter. areatforfault unsuccessful factors thatmorefinding further, this will case studies explore divided political elite prevent the state from advancing in the compliance process. The following as in conditionalitypost-conflict states, emerges largely ineffectual.as Weak institutions and a cases, some In outcome. toachieve thedesired inbe order applied carefully must conditionality that demonstrates literature the However, compliance. into countries andcandidate candidate as are based. influential incentivizingserves potential Theoretically,an conditionality tool, 2009: 6). of governing wouldpowers render them ineffectual an minority (International Crisis Group In sum, this chapter serves as the theoretical foundation on which the subsequent chapters 14 CEU eTD Collection Diez notes: Asby used Diez. employs terminology paper the this to avoidIn an simplification, used. attempt incentury. undercolonial early twentieth the British rule interests conflicting of emergence the with beginning island, the on “problem” modern the analyze exclusively will section communities in dateback to Cyprus periodthe of Ottoman ruleHowever, (Tocci 2007: 31). this ofthe“problem” Evolution of EU, the and finally, conclude by analyzing the EU’s failures in Cyprus. first briefly summarize the conflict, present the obstacles to solving the problem, discuss the role However, in order to adequately assess the current status of the post-conflict member state, I will (Anastasakis 2008: 373).This seems tobethe case whenanalyzinglengthy BiH’s list of criteria. member states they become before in solve countries conflicts ethnic to conditionality unresolved conflictprovides a strong argumentfor increased the use of political strict its post-accession The caseof and focal of Cyprus this paper. point comparative serve asthe has generated relevant findings on the role of conditionality in divided societies. Thus,it will Chapter 2: The case of Cyprus Recent research on the use and effects of political conditionality in post-conflict Cyprus (Bahcheli 1996:34inand Rizopoulos Diez 2000) islatter because inappropriate theyinsist ‘problem’in thatthe was solved 1974. on the island is mostly referred to as the ‘Cyprus problem.’ To the Turkish side, even the by harsh reactions. Bothin academicthe literature and amongst politicians, the situation In fact, there are many histories told, and even using the label ‘conflict’ will often be met To provide a short summary of the history of the Cyprus conflictis easier said than done. When discussing the past and present situations in Cyprus, careful terminology must be Tensions between Greek-speaking Orthodox communities and Turkish-speaking Muslim 15 CEU eTD Collection Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. According toTocci: the basis for the 1960 Constitution and were supplemented with three treaties: the Treaty of (Tocci In 1960, 2007: 32). Cyprus gained . TheZurich- becameagreements and London,which established for framework the an independent Republic of Cyprus (RoC) Greek Cypriotcommunity, the Turkish and community Cypriot inreached agreements Zurich the , Turkey, the , from year, of representatives one the course over Greek and TurkishCypriots, Britishthe shifted their position independence.on Startingin 1959, By this point, violence had escalated. Recognizing the need for immediate comprise between the two separate zones, aGreek sector in the south and Turkish sector in the north (Tocci 2007: 31). intoa movement of their own, termed “.” Taksim called for the of Cyprus into community had ossifying GreekCypriotagainst the tensions. prior dire effects, movement(Tocci 2007: 31).The hasty mobilizationBritish of Turkish the Cypriotcommunity 18% constituted of total the population,Cypriot by in supported Turkey, their anti- 1950s. In response, the British mobilized the Turkish Cypriotcommunity, which, at the time, (Tocci 2007: 31).Their for efforts enosisan led to armed struggle against Britishthe in mid-the , initiated a movement for unification with Greece. They termed the movement “enosis” the British, the , viewing themselves as one people with from the achieve an unconventional form of liberation. Rather than advocate for full independence from 1920, because of their dissatisfaction with British rule, the Greek Cypriotcommunity sought to Although difficult, scholars have identified 1920 as the starting point of the modern problem. In Republic waslaid in down 1960Constitution,the which established a bi-communal guarantor status to Greece, Turkey, and the UK in Cyprus. The basic structure of the British military bases, 950Greek troops, 650Turkish troops on island,the and entrusted The treaties explicitly ruled out both enosis and taksim. They provided for two sovereign transpired movement anti-enosis Turkish Cypriot, Turkish joint the 1950s, late the By 16 CEU eTD Collection interference in Cyprus culminated in in interference Cyprus culminated July the 15 Greek fighting. ofinter-communal round andarenewed constitutional order a collapsethe of losing Turkish power,the Cypriot leadership, backed byAnkara, proposal, rejected the triggering to Opposed arrangements. power-sharing existing the abrogate would changes constitutional state with Turkish Cypriotminority rights (Tocci 2007: 32). In essence, the proposed suggested transforming republicfrom the aGreekCypriota bi-communal unitary to partnership amendments The Constitution. the to amendments for proposal a presented Republic the in generous size (Tocci 2007: 32). contested concessionthe to theTurkishgranted Cypriotcommunity, itas over- perceiving dissatisfaction. They regarded them as insufficient in their pursuance of enosis, and they at expressedmany reached the Despite institutional level, agreements the Greek Cypriots have beenmadebring to sides thetwo togetherandwork towardde-securitization 2000). (Diez ethnically cleansed” (2007: 32).Since 1975,plenty mainlyattempts, of by Unitedthe Nations, entirely areaswerealmost “both Tocci, According to from south. the weredisplaces Cypriots 160,000 GreekCypriots were displacedfrom north andthe approximately 60,000 Turkish andnorth south,roughly along the “ Line,” aceasefireline established by UNinthe 1963. Guarantee. Turkey occupied 37% of the island’s territory, enforcing the partition between the Turkish forces invaded Cyprus onJuly 20, 1974,invokingits rights under theTreaty of military In regime island andthe on Greekresponse, (Tocci 2007: 32). the extended dictatorship As dissatisfaction with the arrangement grew, by , the first president of autonomy within thefive largest municipalities. (2007:32) enshrined in community representation and power sharing at the center, and communal communal autonomy. Rather than through territorial separation, bi-communality was partnership state. It was a hybrid consociational setup with elements of extra-territorial By 1960constitutional1975, the was completelyorder abandoned. Between 140,000 and th coup of which coup 1967, ousted existingthe 17 CEU eTD Collection are complex identities. According to Diez:According to identities. are complex conflict is based on two exclusive identities, Greek Cypriotand Turkish Cypriot. However, both theproblem tosolving Obstacles status for bothsides, ensured by federal a weak authority (Mirbagheri 1998: 123-4in Diez 2000). arrangement. Conversely, Turkish the Cypriotparty a confederation,supports guaranteeing equal Greek Cypriotcommunity, a federal supports modeled solution, after 1960constitutionalthe vision of the island. The official government, comprised exclusively of representation from the arrangements in attempting to solve the Cyprus problem, the two sides disagree on a shared Since 1964,itserves as the only authoritylegitimate on islandthe (Tocci 2007: 33).As for future act (Tocci 2007: 32).In south,theGreekCypriotsthe retain titlethe Republicthe of of Cyprus. recognizes the zone as a . The international community regards it as a secessionist State of Cyprus in is1975, nowthe Turkish Republic of Cyprus.Northern Only Turkey roughly zones along Green the Line. Thenorthern firstdeclared zone, Turkish the Federated conditionality. through power transformative potentially EU’s the on focuses which section, following in the analyzed thoroughly more be will attempts superficial and inconsequential successes and a myriad offailures” Resolution(2007: 34). claims,“successive rounds of negotiations since 1974have amounted tolittle more than a few However, according Diez, to all have failed toachieve their desiredTocci outcomes (2000). most clear terms, ‘Cyprus must belong, and naturally belongs, where its history, Representatives in February CleridesGlafkos 1998, President put representationthis in European civilization. In his inaugural theto address House (Greek)Cypriot of Cypriotidentity is constructed as naturally European, and Cyprus as the cradle of Two significant characteristics emerge as obstacles in the resolution process. First, the two into divided is still island The in astalemate. culminated has problem the Currently, 18 CEU eTD Collection by the Greek CypriotRepublic of Cyprus, although in its official documents, the EU incorrectly Cyprus’launched toemphasizeimportant exclusively that accession process was and conducted an Association Agreement, which was later complemented by a Protocol in 1987. However, itis EU the and Cyprus between relations Bilateral accepting RoCsovereignty (2006: 14). into Turkey coerce to talks accession regardingpower Turkish useits veto to Cyprus threatens inevident vetothe issue. Kaymak, According to GreekCypriot the leadership of Republicthe of 2002: 12). It is this modernism of the conflict that the EU framework promises to help to overcome (Diez He claims: arediscursive. characteristics the official Turkish-Cypriotposition (Diez 2002: 12). According to Diez, both of these island as a whole, the official Greek-Cypriotposition, or it rests with the individual communities, as becoming (2000). European” Cyprus being as has European tobeseen in to contrast representationthe of Turkey Diez contrasts the Cypriotidentity with the Turkish identity,in that “the representation of Bilateral relations between Cyprus and the EU began in 1972, when both parties signed Today, the problem has culminated in a total isolation of the two communities. This is (Katzensteinin state. sovereign’ 1987 Diez 200:12) inunification 1990, which characterize theFederal Republic of a as ‘semi- some resemblance to the status of the Allied Powers in Western Germany before powers, Greece, Turkey, and Britain as laid out in the Treaties of Guarantee, which bears Ironically, Cyprus never really was sovereign, given the influence of the guarantor with itthe asazero-sum game; either rests is often conceptualized Second, (2000) geography, and civilization, valuessocial have destined itto be—in Europe.’ united 19 CEU eTD Collection first three, asmentioned above,Cyprusfulfilledits obligations. However, regarding problem the related, and prospects for a political settlement regarding the Cyprus problem. In terms of the For Cyprus, the EU categorized criteria requirements into four areas: political, economic, acquis- Commission concluded: itsbuilding. final In onCyprus’ Regular Report accession, progress toward European the focusing predominately on adopting andimplementing EUlegislation andinstitutional capacity Accession negotiations officially started on March 30,1998 andincluded 29sectorial chapters, island. whole the of name in the made application the considered Commission European significantly, only according funds3% of toTurkish (BicakCypriots 1997in Tocci 2007: 40). financial of protocol its1977 awarded20% of funds toTurkish Cypriots. In 1984, this decreased community also experienced a significant decrease in financial assistance. For instance, the first benefited the GreekCypriotcommunity. being In addition to excluded, Turkish the Cypriot represent wholethe island”(2008:185). Thus, all incentives attached toconditionality only application at the time, on the grounds that the government of the Republic of Cyprus did not leadershipin Turkishthe Republic of questioned thelegitimacy of the refers Republicto the of Cyprus simply “Cyprus.”as Ackali claims,“the Turkish-Cypriot accession 123) accession negotiations. (2002: in ithas line its tocontinue preparations, madeneeds commitments the in with the Cyprus accession, leading to period Inthe timeframe. envisaged with the accordance considers Cyprusthat willbe able assumeto the obligations ofmembership in in implementing the commitments it has made in the negotiations, the Commission the level of alignment that Cyprus has achieved at this point in time, and its track record to be addressed.in Bearing mindtheprogress achieved 1998Regular sincethe Report, need issues These and as regards oil electricity with Directive. stocks the legal alignment and with in totheestablishmenthave of the fishing vesselregister, regard the occurred delays However, negotiations. in the made has it commitments the meeting generally In accessionthe negotiations, 28chapters have been provisionally closed. Cyprus is In 1990, the Republic of Cyprus officially appliedmembership, for andin 1993, the 20 CEU eTD Collection of accession as a tool to foster resolution, specifically,focusing on the EU’s failure to achieve its entirety of the Cypriotconflict resolution process. Rather, it will focus on the EU’s attempted use Cypriotmodel for accession (Akcali 2008: 185; Erlap and Beriker2005:182). its theEUasan interestedsecondary Greek following adherencetothe sphere, categorizes party has and will remain an external third part. However, the dominant discourse within the academic more involved second party, with clear interests. The European Commission argues that the EU whether the EU has served as a third party, clearly outside of the scope of the conflict, or as a myriad of problems prior toaccession 2006:4).Second,(Kaymak acurrentdebate exists over solve UNinitsthe to the mandate rolein mediation,and supported adirect avoided taking settlement (Kaymak 2006: 4). Therefore, the EU has assumed more of a supportive role. The EU Unitedthe principally has Nations for been mediating actor the acomprehensive responsible decades, has For throughout thenegotiating EU as notthe process. acted mediator primary the se, when failings, “EU” per speak of hesitate to First, scholars in regards. two highly contested decades-long problem did not seem necessary, and was assumed to follow member-state status. communities,fostering aninevitable compromise.Thus, requiring aconditional resolution to the Evidently, the EU maintained the view that the act of accession would bring the two claiming: process, conditionality between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the Commission de-emphasized its role in the To address the first issue, this paper does not seek to exaggerate the role of the EU in the Within the existing literature, the role of the EU in the Cyprus problem has emerged as precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevantfactors.’ (2002: 25) negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be taken without the above being a European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession of the EU position: ‘…a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the The conclusions of the at in December 1999 remain the basis 21 CEU eTD Collection in the Commission’s 1993 opinion, which stated in 1993opinion,accession whichstated Commission’s the negotiationsthat would“asbegin that a settlement was a precondition of accession (Tocci 2007: 45). This understanding was clear happened.launchwhatat beginning, the Cyprus’ In the EUstipulated the accession process, of would imply that the Union chose to side with one of the conflicting parties. That is precisely Undoubtedly,if the EU either chose to require a settlement or to not require a settlement, it strengthen theirbargaining hand in inter-communal negotiations (Akcali 2008: 186). supported immediate accession, without reaching asettlement, because they hoped it would from those of the Greek Cypriots (Akcali 2008: 186). On the other hand, Greek Cypriots settlement of conflictthe membership,before anddemanded negotiations separate with EU the follow entrance into Union. the From beginning,the Turkish leadershipCypriot a supported prospective EU accession is whether or not a solution to the Cyprus problem should precede or power. its potential transformative de-legitimized that of conditionality use arbitrary, and attimes consistent hindered its potential positive impact. More specifically, it was the EU’s inconsistent, disposal—that full of (Tocci membership 2007: 39-40).However, its inability remain to throughout the process. In the case of Cyprus, the EU offered the most influential incentive at its consistency maintain normative and state for thetarget incentives providemust credible ofconditionality The EU’sfaileduse This will be analyzed further this throughout section. secondary party. EUasaninterested the considering Beriker, and of Akcali Erlap and research follows the issue, forpaper this the second As process. theaccession through intended objectives The mainissue Greekand the separating Turkishcommunities regarding Cypriot As outlined earlier, according to the theoretical framework, successful conditionality 22 CEU eTD Collection accession path (Tocci (Tocci path accession 2007: 45). years later, the Commission claimed that the conflict posed a “serious obstacle” to Turkey’s own comprehensive settlement of Cyprusthe problem” (Council in 2001: 13 Tocci Two 2007: 45). UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a However, Turkey’s 2001Accession Partnership Turkey that stated “stronglyshould, the support To the Greek Cypriot community, the Commission deemphasized the relevance of the conflict. strongly itrequested of Turkey in its own pre-accession Thisprocess. seems hypocritical.quite Turkish Cypriotperspective. While the Union did not force Cyprus to reach a compromise, it Turkey plays avital in role history,the especially when determining EUcredibility from the process. accession prospective inlostactor even It more resolution the process. leverageandcredibility Turkey’s during 185). By only supporting the interests of one party, EUlost the crucial leverage inits role as an from shifted interested being third of to thatof an that party secondary an interested (2008: one” on EU pointthe From this before accession. settlement for theneed aCyprus to references 45). According to Akcali,from this, “the EU abandoned its impartial position by deleting all negotiations with Cyprus couldbegina settlementwithout being aprecondition. (Tocci 2007: accession requirements entirely. The Commission’s 1997 Agenda stated that accession settlement. conditional compromise, the Commission added an addendum,which allowedflexibility more in reaching a soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer” (Tocci 2007: 45). In an attempt tobalance a As was mentioned earlier, closely identify with mainland Turkey. Thus, wasAnother turn taken, andby 1997, requiringwas dropped asettlement from the 23 CEU eTD Collection the EU exhibited its own structural weaknesses, specifically, in the field of conflict incentives embedded within integration the process (2008:196). However, in casethe of Cyprus, partieslargely their andwork bringing tonegotiate because of differences together” conflict the Republic of Cyprus. According to Akcali,“the EU has significant potential to act as a catalystin chose to hastily lump conflict resolution with the EU accession of only the Greek-Cypriot reducingthus, its ability positivelyto influence the creation of a settlement (Tocci 2007: 41). in EU failed tooffer fashion,benefits valuable a coordinated parties conflicting sufficiently the delivered. Consequently, the EU’s influence in the Republic of Cyprus disappeared. In sum, the By finalizing Cyprus’full membership, finalthe incentive that the EUhad to offer was EU. leveragereturning tothe organizations, international in faith of restoration new a demonstrates Plan Annan the for support accession inprocess years” 41). Although those (2007: brokered UN, the TurkishCypriotthe 2002 and not have2004, would without occurred risingthe momentum in Turkey’s inmobilization northern Cyprus and the policy shiftin , which placetook between late states, one Greek Cypriot and otherthe TurkishCypriot (Akcali 2008: 186). of the Cyprus issue, it proposed the creation of a United Cyprus Republic under a loose federation of two constituent 9 “Turkey beganand Turkish Cypriots converging in support of Annanthe Plan. opening Turkey’s accession talks (Tocci 2007: 41).Tocci as adirectsuggests that result of this, Following the European Council, adate was set for examining the possibility of importance. In2002,Turkey’s forcandidacy membershippotential momentum. gained signifies process accession own Turkey’s Again, its leverage andcredibility. impacted The was the creation of former Secretary-General of the UN, . A comprehensive resolution A comprehensive Annan. Kofi UN, ofthe Secretary-General of former creation the was Plan Annan The In sum, the EU had the opportunity to cultivate a stable settlementin Cyprus. However, it But, Tocci suggests, “at the same time, the EU lost its leverage in the south” (2007: 41). The EU’s inconsistency is also reflected in its mismanaged timing, which severely which timing, mismanaged in its reflected isalso inconsistency EU’s The 9 Themass 24 CEU eTD Collection chapters. viable alternative. The case of BiH willbe more discussed thoroughly in followingthe two accession has been mentioned as an alternative for BiH’s own integration, it does not emerge a between theconflicting parties” (Akcali 2008: 196).Thus, although “Cyprusthe model” EU for at theCrossroads Tocci’s and Diez’s to Refer 196). 2008: (Akcali communities diverse ethnically two the between 10 transformation. More specifically, the EU failed because of its own deficiencies in tackling socio-economic inequalities in Cyprus in inequalities socio-economic tackling in deficiencies own its of because failed EU the specifically, More 10 forfurther reading. This was demonstrated in its fostering of “undistorted communicative Cyprus: A Conflict 25 CEU eTD Collection Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. 11 Ottoman rule in the 15 no experience independenceof inits modern history 1992 to prior (Bieber 2006:5).It underwent oftheconflict Evolution for BiH.agenda integration EU’sprospective of the understanding further andfor a necessary are relevant country.the Both areas:regardingtwo conflict the of 1990sandinstitutional the current of makeup the regarding Chapter 3: Background information tothe case of BiH Ramet, clashes between Serbs and non-Serbsin Bosnia began in August 1991 (2005: 126). But, between jointthe Serb-Yugoslav forces and Croatian forces (Bieber 2006:26). According to Specifically, along its northern and southern borders with , small scale fighting took place state, Yugoslav the of out and Croatia declaration from independence of However,Yugoslavia. evenbefore Bosniafollowed linked conflicts” (2006: 26).Officially, warbegan the in April 1992, followingof Bosnia’s will solely focus onthemost recentconflictin 1990s. the itWar,was a republic within the Yugoslav Socialist Federation. Despite its I tumultuousness, Slovenes (Bieber 2006: 8). Finally,in its last period of cohabitation, following the Second the end of I, it became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and For further reading on the breakup of Yugoslavia, refer to Sabrina Ramet’s Sabrina to refer of Yugoslavia, breakup the on reading further For Prior to assessing BiH’s accession path, background information must be presented in Bosnia, like Cyprus, has had a tumultuous history.In fact, like Cyprus, Bosnia has had According to Bieber, “the war in Bosnia is the sum of a number of overlapping and inter- th century and Austro-Hungarian rule in the early 20 11 parts of parts of hadBosnia begun warfare. experiencing Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly th century. Following 26 CEU eTD Collection Karadzic’s made of because by a decision referendum Radovan the of in Serbs boycotted Bosnia of majority results pollthe The the are However, overwhelming independence. highly contested. independent” (in Ramet 2005:10). The producedvote aclearmajority in favor of Bosnian Commission, Badinter According2005: 10). a (Ramet independence Bosnian tothe concerning referendum conducted 16 Yugoslavia. on Conference the to advice Yugoslavia. Set up in 1991 by Councilthe of Minister of the European Economic Community, itprovided legal Presidency. Bosnian rotating of the member Bosniak first 15 the as role the assumed he 1996, In Yugoslavia. 14 Bosnian Muslim community (Bieber2006: xv). It has since been the primary term in legal documents. 13 Most Serbs. Orthodox and Croats Muslims [inCatholic BiH],as most inhabitantsfrom of Socialist Yugoslavia, religion have not been religious” (2006: xv). different the by solely, not but mainly, distinguished 12 Muslims, TheforcesRamet “Bosnian” 126). refers that arethe Bosnian (2005: collaborating” to headdeclared of Province ofWestern Autonomous the Bosnia, fighting variously eachotheror loyal to the elected government of Alija Izetbegovic, and forces loyal to Fikret Abdic, self- eventually became a four-sided conflict, with Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian forces reach. For the most part, the actors mobilized along ethnic lines. According to Ramet, “the war ethnic tensions in BiH, rendering a solution to the current political stalemate rather difficult to contributed factors other toits severity and duration. the However, conflictundoubtedly ossified (Ramet earnest 2005: 126). in began Bosnia inApril on Serbian the assault that until 1992 itwas not official declaration the Karadzic established the Serbian Democratic Part of Bosnia and served as the first president of . of Republika president first the as served and of Bosnia Part Democratic Serbian the established Karadzic on Conference Peace of the Commission Arbitration the as to referred also is Commission Badinter The In 1991, Izetbegovic served asthepresident of Republic the of Bosnia and Herzegovina under thePresidency of the to referring when ‘Bosniak’ name the adopt to chose intellectuals Muslim of Bosnian congress a 1993, In nation a but group, religious a describe not does “Muslims Bieber, to according terminology: on Anote Priorits declarationto independence,of in March 1991,Alija Izetbegovic’s I hesitate to categorically ‘ethnicize’ the war in BiH. Throughout the war, a number of 12 termed also Bosniaks. termed also 16 Serbian Democratic Party of (RametBosnia 2005: 10). 15 “a referendum was a prerequisite for international recognition of 13 14 government 27 CEU eTD Collection 1995, approximately 215,000 people (Duijzings 2007in Murphy 2010: 10).By the time the warofficially ended in November 8,000 estimated an toll and of five death afteraperiod the reached days executed, forces were 100 kilometers from Srebrenica. However, those who fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serb intointending hills, the toreach Bosniak-controlledthe city Tuzla,of whichis approximately were separated from their families with the forced aid of UN peacekeeping soldiers. Some fled men boys and status, “safe-haven” so-calledDespite town’s the war. massacre of the appalling 126). 18 17 Mladic, under General Ratko Serbforces, Bosnian inSrebrenica, which theirwas protection guaranteed under UNsupervision. However, in 1995, Mostar. The UN created “safe havens” for Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Croat and Muslim forces in western Bosnia, culminating in the destruction of much of the city of began over discussions partitionthe Bosnia of (Bieber 2006:27). Muslim property and Croat (Bieber 2006:26).InMay 1992, Croatandof Serbpolitical leaders control, employing drastic measures, such as,mass murder, expulsion, and destruction of bring large a Bosnia, to eastern andnorthwestern seeking part of underBosnian theirterritory (Bieber 2006:26).Also during the , Bosnian Serb forces “engaged in a war inof conquest” officials and equipment, sieged Sarajevo. The siege lasted until the end of the war in late 1995 Among 215,000the people killed, roughly 160,000 were Bosniak, 30,000 Croat, and 25,000 Serb (Ramet 2005: war. ofthe duration the throughout forces Serb Bosnian the commanded Mladic However, the violence didsubside. not In1993,new rounds offighting beganbetween inAs thewarescalated Bosnian by 1992, largely Serb forces, Yugoslav army constituted 18 people hadbeen killed (Ramet 2005:126). 17 entered Srebrenica, committing their most their committing Srebrenica, entered 28 CEU eTD Collection Bosnian state to institutions of the international community. The table below presents a brief a presents below table The community. international the of institutions to state Bosnian (1999: 34).The eleven of annexes Dayton gave significantandinfluential powerover the involvement of international organizations in institutionpolitical building and governance” involvement. According to Chandler, Dayton “stressed the necessity for the long-term international substantial of basis the so on did it sovereignty, its BiH granted Dayton Although Chandler 1999:43). The goal of peace the was to: agreement “the political of project democratizing of reconstructing Bosnia, 1996 asociety”in (Bildt related to infact, were, Agreement Dayton Peace the to majority annexes 9). The of (1999: treaty demarcation, the Dayton Peace Agreement, went far beyond the goals of a traditional peace International Crisis Group, in addition to calling for acease-fire, arms reduction, and boundary 38).Accordingafterthe 1999: yearsofwar state (Chandler to accountable anddivision” for opportunity Bosnians “creatingthe establishBosnian sovereignty, to ademocratically in of forward development major step the asmarking a celebrated was Agreement Dayton governments of Bosnia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia, ended the war (Chandler 1999: 1). Initially, the The DaytonPeaceAgreement: a peacetreaty the country.the (International 1999:13-14) Crisis Group arrested and turned over to The Hague, and all foreign fighters and soldiers were to leave commission for the protection of national monuments. Indicted war criminals were to be were return wasn’t possible. Joint public corporations were to be established, as was a were to be allowed to return to their homes, or to be compensated for theirloss in cases commission would enforce international human rights obligations.human rights standards,Displaced and allow persons freedom of movement. The state’s human rights and adopt international under international hold adhereauspices, democratic elections to multi-ethnic entities. This wouldunified state a functioning have central government, Create a new country, the unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprised of two On November 21, 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement (Dayton), initialed by the 29 CEU eTD Collection mechanism mechanism in from caseof deviation Dayton Peacethe framework of defined Agreement action” “correction as a function Bonn powers the Therefore, andsustain reconciliation. produce failed to 1996elections the ethnic However, to thestatus-quo asopposed nationalists. moderates, members of PIC believed that democratic elections would foster the election of political Bonn Peace Implementation Council Conference in 1997 as a result of the 1996 elections. The provided with nolegally binding todoso. powers legallyThus, binding were given powers at the but office the was peaceprocess, of the implementation the monitor intendedOHR was to Moreover, the tenth annex created the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Initially, the Refer to the map below, which depicts the inter-entity boundary line separating the two entities. Srpska(RS). theSerb controlled controlled Republika of Federation BiH and Muslim-Croat the Annex 2 established inter-entity the boundary which line, divided thecountry into two entities: Annex Figure 3.1. The Dayton Peace Agreement: Annex by Annex included. power institutional in international and extensive reached Dayton the of agreements overview the 11 10 Civilian Civilian Implementation 10 8 4 2 9 7 6 5 3 1 From Dayton, a couple of the agreements must be emphasized. As was mentioned above, Commission to UNESCO Preserve National Monuments Bank Central Court Constitutional Constitution Inter-Entity Boundary Line International TaskForce Police International Commission on Public Corporations andDisplacedPersons Refugees Human Rights Arbitration Elections Regional Stabilization Military Aspects Area of Authority IMF ECHR Representative High UN NATO ECHR OSCE OSCE NATO OSCE; Council Europe of UN Representative High UN Development Reconstruction/ for Bank International Bodywith Institutional (Source:Chandler 1999: 45) Power 30 CEU eTD Collection House of Peoples and the . The House of Peoples is made up of 15 out the policies and decisions of BiH in and for reporting to the Parliamentary Assembly. Ministry of Civil Affairs. Together, the Chairman and the Ministers are responsible for carrying Communication and Transportation, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, and the of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, the Ministry of Relations, the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry ministers. The Council of Ministers is made up of nine Ministries: the Ministry of Foreign the approval of the House of Representatives. The Chairman, then, nominates the other requires then which Chairman, the nominates Presidency The government. of head the as serves from the Federation, and a Croat from the Federation. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers members: from RS,aBosniak the aSerb of is three comprised Thecollective presidency state. mechanisms. Within the branch, the three-member presidency serves as the head of balancing allfurther power sharing along ethniclines. peoples,” carefully as “threeand constituent the Croat) Serb, of(Bosniak, BiH groups ethnic The Constitution was agreed at Dayton as the fourth annex. It codified the three predominant Thea constitutional DaytonPeaceAgreement: framework power the to twothe entities andvarious international institutions. based on ethnic exclusivity.With a weak central government, Dayton provided the majority of state a highly fragmented created Peace Agreement Dayton sum, In legal influence. the exert (Bojkov 2003: 15).If domestic parties fail reachan to agreement, theHigh Representative may Within the legislative branch, BiH’s bi-cameral Parliamentary Assembly consists of the of consists Assembly Parliamentary bi-cameral BiH’s branch, legislative the Within power-sharing employed Constitution the level, institutional the of facets all In The Dayton served many includingPeace Agreement asastate constitution. purposed, 31 CEU eTD Collection the legislative and executive bodies of of BiH. bodies executive and legislative the information. more for www.icty.org to Refer experienced.” and they witnessed horrors the to opportunity an victims establishment in 1993it has irreversibly changed the landscape its of “since international humanitarian ICTY, to the law and provided According 1990s. inthe inthe conflicts the during place took that crimes war with 19 ICTY. atthe traffic the alleviating security (CIA World Fact Book). A War Crimes Chamber also opened in March 2005, aimed at national or independence, political question BiH's sovereignty, that in entities the cases initiated andjudges international hasjudges, seven casesstate-levelover jurisdiction to related andlaw European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The BiH State Court, comprised of 44 national (four from Federationthe from and two RS) and international three judges by appointed the employsensure Court equal to is quotas It ethnic representation. madeupof judgessix national Chamber. Similar toinstitutions within executivethe andlegislative branches, the Constitutional vote for by elected four-yearpopular terms. Representative consists of 42 members; 28 from the Federation and 14 from RS. Members are House of Representative and RS’s National Assembly serveto four-year terms. The House of delegates; five Bosniak,five and Croat, five Serb, members with elected by Federation’sthe The International Criminal Tribunal for formerthe Yugoslavia(ICTY) is a court of law that deals Lastly, BiH has three courts: a Constitutional Court, a BiH State Court, and a War Crimes 19 Refer to the chart below for acomprehensive breakdown of 32 CEU eTD Collection are further obstructed by the prevalence of power sharing. With power sharing among the three Moreover, decision-making 5). ( processes Commission 2003: decision-making processes is Peace Agreement, Dayton very bureaucracies blocking with of complex an overabundance As the chart more clearly demonstrates, the institutional setup of BiH, as enshrined by the Figure 3.2.Legislative and executives bodies of BiH (Source: Toal, O’Loughlin, and Djipa: 2006: 62) 33 CEU eTD Collection Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement (1999). 21 (1999). Year Figure3.3. BiH’s progress toward EUaccession thetable refer below. to process, in accession EU the membershipfollowing the Council European alistFor (Commission). of key dates EU BiHandthe between Relations Bilateral 2007 20 2008 2008 2007 2005 2004 2003 2000 1999 1998 1997 gridlock (McMahon and Western 2009: 73). constituentpeoples present in every institution on every level, inevitably decisions lead toa For further reading on the failures of the Dayton Peace Agreement, refer to the International Crisis Group’s Crisis International the to refer Agreement, Peace Dayton of the failures the on reading further For For further reading on the Dayton Peace Agreement, refer to Chandler’s to refer Agreement, Peace Dayton onthe reading further For In 2003, the EU recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “potential candidate” for EU as “potential In 2003,the EUrecognizeda Bosnia andcandidate” Herzegovina Balkans, confirming EUperspective the for the countries Thessaloniki European Council confirmed the SAP as the EU policy for the Western EU proposedSAP for five Southeastern European countries, including BiH relations bilateral of development EU established the Regional Approach, political and economic conditionality for the SAA and Interim Agreement on Trade Issues signed EU initialed the SAA with ECsignedthe agreements facilitation/readmission Visa SAA negotiations openedin Sarajevo New European New European Partnershipis signed; BiH signed theIPAFramework Agreement EUFOR replaced NATO’s SFOR mission membership Feira European Council stated that all SAP countries are potential candidates for EU established TaskForce Consultative EU/BiH 20 21 Action Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (Source: European Commission 2012) Is 34 CEU eTD Collection to tailor conditionality more specifically to the Western Balkans, “it had limited success and Whilecooperation, aswell (1997). Regional the as of Approach relations” attempted contractual development of bilateral relations in the field of trade, financial assistance and economic the policy andtowards transparent for acoherent basis as“the served Approach Regional Regional Approach to be fulfilled be the target countries. According to the Commission, the In1997, andeconomic to the Europe. attached political Commission the conditions Southeastern (Anastasakisamong states 2008:367). criteria: the fight against corruption, social and cultural rights, and good neighborly relations in scope establishment the of 1993, political has increased toincludefurtherconditionality Since 2008: 367). its coreofitsplace atthe (Anastasakis conditionality political criteria such stability. The Central andEuropean of East enlargements 2004 and 2007 led the EUto The criteria emphasize political and economic stability and the role of democracy in providing intofuture member admittingit European Union.the requires states that: Specifically, 1999Stability the and for Southeastern Europe, Pact Agenda. 2003 Thessaloniki the membership.fulfilling Theyare: 1993Copenhagen the Criteria, 1997Regionalthe Approach, The table above lists a number of significant documents that provide BiH with the criteria for Then,in 1996, the Commission adopted a “Regional Approach” to the countries of Conclusions) economic andmonetary union. (Copenhagen European Council, 1993,Presidency take on obligationsthe ofmembershipincluding adherence to aimsthe of political, forcesand market within candidate's the presupposes Union. ability the Membership to economy market well cope withfunctioning as as thecapacity pressure competitive to rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a candidate countrythe has stability achieved democracy, guaranteeing institutions of the The , setin 1993, aimed toprovide aguidingframework for 35 CEU eTD Collection was the case in Cyprus. In the following section, BiH’s prospective integration progress between progress integration prospective following casein was the BiH’s section, In the Cyprus. the Cyprus model allegedly will only foster an even more permanent divide of the country, as ethnic tension still prevalent within the upper echelons of BiH political leadership, adoption of divides during and following the conflicts allow for a fruitful comparison. With high levels of comparative analysis to be conducted. Although the two cases differ, the ethnic and territorial country for membership. begin implementing the SAA and transition from a potential candidate country to a candidate necessary for EU accession. EU for necessary reforms constitutional rendering Finci, and of Sejdic favor in ruled ECtHR the 2009, December In . BiH's Constitution is discriminatory. As minorities, Sejdic and Finci cannot run for office in BiH’s presidency or 22 in the Sejdic and Finci v. BiH case, conditions to fulfill as a potential candidate country: amend the constitution to reflect the ruling protection of human (Aybetrights and Bieber2011:1920).Currently, only has BiH twomore Yugoslavia, 2)reform of governance, 3)reform publicof administration and thejudiciary, 4) and Council, toinclude 1) cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former BiH,For conditionality was further expanded in following2003, the Thessaloniki European tailoring conditionality to the with the SAP and the SP. According to Anastasakis: 2008:368). financial assistance” (Anastasakis focused more on the suspension of, and/or exclusion from agreements, or the freezing of Jakob Finci and Dervo Sejdic, aJew and Roma respectively, filed suite against the State of BiH, arguing that In sum, the background information to the two cases has allowed for asufficient with peacethe agreements of inDayton Bosnia. (2008:368) Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the crimes committed during the Yugoslav wars, and compliance damaged property, cooperation with Hague-basedthe International Criminal forTribunal explicitly for returnof the refugees totheir properties, pre-war compensation for lost or crimes, reconciliation, anti-, and good neighborly relations. The EU asked Its political conditionality placed the emphasis on the principles of peace, justice for war In 1999, following the end of the war in Kosovo, the EU made another attempt at 22 and adopt the 2012 budget. After fulfilling those, it can 36 CEU eTD Collection only only in 2008was a new partnershipfor reached current and future BiH relations with EU. the 2008 and 2011will be assessed and analyzed. Only years afterthe 2008will be analyzed because 37 CEU eTD Collection access to all of its progress reports. 24 23 institutional (12).structure” According to Commission,the BiHmade “limited in progress” the cumbersome and complex country’s “the by be undermined to continues administration public specifically, More (9). lines” ethnic along voting systemic and climate political public administration made “some But progress.” both are continually with plagued “unstablethe to fightcorruption (15). Theframework. Commission found that“very little progress” was made improving on its tools Commission. The only making “no progress” was the reform of the constitutional policy. Iwill categorizeseek to theareas byhow wasmade much progress as by determined the constitution, government, parliament, publicjudicial administration, system, and anti-corruption between 2008and 2011according Commission’s tothe annual reports. (2008: 4). Thus, this section aims to track BiH’s progress in fulfilling the set political criteria “progress” on the basis of decisions taken,legislation adopted, and measures implemented 1). In total, the Commission set 174 criteria for BiH to fulfill. The Commission measures Copenhagen criteria andonmeeting specific the priorities of European this Partnership” (2008: “assistance to the Western Balkan countries is conditional on progress on satisfying the principles, priorities, and conditions. Regarding conditionality, the Commission states, from2008-2011 BiH’sprogress Assessing Chapter 4: The case of BiH Referto the European Commission’s site, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/progress_reports, for For full the agreement, refer to document “32008D0211” on the EUR-Lexeur-lex.europa.eu. server, Both improvements to the efficiency of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and to the In its 2008progress report, Commissionthe political deconstructed into six criteria areas: In 2008, EUandthe BiH agreedupon a new partnership, 23 which sets out the current 24 38 CEU eTD Collection Both the political ethnicization of BiH and the institutional structure of BiH arecodified within progress. BiH’s obstructing for isblamed setup institutional cumbersome the Moreover, elites. the political sphere, which is most visible in the discourses and actions of the country’s political transformation—the state’s constitution. Frequently, the Commission blames the ethnicization of In my analysis of the reports, I have found that a common hindrance is prohibiting BiH’s has been set for BiH, country the is making not progress significant in reaching its intended goal. As the Commission’s annual reports show, although a thorough list of conditional requirements overall: that found theCommission in its Lastly, most recentreport, in were reported. changed progression subtly improved,from “very little” in 2008 to“little” in 2009 (14).In 2010, no significant changed from “advancing” in 2008 to“limited” in 2009 (12).Anti-corruption policy progress framework, BiH went from “no progress” to “little progress” (9). Progress in the judicial system system has been advancing” (14). judicial efficient and effective “an in which system, judicial the was progress substantial made efficient toaddress their commitments regarding European integration” (11). The only area that governmental sphere, specifically on “making the state-level government more functional and European Union integration. The coordination mechanisms between the State-level and all require authorities matters on EU-related substantial strengthening. (2011) State-level the between mechanisms coordination The integration. Union European structural reforms and reducing to country's the capacity make towardsto progress to delaying process contributed decision-making concern…Theserious complicated of issue an remains ruling ECtHR above the with Constitution the of harmonization (ECtHR) ruling in the Sejdic-Finci case. The lack of a credible process for the working group to harmonize the Constitution with the European Court of Human Rights reforms. The Council of Ministers issued a decision regarding the establishment of a new This long delayhas had a negative impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina's much-needed authorities remains beto completed with the establishment of a State-level Government. legislativeOneyear thegeneral executive and of after process elections…the establishing Bosnia and madeHerzegovina has in limited progress addressing the political criteria. In its 2009report, minor differences werereported. Regarding the constitutional 39 CEU eTD Collection European Commission’s criteria. Thus, a number of reform packages have focused on factors Analyzingdomestic reform: atconstitutional Attempts BiH’s entire accession process, fraught with challenges and inevitable stalemates. servesfor analyzing as microcosm process a Breaking constitutional reform the down process. Cyprus problem,it is a daunting and overarching task. The next section will explore the reform why, then, has the EU failed to enforce it? I argue that, similar to reaching a settlement in the isimperative, so If constitution the gosuch reforming task. about to a considerable measures Such stipulations neither emphasize the imperative nature of the reform nor provide effective the long-term constitutional reform requires BiH to: reportsthe issued by BiH’s supremeinstitutions” audit (European Commission Moreover,2008). and state follow-upthe between to entities;the Ensure due technical legislative,coordination and institutionalized state/entity by coordination functioningestablishing mechanisms for political, with governance, the short-term constitutional reform requires BiH to “ensure structured and years. in in Lumped a requirement for need itsreform recent the theEUhasde-emphasized fact, a standstill, thatbegan one 17years agowith its signing. is that in inBiHkeeps framework BiH at place Dayton is flawed. that Theconstitutional reasons is It these for Peace Agreement. Dayton enshrinedthe within framework constitutional the However, the EU has not made constitutional reform a requirement for membership. In As mentioned above, a weak central government cannotsuccessfully implement the Commission 2008) full national forresponsibility policy formulation and decision-making. (European with integration; Ensurecontinued process supporting the of progress taking European institutional improvingstructures, respectfor human fundamental and andrights sustainable fiscally and functional more creating to contribute will that Herzegovina of and Bosnia changes totheconstitution and on toagree adopt process Continue the 40 CEU eTD Collection 60). provisions of the RS constitution and four articles of the Federation’s Constitution (Belloni 2008: Entities were not providing equal status for all their peoples, and ruled as unconstitutional twelve based on territorial separation” (Belloni 2008: 59).The court’s rulingfurther asserted boththat in anydomination or segregationsgovernmental structures, homogenization through ethnic equality of peoplesconstituent any prohibits special privilege one for or two of people,these any violation of the preamble of the BiH State Constitution, the court noted that the “collective constituentpeoples, discriminating Serbs Federation against of (Danelius Indeed in the 2000: 3). Similarly, Article I of the Federation Constitution only referred to Croats and Bosniaks as its referring to “Serbs” as the people of RS, constituting discrimination against all other “citizens.” conformity with the Bosnian Constitution. One challenged provision finds fault with only articles from both the Serb Republic’s Constitution and the Federation’s Constitution were notin peoples (International2009). Crisis Group In his opinion, JudgeHansDanelius, stated that entities amended their constitutionstoensurefull the equality country'sthe to threeconstituent governing In structure. 2000, following the rulingof ‘Constituentthe Peoples’ case, two the This section reformswill attempted the from track 2006 until 2009. one example portraying EUconditionality as afutile attempt toachieve stability BiH. within constitutional Thus,structure. Iwill thisargue that inability of political tocompromiseiselites amore effective toward toachieve substantial reforms any havefailed of because this, and minimal, been have Federation the and RS the between compromises However, entities. the strengthening powers the of central the government, and,consequently,lessening the power of It is important tonote priorthat to2006, progress had beenmade in reforming theBiH 41 CEU eTD Collection BiH, SBiH, and the Croat HDZ 1990. Haris Silajdzic, head of SBiH, claimed tohave rejected the in AprilRepresentative The only opposed April2006. to the parties Partyfor were the Package domestic reform participation, the package fell votes shorttwo of approval by Houseof the chairedled and first the for time by actors”domestic (Sebastian However,2007: 4). despite the was actors…It and external in shiftdomestic between “marked aclear relations itbecause the reform processes whenstep with other compared asasignificant emerged The April Package included: amendments in March 2006, agreed upon by eight Bosnian party leaders. These amendments backing of the US Department of State, the reform talks culminated in a proposed set of support of several countries,European namelySweden, , andNorway, andthe Package began as a private initiative of former deputy HR, Donald Hays. With the financial Package.” Named after the month in which it failed in the House of Representatives, the April place on the entity and state levels. 2005: 4).The ‘ConstituentPeoples’ casehighlighted the need for Constitutional reforms totake peoples constituentthree wereincludedin ( respectiveConstitutions the within the Federation. Also, rules allocating the most important positions equally among the veto, similar to the provisions at the state level, were introduced in the entities and the cantons of all peoplesconstituent BiH, throughout power-sharing provisions, including avital interest the HR imposed the amendments to the Entity Constitutions. In an attempt to ensure the equality in both parliamentary chambers(Sebastian 2007: 4). technology; the strengthening of the ofCouncil Ministers; and an increase in the number of MPs competencesnew grantedpowers; its of to the state;reduction a the with creation along of two new Presidency ministries, ofthe namely election the for agriculture new format and a However, thereform beganprocess slowing down in 2006 with failurethe “the of April The major political parties reached an agreement, andin April 2002 andOctober 2002 42 CEU eTD Collection as, the as, the organization of a population in census thestatus 2011, andof Brcko, constitutional Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina. and of Bosnia Union Democratic 25 Dragan Covic meetings were the leaders of the SDA, Sulejman Tihic, SSDN, Milorad Dodik, and HDZ BiH, villagein of Prud November 2008and endinginMarch 2009. Inattendance of seriesthe of ensued. (Dzihic andWieser 2011:1816),rendering compromise futile. Thepolitical deadlock thus Dodik and Haris Silajdzic, “continued relying on ethno-nationalist and arguments ethnopolitics” party system, hardly a step toward democratic consolidation” (2011: 1816). The victors, Milorad an andconfrontational based merely ethnically to transition in the they parties, fact confirmed 2006electionsmarkOctober seemed to apolitical shiftnationalistaway dominantfrom the elections. Dzihic and Wieser cite the Bertelsmann Transformation Index for 2008, “While the entirety. its to state functionality, some political leaders from the Federation dismissed the April Package in (2009:electorate” 5).Rather than smalleragreeing tothe reforms, whichwill gradually attribute campaign beganand tryingwin to by points adoptingmaximalist attractive positions tothe is widely believed tohave failed when BiH’s parties mobilized for 2006generalthe election functional According(Sebastian 2007: 5). International tothe “the Crisis Group, April Package package assert it failed to address some of the key issues preventing the state from being fully rejected of the 2007:1).Representatives parties thatthe (Mustajbegovic “cosmetic” solution reforms on the grounds that they did not weaken the entities as he demanded; they were merely a SDA, the Party of Democratic Action; SSDN, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats; HDZ BiH, Croatian HDZ BiH, Democrats; Social ofIndependent Alliance SSDN, Action; Democratic of Party the SDA, The next significant attempt at reform was a locally driven initiative, beginning in the year of general of results the because the alsoemergesasasignificant The year 2006 25 (SE Times 2009).The leaders met addressissues to of State functionality; such 43 CEU eTD Collection of Europe. of 26 membership. The packageincluded: high-level allowingpackage, OHRtoclose the pushing and BiHtoward EU and NATO (2009:3). Office between the RSpremier of and the High the hissupporters” and Representative “minutiae” of what the legislation entailed, but “a struggle over the authority to impose decisions the over not is government of levels two the between conflict the that suggests Group Crisis if Bosnian government toimposemeasures”2).TheInzko tried further (2009: International “publicly Dodik all nine rejected pull and[laws] to threatened all from representatives Serb another law, totalingnine newlaws days. within two Less than later,a week RSPrime Minister Bonn to imposepowers eightnew lawsin BiH. Thefollowing day,his principal imposeddeputy andInzko RSPrime Milorad Minister Dodik On (2009:4). September 18,2009Inzkoused his Crisis Group, Butmir was a reaction to the 2009 events that transpired between HR Valentin results; thus,it “counts for little and should notbe touted as signifiers of progress” (2009: 13). emerged “delivered lessthan of proclamations deals It was advertised.” as without unspecified positionality. in closer parties the bringing on district,amendment status the of Brcko itfailedthe andfailedresults in concrete in producing reform. Although the meetings effectively led to the adoption of the first Constitutional Report from the Committee on the Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by MemberStates of the Council process (Internationalprocess 2009:4). Crisis Group state authority to assume responsibilities and make commitments in the EU accession a larger and more powerful Council of Ministers with a prime minister; and giving the and larger,more unicameral and creatingpowerful a (ECHR); Human Rights Reforming state structures to make them comply with the European Convention of Therefore, in an attempt to alleviate tensions, the and the EU organized a The nextattempt at reforms was with the Butmir Package. According to the International 26 AccordingKurt Bassuener, to the PrudProcess 44 CEU eTD Collection attempts weaken weaken attempts Srpska(International Republika Crisis 2009:6). Group focus on building the central state by increasing institutional functionality,” to them, these “they Therefore, governing powers. autonomous are suspicious initiativesthat ofinternational Crisis 2009:6). Group national interest veto and their ability to elect amember of the state presidency (International 27 in 2000, making constituent of three the peoples, up14.3% of population Herzegovina.the smallest The supervision, RS will try to secede from BiH (International Crisis Group 2009: 6). international without that believe they Second, institutions. and decisions state most block RScan much power, With so processes. decision-making deadlock Entities powerful because astheanswer of power leaders seethe centralization Bosniak First, presence. international entire constitution, which would centralize power at the state level and maintain a significant Instead of smaller constitutional reforms, they would rather see a comprehensive revision of the of parties three interests the involved. to understand why talksthe Butmir at failed,it is important tounderstand the ethno-nationalist an in In attempt interests to engage of any sort compromise. from their ethno-nationalist diverge miserably flawed. Moreover, again, political elites from the three constituent peoples failed to intentions,initiated approachwas with reform right the the the process package’s sponsors international community shoulders themajority blamethe of (Bieber 2010:2).While the Similar to the fates of previous packages, the Butmir Package also failed, and this time, the In 2000,Bosniaks made up 48% of population the andSerbsmade up 37.1% (CIA World Factbook). Lastly, political elites within the Serb Republic seek to maintain its Entity’s broad In simplest terms, Croat political elites want to ensure their equality within Bosnia and Most Bosniak leaders within the Federation believe BiH does not function under Dayton. 27 equality equality concern. Equality vital astheiremerges can the be biggest through preserved 45 CEU eTD Collection Butmir failures into three reasons: intothree failures Butmir community’s international furtherthe summarizes Bieberreforms. package with significant not agree to a full package that does not include overarching reforms and RS will reject a (International 2009: Crisis 6). ThisGroup toan inevitable deadlock because Bosniakswill BiH leaders were to act on a bundle of reform measures without the ability pickto and choose” complicating the process was the international community’s “all or nothing approach, in which nationalist political elites will never be achieved with a maximalist attempt. Even further deal with the Butmir Package. As this research has shown, a compromise among the ethno- 1). The EU, along with the support of the US, proposed the three parties agree on a far-reaching the end, the EU contributed to creating the sense of crisis rather than alleviating it (Bieber 2010: foster democratic stability through the use of conditionality,it did just the opposite at Butmir. In functional”more (Dzihic andWieser 2011:1817). country the make and constitution Bosnian the of parameters the change to initiatives political officials and OHR confused and desperate about the further reform steps and real effects of their ‘unnecessary adventure’ and as a process ‘that does not exist,’ leaving the EU and the US accusations. Milorad Dodik even went astep further by describing the Butmir talks as an package, butalso “continued offormulatingmaximalist the practice and demands mutual making notpeoples’ the only Dodik leaders.Milorad Haris and constituentethnic Silajdzic three rejected Butmirlikethe predecessors,alsoits failed. Muchblame attempted package, canbeputon the parties which would have lost out as a result. Third, by creating a sense of emergency in those to reform, for especially in hadlittle tooffer exchange mediators international The EU and USwereill-prepared,suggesting ‘quickfix’ totheparties. solutions Second, The EU played an interesting role in the Butmir talks. While the union claims to seek to Thus, with three opposing wills along ethno-nationalistlines, it comes as no surprise that 46 CEU eTD Collection difficulty. The April Package, the Prud Process, and the Butmir Package all failed in failed their all Process, and Butmir Package Prud the the April The Package, difficulty. elites difficult. among compromises inter-entity issue, rendering clear that the political elites within Bosnia posit themselves on opposing ends of almost every leaders seek to serve the ethnic interests of their respective constituent group. With this,it is political for themostparties, part, organize andmobilize along ethnic lines. Thus, political issurprise it that no peoples, constituent the three for arrangements power-sharing intricate framework agreed upon at Dayton is the organization of Bosnian politics along ethnic lines. With an future progress. Furthermore, negative incontestable on impact of result constitutional the divisions in BiH, it institutionalized them. That institutionalization has had a significantly with argument.this This paper has shown although that Dayton didcreatenot ethnicthe “the deepdivisions which shape Bosnian society” (Aybetand Bieber 2011:1913). I findfault an overemphasis of the state constitution’s role in Bosnia’s current political gridlock undermines framework for the past, but it is nolonger the framework for the future. Moreover, critics argue state functions”core (2011: 1913).While this may be true, Dayton may have been the decade institutionalthe providedframework for gradual the emergence of a Bosnian withstate Agreement and current political deadlock in BiH. According to Aybet and Bieber, “for the first Peace link Dayton maythe causal the between Ihavedrawn my argument problematize actual problem. conflict between RS and the OHR, so it threw together a list of cosmetic reforms,ignoring the Ultimately, the international community acted out of haste and fear. It feared an impending The inability political of elites toagree constitutionalon demonstrates reforms this Switching perspectives,in analyzing the constitutional reform process in BiH, critics of coercive meansmight be used tochange 1-2). Bosnia’spolitical (2010: structure suggestedthatextra-institutional mediators and quasi- army the Butmir’s barracks, 47 CEU eTD Collection substantial institutional isreform made, beginning with the constitutional framework. As the EU continues pushing for reform through conditionality, no progress will be made until impactcountry.contributes the to negatively of It tothedivide lines. along ethnic political elites the institutional capability to comply with the measures required. A political stalemate continues themselves to such a comparison. This chapter finds, on the domestic level, BiH does not have do not factors domestic lend However, variable inboth. EUis cases becausethe constant the The role of the EU, specifically its use of conditionality, can be comparatively analyzed in both tracking approach through the analysis of the EU’s progress report. The reason for this is simple. set by the EU. Here, I chose not to use a comparative analysis; rather, employed a process reform package. Bosnian state. While, on the other hand, elites within the Federation seek to achieve a maximalist minority it them from for a prevents a within centralized becoming Peace Agreement, Dayton package in its entirety. Elites within the Serb Republic adhere to maintaining the integrity of the interests, reform failedthe thus the packages incapableoffurthering their ethno-nationalist Union. Tosimplify, one or more of the political elites from the three constituent peoples found into the integration facilitate Bosnia’s set byto EUin the order requirement Herzegovina—a and Bosnia of government central the of efficiency the strengthen to goals intended This chapter presented presented This chapter domesticthe prohibiting BiH factors from fulfilling conditions the 48 CEU eTD Collection finds another actor willing to assist, financially or in another aspect, requiring alower adjustment strong enough leverage in BiH. Moreover, assistance can come from other external actors. If BiH with the stipulated requirements. Although assistance can incentivize,it does not give the EU with the EU does not mention “membership” but, instead, offers “assistance” upon compliance divided Turkish andGreek Cypriots. benefitted one of the two communities of Cyprus. Thus,it comes as no surprise that it further objective gainstotheGreekCypriotcommunity (Tocci 2007: 159).However, this incentive only gave the Union higher potential influenceto Cyprus. Cyprus’ accession providedprocess strong from beginning,the maintained Cyprus contractual astrong relationship with EU,andthe this agreementwent to mention on “membership”more eight times throughoutthedocument. Thus, of European the Commission. The agreementsought“prepare to [Cyprus]for membership.” The target state.For Cyprus, membership prospect the of was codified in 2002Council the Decision membership is the most valuable incentive the EU can offer to encourage compliance from the of incentives Credibility credibility of obligations, and monitoring mechanisms. incentives, of credibility in beareas: specific three will compared The EU’suse of conditionality improve relations with BiH by comparatively analyzing its failed use of conditionality in Cyprus. the EU’s use of conditionality in BiH and Cyprus. The aim is to understand how the EU can I process. will apply theoretical the fromframework chapter first the to comparatively analyze Chapter 5: Comparing conditionality in BiH and Cyprus This section will explore the prohibitive potential of international factors in accession the factors ofinternational potential prohibitive the This will explore section On the other hand, membership is not yet on the table for BiH. Its partnership agreement As Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, and Tocci have indicated, the prospect of EU 49 CEU eTD Collection pushes anill-prepared BiHinto official EUwill candidacy, the itslose credibility anenforceras candidate country,it must doso only after complying with the final two conditions. If BiH constitution in line with the ECtHR ruling. Although I argue BiH needs to become an official versus potential country country: a the2012budgetcandidate and adopting amending the be enforced. For instance, as mentioned above, only two requirements stand between BiH as a in its leverage theEUlost Cyprus. accession, membership, without having tofully meet the initial demands set by the Union. Then, upon regarding problem. the In end,the GreekCypriot the community received the reward fullof it longerno credibility Turkishlost to reach Cypriots after asettlement and required Greek fully met(Sedelmeier 2011:12).In casethe of EU didthe Cyprus, uphold not latter. the The EU after meeting the demand, and it must believe that it will only receive the reward if the demand is conditions is two-fold; the target state must be certain that it will receive the promised reward adoption by the potential candidate or candidate country. The process of creating credible ofobligations Credibility only offers party incentive,ita particularone will risk furtherthecountry. dividing careful when offering incentives. Ifit isolates the two communities, as it did in Cyprus, and compelling domestic actors to work toward the common incentive. However, the EU must be country’s political elites. If membership is officially it mayoffered, bridge the ethnic divide, astrongerisfactors, needed incentive tounite domestic the Considering above-discussed the cost from BiH, it will have virtually no reason to comply with the EU’s high-cost requirements. To prevent asimilar outcome from occurring in BiH, strict compliance with criteria must As discussed, the credibility of the conditions being imposed is vital in its successful 50 CEU eTD Collection work/progress_reports. 28 progress. The Commission states BiH has made either “no,” “very limited,” “limited,” or “some” pushingmembership. Cyprustoward In BiH,avague threshold has been set for measuring their reports on Cyprus, the EU takes a similar approach as was taken in the CEECs, superficially countries for similar reasons as outlined above: vague, inconsistent language. For instance, in monitoring mechanisms fail significantly to impact the potential candidate and candidate isyearmore needed” thelastover effort areaswhere and and services monitor in assess each and has what detail candidate potential achieved candidate progress reports. According to the Commission, the progress reports are “where the Commission mechanisms Monitoring fulfillment. of capable more BiH rendering clarity, greater have law of rule the and rights human individual with neither Cyprus nor the EU benefitted from it. For BiH, it seems as those requirements dealing accordingTocci, to at “thisa occurred very late date in accession the (2007:166) process” and more easily fulfill them. For instance,in Cyprus greater clarity came with the Annan Plan, but, and clarify its voice. When clear requirements with clear benchmarks are set, target states can vague language. Perhaps as a result of speaking on the behalf of 27 members, the EU must hone consistency of obligationsthe (Tocci 2007: 166). Unfortunately, EUhas the atendency use to it havenegativeconsequences. could of its own requirements. For this to happen even earlier in the accession process than in Cyprus, For further For reading, referto the Commission’s website: ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it- The EU monitored, andis currently monitoring, CyprusandBiH respectively with annual Another factor determining the credibility of conditionality is the clarity and/or 28 (2012). However, the EU’s 51 CEU eTD Collection may an risk inoutcome BiH similarto of that Cyprus. light on the severe potential for failure in BiH. If the EU continues on its conditional trajectory,it conditions, andmechanisms monitoring in BiH. The between comparison BiH and Cyprus sheds EUhas that finds the conditionality. This providechapter failed incentives, credible credible to can be madein tothe regards EU’s monitoring mechanisms in new memberpotential states. progress. However, the reason behind their selection remains unclear. An overall improvement In sum,international factors also undermine the EU’s successful application of 52 CEU eTD Collection paper has shown,happen. this didnot After divided the country joined, reaching aprospective attempted through the use of conditionality, was to have a unified Cyprus enter the EU. As this Partnership agreement with the Union have been met. notdetermined byuponin or whether the agreed potential the objections candidate/candidate’s stalemate. Moreover, throughout this paper, the effectiveness of conditionality has been transformative power in BiH? For BiH, stability entails progressing out of the current political potential its in culminated not conditionality accession has why Finally, EU? by the Second, has BiH upheld its end of the responsibility, receptively adhering to the conditions set has the EU effectively used its transformative ability to foster stability in post-conflict BiH? several aimingquestions, tocomprehensively analyze the two-fold ofintegration: process first, leadintended like to the in states outcomes BiHand post-conflict posed Cyprus.My research true. Weak institutions prohibit potential candidate and candidate countries from implementing the providedEU’s criteria. by the weak institutions. space the of BiHbecause Conversely, like state thein apost-conflict existing atransformation scholarship infostering leverage more has shownmay EU have the that the opposite, in fact, holds 29 states. of in integration post-conflict the conditionality BiH. This new perspective will contribute to the existing scholarship on the EU’s use of unsuccessful use of conditionality in Cyprus to offer a new perspective on the EU’s efforts in for theisolation of EU’s allowedthe analysis comparative the Methodologically, 2004. primary case study through lensthe provided byCyprus’ own accession path, which ended in candidate country, BiH. An asymmetrical comparative analysis was employed to analyze the Chapter 6: Conclusion However, my findings refute the initial assumption stated introduction.in the In the introduction,I assumed that Before assessing BiH, Ifirst analyzed Cyprus. For Cyprus, the primary objection, This paper explored the EU’s use of conditionality as a tool to influence its potential Overall,my findings mysupport hypotheses. 29 The application of conditionality does not 53 CEU eTD Collection thorough background information. Ichose the latter in an attempt toavoid simplifying and with lengthy and complex histories requiredforgoing more extensive foranalysis providing of thestudy Limitations building. needed, one conducive to a post-conflict state, still in the reform process of its own state- is in moresucceed tailored BiH, approach a in to for conditionality show order paper that BiHfuture relations with EU,the the Cyprus model a is not viable solution. The findings of this isolating from one other,the I have soughttodeconstruct the potentially factors. For prohibitive obstructing the accession process of post-conflict states as mutually exclusive. Rather, by mechanism. monitoring effective an lacked overall, has, and reform), constitutional of incentive (full membership), hasfailed toprovide credible conditions (only a vague requirement emerges as equally as important. Thus far in BiH, the EU has failed to provide a credible However, as Cyprus has shown, the role of the EU in providing an effective accession model because existing integration BiH’s of scholarship problematizes prospective domestic factors. the framework. with state effectconditionality more conflict the incentives, credible incentives, and monitoringmechanisms, the EUdidprovide not the post- legitimized its potential transformative power. In all three categories analyzed: credible accession. It found that the EU’s inconsistent, and at times arbitrary, use of conditionality de- territory, became less feasible. This paper extensively analyzed the EU’s role in Cyprus’ settlement between the RoC, a new EU member-state, and the TRNC, anon-EU recognized Inherently, comparative analyses have limitations. In this study, comparing two countries factors international domestic been to and has the aim treat not paper this However, of The findings from the case of Cyprus shed new light on the case of BiH. Much of the 54 CEU eTD Collection substantial empirical evidence. Moreover, analyzing EUconditionality in more post-conflictwould states provide more Recommendations for further research may be more easily controlled. variables external in which analysis, a quantitative to itself lend may research This variables. process. However, in conducting a qualitative analysis,it is difficult tocontrol for external isolated EU conditionality because it is the most effective tool of the EU in the accession variable that transforms post-conflict states into EU member states may emerge as problematic. I generalizing for the sake of a comparison. 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